WEBVTT - Scams and Hoaxes 0:00:04.240 --> 0:00:07.240 Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios 0:00:07.320 --> 0:00:13.880 How Stuff Works. Me there and Welcome to tech Stuff. 0:00:13.920 --> 0:00:17.400 I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with 0:00:17.440 --> 0:00:19.560 How Stuff Works in My Heart Radio and I love 0:00:19.560 --> 0:00:22.680 of all things tech, and today I wanted to talk 0:00:22.760 --> 0:00:26.800 once again about scams and hoaxes and efforts to separate 0:00:26.880 --> 0:00:31.200 you from your money and or personal information. So this 0:00:31.280 --> 0:00:34.720 episode is related to episodes I've done about fishing, and 0:00:35.120 --> 0:00:38.320 I'll likely tread some of the same ground, but I 0:00:38.360 --> 0:00:42.320 feel it's an important topic and while I have touched 0:00:42.360 --> 0:00:45.559 on it before, it always pays to go back and 0:00:45.640 --> 0:00:49.400 re examined this and to remind ourselves of how unethical, 0:00:49.680 --> 0:00:53.000 dishonest people might target us and how we might be 0:00:53.120 --> 0:00:56.720 vulnerable to them. Being aware means we're more likely able 0:00:56.760 --> 0:00:59.920 to avoid becoming a victim. And I say this is 0:01:00.120 --> 0:01:03.840 someone who has fallen for some of these scams before. 0:01:04.319 --> 0:01:07.520 It's not something I'm particularly proud of, but you know, 0:01:07.560 --> 0:01:09.560 it was one of those valuable lessons I learned. And 0:01:09.760 --> 0:01:12.920 fortunately it wasn't a super expensive lesson for me to learn, 0:01:13.000 --> 0:01:16.760 but it could have been. And uh, I thought, maybe 0:01:16.840 --> 0:01:21.119 to spare other people the same learning experience I had 0:01:21.200 --> 0:01:24.600 through experience, we could talk about this, and so this 0:01:24.640 --> 0:01:27.760 episode was prompted by something that I actually encountered while 0:01:27.800 --> 0:01:30.880 I was on Facebook the morning of the day that 0:01:30.920 --> 0:01:33.920 I'm recording this. So I'm actually one of those Facebook 0:01:34.000 --> 0:01:36.959 users who once in a blue moon, I will click 0:01:37.319 --> 0:01:40.760 through on an ad. Sometimes I see ads for stuff 0:01:40.760 --> 0:01:43.560 that I find really interesting, so I'll go ahead and 0:01:43.640 --> 0:01:46.920 investigate it, And sometimes it just turns out to be 0:01:46.959 --> 0:01:49.680 a waste of time, Like I'll figure out the thing 0:01:49.760 --> 0:01:53.160 that was being advertised and what's actually on the respective 0:01:53.160 --> 0:01:56.320 site don't quite match up, for example, and I'll realize, oh, well, 0:01:56.320 --> 0:01:59.520 this isn't for me. Or there was one case where 0:01:59.520 --> 0:02:02.480 I was seeing a preview for a show and it 0:02:02.520 --> 0:02:05.920 looked like a spectacular show, but I didn't recognize the 0:02:06.000 --> 0:02:08.240 name of the theater, and I clicked through and discovered 0:02:08.280 --> 0:02:13.120 that the theater is in Seattle, Washington. Well, I'm in Atlanta, Georgia, 0:02:13.240 --> 0:02:16.160 and those two places are not close to each other. 0:02:16.200 --> 0:02:19.640 They are on opposite sides of the United States, so 0:02:19.760 --> 0:02:21.720 it's not likely that I'm going to get around to 0:02:21.800 --> 0:02:24.480 seeing that show. So once in a while I'll click 0:02:24.520 --> 0:02:26.959 through if it looks interesting, but I realized, oh, you know, 0:02:27.240 --> 0:02:29.799 I kind of I could have saved myself some effort 0:02:29.800 --> 0:02:32.160 if I had just realized up front that this doesn't 0:02:32.200 --> 0:02:35.760 really you know, this isn't really relevant to me. So 0:02:37.000 --> 0:02:39.799 eventually you can get into some territory where things get 0:02:39.800 --> 0:02:43.400 a little questionable. Maybe it's not just this doesn't really 0:02:43.440 --> 0:02:45.880 represent what I was looking at, but this is an 0:02:45.919 --> 0:02:52.440 actual attempt to misdirect, to to capture, to trick someone. 0:02:53.000 --> 0:02:54.840 And what really gets my dinner up are the more 0:02:54.880 --> 0:02:58.200 brazen attempts to scan people or to pull a bait 0:02:58.280 --> 0:03:03.200 and switch. So the example that prompted this episode was 0:03:03.240 --> 0:03:06.960 for a silicone mask. Now, as I record this, Halloween 0:03:07.080 --> 0:03:10.120 is coming up. I'm recording this on October six, two 0:03:10.120 --> 0:03:14.760 thousand nineteen, so these scammers are jumping on that opportunity 0:03:14.880 --> 0:03:18.160 to showcase what are truly incredible masks. I mean, these 0:03:18.160 --> 0:03:22.560 are actual silicone masks that are really well made, and 0:03:22.720 --> 0:03:27.640 supposedly these online stores that are advertising on Facebook have 0:03:27.919 --> 0:03:33.400 these masks in stock on their sites. The mask I 0:03:33.480 --> 0:03:37.680 first saw was Belile the Demon. It's a silicone mask 0:03:37.720 --> 0:03:41.600 of a devilish looking creation, and the silicone allows the 0:03:41.640 --> 0:03:44.560 mask to conform closely with the face of the person 0:03:44.600 --> 0:03:48.160 who's wearing the mask, so the lips on the mask 0:03:48.280 --> 0:03:51.320 fit right around the wearer's lips, and that means you 0:03:51.360 --> 0:03:54.240 can actually open and close your mouth and the mask 0:03:54.320 --> 0:03:57.160 will open and close its mouth. It conforms so well. 0:03:57.280 --> 0:04:01.040 It looks very natural, and the mask looks and credibly lifelike. 0:04:01.280 --> 0:04:04.400 And they're great. I mean this, this Belial one is 0:04:04.400 --> 0:04:07.280 a great example of how a silicone mask can be 0:04:07.720 --> 0:04:14.240 a really amazing work, and uh, I was immediately intrigued 0:04:14.280 --> 0:04:16.960 by it. The ad had a video of a man 0:04:17.080 --> 0:04:20.360 trying on the mask. It was an unboxing video, and 0:04:20.680 --> 0:04:23.719 he had the mask on a mannequin head and he 0:04:23.839 --> 0:04:26.440 pulls the mask off of it and then he puts 0:04:26.440 --> 0:04:29.600 it onto himself and demonstrates how well it moves with 0:04:29.640 --> 0:04:32.200 his facial features. It was a great demonstration of the 0:04:32.240 --> 0:04:36.039 masks features and mobility. So I was curious. I clicked through. 0:04:36.480 --> 0:04:39.280 I was thinking, how much is the store selling this 0:04:39.360 --> 0:04:43.720 mask for? And what I saw immediately raised red flags 0:04:43.839 --> 0:04:46.800 in my head. So the price for the mask on 0:04:46.880 --> 0:04:52.000 this website was listed as thirty four dollars cents, marked 0:04:52.040 --> 0:04:56.320 down from around fifty dollars, and I knew immediately that 0:04:56.440 --> 0:05:02.040 could not possibly be legit. I've seen masks in Halloween 0:05:02.200 --> 0:05:05.760 stores that cost more than that, and we're not nearly 0:05:05.960 --> 0:05:09.440 as sophisticated as this particular mask was. So then I 0:05:09.480 --> 0:05:12.960 did a Google search for the mask and found the 0:05:13.040 --> 0:05:17.000 actual Bellal the Demon mask on several specialty mask and 0:05:17.080 --> 0:05:21.359 costume shops, and those prices ranged from around six hundred 0:05:21.360 --> 0:05:25.320 to eight hundred dollars, so thirty five bucks would be 0:05:25.520 --> 0:05:30.440 quite a markdown. Moreover, I found the unboxing video and 0:05:30.480 --> 0:05:33.080 the review video that was playing as part of this ad. 0:05:33.120 --> 0:05:37.880 I found it on YouTube and it was completely independent 0:05:38.200 --> 0:05:41.159 of the store. The guy who was doing the video 0:05:41.440 --> 0:05:45.240 had no connection whatsoever to the online store that was 0:05:45.640 --> 0:05:50.200 advertising this mask. In fact, the YouTuber had posted in 0:05:50.279 --> 0:05:55.080 the comments section and penned the comment that the video 0:05:55.120 --> 0:05:58.520 had been appropriated for these scam ads and said, don't 0:05:58.560 --> 0:06:03.240 believe what you see on Facebook, because those ads are 0:06:03.360 --> 0:06:05.960 four masks that look nothing like this one. They are 0:06:06.080 --> 0:06:11.080 cheap knockoffs, or maybe not even knockoffs. They're just terrible masks, uh, 0:06:11.120 --> 0:06:13.360 and you're getting a bait and switch. And it proved 0:06:13.400 --> 0:06:16.080 there was no connection between the video that played as 0:06:16.080 --> 0:06:19.760 part of this advertisement and the actual product that was 0:06:19.800 --> 0:06:24.279 being sold. Uh. And it's I'm sure incredibly frustrating for 0:06:24.360 --> 0:06:27.880 him to see a video he made being used in 0:06:27.920 --> 0:06:31.320 this way because it it sort of implicates him in 0:06:31.360 --> 0:06:34.080 this even though he has no connection to it. And 0:06:34.120 --> 0:06:36.960 I know that as a content creator myself, if I 0:06:37.040 --> 0:06:40.520 were to come across a piece of content where I 0:06:40.560 --> 0:06:44.600 appear to be advertising for something marketing something and I 0:06:44.640 --> 0:06:47.920 never agreed to that, I would feel really betrayed by that. 0:06:48.560 --> 0:06:51.640 Then I went a step further. The shop that was 0:06:52.680 --> 0:06:56.040 linked through this Facebook ad had a contact page, so 0:06:56.080 --> 0:06:58.480 I clicked on the contact page. I wanted to see 0:06:58.520 --> 0:07:01.839 what was there, and then was an email listed there, 0:07:01.880 --> 0:07:04.520 which was already unusual that there was actually an email 0:07:04.560 --> 0:07:09.920 address where you could send a question or a comment 0:07:10.080 --> 0:07:13.720 or whatever. But the domain for the email address was 0:07:13.880 --> 0:07:17.000 different from the domain in the stores you are l. 0:07:17.600 --> 0:07:20.520 So the stores you are l was one thing, and 0:07:20.680 --> 0:07:25.000 the email address was totally not connected to that, And 0:07:25.040 --> 0:07:28.280 that's another red flag. You would expect a legitimate business 0:07:28.560 --> 0:07:31.720 to use email addresses that reflect the stores you are l. 0:07:31.840 --> 0:07:35.880 You would expect uniformity across that, or at least an 0:07:35.920 --> 0:07:40.600 email address of a parent company for an outlet, but 0:07:40.680 --> 0:07:43.480 none of that was the case here. So I did 0:07:43.520 --> 0:07:46.840 a Google search for the email. I highlighted the email address, 0:07:47.240 --> 0:07:50.120 and I did a Google search for that, and up 0:07:50.200 --> 0:07:54.960 came another dozen online stores that also included that email 0:07:55.040 --> 0:07:58.480 as the contact email. None of these stores appeared to 0:07:58.480 --> 0:08:01.880 be connected to each other. They all had different names. 0:08:01.920 --> 0:08:03.840 Some of the names were really weird, like there was 0:08:03.920 --> 0:08:08.160 one that was about yoga, supposedly, not that the store 0:08:08.240 --> 0:08:10.240 was about yoga, but that was what the name was. 0:08:10.840 --> 0:08:13.240 But they none of them had any connection to each other, 0:08:13.560 --> 0:08:17.040 and that was another big red flag. Then I decided 0:08:17.520 --> 0:08:19.960 I wasn't finished yet. I decided to use a tool 0:08:20.080 --> 0:08:24.480 called scam doc dot com. That's s C A M 0:08:24.720 --> 0:08:27.440 D O C dot com. This is a tool that 0:08:27.480 --> 0:08:31.400 analyzes website u r l s and email domains. And 0:08:31.480 --> 0:08:34.040 just so you guys know, I have no connection to 0:08:34.160 --> 0:08:37.960 that service. I'm recommending it as a user, but I 0:08:38.040 --> 0:08:41.640 have no you know, I don't know those guys. I 0:08:41.720 --> 0:08:44.320 don't have any other connection to it. I just used 0:08:44.400 --> 0:08:49.280 that tool myself. The tool assigns a reliability score to 0:08:49.440 --> 0:08:53.199 websites and emails, and the score is based off of 0:08:53.320 --> 0:08:57.920 several criteria for example, how long has the site been around. 0:08:58.240 --> 0:09:01.440 Younger sites are less trub worthy than older sites, And 0:09:01.440 --> 0:09:05.559 in the case of every site I checked, each one 0:09:05.600 --> 0:09:08.880 of those was younger than six months, so they hadn't 0:09:08.880 --> 0:09:11.320 even been around for six months. That's a warning flag 0:09:11.400 --> 0:09:14.800 right there. Also are the sites details such as where 0:09:14.840 --> 0:09:18.959 in the world it was registered? Are those details publicly viewable? 0:09:19.000 --> 0:09:20.920 Do you know who the registrar is? Do you know 0:09:21.320 --> 0:09:24.520 you know where it was registered? If not, that's another 0:09:24.600 --> 0:09:28.480 big warning flag there, and that contributes to the reliability score. 0:09:28.760 --> 0:09:31.200 So in case you're curious, the score I got back 0:09:31.280 --> 0:09:36.360 from this particular shop that prompted this entire episode was 0:09:36.440 --> 0:09:41.120 a hearty one percent, meaning the analysis tool concluded the 0:09:41.200 --> 0:09:45.120 site posed a serious risk of being a scam operation. 0:09:45.480 --> 0:09:48.240 It concluded that the site hadn't been around long, the 0:09:48.320 --> 0:09:51.120 details behind who registered it and where it was registered 0:09:51.120 --> 0:09:54.760 weren't public, and based off similar sites, the tool predicted 0:09:54.920 --> 0:09:58.760 that this particular shop wouldn't be around for very long. 0:09:59.080 --> 0:10:01.520 It was sort of a fly by night thing, which 0:10:01.559 --> 0:10:03.920 is not a good indication that you're dealing with someone 0:10:04.080 --> 0:10:06.720 on the up and up. Now, I reported the ad 0:10:06.840 --> 0:10:11.080 as misleading and a scam to Facebook there's a little tool. 0:10:11.160 --> 0:10:13.839 If you ever see a Facebook ad and you're thinking, well, 0:10:13.840 --> 0:10:16.280 this looks shifty and I want to report it. There 0:10:16.320 --> 0:10:18.600 are these little three dots in the upper right corner. 0:10:18.600 --> 0:10:20.520 If you click on that, one of the options there's 0:10:20.559 --> 0:10:22.600 to report an ad, and then you have different options 0:10:23.000 --> 0:10:27.240 on why you reported it. So I chose misleading and scam. 0:10:27.320 --> 0:10:29.560 But here's the thing. Now, remember when I said that 0:10:29.640 --> 0:10:33.199 searching that email address brought up numerous other websites, all 0:10:33.240 --> 0:10:36.560 of them similar shops to the one I had just visited. 0:10:36.800 --> 0:10:40.280 In fact, many of them were using the same web template, 0:10:40.400 --> 0:10:43.560 although they had different names. Well that's just a tiny 0:10:43.679 --> 0:10:47.360 sample of the bogus businesses that are all using this 0:10:47.520 --> 0:10:51.520 exact same tactic on Facebook. While I had reported the 0:10:51.559 --> 0:10:54.880 original ad that I saw, and while Facebook would then 0:10:54.920 --> 0:10:57.840 block that ad from appearing in my feed, ever again, 0:10:58.400 --> 0:11:03.000 Facebook couldn't block all the identical ads that were registered 0:11:03.120 --> 0:11:07.280 to different stores. So I kept seeing the same or 0:11:07.440 --> 0:11:10.600 similar ads for this mask or masks that were just 0:11:10.760 --> 0:11:13.240 like this one, maybe of a slightly different design, but 0:11:13.280 --> 0:11:17.720 they were also high quality silicone masks. I kept seeing 0:11:17.760 --> 0:11:21.200 these sorts of ads, one after another, and I would 0:11:21.240 --> 0:11:25.360 go through the process of blocking saying misleading or scam 0:11:25.400 --> 0:11:27.680 and then scroll through it and yet another one would 0:11:27.720 --> 0:11:32.120 pop up. So this doesn't stop me from reporting the 0:11:32.160 --> 0:11:34.920 bogus ads because I don't want anyone to fall victim 0:11:34.960 --> 0:11:37.880 to them if I can help it. But it's very discouraging. 0:11:37.920 --> 0:11:43.920 It's telling me that there are several people, maybe several companies, 0:11:44.520 --> 0:11:48.319 most likely in places like China, that are popping up 0:11:48.760 --> 0:11:52.520 and using this same approach to cast as wide a 0:11:52.640 --> 0:11:56.240 net as possible to catch as many suckers as possible. 0:11:56.840 --> 0:12:00.160 So I likened it to squishing a bug in a 0:12:00.240 --> 0:12:04.160 room that's teeming with thousands of bugs. Sure, there's one 0:12:04.240 --> 0:12:07.240 fewer bug in the mix, but there's still thousands more 0:12:07.320 --> 0:12:12.400 to deal with. Okay, So what's actually at stake here? 0:12:12.520 --> 0:12:16.840 Why am I so head up about this? Well, some 0:12:16.880 --> 0:12:20.200 of these sites actually do sell you something. It's not 0:12:20.840 --> 0:12:24.240 likely to look like the image or the video that 0:12:24.280 --> 0:12:27.240 was attached to the original ad, but it's something. It 0:12:27.320 --> 0:12:30.880 might be the wrong product entirely. It's almost certainly a cheap, 0:12:31.080 --> 0:12:34.400 poorly made product, and you might chalk it up as 0:12:34.440 --> 0:12:37.080 just a learning experience like I did in the past, 0:12:37.160 --> 0:12:39.680 and you might say, well, I won't let that happen 0:12:39.720 --> 0:12:42.600 to me again, and you'll think, well, I'm out however 0:12:42.679 --> 0:12:46.280 much money I spent. But that's as far as the 0:12:46.280 --> 0:12:49.040 the damage is gonna go. But you're still out of 0:12:49.080 --> 0:12:52.160 however much money the thing costs. And nobody wants to 0:12:52.200 --> 0:12:56.960 just throw money away. Maybe it's not that much money. 0:12:57.040 --> 0:12:59.040 Maybe you decide you're going to eat the cost and 0:12:59.040 --> 0:13:01.760 you'll just deal with it, but no one wants to 0:13:01.800 --> 0:13:06.360 do that some. In fact, many of these sites that 0:13:07.240 --> 0:13:10.640 are up there say they offer free refunds, but that 0:13:10.880 --> 0:13:14.200 itself comes with a set of caveats. So I saw 0:13:14.320 --> 0:13:18.960 one of these sites that listed uh product like this 0:13:19.040 --> 0:13:21.840 and said refunds are free within the first thirty days 0:13:21.840 --> 0:13:25.000 of purchase. But then and another part of the exact 0:13:25.040 --> 0:13:29.240 same site, I saw a discussion that explained that all 0:13:29.360 --> 0:13:33.360 refund requests must first go through a verification process, they 0:13:33.400 --> 0:13:36.440 have to be reviewed by a team, and that you 0:13:36.520 --> 0:13:39.960 have to submit your refund request within seven days of 0:13:40.000 --> 0:13:43.079 having received the product. There's no indication of how long 0:13:43.120 --> 0:13:46.640 that process is supposed to last either, So it may 0:13:46.640 --> 0:13:48.600 be that, oh, yeah, you get a free refund within 0:13:48.679 --> 0:13:51.959 thirty days, but if the review process lasts longer than 0:13:52.000 --> 0:13:56.080 thirty days, then maybe the company argues, well, it doesn't 0:13:56.120 --> 0:13:58.280 fall within that thirty day period, and so you're not 0:13:58.559 --> 0:14:01.600 entitled to a refund. In addition, while the refund might 0:14:01.600 --> 0:14:08.000 be free, return shipping is almost never uh an included benefit. 0:14:08.520 --> 0:14:10.839 So in other words, if you want a refund, you're 0:14:10.840 --> 0:14:13.280 gonna have to pay to ship the thing back to 0:14:13.360 --> 0:14:16.320 where it came from. And because these items are mostly 0:14:16.320 --> 0:14:20.040 being shipped from places like China, you know, primarily China, 0:14:20.480 --> 0:14:24.240 you're looking at shipping costs that can be much higher 0:14:24.240 --> 0:14:28.040 than what you paid for the product in the first place. So, yeah, 0:14:28.160 --> 0:14:30.560 you can get a refund. You could send the stuff back, 0:14:30.920 --> 0:14:32.840 but it's actually going to cost you more money to 0:14:32.840 --> 0:14:35.040 send it back than it did for you to purchase it. 0:14:35.400 --> 0:14:37.960 So you would be losing money on the refund. And 0:14:37.960 --> 0:14:41.680 that's assuming the company actually refunds your money. So there's 0:14:41.680 --> 0:14:44.840 no incentive to actually pursue a refund. It would cost 0:14:44.880 --> 0:14:48.040 you more money than you would get. Moreover, since many 0:14:48.040 --> 0:14:50.880 of these companies are overseas and again mostly in China, 0:14:51.200 --> 0:14:53.520 there's not a lot you can do legally to go 0:14:53.600 --> 0:14:57.160 after your money. You can't really hold the company accountable. 0:14:57.200 --> 0:15:01.200 There's very little chance that the Chinese government's going to 0:15:01.320 --> 0:15:06.440 jump in and say, oh, you're you're cheating people overseas 0:15:06.480 --> 0:15:10.480 out of their money. Bad, that's probably not going to happen. 0:15:10.880 --> 0:15:14.120 So the bogus businesses are protected and can generate revenue 0:15:14.120 --> 0:15:17.520 by depending upon naive customers who take the bait, and 0:15:17.600 --> 0:15:21.280 thanks to Facebook's algorithms for serving up ads, those ads 0:15:21.320 --> 0:15:25.280 can reach a pretty big base of potential customers. So 0:15:25.360 --> 0:15:28.120 even if you only get one bite out of a thousand, 0:15:28.520 --> 0:15:31.680 if millions of people are seeing the ad, that still 0:15:31.720 --> 0:15:35.800 adds up. And this brings me to another red flag. Though, 0:15:36.000 --> 0:15:38.880 I think it's pretty safe to say we've established from 0:15:38.920 --> 0:15:42.400 this example that I'm citing that it definitely was not 0:15:42.560 --> 0:15:46.520 a legit business. When I visited the shop by clicking 0:15:46.520 --> 0:15:48.960 through the ad, I decided I would also look at 0:15:48.960 --> 0:15:51.040 their home page to get a look at the types 0:15:51.080 --> 0:15:54.720 of stuff that the store sold. If all the stuff 0:15:54.800 --> 0:15:57.560 on the store had been thematically linked, let's say that 0:15:57.600 --> 0:16:00.880 they were all like Halloween or cost supplies, or maybe 0:16:00.880 --> 0:16:03.800 even party supplies, I might have felt like it was 0:16:03.840 --> 0:16:07.520 a more legitimate business that perhaps engaged in some bad 0:16:07.600 --> 0:16:12.520 marketing decisions, primarily snagging someone else's video without their permission 0:16:12.760 --> 0:16:15.720 to act as part of their ad. But instead I 0:16:15.760 --> 0:16:19.360 saw an eclectic mix of products across all sorts of 0:16:19.400 --> 0:16:24.040 different categories. They had wigs, not not costume wigs, but 0:16:24.200 --> 0:16:27.800 fashion wigs. They had kitchen items, they had automotive items, 0:16:27.800 --> 0:16:30.920 and more. There's stuff from you know, no rhyme or 0:16:30.920 --> 0:16:33.400 reason to what was on there, the stuff from every 0:16:33.440 --> 0:16:38.240 conceivable category, unless you happen to know how Facebook's algorithms work, 0:16:38.600 --> 0:16:42.360 in which case you would see a rhyme and reason 0:16:42.440 --> 0:16:48.080 to this approach. See Advertisers can tag their ads with keywords, 0:16:48.120 --> 0:16:51.000 and this is important because Facebook can then use that 0:16:51.440 --> 0:16:55.720 in order to serve the ads to the most receptive audiences, 0:16:56.040 --> 0:16:59.480 in other words, to pair up ads to potential customers. 0:16:59.480 --> 0:17:02.400 So your activity on Facebook and on the web at 0:17:02.480 --> 0:17:06.320 large teaches Facebook what you like and what you don't like. 0:17:06.920 --> 0:17:10.800 So if you've liked certain pages on Facebook or images 0:17:10.840 --> 0:17:13.879 on Facebook, or you've engaged in conversations, or you've shared 0:17:13.920 --> 0:17:17.959 certain posts, all of that activity is logged and analyzed 0:17:17.960 --> 0:17:20.879 by Facebook, and Facebook starts to build a profile of you. 0:17:21.840 --> 0:17:23.679 What are the things you're interested in, What are the 0:17:23.720 --> 0:17:26.080 things you like? What are the things you tend to 0:17:26.160 --> 0:17:29.480 ignore or or you seem not to like. That way, 0:17:29.520 --> 0:17:32.199 Facebook can say, well, let's serve up the ads that 0:17:32.280 --> 0:17:35.240 are most likely going to be relevant to this person, 0:17:36.000 --> 0:17:38.960 and that way you get ads that most closely aligned 0:17:38.960 --> 0:17:40.960 with your interests. So if you've liked a lot of 0:17:41.000 --> 0:17:43.760 posts about cars, for example, you're more likely to see 0:17:43.760 --> 0:17:48.080 ads related to car stuff. Similarly, if you've been browsing 0:17:48.119 --> 0:17:51.240 the web for certain types of products, you're more likely 0:17:51.280 --> 0:17:54.720 to see those types of products advertised to you as well, 0:17:54.800 --> 0:17:58.159 due to web tracking tools that lots of advertisers and 0:17:58.240 --> 0:18:02.760 web page administrators use. So if you're running a scam company, 0:18:03.119 --> 0:18:06.880 one in which you send out cheap products for low prices, 0:18:06.920 --> 0:18:10.200 but they're presented to look like incredible deals on high 0:18:10.280 --> 0:18:14.160 quality items, it behooves you to have a wide selection 0:18:14.240 --> 0:18:17.919 of crab to pedal. On Facebook, you can arrange for 0:18:18.000 --> 0:18:22.120 ads on multiple categories of products. So some people will 0:18:22.160 --> 0:18:24.760 get that Halloween mask ad I was talking about because 0:18:24.840 --> 0:18:28.560 their interests happened to fall in that kind of category. 0:18:29.320 --> 0:18:33.040 Some other people might get hair care products I rarely 0:18:33.200 --> 0:18:36.760 see those for some reason. Or they might get automotive 0:18:36.800 --> 0:18:41.800 accessories or computer peripherals or kitchen gadgets. One online store 0:18:41.880 --> 0:18:44.960 might have dozens of ads running on Facebook, with each 0:18:45.000 --> 0:18:48.359 ad served to a different segment of the population that 0:18:48.400 --> 0:18:52.280 has been predisposed to shopping for those items, as indicated 0:18:52.320 --> 0:18:56.240 by their online behaviors. Now, I want to be clear here, 0:18:57.280 --> 0:19:00.320 I don't think the actual process of matching ads to 0:19:00.520 --> 0:19:04.080 users is totally awful. I do think it tends to 0:19:04.119 --> 0:19:07.480 be pretty invasive, But then I also think it's nice 0:19:07.480 --> 0:19:10.520 to encounter ads that align with my interests as opposed 0:19:10.520 --> 0:19:13.080 to seeing ads that have no real relevance to me. 0:19:13.440 --> 0:19:16.760 I don't need to see ads for childcare products and services, 0:19:16.800 --> 0:19:20.240 for example, because I don't have kids, But if you 0:19:20.280 --> 0:19:23.680 serve me up ads for doggy toys, I'm all over it. 0:19:24.080 --> 0:19:28.040 So that part I don't really object to that much, 0:19:28.400 --> 0:19:31.200 though I recognize it gets pretty creepy when you realize 0:19:31.200 --> 0:19:34.840 how well Facebook knows its users based on the massive 0:19:34.880 --> 0:19:38.640 amounts of data we users provide every time we're online, 0:19:38.720 --> 0:19:42.560 even if we're not currently using Facebook while we're online. 0:19:43.359 --> 0:19:46.960 What I really object to is Facebook's failure to vet 0:19:47.119 --> 0:19:50.879 advertising in any meaningful way. I think as users, we 0:19:50.960 --> 0:19:53.879 each have a responsibility to use critical thinking and to 0:19:53.920 --> 0:19:56.439 protect ourselves and I'll talk more about that later in 0:19:56.480 --> 0:20:00.600 this episode. But I also think Facebook and other platforms 0:20:00.760 --> 0:20:04.280 have a responsibility to be good stewards of their platforms 0:20:04.440 --> 0:20:08.400 and to weed out scams that target users. I don't 0:20:08.440 --> 0:20:11.280 subscribe to the philosophy that Facebook should be just a 0:20:11.440 --> 0:20:15.160 passive platform that allows this to happen, because the company 0:20:15.280 --> 0:20:19.000 is getting paid by these hoax shops to post ads. 0:20:19.280 --> 0:20:24.159 Facebook is benefiting from this arrangement. It profits from the 0:20:24.200 --> 0:20:27.320 whole process. To me, that makes them at least partly 0:20:27.400 --> 0:20:31.560 responsible for the perpetuation of scams. I've got a little 0:20:31.560 --> 0:20:33.639 more to say about Facebook's role in this, but first 0:20:34.080 --> 0:20:37.880 let's take a quick break for you know, a real ad. 0:20:45.480 --> 0:20:49.240 In the UK, Facebook was hit by a defamation lawsuit 0:20:49.359 --> 0:20:52.359 by Martin Lewis, who is a financial expert who runs 0:20:52.359 --> 0:20:57.480 a financial advice service. Lewis sued Facebook because there were 0:20:57.480 --> 0:21:01.760 ads running on Facebook that feats Lewis's image or it 0:21:01.800 --> 0:21:06.480 implied that he had endorsed various services with which he 0:21:06.520 --> 0:21:10.680 had no connection. He successfully argued that these services were 0:21:10.680 --> 0:21:15.480 profiting off of his reputation and his image without his permission, 0:21:15.560 --> 0:21:19.760 and that Facebook was letting it happen. Moreover, after reporting 0:21:19.760 --> 0:21:23.200 the issue, Facebook continued running the ads for some time. 0:21:23.760 --> 0:21:27.040 Facebook responded by rolling out a tool that lets users 0:21:27.080 --> 0:21:30.960 report ads for various reasons, including for being misleading or 0:21:31.000 --> 0:21:33.800 a scam. That's similar to the tool I used when 0:21:33.840 --> 0:21:37.040 I reported the ad, and I'm in the United States, 0:21:37.040 --> 0:21:40.800 not in the UK. And yes, that is a positive step, 0:21:41.119 --> 0:21:44.479 it's a good one, but it's also a reactive step, right. 0:21:44.640 --> 0:21:49.440 It only works after people have either noticed something hinky 0:21:49.560 --> 0:21:52.320 is going on, or they didn't notice it in time 0:21:52.720 --> 0:21:55.920 and they were victimized, and then they respond to Facebook. 0:21:56.720 --> 0:22:00.359 That's really too late, you know you you would prefer 0:22:00.440 --> 0:22:04.560 to see an approach that prevents this stuff from ever 0:22:04.680 --> 0:22:07.399 reaching an audience in the first place, as opposed to 0:22:07.400 --> 0:22:12.320 reaching an audience. And now it's the audience's responsibility to say, hey, 0:22:12.400 --> 0:22:15.200 this doesn't look right to me. So by the time 0:22:15.240 --> 0:22:18.000 someone on Facebook actually takes that step, the ad has 0:22:18.040 --> 0:22:21.840 already been served up to potentially millions of people. I 0:22:21.920 --> 0:22:25.600 suggest that perhaps Facebook should develop some sort of process 0:22:25.960 --> 0:22:28.680 to try and catch these things before the ads are 0:22:28.800 --> 0:22:32.960 accepted to run on the site, to verify that the 0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:36.280 party that's purchasing the ad is in fact what they 0:22:36.359 --> 0:22:40.080 say they are and granted this is way more work 0:22:40.160 --> 0:22:42.280 for Facebook, but it would go a long way to 0:22:42.359 --> 0:22:45.320 improving the reputation of the company, which has been under 0:22:45.359 --> 0:22:49.959 fire recently for multiple reasons, not just the dodgy ads 0:22:50.000 --> 0:22:53.200 appearing on the site. Now, since I started writing up 0:22:53.200 --> 0:22:56.760 these notes, Facebook has sent me a few notifications telling 0:22:56.800 --> 0:22:59.760 me that their teams are reviewing the various ads I 0:22:59.800 --> 0:23:03.480 have flagged as being misleading or a scam. Now, I 0:23:03.520 --> 0:23:05.720 don't have a high level of confidence that this is 0:23:05.720 --> 0:23:09.000 going to result in very much other than maybe Facebook 0:23:09.000 --> 0:23:12.280 telling me to chill out. I'm fairly sure the review 0:23:12.320 --> 0:23:16.560 teams won't take the steps I took to investigate those instances. 0:23:17.000 --> 0:23:19.440 At the time I'm writing this, I must have reported 0:23:19.520 --> 0:23:24.119 at least fifteen or twenty ads, all using similar video 0:23:24.640 --> 0:23:28.120 many of them using the exact same video clips and 0:23:28.560 --> 0:23:32.120 the same images, and all marketing items for far less 0:23:32.160 --> 0:23:34.840 than what they go for elsewhere. And when I say 0:23:34.880 --> 0:23:37.480 far less, I'm talking in the hundreds of dollars less 0:23:37.880 --> 0:23:41.720 like the too good to be true level of a sale. 0:23:42.320 --> 0:23:46.920 Facebook has posted some tips to help users avoid these scams, 0:23:47.000 --> 0:23:50.240 and they include making sure that the posted ad or 0:23:50.320 --> 0:23:54.840 corresponding product page includes clear details about the product, like 0:23:55.040 --> 0:23:58.360 its dimensions or its weight, as well as its quality, 0:23:58.800 --> 0:24:02.720 and that there should also be your photographs of the product. Now, 0:24:02.720 --> 0:24:06.439 while fuzzy photos are pretty much a dead giveaway that 0:24:06.480 --> 0:24:09.320 it's a fake, I also counter that it's very easy 0:24:09.400 --> 0:24:13.080 these days to lift good images online and there's no 0:24:13.119 --> 0:24:16.640 shortage of high res photographs of tons of different products, 0:24:16.880 --> 0:24:20.280 particularly for stuff like the mask I was referring to earlier, 0:24:20.600 --> 0:24:22.880 and so it doesn't take very much to steal those 0:24:22.920 --> 0:24:26.760 images and then use them for another purpose on another site. 0:24:27.280 --> 0:24:29.680 And you can always do a reverse image search as 0:24:29.680 --> 0:24:31.680 a user to see if something you're looking at has 0:24:31.680 --> 0:24:34.840 been nicked from somewhere else, but that's yet another step 0:24:34.920 --> 0:24:38.119 that the user has to take. The onus falls on 0:24:38.359 --> 0:24:42.479 you so that you aren't made into a victim. Another 0:24:42.520 --> 0:24:46.280 tip that Facebook gives is that the seller should include 0:24:46.320 --> 0:24:49.520 clear information about the amount of time it will take 0:24:49.560 --> 0:24:53.200 to ship items to the customer, how long will it 0:24:53.440 --> 0:24:56.760 take to get from door to door, and also whether 0:24:56.880 --> 0:24:59.840 or not the seller offers up tracking information so that 0:25:00.040 --> 0:25:02.840 users can track orders as they go through the shipping process. 0:25:03.359 --> 0:25:06.800 Companies only list something like a dispatch time. That's another 0:25:07.080 --> 0:25:12.800 warning flag. Also legitimate companies should have a clear way 0:25:12.840 --> 0:25:16.120 to contact customer service. So in the pages I looked 0:25:16.160 --> 0:25:18.560 at the morning and that I'm recording this, I saw 0:25:18.880 --> 0:25:22.960 email addresses for some unnamed person who is supposedly the 0:25:23.000 --> 0:25:27.000 customer service representative. But the email address didn't indicate that 0:25:27.119 --> 0:25:30.640 in of itself right. The email address wasn't like customer 0:25:30.760 --> 0:25:34.840 representative at store dot com. Instead, it would be something 0:25:34.960 --> 0:25:38.760 seemingly random like l f U r Z three one 0:25:38.800 --> 0:25:41.800 one at b E r Q dot shop, and it 0:25:41.840 --> 0:25:44.040 has no connection to whatever the U r L for 0:25:44.119 --> 0:25:48.119 the website is at all. That's not exactly a confidence booster. 0:25:48.680 --> 0:25:50.960 In a couple of other cases, I saw an online 0:25:51.000 --> 0:25:53.960 field into which you would type your email address, and 0:25:54.000 --> 0:25:56.200 it would include a promise that a customer service rep 0:25:56.240 --> 0:25:58.919 would get in touch with you, quote unquote soon. I 0:25:58.920 --> 0:26:02.159 have no clue how honest that claim is. And in 0:26:02.200 --> 0:26:05.280 a few cases there was no contact page at all, 0:26:05.640 --> 0:26:07.800 so there's no obvious way for you to get in 0:26:07.880 --> 0:26:13.400 contact with the company. That is another clear warning. While 0:26:13.520 --> 0:26:16.720 these tips from Facebook are helpful, they still place the 0:26:16.760 --> 0:26:20.760 responsibility of not getting scammed on the end user. There 0:26:20.800 --> 0:26:23.719 doesn't seem to be much acknowledgement that Facebook shoulders at 0:26:23.800 --> 0:26:26.760 least some of the blame here, and that the site 0:26:26.840 --> 0:26:29.680 has to find a better way to evaluate businesses before 0:26:29.720 --> 0:26:33.119 accepting ads from them. The company has stated that bad 0:26:33.200 --> 0:26:38.280 shopping experiences hurt everyone, not just the user but also Facebook, 0:26:38.760 --> 0:26:41.840 and that's true, so you would think the company would 0:26:41.840 --> 0:26:44.520 have a pretty strong incentive to prevent these ads from 0:26:44.600 --> 0:26:47.760 going onto the platform. But I guess that money all 0:26:47.840 --> 0:26:51.400 spends the same, whether it's from a legitimate business or not. 0:26:52.119 --> 0:26:54.440 And yes, I am bitter about this because I hate 0:26:54.440 --> 0:26:57.400 when people get scammed out of their cash or their 0:26:57.440 --> 0:27:01.639 personal information. Now there's an opinion and the Harvard Business 0:27:01.680 --> 0:27:04.160 Review that I feel really gets to why this has 0:27:04.200 --> 0:27:07.680 become such a troubling issue for Facebook users. The article 0:27:07.760 --> 0:27:11.600 is titled Facebook's oversight board is not Enough, and it's 0:27:11.640 --> 0:27:15.080 by Dipayan Gosh And I apologize for doing a terrible 0:27:15.160 --> 0:27:19.199 job pronouncing that name. That's entirely due to my own ignorance, 0:27:19.760 --> 0:27:22.920 So I apologize for that. But the article is really good. 0:27:23.000 --> 0:27:26.080 It points out that Facebook's business model is such that 0:27:26.240 --> 0:27:30.200 depends upon ads, and I'm going to quote a passage, 0:27:30.440 --> 0:27:33.600 so here's the quote. The same model lies at the 0:27:33.640 --> 0:27:36.760 center of the consumer Internet as a whole, and is 0:27:36.800 --> 0:27:41.760 based on maximizing consumer engagement and injecting ads throughout our 0:27:41.760 --> 0:27:45.639 digital experience. It relies on collecting personal data and on 0:27:45.760 --> 0:27:50.600 sophisticated algorithms that curate social feeds and target those ads. 0:27:51.040 --> 0:27:54.560 Because there is no earnest consideration of what consumers wish 0:27:54.680 --> 0:27:58.280 to or should see in this equation, they are subjected 0:27:58.280 --> 0:28:02.960 to whatever content the platform believes will maximize profits. These 0:28:02.960 --> 0:28:08.439 practices in turn generate negative externalities, of which disinformation is 0:28:08.520 --> 0:28:12.639 only one end quote. And in this case, the article 0:28:12.720 --> 0:28:17.040 was more about fake news and propaganda and how Facebook 0:28:17.080 --> 0:28:20.480 is incented to share that because it's part and parcel 0:28:20.600 --> 0:28:25.920 with its business model. That wasn't Facebook's intent when they 0:28:25.960 --> 0:28:28.960 built that business model. That's a reflection of how people 0:28:29.000 --> 0:28:33.680 recognized how Facebook's business model works, and then they gamed 0:28:33.840 --> 0:28:37.080 the system. By knowing how the system works, they took 0:28:37.080 --> 0:28:41.760 advantage of it, and that's the issue. Now. I didn't 0:28:41.800 --> 0:28:44.640 really go into other problems with Facebook ads, such as 0:28:44.680 --> 0:28:48.200 it's shifting policies with regard to political ads, which is 0:28:48.600 --> 0:28:51.600 a huge can of worms here in the United States 0:28:51.720 --> 0:28:55.160 right now, But that's because it is really another kettle 0:28:55.200 --> 0:28:57.200 of fish, I said, ken of worms, kettle of fish. 0:28:57.240 --> 0:29:00.280 I'm gonna mix metaphors left and right, come at me. 0:29:00.880 --> 0:29:04.800 Ultimately it gets wrapped in a bigger discussion about propaganda, 0:29:04.880 --> 0:29:09.400 and frankly, I am exhausted over the concept of political 0:29:09.440 --> 0:29:12.160 ads for the moment, probably for the next year and 0:29:12.240 --> 0:29:14.920 a half. So I'm going to spare all of that 0:29:15.720 --> 0:29:21.959 discussion for some future episode when I'm not as irritated 0:29:21.960 --> 0:29:27.440 by it. Instead, let's talk about other common scam techniques. Well, 0:29:27.720 --> 0:29:31.360 will slowly ease off Facebook here for a second. And 0:29:31.400 --> 0:29:35.080 I've touched on this next topic in the past because 0:29:35.120 --> 0:29:39.080 I remember getting really upset about it when I chatted 0:29:39.480 --> 0:29:42.520 about the topic with my then co host Chris Pallette. 0:29:42.760 --> 0:29:45.520 So this was an old, old episode of Tech Stuff, 0:29:45.760 --> 0:29:50.560 and it's about hiring scams. So these scams target a 0:29:50.720 --> 0:29:55.080 very vulnerable population, people who are looking for a job. 0:29:55.560 --> 0:29:58.560 Maybe they are out of work and they're looking to 0:29:58.960 --> 0:30:01.880 actually find job so they can make ends meet. Maybe 0:30:01.880 --> 0:30:04.240 they're just looking for a better opportunity. They're in a 0:30:04.360 --> 0:30:06.520 job already, but it's not a great one. They want 0:30:06.520 --> 0:30:09.960 a better chance. Now, as I'm sure many of you know, 0:30:10.400 --> 0:30:13.880 hunting for a job is exhausting, and it can get 0:30:13.920 --> 0:30:17.600 pretty discouraging if it starts to take a while. And 0:30:17.720 --> 0:30:20.239 I've been in that situation myself. I worked for a 0:30:20.240 --> 0:30:24.880 company for seven years and that company then eliminated my position. 0:30:25.240 --> 0:30:28.080 I wasn't fired, I just didn't have a job anymore. 0:30:28.720 --> 0:30:34.000 That the the definition of that, and the difference between 0:30:34.000 --> 0:30:36.120 being fired and not having a job was kind of 0:30:36.160 --> 0:30:39.360 lost on me at the time. For three months, I 0:30:39.440 --> 0:30:41.880 worked hard trying to land a gig that I really 0:30:41.880 --> 0:30:44.640 wanted to do. I thought, this is my chance to 0:30:45.160 --> 0:30:47.440 not just do something I can do, but do something 0:30:47.480 --> 0:30:50.360 I really want to do. I had stars in my eyes. 0:30:51.800 --> 0:30:54.920 Well that didn't pan out after three months, so then 0:30:54.960 --> 0:30:58.200 I spent the following three months trying to land a 0:30:58.240 --> 0:31:01.800 decent gig at all. I ended up working for a 0:31:01.840 --> 0:31:04.760 company not that different from the one that let me 0:31:04.800 --> 0:31:07.640 go in the first place. This was very rough on 0:31:07.800 --> 0:31:10.240 me and my psyche, but I had been out of 0:31:10.240 --> 0:31:13.960 work for nearly six months at that point. It was 0:31:14.360 --> 0:31:17.920 really tough on me. Well, scammers know that people who 0:31:17.920 --> 0:31:21.560 are looking for jobs are in that vulnerable space, and 0:31:21.600 --> 0:31:25.000 by promising a little, the scammers can get what they're after. 0:31:25.480 --> 0:31:28.160 They might be after the person's money, they might be 0:31:28.200 --> 0:31:32.760 after their personal information, or they might be after their cooperation. 0:31:32.800 --> 0:31:36.480 And one amounts to an illegal operation, and they're probably 0:31:36.520 --> 0:31:40.760 not upfront about that. They're probably not telling the applicant, hey, 0:31:41.520 --> 0:31:44.360 just so you know, what we're doing is illegal, So 0:31:44.560 --> 0:31:48.920 the applicant becomes an unwilling participant of a crime. This 0:31:48.960 --> 0:31:52.000 practice also gets me really angry. I hate seeing folks 0:31:52.040 --> 0:31:55.600 who are trying to get a job be targeted like that. 0:31:55.720 --> 0:31:59.560 Often these are people who can least afford the hardships 0:31:59.600 --> 0:32:03.120 that could follow if they're tricked by the scammers. Meanwhile, 0:32:03.280 --> 0:32:06.000 the scammers are profiting off people who are just trying 0:32:06.000 --> 0:32:09.800 to improve their own lives. It is gross. So these 0:32:09.840 --> 0:32:13.600 schemes tend to fall into a few broad categories, and 0:32:13.680 --> 0:32:16.400 some of them fall into just outright theft. So a 0:32:16.400 --> 0:32:20.560 common example of this is a payment representative scam. And 0:32:20.600 --> 0:32:24.560 here's how the scam works. The fraudsters identify a mark. 0:32:25.000 --> 0:32:27.840 This could be a totally cold call on their part. 0:32:27.920 --> 0:32:31.360 You know, they're just pulling off email addresses and sending 0:32:31.400 --> 0:32:34.280 out emails hoping to get a hit. Maybe they're using 0:32:34.320 --> 0:32:38.120 some job hunting sites to have a more targeted approach 0:32:38.680 --> 0:32:41.600 to their marks, or they might even post a job 0:32:41.800 --> 0:32:43.680 on a site to see if they get any bites. 0:32:44.200 --> 0:32:47.040 However they do this, it doesn't really matter whenever they 0:32:47.080 --> 0:32:51.000 make that first contact. Here's how the supposed job pans out. 0:32:51.040 --> 0:32:53.760 So let's assume you are the person who has been 0:32:53.800 --> 0:32:58.840 targeted by these fraudsters. They claim that the company they 0:32:58.920 --> 0:33:03.000 represent needs someone in your home country to handle some 0:33:03.040 --> 0:33:07.440 financial transactions because for some reason, the company itself has 0:33:07.560 --> 0:33:12.640 difficulty working within the financial institutions in your country. So 0:33:13.000 --> 0:33:16.520 this is a company that exists outside your country and 0:33:16.560 --> 0:33:20.000 needs to be able to process payments inside your country. 0:33:20.400 --> 0:33:24.960 Your job is to accept payments from this company, typically 0:33:25.000 --> 0:33:28.960 for really large sums of money. You're meant to deposit 0:33:29.360 --> 0:33:32.800 those payments in the form of checks. Check comes to you, 0:33:32.800 --> 0:33:36.400 you're supposed to deposit that check into your own personal account. 0:33:36.840 --> 0:33:39.640 Then you're meant to send on a payment from the 0:33:39.680 --> 0:33:43.240 amount that was given to you to some other entity, 0:33:43.520 --> 0:33:47.360 and you deduct your representative fee from that amount. So 0:33:47.440 --> 0:33:50.520 let's use an example because this gets confusing otherwise. All right, 0:33:50.600 --> 0:33:54.760 So you have accepted the job of payment representative from 0:33:54.760 --> 0:33:57.920 this company. The company tells you you get a ten 0:33:58.000 --> 0:34:02.440 percent fee off of all the transactions you process. The 0:34:02.480 --> 0:34:06.440 company sends you a check for fifteen thousand dollars, and 0:34:06.480 --> 0:34:10.040 you deposit the check into your account, and the company says, 0:34:10.280 --> 0:34:13.799 we need you to then send a payment to this 0:34:14.000 --> 0:34:17.840 other entity. And you pay out thirteen thousand, five hundred 0:34:17.880 --> 0:34:22.200 dollars because you deducted your ten percent your fifteen hundred dollars, 0:34:22.200 --> 0:34:25.600 so fifteen hundred dollars of that fifteen thousand dollars is 0:34:25.640 --> 0:34:28.320 yours to keep. You send out the other thirteen thousand, 0:34:28.400 --> 0:34:32.160 five hundred and then the scam becomes apparent because the 0:34:32.280 --> 0:34:38.280 fifteen thousand dollar check bounces. Meanwhile, you've already paid out thousand, 0:34:38.400 --> 0:34:42.160 five hundred dollars from your own account to that person 0:34:42.239 --> 0:34:45.600 that the company indicated. You're on the line for all 0:34:45.680 --> 0:34:49.040 of that money. In the United States, the Internal Revenue 0:34:49.080 --> 0:34:51.279 Service the i r S would want to talk to 0:34:51.320 --> 0:34:54.239 you about that fifteen grand. The bank would expect you 0:34:54.280 --> 0:34:56.400 to cover the amount of money you paid out, and 0:34:56.400 --> 0:34:58.759 the fraud sters get away with your money and your 0:34:58.880 --> 0:35:02.040 left holding the bag. It is a pretty awful scheme. 0:35:02.960 --> 0:35:08.040 Another scheme is the re shipper scam. This scam seems 0:35:08.080 --> 0:35:11.319 to ask a pretty simple favor of the employee. Your 0:35:11.440 --> 0:35:14.560 job is to accept packages that are sent to you. 0:35:15.040 --> 0:35:19.840 Then you either forward those packages onward to another address, 0:35:20.000 --> 0:35:22.520 or you might even have to open up a package, 0:35:22.520 --> 0:35:26.839 pull stuff out of the package, pack it into smaller boxes, 0:35:27.400 --> 0:35:30.680 and then send those packages on their way. But this 0:35:30.800 --> 0:35:34.280 raises a question, why would any company need a middleman 0:35:34.600 --> 0:35:37.960 to do this? Why not just send the packages directly 0:35:38.360 --> 0:35:41.160 to the customers. Well, the most common reason for this 0:35:41.239 --> 0:35:45.920 is that the packages actually contain illegal or stolen materials. Typically, 0:35:46.320 --> 0:35:49.840 it means the fraudsters have used stolen credit cards to 0:35:49.960 --> 0:35:54.279 purchase items online and then they use your address as 0:35:54.320 --> 0:35:58.560 the shipping address. You are then responsible for reshipping these 0:35:58.600 --> 0:36:03.000 packages to some other destination, frequently to an overseas address, 0:36:03.040 --> 0:36:05.759 where the goods will enter the black market and be 0:36:05.920 --> 0:36:10.200 sold for a much higher markup price. By accepting the package, 0:36:10.520 --> 0:36:14.120 you effectively become an accessory to the crime, and when 0:36:14.120 --> 0:36:17.480 you forward it on those packages came from you, not 0:36:17.719 --> 0:36:20.400 the original criminals. It's a way for the criminals to 0:36:20.440 --> 0:36:24.719 get illegal goods to a destination while insulating themselves from prosecution, 0:36:25.239 --> 0:36:28.759 and when the credit card gets reported as stolen, the 0:36:29.000 --> 0:36:34.000 point of contact for those fraudulent charges is you because 0:36:34.080 --> 0:36:36.759 you're the person that the fraudsters were using for the 0:36:36.800 --> 0:36:42.000 shipping address. Yeah. I've got some more job hiring scams 0:36:42.000 --> 0:36:44.680 to chat about in a second, but first let's take 0:36:44.840 --> 0:36:56.720 another quick break. Okay, So the previous examples I gave 0:36:57.040 --> 0:37:00.520 of job hiring scams that you'll typically find line are 0:37:00.520 --> 0:37:04.880 all about involving you the mark in crimes that ultimately 0:37:04.920 --> 0:37:09.319 rest on you while the real criminals continue their illegal activities. 0:37:09.680 --> 0:37:13.000 But many job hiring scams are more about harvesting personal 0:37:13.040 --> 0:37:16.360 information from people, often to do stuff like open up 0:37:16.400 --> 0:37:20.120 credit cards in those those employees names, or to get 0:37:20.200 --> 0:37:24.560 access to those employees bank accounts, or otherwise exploit them 0:37:24.600 --> 0:37:27.400 in some way. And you might encounter these scams on 0:37:27.480 --> 0:37:31.000 social media platforms like Facebook or linked In, or you 0:37:31.080 --> 0:37:33.920 might get targeted by them in an email that's attempting 0:37:33.920 --> 0:37:36.680 to phish the data out of you. The job postings 0:37:36.719 --> 0:37:40.120 typically use a few common tactics in an effort to 0:37:40.160 --> 0:37:43.520 get you to lower your guard and to respond quickly 0:37:43.640 --> 0:37:47.080 without thinking too much. For example, there's often a sense 0:37:47.120 --> 0:37:50.640 of urgency that goes along with these messages. That is, 0:37:50.840 --> 0:37:54.200 if you don't respond quickly, the opportunity is going to 0:37:54.320 --> 0:37:58.800 go away. Frequently, the job description will sound pretty simple 0:37:59.080 --> 0:38:02.440 and yet could have of a really generous salary range 0:38:02.520 --> 0:38:06.080 quoted as part of the gig. The message might also 0:38:06.120 --> 0:38:09.480 state that there's no experience necessary, which, if you think 0:38:09.520 --> 0:38:12.680 about it, undercuts the whole argument that you are the 0:38:12.719 --> 0:38:16.680 ideal candidates, since if no experience is necessary, you'd figure 0:38:16.880 --> 0:38:19.960 lots of people would qualify for the job. Another warning 0:38:20.000 --> 0:38:23.000 sign is if there's no interview as part of the 0:38:23.040 --> 0:38:27.040 whole process. Maybe the supposed recruiter says that the interactions 0:38:27.080 --> 0:38:31.439 across something like instant messenger or email exchanges are enough 0:38:31.480 --> 0:38:34.400 to forego the need to have an in person interview. 0:38:34.719 --> 0:38:37.279 That's often a way for the scammer to avoid the 0:38:37.280 --> 0:38:41.440 pitfalls of you getting wise and asking some tricky questions. 0:38:41.640 --> 0:38:45.480 They just sidestep that entirely, and they appeal to your vanity. Oh, 0:38:45.560 --> 0:38:48.440 you're so amazing, we don't even need to have an interview. 0:38:48.480 --> 0:38:51.439 You're hired. Well, it's a very flattering thing to hear. 0:38:52.239 --> 0:38:55.280 Often these scammers will say they came across your resume 0:38:55.440 --> 0:38:58.279 on a job recruiting site. Sometimes it will be a 0:38:58.320 --> 0:39:01.520 site that you've never even visited, or heard of and yeah, 0:39:01.640 --> 0:39:04.360 that's a warning sign. Or they might even claim that 0:39:04.400 --> 0:39:07.400 you actively applied for the job, and they're counting on 0:39:07.440 --> 0:39:10.200 the fact that maybe you you feel like you forgot 0:39:10.200 --> 0:39:11.960 about it, maybe you were applying to a lot of 0:39:12.040 --> 0:39:15.360 jobs and so I don't know, maybe I did, or 0:39:15.400 --> 0:39:18.320 maybe you're just thinking, oh, shut up. They this is 0:39:18.320 --> 0:39:22.280 an opportunity, don't question it a dead giveaway in these circumstances. 0:39:22.719 --> 0:39:25.360 If it is. If there's an email contact for you 0:39:25.400 --> 0:39:28.360 to reach out to and the domain on that email 0:39:28.400 --> 0:39:31.960 contact doesn't match whatever the company is that's supposedly reaching 0:39:31.960 --> 0:39:35.880 out to you. Some scammers like to use recognizable, real 0:39:36.160 --> 0:39:39.040 companies when they reach out. They know that it will 0:39:39.080 --> 0:39:41.600 get more hits than if they just make a company 0:39:41.600 --> 0:39:45.040 out of whole cloth. Plus, if you rely on an 0:39:45.080 --> 0:39:49.319 existing company as your cover, you can trade upon that 0:39:49.360 --> 0:39:53.040 company's reputation as well as it's pre existing presence of 0:39:53.080 --> 0:39:57.399 the company online. Right if I say that I am 0:39:57.480 --> 0:40:01.280 coming from X y Z company and it's a real company, 0:40:01.400 --> 0:40:03.400 there's already a website out there. I don't have to 0:40:03.440 --> 0:40:07.640 create anything. If you make up a company, you need 0:40:07.680 --> 0:40:10.440 to go through some extra trouble. It's pretty suspicious to 0:40:10.480 --> 0:40:13.080 come across a company that's using the Internet to recruit 0:40:13.120 --> 0:40:16.040 people when that same company doesn't have a web page. 0:40:16.200 --> 0:40:19.080 So scammers typically have to make a choice. Do you 0:40:19.160 --> 0:40:22.680 pose as someone from a reputable company that really exists, 0:40:23.120 --> 0:40:26.080 or do you create a fake company complete with a 0:40:26.120 --> 0:40:30.560 website to help lure in job hunters. Those posing as 0:40:30.600 --> 0:40:33.839 representatives for an existing company are often found out when 0:40:33.840 --> 0:40:37.000 their emails do not match that company in question. They 0:40:37.040 --> 0:40:40.120 also run another risk. You could always reach out to 0:40:40.280 --> 0:40:43.480 the real company to confirm that a message actually did 0:40:43.560 --> 0:40:46.680 originate from within that company, and if you get a 0:40:46.680 --> 0:40:51.240 negative response, if you say, hey, I got this job offer, 0:40:51.640 --> 0:40:53.440 I want to make sure that it's legitimate, and the 0:40:53.480 --> 0:40:56.560 response you get is this is the first we've ever 0:40:56.560 --> 0:41:00.600 heard of it, you know it's most likely a scam 0:41:00.640 --> 0:41:04.000 making up a company can get around that problem, right, 0:41:04.080 --> 0:41:08.000 because now you're controlling the whole lie. It's not just well, 0:41:08.040 --> 0:41:11.400 hopefully they don't reach out to the real company because 0:41:11.600 --> 0:41:14.319 there is no real company to reach out to. So 0:41:14.360 --> 0:41:18.000 in this case, if you are the one targeted, you 0:41:18.080 --> 0:41:20.840 have no other authority to turn to in order to 0:41:20.880 --> 0:41:24.320 confirm that a message is legitimate. But this also requires 0:41:24.320 --> 0:41:26.239 a lot more work on the part of the scammers. 0:41:26.440 --> 0:41:29.600 Several years ago, a friend of mine was job hunting 0:41:29.680 --> 0:41:32.480 and got an offer that seemed too good to be true. 0:41:32.880 --> 0:41:36.640 So that was a warning right there. So she asked 0:41:36.640 --> 0:41:39.040 for my help to investigate to make sure it was 0:41:39.080 --> 0:41:42.520 a legitimate offer and not just a scam. You know. 0:41:42.680 --> 0:41:45.319 She thought that it sounded like a really promising job, 0:41:45.360 --> 0:41:47.719 but she was a little worried. So she forwarded a 0:41:47.760 --> 0:41:50.239 message that she received and she sent it to me, 0:41:50.560 --> 0:41:52.359 and I did some digging, and it turned out her 0:41:52.360 --> 0:41:56.640 suspicions were very well placed. The company was a supposed 0:41:56.800 --> 0:41:59.919 architectural firm that was looking to hire someone in an 0:42:00.000 --> 0:42:03.040 in the straight of position. And I can't even remember 0:42:03.480 --> 0:42:06.200 what the name of this fake company was anymore. This 0:42:06.280 --> 0:42:09.000 happened years ago, but I do remember the process. The 0:42:09.040 --> 0:42:12.279 message referred my friend to the company website, and so 0:42:12.320 --> 0:42:14.799 I visited the website and it was pretty slick. It 0:42:14.800 --> 0:42:17.719 looked nice and had a decent design to it, and 0:42:17.760 --> 0:42:21.640 it included photographs of supposed construction sites that this company 0:42:21.680 --> 0:42:24.680 claimed were official projects. So they're saying, you know, we're 0:42:24.719 --> 0:42:29.400 responsible for building this amazing building at the x y 0:42:29.560 --> 0:42:32.920 Z address, but none of this looked legit to me. 0:42:33.160 --> 0:42:37.680 For one thing, the website actually looked a little template ish, 0:42:37.800 --> 0:42:39.919 as if the person who had made the site had 0:42:40.080 --> 0:42:44.200 used a web hosting service that comes with templates for 0:42:44.239 --> 0:42:46.920 web pages, and then they built out a few web pages, 0:42:46.920 --> 0:42:49.319 but they didn't go too much trouble to customize it 0:42:49.400 --> 0:42:53.520 beyond the generic template. I also looked at the address 0:42:53.560 --> 0:42:57.000 for the supposed construction site and I plugged it into 0:42:57.080 --> 0:42:59.560 Google Maps to take a look at it from there, 0:43:00.040 --> 0:43:02.759 and that presented a very different image than what was 0:43:02.800 --> 0:43:05.560 on their web page, and it was clearly not the 0:43:05.600 --> 0:43:09.800 same location despite the claims. That's when I knew something 0:43:09.880 --> 0:43:13.440 was up. Then I did something that proved to me 0:43:13.640 --> 0:43:16.719 that this was a total scam. I found a paragraph 0:43:16.800 --> 0:43:19.200 of text that I found to be a little odd. 0:43:19.320 --> 0:43:22.320 The wording was just a little off and and unusual, 0:43:22.840 --> 0:43:26.120 So I highlighted the text and I searched Google for 0:43:26.200 --> 0:43:29.040 that text. Now, if this were a legit site for 0:43:29.120 --> 0:43:33.480 a local business, maybe one where the web administrator doesn't 0:43:33.480 --> 0:43:36.719 have the best way with words, but otherwise it's completely legitimate. 0:43:37.080 --> 0:43:40.399 The only response I should have seen from Google would 0:43:40.400 --> 0:43:44.120 have been that one web page, but instead I got 0:43:44.160 --> 0:43:48.360 seven or eight different hits, two different web pages, all 0:43:48.400 --> 0:43:52.880 with the exact same wording. Going to those links, I 0:43:52.920 --> 0:43:56.320 found duplicates of the website that I had just visited. 0:43:56.680 --> 0:44:00.360 The company name was different from site to site, but 0:44:00.440 --> 0:44:04.200 all the content was exactly the same. They're all located 0:44:04.239 --> 0:44:07.799 in different cities, and they even all had pictures of 0:44:07.840 --> 0:44:12.760 that same construction site, but the address had been localized 0:44:12.840 --> 0:44:17.400 to whatever site, you know, whatever place the company was 0:44:17.440 --> 0:44:21.440 claiming to be in. So there was one for Atlanta, Georgia, 0:44:21.560 --> 0:44:26.399 there was one for Phoenix, there was one for Helena, Montana. 0:44:26.719 --> 0:44:32.120 They all mysteriously had the exact same content, same staff 0:44:32.480 --> 0:44:36.600 working for the company, and exact same construction site, just 0:44:36.680 --> 0:44:39.840 in different parts of the United States. I alerted my friend, 0:44:40.160 --> 0:44:42.520 who was glad that I had caught the scam, but 0:44:42.560 --> 0:44:45.279 she was obviously discouraged that what initially seemed to be 0:44:45.360 --> 0:44:47.880 a real job offer had turned out to be a trap. 0:44:48.280 --> 0:44:51.520 Now fortunately she found out before it went any further, 0:44:51.719 --> 0:44:54.120 but was still a discouraging thing to happen when you're 0:44:54.120 --> 0:44:56.719 in the middle of a job search. Now. I'm not 0:44:56.760 --> 0:45:00.000 trying to pat myself on the back here about uncovered 0:45:00.040 --> 0:45:03.279 ring this one. It was a pretty sloppy attempt when 0:45:03.320 --> 0:45:06.319 all things are considered too. I was able to go 0:45:06.360 --> 0:45:10.319 about this investigation because I could think critically about it. 0:45:10.640 --> 0:45:13.160 I care for my friends, but I was not as 0:45:13.160 --> 0:45:17.640 emotionally invested in this opportunity as she was. I had 0:45:17.680 --> 0:45:21.319 fewer blinders up because I wasn't counting on this being 0:45:21.320 --> 0:45:24.239 a real offer. If I had been hunting for a job, 0:45:24.280 --> 0:45:26.960 if I had been in my friends position, I might 0:45:27.120 --> 0:45:31.560 very well have totally bought that scam, hook line and sinker. 0:45:32.400 --> 0:45:35.560 The investigation I did was pretty simple stuff. It didn't 0:45:35.600 --> 0:45:38.719 require any advanced search techniques. Had just involved looking at 0:45:38.760 --> 0:45:41.359 the information that was presented and then doing my best 0:45:41.360 --> 0:45:43.680 to fact check it. When things didn't match up, I 0:45:43.719 --> 0:45:46.319 figured I was onto a trick and that's it. And 0:45:46.320 --> 0:45:48.680 the fact that there were several duplicate websites told me 0:45:48.760 --> 0:45:52.600 I had hit upon some sort of scheme. There's one 0:45:52.640 --> 0:45:56.399 other type of job scam I should mention. This one 0:45:56.520 --> 0:45:59.480 is harder to spot, but it's also a crappy thing 0:45:59.520 --> 0:46:02.200 to do to people. And this is the old bait 0:46:02.280 --> 0:46:05.800 and switch. This is when a company advertises a particular 0:46:05.840 --> 0:46:09.560 position in order to get applicants, but then when someone 0:46:09.640 --> 0:46:12.800 actually does apply and perhaps comes in for an interview. 0:46:13.120 --> 0:46:16.920 The company reveals that the position that the applicant is 0:46:16.960 --> 0:46:20.440 interested in isn't actually available, maybe it doesn't even exist, 0:46:21.320 --> 0:46:24.640 maybe it was never available. Instead, they're offering a different 0:46:24.760 --> 0:46:27.959 job that is available. Most likely it's a job that's 0:46:27.960 --> 0:46:31.399 not nearly as desirable as the one that was advertised. 0:46:31.680 --> 0:46:34.360 It might be grunt work for low pay. It's the 0:46:34.360 --> 0:46:37.080 type of job that could be difficult to fill on 0:46:37.120 --> 0:46:39.839 its own if you were to list it, so they 0:46:39.920 --> 0:46:42.279 might not get any applicants if they had listed the 0:46:42.360 --> 0:46:45.719 real job, or maybe they would only get people that 0:46:45.760 --> 0:46:48.760 the company isn't keen on hiring in the first place, 0:46:49.040 --> 0:46:51.239 So the bait and switch might bring in, you know, 0:46:51.320 --> 0:46:55.040 a better class of applicant. And all it takes is 0:46:55.080 --> 0:46:58.759 being dishonest to trick someone into coming in for an interview. 0:46:59.239 --> 0:47:01.880 Companies that do this know that people who are looking 0:47:01.880 --> 0:47:04.600 for a job might be tempted to say yes to 0:47:04.719 --> 0:47:09.080 a less desirable position because it's still represents an opportunity, 0:47:09.480 --> 0:47:12.040 even if it's for a job that they wouldn't normally 0:47:12.080 --> 0:47:15.280 apply for if they just saw it online by itself. 0:47:15.960 --> 0:47:18.920 Don't fall for this one, either, folks. If you wouldn't 0:47:18.920 --> 0:47:21.360 apply for the job if you saw it listed online. 0:47:21.760 --> 0:47:25.000 Don't take it just because it's offered to you. No 0:47:25.120 --> 0:47:27.640 one will end up being happy with that decision in 0:47:27.680 --> 0:47:30.080 the long run, and you don't ever want to work 0:47:30.120 --> 0:47:32.880 for a company that depends on tricks to get people 0:47:32.920 --> 0:47:35.120 to work for them. Now, I don't think I can 0:47:35.120 --> 0:47:38.920 really go into stuff like multi level marketing businesses or 0:47:39.000 --> 0:47:43.040 pyramid schemes, which are not necessarily the same thing, but 0:47:43.440 --> 0:47:47.520 frequently an MLM can turn into a pyramid scheme. The 0:47:47.560 --> 0:47:51.640 two can share a lot of qualities. I think that 0:47:51.840 --> 0:47:54.880 is better left as a subject for a different podcast, 0:47:54.920 --> 0:47:58.400 because it's not as dependent upon technology as the variations 0:47:58.400 --> 0:48:01.759 I've been speaking about today. Once again, I gotta put 0:48:01.840 --> 0:48:04.800 forth the argument for critical thinking. It's all about asking 0:48:04.840 --> 0:48:08.879 important questions and looking for the most truthful answers. It's 0:48:08.880 --> 0:48:13.040 about not taking things at face value and digging a 0:48:13.080 --> 0:48:16.600 little deeper. This is particularly important when you've got a 0:48:16.680 --> 0:48:19.960 strong motivation to believe the story being told to you. 0:48:20.360 --> 0:48:24.160 If you have a predisposition to believe, you really got 0:48:24.160 --> 0:48:27.080 to employ that critical thinking. If you're a person looking 0:48:27.120 --> 0:48:30.280 for a new job, or you're someone who's really hunting 0:48:30.360 --> 0:48:34.200 for a bargain, You're more liable to believe the lie 0:48:34.320 --> 0:48:36.439 because lie is telling you what you want to hear, 0:48:36.480 --> 0:48:39.200 So you've got to really use that critical thinking. The 0:48:39.280 --> 0:48:43.960 motivation for believing is what these con artists are counting on. 0:48:44.719 --> 0:48:48.600 Your motivation is doing the work for these con artists, 0:48:49.120 --> 0:48:52.240 whether it's an ad on social media, a job listing, 0:48:52.680 --> 0:48:58.319 or a crowdfunding campaign for a seemingly incredible idea. It's 0:48:58.320 --> 0:49:02.240 always good to check your expectations and do some research first. 0:49:02.600 --> 0:49:05.040 You may find that everything is totally legit and then 0:49:05.080 --> 0:49:07.799 you're good to go, or you might save yourself some 0:49:07.840 --> 0:49:13.120 money or your credit score, your bank account, or other 0:49:13.200 --> 0:49:17.239 things that are equally important. So it pays to be 0:49:17.280 --> 0:49:21.840 a critical thinker. And that wraps up this episode. Totally 0:49:21.920 --> 0:49:26.200 inspired by my Facebook experience this morning. It's something I 0:49:26.239 --> 0:49:30.160 really am very passionate about. I do not want people 0:49:30.640 --> 0:49:33.720 to be taken advantage of. I want a world where 0:49:34.160 --> 0:49:38.880 con artists don't get any opportunities and they realize that 0:49:38.960 --> 0:49:42.560 they need to spend their efforts doing something else rather 0:49:42.640 --> 0:49:47.080 than tricking people and making their lives more difficult. So 0:49:47.360 --> 0:49:50.880 let's make it hard for those jerks, shall we. If 0:49:50.920 --> 0:49:53.400 you guys have suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff, 0:49:53.760 --> 0:49:56.680 send me an email. The addresses tex stuff at how 0:49:56.760 --> 0:50:00.799 stuff works dot com. If you want you learn more 0:50:00.800 --> 0:50:03.280 about the show, go to our website that's tech stuff 0:50:03.320 --> 0:50:07.439 podcast dot com. We've got a list of every single 0:50:07.480 --> 0:50:10.400 episode that has ever published. We have links to our 0:50:10.440 --> 0:50:12.560 online store, where every purchase you make goes to help 0:50:12.600 --> 0:50:15.200 the show. We greatly appreciate it, and we have links 0:50:15.200 --> 0:50:17.080 to where we are on social media. You can reach 0:50:17.120 --> 0:50:19.839 out to me on Facebook or Twitter and I will 0:50:19.840 --> 0:50:27.880 talk to you again really soon. Y text Stuff is 0:50:27.920 --> 0:50:30.400 a production of I Heart Radio's How Stuff Works. For 0:50:30.520 --> 0:50:33.480 more podcasts from i heeart Radio, visit the I heart 0:50:33.560 --> 0:50:36.719 Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your 0:50:36.760 --> 0:50:37.480 favorite shows.