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Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray.

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Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff Works dot com. Hello, everybody,

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Speaker 1: welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Polette and

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Speaker 1: I'm an editor here at how stuff Works dot com

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Speaker 1: and today I have with me as usual, senior writer

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. Hello, what are you doing stiffen sniffing? What

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Speaker 1: apparently the microphone Josh must have been in here? It

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Speaker 1: smells like chips and fresca. Well then, um, I think

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Speaker 1: that was because we were going to talk about I

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Speaker 1: sp S sniffing packets. Let's say alright then, um, for

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Speaker 1: the uninitiated, a packet is a little piece of information,

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Speaker 1: a little piece of digital information in specific, and it's um.

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Speaker 1: It's essentially how the Internet gets information from one place

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Speaker 1: to another, breaks it down into little chunks, sort of

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Speaker 1: like you might freeze Charleston chew and whacket on the table. Um,

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Speaker 1: These little packets of information are going from server to

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Speaker 1: server to get from your computer to somewhere else. Why

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Speaker 1: are you looking at because I was thinking of Mike

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Speaker 1: TV from Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory that's a

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Speaker 1: better analogy. Tiny tiny bits, sends it through the air,

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Speaker 1: and then it gets magically put back together on the

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Speaker 1: other side. It's not magic. I'm just joking about that obviously. Um.

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Speaker 1: And you don't have to stretch it out at the end. No,

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Speaker 1: But every packet has essentially three three different sections. You

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Speaker 1: have a header, and then the header is sort of

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Speaker 1: the information about the packet itself, like where it fits

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Speaker 1: within the grand scheme of the information um, the origin

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Speaker 1: from the origin computer and the destination computer. You know,

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Speaker 1: it's kind of like all the the administrative stuff you

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Speaker 1: need in order to send information from one place to another.

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Speaker 1: Then you have the payload. The payload is the part

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Speaker 1: of the packet that actually holds the information you want

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Speaker 1: to send. So let's say an email, that would be

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Speaker 1: the part that would hold part of that email. And

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Speaker 1: then the footer, which essentially tells the computer, hey, this

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Speaker 1: is the end of the packet. Um. So you send

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Speaker 1: enough of these packets together, it's like putting a puzzle together.

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Speaker 1: You get all these different headers and that tells you

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Speaker 1: where everything belongs, and the computer puts it all together

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Speaker 1: and then you get the email on the other side. Yep,

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Speaker 1: and Uh. The thing is, there have been rumors, some

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Speaker 1: of them quite substantial, um, that your internet service provider,

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Speaker 1: or at least some Internet service providers, are sniffing packets

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Speaker 1: now sniffing in this case, they're not actually you know,

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Speaker 1: walking up to the computer and inhaling sharply like like

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Speaker 1: Chris and I are. Um. They what they're doing is

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Speaker 1: they're they're using special software to look at the information

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Speaker 1: that is inside these packets and uh, and it can

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Speaker 1: also put this stuff together so I can figure out

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Speaker 1: what it is that's going across the networks. Now, if

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Speaker 1: you're an Internet service provider, you can essentially see everything

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Speaker 1: that's going across your network. I mean you you have

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Speaker 1: that capability of see, of of looking in and saying

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Speaker 1: at any particular time and saying, okay, what's going across

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Speaker 1: right now? And you can see where the traffic is heaviest.

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Speaker 1: And you know, there there's some legitimate reasons for doing this.

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Speaker 1: It's not all you know, cloak and dagger espionage. Someone's

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Speaker 1: spying on my information kind of stuff. But the problem

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Speaker 1: is there also is this cloak and dagger element that

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Speaker 1: goes along with it. And that's where objections are are

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Speaker 1: popping up all over the place. That's true. Um, you know,

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Speaker 1: from the I s P S point of view, Uh,

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Speaker 1: the I s P ight want to do some uh

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Speaker 1: you know, packet sniffing to ensure that they're not their

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Speaker 1: network isn't being misused. Um. You know, you might have,

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Speaker 1: for example, someone downloading a movie via bit torrent. Okay,

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Speaker 1: take away the legal aspects of it. If you have

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Speaker 1: somebody who's downloading a bunch of movies via bit torrent,

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Speaker 1: that person is using a whole lot of bandwidth, and

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Speaker 1: if your bandwidth is split up among say we'll make

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Speaker 1: it will pretend it's a small I s P thirty

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Speaker 1: customers and one person is taking up the majority of

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Speaker 1: the band with You might be kind of concerned, especially

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Speaker 1: if your other customers start calling in and going, hey,

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Speaker 1: I just don't I don't know, I'm not getting any throughput.

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Speaker 1: The latency is terrible. What's going on with this? You

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Speaker 1: might say, well, you know what, I have an idea

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Speaker 1: what might be going on with this? You might say, look,

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Speaker 1: you know, Charlie, you're gonna have to stop downloading all

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Speaker 1: these movies. UM. Now that's where the legal stuff starts

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Speaker 1: getting in, because you know, the r I a A,

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Speaker 1: the Recording Industry Association of America, and the Motion Picture

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Speaker 1: Association of America. Yes, they have a different interest in

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Speaker 1: wanting to know who's downloading what and when. Yeah, chances

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Speaker 1: are if you're listening to this podcast, you at least

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Speaker 1: have some knowledge about what we're talking about here, because

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Speaker 1: it's not like the r I A and the m

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Speaker 1: b a A have been particularly secretive about this. Um.

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Speaker 1: They might have even sued you. Example, you may very

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Speaker 1: well have been one of the people they sued. Um.

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Speaker 1: They're they're quite serious about stopping piracy as any way

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Speaker 1: they can, including all the wrong ones. Um. And and

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Speaker 1: you know, I say that kind of lightly, but it

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Speaker 1: really is true. They tend to use a club to

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Speaker 1: to attack a nap um. There's even debate among a

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Speaker 1: lot of people. I'm sure pirates are among them. Uh

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Speaker 1: that you know, the the quote unquote damage being done

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Speaker 1: by this piracy issue is so minuscule in comparison to

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Speaker 1: the uh the retribution meet it out by these groups

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Speaker 1: that it's absolutely ridiculous. I'm not gonna throw my hat

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Speaker 1: into that ring because that's just a that's that's too

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Speaker 1: thorny even for me. Yeah, I'm stunned. Well, maybe it'll

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Speaker 1: be a blog post in the future. But the the

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Speaker 1: important thing here is that these organizations have a lot

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Speaker 1: of clout. I mean, first of all, they have tons

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Speaker 1: and tons of money, and they are representing the recording

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Speaker 1: industry and the movie industry, right, and uh, they have

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Speaker 1: a lot of Uh. When I say cloud, i'm talking

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Speaker 1: political cloud. They can they're very influential. I mean, these

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Speaker 1: are huge industries, and uh, there are a lot of

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Speaker 1: politicians who listened to them, and they're very highly paid lobbyists.

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Speaker 1: So yeah, they're paid to talk to politicians, or they're

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Speaker 1: paying people to talk to politicians on their behalf. At

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Speaker 1: any rate, what's happening here is that you've got politicians

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Speaker 1: who here, hey, we need to stop this. It's it's

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Speaker 1: ruining our industry. We can't control it. And uh, and

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Speaker 1: so they start looking for ways to stop piracy that

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Speaker 1: could affect you, even if you're not, um misbehaving at all. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's funny that you would say that, because I actually

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Speaker 1: have an example of something that that was just in

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Speaker 1: the news about that UM and it wasn't in in

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Speaker 1: the mainstream media, or at least not a lot of it.

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Speaker 1: So I actually have an article from the Guardian, um

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Speaker 1: in which they were saying that California and Democratic Senator

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Speaker 1: Diane Feinstein was having language added to the stimulus package

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Speaker 1: that was just passed not too long ago. Um. And

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Speaker 1: essentially it was theoretically it was supposed to add uh

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Speaker 1: packets sniffing properties to the language. And you might say, well,

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Speaker 1: what's going on with that? Well, the idea was, Um,

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Speaker 1: it was it was for the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program.

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Speaker 1: It's six to nine billion uh dollar part of the

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Speaker 1: stimulus package, and it was originally aimed to build out

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Speaker 1: broadband networks in less served areas well. She wanted to

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Speaker 1: add language that would allow them to sniff packets or

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Speaker 1: would force I sp s T sniff packets for child

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Speaker 1: pornography and copyright infringement. Um. And uh, you know this,

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Speaker 1: this was in the Guardian and apparently, UM, when I

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Speaker 1: did a little bit of follow up research on it,

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Speaker 1: it doesn't appear to have actually made it in. Uh.

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Speaker 1: They were attempting to add it in, but it didn't

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Speaker 1: actually go in pretty sneak way past it. But the thing, well,

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Speaker 1: the thing is, you know some people were saying that

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Speaker 1: the m P a a had uh. Senator fine Stein's here.

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Speaker 1: Of course, I have no way of knowing that for

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Speaker 1: certain um, but you know, it does go with what

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Speaker 1: you were saying a moment ago about how um you

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Speaker 1: know they have so much political cloud. Well, you know,

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Speaker 1: she has a California senator, and those industries are very

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Speaker 1: very strong in California. So um, and it's conceivable that

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Speaker 1: they may have been suggesting to her that that this

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Speaker 1: language was added into the bill. However, it didn't seem

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Speaker 1: to make it into the law. And Chris mentioned earlier

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Speaker 1: the whole thing about Torrance. Torrent is not necessarily illegal

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Speaker 1: um to a method of peer to peer sharing, and

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Speaker 1: it's there's nothing illegal about sharing files especially. I mean,

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Speaker 1: if you've got the right to share those, then that's

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Speaker 1: perfectly fine. There's nothing stopping you if it's all you know,

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Speaker 1: if it's all in public domain or shareware, or if

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Speaker 1: it's yours and you don't mind, that's cool. Yeah, I mean,

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Speaker 1: this is a This is one of those things where

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Speaker 1: it's not the technology that's illegal. The technology is perfectly

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Speaker 1: fine to to use to break down the information and

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Speaker 1: send it. As a matter of fact, it's very much

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Speaker 1: like the Internet packet sharing. I mean it breaks a

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Speaker 1: file into pieces and distributes them. Um. But yeah, it

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Speaker 1: has nothing to do with what people are using technology

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Speaker 1: for exactly. Just like people can use the web to do,

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Speaker 1: you know, to look at illicit material. That doesn't mean

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Speaker 1: that's what the web is for. You know, it's it's possible.

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Speaker 1: Just like someone could use a I don't know, a

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Speaker 1: highway to make a fast getaway from a bank robbery.

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Speaker 1: That doesn't mean that's what the highways for. So of

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Speaker 1: course you're getting it getting now we're getting into the

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Speaker 1: area where I do throw my hat into the ring.

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Speaker 1: But so here's the question. If if I s p

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Speaker 1: s are forced or at least highly encouraged to sniff packets,

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Speaker 1: how can you tell? Um, Well, there are a couple

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Speaker 1: of different ways. There's some software out there that you

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Speaker 1: can run that at least lets you see kind of

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Speaker 1: what your I SP is up to. Some of it's

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Speaker 1: from our good friends over at a Google. Really yeah,

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Speaker 1: actually it's sort of a kind of a partnership with Google. Um.

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Speaker 1: There's a group called Measurement Lab, and Measurement Lab has

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Speaker 1: several different programs you can download for free to kind

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Speaker 1: of see what's going on on your Internet service provider.

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Speaker 1: One of them is called gloss nost Um, and gloss

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Speaker 1: nost is a tool that tells you if bit torrent

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Speaker 1: traffic is being blocked by your I s P a

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Speaker 1: bit torrent traffic. Yeah, why would why would bit torrent

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Speaker 1: traffic be blocked by your I s P? I mean

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Speaker 1: if you're using I don't know, Comcast for example. Oh yeah,

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Speaker 1: that was a good, good segue there. So Comcast got

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Speaker 1: a huge got egg on its face corporate face, uh,

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Speaker 1: quite a bit in the corporate egg over the last

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Speaker 1: couple of years because they the company argued very strenuously

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Speaker 1: that it was not blocking any traffic um or anything

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Speaker 1: based upon the kind of traffic it was. So they

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Speaker 1: were being accused of throttling, which means they're controlling how

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Speaker 1: much information can go through throttling a bit torrent traffic.

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Speaker 1: And they said no, no, we're not doing that. And

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Speaker 1: then it turned out yes, they were in fact doing

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Speaker 1: that and inserting fake packets into streams to disrupt disrupt

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Speaker 1: traffic entirely. Right, So um, this was the FCC said

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Speaker 1: this was a bad thing and that it violated net

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Speaker 1: neutrality and that Comcast was in violation of it and

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Speaker 1: needed to be fined. Comcast came back and said, you

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Speaker 1: know what, what gives you f c C the right

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Speaker 1: to do this? And the FCC said, we'll get back

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Speaker 1: to you on that, because, as it turns out, it's

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Speaker 1: not against the law. No one really has the authority.

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Speaker 1: I mean, the Internet is a global thing. It grew

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Speaker 1: very organ anically, and we're getting to the point now

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Speaker 1: where it's grown faster than our way, our means of

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Speaker 1: administering it, and and and you know, being able to

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Speaker 1: meet out justice or or detect injustice. I mean, who's

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Speaker 1: to say what's right and wrong? There's no ultimate authority.

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Speaker 1: You can go to the loan Internet ranger, right, I

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Speaker 1: guess we could all go to Tim berners Lee. Of

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Speaker 1: course that's the Web, that's not the Internet. M vent surf. Wait,

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Speaker 1: he's with Google. I think he would just say it

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Speaker 1: all it's all fair. Well, in which case, let's go

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Speaker 1: for it. Well, you know that goes back. Comcast is

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Speaker 1: basically saying, look, you know, people are using our network,

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Speaker 1: and we want to make sure that network resources are

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Speaker 1: used fairly and everybody has a chance to you know,

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Speaker 1: simpath the well of bandwidth, um you know. So that's

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Speaker 1: been their argument, I think is saying, look, you know,

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Speaker 1: we're just trying to make sure that our services are

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Speaker 1: okay for everybody to use. It's just that, uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: some people use a whole lot. And the problem is

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Speaker 1: that there there are a lot of people who say,

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Speaker 1: you know what, there's no evidence that this BitTorrent use

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Speaker 1: is affecting the bandwidth of your network at all. Um,

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Speaker 1: as far as we can tell, you're only doing it

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Speaker 1: because it happens to be a bit torrent. You're not

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Speaker 1: doing it for other kinds of content. So um, and

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Speaker 1: the measurement lab tool only works for this this particular one.

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Speaker 1: They there are others that are supposed to come out soon.

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Speaker 1: They are not out now. Um. But uh yeah, like

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Speaker 1: uh def probe is supposed to determine if your I

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Speaker 1: s P is shuffling around certain kinds of traffic onto

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Speaker 1: a slower pipe, so you would be able to see

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Speaker 1: if your I s P says, you know what, this

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Speaker 1: is not as important to us as this is. Let's uh,

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Speaker 1: you know what, Jimmy's just gonna have to wait an

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Speaker 1: extra hour for that movie to download because Billy over

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Speaker 1: here he needs to access our content. So let's put

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Speaker 1: him on the fast track and let's put Jimmy on

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Speaker 1: the slow track. Well, you're not supposed to do that,

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Speaker 1: not at least according to the philosophy of net neutrality. UM,

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Speaker 1: everyone's supposed to kind of a level playing field. So

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Speaker 1: this would let you tell see if your SP was

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Speaker 1: actually messing around with you. So for example, and I'm

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Speaker 1: not saying that they're doing this, I'm just thinking of

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Speaker 1: them again because I happen to know they have this service.

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Speaker 1: For example, Comcast has a service that's very much like

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Speaker 1: Hulu's where you can download video content, watch shows live

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Speaker 1: or not live, but you know, streaming on the internet.

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Speaker 1: So for example, you might have you know, Steve trying

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Speaker 1: to watch a movie on Comcast service, and you know

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Speaker 1: Jenny watching something on Hulu. They could slow down and

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Speaker 1: inhibit Jenny's traffic to give Steve's traffic priority because he's

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Speaker 1: using their service and they want their service to look

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Speaker 1: good or even not that they have been accused of that,

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Speaker 1: I'm just saying that's an example of how an I

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Speaker 1: SP might do that. They might even do it just

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Speaker 1: so that they can convince Jenny that she really needs

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Speaker 1: to switch to Comcast instead of using Hulu entirely, again

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Speaker 1: goes against the philosophy in that neutrality. UM. So yeah,

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Speaker 1: this is a this is a complicated issue. Now our

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Speaker 1: I SP sniffing packets probably without running this software, it's

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Speaker 1: impossible for me to say that if they're sniffing your

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Speaker 1: packets are not. But um, there's a good chance. So

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Speaker 1: there's nothing stopping them because I mean the FCC is

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Speaker 1: like the FCC complaint was all about throttling, right, not

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Speaker 1: about packet sniffing. UM. So you know, uh, for the

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Speaker 1: answer of your question, is my I s P sniff

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Speaker 1: sniffing my packets? Uh? Probably? Yeah, that said, think about

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Speaker 1: all the people on your I s P. If you

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Speaker 1: use a um, a very large I s P. Especially, UM,

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Speaker 1: you know, they're not gonna sit there and go through

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Speaker 1: everybody's traffic because they honestly don't have time to UM

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Speaker 1: and you know, especially in this economic climate, they don't

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Speaker 1: have enough money to pay all the people it would

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Speaker 1: take to read every packet. Yeah, they're they're not. They're

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Speaker 1: not looking at your emails necessarily to see what you're

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Speaker 1: sending to your high school crush or whatever. Um, they're

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Speaker 1: really looking for massive amounts of traffic and then wondering

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Speaker 1: what they should do about it without getting caught by

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Speaker 1: the FCC. No wait, I mean finding ways of making

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Speaker 1: sure they're bannedwidth usage stays nice and end level. You know,

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Speaker 1: this isn't the first time people have been talking about

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Speaker 1: packet sniffing. This has been available for years and years,

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Speaker 1: and even in the early two thousand's, the FBI had

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Speaker 1: this UM, this implementation they wanted to run. We even

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Speaker 1: have an article about it UM called Carnivore gipes and UM. Yeah. Anyway,

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Speaker 1: Carnivore was this thing that was essentially a piece of

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Speaker 1: hardware that they wanted to install at I s p

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Speaker 1: S and UM. It would it would intercept messages and

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Speaker 1: uh you know, split them apart, look at the content

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Speaker 1: on one side, to look at general statistics on the other,

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Speaker 1: and basically they would be able to get a lot

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Speaker 1: of information about you and and about the traffic you

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Speaker 1: were sending in. I think it was it was seen

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Speaker 1: as a national security initiative. However, Uh, the title of

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Speaker 1: our article here at how stuff works is how Carnivore worked.

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Speaker 1: So it is not something that is in UM implementation now.

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Speaker 1: But the packet sniffing technology has been around for you know,

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Speaker 1: many years now, so that's certainly not a new issue. Um. So,

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Speaker 1: well that's good. That was a good discussion about packet

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Speaker 1: sniff you anything else to add to that. No, well,

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Speaker 1: you know what that means. It's time for listener mail.

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Speaker 1: Oh my, okay, so today's listening mail. My name is

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Speaker 1: John Allen is Sorry, I'm totally mispronounced your last name,

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Speaker 1: John from Texas, and I think you should talk about

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Speaker 1: the ongoing trial of the Pirate Day. I've been reading

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Speaker 1: up on it and find it to be really interesting

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Speaker 1: how the movie industry is behaving. So what John's referring

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Speaker 1: to kind of segways. You know, it works nicely with

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Speaker 1: the packets sniffing, does you think I think it's very

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Speaker 1: funny that you have that you choose that particular emails

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Speaker 1: to read on this particular podcast. Dolly, let's just say

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Speaker 1: that isn't chance Grant. So. Pirate Bay is one of

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Speaker 1: those torrent tracking services we were kind of talking about before.

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Speaker 1: Now here's the important thing to keep in mind. Pirate

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Speaker 1: Bay does not host files, right, It provides a tracking

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Speaker 1: service for torrans, So it's kind of like a search engine.

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Speaker 1: Specifically for Torrance. So say you want to find a

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Speaker 1: copy of a public domain UM program that's out there somewhere,

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Speaker 1: and you go on pirate Bay and you search for it,

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Speaker 1: and you find that there are copies out there by

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Speaker 1: other pirate Bay users. You could download the torrent that way,

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Speaker 1: and you would actually download bits and pieces from all

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Speaker 1: these different users until you had your own copy, And

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Speaker 1: if you chose, you could also participate so that other

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Speaker 1: users who would search for this file in the future

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Speaker 1: could also get hold of it. Or you could use

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Speaker 1: it to download movies and music that are copy under

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Speaker 1: copyright and you're violating the law and your a dirty,

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Speaker 1: dirty pirate. But except those are the dirty, dirty pirates

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Speaker 1: who are not being prosecuted right now. That's exactly right.

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Speaker 1: The users aren't the ones being prosecuted. It's the pirate

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Speaker 1: bay itself. Now. Pirate Base servers are all in Sweden.

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Speaker 1: And it turns out the United States government pressured the

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Speaker 1: Swedish government quite a bit to UM to go after

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Speaker 1: the pirate Bay and prosecute them, and uh. Eventually the

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Speaker 1: Swedish government capitulated and they brought a case against pirate

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Speaker 1: bay UM. There were two different major kinds of charges.

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Speaker 1: There was the let's see, was it assisting copyright infringement charges?

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Speaker 1: And uh, let's see, the other one was assisting making

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Speaker 1: available copyrighted material, as seems kind of you know, weird

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Speaker 1: and and and vague, but that's the way it's worded.

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Speaker 1: So here's the thing. The prosecution did not understand how

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Speaker 1: the pirate Bay worked. And the day after the Pirate Bay,

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Speaker 1: uh lawyer opened with the opening statement, half the charges

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Speaker 1: were dropped. Well, yeah, all the charges that had to

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Speaker 1: do specifically with assisting copyright infringement were dropped because it

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Speaker 1: just wasn't. They weren't making available any of these files.

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Speaker 1: They were just a tracking system. There's a lot of

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Speaker 1: attention being put on this right now because people are

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Speaker 1: you know, kind of falling into one camp or the other.

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Speaker 1: Either come on, they're called the pirate Bay, what do

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Speaker 1: you expect? Or they're saying, no, the pirate Bay is

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Speaker 1: really just a search engine. If you go after the

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Speaker 1: Pirate Bay, you should go after Google because you can

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Speaker 1: find torrents on Google. You can use Google to find torrents.

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Speaker 1: You can use any search engine really to find these

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Speaker 1: sort of torrent files. It's just the pirate base specifically

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Speaker 1: tuned to find torrents. Then there's the revenue aspect, you know,

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Speaker 1: they're they're claiming that not only did they build the

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Speaker 1: site to to show people where you can download files illegally,

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Speaker 1: but they sold ads alongside it, and the the prosecution

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Speaker 1: is trying to get money back for for the revenue

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Speaker 1: that they made on the on the advertising, about a

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Speaker 1: hundred and eighty thousand dollars. I'm told, yeah, and again,

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Speaker 1: this is like search advertising. You could argue, I mean

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Speaker 1: it's not. It's not that they're necessarily advertising these you know,

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Speaker 1: various movies and music as much as they're advertising these

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Speaker 1: search tool itself. Right, So I mean you're it's tricky,

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Speaker 1: and um, it's it's the other interesting thing is that

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Speaker 1: the prosecutions finding it very difficult to go after specific

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Speaker 1: people in the Pirate Bay because they don't have a

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Speaker 1: traditional hierarchy. There's not like one guy in charge. It's

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Speaker 1: a group of people who all pitch in and do work,

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Speaker 1: and when they say, you know what, we could use

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Speaker 1: this feature, someone will go out and build it. It's

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Speaker 1: not like, uh, the leader says, hey we need this,

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Speaker 1: you go do it. It's it's very much collective, and

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Speaker 1: the prosecutions finding it difficult to handle that aspect of

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Speaker 1: the Pirate Bay too. It's actually becoming sort of a

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Speaker 1: a circus over there in a way. And uh, as

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Speaker 1: we're recording this, they trial still ongoing, so we don't

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Speaker 1: know how it's going to turn out just yet. And

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Speaker 1: would explain why they were all wearing the big floppy shoes.

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Speaker 1: I was wondering about that. It's going to ask you.

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Speaker 1: I was just wondering why the defense all came in

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Speaker 1: one car. That is a good question. So anyway, now

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Speaker 1: that we've managed to get completely off track, to get

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Speaker 1: back on track, if you would like to learn more

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Speaker 1: about packet sniffing and torrents and all of the information

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Speaker 1: in between, we have all that at our website, how

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Speaker 1: stuff works dot com. And if you want to get

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Speaker 1: in touch with us you have any corrections or do

405
00:22:38,280 --> 00:22:41,040
Speaker 1: you have any comments or suggestions for for episodes, you

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00:22:41,040 --> 00:22:43,760
Speaker 1: can write to us at tech stuff at how stuff

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Speaker 1: works dot com. And don't forget we have blogs now

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Speaker 1: blogs ya blogs, so you can read all about Chris's

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00:22:51,600 --> 00:22:55,000
Speaker 1: take on the tech world and my stupid jokes. Those

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Speaker 1: can be found at blogs dot how stuff works dot

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Speaker 1: Com slash category, slash text. So I hope you find

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Speaker 1: all that interesting. It's fantastic stuff. There's tons of content there,

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Speaker 1: and we look forward to talking to you again really

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Speaker 1: soon for more on this and thousands of other topics.

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Speaker 1: Is it How Stuff Works dot Com brought to you

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Speaker 1: by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. It's ready, are

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Speaker 1: you