WEBVTT - 3M, Drug Pricing, Google and Other Catalysts

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to the Votes and Verdict podcast, hosted

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<v Speaker 1>by the Litigation and Policy team at Bloomberg Intelligence, the

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<v Speaker 1>investment research platform of Bloomberg LP. This podcast series examines

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<v Speaker 1>the intersection of business policy and law, and today we'll

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<v Speaker 1>be looking at the litigation and policy catalysts that we're

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<v Speaker 1>watching in September twenty twenty three and that we think

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<v Speaker 1>will impact companies across a number of different sectors. My

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<v Speaker 1>name is Elliot Stein. I'm a senior litigation analyst covering

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<v Speaker 1>litigation in the financial sector, and I'll be your host

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<v Speaker 1>for today, August twenty ninth, twenty twenty three. If you

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<v Speaker 1>have any questions about any of the matters that we're

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<v Speaker 1>discussing on this episode, please don't hesitate to reach out

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<v Speaker 1>to us at your convenience with questions. So we'll be

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<v Speaker 1>discussing a hand full of sectors today. First, Jenrie, our

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<v Speaker 1>senior anti trust analyst, will pleave you a pair of

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<v Speaker 1>upcoming trials. First, you'll look at the Justice Department's trial

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<v Speaker 1>against Google over its search business that starts September twelfth,

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<v Speaker 1>happens to be my birthday, and so also look at

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<v Speaker 1>a trial schedule to start the next day in the

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<v Speaker 1>FTC's challenge to amjen Horizon m and A, though that

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<v Speaker 1>case could settle before the trial even starts. Sticking with healthcare,

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<v Speaker 1>Dwyane Wright, our senior healthcare policy analyst, will give us

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<v Speaker 1>his thoughts on the government releasing a list of ten

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<v Speaker 1>Medicare Part D drugs that will be subject to government

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<v Speaker 1>price cuts under the Inflation Reduction Act. We'll then turn

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<v Speaker 1>back to tech and we'll bring in Matt Shettenhelm, who

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<v Speaker 1>covers TMT policy and litigation, and he'll be discussing an

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<v Speaker 1>appeals court decision that he expects soon concerning whether New

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<v Speaker 1>York can set its own broad Bay and rates. Holly Frome,

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<v Speaker 1>who covers litigation and policy in the industrial sector, anticipates

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<v Speaker 1>preliminary approval of three m's twelve point five billion dollars

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<v Speaker 1>settlement in Pfast litigation, and she also expects an appeals

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<v Speaker 1>court decision in three M Earplug litigation, though a pending

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<v Speaker 1>settlement there could moot the appeals court ruling. We'll then

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<v Speaker 1>turn to financials and we'll bring in Nathan Dean, our

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<v Speaker 1>senior financials policy analyst, to discuss an SEC rule that

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<v Speaker 1>was finalized last week that will require more disclosure from

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<v Speaker 1>private funds. Nathan will also discuss President Biden's recent executive

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<v Speaker 1>order that aims to curb investments in certain Chinese industries,

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<v Speaker 1>and then sticking with financials some more, I'll close it

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<v Speaker 1>out with some discussion of an upcoming oral argument in

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<v Speaker 1>one of the remaining cases challenging the profit sweep of

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<v Speaker 1>Fanny Freddie profits to the US Treasury. All of this

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<v Speaker 1>research is available on the Bloomberg terminal at BI go

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<v Speaker 1>And just a quick word about Bloomberg Intelligence for those

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<v Speaker 1>who don't know. We are the investment research platform on

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<v Speaker 1>the Bloomberg terminal, providing in depth research on industries, companies,

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<v Speaker 1>and markets and deliverying key data from BI analysts in

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<v Speaker 1>their given industries. All right, So with all that out

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<v Speaker 1>of the way, let's get started with the actual content. Jen,

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<v Speaker 1>Let's bring you in first to talk antitrust. I know

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<v Speaker 1>you have a super busy fall with a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>antitrust trials on deck, kicking off with this DOJ lawsuit

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<v Speaker 1>against Google over its search business, and then the FTC

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<v Speaker 1>has a trial against Angen and Horizon, though it looks

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<v Speaker 1>like that case is settling. Do you want to come

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<v Speaker 1>in and tell us about these cases.

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<v Speaker 2>Sure, So starting with your birthday trial, Elliott, that Google trial,

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<v Speaker 2>I think that will go forward on September twelfth. And

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<v Speaker 2>this is a lawsuit in which the Department of Justice

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<v Speaker 2>and a group of states sued Google. I'm going to

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<v Speaker 2>call it Google because we're talking about Google Search rather

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<v Speaker 2>than Alphabet, but it sued the company under federal monopolization

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<v Speaker 2>laws for illegally monopolizing Internet search. Now, I always say

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<v Speaker 2>illegally monopolized, because it's not illegal to have a monopoly position.

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<v Speaker 2>But if a company in a monopoly position engages in

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<v Speaker 2>conduct that excludes rivals in a way that harms competition

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<v Speaker 2>and doesn't really have a legitimate pro competitive business justification

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<v Speaker 2>to support it, and this is done in an effort

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<v Speaker 2>to obtain or maintain the monopoly, well then they violated

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<v Speaker 2>the law. And that's what the DOJ, States and states

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<v Speaker 2>have alleged that Google does with respect to search. So

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<v Speaker 2>how exactly does it do this? The allegation is that

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<v Speaker 2>Google's entered multiple agreements in which it pays billions to

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<v Speaker 2>be the default search engine on mobile and desktop devices.

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<v Speaker 2>These are agreements with companies like Apple and OEMs and

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<v Speaker 2>telecoms like Verizon, and the DOJ claims for years this

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<v Speaker 2>has hampered the ability of any other search rival, like Being,

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<v Speaker 2>for instance, to gain scale because to be a really

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<v Speaker 2>good search engine, and the product needs data, and it

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<v Speaker 2>gains data and learning the more searches that are done

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<v Speaker 2>on it. So this has hampered innovation in increased advertising prices. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>I think this is a really tricky case actually, because

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<v Speaker 2>what the law generally holds is that a company can

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<v Speaker 2>enter exclusive agreements with up to about forty percent of

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<v Speaker 2>the available outlets before they've crossed the antitrust line. Because

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<v Speaker 2>once you get tied up more than about forty percent,

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<v Speaker 2>you really start to really foreclose the market from your

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<v Speaker 2>rivals and they can't compete. But the issue here is

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<v Speaker 2>that competitors aren't really foreclosed by Google's agreements because any

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<v Speaker 2>user of any device can go in and change the

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<v Speaker 2>default search. I'm sure some of us have done that.

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<v Speaker 2>I know I do that, and Google hasn't done anything

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<v Speaker 2>to prevent that. So the question here is going to

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<v Speaker 2>be how sticky is that default position, and is this

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<v Speaker 2>real foreclosure, and if it is, does it actually cause

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<v Speaker 2>harm to a market? Since Google's actually quite popular in

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<v Speaker 2>people like the product. So I think this is a

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<v Speaker 2>really close trial because it's going to depend on what

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<v Speaker 2>the evidence shows with respect to those two issues, and

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<v Speaker 2>that remains to be seen. We've got one side that

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<v Speaker 2>say they have evidence that default is sticky and meaningful,

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<v Speaker 2>and we have the other side that says they have

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<v Speaker 2>loads of evidence of rampant consumer switching. So we're gonna

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<v Speaker 2>have to see what comes out at the trial. There's

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<v Speaker 2>one fairly certain prediction I can make, though, and that

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<v Speaker 2>is that if Google loses on liability, it's not going

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<v Speaker 2>to be broken up. That's one of the remedies that

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<v Speaker 2>DJ's requesting here. It is overkill and anti trust injunction

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<v Speaker 2>has to be as nearly tailored as it can to

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<v Speaker 2>fix and target the problem. So I think instead Google

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<v Speaker 2>would be told something like it can't pay for default positions,

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<v Speaker 2>or at least if it does, it has to let

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<v Speaker 2>users know with some sort of communication that they can

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<v Speaker 2>switch and how to do it, or something like that.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm not really sure what it would look like, but

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<v Speaker 2>at that point, the impact on Google will really depend

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<v Speaker 2>on consumer behavior. And then you've got sort of chat

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<v Speaker 2>GPT coming into the picture too that could also change

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of things. Anyway, this trial is going to

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<v Speaker 2>go through early November. I think it'll get a ruling

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<v Speaker 2>in the first quarter, and I think if Google loses,

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<v Speaker 2>it will appeal. And the other anti trust matter that's

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<v Speaker 2>also supposed to go to trial in September, that's on

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<v Speaker 2>the thirteenth. It may not because the settlement is in

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<v Speaker 2>the works. I do think it's likely it's going to settle.

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<v Speaker 2>This is a very different kind of case. It's the

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<v Speaker 2>Federal Trade Commission's challenge to Amgen's acquisition of Horizon. These

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<v Speaker 2>are two biopharma firms, and it's a really unusual lawsuit

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<v Speaker 2>because usually mergers are challenged when they combine two companies

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<v Speaker 2>that compete and the markets would become too concentrated, or

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<v Speaker 2>the deal vertically integrates the buyer in a manner that

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<v Speaker 2>would allow it to foreclose competitors. No merger has really

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<v Speaker 2>been challenged for any other reason in around fifty years,

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<v Speaker 2>but we have neither situation in this case. What the

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<v Speaker 2>FTC says is that Amgen could harm the markets for

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<v Speaker 2>two Horizon drugs that have monopoly position positions, one that

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<v Speaker 2>treats thyroid die disease and one that treats chronic or

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<v Speaker 2>factory gout because it would offer payers PBMs and insurance

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<v Speaker 2>deep rebates for drug bundles that include Horizon drugs, and

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<v Speaker 2>that will block potential entry of competitors to those drugs. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>I think these allegations are really highly speculative. They assume

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<v Speaker 2>new drugs are in development that'll get FDA approved, they'll

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<v Speaker 2>be marketed, they assume they'll be substitutes for the Horizon drugs.

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<v Speaker 2>The evidence doesn't really support that. It also assumes Amgen

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<v Speaker 2>will bundle these two drugs, and it assumes if it does,

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<v Speaker 2>it'll harm competition. So and also, by the way, there's

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<v Speaker 2>no precedent that supports this theory except a few cases

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<v Speaker 2>from the nineteen sixties that have since been rejected. And

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<v Speaker 2>the last most important thing is that Amgen has promised

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<v Speaker 2>to refrain from ever bundling the two drugs and it's

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<v Speaker 2>willing to sign an agreement. So I give the FDC

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<v Speaker 2>only about a five percent chance of winning if they

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<v Speaker 2>actually go to trial here. And I think they understand

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<v Speaker 2>that as well, because last Friday news broke that they

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<v Speaker 2>are discussing a settlement. I suspect it'll be something in

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<v Speaker 2>which Amgen agrees not to bundle the drugs, maybe not

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<v Speaker 2>to bundle even other drugs that it already has, and

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<v Speaker 2>at that point the deal will probably be able to

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<v Speaker 2>close sometime in mid to late September, and I think

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<v Speaker 2>that's probably the route that that will go. So with that,

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<v Speaker 2>back to you, Elliott.

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<v Speaker 1>Great, Thanks Jen. All Right, let's stick with healthcare and

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<v Speaker 1>bring Dwayne in to talk drug pricing. Just this morning,

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<v Speaker 1>the government released its initial list of ten Medicare drugs

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<v Speaker 1>that will be subject to price negotiations under the Inflation

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<v Speaker 1>Reduction Act. So Dwaine, you want to come in and

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<v Speaker 1>tell us more about what happened this morning and what

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<v Speaker 1>the process looks like going forward.

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<v Speaker 3>Sure, thanks Elliott. This is the day that many of

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<v Speaker 3>US health policy nerds have been waiting for, and companies

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<v Speaker 3>manufacturers as well. Keep in mind what we're talking about.

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<v Speaker 3>Inflation Reduction Act past last year includes three big healthcare pieces.

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<v Speaker 3>On the prescription drug side ones the inflation rebate, capping

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<v Speaker 3>price increases, the others a part de redesign and this

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<v Speaker 3>piece which will set prices for those drugs that are

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<v Speaker 3>high expenditure drugs, either those drugs with a list price

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<v Speaker 3>but are used by a lot of people, or those

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<v Speaker 3>drugs that have high price but maybe used by fewer people.

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<v Speaker 3>And so the law requires CMS to look at many

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<v Speaker 3>care spending or expenditures from June one, twenty twenty two

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<v Speaker 3>to May thirty first of this year and come up

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<v Speaker 3>with that list of products that are high expenditure but

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<v Speaker 3>also don't have generic competitors, but are also so many

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<v Speaker 3>years from FDA approval, And so CMS had until Friday,

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<v Speaker 3>September first. They decided to go early to get as

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<v Speaker 3>much press out of this before the Labor Day weekend.

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<v Speaker 3>And the list itself is not a surprise, at least

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<v Speaker 3>to us. Many of us had anticipated that Bristol Myers

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<v Speaker 3>eloquists for blood clots, Chardians for diabetes, Genuvia also for

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<v Speaker 3>diabetes would be on the list, largely because they have

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<v Speaker 3>been consistently high expenditure drugs over the past couple of years.

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<v Speaker 3>There was a bit of a surprise with Stillara from

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<v Speaker 3>Johnson and Johnson. This is a Cronz disease crisis drug

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<v Speaker 3>that we anticipate will have by a similar competition, but

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<v Speaker 3>nevertheless is on the lists. So this is the first

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<v Speaker 3>step identifying that list of drugs that will be subject

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<v Speaker 3>to negotiations that will start October second, and this is

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<v Speaker 3>assuming these companies agree to participate in the process. Now,

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<v Speaker 3>if they do, this will then start a what will

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<v Speaker 3>essentially be a eleventh month eleven month process where CMS

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<v Speaker 3>will hold open forums or the public to participate to

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<v Speaker 3>provide some feedback and input in terms of what the

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<v Speaker 3>fair price should be for these drugs. CMS will have

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<v Speaker 3>a meeting with the manufacturers of these drugs for each

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<v Speaker 3>drug as well, and then we'll see an initial offer

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<v Speaker 3>based on those meetings as well as other information supplied

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<v Speaker 3>by the manufacturers and other stakeholders. We'll see that first

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<v Speaker 3>offer from CMS February first. Manufacturers will then have an

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<v Speaker 3>opportunity to accept the offer or counteroffer, and to the

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<v Speaker 3>extent that there's a counter offer, we can see another

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<v Speaker 3>two meetings between CMS and the manufacturers. This all culminates

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<v Speaker 3>in the August first end of the negotiation process, and

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<v Speaker 3>then September first of twenty twenty four, we'll see CMS

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<v Speaker 3>really the quote unquote maximum fair price for these drugs,

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<v Speaker 3>and this is again based off of conversations with manufacturers

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<v Speaker 3>as well as other data including other types of drugs

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<v Speaker 3>on the market, including the R and D that went

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<v Speaker 3>into it, how much of that has been recouped, and

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<v Speaker 3>then also the cost of manufacturing the drug. Then after

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<v Speaker 3>that March of twenty twenty five, we'll see CMS provide

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<v Speaker 3>their justification for the prices, and then January one, twenty

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<v Speaker 3>twenty six, we will see these prices become effective for

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<v Speaker 3>these drugs. So this is the first step in the process,

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<v Speaker 3>and there's quite a few more steps to go. There's

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<v Speaker 3>of course litigation happening while this process is unfolding, but

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<v Speaker 3>by and large, there weren't any or should say, many

0:13:58.080 --> 0:14:01.480
<v Speaker 3>surprises on this list, but it does set up a

0:14:01.840 --> 0:14:06.200
<v Speaker 3>long eleven month process for CMS and rate setting. So

0:14:07.120 --> 0:14:10.000
<v Speaker 3>with that, I will stop and turn it back to Elliott.

0:14:11.280 --> 0:14:14.880
<v Speaker 1>Great, Thanks Dayne. All right, Matt, let's bring you in

0:14:15.040 --> 0:14:18.520
<v Speaker 1>turn back to tech here. So this is an interesting

0:14:18.520 --> 0:14:20.600
<v Speaker 1>issue you're going to be talking about. Can states like

0:14:20.760 --> 0:14:24.600
<v Speaker 1>New York regulate broadband rates and set their own price caps?

0:14:24.920 --> 0:14:28.120
<v Speaker 1>Obviously the industry is against it, and a key court

0:14:28.200 --> 0:14:30.560
<v Speaker 1>ruling could provide clarity. You want to come in and

0:14:30.600 --> 0:14:31.160
<v Speaker 1>tell us more.

0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:34.200
<v Speaker 4>About that, Yeah, thanks Elliott. You know, from a legal

0:14:34.200 --> 0:14:39.640
<v Speaker 4>and regulatory standpoint, broadband providers like Comcast and Verizon and

0:14:39.720 --> 0:14:42.840
<v Speaker 4>AT and T have had a really nice five years

0:14:42.880 --> 0:14:46.120
<v Speaker 4>because for a while while it looked like the federal

0:14:46.160 --> 0:14:49.400
<v Speaker 4>government and the states were going to try to regulate

0:14:49.680 --> 0:14:53.800
<v Speaker 4>their number one product, broadmand pretty aggressively, those efforts have

0:14:54.600 --> 0:14:58.320
<v Speaker 4>mostly fizzled. At the federal level, the Trump FCC tore

0:14:58.440 --> 0:15:03.000
<v Speaker 4>down its broadband rules, the Biden FCC hasn't been able

0:15:03.000 --> 0:15:05.920
<v Speaker 4>to build them back up, And at the state level,

0:15:05.960 --> 0:15:08.960
<v Speaker 4>things have mostly been quiet, in part because of this

0:15:09.160 --> 0:15:12.720
<v Speaker 4>case which is pending at the Second Circuit about whether

0:15:12.920 --> 0:15:16.880
<v Speaker 4>states like New York can step in and set the

0:15:16.920 --> 0:15:22.240
<v Speaker 4>prices for broadband services now you know, and so both

0:15:22.240 --> 0:15:24.520
<v Speaker 4>of those issues may be returning soon. But I'm going

0:15:24.600 --> 0:15:28.560
<v Speaker 4>to focus on the state level issue because I think

0:15:28.560 --> 0:15:33.280
<v Speaker 4>we could see a decision on New York's policy this month.

0:15:33.840 --> 0:15:36.320
<v Speaker 4>So why does it matter? So if New York wins,

0:15:36.360 --> 0:15:39.520
<v Speaker 4>it really does set an important precedent for other states

0:15:39.600 --> 0:15:43.440
<v Speaker 4>that if they think of broadband providers overcharging or engaging

0:15:43.440 --> 0:15:45.880
<v Speaker 4>in other practices they don't like, they can step in

0:15:45.960 --> 0:15:49.880
<v Speaker 4>with their own state law mandates that could cost you know,

0:15:49.960 --> 0:15:54.240
<v Speaker 4>the companies billions of dollars. Theoretically, this case is about

0:15:54.320 --> 0:15:58.880
<v Speaker 4>New York setting the price of certain broadband products. And

0:15:59.440 --> 0:16:03.320
<v Speaker 4>the case was argued in January, and so that means

0:16:03.360 --> 0:16:05.720
<v Speaker 4>where we're some eight months later, now we're due for

0:16:05.760 --> 0:16:09.920
<v Speaker 4>a decision any time. Who's favored in it. I view

0:16:09.960 --> 0:16:12.960
<v Speaker 4>this as an extremely close case because it turns on

0:16:13.040 --> 0:16:17.280
<v Speaker 4>a very murky legal doctrine, the idea of what's known

0:16:17.280 --> 0:16:21.680
<v Speaker 4>as conflict or obstacle preemption. Preemption cases are pretty easy

0:16:21.720 --> 0:16:25.840
<v Speaker 4>when the federal law is express, when it says, hey, states,

0:16:25.880 --> 0:16:28.640
<v Speaker 4>you can't regulate here, that's easy for courts to deal with.

0:16:29.080 --> 0:16:31.760
<v Speaker 4>This isn't one of those easy cases. It's a case

0:16:31.800 --> 0:16:35.800
<v Speaker 4>of implied preemption where the federal law doesn't say states

0:16:35.840 --> 0:16:39.000
<v Speaker 4>can act, but maybe it's implied because the federal law

0:16:39.120 --> 0:16:44.720
<v Speaker 4>conflicts or is an obstacle to what's going on here.

0:16:44.800 --> 0:16:47.840
<v Speaker 4>So in some judges are skeptical that such a thing

0:16:47.880 --> 0:16:51.080
<v Speaker 4>as implied pre option exists at all. So that makes

0:16:51.120 --> 0:16:55.160
<v Speaker 4>it a very close call. A Republican appointed lower court

0:16:55.240 --> 0:16:58.160
<v Speaker 4>judge ruled for the companies here and block this New

0:16:58.240 --> 0:17:02.200
<v Speaker 4>York law. This appeals being heard by two of three

0:17:02.720 --> 0:17:07.560
<v Speaker 4>Democrat appointed judges Biden nominated judges, and for that reason,

0:17:07.640 --> 0:17:10.359
<v Speaker 4>and based on the questions in January. I give a

0:17:10.359 --> 0:17:15.040
<v Speaker 4>slight edge to the state to prevail here, but it's

0:17:15.160 --> 0:17:18.439
<v Speaker 4>very important to watch this this play out because of

0:17:18.440 --> 0:17:21.240
<v Speaker 4>the president it will set so we'll expect a decision

0:17:21.560 --> 0:17:23.919
<v Speaker 4>you know, very likely in September, if not in the

0:17:23.920 --> 0:17:26.760
<v Speaker 4>fourth quarter. With that, back to you, Elliott.

0:17:27.320 --> 0:17:30.280
<v Speaker 1>Great, thanks Matt. All Right, Holly, let's bring you in

0:17:30.320 --> 0:17:33.080
<v Speaker 1>to talk about a pair of three M cases. The

0:17:33.119 --> 0:17:36.159
<v Speaker 1>first is three m's p Fast litigation, where you expect

0:17:36.240 --> 0:17:39.720
<v Speaker 1>preliminary approval of a twelve point five billion dollars settlement.

0:17:40.200 --> 0:17:44.480
<v Speaker 1>And the second is defective earplug litigation, which also looks

0:17:44.520 --> 0:17:46.600
<v Speaker 1>to be settling, but in which you've been waiting for

0:17:46.680 --> 0:17:49.159
<v Speaker 1>a key appeals court decision. Do you want to come

0:17:49.160 --> 0:17:50.800
<v Speaker 1>in and tell us more about these cases?

0:17:51.280 --> 0:17:55.040
<v Speaker 5>Sure, thanks Elliott. So three M proposed in June a

0:17:55.160 --> 0:17:58.159
<v Speaker 5>ten to twelve point five billion dollars class deal to

0:17:58.240 --> 0:18:02.159
<v Speaker 5>resolve water authority cases over alleged p Fast contamination and

0:18:02.240 --> 0:18:05.760
<v Speaker 5>drinking water. The settlement would resolve all claims by water

0:18:05.800 --> 0:18:10.840
<v Speaker 5>authorities that drinking water contained p Fast contamination. It provided

0:18:10.880 --> 0:18:14.400
<v Speaker 5>for a roughly ten year payout. A bid for preliminary

0:18:14.440 --> 0:18:17.440
<v Speaker 5>approval was filed in July, but a number of states

0:18:17.440 --> 0:18:23.119
<v Speaker 5>filed emotion opposing approval or a letter opposing approval on

0:18:23.200 --> 0:18:26.600
<v Speaker 5>several different grounds, which included that they felt the releases

0:18:26.600 --> 0:18:31.000
<v Speaker 5>and identification obligations of water authorities were too broad. Yesterday,

0:18:31.040 --> 0:18:33.800
<v Speaker 5>States filed a statement that they no longer formally opposed

0:18:33.800 --> 0:18:37.880
<v Speaker 5>the deal after modifications were made. We saw something similar

0:18:37.920 --> 0:18:41.160
<v Speaker 5>happen with another set of companies, Camors, DuPont and Qurteva,

0:18:41.320 --> 0:18:44.120
<v Speaker 5>which were also named in lawsuits over p fast contamination.

0:18:44.640 --> 0:18:47.080
<v Speaker 5>They announced a deal to resolved water authority cases for

0:18:47.160 --> 0:18:51.080
<v Speaker 5>one point two billion dollars. The deal was ultimately revised

0:18:51.160 --> 0:18:56.919
<v Speaker 5>after States had certain objections, and their revised deal after

0:18:57.560 --> 0:19:00.280
<v Speaker 5>it was revised, was approved by the court on a

0:19:00.320 --> 0:19:04.000
<v Speaker 5>relatively quick timetable. We think the same thing can happen here.

0:19:04.359 --> 0:19:07.160
<v Speaker 5>We think three m's deal could obtain preliminary approval, possibly

0:19:07.160 --> 0:19:09.719
<v Speaker 5>as early as three Q. And what then has to

0:19:09.760 --> 0:19:13.120
<v Speaker 5>happen is notices have to be provided to potential class members.

0:19:13.520 --> 0:19:16.240
<v Speaker 5>Class members who don't want to participate have to opt out,

0:19:16.280 --> 0:19:18.399
<v Speaker 5>and that's when we can get an idea of how

0:19:18.440 --> 0:19:23.159
<v Speaker 5>many entities decide to participate. The judge will schedule of

0:19:23.240 --> 0:19:27.520
<v Speaker 5>final approval hearing objections will probably be made. We think

0:19:27.560 --> 0:19:30.600
<v Speaker 5>a number of amenities will opt out, but ultimately the

0:19:30.600 --> 0:19:35.680
<v Speaker 5>deal will obtain final approval and so. In other news,

0:19:36.119 --> 0:19:39.359
<v Speaker 5>THREEM says it reached a six billion dollars deal to

0:19:39.440 --> 0:19:41.720
<v Speaker 5>end more than two hundred and sixty thousand lawsuits over

0:19:41.800 --> 0:19:47.240
<v Speaker 5>defective earplugs. We had said cases could settle for somewhere

0:19:47.320 --> 0:19:50.119
<v Speaker 5>between four point five to nine point five billion, with

0:19:50.200 --> 0:19:53.119
<v Speaker 5>a discrepancy based on the number of cases which would

0:19:53.440 --> 0:19:56.960
<v Speaker 5>actually be pursued. Three AM had said over eighty five

0:19:56.960 --> 0:20:00.320
<v Speaker 5>percent of claimants didn't have actual hearing loss number of

0:20:00.440 --> 0:20:04.200
<v Speaker 5>legitimate claims was in dispute, but that settlement amount is

0:20:04.240 --> 0:20:06.439
<v Speaker 5>within the range that we expected, so we think the

0:20:06.480 --> 0:20:08.440
<v Speaker 5>deal will likely be signed on to you by the

0:20:08.520 --> 0:20:12.200
<v Speaker 5>vast majority of plainifs. We also think THREEM will likely

0:20:12.240 --> 0:20:14.440
<v Speaker 5>lose an appeal of the first bell Wether verdict that's

0:20:14.440 --> 0:20:18.239
<v Speaker 5>pending before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and that

0:20:18.359 --> 0:20:21.520
<v Speaker 5>also is likely an impetus for settlement. Three AM may

0:20:21.560 --> 0:20:24.880
<v Speaker 5>request a delay of that ruling pending finalization, but if

0:20:24.880 --> 0:20:27.560
<v Speaker 5>you can't get a delay, we think they'll lose that appeal,

0:20:27.600 --> 0:20:30.840
<v Speaker 5>and that is also coming probably coming in three Q

0:20:31.520 --> 0:20:33.640
<v Speaker 5>And with that, I'll turn it back to you Elliott.

0:20:36.920 --> 0:20:40.760
<v Speaker 1>Great, thanks Holly. All right, Nathan Dean, let's bring you in.

0:20:41.480 --> 0:20:43.520
<v Speaker 1>When you come in and tell us more about the

0:20:43.560 --> 0:20:46.480
<v Speaker 1>private funds rule that the SEC finalized last week. And

0:20:46.800 --> 0:20:50.400
<v Speaker 1>also you can update us on President Biden's recent executive

0:20:50.480 --> 0:20:53.960
<v Speaker 1>order aiming to curb investments in certain Chinese industries.

0:20:54.320 --> 0:20:57.480
<v Speaker 6>Yeah, so let's start with the SEC. What the SEC is,

0:20:57.480 --> 0:21:02.560
<v Speaker 6>They finalized a rule on disclosure requirements for private funds. Now,

0:21:02.600 --> 0:21:04.920
<v Speaker 6>that may not sound all that interesting, but what this

0:21:05.040 --> 0:21:09.000
<v Speaker 6>does is actually requires hedge funds, private equity funds, and

0:21:09.080 --> 0:21:13.520
<v Speaker 6>a whole host of the other eighteen trillion dollar private

0:21:13.560 --> 0:21:18.399
<v Speaker 6>fund industry to put out standardization or standardized disclosures that

0:21:18.480 --> 0:21:24.879
<v Speaker 6>include things like costs, performance fees, expenses, and so forth.

0:21:25.040 --> 0:21:28.520
<v Speaker 6>Like that. It also requires that if you are an

0:21:28.600 --> 0:21:31.640
<v Speaker 6>investor in a private fund and you get a special

0:21:31.720 --> 0:21:35.760
<v Speaker 6>deal for an early withdrawal or something to that effect,

0:21:36.600 --> 0:21:39.800
<v Speaker 6>the fund itself then needs to give that special deal

0:21:39.880 --> 0:21:45.800
<v Speaker 6>to everybody in the fund. The proposal is also designed

0:21:45.800 --> 0:21:50.399
<v Speaker 6>to take out conflicts of interest. Now, normally a disclosure

0:21:50.520 --> 0:21:53.720
<v Speaker 6>proposal or a disclosure rule isn't all that controversial, but

0:21:53.800 --> 0:21:55.920
<v Speaker 6>this one is a little bit different. The reason being

0:21:56.080 --> 0:22:00.240
<v Speaker 6>is is that a lot of the hedge funds, especially

0:22:00.240 --> 0:22:03.679
<v Speaker 6>the big ones, already do this type of disclosure. Now

0:22:03.720 --> 0:22:06.120
<v Speaker 6>they don't disclosure to the same extent the SEC wants

0:22:06.119 --> 0:22:08.600
<v Speaker 6>it to. But the funds counter and say, look, we're

0:22:08.600 --> 0:22:11.040
<v Speaker 6>already doing this, why should we spend more money. Because

0:22:11.880 --> 0:22:14.800
<v Speaker 6>for the big firms like Carlisle and KKR and so forth,

0:22:14.840 --> 0:22:18.199
<v Speaker 6>this probably isn't all that big of a cost expenditure.

0:22:18.240 --> 0:22:20.080
<v Speaker 6>But for a lot of those smaller funds that are

0:22:20.119 --> 0:22:23.399
<v Speaker 6>out there, this isn't something that they can take lightly.

0:22:23.440 --> 0:22:25.200
<v Speaker 6>I mean, there's going to be a lot of compliance

0:22:25.200 --> 0:22:28.639
<v Speaker 6>and legal and risk costs associated with that. The second

0:22:28.640 --> 0:22:31.840
<v Speaker 6>thing is just disclosure. You're giving up more information and

0:22:31.880 --> 0:22:35.320
<v Speaker 6>a lot of private funds are hence private, and you know,

0:22:35.359 --> 0:22:37.000
<v Speaker 6>there's a lot of folks out there that like to

0:22:37.040 --> 0:22:40.040
<v Speaker 6>try and re engineer or reverse what a hedge fund

0:22:40.119 --> 0:22:42.000
<v Speaker 6>is doing and so forth like that, and the more

0:22:42.040 --> 0:22:44.240
<v Speaker 6>information that is out there, the more information that other

0:22:44.280 --> 0:22:48.159
<v Speaker 6>people get. So we do anticipate a lawsuit coming, at

0:22:48.240 --> 0:22:51.359
<v Speaker 6>least given based off of comments from the industry, that

0:22:51.440 --> 0:22:54.960
<v Speaker 6>lawsuit could come fairly quickly. Elliot can always tell you

0:22:54.960 --> 0:22:58.600
<v Speaker 6>offline how the SEC is challenged these days in terms

0:22:58.640 --> 0:23:01.119
<v Speaker 6>of lawsuits, so don't don't be surprised if that one

0:23:01.200 --> 0:23:04.000
<v Speaker 6>comes out now when it comes to President Biden's executive

0:23:04.119 --> 0:23:08.480
<v Speaker 6>order on China, earlier in August, he signed an executive

0:23:08.560 --> 0:23:12.840
<v Speaker 6>order that would prohibit and or limit used investments in

0:23:12.960 --> 0:23:22.080
<v Speaker 6>certain Chinese sectors. These sectors are quantum computing, artificial intelligence, semiconductors,

0:23:22.160 --> 0:23:29.680
<v Speaker 6>and microelectronics. Now the prohibitions are for semiconductors, microelectronics, and

0:23:29.800 --> 0:23:34.720
<v Speaker 6>quantum computing. The limitations are primarily for the artificial intelligence,

0:23:34.720 --> 0:23:37.439
<v Speaker 6>at least that's my view based off of how the

0:23:37.560 --> 0:23:41.399
<v Speaker 6>order was put out. There's two things to note though,

0:23:41.440 --> 0:23:44.200
<v Speaker 6>as you're trying to dissect what this order means. One

0:23:45.240 --> 0:23:48.639
<v Speaker 6>is that this order doesn't take effect day one. This

0:23:48.840 --> 0:23:51.840
<v Speaker 6>order directs the Department of Treasury to issue a proposal,

0:23:51.880 --> 0:23:55.159
<v Speaker 6>which they did on day one, that would then go

0:23:55.200 --> 0:24:00.120
<v Speaker 6>and implement this. But proposals change, and so that proposal'll

0:24:00.119 --> 0:24:02.800
<v Speaker 6>probably be finalized sometime in their first half of twenty

0:24:02.840 --> 0:24:06.119
<v Speaker 6>twenty four, and then we'll go effective after that. But

0:24:06.359 --> 0:24:09.000
<v Speaker 6>you know, presidents can always change their mind, especially when

0:24:09.000 --> 0:24:12.280
<v Speaker 6>they're dealing with a trade partner. Is as important as China.

0:24:12.760 --> 0:24:14.640
<v Speaker 6>The second other piece to note is that the US

0:24:14.720 --> 0:24:19.120
<v Speaker 6>exposure to China is somewhat limited. From the hedge fund analysis,

0:24:19.240 --> 0:24:21.920
<v Speaker 6>or at least the alternative asset manager analysis that we've

0:24:21.960 --> 0:24:24.320
<v Speaker 6>been doing. Most of the big ones, at least the

0:24:24.320 --> 0:24:27.480
<v Speaker 6>publicly traded ones have less than five percent exposure to

0:24:27.560 --> 0:24:30.720
<v Speaker 6>Chinese assets and they've been very cautious on China over

0:24:30.760 --> 0:24:34.520
<v Speaker 6>the last few years. This does nothing to impact supply chain.

0:24:34.840 --> 0:24:39.479
<v Speaker 6>This is solely US investments in China, so overall we

0:24:39.520 --> 0:24:44.120
<v Speaker 6>anticipate a very limited impact, but as with all things proposals,

0:24:44.400 --> 0:24:47.120
<v Speaker 6>things could change within the next nine months. So Elliott,

0:24:47.200 --> 0:24:47.680
<v Speaker 6>back to you.

0:24:48.000 --> 0:24:52.840
<v Speaker 1>Great, thanks Nathan. All right, so I'll close things out

0:24:53.000 --> 0:24:57.720
<v Speaker 1>with this Fanni Freddi litigation that is one of the

0:24:57.720 --> 0:25:01.000
<v Speaker 1>few remaining lawsuits by Fanny Freddi invest there's challenging the

0:25:01.000 --> 0:25:04.760
<v Speaker 1>sweep of profits to the US Treasury. We have appeal

0:25:04.960 --> 0:25:09.119
<v Speaker 1>oral arguments on September eighth, following the trial court's November

0:25:09.200 --> 0:25:13.840
<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty two ruling that dismissed the case. Shareholders are

0:25:13.920 --> 0:25:17.560
<v Speaker 1>essentially asking the court to eliminate the government's roughly three

0:25:17.640 --> 0:25:22.200
<v Speaker 1>hundred billion dollars liquidation preference in Fanni May and Freddie Mack,

0:25:22.720 --> 0:25:25.119
<v Speaker 1>And the crux of the shareholders' argument is that the

0:25:25.160 --> 0:25:28.920
<v Speaker 1>government would have ended its ownership stake in the companies

0:25:29.000 --> 0:25:33.159
<v Speaker 1>during the Trump administration if President Trump had been allowed

0:25:33.200 --> 0:25:37.040
<v Speaker 1>to remove the FHFA director prior to the Supreme Court

0:25:37.119 --> 0:25:41.400
<v Speaker 1>ruling on that issue in twenty twenty one. We continue

0:25:41.440 --> 0:25:43.679
<v Speaker 1>to give the government the edge in this case. We

0:25:43.760 --> 0:25:47.560
<v Speaker 1>think they're eighty percent likely to win, either by winning

0:25:47.640 --> 0:25:51.840
<v Speaker 1>this particular appeal or later on summary judgment if the

0:25:51.880 --> 0:25:57.040
<v Speaker 1>appeals court winds up reversing the trial court's dismissal. At

0:25:57.040 --> 0:25:59.399
<v Speaker 1>the end of the day, we think shareholders argument about

0:25:59.400 --> 0:26:03.480
<v Speaker 1>what the Trump administration would have done in an alternative

0:26:03.560 --> 0:26:06.520
<v Speaker 1>universe where there was no removal restriction, we think that's

0:26:06.600 --> 0:26:10.439
<v Speaker 1>just too speculative to prevail. And we also think that

0:26:10.480 --> 0:26:13.359
<v Speaker 1>a letter that President Trump wrote in November twenty twenty

0:26:13.400 --> 0:26:16.239
<v Speaker 1>one saying that he would have fired mel Watt, the

0:26:16.320 --> 0:26:19.400
<v Speaker 1>FHFA director, and he would have ended the sweep if

0:26:19.440 --> 0:26:22.439
<v Speaker 1>he could have. We think that that letter, you know,

0:26:22.480 --> 0:26:25.720
<v Speaker 1>it's really just designed for litigation, and we think that

0:26:25.880 --> 0:26:30.199
<v Speaker 1>sort of undermines its intended effect. So we'll be watching

0:26:30.240 --> 0:26:33.800
<v Speaker 1>that or argument on September eighth. We'll have an update

0:26:33.920 --> 0:26:37.879
<v Speaker 1>after that. You know, with any tea leave reading that

0:26:38.240 --> 0:26:41.760
<v Speaker 1>we can lean from the argument. But for now, I

0:26:41.800 --> 0:26:45.120
<v Speaker 1>think we will wrap up this episode of Votes and Verdicts.

0:26:45.560 --> 0:26:48.919
<v Speaker 1>As always, thank you for listening, and as a reminder,

0:26:49.240 --> 0:26:51.600
<v Speaker 1>you can find all of our research on the Bloomberg

0:26:51.680 --> 0:26:55.879
<v Speaker 1>terminal at b I Go, and we encourage you to

0:26:55.920 --> 0:26:58.920
<v Speaker 1>reach out to us with any questions that you may have.

0:26:59.200 --> 0:27:01.600
<v Speaker 1>We also encourage you to listen to other episodes of

0:27:01.640 --> 0:27:04.600
<v Speaker 1>Votes and Verdicts on whatever platform you'd like to get

0:27:04.640 --> 0:27:07.960
<v Speaker 1>your favorite podcasts. So thank you for listening and have

0:27:08.040 --> 0:27:10.200
<v Speaker 1>a great day.