1 00:00:01,720 --> 00:00:08,000 Speaker 1: As media. Hey everyone, Robert Evans here, Welcome to It 2 00:00:08,039 --> 00:00:10,959 Speaker 1: could happen here, as I'm sure you're aware, at this 3 00:00:11,080 --> 00:00:14,040 Speaker 1: point over the weekend, somewhere between five hundred and one 4 00:00:14,040 --> 00:00:17,720 Speaker 1: thousand Hamas fighters. Those numbers have a lot of flex 5 00:00:17,800 --> 00:00:20,200 Speaker 1: in them. It's really unclear at this moment that just 6 00:00:20,320 --> 00:00:22,680 Speaker 1: kind of my guess, based on what I've seen so far, 7 00:00:23,239 --> 00:00:26,880 Speaker 1: carried out a successful infiltration and sneak attack across a 8 00:00:26,920 --> 00:00:30,160 Speaker 1: wide swath of the Israeli border. Their methods were varied 9 00:00:30,200 --> 00:00:33,199 Speaker 1: from motorized hang gliders and boats to mobile columns of 10 00:00:33,200 --> 00:00:36,839 Speaker 1: technicals and bulldozers, which they used to breach fence lines. 11 00:00:37,360 --> 00:00:40,560 Speaker 1: Surprise seems to have been nearly total. In their worst 12 00:00:40,600 --> 00:00:44,519 Speaker 1: intelligence failure since the nineteen seventies, many IDF troops were 13 00:00:44,560 --> 00:00:48,320 Speaker 1: caught literally in their underwear. Casualties seem to have been 14 00:00:48,400 --> 00:00:51,760 Speaker 1: highest among the police, who were unprepared for militants armed 15 00:00:51,800 --> 00:00:56,520 Speaker 1: with conventional military weapons. Casualty accounts remain heavily in flux, 16 00:00:56,560 --> 00:00:59,080 Speaker 1: so I will not labor over them here. Suffice to 17 00:00:59,080 --> 00:01:01,400 Speaker 1: say that the best information at the time that I'm 18 00:01:01,400 --> 00:01:04,200 Speaker 1: writing this suggests at least a thousand dead in the 19 00:01:04,240 --> 00:01:07,640 Speaker 1: first day or so of fighting. It appears at the 20 00:01:07,720 --> 00:01:11,520 Speaker 1: moment to be fairly evenly split between Israeli soldiers, police 21 00:01:11,560 --> 00:01:15,919 Speaker 1: and civilians, as well as Hamas fighters and Palestinian civilians. 22 00:01:16,480 --> 00:01:19,280 Speaker 1: We can expect the death toll among Palestinians to rise 23 00:01:19,319 --> 00:01:23,520 Speaker 1: steadily in the near future as the bombing of Gaza escalates. 24 00:01:23,880 --> 00:01:26,039 Speaker 1: It is very clear though, that the Hamas did not 25 00:01:26,120 --> 00:01:29,679 Speaker 1: strike only military targets, and Israelis and Palestinians are not 26 00:01:29,720 --> 00:01:32,800 Speaker 1: the only people killed right now. There are reports coming 27 00:01:32,800 --> 00:01:35,080 Speaker 1: in that a music festival, it was some sort of 28 00:01:35,080 --> 00:01:39,400 Speaker 1: sytrance psychedelia festival in southern Israel on land that was 29 00:01:39,520 --> 00:01:44,640 Speaker 1: possibly illegally occupied, was attacked by Hamas militants. Something like 30 00:01:44,680 --> 00:01:47,960 Speaker 1: two hundred and sixty people are confirmed to have been killed. 31 00:01:48,200 --> 00:01:51,120 Speaker 1: There's pretty hideous video of a young German woman in 32 00:01:51,120 --> 00:01:55,280 Speaker 1: her twenties, her corpse stripped, being paraded around by fighters. 33 00:01:55,720 --> 00:01:59,920 Speaker 1: It's very ugly stuff. There's also unclear videos of other killing. 34 00:02:00,160 --> 00:02:03,040 Speaker 1: I've seen one video of a man beating another man's 35 00:02:03,080 --> 00:02:05,960 Speaker 1: head in it's claimed to be a Hummas militant and 36 00:02:06,000 --> 00:02:09,680 Speaker 1: civilian clothes beating a Filipino guest worker in Israel to death. 37 00:02:10,000 --> 00:02:12,840 Speaker 1: There's no actual evidence that I've seen as to who 38 00:02:13,040 --> 00:02:15,800 Speaker 1: either person in the video is, and a lot of 39 00:02:15,840 --> 00:02:18,280 Speaker 1: the videos of horrible things that are spreading right now 40 00:02:18,320 --> 00:02:22,160 Speaker 1: are just that, videos that definitely show violence, but that 41 00:02:22,320 --> 00:02:25,800 Speaker 1: are extremely unclear as to who is perpetrating the violence 42 00:02:25,919 --> 00:02:29,320 Speaker 1: and why. We do, of course, know that Hummas targeted 43 00:02:29,360 --> 00:02:32,480 Speaker 1: a number of civilians. A significant number were killed, including 44 00:02:32,520 --> 00:02:36,200 Speaker 1: people in their homes, and unknown numbers of people were 45 00:02:36,480 --> 00:02:39,760 Speaker 1: kidnapped and taken back across the border to be ransomed 46 00:02:39,840 --> 00:02:43,720 Speaker 1: later for imprisoned fighters and Palestinian civilians. This has happened 47 00:02:43,760 --> 00:02:48,679 Speaker 1: before in previous escalations of conflict in the area. It's 48 00:02:48,720 --> 00:02:50,760 Speaker 1: not a new tactic. In The videos of it are, 49 00:02:50,800 --> 00:02:53,600 Speaker 1: of course horrifying. The capturing and killing of civilians is 50 00:02:53,639 --> 00:02:57,040 Speaker 1: by any definition of the term, a war crime. Israel's 51 00:02:57,040 --> 00:02:59,560 Speaker 1: response has been horrifying as well, and writ on a 52 00:02:59,680 --> 00:03:03,160 Speaker 1: larger scale. Significant chunks of Gaza have already been leveled 53 00:03:03,160 --> 00:03:06,240 Speaker 1: in airstrikes. At least one hospital has been targeted, killing 54 00:03:06,320 --> 00:03:09,440 Speaker 1: a nurse. Israel has cut off power to Gasam, an 55 00:03:09,480 --> 00:03:13,280 Speaker 1: active collective punishment that also qualifies as a war crime. 56 00:03:13,480 --> 00:03:16,440 Speaker 1: That term has less weight than it used to these days. 57 00:03:16,919 --> 00:03:19,400 Speaker 1: Many of US in the West grew up with illusions 58 00:03:19,440 --> 00:03:22,799 Speaker 1: about a rules based international order. The crimes occurring now 59 00:03:22,880 --> 00:03:25,639 Speaker 1: will continue to erode the idea that war might ever 60 00:03:25,680 --> 00:03:29,360 Speaker 1: have limits. Like white water cutting a path through stone. 61 00:03:29,400 --> 00:03:31,600 Speaker 1: I try to stay plugged into such things, and I 62 00:03:31,639 --> 00:03:34,680 Speaker 1: become aware of this most recent eruption as it happened. 63 00:03:35,360 --> 00:03:38,280 Speaker 1: I spent several hours trying to understand the early open 64 00:03:38,320 --> 00:03:41,440 Speaker 1: source intelligence, watching people that I trusted in the region 65 00:03:41,560 --> 00:03:44,760 Speaker 1: post videos that they could verify, and then I went 66 00:03:44,760 --> 00:03:47,960 Speaker 1: to sleep. When I woke up, I saw the expected 67 00:03:48,080 --> 00:03:51,960 Speaker 1: river of bloodthirst on social media. This is also nothing new. 68 00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:55,120 Speaker 1: The Internet has not created this behavior. You may have 69 00:03:55,200 --> 00:03:57,080 Speaker 1: read when you were in high school that early in 70 00:03:57,120 --> 00:03:59,800 Speaker 1: the US Civil War, picnicking civilians would show up to 71 00:03:59,800 --> 00:04:04,400 Speaker 1: awe the Battle of Manassas. Certain aspects of online culture have, however, 72 00:04:04,600 --> 00:04:08,160 Speaker 1: lent a deeper ugliness to the affair. I noticed this 73 00:04:08,200 --> 00:04:11,040 Speaker 1: for the first time during the fighting against ISIS. I 74 00:04:11,120 --> 00:04:13,920 Speaker 1: reported from Moses several times and kept up with various 75 00:04:13,920 --> 00:04:17,679 Speaker 1: Telegram channels, WhatsApp groups, and Twitter accounts that shared footage 76 00:04:17,680 --> 00:04:21,120 Speaker 1: and updates from the field. A subculture developed around this, 77 00:04:21,279 --> 00:04:24,840 Speaker 1: fueled by a mix of professional seeking intel and amateurs, 78 00:04:25,000 --> 00:04:27,560 Speaker 1: some of whom later became experts, and others of whom 79 00:04:27,600 --> 00:04:31,360 Speaker 1: simply liked watching the violence. All of us experienced a 80 00:04:31,400 --> 00:04:36,279 Speaker 1: degree of desensitization, and Gallo's humor was common. Researchers would 81 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:40,960 Speaker 1: share their favorite Isis nasheeds effectively Jihati theme music, and 82 00:04:41,040 --> 00:04:43,760 Speaker 1: throw Arabic phrases that they'd read in issues of Debique 83 00:04:43,760 --> 00:04:48,359 Speaker 1: Isis's magazine into daily conversation. Lines of dialogue from different 84 00:04:48,480 --> 00:04:52,200 Speaker 1: videos of combat became catchphrases. The best known of these 85 00:04:52,320 --> 00:04:54,880 Speaker 1: was probably a video released in April of twenty sixteen, 86 00:04:54,960 --> 00:04:58,120 Speaker 1: which showed a group of four ISIS fighters battling Kurdish 87 00:04:58,120 --> 00:05:01,919 Speaker 1: troops north of Mosl. These guys were not overly familiar 88 00:05:02,000 --> 00:05:04,480 Speaker 1: with their weaponry, much of which had recently been looted 89 00:05:04,480 --> 00:05:07,680 Speaker 1: from Iraqi army stores. One of the fighters in the video, 90 00:05:07,960 --> 00:05:11,560 Speaker 1: Abu Hajar, fucks up constantly, at one point roasting his 91 00:05:11,640 --> 00:05:14,040 Speaker 1: own men with the back blast of a rocket launcher. 92 00:05:14,240 --> 00:05:16,680 Speaker 1: The timing on it is pretty perfect, and it's basically 93 00:05:16,720 --> 00:05:20,240 Speaker 1: impossible not to laugh a little at this. His comrade 94 00:05:20,279 --> 00:05:23,360 Speaker 1: shouts a now infamous line at him, what is wrong 95 00:05:23,400 --> 00:05:27,400 Speaker 1: with you? Abu Hajar? The man who filmed the video dies, 96 00:05:27,440 --> 00:05:29,440 Speaker 1: of course, and so did a bunch of other people 97 00:05:29,480 --> 00:05:32,560 Speaker 1: that day. Now, these guys are ices fighters, so it 98 00:05:32,600 --> 00:05:34,640 Speaker 1: wasn't hard to laugh at the footage and move on. 99 00:05:34,920 --> 00:05:37,719 Speaker 1: I did, and so did many other people. I still 100 00:05:38,160 --> 00:05:41,039 Speaker 1: chuckle sometimes at it. Of late, though I've come to 101 00:05:41,080 --> 00:05:45,000 Speaker 1: find the laughter more unsettling. This started after the expanded 102 00:05:45,080 --> 00:05:49,000 Speaker 1: Russian invasion of Ukraine. I began to see videos of wounded, dying, 103 00:05:49,040 --> 00:05:53,560 Speaker 1: and dead Russian conscripts. These were often close in gory shots, 104 00:05:53,560 --> 00:05:57,599 Speaker 1: devoid of broader information, and shot purely for entertainments. One 105 00:05:57,640 --> 00:06:00,400 Speaker 1: thing to watch combat videos in which people die, if 106 00:06:00,400 --> 00:06:03,200 Speaker 1: it gives you an understanding of the nature of combat 107 00:06:03,320 --> 00:06:05,640 Speaker 1: in that theater of war, the kinds of weapons used, 108 00:06:05,640 --> 00:06:08,840 Speaker 1: the efficacy of certain tactics. It's another to just look 109 00:06:08,920 --> 00:06:12,360 Speaker 1: at a bleeding teenager as he slowly dies and joke 110 00:06:12,440 --> 00:06:15,040 Speaker 1: about it. Now, some of the folks who were laughing 111 00:06:15,080 --> 00:06:18,640 Speaker 1: are people I knew Ukrainian civilians and volunteers, and I 112 00:06:18,760 --> 00:06:21,080 Speaker 1: cannot blame them, and do not blame them for taking 113 00:06:21,160 --> 00:06:24,120 Speaker 1: satisfaction or even mirth in the death of an invader. 114 00:06:24,640 --> 00:06:27,320 Speaker 1: That is how war works. That is how war has 115 00:06:27,440 --> 00:06:30,520 Speaker 1: always worked. It is foolish and cruel to ask for 116 00:06:30,600 --> 00:06:34,280 Speaker 1: decorum from people under siege. I'm sure many Gazans feel 117 00:06:34,279 --> 00:06:36,960 Speaker 1: the same about footage now flooding the Internet from this 118 00:06:37,080 --> 00:06:40,480 Speaker 1: most recent attack. But many of the people cheering at 119 00:06:40,520 --> 00:06:44,280 Speaker 1: dead Russian conscripts were not soldiers and not civilians who 120 00:06:44,360 --> 00:06:47,520 Speaker 1: were being shelled by that state, but were random Americans, 121 00:06:47,600 --> 00:06:51,080 Speaker 1: middle class, suburban war aficionados far from the danger, who 122 00:06:51,120 --> 00:06:53,120 Speaker 1: spent time, who took a moment from their day to 123 00:06:53,400 --> 00:06:57,400 Speaker 1: joke about suffering soldiers in a foreign country. A mirror 124 00:06:57,480 --> 00:07:01,200 Speaker 1: of that behavior now proliferates as well. It curdled my 125 00:07:01,279 --> 00:07:04,520 Speaker 1: gut then, and it still does. But my feelings here 126 00:07:04,560 --> 00:07:07,720 Speaker 1: are immaterial. I have come to believe that this behavior 127 00:07:07,800 --> 00:07:10,760 Speaker 1: is impossible to avoid or even mitigate. To a very 128 00:07:10,760 --> 00:07:15,640 Speaker 1: substantial degree. It also appears to be nearly universal. Social 129 00:07:15,680 --> 00:07:29,240 Speaker 1: media has made barbarism easier than ever to monetize. As 130 00:07:29,240 --> 00:07:31,600 Speaker 1: the years have gone on, every new eruption of violence 131 00:07:31,640 --> 00:07:35,000 Speaker 1: around the world brings with it more footage faster ocent 132 00:07:35,240 --> 00:07:38,960 Speaker 1: open source intelligence accounts have gone from a niche obsession 133 00:07:39,040 --> 00:07:43,760 Speaker 1: among reporters and conflict nerds to mainstream entertainment. Because views 134 00:07:43,880 --> 00:07:47,360 Speaker 1: equal money, especially on Twitter, where Elon Musk pays people 135 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:49,800 Speaker 1: based on the engagement they get. There is now a 136 00:07:49,880 --> 00:07:53,080 Speaker 1: financial incentive to post videos that will be shared widely, 137 00:07:53,160 --> 00:07:55,480 Speaker 1: and as always, the stuff that is shared most widely 138 00:07:55,800 --> 00:07:59,280 Speaker 1: is the stuff that makes people angry. Videos need not 139 00:07:59,400 --> 00:08:03,280 Speaker 1: be truthful to spread. In some cases, this means reposting 140 00:08:03,360 --> 00:08:06,080 Speaker 1: old footage as if it is new. This is particularly 141 00:08:06,160 --> 00:08:09,280 Speaker 1: easy with the conflict in Gaza, since Israel has launched 142 00:08:09,320 --> 00:08:12,320 Speaker 1: so many strikes against it over the years. One video 143 00:08:12,400 --> 00:08:14,760 Speaker 1: of a building crumbling into rubble left or a missile 144 00:08:14,760 --> 00:08:17,240 Speaker 1: strike is as good as another to the rats scrambling 145 00:08:17,280 --> 00:08:21,920 Speaker 1: for Elon Musk's pocket change. Many viral disinformation videos are 146 00:08:21,960 --> 00:08:24,920 Speaker 1: just clips from the check video game Arma two. For 147 00:08:25,000 --> 00:08:28,440 Speaker 1: roughly a decade, footage of in game combat has gone viral, 148 00:08:28,760 --> 00:08:31,920 Speaker 1: netting followers and sometimes money for all manner of shady figures. 149 00:08:31,960 --> 00:08:34,480 Speaker 1: If you see video that's claimed to be an Israeli 150 00:08:34,480 --> 00:08:37,920 Speaker 1: helicopter or a Russian helicopter or an American helicopter being 151 00:08:37,920 --> 00:08:41,640 Speaker 1: shot down in some erupting field, you should really double 152 00:08:41,720 --> 00:08:43,920 Speaker 1: check that, because there's always a very good chance that 153 00:08:43,920 --> 00:08:46,160 Speaker 1: it's a clip from this video game of a chopper 154 00:08:46,200 --> 00:08:48,520 Speaker 1: going down, or of some other kind of military vehicle 155 00:08:48,600 --> 00:08:51,920 Speaker 1: being taken out. In real warfare, it's quite rare to 156 00:08:52,000 --> 00:08:54,360 Speaker 1: get footage at a good angle and close to that 157 00:08:54,440 --> 00:08:56,840 Speaker 1: sort of thing. So anytime you see footage that seems 158 00:08:56,880 --> 00:09:00,160 Speaker 1: like it might be too good to be real, it 159 00:09:00,200 --> 00:09:04,280 Speaker 1: probably is. Such disinformation is of course unsightly, but that's 160 00:09:04,320 --> 00:09:06,760 Speaker 1: not all it is. It can provoke violence as well. 161 00:09:07,160 --> 00:09:10,400 Speaker 1: A recent New York Times article on social media disinformation 162 00:09:10,520 --> 00:09:14,160 Speaker 1: makes this clear quote. The Times found several pieces of 163 00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:18,280 Speaker 1: misinformation that spread out across Israelian Palestinian neighborhood and activist 164 00:09:18,280 --> 00:09:20,880 Speaker 1: WhatsApp groups this week. One which appeared as a block 165 00:09:20,920 --> 00:09:23,760 Speaker 1: of Hebrew text or an audio file, contained a warning 166 00:09:23,800 --> 00:09:27,240 Speaker 1: that Palestinian mobs were preparing to descend on Israeli civilians. 167 00:09:27,600 --> 00:09:30,960 Speaker 1: Palestinians are coming. Parents, Protect your children, read the message, 168 00:09:31,000 --> 00:09:34,320 Speaker 1: which pointed specifically to several suburban areas north of Tel Aviv. 169 00:09:34,760 --> 00:09:36,840 Speaker 1: Thousands of people were in one of the telegram groups 170 00:09:36,880 --> 00:09:39,000 Speaker 1: where the post was shared. The post then appeared in 171 00:09:39,000 --> 00:09:42,640 Speaker 1: several WhatsApp groups, which had dozens to hundreds of members. Now, 172 00:09:42,920 --> 00:09:45,920 Speaker 1: there were no reports of violence in the areas mentioned 173 00:09:46,040 --> 00:09:48,559 Speaker 1: in this post. This kind of thing happens all over 174 00:09:48,600 --> 00:09:50,840 Speaker 1: the world and has been happening for years, and the 175 00:09:50,840 --> 00:09:53,880 Speaker 1: fact that it's untrue does not stop similar viral lies 176 00:09:53,920 --> 00:09:57,720 Speaker 1: from inspiring and justifying mass violence in places like India 177 00:09:57,760 --> 00:10:01,400 Speaker 1: and Meanmar. In both those countries, much of this targeted 178 00:10:01,400 --> 00:10:04,880 Speaker 1: disinformation was posted at the direct behest of state security 179 00:10:04,880 --> 00:10:08,360 Speaker 1: agencies to further their efforts at genocide. None of this 180 00:10:08,440 --> 00:10:10,840 Speaker 1: is new. It all just works much faster thanks to 181 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:14,800 Speaker 1: social media. The one truly significant change in recent months 182 00:10:14,880 --> 00:10:17,440 Speaker 1: has been the addition of a direct profit motive to 183 00:10:17,480 --> 00:10:20,600 Speaker 1: sharing lies. The best recent example of this is a 184 00:10:20,600 --> 00:10:24,000 Speaker 1: fellow named Mario Naffall. He's a con artist and a 185 00:10:24,040 --> 00:10:26,920 Speaker 1: crypto scammer who embezzled from his own company and has 186 00:10:26,920 --> 00:10:31,080 Speaker 1: built a massive following retweeting out of context videos starting 187 00:10:31,080 --> 00:10:35,000 Speaker 1: with the Wagner rebellion in Russia. Earlier this year. Elon Musk, 188 00:10:35,040 --> 00:10:39,040 Speaker 1: whose ignorance of that conflict is unsurpassed, called Naffall's messages 189 00:10:39,200 --> 00:10:43,120 Speaker 1: the best coverage I've seen so far. More recently, marion 190 00:10:43,160 --> 00:10:46,360 Speaker 1: Na Fall has been responsible for spreading fake news about 191 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:49,880 Speaker 1: the potential capture of Nimrod Alone, who is the commander 192 00:10:49,920 --> 00:10:53,640 Speaker 1: of Israel's Southern forces in the region. The video that 193 00:10:53,720 --> 00:10:57,160 Speaker 1: he claimed was Nimrod alone being taken into captivity was 194 00:10:57,200 --> 00:11:01,680 Speaker 1: in fact a completely different persons, actually unclear who. Mario 195 00:11:01,760 --> 00:11:04,640 Speaker 1: does not know anything about anything, and I think was 196 00:11:04,760 --> 00:11:08,240 Speaker 1: just lying because that would be the most salacious thing possible. 197 00:11:08,760 --> 00:11:11,600 Speaker 1: It's also worth noting that Elon Musk recently made a 198 00:11:11,679 --> 00:11:16,000 Speaker 1: post highlighting a couple of ocent accounts that were his recommendations, 199 00:11:16,000 --> 00:11:18,920 Speaker 1: his picks for credible people to report on the conflict, 200 00:11:18,960 --> 00:11:21,760 Speaker 1: and you should follow these folks. He then deleted part 201 00:11:21,800 --> 00:11:24,200 Speaker 1: of that tweet and self censored himself when one of 202 00:11:24,200 --> 00:11:26,760 Speaker 1: the sources he had picked referred to dead Hamas fighters 203 00:11:26,760 --> 00:11:29,960 Speaker 1: as martyrs, which Elon had an issue with. Clearly, what 204 00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:33,120 Speaker 1: he's doing is attempting to pick and set his own 205 00:11:33,360 --> 00:11:37,160 Speaker 1: propaganda dispensers, you know, the people that, for whatever reason 206 00:11:37,200 --> 00:11:41,360 Speaker 1: he thinks, are providing the most convenient narrative about what's happening. 207 00:11:41,760 --> 00:11:45,320 Speaker 1: None of this should be mistaken for actual news. It 208 00:11:45,400 --> 00:11:48,160 Speaker 1: is likely that much, perhaps most, of the footage on 209 00:11:48,280 --> 00:11:51,240 Speaker 1: your timeline from the fighting in Gaza and Israel is 210 00:11:51,360 --> 00:11:54,040 Speaker 1: reposted video that is not current. Obviously, there is a 211 00:11:54,040 --> 00:11:56,760 Speaker 1: lot of current footage going out right now too, But 212 00:11:56,840 --> 00:12:00,439 Speaker 1: a significant amount of it is not. I find this exastspirating, 213 00:12:00,600 --> 00:12:03,680 Speaker 1: even as I wonder how much that really matters. Is 214 00:12:03,840 --> 00:12:07,120 Speaker 1: sharing old footage of civilian homes being leveled by Israeli 215 00:12:07,160 --> 00:12:10,240 Speaker 1: missiles really an issue when similar homes are being bombed 216 00:12:10,280 --> 00:12:13,560 Speaker 1: at the same time. I do still think so, but 217 00:12:13,600 --> 00:12:15,600 Speaker 1: I'm no longer sure that my feelings on the matter 218 00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:20,200 Speaker 1: are quite rational. The most commonly accepted definition of intelligence 219 00:12:20,280 --> 00:12:23,320 Speaker 1: of intellect that you'll find is the ability to adapt 220 00:12:23,320 --> 00:12:27,560 Speaker 1: to change and select environments, or the ability to deal 221 00:12:27,640 --> 00:12:31,120 Speaker 1: with change in your environment. If that is truly the 222 00:12:31,120 --> 00:12:35,000 Speaker 1: best measure of intelligence, then my discussed at disinformation makes 223 00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:38,400 Speaker 1: me kind of stupid. Its purveyors have had blinding success 224 00:12:38,480 --> 00:12:41,080 Speaker 1: in using it to push their own narratives and to 225 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:45,800 Speaker 1: shape reality. I use the word barbarism earlier to describe this, 226 00:12:45,920 --> 00:12:48,960 Speaker 1: and it's a loaded word, but not nearly so loaded 227 00:12:49,000 --> 00:12:53,880 Speaker 1: as its synonym, savagery. Savagery is a word that inspires 228 00:12:53,920 --> 00:12:56,959 Speaker 1: powerful emotions for good reason. It was often used by 229 00:12:56,960 --> 00:13:00,360 Speaker 1: white supremacist colonizers to paint whole peoples as bad, backwards 230 00:13:00,400 --> 00:13:03,480 Speaker 1: and less human, especially when they engaged in acts of 231 00:13:03,520 --> 00:13:07,200 Speaker 1: resistance that were in reality no bloodier or more violent 232 00:13:07,280 --> 00:13:10,959 Speaker 1: than the acts being perpetrated against them. The word predates 233 00:13:11,000 --> 00:13:14,360 Speaker 1: European colonialism, though it seems to date back to around 234 00:13:14,400 --> 00:13:18,080 Speaker 1: thirteen hundred, and it entered French salvage like the Cologne 235 00:13:18,160 --> 00:13:22,480 Speaker 1: Johnny depphawks from the Latin salvaticus, which literally means of 236 00:13:22,559 --> 00:13:26,240 Speaker 1: the woods. Why this digression because in two thousand and four, 237 00:13:26,280 --> 00:13:29,880 Speaker 1: an Islamist strategist named Abu Baker Naji published a book 238 00:13:29,920 --> 00:13:34,160 Speaker 1: on the Internet titled Management of Savagery. In Naj's conception, 239 00:13:34,360 --> 00:13:38,000 Speaker 1: savagery was defined as terrorist attacks against civilian infrastructure and 240 00:13:38,280 --> 00:13:41,280 Speaker 1: stuff like tourist facilities, which were meant to provoke violent 241 00:13:41,440 --> 00:13:45,920 Speaker 1: escalations from superpowers. That violence would radicalize more people against 242 00:13:45,920 --> 00:13:48,840 Speaker 1: the West and lead to a progressive degradation of social 243 00:13:48,960 --> 00:13:52,960 Speaker 1: order and operational capacity in the nation's nase saw as enemies. 244 00:13:53,520 --> 00:13:56,040 Speaker 1: The management of savagery was a key text for the 245 00:13:56,080 --> 00:13:59,240 Speaker 1: men who wound up creating the Islamic State. Some will 246 00:13:59,320 --> 00:14:01,760 Speaker 1: use this to our argue that the tactics failed, since 247 00:14:01,800 --> 00:14:05,079 Speaker 1: Isis is not exactly thriving at present. To do so 248 00:14:05,200 --> 00:14:07,800 Speaker 1: would be to ignore the six trillion dollars the United 249 00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:10,800 Speaker 1: States lit on fire fighting, a disastrous war on terror 250 00:14:11,120 --> 00:14:14,720 Speaker 1: which supercharged much of the underlying instability in our country 251 00:14:14,800 --> 00:14:17,240 Speaker 1: and may yet lead to a collapse in domestic order. 252 00:14:18,280 --> 00:14:20,400 Speaker 1: I will admit that I have found the framework of 253 00:14:20,520 --> 00:14:24,520 Speaker 1: managing savagery useful in my interpretation and understanding of conflict, 254 00:14:24,760 --> 00:14:28,000 Speaker 1: both domestic and international. In twenty twenty, I got to 255 00:14:28,040 --> 00:14:30,920 Speaker 1: watch the process up close over the course of dozens 256 00:14:30,920 --> 00:14:35,160 Speaker 1: of protests. The basic strategy of most Portland protests that year. 257 00:14:35,200 --> 00:14:37,080 Speaker 1: When like this you got a bunch of people to 258 00:14:37,080 --> 00:14:39,240 Speaker 1: march up to a police building, they would chant and 259 00:14:39,320 --> 00:14:41,840 Speaker 1: yell until the police got angry and then gassed and 260 00:14:41,960 --> 00:14:45,200 Speaker 1: or beat up everybody. After a while, this dynamic was 261 00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:49,200 Speaker 1: widely understood and accepted by protesters. They saw their suffering 262 00:14:49,280 --> 00:14:51,880 Speaker 1: and the risk that they engaged in as an acceptable 263 00:14:51,920 --> 00:14:55,440 Speaker 1: trade off because it revealed the violence and savagery inherent 264 00:14:55,560 --> 00:14:59,600 Speaker 1: in policing as an institution. This they hoped, would radicalize 265 00:14:59,600 --> 00:15:02,200 Speaker 1: others again against it, people who watched clips of videos 266 00:15:02,200 --> 00:15:05,240 Speaker 1: from the protest or who attended themselves, and for a 267 00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:08,200 Speaker 1: time this strategy worked quite well. Many people who had 268 00:15:08,200 --> 00:15:10,920 Speaker 1: been apolitical on the matter grew utterly hardened against the 269 00:15:10,960 --> 00:15:14,400 Speaker 1: cops after a few hours in the gas clouds. People 270 00:15:14,440 --> 00:15:17,520 Speaker 1: cannot endure violence, however, without being changed by it. So 271 00:15:17,600 --> 00:15:20,160 Speaker 1: as the week's war on, participants grew more and more 272 00:15:20,160 --> 00:15:23,000 Speaker 1: comfortable with not just property destruction, but with the use 273 00:15:23,040 --> 00:15:26,920 Speaker 1: of things like molotov cocktails. One may consider a molotov 274 00:15:26,960 --> 00:15:30,160 Speaker 1: to be necessary sometimes, and throughout history they often have been, 275 00:15:30,480 --> 00:15:33,600 Speaker 1: But savage is as good a term to describe firebombs 276 00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:36,560 Speaker 1: as any. No one was killed by any molotov that 277 00:15:36,600 --> 00:15:38,880 Speaker 1: I ever saw used in Portland, but of course no 278 00:15:39,000 --> 00:15:42,760 Speaker 1: protests come close to the savagery of warfare. The emotional 279 00:15:42,800 --> 00:15:45,080 Speaker 1: dynamics at play are shades of each other, though, and 280 00:15:45,120 --> 00:15:48,000 Speaker 1: I thought it might be useful to mention perhaps a 281 00:15:48,040 --> 00:15:51,360 Speaker 1: more illustrative example would be my own experiences in Mosel 282 00:15:51,520 --> 00:15:54,520 Speaker 1: in the early summer of twenty seventeen. My team and 283 00:15:54,560 --> 00:15:56,920 Speaker 1: I were embedded with an Iraqi federal police unit in 284 00:15:56,960 --> 00:15:59,360 Speaker 1: the Old City, where the fighting was intense and hideous. 285 00:16:00,000 --> 00:16:02,120 Speaker 1: I'm under fire from a sniper. Some of the shots 286 00:16:02,120 --> 00:16:05,040 Speaker 1: were so close that chipped concrete hit my helmet. The 287 00:16:05,040 --> 00:16:07,400 Speaker 1: mortar team with us responded with the help of a spotter. 288 00:16:07,480 --> 00:16:10,120 Speaker 1: They dropped explosive shells on homes and shops until they 289 00:16:10,200 --> 00:16:13,160 Speaker 1: hit and killed the sniper. In that moment, I felt 290 00:16:13,160 --> 00:16:16,480 Speaker 1: elation I've seldom felt since. After we found better cover, 291 00:16:16,600 --> 00:16:18,880 Speaker 1: I began composing the scene in my head, laying out 292 00:16:18,960 --> 00:16:21,680 Speaker 1: how I would write it. Then my fixer, Sangar said 293 00:16:21,720 --> 00:16:24,160 Speaker 1: something that interrupted my train of thought and has remained 294 00:16:24,160 --> 00:16:26,880 Speaker 1: with me ever since. Did you count how many rounds 295 00:16:26,880 --> 00:16:29,160 Speaker 1: they fired before they hit him? I told him I 296 00:16:29,160 --> 00:16:31,680 Speaker 1: thought it was six or seven. Maybe where do you 297 00:16:31,720 --> 00:16:32,800 Speaker 1: think the others landed? 298 00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:34,000 Speaker 2: From? 299 00:16:34,040 --> 00:16:36,280 Speaker 1: His tone was clear what he meant. The old city 300 00:16:36,360 --> 00:16:38,800 Speaker 1: was crowded. Many civilians had not yet been able to 301 00:16:38,960 --> 00:16:42,600 Speaker 1: escape the Isis lines. Their homes were often next door 302 00:16:42,640 --> 00:16:45,640 Speaker 1: to fighting positions, and the density of the city meant 303 00:16:45,640 --> 00:16:47,880 Speaker 1: that any honest hit still had a good chance of 304 00:16:47,920 --> 00:16:51,120 Speaker 1: hitting someone. Later, I met a man whose house had 305 00:16:51,160 --> 00:16:53,960 Speaker 1: been hit twenty times by mortar rounds and rockets before 306 00:16:53,960 --> 00:16:57,240 Speaker 1: he had a chance to escape with his family. So 307 00:16:57,320 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 1: the glee of the moment faded. My writing about that 308 00:16:59,760 --> 00:17:02,560 Speaker 1: scene was more sober, more careful, and much better. As 309 00:17:02,600 --> 00:17:05,199 Speaker 1: a result, Saygur's words have helped me shape both my 310 00:17:05,280 --> 00:17:07,720 Speaker 1: coverage of war and my reactions to it ever since. 311 00:17:08,680 --> 00:17:11,240 Speaker 1: This shouldn't matter to people being bombed out of their 312 00:17:11,240 --> 00:17:14,280 Speaker 1: homes and losing loved ones right now. It might be helpful, though, 313 00:17:14,280 --> 00:17:16,720 Speaker 1: to those of us watching bloodshed from behind a screen, 314 00:17:17,359 --> 00:17:19,359 Speaker 1: at least until we're the ones filming. 315 00:17:23,000 --> 00:17:25,359 Speaker 2: It Could Happen here as a production of cool Zone Media. 316 00:17:25,560 --> 00:17:28,240 Speaker 2: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 317 00:17:28,280 --> 00:17:30,520 Speaker 2: cool zonemedia dot com, or check us out on the 318 00:17:30,560 --> 00:17:34,000 Speaker 2: iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. 319 00:17:34,359 --> 00:17:36,479 Speaker 2: You can find sources for It Could Happen Here, Updated 320 00:17:36,560 --> 00:17:40,600 Speaker 2: monthly at coolzonemedia dot com slash sources. Thanks for listening.