Speaker 1: And we continue with our American stories. Up next, the
Speaker 1: story of one of the most controversial, beloved and complex
Speaker 1: generals in American history. Here to tell the true story
Speaker 1: of Robert E. Lee is Alan C. Kelzo, author of
Speaker 1: Robert E. Lee, A Life. We'd like to thank the
Speaker 1: folks at the Bill of Wrights Institute for allowing us
Speaker 1: to use this audio, originally a part of their scholar
Speaker 1: Talk series Take it Away, Alan.
Speaker 2: Robert E. Lee, just to give you the basic skeleton outline,
Speaker 2: was born in eighteen oh seven at Stratford Hall on
Speaker 2: the Northern Neck of Virginia, which had been the ancestral
Speaker 2: home of many of the Lee family, a family which
Speaker 2: had roots in Virginia back into the seventeenth century. He
Speaker 2: attends West Point. He is class of eighteen twenty nine
Speaker 2: graduates second in his class. When I say second, he
Speaker 2: missed graduating first really by a couple of digits. It
Speaker 2: was like one of those batting average contests where you
Speaker 2: have to take it out to the fourth digit to
Speaker 2: determine who the winner is. And is posted to the
Speaker 2: elite Corps of Engineers and spends a good deal of
Speaker 2: the rest of his professional life in the Army's Corps
Speaker 2: of Engineers doing really corp of engineering things. He mainly
Speaker 2: is devoted to fortification construction, and as a specialty within that,
Speaker 2: Coastal fortification is something of a specialty within that kind
Speaker 2: of engineering, which requires a great deal of imagination. And
Speaker 2: it has to be said that Lee was a very
Speaker 2: good engineer and a very dedicated engineer. He also was
Speaker 2: a very frustrated engineer because promotion in the Army as
Speaker 2: a whole and in the corp of Engineers was sclerotic,
Speaker 2: to say the lead. The great advantage of army employment
Speaker 2: was that it was guaranteed and secure. The downside was
Speaker 2: that it was slow. And Lee experiences this and it's
Speaker 2: a source of great frustration. He would like to move up.
Speaker 2: When the Mexican War comes, he sees this as an
Speaker 2: opportunity and he grabs it. He's sent off on one
Speaker 2: engineering assignment, which doesn't look terribly promising, but then he
Speaker 2: is seconded to the staff of Winfield Scott. Winfield Scott
Speaker 2: is about to mount one of the most adventurous, amphibious
Speaker 2: expeditions in American military history, and that is the Joint
Speaker 2: Army Navy landing at Vera, Cruz on the eastern coast
Speaker 2: of Mexico. Lee is immediately ticketed by Scott as an
Speaker 2: up and coming person and becomes a major part of
Speaker 2: Scott's staff as a major assistance to Scott in the
Speaker 2: capture of Vera Cruz accompany, Scott's invasion of Mexico, pass
Speaker 2: the battle at Sara Gordo, up to the battles around
Speaker 2: Mexico City, which eventually end in the surrender of Mexico
Speaker 2: City and the end of the Mexican War with the
Speaker 2: Treaty of Guadalupe Hitdalgo. All through it, Lee is very
Speaker 2: much Winfield Scott's right hand man, and Scott would later
Speaker 2: say years later that all of the plaudits he Scott
Speaker 2: won in the Mexican War were really due to the
Speaker 2: advice that he garnered from Robert E. Lee. But the
Speaker 2: war is over, Lee goes back to doing coastal and
Speaker 2: fortification with corp of Engineers. Is not terribly exciting, and
Speaker 2: in fact it gets off anything. It gets worse because
Speaker 2: in eighteen fifty two he's assigned to become superintendent of
Speaker 2: West Point. Now that I know that it sounds glamorous
Speaker 2: on the surface of it, in eighteen fifty two it wasn't.
Speaker 2: At this point, West Point is still very much a
Speaker 2: corp of Engineering school, which means that even though Lee
Speaker 2: is the superintendent, he has virtually no discretion about what
Speaker 2: to do. He is micromanaged for three years by the
Speaker 2: chief Engineer in Washington, DC, and finally, at the end
Speaker 2: of it, he is only too happy to grab an
Speaker 2: opportunity to transfer out of the Corps of Engineers and
Speaker 2: accept a commission as lieutenant colonel of the second Cavalry
Speaker 2: in Texas. Texas is not what you would call in
Speaker 2: those days an ideal posting. It gives you an idea
Speaker 2: of some degree of his frustration that he's willing to
Speaker 2: accept this. But off to Texas he goes as lieutenant
Speaker 2: colonel of the second Cavalry, and there he really does
Speaker 2: nothing more than chase commanches and various outlaws around the
Speaker 2: countryside to no very particular purpose. He never really fires
Speaker 2: a shot and anger himself. It is not intol eighteen
Speaker 2: sixty one, the things begin to warm up. In eighteen
Speaker 2: sixty one, he's recalled to Washington by Winfield Scott, ostensibly
Speaker 2: to help rewrite the army regular relations, but really Scott
Speaker 2: wants him in Washington, because the country is splitting apart.
Speaker 2: Seven southern states have seceded from the Union. There is
Speaker 2: a possibility of conflict. Scott wants Lee in Washington because
Speaker 2: Scott's feeling is that if anyone should take command of
Speaker 2: federal forces in dealing with secession, it should be Robert E. Lee.
Speaker 2: The firing on Fort Sumter takes place, and indeed Abraham
Speaker 2: Lincoln puts into process an invitation to Lee. It comes
Speaker 2: through Old Francis Preston Blair, one of the great political
Speaker 2: wire pullers of Washington. Blair sits down with Lee and
Speaker 2: it basically says to Lee, President lincol would like you
Speaker 2: to take command of the armies in the field. And
Speaker 2: Lee says no, which is a great surprise. But Lee
Speaker 2: explains it this way, I cannot raise my hand against
Speaker 2: my native state. Now Virginia at that point had not
Speaker 2: yet seceded, but it was hovering on the of doing so.
Speaker 2: And Lee simply says, I can't. I can't do that.
Speaker 2: What Lee does, in fact, is not only refuse that invitation.
Speaker 2: He then goes home and writes out a letter of
Speaker 2: resignation from the army. And he might have stopped right there,
Speaker 2: but at that same moment he receives an invitation from
Speaker 2: the state authorities, the Virginia State authorities in Richmond, to
Speaker 2: come there and help them oversee the organization of state forces,
Speaker 2: and he agrees to do that. So he goes to Richmond.
Speaker 2: He is commissioned as a brigadier general of Virginia Forces.
Speaker 2: When Virginia joins the Confederacy, he's made a general in
Speaker 2: the Confederate Army, and from that point he takes off,
Speaker 2: he becomes General Lee. A lot of interpreters of Lee
Speaker 2: had wanted this to be, as Douglas Southall Freeman once
Speaker 2: put it, the decision he had to make, the decision
Speaker 2: he was made to make. And I don't really think
Speaker 2: that's the case at all. I think that Lee found
Speaker 2: himself staring at not just one decision, but several decisions,
Speaker 2: and each one of them was a swamp. For one thing.
Speaker 2: Robert E. Lee had been serving in the United States
Speaker 2: Army for thirty years when he confronted this crisis, and
Speaker 2: he understood that secession from the Union was a dodge
Speaker 2: the southern slave states, which couldn't abide the election of
Speaker 2: Abraham Lincoln and were determined to break up the Union
Speaker 2: rather than tolerate Lincoln's presidency. Tried to explain what they
Speaker 2: were doing as secession. They argued six ways to Sunday
Speaker 2: that this is somehow constitutional. Nobody but they really believed that,
Speaker 2: And Robert E. Lee didn't believe it. He characterized what
Speaker 2: they were doing pretty frankly as revolution. But characterizing it
Speaker 2: that way was the easy part. The hard part was
Speaker 2: going to come if he was expected to do something
Speaker 2: about it, And of course that's what he was. That's
Speaker 2: what the Francis Preston Blair offer was about, and that
Speaker 2: was where he had to make the first decision because
Speaker 2: Lee balks. At that point, Lee makes it clear to
Speaker 2: Blair he's not refusing this offer out of any interest
Speaker 2: in slavery. He says to Blair, if I could free
Speaker 2: all of the South slaves in order to avert the
Speaker 2: crisis being posed by secession, I'd do it. I would
Speaker 2: do it. Yet he says, I can't draw my sword
Speaker 2: against my native state, against Virginia, which is a little odd.
Speaker 2: And there are odd things about this decision process that
Speaker 2: poke out at every point. He says he couldn't raise
Speaker 2: his sword against Virginia. That's odd. Because actually Virginia had
Speaker 2: not yet seceded when he has this interview with Blair.
Speaker 2: Not only had it not succeeded, but the secession vote
Speaker 2: that the Virginia Secession Convention does take actually has to
Speaker 2: go through a referendum process that will not conclude until
Speaker 2: the twenty fifth of May. So strictly speaking, he is
Speaker 2: not in a position where he necessarily has to draw
Speaker 2: his sword against Virginia because Virginia is not out of
Speaker 2: the Union yet. The odder thing still is Lee talks
Speaker 2: about Virginia as his native state, but the truth is
Speaker 2: he hadn't lived in Virginia for most of his life.
Speaker 2: In fact, if you add up the exact amounts of time,
Speaker 2: I think it's safe to say he probably spent more
Speaker 2: of his life in New York. So that's an odd
Speaker 2: argument as well. How do you untangle these arguments?
Speaker 1: When we come back more of this remarkable story, this
Speaker 1: complicated and rich story of General Robert E. Lee. His
Speaker 1: story continues with Alankelzo here on our American Stories, and
Speaker 1: we returned to our American stories and with Alan Galzo
Speaker 1: telling the story of Robert E. Lee. When we last
Speaker 1: left off, Lee had made a decision that would alter
Speaker 1: the course of his life and history itself. He rejected
Speaker 1: command of the Union Army and resigned from the military.
Speaker 1: His stated reasoning that he could not possibly raise his
Speaker 1: sword against his home state of Virginia. And while that
Speaker 1: may be true, it's not the full story. Here again
Speaker 1: is Alan Gelzo.
Speaker 2: He says he couldn't raise his sword against Virginia. That's
Speaker 2: odd because actually Virginia had not yet seceded, So strictly speaking,
Speaker 2: he is not in a position where he necessarily has
Speaker 2: to draw his sword against Virginia, because Virginia is not
Speaker 2: out of the Union yet. The odd thing still is
Speaker 2: Lee talks by Virginia as his native state. But the
Speaker 2: truth is he hadn't lived in Virginia for most of
Speaker 2: his life. How do you untangle these arguments? I think
Speaker 2: you untangled him this way. First of all, he himself
Speaker 2: may not have lived all that long in Virginia, but
Speaker 2: he did have an enormous sway of relatives in Virginia.
Speaker 2: These were relatives who had come to the rescue of
Speaker 2: his family when it was on hard times in Alexandria.
Speaker 2: These were people he owed big time. When I say relatives,
Speaker 2: I don't mean just someone that he exchanged a Christmas
Speaker 2: card with and there were a lot of them. He
Speaker 2: had eighty first cousins. I think it could be safely
Speaker 2: said that if Robert E. Lee had thrown a brick
Speaker 2: down a street in Alexandria, he would have hit one
Speaker 2: of his relatives. And when he says he can't raise
Speaker 2: his hand against Virginia, I think that's the Virginia he's
Speaker 2: talking about. It's the Virginia of that family. But there's
Speaker 2: another complication that also enters into this, and that's Arlington. Today.
Speaker 2: When we think of Arlington we think of the National Cemetery,
Speaker 2: But before it was National Cemetery, it was Arlington House,
Speaker 2: and he called Arlington home for a lot of his
Speaker 2: adult life, yet it was never actually his property. He
Speaker 2: is there because he married into the family of George
Speaker 2: Washington Park Custos, who did own Arlington. Mary was as
Speaker 2: wedded Arlington her parents' home, as she was to her husband.
Speaker 2: It's a really obsessive relationship. When Lee is put to
Speaker 2: this situation in eighteen sixty one, what he has to
Speaker 2: calculate is what is going to happen to my family?
Speaker 2: What is going to happen to the property If I
Speaker 2: make a decision in a certain way. If I decide
Speaker 2: to accept command of the Union armies, doubtless Virginia will
Speaker 2: confiscate Arlington. Sure it will, because Arlington sits on this
Speaker 2: bluff overlooking the Potomac River. I mean, it's the perfect
Speaker 2: place to put artillery to bombard the national capital. People
Speaker 2: were calling in Richmond for the seizure and fortification of Arlington.
Speaker 2: So if he makes a move like that, kiss goodbye
Speaker 2: to Arlington. On the other hand, if he goes to Richmond,
Speaker 2: or if he declares neutrality, then maybe there won't be
Speaker 2: a war, there won't be a federal occupation of Arlington,
Speaker 2: and he can squeeze through the cracks and preserve the
Speaker 2: property for his family, and in large measure, I think
Speaker 2: that's what he intends to do. A lot of the
Speaker 2: evidence suggests that Lee goes to Richmond with a view
Speaker 2: towards thinking that he's going to act as some kind
Speaker 2: of peace broker. Because all along in this process, in
Speaker 2: the months prior, people had talked incessantly about the Union
Speaker 2: breaking up, about it organizing itself into one, two, three, four,
Speaker 2: five different confederacies. But then after a period of time,
Speaker 2: everyone cooling off and getting together in a constitutional convention
Speaker 2: and reconstructing the union. By the way, that's where the
Speaker 2: term reconstruction first it's used. And there's evidence that Lee
Speaker 2: saw himself as being part of a process like that,
Speaker 2: that he would help to guide the reunification process once
Speaker 2: the secession fervor had worn off, and by May of
Speaker 2: eighteen sixty one, it's clear there isn't going to be
Speaker 2: any reconciliation. It's clear that Virginia is going to unite
Speaker 2: itself to the Confederacy. At that point, he actually writes
Speaker 2: to his wife and says, well, maybe it's maybe I
Speaker 2: should just resign now, maybe I should just retire and
Speaker 2: wash my hands of all this. But by that point
Speaker 2: it's too late. So he finds himself now an advisor
Speaker 2: to Confederate President Jefferson Davis and a Confederate general. But
Speaker 2: it's the kind of process you watch him going through
Speaker 2: and it looks like he's shadow walking, always thinking that
Speaker 2: the result is going to be different, but the result
Speaker 2: never is different. So it's not a one off, one
Speaker 2: time dramatic movie edit decision, and it's certainly not as
Speaker 2: Freeman made it look. The decision he was doomed to
Speaker 2: make from the very beginning in his life. It's an incremental,
Speaker 2: step by step getting sucked further and further in kind
Speaker 2: of decision. When you watch Robert E. Lee in action
Speaker 2: as a general, bear in mind that this man learned
Speaker 2: the practicalities of real war under Winfield Scott in Mexico,
Speaker 2: and the primary lesson he learns from Scott in Mexico
Speaker 2: is the importance of the continuous offensive. Even if the
Speaker 2: numbers are not on your side, keep the initiative in
Speaker 2: your hands, keep moving onwards, because that is what will
Speaker 2: eventually demoralize an enemy and allow you to destroy the
Speaker 2: nime army. That is the rule by which Lee took
Speaker 2: his army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac in eighteen
Speaker 2: sixty two, and probably would have taken it into Pennsylvania
Speaker 2: at that point. There might have been a Battle of
Speaker 2: Gettysburg in September of eighteen sixty two. Instead, there's the
Speaker 2: famous incident of the Lost Orders. The terrible intelligence coup,
Speaker 2: which allows the Federal commander, General McClellan to understand what
Speaker 2: Lee's plans are results in the Battle of Antietam, and
Speaker 2: Lee is forced to retreat into Virginia, but Lee never
Speaker 2: loses sight of the need for taking the war northwards.
Speaker 2: Lee understood, and I think he understood this better almost
Speaker 2: than any other Confederate leader, that the Southern Confederacy's resources
Speaker 2: were too meager to last for a fifteen round heavyweight
Speaker 2: bout with the North. He'd lived in the North quite
Speaker 2: long enough to know what the North's resources were like,
Speaker 2: and he knew that the souths could not compare to those.
Speaker 2: If the South was to win its independence, it would
Speaker 2: need to score an early knockout in the early rounds,
Speaker 2: a surprise knockout, and the only way to do that
Speaker 2: would be get across the Potomac, get up into Pennsylvania
Speaker 2: and either win a battle there, or even if you
Speaker 2: didn't fight a battle at all, just run around the
Speaker 2: countryside showing how the Lincoln administration was incapable of defending
Speaker 2: its own home turf. That would then have a political
Speaker 2: knock on effect. It would convince the Northerners that the
Speaker 2: Lincoln administration was incapable of defending them and that the
Speaker 2: war really ought to be brought to an end, because
Speaker 2: there is really no way to subdue the Confederates in
Speaker 2: the fall elections of eighteen sixty two, Lincoln has just
Speaker 2: issued the Emancipation Proclamation and he is punished for it.
Speaker 2: The Republican Party loses thirty four seats in the House
Speaker 2: of Representatives. It loses two key northern governorships in New
Speaker 2: York and New Jersey. That's eighteen sixty two. In the
Speaker 2: summer of eighteen sixty three, there are two more key
Speaker 2: Northern governorships up for grabs, Pennsylvania and Ohio, and both
Speaker 2: have serious Democratic anti administration contenders, Clement Volandigum in Ohio
Speaker 2: and George Woodworth in Pennsylvania. If Lee is able to
Speaker 2: score a victory in Pennsylvania, or even just use Pennsylvania
Speaker 2: as a base of operations that the Union Army can't
Speaker 2: nudge him from, then when the gubernatorial elections take place
Speaker 2: in Ohio and Pennsylvania, people will turn out and vote
Speaker 2: for Democrats, to vote for the end of the war.
Speaker 2: And if you have a corps of states at the
Speaker 2: center of the North, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania
Speaker 2: with Democratic anti Lincoln governors, they're going to fold their
Speaker 2: arms and say we're not cooperating with this bloodshed anymore.
Speaker 2: This is a useless war which is being foisted on
Speaker 2: us by radical abolitionists. We want an end to this war.
Speaker 2: We're not sending any more troops. We're not permitting any
Speaker 2: more supplies to go to Lincoln's army. You have to
Speaker 2: open negotiation with the Confederates. Well, once you opened negotiations
Speaker 2: with the Confederacy, they weren't going to go back to shooting,
Speaker 2: and the independence of the Confederacy would virtually be conceded.
Speaker 1: When we come back more of Alan Galzo's storytelling on
Speaker 1: Robert E. Lee here on our American stories, and we
Speaker 1: returned to our American stories and the final portion of
Speaker 1: our story on Robert E. Lee telling the story Alan Gelzo,
Speaker 1: author of Robert E. Lee, A Life. When we last
Speaker 1: left off, Lee had determined that what the Confederacy needed
Speaker 1: to win or at least draw even with the Union,
Speaker 1: was to plunge the army of Virginia deep into the
Speaker 1: north to so chaos that perhaps would cause the governors
Speaker 1: in the area Pennsylvania and Ohio, or Lincoln himself to
Speaker 1: be voted out of office. Let's return to the story.
Speaker 2: That was Lee's strategy, and he saw that that making
Speaker 2: war in effect on the political will of the North
Speaker 2: was the way for the South to win the Civil War.
Speaker 2: Lee crosses the Potomac substantially ahead of the Federal Army
Speaker 2: of the Potomac, and his army arcs northwards through the
Speaker 2: Cumberland Valley all the way up to the Susquehanna River,
Speaker 2: just across from the Pennsylvania capital at Harrisburg. But his
Speaker 2: real goal is not Harrisburg. His real goal is to
Speaker 2: make the Army of the Potomac chase him so far
Speaker 2: and so fast that it becomes winded, exhausted, disorganized, and disconnected.
Speaker 2: And when it does, then he can turn and concentrate,
Speaker 2: pick off peace of the Federal army one by one,
Speaker 2: and defeat them in detail. And that is what he
Speaker 2: has in view as a military plan. He puts his
Speaker 2: finger down on Gettysburg on a map and says, this
Speaker 2: is where we will probably meet the Federal army and
Speaker 2: defeat it. Well, he was close. He planned to concentrate
Speaker 2: his army at Gettysburg on the first of July and
Speaker 2: then wait for this straggling Federal army to come up
Speaker 2: and get its nose bloodied piece by piece. What put
Speaker 2: that out of kiltr was that pieces of the Federal
Speaker 2: Army got to Gettysburg first, got there on June thirtieth,
Speaker 2: and were prepared to hold on to Gettysburg as tightly
Speaker 2: as they could until the rest of the Army at
Speaker 2: the Potomac could come up and support them. This surprised
Speaker 2: and discomfidently, but there weren't that many Federals holding Gettysburg,
Speaker 2: so he decides to push ahead with his plan and
Speaker 2: push the Federals out of Gettysburg. He succeeds in doing
Speaker 2: and in the process he basically ruins two of the
Speaker 2: seven army corps of the Federal Army of the Potomac.
Speaker 2: He ruins the first Corps, he ruins the eleventh Corps.
Speaker 2: He probably would have mopped them up completely but for
Speaker 2: the fact that his army had been marching all day,
Speaker 2: fighting all day, dusk was coming on because it was
Speaker 2: an overcast day up, dusk was coming in somewhat early.
Speaker 2: The Federal forces managed to regroup on Cemetery Hill south
Speaker 2: of the town, and Lee's feeling is, all right, well,
Speaker 2: we're not going to try and push head now. Let's
Speaker 2: regroup and tomorrow morning we'll finish them off and be
Speaker 2: in a position to deal with the next parts of
Speaker 2: the Federal Army as it comes up the road. Well,
Speaker 2: that was a mistake, because by the next day the
Speaker 2: other parts of the Federal Army had in fact gotten
Speaker 2: to Gettysburg, and when he launches an attack on July second,
Speaker 2: to his surprise, he finds out that there are three
Speaker 2: more pieces of the Army of the Potomac in place
Speaker 2: in his path. Even so, his attack almost succeeds on
Speaker 2: July second, it really comes within inches of a complete
Speaker 2: destruction of the Army of the Potomac. So his solution
Speaker 2: is that, all right, tomorrow, we will finish them off
Speaker 2: tomorrow July third. He wasn't entirely wrong either, because by
Speaker 2: the morning of July third, of those seven infantry corps
Speaker 2: in the Federal Army of the Potomac, basically five of
Speaker 2: them were out of action, one of them was being
Speaker 2: held in reserve, and the other one only had about
Speaker 2: parts of two divisions prepared to defend the rear of
Speaker 2: Cemetery Hill, whereas Lee had an entirely fresh, untested division
Speaker 2: that belonging to George Pickett. So on July third, he
Speaker 2: launches George Pickett's division, along with some supporting troops at
Speaker 2: these remnants, holding onto Cemetery Hill, and it fails. It
Speaker 2: fails against every expectation, and at that point Lee realizes
Speaker 2: he has no more wherewithal to continue this fight and
Speaker 2: begins a withdrawal back across the Potomac into Virginia and Gettysburg,
Speaker 2: very much to many people's surprised, turns out to be
Speaker 2: a Union victory. People often asked after the battle, and
Speaker 2: continue to ask to this day, what caused the Confederacy?
Speaker 2: What caused Robert E. Lee to lose the Battle of
Speaker 2: Gettysburg when it seemed like he had everything going for him.
Speaker 2: George Pickett answered that question, and I think he gave
Speaker 2: probably the best answer that could be given. I think
Speaker 2: the Yankees had something to do with it. It was
Speaker 2: a tenacious fight on the part of the Army of
Speaker 2: the Potomac, and that is really the best explanation I
Speaker 2: think that people can come up with. It was pivotal,
Speaker 2: but it was also not pivotal. Let me at least
Speaker 2: do the pivotal part first, What if, in fact Lee
Speaker 2: had been victorious at Gettysburg. If he had, I think
Speaker 2: there's a of strong possibility that the Army of the Potomac,
Speaker 2: which had met with so many defeats Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg. I
Speaker 2: think the Army of the Potomac might very easily have
Speaker 2: gone to pieces like Napoleon's army after Waterlow. It had
Speaker 2: just been defeated so many times under so many generals.
Speaker 2: It had just seemed like it was no longer worth it.
Speaker 2: Some parts of it would have cohered, but other parts
Speaker 2: of it would simply have walked away as from a
Speaker 2: lost game. At that point, Lee would have been able
Speaker 2: to threaten Baltimore, Washington, Philadelphia. There would probably have been
Speaker 2: political uprisings in the North demanding an end of the war.
Speaker 2: I mean, as it was only two weeks after the
Speaker 2: Battle of Gettysburg. There's a major draft riot in New
Speaker 2: York City that turns New York City upside down. New
Speaker 2: York City is not the only place where riots like
Speaker 2: that take place. We call them riots. Well, yeah, they
Speaker 2: were draft riots. They were also racial pegrums. But the
Speaker 2: fundamental message was we're not going to be We don't
Speaker 2: want to fight this war anymore. This war is hopeless,
Speaker 2: it's lost. We might as well admit it. And if
Speaker 2: Lee had been victorious at Gettysburg, Lincoln might well have
Speaker 2: had no choice politically speaking, either to resign or to
Speaker 2: have opened those negotiations with the Confederacy. As it was,
Speaker 2: Jefferson Davis had sent his vice president Alexander Stevens in
Speaker 2: a messenger boat into the Chesapeake with a request to
Speaker 2: come up to Washington. Now, the ostensible request was to
Speaker 2: discuss prisoner exchanges, but a lot of people suspected that
Speaker 2: what Alexander Stevens had up his sleeve was some kind
Speaker 2: of document from Davis for Lincoln saying all right, let's
Speaker 2: open negotiations. That might well have happened. So that is
Speaker 2: a pivotal battle, and in fact, the military fortunes of
Speaker 2: the Confederacy go nowhere but into a slow slide down
Speaker 2: hill after that. But here's the other side of the coin.
Speaker 2: In some senses, it wasn't pivotal, because the Civil War
Speaker 2: is going to go on for another twenty two months.
Speaker 2: And Gettysburg turns out not to be pivotal, basically for
Speaker 2: two reasons. One is Lee does escape. George Gordon Meade,
Speaker 2: the commander of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg,
Speaker 2: was a cautious soul. He was a Democrat politically who
Speaker 2: was convinced that the Lincoln aministration was interested in nothing
Speaker 2: but embarrassing him and taking credit for itself. So he
Speaker 2: was not going to shinny out on any strategic limbs.
Speaker 2: He does not pursue Lee in the way that let's say,
Speaker 2: the Duke of Wellington pursues Napoleon after Waterloop. There's none
Speaker 2: of this up Guards and Adam in George Mead. Mead
Speaker 2: is content to let Lee get across the Potomac and
Speaker 2: that's the end of the campaign. This infuriates Lincoln, but
Speaker 2: there's not too much Lincoln could do about it, because look,
Speaker 2: here's a general who won a battle. Here's a federal
Speaker 2: general finally won a battle. What is he going to
Speaker 2: do pun assume. Eh So there's not too much there's
Speaker 2: not too much wiggle room politically speaking for for President
Speaker 2: Lincoln at that point. But it does mean the war
Speaker 2: is going to go on. It's going to drag on
Speaker 2: through eighteen sixty four. It's going to drag on through
Speaker 2: the Overlain campaign. It's going to drag on really right
Speaker 2: up until Lincoln is re elected in November of eighteen
Speaker 2: sixty four. And it's when Lincoln is re elected that finally,
Speaker 2: the handwriting is on the wall for the Confederacy. People
Speaker 2: often ask me what I think the turning point of
Speaker 2: the Civil War was, and they expect me to say Gettysburg,
Speaker 2: and I don't. I tell them turning point of the
Speaker 2: Civil War Appomatic Courthouse. And I say this partly to
Speaker 2: be snarky, but also partly in a serious frame, because
Speaker 2: in the summer of eighteen sixty four, the campaigns that
Speaker 2: Lincoln was responsible for were going so poorly that Lincoln
Speaker 2: himself did not expect to be re elected. If he
Speaker 2: was dumped by the voters in November of eighteen sixty four,
Speaker 2: the new president would be George mclach and McClellan would
Speaker 2: from a variety of forces operative on him from the
Speaker 2: Democratic Party. I have been forced to come to some
Speaker 2: kind of negotiations with the Confederacy. And as soon as
Speaker 2: you started those negotiations, that was the end. That would
Speaker 2: mean the independence of the Confederacy. So even though Gettysburg
Speaker 2: is a pivotal battle in preventing something like that from
Speaker 2: happening in eighteen sixty three, it's not quite pivotal enough
Speaker 2: to have prevented something like that from happening in eighteen
Speaker 2: sixty four, and we really don't get the handwriting on
Speaker 2: the wall until after the election of Lincoln, and then
Speaker 2: it becomes clear that the Confederacy is really on the ropes.
Speaker 1: And a terrific job on the production and editing by
Speaker 1: our own Monty Montgomery. And a special thanks to the
Speaker 1: Bill of Rights Institute for allowing us to use this
Speaker 1: audio originally a part of their Scalar Talk series, which
Speaker 1: can be found on YouTube. Simply look up Bill of
Speaker 1: Rights Institute Scalar Talks to take a listen. Story of
Speaker 1: Robert E. Lee is told by Alan Gelzo here on
Speaker 1: our American Stories