1 00:00:01,760 --> 00:00:04,920 Speaker 1: Cool Zone Media. 2 00:00:05,120 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 2: Welcome to take it out here, a podcast about things 3 00:00:07,840 --> 00:00:11,920 Speaker 2: happening to Boeing. I'm your host, Mio Long. When we 4 00:00:12,000 --> 00:00:16,080 Speaker 2: last left our intrepid aerospace company, Boeing had gotten caught 5 00:00:16,120 --> 00:00:18,680 Speaker 2: up in the mergers and acquisitions frenzy of the nineteen 6 00:00:18,720 --> 00:00:22,439 Speaker 2: nineties and bought out its rival McDonald douglas, after which 7 00:00:22,520 --> 00:00:26,720 Speaker 2: McDonald douglas CEO and Jack Welsh disciple Harry Stonezeipher effectively 8 00:00:26,800 --> 00:00:29,800 Speaker 2: launched an administrative coup and sees control of the company. 9 00:00:30,320 --> 00:00:33,879 Speaker 2: Now stone Ceipher wasn't able to hold onto power for 10 00:00:33,960 --> 00:00:37,240 Speaker 2: long because he was very quickly forced to resign after 11 00:00:37,280 --> 00:00:42,080 Speaker 2: he had what CNN describes as a quote improper relationship 12 00:00:42,120 --> 00:00:46,000 Speaker 2: with a female executive. So things are going great for everyone. 13 00:00:46,200 --> 00:00:49,159 Speaker 2: I'm realizing reading the script that I should mention it 14 00:00:49,200 --> 00:00:51,599 Speaker 2: wasn't like an abuse thing. It's just that he was 15 00:00:51,800 --> 00:00:54,000 Speaker 2: having a relationship with one of his subordinates, which is 16 00:00:54,000 --> 00:00:57,480 Speaker 2: also not great. But it yeah, it wasn't good, and 17 00:00:57,520 --> 00:01:00,400 Speaker 2: he gets kicked out of media almost immediately. But by 18 00:01:00,440 --> 00:01:03,800 Speaker 2: the time he was forced out, his model for how 19 00:01:03,840 --> 00:01:08,520 Speaker 2: Boeing should work going forwards, you know, the layoffs, the outsourcing, slashing, 20 00:01:08,560 --> 00:01:12,520 Speaker 2: the research and development budget, and above all, taking power 21 00:01:12,560 --> 00:01:15,400 Speaker 2: from engineers and giving it to the shareholder value fanatics 22 00:01:15,800 --> 00:01:19,480 Speaker 2: had already been embedded at the core of Boeing's management structure. 23 00:01:20,240 --> 00:01:25,240 Speaker 2: Here's journalist Natasha Frost writing in Courts two decades on. 24 00:01:25,600 --> 00:01:28,760 Speaker 2: Perhaps the most lasting consequence of the change in culture 25 00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:32,839 Speaker 2: has been in Boeing's approach to building aircraft. Cutting costs 26 00:01:32,840 --> 00:01:35,720 Speaker 2: and diversifying revenue ought to have served as an ideal 27 00:01:35,760 --> 00:01:40,440 Speaker 2: way to subsidize the expensive process of plane development. Oh 28 00:01:40,480 --> 00:01:45,319 Speaker 2: boy did it not. Instead, with engineers now disempowered and 29 00:01:45,360 --> 00:01:48,600 Speaker 2: management far away in Chicago, the actual building of new 30 00:01:48,600 --> 00:01:52,080 Speaker 2: planes in Seattle all but stalled. Boeing would not actually 31 00:01:52,120 --> 00:01:55,240 Speaker 2: announce even the plans for a new plan until two 32 00:01:55,240 --> 00:01:58,600 Speaker 2: thousand and three with the seven to eighty seven Dreamliner. 33 00:01:59,080 --> 00:02:02,160 Speaker 2: Throughout this time, Boeing was led by its first chairman 34 00:02:02,240 --> 00:02:07,000 Speaker 2: without a traditional aviation background, James McNerney. James McNee had 35 00:02:07,040 --> 00:02:10,200 Speaker 2: instead spent almost two decades in management at General Electric. 36 00:02:10,760 --> 00:02:15,200 Speaker 2: Now he was following a tried and tested route of cutting, downsizing, 37 00:02:15,240 --> 00:02:18,399 Speaker 2: and shifting. That approach was applied to upgrading the seven 38 00:02:18,560 --> 00:02:21,200 Speaker 2: thirty seven, which had become the victim of its own success. 39 00:02:21,919 --> 00:02:25,440 Speaker 2: In its five decade history, airlines have cumulatively ordered more 40 00:02:25,480 --> 00:02:28,520 Speaker 2: than ten thousand of the plane, an aviation rock star. 41 00:02:28,880 --> 00:02:31,359 Speaker 2: But rather than retiring the plane replacing it with the 42 00:02:31,400 --> 00:02:34,400 Speaker 2: next big thing, Boeing often to keep costs down by 43 00:02:34,400 --> 00:02:38,040 Speaker 2: tinkering and adjusting the model to fit still more passengers. 44 00:02:38,760 --> 00:02:41,200 Speaker 2: And this is how you get planes falling out of 45 00:02:41,200 --> 00:02:45,960 Speaker 2: the sky instead of you doing the normal thing, which 46 00:02:46,000 --> 00:02:49,200 Speaker 2: is putting money into building a new airplane, which is 47 00:02:49,440 --> 00:02:52,840 Speaker 2: you know, expensive in the short run. And again remember 48 00:02:52,840 --> 00:02:55,359 Speaker 2: that the finance goals are now in charge for these people. 49 00:02:55,400 --> 00:02:57,239 Speaker 2: The only thing that exists is the short run in 50 00:02:57,320 --> 00:03:01,520 Speaker 2: immediate stock price. So instead of doing that management, when eh, 51 00:03:01,600 --> 00:03:04,040 Speaker 2: we already have this plane were first designed in the 52 00:03:04,040 --> 00:03:08,560 Speaker 2: fucking sixties, let's keep modifying that. And this, this is 53 00:03:08,600 --> 00:03:11,680 Speaker 2: going to kill an extremely large number of people. Now. 54 00:03:12,360 --> 00:03:17,079 Speaker 2: The seven thirty seven again came out originally in nineteen 55 00:03:17,480 --> 00:03:23,960 Speaker 2: sixty seven. In the two thousands, in the century the millennia, 56 00:03:24,320 --> 00:03:28,120 Speaker 2: the two thousands, Boeing begins to design a new version 57 00:03:28,160 --> 00:03:32,040 Speaker 2: of this plane from the last millennium called the seven 58 00:03:32,120 --> 00:03:35,960 Speaker 2: thirty seven Max. For shareholders. Again, this is this is 59 00:03:35,960 --> 00:03:39,880 Speaker 2: a great idea. It's not just that, you know, building 60 00:03:39,920 --> 00:03:42,720 Speaker 2: new planes is expensive, and this is cheaper because you're 61 00:03:42,720 --> 00:03:45,520 Speaker 2: not spending the money on building a new plane. There's 62 00:03:45,760 --> 00:03:49,640 Speaker 2: a bunch of other advantages for Boeing for this, and 63 00:03:49,720 --> 00:03:51,920 Speaker 2: one of the biggest is that you can tell everyone, 64 00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:54,320 Speaker 2: from you know, the FAA to the airlines of the 65 00:03:54,320 --> 00:03:57,240 Speaker 2: pilots that hey, this is just a regular seven thirty seven. 66 00:03:57,360 --> 00:03:59,360 Speaker 2: It's it's just the same plane. You don't need to 67 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:02,280 Speaker 2: like reach train your pilots to learn how our new 68 00:04:02,280 --> 00:04:05,720 Speaker 2: systems work, because there's really like no new systems and 69 00:04:05,760 --> 00:04:07,520 Speaker 2: that you know that costs money, so they don't want 70 00:04:07,560 --> 00:04:09,520 Speaker 2: to do it. You don't need to have the FAA 71 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:11,720 Speaker 2: do the regulatory shit they would do for a new plane, 72 00:04:11,800 --> 00:04:15,400 Speaker 2: or even like a substantial change to like the original plane, 73 00:04:15,440 --> 00:04:18,920 Speaker 2: which you know, again costs money and time that Boeing 74 00:04:18,960 --> 00:04:22,640 Speaker 2: does not want to, you know, do The problem is that, 75 00:04:23,080 --> 00:04:26,000 Speaker 2: you know, I tried to find a sort of delicate 76 00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:27,720 Speaker 2: way to say this, and then I realized you simply 77 00:04:27,760 --> 00:04:30,080 Speaker 2: should not do it like that. The problem is that 78 00:04:30,120 --> 00:04:32,159 Speaker 2: the seven thirty seven Max is a plane that is 79 00:04:32,160 --> 00:04:35,680 Speaker 2: trying to kill you. If you know anything about the story, 80 00:04:35,960 --> 00:04:38,240 Speaker 2: you're probably assuming that when I say this plane is 81 00:04:38,279 --> 00:04:41,920 Speaker 2: trying to kill you. I'm talking about the Maneuvering Characteristics 82 00:04:41,960 --> 00:04:45,359 Speaker 2: Augmentation System or m CASTS, the piece of software that 83 00:04:45,400 --> 00:04:48,040 Speaker 2: directly caused the crashes, and to some extents, like I 84 00:04:48,080 --> 00:04:51,760 Speaker 2: am talking about MCASTS, we'll we'll get into it in 85 00:04:51,760 --> 00:04:54,599 Speaker 2: a second. It absolutely did kill all those people. But 86 00:04:55,040 --> 00:04:57,360 Speaker 2: I think there's a problem with a lot of the 87 00:04:57,400 --> 00:05:00,040 Speaker 2: way the story has been covered, which is that but 88 00:05:00,600 --> 00:05:02,680 Speaker 2: a lot of the coverage of this has been obsessively 89 00:05:02,720 --> 00:05:06,960 Speaker 2: focused on the software problem, specifically on MCAST, And I 90 00:05:07,080 --> 00:05:09,640 Speaker 2: understand why people focus on the software. It is the 91 00:05:09,680 --> 00:05:13,320 Speaker 2: immediate cause of the crash, But the real problem with 92 00:05:13,400 --> 00:05:16,560 Speaker 2: the seven thirty seven Max is that the actual physical 93 00:05:16,600 --> 00:05:20,839 Speaker 2: plane is also trying to kill you. And the software 94 00:05:20,960 --> 00:05:24,000 Speaker 2: MCAST was developed to again stop the plane from trying 95 00:05:24,000 --> 00:05:27,200 Speaker 2: to kill you. Now that software is also trying to 96 00:05:27,279 --> 00:05:30,680 Speaker 2: kill you. But both the software and the physical plane 97 00:05:31,000 --> 00:05:34,200 Speaker 2: are trying to burdy you. So you know what do 98 00:05:34,279 --> 00:05:36,640 Speaker 2: I mean when I say the physical plane is trying 99 00:05:36,680 --> 00:05:38,599 Speaker 2: to kill you. For this, I'm going to turn to 100 00:05:38,720 --> 00:05:42,160 Speaker 2: an actual engineer and pilot, Gregory Travis, who wrote probably 101 00:05:42,160 --> 00:05:44,800 Speaker 2: the best piece in the technical details of this whole 102 00:05:44,800 --> 00:05:48,000 Speaker 2: problem that I've seen for I triple ET spectrum. I 103 00:05:48,120 --> 00:05:51,320 Speaker 2: Triple E is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 104 00:05:52,080 --> 00:05:55,640 Speaker 2: They know who they're talking about spectrums their magazine. So 105 00:05:56,320 --> 00:06:00,479 Speaker 2: the initial problem, as Travis explains, was this, the original 106 00:06:00,480 --> 00:06:04,000 Speaker 2: seven thirty seven was designed for nineteen sixties engines. Modern 107 00:06:04,040 --> 00:06:07,320 Speaker 2: airplanes have way bigger engines because, due to a bunch 108 00:06:07,320 --> 00:06:09,720 Speaker 2: of engineering stuff that we're not going to get into here, 109 00:06:10,160 --> 00:06:14,000 Speaker 2: large engines are more efficient than small engines, and this 110 00:06:14,080 --> 00:06:18,440 Speaker 2: is a huge deal for aircraft which consume unbelievably large 111 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:23,200 Speaker 2: quantities of extremely expensive fuel. The safe and sensible, but 112 00:06:23,240 --> 00:06:26,040 Speaker 2: again expensive option would have been to design a new 113 00:06:26,080 --> 00:06:29,040 Speaker 2: aircraft to replace the seven thirty seven that is actually 114 00:06:29,080 --> 00:06:33,320 Speaker 2: designed to accommodate the new giant engines. The chief skate 115 00:06:33,360 --> 00:06:37,000 Speaker 2: option would be just bolt the new giant engines onto 116 00:06:37,000 --> 00:06:40,200 Speaker 2: the old plane design. Now, the problem is that the 117 00:06:40,240 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 2: only way to do this is to move the engines forward. 118 00:06:44,240 --> 00:06:46,799 Speaker 2: The engines on the seven thirty seven are you under 119 00:06:46,800 --> 00:06:50,560 Speaker 2: the wing, which is like the normal thing, but the 120 00:06:50,560 --> 00:06:53,040 Speaker 2: engines would no longer fit under the way because they 121 00:06:53,040 --> 00:06:57,080 Speaker 2: were too large, and moving the engines forward changes where 122 00:06:57,120 --> 00:07:01,880 Speaker 2: the thrust is coming from here's Travis quote. Now, when 123 00:07:01,920 --> 00:07:05,200 Speaker 2: pilots supplied power to the engine, the aircraft would have 124 00:07:05,240 --> 00:07:09,640 Speaker 2: a significant propensity to pitch up or raise its nose. Now, this, 125 00:07:09,800 --> 00:07:13,840 Speaker 2: as you might expect, is not good. It is quite bad. 126 00:07:13,880 --> 00:07:16,440 Speaker 2: I mean airplanes and Trumps talks about this. Airplanes do 127 00:07:16,640 --> 00:07:19,040 Speaker 2: kind of naturally do this a little bit. This plane 128 00:07:19,160 --> 00:07:22,280 Speaker 2: does it way, way more than it's supposed to. So 129 00:07:22,480 --> 00:07:26,200 Speaker 2: here's where things, unfortunately get a bit technical. So the 130 00:07:26,240 --> 00:07:29,480 Speaker 2: nose going up increases something called the angle of attack. 131 00:07:30,040 --> 00:07:33,320 Speaker 2: I'm going to read a description of this. Fully. Understanding 132 00:07:33,360 --> 00:07:36,560 Speaker 2: exactly how the angle of attack works is not enormously 133 00:07:36,560 --> 00:07:39,920 Speaker 2: important to understanding the story. But you know, the crux 134 00:07:39,960 --> 00:07:42,280 Speaker 2: of this story is angle of attack. Center is not working, 135 00:07:42,640 --> 00:07:45,320 Speaker 2: so we have to explain it a little bit. Quote. 136 00:07:45,720 --> 00:07:48,400 Speaker 2: The angle of attack is the angle between the wings 137 00:07:48,440 --> 00:07:51,960 Speaker 2: and the airflow over the wings. So if you want 138 00:07:52,000 --> 00:07:54,720 Speaker 2: to understand exactly what this is, go read the piece. 139 00:07:55,000 --> 00:07:58,000 Speaker 2: The important thing for our purposes is that if the 140 00:07:58,000 --> 00:08:01,560 Speaker 2: angle of attack gets too high, Right, if the planes 141 00:08:01,600 --> 00:08:03,400 Speaker 2: are a level and it is flying normally, the angle 142 00:08:03,400 --> 00:08:06,200 Speaker 2: of attack is like zero, but the angle attack can 143 00:08:06,200 --> 00:08:08,720 Speaker 2: get higher as like you know, if you're not flying 144 00:08:08,760 --> 00:08:11,840 Speaker 2: like level, and if the angle attack gets too high, 145 00:08:12,000 --> 00:08:13,920 Speaker 2: the plane's stalls, and this is one of the ways 146 00:08:13,920 --> 00:08:17,480 Speaker 2: that you crash a plane. Worse still, in the seven 147 00:08:17,560 --> 00:08:22,240 Speaker 2: thirty seven Max, basically, the engine casings themselves can at 148 00:08:22,280 --> 00:08:25,840 Speaker 2: high angles of attack, work as a wing and produced lift, 149 00:08:26,440 --> 00:08:28,920 Speaker 2: and the lift they produce is well ahead of the 150 00:08:28,960 --> 00:08:33,200 Speaker 2: wings center of lift meeting the engine casings will cause 151 00:08:33,240 --> 00:08:36,000 Speaker 2: the seven thirty seven at a high angle of attack 152 00:08:36,280 --> 00:08:38,720 Speaker 2: to go to a higher angle of attack. This is 153 00:08:38,760 --> 00:08:43,440 Speaker 2: aerodynamic mispractice of the worst kind. An airplane approaching an 154 00:08:43,480 --> 00:08:48,839 Speaker 2: aerodynamic stall cannot, under any circumstances, have the tendency to 155 00:08:48,880 --> 00:08:52,960 Speaker 2: go further into the stall. This is called quote dynamic instability, 156 00:08:53,280 --> 00:08:56,600 Speaker 2: and the only airplanes that exhibit that characteristic fighter jets 157 00:08:56,880 --> 00:08:59,840 Speaker 2: are also fitted with ejector seats. So let me let 158 00:08:59,840 --> 00:09:02,280 Speaker 2: me try to kind of like explain the sort of 159 00:09:02,320 --> 00:09:05,760 Speaker 2: frux of this. Well, A, they've they've managed to position 160 00:09:05,800 --> 00:09:07,480 Speaker 2: the engines in such a way the engines can act 161 00:09:07,480 --> 00:09:11,560 Speaker 2: as a wing, which is insane. And b once you 162 00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:13,760 Speaker 2: get to a high enough angle of attack, which again, 163 00:09:13,800 --> 00:09:15,360 Speaker 2: the higher the angle of attack you're at, the more 164 00:09:15,440 --> 00:09:18,080 Speaker 2: risk you're out installing the plane starts trying to kill 165 00:09:18,120 --> 00:09:21,480 Speaker 2: you by making the angle of attack increase. It is 166 00:09:21,520 --> 00:09:23,920 Speaker 2: a feedback loop that means when you start to stall, 167 00:09:24,080 --> 00:09:27,480 Speaker 2: the airplane makes you stall more. Planes are not supposed 168 00:09:27,480 --> 00:09:30,880 Speaker 2: to do this. Again, and I cannot epicize this enough quote. 169 00:09:31,080 --> 00:09:34,640 Speaker 2: This is called dynamic instability. And the only airplanes which 170 00:09:34,679 --> 00:09:38,920 Speaker 2: exhibit this characteristic fighter jets, are also fitted with ejector seats. 171 00:09:39,520 --> 00:09:42,240 Speaker 2: So again, this is the thing that is dangerous enough 172 00:09:42,440 --> 00:09:45,000 Speaker 2: that you get like regular, regular civilian airplanes are not 173 00:09:45,040 --> 00:09:47,120 Speaker 2: supposed to do this, they do it on fighter jets 174 00:09:47,160 --> 00:09:49,440 Speaker 2: because fighter jets are doing things that planes aren't supposed 175 00:09:49,440 --> 00:09:52,320 Speaker 2: to do. And you can leave the plane if it 176 00:09:52,320 --> 00:09:54,920 Speaker 2: fucks up and does something like this. And the worst 177 00:09:55,000 --> 00:09:58,400 Speaker 2: part about this is that you can kick off this 178 00:09:58,559 --> 00:10:02,760 Speaker 2: problem by trying to get the plane going faster, like 179 00:10:02,840 --> 00:10:05,960 Speaker 2: while it's going slow. What part of flying a plane 180 00:10:06,480 --> 00:10:08,640 Speaker 2: does it start slow is kind of at a high 181 00:10:08,679 --> 00:10:10,480 Speaker 2: angle of attack and then has to go faster. Oh wait, 182 00:10:10,559 --> 00:10:12,200 Speaker 2: take off the thing you have to do every single 183 00:10:12,240 --> 00:10:16,679 Speaker 2: time we fly. This is fucking batshit. No one would 184 00:10:16,720 --> 00:10:20,600 Speaker 2: intentionally design a new airliner like this, right, No one, 185 00:10:20,880 --> 00:10:24,520 Speaker 2: not even modern I mean like Boeings, like other airplanes 186 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:27,040 Speaker 2: like even the modern ones, even the Dreamliner doesn't fucking 187 00:10:27,080 --> 00:10:31,600 Speaker 2: do this right. It's completely nuts. The only way that 188 00:10:31,640 --> 00:10:34,280 Speaker 2: you could get something like this is as a pure 189 00:10:34,320 --> 00:10:37,480 Speaker 2: product of trying to bolt increasingly large engines onto a 190 00:10:37,520 --> 00:10:40,520 Speaker 2: plane from the sixties, because you are too cheap to 191 00:10:40,559 --> 00:10:43,400 Speaker 2: try to do anything new. But you know who isn't 192 00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:45,960 Speaker 2: afraid of doing new things. It's the products and services 193 00:10:45,960 --> 00:10:48,839 Speaker 2: that support this podcast. We've never gotten a Boeing ad, 194 00:10:48,880 --> 00:10:51,040 Speaker 2: but if it was gonna happen, I guess it'd probably 195 00:10:51,080 --> 00:11:04,040 Speaker 2: happen now, dear God. But instead of you know, dealing 196 00:11:04,080 --> 00:11:07,240 Speaker 2: with this problem by either making a new fucking plane 197 00:11:07,559 --> 00:11:10,120 Speaker 2: or figuring out some way to not have the engines 198 00:11:10,200 --> 00:11:13,840 Speaker 2: literally become wings, Boeing was like, ah, fuck it, We'll 199 00:11:13,920 --> 00:11:17,520 Speaker 2: just build some software that pushes the plane's nose down 200 00:11:17,679 --> 00:11:21,400 Speaker 2: if it starts doing this. Now, if your reaction to 201 00:11:21,520 --> 00:11:24,920 Speaker 2: hearing let's put software on the plane that makes it 202 00:11:24,960 --> 00:11:28,080 Speaker 2: fly towards the ground is Wait, that's a terrible idea. 203 00:11:28,600 --> 00:11:31,480 Speaker 2: You have the right idea. These people did not have 204 00:11:31,520 --> 00:11:34,920 Speaker 2: the right idea. But stunningly, there's like a version of 205 00:11:34,920 --> 00:11:41,160 Speaker 2: this system that isn't like lethally unsafe, but com Combing 206 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:44,080 Speaker 2: did not design a version of this that is even 207 00:11:44,160 --> 00:11:46,880 Speaker 2: remotely safe. I don't know if that's more egregious than 208 00:11:46,880 --> 00:11:50,120 Speaker 2: designing an aircraft that has that Amaic instability, but uh, 209 00:11:50,559 --> 00:11:54,160 Speaker 2: the way they implement this is egregious. They decided in 210 00:11:54,200 --> 00:11:57,840 Speaker 2: their infinite wisdom that the entire system would work on 211 00:11:57,920 --> 00:12:00,599 Speaker 2: a single sensor, and I we need to know it 212 00:12:00,640 --> 00:12:02,520 Speaker 2: before we start this. So this is we're gonna be 213 00:12:02,520 --> 00:12:05,040 Speaker 2: talking about angle attack sensors. They're kind of just like 214 00:12:06,080 --> 00:12:08,160 Speaker 2: pieces of metal that stick out the side of the 215 00:12:08,200 --> 00:12:11,680 Speaker 2: plane and they break a lot, and they break a 216 00:12:11,679 --> 00:12:14,640 Speaker 2: lot because flying a plane is like the worst thing 217 00:12:14,640 --> 00:12:16,679 Speaker 2: you can possibly do to a piece of equipment doesn't 218 00:12:16,679 --> 00:12:20,040 Speaker 2: involve leaving the atmosphere or putting it under the ocean. Yeah. 219 00:12:20,080 --> 00:12:22,840 Speaker 2: So here's from the Seattle Times, which the Scale Times actually, 220 00:12:22,920 --> 00:12:26,120 Speaker 2: because you know, Boeing has traditionally been in Seattle, like, 221 00:12:26,200 --> 00:12:27,840 Speaker 2: does a lot of very very good coverage on this. 222 00:12:27,880 --> 00:12:30,920 Speaker 2: They have good sources. Yeah, from the Seattle Times quote. 223 00:12:30,960 --> 00:12:35,160 Speaker 2: The most controversial deal of the mcast design has been 224 00:12:35,200 --> 00:12:38,320 Speaker 2: the reliance on a single angle of attack sensor. Of 225 00:12:38,400 --> 00:12:41,160 Speaker 2: both of the deadly flights, Everything started with a faulty 226 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:44,720 Speaker 2: sensor in the second crash in Ethiopia. The data trace 227 00:12:44,800 --> 00:12:47,680 Speaker 2: strongly suggests that the sensor was destorted an instant, likely 228 00:12:47,720 --> 00:12:50,719 Speaker 2: by a bird strike. There are two such sensors, one 229 00:12:50,760 --> 00:12:53,920 Speaker 2: on either side of the fuselage. Why didn't Boeing, especially 230 00:12:53,920 --> 00:12:56,760 Speaker 2: after discarding the g forces a trigger, use both angle 231 00:12:56,840 --> 00:13:00,600 Speaker 2: of attack sensors. The thinking was that requiring input from 232 00:13:00,600 --> 00:13:04,040 Speaker 2: two angle of attack sensors would mean that if one failed, 233 00:13:04,080 --> 00:13:08,080 Speaker 2: the system would not function. Now, the article goes on 234 00:13:08,120 --> 00:13:12,079 Speaker 2: to talk about how their justification for for why they 235 00:13:12,120 --> 00:13:14,240 Speaker 2: only use one sensor, and you know, they talked about 236 00:13:14,280 --> 00:13:16,880 Speaker 2: the safety and simplicity if not wanting to add complexity 237 00:13:16,920 --> 00:13:18,840 Speaker 2: to a system. You know, because if you have two 238 00:13:18,880 --> 00:13:21,079 Speaker 2: things that you're running for, it's slightly more complex than 239 00:13:21,080 --> 00:13:24,559 Speaker 2: having one thing that you're running from. Now, this kind 240 00:13:24,600 --> 00:13:28,040 Speaker 2: of sounds reasonable at first glance, But first off, if 241 00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:31,080 Speaker 2: your plane has dynamic instability that causes it to snowball 242 00:13:31,240 --> 00:13:34,559 Speaker 2: to stalling, and this software system to make it not 243 00:13:34,640 --> 00:13:37,080 Speaker 2: do that is so important you can't risk it not 244 00:13:37,280 --> 00:13:39,560 Speaker 2: being on. If one of the two sensors breaks, then 245 00:13:39,559 --> 00:13:41,560 Speaker 2: maybe you shouldn't have you designed your plane like this. 246 00:13:42,800 --> 00:13:47,920 Speaker 2: And second, this entire system violates every design principle that 247 00:13:48,000 --> 00:13:50,560 Speaker 2: you see in sort of like Boeing's Good Aircraft Design 248 00:13:50,920 --> 00:13:53,600 Speaker 2: for simplicity and safety risk. And I want to go 249 00:13:53,679 --> 00:13:55,840 Speaker 2: back to that Spectrum article because it lays out how 250 00:13:55,880 --> 00:13:59,280 Speaker 2: this kind of thing is supposed to work. Quote, there 251 00:13:59,320 --> 00:14:01,760 Speaker 2: were two sets angle of attack censors and two sets 252 00:14:01,760 --> 00:14:05,360 Speaker 2: of p hot tubes, one on either side of the fuselage. 253 00:14:06,000 --> 00:14:09,120 Speaker 2: Normal usage is to have the set on the pilot 254 00:14:09,240 --> 00:14:12,120 Speaker 2: side feed the instruments to the pilot side, and the 255 00:14:12,160 --> 00:14:14,440 Speaker 2: set on the copilot side feed the instrument to the 256 00:14:14,440 --> 00:14:17,840 Speaker 2: copilot side. That gives a state of natural redundancy and 257 00:14:17,920 --> 00:14:21,360 Speaker 2: instrumentation that can be easily cross checked by either pilot. 258 00:14:22,040 --> 00:14:25,280 Speaker 2: If the copilot thinks his airspeed indicator is acting up, 259 00:14:25,640 --> 00:14:28,200 Speaker 2: he can look over at the pilot's airspeed indicator and 260 00:14:28,200 --> 00:14:31,840 Speaker 2: see if it agrees. If not, both pilot and copilot 261 00:14:31,840 --> 00:14:34,800 Speaker 2: can engage in a bit of triage determine which instrument 262 00:14:34,880 --> 00:14:38,520 Speaker 2: is profane and which is sacred. Now, this is great engineering, right, 263 00:14:38,680 --> 00:14:41,320 Speaker 2: It is simple, It is redundant, and it allows humans 264 00:14:41,320 --> 00:14:43,680 Speaker 2: and sort out issues, you know, and like this is 265 00:14:43,680 --> 00:14:47,680 Speaker 2: a product of what aerospace engineering used to be, you know, 266 00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:50,480 Speaker 2: and we still have this in the world, but the 267 00:14:50,520 --> 00:14:53,240 Speaker 2: fact that there are a bunch of very very good 268 00:14:53,240 --> 00:14:56,560 Speaker 2: engineers who have spent an enormously long time trying to 269 00:14:56,640 --> 00:15:00,520 Speaker 2: work out how this kind of stuff should work. Boeing 270 00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:03,720 Speaker 2: was like, well, you know, instead of of our system 271 00:15:03,760 --> 00:15:06,200 Speaker 2: where multiple centers can be cross referenced by pilots, you know, 272 00:15:06,200 --> 00:15:08,960 Speaker 2: and the pilots can then disable the system. Fuck that, 273 00:15:09,240 --> 00:15:11,480 Speaker 2: what if we insaid, use a single sensor that can't 274 00:15:11,480 --> 00:15:15,680 Speaker 2: be overridden. This is a complete violation of Boeing design principle. 275 00:15:15,800 --> 00:15:18,360 Speaker 2: The thing about Boeing planes is that there isn't supposed 276 00:15:18,360 --> 00:15:20,720 Speaker 2: to be like automated shit running in the background that 277 00:15:20,760 --> 00:15:23,440 Speaker 2: pilots don't know about or don't know how to turn off. 278 00:15:23,640 --> 00:15:26,040 Speaker 2: The pilot is supposed to be in complete control of 279 00:15:26,080 --> 00:15:28,400 Speaker 2: the plane. You know the old joke, and I mean 280 00:15:28,440 --> 00:15:30,760 Speaker 2: I remember hearing this like every once in a while, 281 00:15:30,800 --> 00:15:32,800 Speaker 2: like when I was a kid. Was that Airbus planes, 282 00:15:32,840 --> 00:15:34,960 Speaker 2: which you know, Airbus obviously is a rival to Boeing. 283 00:15:35,400 --> 00:15:38,200 Speaker 2: Airbus planes were quote die by wire because you know, 284 00:15:38,240 --> 00:15:41,320 Speaker 2: they didn't give you control. The documentary that Frontline did 285 00:15:41,600 --> 00:15:44,280 Speaker 2: called Boeing's Fatal Flaw, which I didn't really use. The 286 00:15:44,320 --> 00:15:46,760 Speaker 2: source for this, but I just this is this is 287 00:15:46,800 --> 00:15:48,680 Speaker 2: the one part that I remember from when I watched 288 00:15:48,720 --> 00:15:51,880 Speaker 2: this in twenty nineteen about the crash, described how like 289 00:15:52,000 --> 00:15:55,160 Speaker 2: pilots trusted that they were flying an aircraft designed by Boeing, 290 00:15:55,160 --> 00:15:56,480 Speaker 2: so there would be a way to kill the system. 291 00:15:56,480 --> 00:15:58,240 Speaker 2: And again there's something I remember, like from talking to 292 00:15:58,240 --> 00:16:00,480 Speaker 2: people growing up, you know, so these pilots figure that 293 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:03,120 Speaker 2: there'd be a way to kill the system, those voices 294 00:16:03,160 --> 00:16:06,920 Speaker 2: a plane down, and they were trying to find it, 295 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:08,200 Speaker 2: like they're trying to figure out how to turn the 296 00:16:08,200 --> 00:16:10,840 Speaker 2: system off in the manual when they died, because they 297 00:16:10,880 --> 00:16:14,080 Speaker 2: didn't realize the plane wasn't designed by Boeing engineers, was 298 00:16:14,080 --> 00:16:18,000 Speaker 2: designed by Boeing shareholders. Going back to the process on 299 00:16:18,080 --> 00:16:22,400 Speaker 2: how this was added, the stated reason for again why 300 00:16:22,440 --> 00:16:24,720 Speaker 2: you don't want a second sensor is that it in 301 00:16:24,800 --> 00:16:28,840 Speaker 2: theory like adds complexity by adding a second sensor. But 302 00:16:29,080 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 2: you know, that's actually terrible reasoning from the perspective of engineering, 303 00:16:33,720 --> 00:16:36,440 Speaker 2: like of engineering in general, but also like from the 304 00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:39,520 Speaker 2: perspective of the engineering that the rest of the plane 305 00:16:39,600 --> 00:16:42,000 Speaker 2: works on right, The rest of the plane works on 306 00:16:42,080 --> 00:16:45,480 Speaker 2: different principles than this, and it works well and It's 307 00:16:45,480 --> 00:16:49,040 Speaker 2: something that Travis describes as being a product of the 308 00:16:49,080 --> 00:16:53,600 Speaker 2: destruction of Bowie's collective knowledge base, but something I don't know. 309 00:16:54,760 --> 00:16:57,120 Speaker 2: I don't know to what extent, Travis, he's kind of 310 00:16:57,120 --> 00:16:59,080 Speaker 2: writing about this, but I'm not sure that a lot 311 00:16:59,080 --> 00:17:01,760 Speaker 2: of people writing able this understand that, like this was 312 00:17:01,880 --> 00:17:06,879 Speaker 2: the point, right, destroying this kind of collective knowledge. This 313 00:17:06,960 --> 00:17:09,639 Speaker 2: is something that was done deliberately, right, This was the 314 00:17:09,640 --> 00:17:13,560 Speaker 2: inevitable sort of product of going management trying to make 315 00:17:13,560 --> 00:17:15,800 Speaker 2: the company quote unquote run like a business. They were 316 00:17:15,840 --> 00:17:21,240 Speaker 2: trying to destroy the interpersonal bonds that create the system 317 00:17:21,280 --> 00:17:24,000 Speaker 2: of collective knowledge, and they were trying to take power 318 00:17:24,080 --> 00:17:25,800 Speaker 2: out of the hands that people who had that collective 319 00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:28,320 Speaker 2: knowledge and put it into the hands of people who 320 00:17:28,400 --> 00:17:30,840 Speaker 2: you could pay for really cheap and exploit more who 321 00:17:31,000 --> 00:17:34,240 Speaker 2: did not have access to that kind of information. Right, 322 00:17:34,400 --> 00:17:36,000 Speaker 2: this is a case forre like, yeah, you're you're you're 323 00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:38,080 Speaker 2: putting power in the hands software engineers instead of sort 324 00:17:38,080 --> 00:17:41,840 Speaker 2: of aviation engineers, speaking of I don't know, taking power 325 00:17:41,880 --> 00:17:43,560 Speaker 2: out of the hands of the consumer and giving it 326 00:17:43,600 --> 00:17:58,280 Speaker 2: to a corporation. Here's ads. Now, if you're trying to 327 00:17:58,359 --> 00:18:02,720 Speaker 2: make the company quote unquot run like a business. What 328 00:18:02,760 --> 00:18:06,960 Speaker 2: else would you do, Oh yeah, you would not tell 329 00:18:07,000 --> 00:18:09,760 Speaker 2: the pilots about this new system that you've added to 330 00:18:09,800 --> 00:18:13,480 Speaker 2: your airplane, because if you talk about the system, everyone 331 00:18:13,520 --> 00:18:15,560 Speaker 2: from you know, the FAA to the airlines of the 332 00:18:15,600 --> 00:18:18,960 Speaker 2: pilots unions might realize that this is not the same 333 00:18:19,000 --> 00:18:22,160 Speaker 2: plane as the seven thirty seven, and that would require 334 00:18:22,359 --> 00:18:24,840 Speaker 2: all sorts of stuff like again re certifying the plane, 335 00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:28,600 Speaker 2: training pilots on simulators of your new plane which is 336 00:18:28,840 --> 00:18:31,840 Speaker 2: not the old plane. It requires all sorts of stuff 337 00:18:32,320 --> 00:18:35,360 Speaker 2: that would have very well could have prevented these crashes. 338 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:38,919 Speaker 2: But you know, that stuff all costs money, and Boeing 339 00:18:39,160 --> 00:18:42,120 Speaker 2: doesn't fucking want to spend money trying to make sure 340 00:18:42,320 --> 00:18:46,119 Speaker 2: that its planes don't crash. So when they moved on 341 00:18:46,160 --> 00:18:48,920 Speaker 2: to this version of like the seven thirty seven max right, 342 00:18:49,280 --> 00:18:53,600 Speaker 2: pilots famously got I think half an hour of iPad 343 00:18:53,640 --> 00:18:55,680 Speaker 2: training and that maybe I might have been an hour 344 00:18:55,680 --> 00:18:59,000 Speaker 2: of iPad training. And that training that they got on 345 00:18:59,040 --> 00:19:02,800 Speaker 2: their iPad again not in a simulator, didn't even have 346 00:19:03,320 --> 00:19:07,040 Speaker 2: any information about the MCAST system that killed all these people. 347 00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:10,600 Speaker 2: And the product of this was that on October twenty ninth, 348 00:19:10,640 --> 00:19:13,920 Speaker 2: twenty nineteen, seven point thirty seven Max flying from Jakarta 349 00:19:14,440 --> 00:19:17,879 Speaker 2: crashed as the pilot was, you know, physically unable to 350 00:19:17,920 --> 00:19:20,040 Speaker 2: fight the control stick. And that's another thing that's going 351 00:19:20,040 --> 00:19:22,679 Speaker 2: on with this, you know, with his decision to put 352 00:19:22,760 --> 00:19:25,800 Speaker 2: Howard in the hands of software and not pilots, is 353 00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:30,000 Speaker 2: that mcast is also physically exerting control over the pilot 354 00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:31,960 Speaker 2: stick and these people are trying to fight it, and 355 00:19:31,960 --> 00:19:34,040 Speaker 2: they're not able to fight it enough to stop the 356 00:19:34,080 --> 00:19:37,879 Speaker 2: plane from tipping down and crashing into the ground. And 357 00:19:38,200 --> 00:19:44,000 Speaker 2: Boeing runs this really like pretty racist campaign blaming this 358 00:19:44,080 --> 00:19:47,440 Speaker 2: pilot who was not white, for this error to try to, 359 00:19:47,480 --> 00:19:50,359 Speaker 2: you know, cover up the fact that they fucking did this. 360 00:19:50,960 --> 00:19:55,200 Speaker 2: And this maybe would have worked, except a few months later, 361 00:19:55,359 --> 00:19:58,560 Speaker 2: Ethiopia air Flight three zero two went down and also 362 00:19:58,640 --> 00:20:02,760 Speaker 2: killed everyone on board, and you know, all told displayed 363 00:20:02,800 --> 00:20:05,800 Speaker 2: the Boeing seventy seven Max killed three hundred and forty 364 00:20:05,800 --> 00:20:08,520 Speaker 2: six people the Seattle time, which broke a lot of 365 00:20:08,520 --> 00:20:12,040 Speaker 2: the initial story said quote. A variety of employees have 366 00:20:12,119 --> 00:20:15,600 Speaker 2: described internal pressure to advance the Max to completion as 367 00:20:15,640 --> 00:20:18,000 Speaker 2: Boeing hurry to catch up with the hot selling a 368 00:20:18,160 --> 00:20:22,200 Speaker 2: three twenty from rival Airbus Mark Rabin, an engineer who 369 00:20:22,200 --> 00:20:25,760 Speaker 2: had flight testing work unrelated to the flight controls, said 370 00:20:25,760 --> 00:20:28,400 Speaker 2: there was always talk about how delays of even one 371 00:20:28,520 --> 00:20:32,359 Speaker 2: day can cause substantial amounts. Meanwhile, staff were expected to 372 00:20:32,400 --> 00:20:35,440 Speaker 2: stay in line. Rebin said it was all about loyalty. 373 00:20:35,560 --> 00:20:38,000 Speaker 2: Rebin said, I had managers tell me, don't rock the boat. 374 00:20:38,080 --> 00:20:40,960 Speaker 2: You don't want to be upsetting executives. And I find 375 00:20:40,960 --> 00:20:43,000 Speaker 2: this very funny because again, part of the whole jack 376 00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:45,480 Speaker 2: Well strategy was to destroy the concept of loyalty to 377 00:20:45,920 --> 00:20:48,080 Speaker 2: like Boeing as a company. But you have to be 378 00:20:48,160 --> 00:20:52,760 Speaker 2: loyal to these shitty fucking executives because these executives, you know, 379 00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:55,560 Speaker 2: have all of the power in this company and they 380 00:20:55,600 --> 00:20:57,840 Speaker 2: want to make sure they can just ring out every 381 00:20:57,840 --> 00:21:00,000 Speaker 2: single last drop of profit. And if you upset them, 382 00:21:00,040 --> 00:21:02,600 Speaker 2: they're going to fire you. And so the product of 383 00:21:02,600 --> 00:21:04,719 Speaker 2: this is this process that we've seen, which is that 384 00:21:05,600 --> 00:21:09,879 Speaker 2: this plane isn't being designed by aircraft. This is what 385 00:21:09,880 --> 00:21:12,960 Speaker 2: happens when shareholders design an airplane. And of course the 386 00:21:13,000 --> 00:21:16,160 Speaker 2: seven thirty seven Max continues to have problems right earlier 387 00:21:16,160 --> 00:21:19,160 Speaker 2: this year, famously, the fucking door flew off in Alaska 388 00:21:19,200 --> 00:21:23,639 Speaker 2: air flight. Multiple whistleblowers have come forward to describe. I mean, 389 00:21:23,720 --> 00:21:26,040 Speaker 2: just like all of the things that you would have 390 00:21:26,080 --> 00:21:30,320 Speaker 2: expected from Boeing, outsourcing shit to overwork and undertrained contractors. 391 00:21:31,280 --> 00:21:36,240 Speaker 2: Now several of those whistle blowers have died. When I 392 00:21:36,280 --> 00:21:40,720 Speaker 2: was originally doing this, I was considering basically making this 393 00:21:40,840 --> 00:21:44,760 Speaker 2: episode just about the whistleblowers being killed. But like I, 394 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:46,639 Speaker 2: I don't know, I don't really have any more information 395 00:21:46,920 --> 00:21:51,280 Speaker 2: than anyone else about these deaths. So I'm just going 396 00:21:51,320 --> 00:21:53,240 Speaker 2: to put on the record that if I go out here, 397 00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:57,680 Speaker 2: it was murder. Yeah, And I think the more important 398 00:21:57,720 --> 00:22:01,040 Speaker 2: story is this one, because I think I think at 399 00:22:01,040 --> 00:22:05,840 Speaker 2: this point everyone everyone kind of knows that something is 400 00:22:05,880 --> 00:22:09,240 Speaker 2: wrong with Boeing, And every day we're getting more and 401 00:22:09,280 --> 00:22:11,600 Speaker 2: more sort of specifics about every single part of this 402 00:22:11,640 --> 00:22:15,160 Speaker 2: production process that you used to be entirely run by 403 00:22:15,400 --> 00:22:18,560 Speaker 2: highly paid, while at least sort of highly paid and 404 00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:21,680 Speaker 2: highly trained employees, that's now being run by a bunch 405 00:22:21,720 --> 00:22:26,880 Speaker 2: of non unionized, underpaid contractors who are producing shitty equipment. 406 00:22:27,440 --> 00:22:30,439 Speaker 2: But what we're looking at here is Boeing coming apart 407 00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:34,679 Speaker 2: somewhat more famously. I think the rescue flight is like 408 00:22:35,040 --> 00:22:37,320 Speaker 2: being prepped, but a bunch of astronauts have been stranded 409 00:22:37,359 --> 00:22:42,159 Speaker 2: on the space station because Boeing's launch craft was like 410 00:22:42,320 --> 00:22:44,479 Speaker 2: veering off course. There are a bunch of visues with it, 411 00:22:44,520 --> 00:22:46,320 Speaker 2: and so NASA just was just like, no, fuck this. 412 00:22:46,680 --> 00:22:50,680 Speaker 2: And the most hideously galling part of this entire story 413 00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:53,359 Speaker 2: is that the craft that's going to pick up the 414 00:22:53,359 --> 00:22:57,280 Speaker 2: astronauts is made by fucking SpaceX, because we have reached 415 00:22:57,280 --> 00:23:00,840 Speaker 2: a point where an Elon Musk company is somehow designing 416 00:23:00,920 --> 00:23:04,800 Speaker 2: rockets that are you know, like designing spacecraft that are 417 00:23:04,880 --> 00:23:09,240 Speaker 2: less likely to fucking explode than Boeing. That is, that 418 00:23:09,359 --> 00:23:14,520 Speaker 2: is an unbelievably depressing idea. And to close, I think 419 00:23:14,560 --> 00:23:18,880 Speaker 2: we need to ask who killed these people, because it's 420 00:23:18,960 --> 00:23:24,040 Speaker 2: not just Boeing. Jack Welsh killed these people. Michael Milken 421 00:23:24,119 --> 00:23:27,159 Speaker 2: killed these people. Ronald Reagan killed these people, and in 422 00:23:27,200 --> 00:23:30,159 Speaker 2: a way, all of us killed them because none of 423 00:23:30,200 --> 00:23:33,200 Speaker 2: us stopped them. And these people could have been stopped 424 00:23:33,600 --> 00:23:35,680 Speaker 2: at any point in the process, from Reagan to Stone, 425 00:23:35,720 --> 00:23:39,040 Speaker 2: Cipher to Kelly or Berg. We could have stopped these people. 426 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:42,919 Speaker 2: To quote for a final time, David Graeber, the ultimate 427 00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:46,320 Speaker 2: hidden truth of this world is that it is something 428 00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:49,080 Speaker 2: that we make and could just as easily make differently. 429 00:23:50,119 --> 00:23:53,000 Speaker 2: I add only this, If we don't make the world differently, 430 00:23:53,280 --> 00:23:56,639 Speaker 2: people are going to die. Why should these murderers be 431 00:23:56,720 --> 00:23:59,520 Speaker 2: allowed to run the world. We know how to make 432 00:23:59,520 --> 00:24:02,520 Speaker 2: planes don't fall out of the sky. The people who 433 00:24:02,520 --> 00:24:05,920 Speaker 2: are fucking running this planet apparently don't. It shouldn't be 434 00:24:06,040 --> 00:24:08,360 Speaker 2: enormously controversial to say that the people who know how 435 00:24:08,359 --> 00:24:11,200 Speaker 2: to build airplanes should control how we fucking design and 436 00:24:11,240 --> 00:24:15,080 Speaker 2: build airplanes. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, this idea 437 00:24:15,240 --> 00:24:17,879 Speaker 2: was called worker self management, and it was considered so 438 00:24:18,040 --> 00:24:21,000 Speaker 2: dangerous that from Chile that she off us to algeriat A, Hungary, 439 00:24:21,040 --> 00:24:24,679 Speaker 2: to Korea. Capitalist communists and fascists alike killed anyone who 440 00:24:24,760 --> 00:24:28,000 Speaker 2: dared believe it. But now our choices are stark. We 441 00:24:28,040 --> 00:24:30,359 Speaker 2: even let these people continue to drop planes out of 442 00:24:30,359 --> 00:24:33,080 Speaker 2: the sky as the world burns in our cities sink 443 00:24:33,119 --> 00:24:36,240 Speaker 2: into the sea. But we do something about it. So 444 00:24:36,320 --> 00:24:37,280 Speaker 2: what are you going to do? 445 00:24:40,880 --> 00:24:41,480 Speaker 1: It could happen. 446 00:24:41,520 --> 00:24:43,359 Speaker 2: Here is a production of cool Zone Media. 447 00:24:43,560 --> 00:24:46,560 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 448 00:24:46,680 --> 00:24:50,280 Speaker 1: coolzonmedia dot com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, 449 00:24:50,359 --> 00:24:54,080 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts, can now 450 00:24:54,119 --> 00:24:56,359 Speaker 1: find sources for it could happen here, listed directly in 451 00:24:56,400 --> 00:24:58,600 Speaker 1: episode descriptions. Thanks for listening.