WEBVTT - Is your ISP sniffing packets?

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray.

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<v Speaker 1>It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff from how stuff Works dot com. Hello, everybody,

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<v Speaker 1>welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Polette and

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<v Speaker 1>I'm an editor here at how stuff Works dot com

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<v Speaker 1>and today I have with me as usual, senior writer

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. Hello, what are you doing stiffen sniffing? What

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<v Speaker 1>apparently the microphone Josh must have been in here? It

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<v Speaker 1>smells like chips and fresca. Well then, um, I think

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<v Speaker 1>that was because we were going to talk about I

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<v Speaker 1>sp S sniffing packets. Let's say alright then, um, for

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<v Speaker 1>the uninitiated, a packet is a little piece of information,

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<v Speaker 1>a little piece of digital information in specific, and it's um.

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<v Speaker 1>It's essentially how the Internet gets information from one place

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<v Speaker 1>to another, breaks it down into little chunks, sort of

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<v Speaker 1>like you might freeze Charleston chew and whacket on the table. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>These little packets of information are going from server to

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<v Speaker 1>server to get from your computer to somewhere else. Why

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<v Speaker 1>are you looking at because I was thinking of Mike

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<v Speaker 1>TV from Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory that's a

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<v Speaker 1>better analogy. Tiny tiny bits, sends it through the air,

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<v Speaker 1>and then it gets magically put back together on the

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<v Speaker 1>other side. It's not magic. I'm just joking about that obviously. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>And you don't have to stretch it out at the end. No,

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<v Speaker 1>But every packet has essentially three three different sections. You

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<v Speaker 1>have a header, and then the header is sort of

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<v Speaker 1>the information about the packet itself, like where it fits

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<v Speaker 1>within the grand scheme of the information um, the origin

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<v Speaker 1>from the origin computer and the destination computer. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>it's kind of like all the the administrative stuff you

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<v Speaker 1>need in order to send information from one place to another.

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<v Speaker 1>Then you have the payload. The payload is the part

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<v Speaker 1>of the packet that actually holds the information you want

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<v Speaker 1>to send. So let's say an email, that would be

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<v Speaker 1>the part that would hold part of that email. And

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<v Speaker 1>then the footer, which essentially tells the computer, hey, this

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<v Speaker 1>is the end of the packet. Um. So you send

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<v Speaker 1>enough of these packets together, it's like putting a puzzle together.

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<v Speaker 1>You get all these different headers and that tells you

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<v Speaker 1>where everything belongs, and the computer puts it all together

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<v Speaker 1>and then you get the email on the other side. Yep,

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<v Speaker 1>and Uh. The thing is, there have been rumors, some

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<v Speaker 1>of them quite substantial, um, that your internet service provider,

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<v Speaker 1>or at least some Internet service providers, are sniffing packets

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<v Speaker 1>now sniffing in this case, they're not actually you know,

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<v Speaker 1>walking up to the computer and inhaling sharply like like

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<v Speaker 1>Chris and I are. Um. They what they're doing is

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<v Speaker 1>they're they're using special software to look at the information

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<v Speaker 1>that is inside these packets and uh, and it can

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<v Speaker 1>also put this stuff together so I can figure out

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<v Speaker 1>what it is that's going across the networks. Now, if

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<v Speaker 1>you're an Internet service provider, you can essentially see everything

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<v Speaker 1>that's going across your network. I mean you you have

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<v Speaker 1>that capability of see, of of looking in and saying

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<v Speaker 1>at any particular time and saying, okay, what's going across

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<v Speaker 1>right now? And you can see where the traffic is heaviest.

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<v Speaker 1>And you know, there there's some legitimate reasons for doing this.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not all you know, cloak and dagger espionage. Someone's

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<v Speaker 1>spying on my information kind of stuff. But the problem

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<v Speaker 1>is there also is this cloak and dagger element that

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<v Speaker 1>goes along with it. And that's where objections are are

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<v Speaker 1>popping up all over the place. That's true. Um, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>from the I s P S point of view, Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>the I s P ight want to do some uh

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<v Speaker 1>you know, packet sniffing to ensure that they're not their

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<v Speaker 1>network isn't being misused. Um. You know, you might have,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, someone downloading a movie via bit torrent. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>take away the legal aspects of it. If you have

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<v Speaker 1>somebody who's downloading a bunch of movies via bit torrent,

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<v Speaker 1>that person is using a whole lot of bandwidth, and

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<v Speaker 1>if your bandwidth is split up among say we'll make

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<v Speaker 1>it will pretend it's a small I s P thirty

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<v Speaker 1>customers and one person is taking up the majority of

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<v Speaker 1>the band with You might be kind of concerned, especially

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<v Speaker 1>if your other customers start calling in and going, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>I just don't I don't know, I'm not getting any throughput.

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<v Speaker 1>The latency is terrible. What's going on with this? You

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<v Speaker 1>might say, well, you know what, I have an idea

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<v Speaker 1>what might be going on with this? You might say, look,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, Charlie, you're gonna have to stop downloading all

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<v Speaker 1>these movies. UM. Now that's where the legal stuff starts

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<v Speaker 1>getting in, because you know, the r I a A,

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<v Speaker 1>the Recording Industry Association of America, and the Motion Picture

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<v Speaker 1>Association of America. Yes, they have a different interest in

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<v Speaker 1>wanting to know who's downloading what and when. Yeah, chances

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<v Speaker 1>are if you're listening to this podcast, you at least

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<v Speaker 1>have some knowledge about what we're talking about here, because

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<v Speaker 1>it's not like the r I A and the m

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<v Speaker 1>b a A have been particularly secretive about this. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>They might have even sued you. Example, you may very

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<v Speaker 1>well have been one of the people they sued. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>They're they're quite serious about stopping piracy as any way

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<v Speaker 1>they can, including all the wrong ones. Um. And and

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<v Speaker 1>you know, I say that kind of lightly, but it

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<v Speaker 1>really is true. They tend to use a club to

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<v Speaker 1>to attack a nap um. There's even debate among a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of people. I'm sure pirates are among them. Uh

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<v Speaker 1>that you know, the the quote unquote damage being done

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<v Speaker 1>by this piracy issue is so minuscule in comparison to

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<v Speaker 1>the uh the retribution meet it out by these groups

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<v Speaker 1>that it's absolutely ridiculous. I'm not gonna throw my hat

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<v Speaker 1>into that ring because that's just a that's that's too

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<v Speaker 1>thorny even for me. Yeah, I'm stunned. Well, maybe it'll

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<v Speaker 1>be a blog post in the future. But the the

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<v Speaker 1>important thing here is that these organizations have a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of clout. I mean, first of all, they have tons

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<v Speaker 1>and tons of money, and they are representing the recording

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<v Speaker 1>industry and the movie industry, right, and uh, they have

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of Uh. When I say cloud, i'm talking

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<v Speaker 1>political cloud. They can they're very influential. I mean, these

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<v Speaker 1>are huge industries, and uh, there are a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>politicians who listened to them, and they're very highly paid lobbyists.

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<v Speaker 1>So yeah, they're paid to talk to politicians, or they're

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<v Speaker 1>paying people to talk to politicians on their behalf. At

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<v Speaker 1>any rate, what's happening here is that you've got politicians

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<v Speaker 1>who here, hey, we need to stop this. It's it's

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<v Speaker 1>ruining our industry. We can't control it. And uh, and

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<v Speaker 1>so they start looking for ways to stop piracy that

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<v Speaker 1>could affect you, even if you're not, um misbehaving at all. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's funny that you would say that, because I actually

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<v Speaker 1>have an example of something that that was just in

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<v Speaker 1>the news about that UM and it wasn't in in

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<v Speaker 1>the mainstream media, or at least not a lot of it.

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<v Speaker 1>So I actually have an article from the Guardian, um

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<v Speaker 1>in which they were saying that California and Democratic Senator

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<v Speaker 1>Diane Feinstein was having language added to the stimulus package

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<v Speaker 1>that was just passed not too long ago. Um. And

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<v Speaker 1>essentially it was theoretically it was supposed to add uh

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<v Speaker 1>packets sniffing properties to the language. And you might say, well,

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<v Speaker 1>what's going on with that? Well, the idea was, Um,

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<v Speaker 1>it was it was for the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program.

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<v Speaker 1>It's six to nine billion uh dollar part of the

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<v Speaker 1>stimulus package, and it was originally aimed to build out

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<v Speaker 1>broadband networks in less served areas well. She wanted to

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<v Speaker 1>add language that would allow them to sniff packets or

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<v Speaker 1>would force I sp s T sniff packets for child

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<v Speaker 1>pornography and copyright infringement. Um. And uh, you know this,

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<v Speaker 1>this was in the Guardian and apparently, UM, when I

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<v Speaker 1>did a little bit of follow up research on it,

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't appear to have actually made it in. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>They were attempting to add it in, but it didn't

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<v Speaker 1>actually go in pretty sneak way past it. But the thing, well,

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<v Speaker 1>the thing is, you know some people were saying that

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<v Speaker 1>the m P a a had uh. Senator fine Stein's here.

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<v Speaker 1>Of course, I have no way of knowing that for

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<v Speaker 1>certain um, but you know, it does go with what

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<v Speaker 1>you were saying a moment ago about how um you

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<v Speaker 1>know they have so much political cloud. Well, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>she has a California senator, and those industries are very

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<v Speaker 1>very strong in California. So um, and it's conceivable that

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<v Speaker 1>they may have been suggesting to her that that this

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<v Speaker 1>language was added into the bill. However, it didn't seem

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<v Speaker 1>to make it into the law. And Chris mentioned earlier

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<v Speaker 1>the whole thing about Torrance. Torrent is not necessarily illegal

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<v Speaker 1>um to a method of peer to peer sharing, and

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<v Speaker 1>it's there's nothing illegal about sharing files especially. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>if you've got the right to share those, then that's

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<v Speaker 1>perfectly fine. There's nothing stopping you if it's all you know,

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<v Speaker 1>if it's all in public domain or shareware, or if

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<v Speaker 1>it's yours and you don't mind, that's cool. Yeah, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>this is a This is one of those things where

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<v Speaker 1>it's not the technology that's illegal. The technology is perfectly

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<v Speaker 1>fine to to use to break down the information and

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<v Speaker 1>send it. As a matter of fact, it's very much

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<v Speaker 1>like the Internet packet sharing. I mean it breaks a

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<v Speaker 1>file into pieces and distributes them. Um. But yeah, it

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<v Speaker 1>has nothing to do with what people are using technology

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<v Speaker 1>for exactly. Just like people can use the web to do,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, to look at illicit material. That doesn't mean

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<v Speaker 1>that's what the web is for. You know, it's it's possible.

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<v Speaker 1>Just like someone could use a I don't know, a

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<v Speaker 1>highway to make a fast getaway from a bank robbery.

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<v Speaker 1>That doesn't mean that's what the highways for. So of

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<v Speaker 1>course you're getting it getting now we're getting into the

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<v Speaker 1>area where I do throw my hat into the ring.

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<v Speaker 1>But so here's the question. If if I s p

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<v Speaker 1>s are forced or at least highly encouraged to sniff packets,

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<v Speaker 1>how can you tell? Um, Well, there are a couple

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<v Speaker 1>of different ways. There's some software out there that you

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<v Speaker 1>can run that at least lets you see kind of

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<v Speaker 1>what your I SP is up to. Some of it's

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<v Speaker 1>from our good friends over at a Google. Really yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>actually it's sort of a kind of a partnership with Google. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a group called Measurement Lab, and Measurement Lab has

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<v Speaker 1>several different programs you can download for free to kind

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<v Speaker 1>of see what's going on on your Internet service provider.

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<v Speaker 1>One of them is called gloss nost Um, and gloss

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<v Speaker 1>nost is a tool that tells you if bit torrent

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<v Speaker 1>traffic is being blocked by your I s P a

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<v Speaker 1>bit torrent traffic. Yeah, why would why would bit torrent

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<v Speaker 1>traffic be blocked by your I s P? I mean

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<v Speaker 1>if you're using I don't know, Comcast for example. Oh yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>that was a good, good segue there. So Comcast got

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<v Speaker 1>a huge got egg on its face corporate face, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>quite a bit in the corporate egg over the last

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<v Speaker 1>couple of years because they the company argued very strenuously

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<v Speaker 1>that it was not blocking any traffic um or anything

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<v Speaker 1>based upon the kind of traffic it was. So they

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<v Speaker 1>were being accused of throttling, which means they're controlling how

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<v Speaker 1>much information can go through throttling a bit torrent traffic.

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<v Speaker 1>And they said no, no, we're not doing that. And

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<v Speaker 1>then it turned out yes, they were in fact doing

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<v Speaker 1>that and inserting fake packets into streams to disrupt disrupt

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<v Speaker 1>traffic entirely. Right, So um, this was the FCC said

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<v Speaker 1>this was a bad thing and that it violated net

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<v Speaker 1>neutrality and that Comcast was in violation of it and

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<v Speaker 1>needed to be fined. Comcast came back and said, you

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<v Speaker 1>know what, what gives you f c C the right

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<v Speaker 1>to do this? And the FCC said, we'll get back

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<v Speaker 1>to you on that, because, as it turns out, it's

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<v Speaker 1>not against the law. No one really has the authority.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, the Internet is a global thing. It grew

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<v Speaker 1>very organ anically, and we're getting to the point now

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<v Speaker 1>where it's grown faster than our way, our means of

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<v Speaker 1>administering it, and and and you know, being able to

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<v Speaker 1>meet out justice or or detect injustice. I mean, who's

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<v Speaker 1>to say what's right and wrong? There's no ultimate authority.

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<v Speaker 1>You can go to the loan Internet ranger, right, I

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<v Speaker 1>guess we could all go to Tim berners Lee. Of

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<v Speaker 1>course that's the Web, that's not the Internet. M vent surf. Wait,

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<v Speaker 1>he's with Google. I think he would just say it

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<v Speaker 1>all it's all fair. Well, in which case, let's go

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<v Speaker 1>for it. Well, you know that goes back. Comcast is

0:12:37.400 --> 0:12:40.560
<v Speaker 1>basically saying, look, you know, people are using our network,

0:12:41.040 --> 0:12:43.240
<v Speaker 1>and we want to make sure that network resources are

0:12:43.400 --> 0:12:46.240
<v Speaker 1>used fairly and everybody has a chance to you know,

0:12:46.320 --> 0:12:50.840
<v Speaker 1>simpath the well of bandwidth, um you know. So that's

0:12:50.920 --> 0:12:53.960
<v Speaker 1>been their argument, I think is saying, look, you know,

0:12:54.040 --> 0:12:55.760
<v Speaker 1>we're just trying to make sure that our services are

0:12:55.840 --> 0:12:58.679
<v Speaker 1>okay for everybody to use. It's just that, uh, you know,

0:12:58.800 --> 0:13:01.120
<v Speaker 1>some people use a whole lot. And the problem is

0:13:01.160 --> 0:13:02.920
<v Speaker 1>that there there are a lot of people who say,

0:13:02.960 --> 0:13:06.760
<v Speaker 1>you know what, there's no evidence that this BitTorrent use

0:13:07.040 --> 0:13:10.280
<v Speaker 1>is affecting the bandwidth of your network at all. Um,

0:13:10.320 --> 0:13:12.080
<v Speaker 1>as far as we can tell, you're only doing it

0:13:12.120 --> 0:13:13.920
<v Speaker 1>because it happens to be a bit torrent. You're not

0:13:14.000 --> 0:13:17.240
<v Speaker 1>doing it for other kinds of content. So um, and

0:13:17.240 --> 0:13:21.559
<v Speaker 1>the measurement lab tool only works for this this particular one.

0:13:21.600 --> 0:13:23.960
<v Speaker 1>They there are others that are supposed to come out soon.

0:13:24.120 --> 0:13:28.600
<v Speaker 1>They are not out now. Um. But uh yeah, like

0:13:28.800 --> 0:13:32.240
<v Speaker 1>uh def probe is supposed to determine if your I

0:13:32.360 --> 0:13:35.240
<v Speaker 1>s P is shuffling around certain kinds of traffic onto

0:13:35.280 --> 0:13:38.120
<v Speaker 1>a slower pipe, so you would be able to see

0:13:38.160 --> 0:13:39.760
<v Speaker 1>if your I s P says, you know what, this

0:13:39.840 --> 0:13:43.320
<v Speaker 1>is not as important to us as this is. Let's uh,

0:13:43.400 --> 0:13:45.000
<v Speaker 1>you know what, Jimmy's just gonna have to wait an

0:13:45.000 --> 0:13:48.559
<v Speaker 1>extra hour for that movie to download because Billy over

0:13:48.600 --> 0:13:51.439
<v Speaker 1>here he needs to access our content. So let's put

0:13:51.480 --> 0:13:53.240
<v Speaker 1>him on the fast track and let's put Jimmy on

0:13:53.240 --> 0:13:55.400
<v Speaker 1>the slow track. Well, you're not supposed to do that,

0:13:55.480 --> 0:13:58.880
<v Speaker 1>not at least according to the philosophy of net neutrality. UM,

0:13:58.920 --> 0:14:01.480
<v Speaker 1>everyone's supposed to kind of a level playing field. So

0:14:01.640 --> 0:14:03.959
<v Speaker 1>this would let you tell see if your SP was

0:14:03.960 --> 0:14:07.600
<v Speaker 1>actually messing around with you. So for example, and I'm

0:14:07.640 --> 0:14:10.000
<v Speaker 1>not saying that they're doing this, I'm just thinking of

0:14:10.040 --> 0:14:13.240
<v Speaker 1>them again because I happen to know they have this service.

0:14:13.440 --> 0:14:15.880
<v Speaker 1>For example, Comcast has a service that's very much like

0:14:15.960 --> 0:14:20.080
<v Speaker 1>Hulu's where you can download video content, watch shows live

0:14:20.360 --> 0:14:23.560
<v Speaker 1>or not live, but you know, streaming on the internet.

0:14:23.640 --> 0:14:27.680
<v Speaker 1>So for example, you might have you know, Steve trying

0:14:27.720 --> 0:14:30.720
<v Speaker 1>to watch a movie on Comcast service, and you know

0:14:31.120 --> 0:14:35.120
<v Speaker 1>Jenny watching something on Hulu. They could slow down and

0:14:35.440 --> 0:14:39.160
<v Speaker 1>inhibit Jenny's traffic to give Steve's traffic priority because he's

0:14:39.240 --> 0:14:41.560
<v Speaker 1>using their service and they want their service to look

0:14:41.560 --> 0:14:44.120
<v Speaker 1>good or even not that they have been accused of that,

0:14:44.160 --> 0:14:46.960
<v Speaker 1>I'm just saying that's an example of how an I

0:14:47.040 --> 0:14:49.080
<v Speaker 1>SP might do that. They might even do it just

0:14:49.120 --> 0:14:51.200
<v Speaker 1>so that they can convince Jenny that she really needs

0:14:51.200 --> 0:14:54.680
<v Speaker 1>to switch to Comcast instead of using Hulu entirely, again

0:14:54.720 --> 0:14:58.200
<v Speaker 1>goes against the philosophy in that neutrality. UM. So yeah,

0:14:58.400 --> 0:15:02.000
<v Speaker 1>this is a this is a complicated issue. Now our

0:15:02.080 --> 0:15:07.520
<v Speaker 1>I SP sniffing packets probably without running this software, it's

0:15:07.560 --> 0:15:10.240
<v Speaker 1>impossible for me to say that if they're sniffing your

0:15:10.280 --> 0:15:13.760
<v Speaker 1>packets are not. But um, there's a good chance. So

0:15:14.800 --> 0:15:17.680
<v Speaker 1>there's nothing stopping them because I mean the FCC is

0:15:18.080 --> 0:15:21.040
<v Speaker 1>like the FCC complaint was all about throttling, right, not

0:15:21.080 --> 0:15:26.000
<v Speaker 1>about packet sniffing. UM. So you know, uh, for the

0:15:26.040 --> 0:15:28.400
<v Speaker 1>answer of your question, is my I s P sniff

0:15:28.600 --> 0:15:34.880
<v Speaker 1>sniffing my packets? Uh? Probably? Yeah, that said, think about

0:15:34.920 --> 0:15:37.000
<v Speaker 1>all the people on your I s P. If you

0:15:37.080 --> 0:15:42.080
<v Speaker 1>use a um, a very large I s P. Especially, UM,

0:15:42.120 --> 0:15:44.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, they're not gonna sit there and go through

0:15:44.840 --> 0:15:48.440
<v Speaker 1>everybody's traffic because they honestly don't have time to UM

0:15:48.480 --> 0:15:51.360
<v Speaker 1>and you know, especially in this economic climate, they don't

0:15:51.360 --> 0:15:53.320
<v Speaker 1>have enough money to pay all the people it would

0:15:53.320 --> 0:15:55.720
<v Speaker 1>take to read every packet. Yeah, they're they're not. They're

0:15:55.720 --> 0:15:58.920
<v Speaker 1>not looking at your emails necessarily to see what you're

0:15:58.960 --> 0:16:02.360
<v Speaker 1>sending to your high school crush or whatever. Um, they're

0:16:02.400 --> 0:16:06.160
<v Speaker 1>really looking for massive amounts of traffic and then wondering

0:16:06.200 --> 0:16:07.920
<v Speaker 1>what they should do about it without getting caught by

0:16:07.920 --> 0:16:11.800
<v Speaker 1>the FCC. No wait, I mean finding ways of making

0:16:11.840 --> 0:16:16.240
<v Speaker 1>sure they're bannedwidth usage stays nice and end level. You know,

0:16:16.280 --> 0:16:18.880
<v Speaker 1>this isn't the first time people have been talking about

0:16:18.880 --> 0:16:21.720
<v Speaker 1>packet sniffing. This has been available for years and years,

0:16:22.200 --> 0:16:25.040
<v Speaker 1>and even in the early two thousand's, the FBI had

0:16:25.080 --> 0:16:29.440
<v Speaker 1>this UM, this implementation they wanted to run. We even

0:16:29.440 --> 0:16:37.240
<v Speaker 1>have an article about it UM called Carnivore gipes and UM. Yeah. Anyway,

0:16:37.680 --> 0:16:40.400
<v Speaker 1>Carnivore was this thing that was essentially a piece of

0:16:40.440 --> 0:16:42.680
<v Speaker 1>hardware that they wanted to install at I s p

0:16:42.920 --> 0:16:46.880
<v Speaker 1>S and UM. It would it would intercept messages and

0:16:47.000 --> 0:16:49.720
<v Speaker 1>uh you know, split them apart, look at the content

0:16:50.320 --> 0:16:52.560
<v Speaker 1>on one side, to look at general statistics on the other,

0:16:52.640 --> 0:16:55.320
<v Speaker 1>and basically they would be able to get a lot

0:16:55.320 --> 0:16:58.840
<v Speaker 1>of information about you and and about the traffic you

0:16:58.880 --> 0:17:01.720
<v Speaker 1>were sending in. I think it was it was seen

0:17:01.720 --> 0:17:06.000
<v Speaker 1>as a national security initiative. However, Uh, the title of

0:17:06.000 --> 0:17:08.600
<v Speaker 1>our article here at how stuff works is how Carnivore worked.

0:17:09.200 --> 0:17:13.040
<v Speaker 1>So it is not something that is in UM implementation now.

0:17:13.640 --> 0:17:17.480
<v Speaker 1>But the packet sniffing technology has been around for you know,

0:17:17.560 --> 0:17:22.280
<v Speaker 1>many years now, so that's certainly not a new issue. Um. So,

0:17:22.760 --> 0:17:24.600
<v Speaker 1>well that's good. That was a good discussion about packet

0:17:24.600 --> 0:17:26.960
<v Speaker 1>sniff you anything else to add to that. No, well,

0:17:27.000 --> 0:17:31.520
<v Speaker 1>you know what that means. It's time for listener mail.

0:17:33.280 --> 0:17:39.600
<v Speaker 1>Oh my, okay, so today's listening mail. My name is

0:17:39.680 --> 0:17:43.080
<v Speaker 1>John Allen is Sorry, I'm totally mispronounced your last name,

0:17:43.119 --> 0:17:45.600
<v Speaker 1>John from Texas, and I think you should talk about

0:17:45.640 --> 0:17:48.639
<v Speaker 1>the ongoing trial of the Pirate Day. I've been reading

0:17:48.680 --> 0:17:50.280
<v Speaker 1>up on it and find it to be really interesting

0:17:50.400 --> 0:17:54.119
<v Speaker 1>how the movie industry is behaving. So what John's referring

0:17:54.160 --> 0:17:56.960
<v Speaker 1>to kind of segways. You know, it works nicely with

0:17:57.000 --> 0:17:59.080
<v Speaker 1>the packets sniffing, does you think I think it's very

0:17:59.160 --> 0:18:01.840
<v Speaker 1>funny that you have that you choose that particular emails

0:18:01.880 --> 0:18:04.400
<v Speaker 1>to read on this particular podcast. Dolly, let's just say

0:18:04.400 --> 0:18:07.760
<v Speaker 1>that isn't chance Grant. So. Pirate Bay is one of

0:18:07.760 --> 0:18:11.560
<v Speaker 1>those torrent tracking services we were kind of talking about before.

0:18:12.000 --> 0:18:14.719
<v Speaker 1>Now here's the important thing to keep in mind. Pirate

0:18:14.800 --> 0:18:19.040
<v Speaker 1>Bay does not host files, right, It provides a tracking

0:18:19.240 --> 0:18:22.240
<v Speaker 1>service for torrans, So it's kind of like a search engine.

0:18:22.280 --> 0:18:26.240
<v Speaker 1>Specifically for Torrance. So say you want to find a

0:18:26.320 --> 0:18:31.960
<v Speaker 1>copy of a public domain UM program that's out there somewhere,

0:18:32.320 --> 0:18:34.399
<v Speaker 1>and you go on pirate Bay and you search for it,

0:18:34.400 --> 0:18:36.720
<v Speaker 1>and you find that there are copies out there by

0:18:36.760 --> 0:18:39.919
<v Speaker 1>other pirate Bay users. You could download the torrent that way,

0:18:39.920 --> 0:18:41.919
<v Speaker 1>and you would actually download bits and pieces from all

0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:44.600
<v Speaker 1>these different users until you had your own copy, And

0:18:44.680 --> 0:18:47.480
<v Speaker 1>if you chose, you could also participate so that other

0:18:47.600 --> 0:18:49.840
<v Speaker 1>users who would search for this file in the future

0:18:49.960 --> 0:18:54.359
<v Speaker 1>could also get hold of it. Or you could use

0:18:54.400 --> 0:18:57.840
<v Speaker 1>it to download movies and music that are copy under

0:18:57.880 --> 0:19:00.480
<v Speaker 1>copyright and you're violating the law and your a dirty,

0:19:00.520 --> 0:19:04.600
<v Speaker 1>dirty pirate. But except those are the dirty, dirty pirates

0:19:04.600 --> 0:19:07.680
<v Speaker 1>who are not being prosecuted right now. That's exactly right.

0:19:07.840 --> 0:19:10.600
<v Speaker 1>The users aren't the ones being prosecuted. It's the pirate

0:19:10.640 --> 0:19:14.360
<v Speaker 1>bay itself. Now. Pirate Base servers are all in Sweden.

0:19:14.960 --> 0:19:18.159
<v Speaker 1>And it turns out the United States government pressured the

0:19:18.200 --> 0:19:21.560
<v Speaker 1>Swedish government quite a bit to UM to go after

0:19:21.840 --> 0:19:25.359
<v Speaker 1>the pirate Bay and prosecute them, and uh. Eventually the

0:19:25.400 --> 0:19:29.000
<v Speaker 1>Swedish government capitulated and they brought a case against pirate

0:19:29.000 --> 0:19:32.639
<v Speaker 1>bay UM. There were two different major kinds of charges.

0:19:33.280 --> 0:19:38.720
<v Speaker 1>There was the let's see, was it assisting copyright infringement charges?

0:19:39.160 --> 0:19:43.520
<v Speaker 1>And uh, let's see, the other one was assisting making

0:19:43.560 --> 0:19:48.600
<v Speaker 1>available copyrighted material, as seems kind of you know, weird

0:19:48.680 --> 0:19:51.439
<v Speaker 1>and and and vague, but that's the way it's worded.

0:19:52.320 --> 0:19:55.560
<v Speaker 1>So here's the thing. The prosecution did not understand how

0:19:55.600 --> 0:20:00.000
<v Speaker 1>the pirate Bay worked. And the day after the Pirate Bay,

0:20:00.480 --> 0:20:03.479
<v Speaker 1>uh lawyer opened with the opening statement, half the charges

0:20:03.520 --> 0:20:06.959
<v Speaker 1>were dropped. Well, yeah, all the charges that had to

0:20:07.000 --> 0:20:10.600
<v Speaker 1>do specifically with assisting copyright infringement were dropped because it

0:20:10.760 --> 0:20:13.720
<v Speaker 1>just wasn't. They weren't making available any of these files.

0:20:14.240 --> 0:20:17.639
<v Speaker 1>They were just a tracking system. There's a lot of

0:20:17.680 --> 0:20:20.800
<v Speaker 1>attention being put on this right now because people are

0:20:21.080 --> 0:20:22.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, kind of falling into one camp or the other.

0:20:23.040 --> 0:20:25.960
<v Speaker 1>Either come on, they're called the pirate Bay, what do

0:20:26.000 --> 0:20:28.919
<v Speaker 1>you expect? Or they're saying, no, the pirate Bay is

0:20:28.960 --> 0:20:30.960
<v Speaker 1>really just a search engine. If you go after the

0:20:30.960 --> 0:20:34.080
<v Speaker 1>Pirate Bay, you should go after Google because you can

0:20:34.080 --> 0:20:37.439
<v Speaker 1>find torrents on Google. You can use Google to find torrents.

0:20:37.440 --> 0:20:40.360
<v Speaker 1>You can use any search engine really to find these

0:20:40.359 --> 0:20:44.240
<v Speaker 1>sort of torrent files. It's just the pirate base specifically

0:20:44.359 --> 0:20:48.879
<v Speaker 1>tuned to find torrents. Then there's the revenue aspect, you know,

0:20:49.040 --> 0:20:52.720
<v Speaker 1>they're they're claiming that not only did they build the

0:20:52.760 --> 0:20:56.720
<v Speaker 1>site to to show people where you can download files illegally,

0:20:56.840 --> 0:21:01.240
<v Speaker 1>but they sold ads alongside it, and the the prosecution

0:21:01.280 --> 0:21:03.840
<v Speaker 1>is trying to get money back for for the revenue

0:21:04.160 --> 0:21:08.440
<v Speaker 1>that they made on the on the advertising, about a

0:21:08.520 --> 0:21:11.920
<v Speaker 1>hundred and eighty thousand dollars. I'm told, yeah, and again,

0:21:11.960 --> 0:21:14.280
<v Speaker 1>this is like search advertising. You could argue, I mean

0:21:14.280 --> 0:21:18.040
<v Speaker 1>it's not. It's not that they're necessarily advertising these you know,

0:21:18.720 --> 0:21:21.600
<v Speaker 1>various movies and music as much as they're advertising these

0:21:21.640 --> 0:21:26.480
<v Speaker 1>search tool itself. Right, So I mean you're it's tricky,

0:21:26.960 --> 0:21:30.719
<v Speaker 1>and um, it's it's the other interesting thing is that

0:21:30.760 --> 0:21:34.240
<v Speaker 1>the prosecutions finding it very difficult to go after specific

0:21:34.240 --> 0:21:35.840
<v Speaker 1>people in the Pirate Bay because they don't have a

0:21:35.840 --> 0:21:39.280
<v Speaker 1>traditional hierarchy. There's not like one guy in charge. It's

0:21:39.320 --> 0:21:42.560
<v Speaker 1>a group of people who all pitch in and do work,

0:21:42.680 --> 0:21:44.600
<v Speaker 1>and when they say, you know what, we could use

0:21:44.600 --> 0:21:47.480
<v Speaker 1>this feature, someone will go out and build it. It's

0:21:47.480 --> 0:21:51.080
<v Speaker 1>not like, uh, the leader says, hey we need this,

0:21:51.480 --> 0:21:55.240
<v Speaker 1>you go do it. It's it's very much collective, and

0:21:55.280 --> 0:21:58.560
<v Speaker 1>the prosecutions finding it difficult to handle that aspect of

0:21:58.680 --> 0:22:01.080
<v Speaker 1>the Pirate Bay too. It's actually becoming sort of a

0:22:01.960 --> 0:22:05.560
<v Speaker 1>a circus over there in a way. And uh, as

0:22:05.560 --> 0:22:08.600
<v Speaker 1>we're recording this, they trial still ongoing, so we don't

0:22:08.600 --> 0:22:11.159
<v Speaker 1>know how it's going to turn out just yet. And

0:22:11.280 --> 0:22:14.560
<v Speaker 1>would explain why they were all wearing the big floppy shoes.

0:22:15.200 --> 0:22:16.800
<v Speaker 1>I was wondering about that. It's going to ask you.

0:22:17.040 --> 0:22:19.080
<v Speaker 1>I was just wondering why the defense all came in

0:22:19.119 --> 0:22:23.640
<v Speaker 1>one car. That is a good question. So anyway, now

0:22:23.640 --> 0:22:26.360
<v Speaker 1>that we've managed to get completely off track, to get

0:22:26.359 --> 0:22:28.359
<v Speaker 1>back on track, if you would like to learn more

0:22:28.359 --> 0:22:30.960
<v Speaker 1>about packet sniffing and torrents and all of the information

0:22:30.960 --> 0:22:33.600
<v Speaker 1>in between, we have all that at our website, how

0:22:33.680 --> 0:22:35.960
<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. And if you want to get

0:22:35.960 --> 0:22:38.240
<v Speaker 1>in touch with us you have any corrections or do

0:22:38.280 --> 0:22:41.040
<v Speaker 1>you have any comments or suggestions for for episodes, you

0:22:41.040 --> 0:22:43.760
<v Speaker 1>can write to us at tech stuff at how stuff

0:22:43.760 --> 0:22:47.280
<v Speaker 1>works dot com. And don't forget we have blogs now

0:22:48.040 --> 0:22:51.560
<v Speaker 1>blogs ya blogs, so you can read all about Chris's

0:22:51.600 --> 0:22:55.000
<v Speaker 1>take on the tech world and my stupid jokes. Those

0:22:55.119 --> 0:22:57.840
<v Speaker 1>can be found at blogs dot how stuff works dot

0:22:57.840 --> 0:23:01.640
<v Speaker 1>Com slash category, slash text. So I hope you find

0:23:01.680 --> 0:23:04.800
<v Speaker 1>all that interesting. It's fantastic stuff. There's tons of content there,

0:23:04.880 --> 0:23:07.200
<v Speaker 1>and we look forward to talking to you again really

0:23:07.240 --> 0:23:11.000
<v Speaker 1>soon for more on this and thousands of other topics.

0:23:11.240 --> 0:23:17.720
<v Speaker 1>Is it How Stuff Works dot Com brought to you

0:23:17.800 --> 0:23:21.160
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0:23:21.240 --> 0:23:21.400
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