1 00:00:01,840 --> 00:00:04,560 Speaker 1: The World Health Organization is calling from media action to 2 00:00:04,600 --> 00:00:07,760 Speaker 1: protect children from contaminated medicines after a. 3 00:00:07,720 --> 00:00:10,600 Speaker 2: Spate of child deaths linked to cough syrups. Last year, 4 00:00:11,640 --> 00:00:16,000 Speaker 2: Bloomberg investigative correspondent Zachary Miiter and contributors Swati Gupta and 5 00:00:16,120 --> 00:00:19,680 Speaker 2: Modu Jeu looked into the tragic deaths of scores of 6 00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:24,200 Speaker 2: children in Gambia, a small country in western Africa. The 7 00:00:24,320 --> 00:00:27,760 Speaker 2: children had been given tainted cough syrup imported from a 8 00:00:27,800 --> 00:00:31,440 Speaker 2: manufacturer in India. India, of course, is known as a 9 00:00:31,520 --> 00:00:35,680 Speaker 2: leading exporterer of vaccines and generic drugs. Zach in New 10 00:00:35,760 --> 00:00:38,480 Speaker 2: York and Swati in New Delhi joined me to share 11 00:00:38,479 --> 00:00:41,960 Speaker 2: their reporting about a less visible side of the industry 12 00:00:42,320 --> 00:00:45,800 Speaker 2: of trade in cheaply produced medicines, often sold to some 13 00:00:45,840 --> 00:00:47,479 Speaker 2: of the world's poorest countries. 14 00:00:48,000 --> 00:00:51,240 Speaker 3: At what point did someone switch the raw materials, switch 15 00:00:51,320 --> 00:00:53,880 Speaker 3: something poisonous for something totally benign. 16 00:00:54,720 --> 00:00:57,520 Speaker 1: Nobody is thinking about the ultimate consequence. 17 00:01:04,040 --> 00:01:07,319 Speaker 2: I'm West Ksova today on the big take, how poison 18 00:01:07,520 --> 00:01:11,120 Speaker 2: can get into medicine for kids and why India hasn't 19 00:01:11,160 --> 00:01:19,000 Speaker 2: done more to stop it. Zach. This story begins at 20 00:01:19,000 --> 00:01:22,440 Speaker 2: a hospital in Gambia can you tell us what happened. 21 00:01:23,240 --> 00:01:26,800 Speaker 3: So, Gambia is a very small country in Africa, and 22 00:01:26,959 --> 00:01:30,720 Speaker 3: last summer kids started showing up at the hospital they 23 00:01:30,720 --> 00:01:33,480 Speaker 3: are kind of the biggest, best hospital in the country 24 00:01:34,240 --> 00:01:37,960 Speaker 3: with kidney problems. Their kidneys weren't working. This is dozens 25 00:01:38,000 --> 00:01:42,080 Speaker 3: of kids, and what was confusing to doctors at the 26 00:01:42,120 --> 00:01:46,800 Speaker 3: hospital was that even when they gave the kids dialysis 27 00:01:46,880 --> 00:01:49,800 Speaker 3: right away, that should normally mean that they're going to 28 00:01:49,880 --> 00:01:52,360 Speaker 3: make it, but in this case, like every one of 29 00:01:52,400 --> 00:01:55,400 Speaker 3: the kids died and usually there were really small kids 30 00:01:55,400 --> 00:01:57,760 Speaker 3: that were like one to three years. 31 00:01:57,600 --> 00:02:00,800 Speaker 2: Old, and what did they find when they were trying 32 00:02:00,800 --> 00:02:03,480 Speaker 2: to figure out why these kids were done? 33 00:02:04,200 --> 00:02:07,280 Speaker 3: So, some of the doctors at the hospital were aware 34 00:02:07,400 --> 00:02:11,040 Speaker 3: that years earlier in Nigeria there had been a similar 35 00:02:11,040 --> 00:02:14,600 Speaker 3: outbreak of kids showing up with kidney failure and in 36 00:02:14,600 --> 00:02:18,799 Speaker 3: that case the cause was traced to basically syrup medication 37 00:02:19,080 --> 00:02:22,239 Speaker 3: like cough syrup, fever, reducing syrup and stuff that was 38 00:02:22,280 --> 00:02:26,000 Speaker 3: tainted and so pretty much right away, the doctors had 39 00:02:26,040 --> 00:02:28,680 Speaker 3: a theory that maybe this was the cause, so they 40 00:02:28,720 --> 00:02:31,799 Speaker 3: would ask parents when they came into the hospital, what 41 00:02:31,880 --> 00:02:34,040 Speaker 3: medicine did you give your kids? Can you show us 42 00:02:34,040 --> 00:02:38,480 Speaker 3: the bottles, like, they started collecting data on what medicine 43 00:02:38,560 --> 00:02:41,480 Speaker 3: these kids had been taking, you know, before the onset 44 00:02:41,520 --> 00:02:42,720 Speaker 3: of these symptoms. 45 00:02:43,880 --> 00:02:46,480 Speaker 2: And had all of these kids taken the coughs arup 46 00:02:46,520 --> 00:02:48,119 Speaker 2: taking the same sort of medicine. 47 00:02:48,520 --> 00:02:51,079 Speaker 3: It was a little confusing at the time because if 48 00:02:51,080 --> 00:02:54,120 Speaker 3: you think about it, people give cough syrup or a 49 00:02:54,160 --> 00:02:56,680 Speaker 3: set of medicine syrup to their kids kind of all 50 00:02:56,720 --> 00:03:00,200 Speaker 3: the time without really thinking about it, sometimes without a prescription, 51 00:03:00,400 --> 00:03:03,440 Speaker 3: and so you might now remember exactly what you gave 52 00:03:03,440 --> 00:03:07,040 Speaker 3: your kid or when, and so not everybody remembered, and 53 00:03:07,080 --> 00:03:10,320 Speaker 3: not everyone had the bottle still around, so it was 54 00:03:10,400 --> 00:03:12,960 Speaker 3: difficult to kind of collect this data and have it 55 00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:13,680 Speaker 3: be reliable. 56 00:03:14,160 --> 00:03:14,320 Speaker 2: You know. 57 00:03:14,400 --> 00:03:16,760 Speaker 3: Once they collected these bottles, there was a whole bunch 58 00:03:16,760 --> 00:03:18,720 Speaker 3: of different brands and stuff, and they had to get 59 00:03:18,760 --> 00:03:23,160 Speaker 3: them tested, which took time and a lot of waiting around. Meanwhile, 60 00:03:23,200 --> 00:03:25,360 Speaker 3: while they're waiting, more and more kids are showing up 61 00:03:25,440 --> 00:03:28,200 Speaker 3: every day. They're in the hospital for a few days, 62 00:03:28,280 --> 00:03:31,880 Speaker 3: and usually they're dead within three or four days. So 63 00:03:31,919 --> 00:03:35,520 Speaker 3: eventually they did get test results back, and the results 64 00:03:35,560 --> 00:03:38,360 Speaker 3: of those tests were crystal clear. They found that some 65 00:03:38,440 --> 00:03:43,200 Speaker 3: of the medicine that was circulating in Gambia was contaminated 66 00:03:43,520 --> 00:03:46,160 Speaker 3: with these toxic substances. 67 00:03:46,360 --> 00:03:50,839 Speaker 2: And so they were able to track these different medicines 68 00:03:51,040 --> 00:03:54,160 Speaker 2: that were causing these children to die to a single source. 69 00:03:54,760 --> 00:03:57,240 Speaker 3: So what they found was that there were four different 70 00:03:57,320 --> 00:04:00,680 Speaker 3: kinds of medication that were circulating in the country that 71 00:04:00,840 --> 00:04:04,480 Speaker 3: all had the same toxic contamination and they were all 72 00:04:04,520 --> 00:04:06,960 Speaker 3: made by one company. So it was just one company's 73 00:04:07,000 --> 00:04:09,800 Speaker 3: medicine that they found was at the root of this problem. 74 00:04:10,440 --> 00:04:14,080 Speaker 2: Swadi. They were able to trace this medication and where 75 00:04:14,080 --> 00:04:14,800 Speaker 2: do they trace it to? 76 00:04:15,480 --> 00:04:19,600 Speaker 1: The World Health Organization connected the contaminated cough syrups to 77 00:04:19,839 --> 00:04:23,719 Speaker 1: a manufacturing a pharmaceutical company in India, which is not 78 00:04:23,839 --> 00:04:28,200 Speaker 1: located very far from the capital in India, Zach. 79 00:04:28,640 --> 00:04:33,679 Speaker 2: How common is it for this sort of investigation happened 80 00:04:33,720 --> 00:04:37,440 Speaker 2: to trace poison medication like this? 81 00:04:37,440 --> 00:04:39,960 Speaker 3: This is the kind of thing the World Health Organization does. 82 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:44,359 Speaker 3: If a company or a country finds a product that's 83 00:04:44,400 --> 00:04:49,520 Speaker 3: no good, oftentimes that'll lead the WHO to call up 84 00:04:49,600 --> 00:04:52,760 Speaker 3: another country where the product was manufactured and say, hey, 85 00:04:52,760 --> 00:04:55,800 Speaker 3: we've got a problem here, let's look into it. And 86 00:04:55,839 --> 00:04:59,400 Speaker 3: nowadays that trail very often leads back to India. Just 87 00:04:59,440 --> 00:05:03,279 Speaker 3: because India such a major exporter of pharmaceuticals around the world. 88 00:05:04,000 --> 00:05:07,839 Speaker 2: And what did the WHO do in this case? 89 00:05:08,720 --> 00:05:12,360 Speaker 3: So the WHO helped Gambia like actually arrange the testing 90 00:05:12,480 --> 00:05:16,400 Speaker 3: and find labs and do the testing of the cough syrups. 91 00:05:16,560 --> 00:05:18,840 Speaker 3: But then once they knew there was a problem, it 92 00:05:18,880 --> 00:05:22,039 Speaker 3: was WHO that kind of reached out to India and said, hey, guys, 93 00:05:22,240 --> 00:05:25,760 Speaker 3: let's look into this. We've got some bad drugs coming 94 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:28,960 Speaker 3: from this manufacturer in India. And at the time they 95 00:05:28,960 --> 00:05:31,359 Speaker 3: didn't know maybe these drugs have been exported to a 96 00:05:31,360 --> 00:05:34,240 Speaker 3: bunch of other countries, and so they basically called on 97 00:05:34,279 --> 00:05:37,080 Speaker 3: the Indian authorities to look into it in their country 98 00:05:37,120 --> 00:05:38,520 Speaker 3: and kind of get to the bottom of it. 99 00:05:40,279 --> 00:05:42,719 Speaker 2: What happened next, What did Indian officials do? 100 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:49,640 Speaker 1: Well, that's exactly when the Indian government started pushing back slowly, 101 00:05:50,279 --> 00:05:53,840 Speaker 1: and then it became more and more aggressive as the 102 00:05:54,040 --> 00:05:58,520 Speaker 1: WHO refused to kind of back down from the allegations 103 00:05:58,520 --> 00:06:02,440 Speaker 1: that they had made. It took two days for the 104 00:06:02,480 --> 00:06:06,680 Speaker 1: Indian drug authorities to raid the pharmaceutical company in question 105 00:06:07,200 --> 00:06:12,320 Speaker 1: and confiscate samples that the company had sent to Gambia, 106 00:06:13,040 --> 00:06:17,440 Speaker 1: and then they took a further three months to test, investigate, 107 00:06:17,800 --> 00:06:23,920 Speaker 1: and finally announce that there was no discrepancy, found that 108 00:06:24,000 --> 00:06:27,400 Speaker 1: the samples that they had collected were clean and the 109 00:06:27,440 --> 00:06:31,719 Speaker 1: pharmaceutical company made them. Pharmaceuticals had done nothing wrong. 110 00:06:32,440 --> 00:06:36,040 Speaker 2: Why was there such pushback from government officials. 111 00:06:36,480 --> 00:06:40,919 Speaker 1: Well, the Indian government has generally not been open to criticism, 112 00:06:41,240 --> 00:06:46,440 Speaker 1: and it has become much more difficult to criticize any 113 00:06:46,520 --> 00:06:49,920 Speaker 1: product that comes out of India or any issues that 114 00:06:50,040 --> 00:06:54,800 Speaker 1: crop up in India. There is immagerate pushback. It's difficult 115 00:06:55,000 --> 00:07:00,200 Speaker 1: nowadays to navigate Indian politics and separate the two. In 116 00:07:00,480 --> 00:07:04,120 Speaker 1: politics is now very tightly intertwined with the image that 117 00:07:04,279 --> 00:07:08,200 Speaker 1: India wants. You know, in the global economy, India is 118 00:07:08,360 --> 00:07:11,520 Speaker 1: right now considered as the pharmaceutical capital of the world. 119 00:07:12,200 --> 00:07:15,720 Speaker 1: A lot of money comes into India because it provides 120 00:07:15,800 --> 00:07:18,640 Speaker 1: a lot of generic medication to the rest of the world, 121 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:24,040 Speaker 1: and one bad batch of medication can smear the image 122 00:07:24,040 --> 00:07:26,400 Speaker 1: that India wants of itself in the world. 123 00:07:27,240 --> 00:07:30,880 Speaker 2: So zach the who other health officials have procedures in 124 00:07:30,920 --> 00:07:33,440 Speaker 2: place when they find medication that may have been tainted. 125 00:07:33,480 --> 00:07:36,520 Speaker 2: But you write that this was an especially big deal 126 00:07:36,680 --> 00:07:40,920 Speaker 2: because this was a case of exported medicine from another country. 127 00:07:40,960 --> 00:07:42,920 Speaker 2: Why is that such a significant thing. 128 00:07:43,840 --> 00:07:47,760 Speaker 3: This kind of contamination, where cough syrup or other kind 129 00:07:47,800 --> 00:07:52,120 Speaker 3: of medicinal syrups get contaminated with these toxic chemicals, has 130 00:07:52,160 --> 00:07:54,640 Speaker 3: happened a bunch of times over the past decades. It 131 00:07:54,720 --> 00:07:57,640 Speaker 3: seems to crop up like every few years. Basically, it's 132 00:07:57,680 --> 00:08:01,360 Speaker 3: happened in like Haiti, Panama, Nigi. As I mentioned, in 133 00:08:01,400 --> 00:08:04,560 Speaker 3: all those previous cases, the drugs weren't imported. They were 134 00:08:04,600 --> 00:08:07,680 Speaker 3: made in Haiti or Panama, and then they were consumed 135 00:08:07,680 --> 00:08:10,400 Speaker 3: there and that's where people died. This was new because 136 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:13,440 Speaker 3: it was the first time that contaminated drugs had actually 137 00:08:13,480 --> 00:08:16,920 Speaker 3: been exported. It wasn't the first time that any drugs 138 00:08:17,120 --> 00:08:21,200 Speaker 3: that were exported caused problems around the world, but this 139 00:08:21,360 --> 00:08:24,360 Speaker 3: coft serrup contamination, it was the first time that happened 140 00:08:24,400 --> 00:08:27,560 Speaker 3: with that. And this is a really important issue because 141 00:08:28,160 --> 00:08:30,440 Speaker 3: it tends to kill a lot of people when it happens, 142 00:08:30,480 --> 00:08:33,600 Speaker 3: and the people tend to be very small. It usually 143 00:08:33,679 --> 00:08:37,079 Speaker 3: just kills children, and it often kills like dozens of dozens. 144 00:08:37,640 --> 00:08:40,200 Speaker 3: And it's worth pointing out that the WHO is an 145 00:08:40,280 --> 00:08:42,600 Speaker 3: arm of the un like they don't have the power 146 00:08:42,720 --> 00:08:46,000 Speaker 3: to go in to various countries and kind of tell 147 00:08:46,040 --> 00:08:48,920 Speaker 3: them what to do or do the regulator's job for them, 148 00:08:49,360 --> 00:08:52,120 Speaker 3: so they can convene, they can call for meetings, they 149 00:08:52,120 --> 00:08:55,280 Speaker 3: can sort of advise countries and help them with technical 150 00:08:55,280 --> 00:08:58,559 Speaker 3: expertise and maybe kind of behind the scenes, you know, 151 00:08:58,679 --> 00:09:01,160 Speaker 3: nag them to do what they think is right. But 152 00:09:01,240 --> 00:09:03,240 Speaker 3: at the end of the day, it's up to the 153 00:09:03,360 --> 00:09:07,359 Speaker 3: national country regulators to actually do the work of regulating. 154 00:09:08,240 --> 00:09:10,880 Speaker 3: So in this case, you know, the who could call 155 00:09:10,960 --> 00:09:13,120 Speaker 3: up India and say, please get to the bottom of this, 156 00:09:13,240 --> 00:09:15,160 Speaker 3: but they couldn't force them to do it. It was 157 00:09:15,200 --> 00:09:18,119 Speaker 3: really up to India how they would handle this internally 158 00:09:18,480 --> 00:09:19,920 Speaker 3: and how they would deal with this company. 159 00:09:21,200 --> 00:09:24,320 Speaker 2: So why do you talked about how important the pharmaceutical 160 00:09:24,360 --> 00:09:29,040 Speaker 2: industry is to India, How big an industry is it 161 00:09:29,120 --> 00:09:30,280 Speaker 2: for India's academy. 162 00:09:31,120 --> 00:09:34,080 Speaker 1: It does bring in a lot of money into India. 163 00:09:34,120 --> 00:09:38,880 Speaker 1: But essentially what India is looking for right now in 164 00:09:38,960 --> 00:09:43,880 Speaker 1: this current global scenario is soft power. India has steadily 165 00:09:43,920 --> 00:09:47,559 Speaker 1: been gaining value on the global stage. It is now 166 00:09:47,600 --> 00:09:51,040 Speaker 1: being consulted in major decisions that are being taken across 167 00:09:51,040 --> 00:09:56,160 Speaker 1: the world, and the power that India has in providing generic, 168 00:09:56,360 --> 00:10:01,200 Speaker 1: cheap medication in comparison to what developed country like the 169 00:10:01,320 --> 00:10:05,320 Speaker 1: USA would provide. It gives India a lot of soft power. 170 00:10:06,000 --> 00:10:08,800 Speaker 1: So more than the money, it's about the fact that 171 00:10:08,880 --> 00:10:13,160 Speaker 1: India is able to provide cheap pharmaceuticals. And we saw 172 00:10:13,200 --> 00:10:19,079 Speaker 1: that very starkly during COVID nineteen when India started manufacturing 173 00:10:19,320 --> 00:10:23,120 Speaker 1: the COVID vaccines and was responsible for most of the 174 00:10:23,200 --> 00:10:26,400 Speaker 1: vaccinations that went out to developing countries across the world. 175 00:10:27,160 --> 00:10:31,160 Speaker 1: So for India that is immense power. It gives them 176 00:10:31,200 --> 00:10:35,160 Speaker 1: a lot of leverage with organizations like the WHO or 177 00:10:35,200 --> 00:10:36,280 Speaker 1: the United Nations. 178 00:10:37,200 --> 00:10:39,840 Speaker 3: I might mention one other thing, which is that there's 179 00:10:39,920 --> 00:10:42,640 Speaker 3: kind of an ugly history when it comes to raising 180 00:10:42,720 --> 00:10:46,400 Speaker 3: questions about the quality of Indian pharmaceuticals. And we saw 181 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:49,360 Speaker 3: this probably most starkly in the early two thousands when 182 00:10:49,760 --> 00:10:53,520 Speaker 3: Indian drug makers were saying, we want to make cheap, 183 00:10:53,559 --> 00:10:56,319 Speaker 3: affordable age drugs the first time ever. We're going to 184 00:10:56,360 --> 00:10:59,520 Speaker 3: send them to Africa and save millions of lives. We're 185 00:10:59,559 --> 00:11:01,720 Speaker 3: going to make AIDS drugs for a dollar a day 186 00:11:01,840 --> 00:11:04,320 Speaker 3: when they were costing something like eight thousand dollars a 187 00:11:04,360 --> 00:11:08,560 Speaker 3: year at the time, and Western drug companies weren't having it. 188 00:11:08,720 --> 00:11:10,840 Speaker 3: They were saying, you know, they wanted to protect their 189 00:11:10,880 --> 00:11:14,480 Speaker 3: patents among other things. They said, well, if you buy 190 00:11:14,480 --> 00:11:16,960 Speaker 3: them from India, what's the guarantee they're going to be 191 00:11:16,960 --> 00:11:20,040 Speaker 3: any good. Maybe they're going to be of low quality. 192 00:11:20,120 --> 00:11:23,480 Speaker 3: And so I think from that point on, the Indian 193 00:11:23,760 --> 00:11:28,920 Speaker 3: pharmaceutical community is sort of primed to expect that when 194 00:11:28,920 --> 00:11:33,679 Speaker 3: they hear concerns about quality, especially coming from foreign critics, 195 00:11:34,559 --> 00:11:37,920 Speaker 3: they're going to suspect that maybe that's really just big 196 00:11:37,920 --> 00:11:40,520 Speaker 3: pharma trying to protect its turf, trying to protect its 197 00:11:40,559 --> 00:11:44,120 Speaker 3: patents against cheaper Indian products that are just as good. 198 00:11:45,360 --> 00:11:48,000 Speaker 2: And yet Zach, in this case, they did trace this 199 00:11:48,080 --> 00:11:51,480 Speaker 2: poison back to a single company in India. Can you 200 00:11:51,520 --> 00:11:55,319 Speaker 2: tell us about that company? So, Maiden Pharmaceuticals is a 201 00:11:55,360 --> 00:11:58,720 Speaker 2: family owned company. It's based in the Delhi area. And 202 00:11:59,080 --> 00:12:02,560 Speaker 2: this isn't one of these like giant, publicly traded Indian 203 00:12:02,600 --> 00:12:06,360 Speaker 2: pharmaceutical companies that export a lot of drugs into highly 204 00:12:06,400 --> 00:12:10,400 Speaker 2: regulated markets like the US or the European Union. This 205 00:12:10,559 --> 00:12:14,600 Speaker 2: is more like a company that specializes in sending drugs 206 00:12:14,800 --> 00:12:18,200 Speaker 2: to kind of the least regulated pharma countries. So you know, 207 00:12:18,240 --> 00:12:22,240 Speaker 2: Maiden sends a lot of drugs to Afghanistan, Venezuela, Iraq, 208 00:12:22,720 --> 00:12:27,920 Speaker 2: places where there's not necessarily really high quality drug regulations. 209 00:12:28,679 --> 00:12:32,440 Speaker 2: If you're a small country like Gambia, you might not 210 00:12:32,480 --> 00:12:36,880 Speaker 2: have the resources to send somebody to India to check 211 00:12:36,920 --> 00:12:39,319 Speaker 2: out the factory. You might basically just have to go 212 00:12:39,360 --> 00:12:43,840 Speaker 2: by whatever paperwork the pharmaceutical company gives you saying these 213 00:12:43,920 --> 00:12:48,599 Speaker 2: drugs are okay after the break, What was the poison 214 00:12:48,800 --> 00:13:00,719 Speaker 2: found in these medicines? What did the regulators do when 215 00:13:00,800 --> 00:13:02,360 Speaker 2: they went to this company. 216 00:13:03,120 --> 00:13:06,240 Speaker 1: Well, there's a difference in what they are supposed to 217 00:13:06,240 --> 00:13:09,320 Speaker 1: do and what actually happened, and a lot of it 218 00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:13,480 Speaker 1: is very mulky because new authorities are not releasing a 219 00:13:13,559 --> 00:13:18,040 Speaker 1: lot of information on their investigation. So they are supposed 220 00:13:18,040 --> 00:13:21,680 Speaker 1: to go in and seize all the samples for the 221 00:13:21,760 --> 00:13:26,400 Speaker 1: batches that the WHO has flagged as contaminated, and then 222 00:13:26,640 --> 00:13:30,319 Speaker 1: those samples have to be sent to a government regulated 223 00:13:30,400 --> 00:13:33,760 Speaker 1: lab to be tested and to be seen whether they 224 00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:37,640 Speaker 1: are contaminated as well. The authorities in India did not 225 00:13:37,800 --> 00:13:41,520 Speaker 1: release this information till a few months later, where they 226 00:13:42,040 --> 00:13:46,000 Speaker 1: just gave a clean chit to the company. They refused 227 00:13:46,040 --> 00:13:50,200 Speaker 1: to have any kind of conversation about exactly how many 228 00:13:50,320 --> 00:13:53,479 Speaker 1: samples that they had taken, or how they were processed, 229 00:13:54,320 --> 00:13:57,440 Speaker 1: what exactly was found in those samples. They did not 230 00:13:57,480 --> 00:14:00,680 Speaker 1: release any of that information publicly, Zach. 231 00:14:00,880 --> 00:14:05,560 Speaker 2: The Indian government's claims that Maiden did not have anything 232 00:14:05,640 --> 00:14:09,560 Speaker 2: to do with this contaminated coughs era was not found 233 00:14:09,600 --> 00:14:12,200 Speaker 2: to be persuasive by other people who looked into it. 234 00:14:12,280 --> 00:14:15,720 Speaker 3: Is that right, Yeah, The main point that the Indian 235 00:14:15,760 --> 00:14:19,040 Speaker 3: government kind of rested its case on was that the 236 00:14:19,160 --> 00:14:22,960 Speaker 3: drugs that they tested didn't have any contamination in them. 237 00:14:23,040 --> 00:14:26,360 Speaker 3: But the drugs they tested were not the same as 238 00:14:26,400 --> 00:14:30,280 Speaker 3: the drugs tested in Gambia. They weren't taken from a 239 00:14:30,320 --> 00:14:33,040 Speaker 3: medicine cabinet of a sick kid in Gambia. They were 240 00:14:33,280 --> 00:14:37,760 Speaker 3: taken from the Maiden Pharmaceuticals factory. And drug makers are 241 00:14:37,760 --> 00:14:41,040 Speaker 3: supposed to set aside samples of each batch they make 242 00:14:41,120 --> 00:14:43,360 Speaker 3: in case there's a problem later they need to test it. 243 00:14:43,760 --> 00:14:46,720 Speaker 3: And so those are the samples that the Indian regulators 244 00:14:46,760 --> 00:14:50,800 Speaker 3: seized and tested and said we're fine. So obviously you've 245 00:14:50,800 --> 00:14:54,520 Speaker 3: got to assume that those samples actually really did correspond 246 00:14:54,640 --> 00:14:58,000 Speaker 3: to the drugs that were sent overseas. The other thing 247 00:14:58,040 --> 00:15:01,640 Speaker 3: is that Maiden Pharmaceuticals, the manufact xture, was notified by 248 00:15:01,760 --> 00:15:05,640 Speaker 3: WHO on September twenty ninth that their drugs had failed 249 00:15:05,680 --> 00:15:07,960 Speaker 3: this test in Gambia and they were full of poison. 250 00:15:08,240 --> 00:15:11,520 Speaker 3: But it wasn't until two days later, October first, that 251 00:15:11,560 --> 00:15:14,320 Speaker 3: the Indian regulators actually showed up at their factory and 252 00:15:14,400 --> 00:15:17,640 Speaker 3: seized these samples. So if the Indian regulators wanted to 253 00:15:17,640 --> 00:15:21,080 Speaker 3: be absolutely sure that these samples were really the same 254 00:15:21,120 --> 00:15:23,840 Speaker 3: ones that had been sent to Gambia, they could have 255 00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:26,640 Speaker 3: gone to the factory right away and gotten them. Instead, 256 00:15:26,640 --> 00:15:29,240 Speaker 3: they left a two day window when who knows, somebody 257 00:15:29,240 --> 00:15:31,960 Speaker 3: could have moved things around. We don't know that that happened, 258 00:15:32,320 --> 00:15:34,600 Speaker 3: but the fact that there was this two day delay 259 00:15:34,760 --> 00:15:37,520 Speaker 3: means that the regulators created a window of opportunity there. 260 00:15:38,920 --> 00:15:41,880 Speaker 2: So how do they think this happened? How did this 261 00:15:42,040 --> 00:15:45,600 Speaker 2: poison get into this cough syrup and then get from 262 00:15:45,680 --> 00:15:48,000 Speaker 2: there all the way to Gambia. 263 00:15:48,760 --> 00:15:51,720 Speaker 3: So the official position of the Indian government is that 264 00:15:51,840 --> 00:15:55,880 Speaker 3: these drugs weren't contaminated, but you know, the international consensus 265 00:15:56,000 --> 00:15:59,400 Speaker 3: everybody else's looked at this says they were so to 266 00:15:59,480 --> 00:16:03,400 Speaker 3: your question in how could they have gotten contaminated? If 267 00:16:03,440 --> 00:16:06,520 Speaker 3: you look at similar cases that have happened in the past, 268 00:16:06,840 --> 00:16:09,640 Speaker 3: it's basically always the same. Cause you've got a drug 269 00:16:09,680 --> 00:16:13,520 Speaker 3: that's like a syrup, a liquid formulation, and the active 270 00:16:13,640 --> 00:16:16,760 Speaker 3: ingredient is like a powder. It's like a little bit 271 00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:19,200 Speaker 3: of a set of metaphin which people outside the US 272 00:16:19,240 --> 00:16:22,280 Speaker 3: called paracetamol, or it might be a cough suppressant of 273 00:16:22,320 --> 00:16:24,320 Speaker 3: some kind. And so I for you to just put 274 00:16:24,400 --> 00:16:27,400 Speaker 3: it in some water, the stuff would just settle out, 275 00:16:27,480 --> 00:16:30,240 Speaker 3: it wouldn't mix properly with the liquid, and so you 276 00:16:30,320 --> 00:16:34,080 Speaker 3: need another chemical that's going to dissolve the active ingredient 277 00:16:34,160 --> 00:16:37,240 Speaker 3: in the liquid. And so what drug companies tend to 278 00:16:37,320 --> 00:16:40,520 Speaker 3: use is this substance called propylene glycol, which is like 279 00:16:40,760 --> 00:16:44,640 Speaker 3: totally harmless, clear, tastes a little sweet, It's pretty easy 280 00:16:44,640 --> 00:16:45,880 Speaker 3: to get your hands on. There's a lot of it 281 00:16:45,920 --> 00:16:47,320 Speaker 3: in the world, and you just put some of that 282 00:16:47,400 --> 00:16:50,440 Speaker 3: in there and everything works right. So the problem is 283 00:16:50,480 --> 00:16:53,640 Speaker 3: that propylene glycol. There are some other chemicals that look 284 00:16:53,800 --> 00:16:56,680 Speaker 3: and act just like it. They're called diethylene glycol and 285 00:16:56,720 --> 00:17:00,760 Speaker 3: ethylene glycol. They dissolve the act of ingredients in the 286 00:17:00,800 --> 00:17:03,920 Speaker 3: same way. The only difference really is that they're cheaper 287 00:17:04,000 --> 00:17:07,080 Speaker 3: and that they're deadly poison And so if you look 288 00:17:07,080 --> 00:17:10,520 Speaker 3: at all these kind of historical cases where this kind 289 00:17:10,520 --> 00:17:14,320 Speaker 3: of poisoning has happened, it's because somewhere along the way 290 00:17:14,440 --> 00:17:17,679 Speaker 3: in the supply chain, propylene glycol gets switched out with 291 00:17:17,960 --> 00:17:20,520 Speaker 3: one of these kind of cheaper toxic substitutes. 292 00:17:21,400 --> 00:17:25,000 Speaker 2: Swaty, is this something that can just happen accidentally, where 293 00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:27,840 Speaker 2: you just mistakenly use one for the other. 294 00:17:28,520 --> 00:17:30,719 Speaker 1: There are a lot of checks and measures that are 295 00:17:30,760 --> 00:17:34,640 Speaker 1: built to make sure that this doesn't happen. The companies 296 00:17:34,760 --> 00:17:37,840 Speaker 1: that are making the propelling glacol have to sell it 297 00:17:37,880 --> 00:17:41,080 Speaker 1: in sealed drums, and there is documentation that has to 298 00:17:41,119 --> 00:17:44,680 Speaker 1: be attached with it every step of the way, and 299 00:17:44,920 --> 00:17:48,800 Speaker 1: the pharmaceutical company that is buying this propelling glacol has 300 00:17:48,840 --> 00:17:53,520 Speaker 1: to test it. But somewhere along the way from the 301 00:17:53,560 --> 00:17:56,600 Speaker 1: manufacturers of the chemical and by the time it reaches 302 00:17:56,600 --> 00:18:00,719 Speaker 1: a manufacturer of the medicines, there is a little bit 303 00:18:00,720 --> 00:18:05,800 Speaker 1: of switch. Barrels are changed or mislabeled, and people are 304 00:18:05,800 --> 00:18:07,760 Speaker 1: trying to make a profit on the side. 305 00:18:09,000 --> 00:18:11,200 Speaker 2: And Zach, you're writ in the story that in fact, 306 00:18:11,359 --> 00:18:16,000 Speaker 2: there's a whole trade in these barrels that can make 307 00:18:16,040 --> 00:18:18,960 Speaker 2: it look like one chemical is the other. 308 00:18:19,840 --> 00:18:22,679 Speaker 3: Yeah, So Swadi and I met with this chemical trader 309 00:18:22,720 --> 00:18:26,200 Speaker 3: in Delhi who told us that mislabeling is so common 310 00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:29,440 Speaker 3: in the chemical industry that if you're selling like some 311 00:18:29,520 --> 00:18:33,400 Speaker 3: like old used barrels, you can actually get more money 312 00:18:33,440 --> 00:18:35,560 Speaker 3: for them if you leave the labels on, you can 313 00:18:35,600 --> 00:18:37,960 Speaker 3: get a premium. And the reason that they're more valuable 314 00:18:37,960 --> 00:18:40,920 Speaker 3: with the labels on is because somebody might want to 315 00:18:40,960 --> 00:18:44,159 Speaker 3: put something else in there and keep the original labels 316 00:18:44,200 --> 00:18:47,240 Speaker 3: in other words, that they might try to counterfeit, and 317 00:18:47,320 --> 00:18:50,280 Speaker 3: so to make everything kind of more complicated. Propylene glackol 318 00:18:50,320 --> 00:18:54,840 Speaker 3: has all these other uses that don't involve humans consuming them. 319 00:18:55,200 --> 00:18:56,959 Speaker 3: You can use it to make paint, you use it 320 00:18:56,960 --> 00:19:00,960 Speaker 3: to you know, cigar humidors. So as a trader, you 321 00:19:01,040 --> 00:19:03,440 Speaker 3: might think, well, if this is just going in a paint, 322 00:19:03,480 --> 00:19:06,200 Speaker 3: what is anyone going to care? If I switch these chemicals, 323 00:19:06,359 --> 00:19:08,439 Speaker 3: it won't harm anyone. The other thing is that if 324 00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:12,520 Speaker 3: you're mostly a trader who deals in industrial chemicals, you 325 00:19:12,600 --> 00:19:15,040 Speaker 3: might not even be aware that this stuff is actually 326 00:19:15,040 --> 00:19:18,400 Speaker 3: poisonous because it just would never enter into your mind 327 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:20,120 Speaker 3: that someone would would ever consume it. 328 00:19:20,359 --> 00:19:22,480 Speaker 1: To just add to what Zach said, to check some 329 00:19:22,600 --> 00:19:25,600 Speaker 1: balances that are placed. They have to fail at multiple 330 00:19:25,640 --> 00:19:29,120 Speaker 1: levels for this to happen. The regulators have to drop 331 00:19:29,160 --> 00:19:32,240 Speaker 1: the ball somewhere in the surprise checks that they do 332 00:19:32,359 --> 00:19:36,040 Speaker 1: at the factories, or the company has to not test 333 00:19:36,400 --> 00:19:40,440 Speaker 1: the samples that they are buying off these chemical producers, 334 00:19:40,880 --> 00:19:44,240 Speaker 1: and these guys also have to be unaware of what 335 00:19:44,800 --> 00:19:49,040 Speaker 1: purpose they are selling the chemical for. You have the 336 00:19:49,040 --> 00:19:52,280 Speaker 1: big cheese, and then you have a long list of 337 00:19:52,400 --> 00:19:56,119 Speaker 1: middlemen who are in the supply chain, and then you 338 00:19:56,280 --> 00:20:01,800 Speaker 1: have the ultimate consumer. So why the chemical is moving 339 00:20:02,080 --> 00:20:05,840 Speaker 1: across the list of middlemen. The switch can happen at 340 00:20:05,880 --> 00:20:10,439 Speaker 1: any point. The main manufacturer will not sell to a 341 00:20:10,600 --> 00:20:15,879 Speaker 1: very small farmer company. They sell in bigger quantities. So 342 00:20:16,440 --> 00:20:21,720 Speaker 1: a smaller distributor buys maybe fifty barrels, and then he 343 00:20:21,800 --> 00:20:24,959 Speaker 1: sells about twenty of those to another distributor, and so 344 00:20:25,000 --> 00:20:28,160 Speaker 1: on it goes. So we spoke to one of the middlemen. 345 00:20:28,560 --> 00:20:31,480 Speaker 1: His name is Punkach Mehra. He has a tiny office 346 00:20:31,480 --> 00:20:36,840 Speaker 1: in the basement, and throughout our conversation he was picking 347 00:20:36,920 --> 00:20:40,240 Speaker 1: up his phone every ten to fifteen minutes and selling 348 00:20:40,359 --> 00:20:44,719 Speaker 1: barrels of chemicals over the phone, negotiating rates. It's a 349 00:20:44,840 --> 00:20:48,960 Speaker 1: very tiny picture into this very chaotic manner in which 350 00:20:49,080 --> 00:20:52,679 Speaker 1: chemicals are sold, where one trader is sitting in a 351 00:20:52,720 --> 00:20:57,199 Speaker 1: tiny office somewhere in Deli and he's selling chemicals in 352 00:20:57,240 --> 00:20:59,560 Speaker 1: a state which is five hundred miles away. 353 00:21:00,840 --> 00:21:04,040 Speaker 2: And Zach, what did he say about how the industry works. 354 00:21:05,000 --> 00:21:08,560 Speaker 3: He said, adulteration is a temptation. I mean, he kind 355 00:21:08,560 --> 00:21:11,160 Speaker 3: of ran the numbers in his head. I was like, oh, yeah, 356 00:21:11,280 --> 00:21:14,480 Speaker 3: diethylene glac all is about half the price of propylene 357 00:21:14,480 --> 00:21:17,639 Speaker 3: glycol right now, So if you were to put a 358 00:21:17,680 --> 00:21:21,920 Speaker 3: propylene glycol label on a barrel of diatheling glycol, you 359 00:21:21,960 --> 00:21:25,280 Speaker 3: could double your money. Maybe you don't know it's going 360 00:21:25,560 --> 00:21:28,560 Speaker 3: into a product that someone is going to consume. It 361 00:21:28,680 --> 00:21:30,640 Speaker 3: just might not cross your mind that this is a problem. 362 00:21:31,000 --> 00:21:33,840 Speaker 3: So this guy, punkash Mehra, he didn't have anything to 363 00:21:33,880 --> 00:21:36,360 Speaker 3: do with any of these poisoning cases. He says he 364 00:21:36,440 --> 00:21:40,760 Speaker 3: only does business with very legitimate suppliers. He's just he 365 00:21:40,840 --> 00:21:43,200 Speaker 3: understands the business because he's been in it since nineteen 366 00:21:43,240 --> 00:21:46,399 Speaker 3: fifty one, so he knows enough about the business to 367 00:21:46,680 --> 00:21:48,720 Speaker 3: explain kind of what the temptations. 368 00:21:48,240 --> 00:21:52,800 Speaker 2: Are and what does Maiden say about these allegations that 369 00:21:52,840 --> 00:21:55,359 Speaker 2: their coughs are contain this poisonous chemical. 370 00:21:55,880 --> 00:21:59,800 Speaker 1: Midim Pharmaceuticals has largely been silent on this, and they've 371 00:21:59,840 --> 00:22:03,199 Speaker 1: been just waiting on the regulators to allow them to 372 00:22:03,200 --> 00:22:08,679 Speaker 1: reopen their factories. We understood that they have applied for 373 00:22:08,840 --> 00:22:12,560 Speaker 1: authorization to reopen, but the last time I went to 374 00:22:12,600 --> 00:22:16,440 Speaker 1: the factory, they had taken down the signboard and the 375 00:22:16,480 --> 00:22:19,640 Speaker 1: premises were under construction, So we don't know what they're 376 00:22:19,640 --> 00:22:20,720 Speaker 1: planning to do now. 377 00:22:21,560 --> 00:22:23,840 Speaker 3: And I should add they have made some public comments 378 00:22:23,840 --> 00:22:27,200 Speaker 3: since this happened, and they said they followed all the rules, 379 00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:30,080 Speaker 3: they did nothing wrong, and they've kind of floated these 380 00:22:30,119 --> 00:22:32,919 Speaker 3: alternative theories of what might have killed the kids in Gambia, 381 00:22:33,040 --> 00:22:36,200 Speaker 3: like maybe there's a bacterial infection. Nobody else really takes 382 00:22:36,240 --> 00:22:37,320 Speaker 3: those theories seriously. 383 00:22:38,440 --> 00:22:41,920 Speaker 2: When we come back, tainted medicine found in another country 384 00:22:42,080 --> 00:22:55,439 Speaker 2: raises new questions, Twady. Despite this happening, there was still 385 00:22:55,680 --> 00:22:59,119 Speaker 2: another poisoning that happened after it. Can you tell us 386 00:22:59,160 --> 00:22:59,920 Speaker 2: what happened then? 387 00:23:00,840 --> 00:23:05,000 Speaker 1: Sometimes December last year was bakised On also announced that 388 00:23:05,240 --> 00:23:09,920 Speaker 1: it had also traced contaminated cofser up to a pharmaceutical 389 00:23:09,960 --> 00:23:14,040 Speaker 1: company in India. In that case, the authorities moved very 390 00:23:14,040 --> 00:23:17,159 Speaker 1: swiftly and they immediately raided the place. They canceled the 391 00:23:17,200 --> 00:23:18,920 Speaker 1: license of the film. 392 00:23:19,280 --> 00:23:22,240 Speaker 3: It's worth parting out here. You know about twenty kids 393 00:23:22,280 --> 00:23:27,000 Speaker 3: died in the Uzbekistan case, and that manufacturer is also 394 00:23:27,080 --> 00:23:30,000 Speaker 3: based in the Delhi area. So that raised the question 395 00:23:30,080 --> 00:23:33,879 Speaker 3: of like, could the chemicals have had a common source. 396 00:23:34,440 --> 00:23:37,119 Speaker 3: And it turns out that's actually a possibility because the 397 00:23:37,200 --> 00:23:41,240 Speaker 3: chemical dealer that provided some of the raw materials for 398 00:23:41,280 --> 00:23:46,000 Speaker 3: the Uzbekistan drugs was also doing business with the supplier 399 00:23:46,040 --> 00:23:48,840 Speaker 3: that supplied some of the chemicals for the drugs that 400 00:23:48,880 --> 00:23:51,600 Speaker 3: went to the Gambia. And so this one chemical dealer 401 00:23:51,680 --> 00:23:54,480 Speaker 3: seemed to be a key player in the supply chain. 402 00:23:54,800 --> 00:23:57,720 Speaker 3: And Swadi went to that warehouse and. 403 00:23:58,119 --> 00:24:01,600 Speaker 1: I found that the entire warehouse had been borne down. 404 00:24:02,640 --> 00:24:07,119 Speaker 1: Nobody knows what the cause of the fire was. The drums, chemicals, 405 00:24:07,160 --> 00:24:10,000 Speaker 1: everything had melted away, I. 406 00:24:10,000 --> 00:24:12,840 Speaker 2: Should say here. The company the authority shut down told 407 00:24:12,840 --> 00:24:16,640 Speaker 2: Bloomberg in January that it complied with drug making rules 408 00:24:16,720 --> 00:24:20,560 Speaker 2: and was cooperating with authorities. It did not respond to 409 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:24,560 Speaker 2: subsequent requests for comment, and the company whose warehouse burned 410 00:24:24,560 --> 00:24:27,840 Speaker 2: down it did not reply to Bloomberg's request for comment. 411 00:24:28,440 --> 00:24:31,720 Speaker 3: So, in a situation like this, where the raw materials 412 00:24:31,760 --> 00:24:35,000 Speaker 3: are in question, what the authorities should be doing is 413 00:24:35,160 --> 00:24:38,760 Speaker 3: getting to the bottom of it, tracing the actual origin, 414 00:24:38,880 --> 00:24:41,720 Speaker 3: where was it, At what point did someone switch the 415 00:24:41,800 --> 00:24:46,680 Speaker 3: raw materials, switch something poisonous for something totally benign, and 416 00:24:46,720 --> 00:24:50,440 Speaker 3: then identify where all of this tainted material came from. 417 00:24:50,920 --> 00:24:53,320 Speaker 3: But they only traced it so far and then they 418 00:24:53,440 --> 00:24:55,879 Speaker 3: kind of stopped. And what we heard from the authorities 419 00:24:55,920 --> 00:24:59,280 Speaker 3: we talked to on an anonymous basis was that there 420 00:24:59,400 --> 00:25:00,840 Speaker 3: is no way we could and get into that, Like 421 00:25:00,880 --> 00:25:04,360 Speaker 3: the chemical industry in India is just impossible to regulate, 422 00:25:04,920 --> 00:25:07,440 Speaker 3: and so they just kind of let the trail go cold. 423 00:25:07,880 --> 00:25:11,160 Speaker 2: Swadi, What is the solution here? How can this problem 424 00:25:11,680 --> 00:25:12,640 Speaker 2: start to be fixed? 425 00:25:13,240 --> 00:25:16,159 Speaker 1: Well, the Indian government is not acknowledging that there is 426 00:25:16,200 --> 00:25:19,159 Speaker 1: a widespread problem here. One of the steps that they 427 00:25:19,200 --> 00:25:24,520 Speaker 1: took was to actually mandate that every batch of cough 428 00:25:24,560 --> 00:25:28,160 Speaker 1: syrup that is going out of India needs to be tested. 429 00:25:28,880 --> 00:25:32,200 Speaker 1: Besides that the government has not made any move to 430 00:25:32,280 --> 00:25:39,000 Speaker 1: regulate this market that just rampantly is distributing chemicals Zach. 431 00:25:39,160 --> 00:25:42,720 Speaker 2: In the story, you write that advocates for drug safety 432 00:25:43,119 --> 00:25:46,000 Speaker 2: are skeptical that this is a real solution. 433 00:25:46,920 --> 00:25:49,880 Speaker 3: That's right. There's a bunch of questions about this. It's 434 00:25:49,960 --> 00:25:53,280 Speaker 3: unclear what syrup would actually fall under the new rule, 435 00:25:53,320 --> 00:25:57,119 Speaker 3: because the most poisonous syrup sent to Gambia wasn't actually 436 00:25:57,160 --> 00:26:00,080 Speaker 3: a cough syrup, it was an anti nausea syrup. So 437 00:26:00,119 --> 00:26:02,560 Speaker 3: would that need to be tested under this new rule. 438 00:26:02,880 --> 00:26:05,320 Speaker 3: Nobody seems to know. And you know, the law only 439 00:26:05,359 --> 00:26:09,600 Speaker 3: applies to exports. So one of the recent cases of 440 00:26:10,040 --> 00:26:12,920 Speaker 3: coughs are poisoning happened in India in two thousand, killed 441 00:26:12,960 --> 00:26:16,000 Speaker 3: about a dozen kits. That medicine would not have had 442 00:26:16,080 --> 00:26:18,000 Speaker 3: to be tested under this new law because it only 443 00:26:18,040 --> 00:26:20,919 Speaker 3: applies to exports. So, just on a broader level, if 444 00:26:20,960 --> 00:26:23,840 Speaker 3: you talk to public health advocates who pay attention to 445 00:26:23,880 --> 00:26:26,879 Speaker 3: drug regulation India, they say there needs to be a 446 00:26:26,960 --> 00:26:32,199 Speaker 3: much more comprehensive fix. Whole drug regulatory system needs to 447 00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:35,959 Speaker 3: move from promoting the industry to policing it. There need 448 00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:40,080 Speaker 3: to be more staff and resources for drug inspectors, and 449 00:26:40,119 --> 00:26:43,080 Speaker 3: there needs to be better coordination between the National Drug 450 00:26:43,119 --> 00:26:47,199 Speaker 3: Regulator and the more than thirty local drug regulators in 451 00:26:47,240 --> 00:26:48,399 Speaker 3: the States and territories. 452 00:26:49,680 --> 00:26:55,440 Speaker 2: So have these widely publicized cases hurt business. Are other 453 00:26:55,520 --> 00:26:59,200 Speaker 2: countries now hesitant to import drugs from India? 454 00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:03,520 Speaker 3: Well, Gambia is Gambia just recently passed a rule requiring 455 00:27:03,560 --> 00:27:07,120 Speaker 3: testing of all imports from India. But keep in mind, 456 00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:09,480 Speaker 3: Gambia is a very small country. It's not going to 457 00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:11,879 Speaker 3: make much of a dent in like a fifty billion 458 00:27:11,920 --> 00:27:16,119 Speaker 3: dollar Indian pharmaceutical industry. And beyond that, there's not a 459 00:27:16,119 --> 00:27:19,919 Speaker 3: lot of evidence that this has really impacted enthusiasm for 460 00:27:20,000 --> 00:27:23,159 Speaker 3: Indian medications. On the other hand, there's been kind of 461 00:27:23,160 --> 00:27:26,040 Speaker 3: a drumbeat of bad news this year about Indian drugs, 462 00:27:26,160 --> 00:27:28,800 Speaker 3: not just the cough syrup ex sports, but other kinds 463 00:27:28,840 --> 00:27:31,879 Speaker 3: of medication that have caused problems around the world. And 464 00:27:31,920 --> 00:27:34,200 Speaker 3: so you can imagine if that were to continue, that 465 00:27:34,200 --> 00:27:37,040 Speaker 3: could be a real threat to the Indian pharmaceutical industry 466 00:27:37,080 --> 00:27:38,879 Speaker 3: and its ability to keep growing. 467 00:27:39,680 --> 00:27:43,840 Speaker 2: SWATI, As you continue to cover this story, what are 468 00:27:43,840 --> 00:27:46,600 Speaker 2: you watching for? Where do you think things go from here? 469 00:27:47,359 --> 00:27:53,120 Speaker 1: I'm hoping that somewhere the who is able to convince 470 00:27:53,320 --> 00:27:58,000 Speaker 1: the Indian government of how the pharmaceutical industries are connected 471 00:27:58,040 --> 00:28:02,920 Speaker 1: to the contamination, and at least there is some very 472 00:28:03,000 --> 00:28:07,239 Speaker 1: concrete trap percussions for the companies involved. Once you have that, 473 00:28:07,800 --> 00:28:12,320 Speaker 1: then other companies will be more mindful. I spoke to 474 00:28:12,400 --> 00:28:15,160 Speaker 1: Mehra again a couple of days ago, and he did 475 00:28:15,280 --> 00:28:19,960 Speaker 1: mention that the distributors that he's talking to are talking 476 00:28:20,000 --> 00:28:24,879 Speaker 1: about very very customers. They are trying really hard to 477 00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:27,879 Speaker 1: make sure that the properly inclacole, that the buie is 478 00:28:28,080 --> 00:28:30,080 Speaker 1: legit sweatie. 479 00:28:30,520 --> 00:28:33,680 Speaker 2: Zach, thanks so much for speaking with me, Thanks us, 480 00:28:35,160 --> 00:28:37,080 Speaker 2: Thanks for listening to us here at The Big Take. 481 00:28:37,240 --> 00:28:40,440 Speaker 2: It's a daily podcast from Bloomberg and iHeartRadio. For more 482 00:28:40,480 --> 00:28:44,560 Speaker 2: shows from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or 483 00:28:44,560 --> 00:28:47,080 Speaker 2: wherever you listen, and we'd love to hear from you. 484 00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:50,440 Speaker 2: Email us questions or comments at Big Take at Bloomberg 485 00:28:50,480 --> 00:28:53,720 Speaker 2: dot net. The supervising producer of The Big Take is 486 00:28:53,840 --> 00:28:58,120 Speaker 2: Vicky Ergolino. Our senior producer is Catherine Fink. Our producers 487 00:28:58,160 --> 00:29:02,400 Speaker 2: are Michael Falleerro and Mobar Kilde. Garcia is our engineer. 488 00:29:02,760 --> 00:29:06,680 Speaker 2: Our original music was composed by Leo Sidrin I'm Weskasova. 489 00:29:06,960 --> 00:29:09,400 Speaker 2: We'll be back tomorrow with another big take.