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Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios

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Speaker 1: How Stuff Works. Me there and Welcome to tech Stuff.

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Speaker 1: I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with

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Speaker 1: How Stuff Works in My Heart Radio and I love

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Speaker 1: of all things tech, and today I wanted to talk

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Speaker 1: once again about scams and hoaxes and efforts to separate

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Speaker 1: you from your money and or personal information. So this

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Speaker 1: episode is related to episodes I've done about fishing, and

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Speaker 1: I'll likely tread some of the same ground, but I

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Speaker 1: feel it's an important topic and while I have touched

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Speaker 1: on it before, it always pays to go back and

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Speaker 1: re examined this and to remind ourselves of how unethical,

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Speaker 1: dishonest people might target us and how we might be

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Speaker 1: vulnerable to them. Being aware means we're more likely able

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Speaker 1: to avoid becoming a victim. And I say this is

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Speaker 1: someone who has fallen for some of these scams before.

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Speaker 1: It's not something I'm particularly proud of, but you know,

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Speaker 1: it was one of those valuable lessons I learned. And

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Speaker 1: fortunately it wasn't a super expensive lesson for me to learn,

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Speaker 1: but it could have been. And uh, I thought, maybe

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Speaker 1: to spare other people the same learning experience I had

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Speaker 1: through experience, we could talk about this, and so this

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Speaker 1: episode was prompted by something that I actually encountered while

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Speaker 1: I was on Facebook the morning of the day that

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Speaker 1: I'm recording this. So I'm actually one of those Facebook

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Speaker 1: users who once in a blue moon, I will click

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Speaker 1: through on an ad. Sometimes I see ads for stuff

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Speaker 1: that I find really interesting, so I'll go ahead and

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Speaker 1: investigate it, And sometimes it just turns out to be

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Speaker 1: a waste of time, Like I'll figure out the thing

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Speaker 1: that was being advertised and what's actually on the respective

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Speaker 1: site don't quite match up, for example, and I'll realize, oh, well,

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Speaker 1: this isn't for me. Or there was one case where

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Speaker 1: I was seeing a preview for a show and it

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Speaker 1: looked like a spectacular show, but I didn't recognize the

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Speaker 1: name of the theater, and I clicked through and discovered

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Speaker 1: that the theater is in Seattle, Washington. Well, I'm in Atlanta, Georgia,

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Speaker 1: and those two places are not close to each other.

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Speaker 1: They are on opposite sides of the United States, so

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Speaker 1: it's not likely that I'm going to get around to

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Speaker 1: seeing that show. So once in a while I'll click

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Speaker 1: through if it looks interesting, but I realized, oh, you know,

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Speaker 1: I kind of I could have saved myself some effort

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Speaker 1: if I had just realized up front that this doesn't

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Speaker 1: really you know, this isn't really relevant to me. So

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Speaker 1: eventually you can get into some territory where things get

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Speaker 1: a little questionable. Maybe it's not just this doesn't really

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Speaker 1: represent what I was looking at, but this is an

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Speaker 1: actual attempt to misdirect, to to capture, to trick someone.

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Speaker 1: And what really gets my dinner up are the more

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Speaker 1: brazen attempts to scan people or to pull a bait

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Speaker 1: and switch. So the example that prompted this episode was

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Speaker 1: for a silicone mask. Now, as I record this, Halloween

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Speaker 1: is coming up. I'm recording this on October six, two

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Speaker 1: thousand nineteen, so these scammers are jumping on that opportunity

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Speaker 1: to showcase what are truly incredible masks. I mean, these

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Speaker 1: are actual silicone masks that are really well made, and

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Speaker 1: supposedly these online stores that are advertising on Facebook have

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Speaker 1: these masks in stock on their sites. The mask I

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Speaker 1: first saw was Belile the Demon. It's a silicone mask

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Speaker 1: of a devilish looking creation, and the silicone allows the

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Speaker 1: mask to conform closely with the face of the person

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Speaker 1: who's wearing the mask, so the lips on the mask

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Speaker 1: fit right around the wearer's lips, and that means you

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Speaker 1: can actually open and close your mouth and the mask

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Speaker 1: will open and close its mouth. It conforms so well.

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Speaker 1: It looks very natural, and the mask looks and credibly lifelike.

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Speaker 1: And they're great. I mean this, this Belial one is

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Speaker 1: a great example of how a silicone mask can be

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Speaker 1: a really amazing work, and uh, I was immediately intrigued

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Speaker 1: by it. The ad had a video of a man

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Speaker 1: trying on the mask. It was an unboxing video, and

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Speaker 1: he had the mask on a mannequin head and he

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Speaker 1: pulls the mask off of it and then he puts

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Speaker 1: it onto himself and demonstrates how well it moves with

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Speaker 1: his facial features. It was a great demonstration of the

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Speaker 1: masks features and mobility. So I was curious. I clicked through.

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Speaker 1: I was thinking, how much is the store selling this

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Speaker 1: mask for? And what I saw immediately raised red flags

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Speaker 1: in my head. So the price for the mask on

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Speaker 1: this website was listed as thirty four dollars cents, marked

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Speaker 1: down from around fifty dollars, and I knew immediately that

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Speaker 1: could not possibly be legit. I've seen masks in Halloween

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Speaker 1: stores that cost more than that, and we're not nearly

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Speaker 1: as sophisticated as this particular mask was. So then I

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Speaker 1: did a Google search for the mask and found the

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Speaker 1: actual Bellal the Demon mask on several specialty mask and

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Speaker 1: costume shops, and those prices ranged from around six hundred

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Speaker 1: to eight hundred dollars, so thirty five bucks would be

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Speaker 1: quite a markdown. Moreover, I found the unboxing video and

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Speaker 1: the review video that was playing as part of this ad.

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Speaker 1: I found it on YouTube and it was completely independent

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Speaker 1: of the store. The guy who was doing the video

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Speaker 1: had no connection whatsoever to the online store that was

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Speaker 1: advertising this mask. In fact, the YouTuber had posted in

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Speaker 1: the comments section and penned the comment that the video

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Speaker 1: had been appropriated for these scam ads and said, don't

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Speaker 1: believe what you see on Facebook, because those ads are

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Speaker 1: four masks that look nothing like this one. They are

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Speaker 1: cheap knockoffs, or maybe not even knockoffs. They're just terrible masks, uh,

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Speaker 1: and you're getting a bait and switch. And it proved

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Speaker 1: there was no connection between the video that played as

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Speaker 1: part of this advertisement and the actual product that was

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Speaker 1: being sold. Uh. And it's I'm sure incredibly frustrating for

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Speaker 1: him to see a video he made being used in

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Speaker 1: this way because it it sort of implicates him in

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Speaker 1: this even though he has no connection to it. And

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Speaker 1: I know that as a content creator myself, if I

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Speaker 1: were to come across a piece of content where I

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Speaker 1: appear to be advertising for something marketing something and I

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Speaker 1: never agreed to that, I would feel really betrayed by that.

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Speaker 1: Then I went a step further. The shop that was

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Speaker 1: linked through this Facebook ad had a contact page, so

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Speaker 1: I clicked on the contact page. I wanted to see

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Speaker 1: what was there, and then was an email listed there,

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Speaker 1: which was already unusual that there was actually an email

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Speaker 1: address where you could send a question or a comment

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Speaker 1: or whatever. But the domain for the email address was

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Speaker 1: different from the domain in the stores you are l.

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Speaker 1: So the stores you are l was one thing, and

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Speaker 1: the email address was totally not connected to that, And

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Speaker 1: that's another red flag. You would expect a legitimate business

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Speaker 1: to use email addresses that reflect the stores you are l.

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Speaker 1: You would expect uniformity across that, or at least an

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Speaker 1: email address of a parent company for an outlet, but

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Speaker 1: none of that was the case here. So I did

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Speaker 1: a Google search for the email. I highlighted the email address,

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Speaker 1: and I did a Google search for that, and up

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Speaker 1: came another dozen online stores that also included that email

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Speaker 1: as the contact email. None of these stores appeared to

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Speaker 1: be connected to each other. They all had different names.

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Speaker 1: Some of the names were really weird, like there was

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Speaker 1: one that was about yoga, supposedly, not that the store

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Speaker 1: was about yoga, but that was what the name was.

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Speaker 1: But they none of them had any connection to each other,

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Speaker 1: and that was another big red flag. Then I decided

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Speaker 1: I wasn't finished yet. I decided to use a tool

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Speaker 1: called scam doc dot com. That's s C A M

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Speaker 1: D O C dot com. This is a tool that

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Speaker 1: analyzes website u r l s and email domains. And

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Speaker 1: just so you guys know, I have no connection to

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Speaker 1: that service. I'm recommending it as a user, but I

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Speaker 1: have no you know, I don't know those guys. I

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Speaker 1: don't have any other connection to it. I just used

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Speaker 1: that tool myself. The tool assigns a reliability score to

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Speaker 1: websites and emails, and the score is based off of

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Speaker 1: several criteria for example, how long has the site been around.

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Speaker 1: Younger sites are less trub worthy than older sites, And

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Speaker 1: in the case of every site I checked, each one

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Speaker 1: of those was younger than six months, so they hadn't

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Speaker 1: even been around for six months. That's a warning flag

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Speaker 1: right there. Also are the sites details such as where

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Speaker 1: in the world it was registered? Are those details publicly viewable?

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Speaker 1: Do you know who the registrar is? Do you know

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Speaker 1: you know where it was registered? If not, that's another

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Speaker 1: big warning flag there, and that contributes to the reliability score.

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Speaker 1: So in case you're curious, the score I got back

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Speaker 1: from this particular shop that prompted this entire episode was

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Speaker 1: a hearty one percent, meaning the analysis tool concluded the

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Speaker 1: site posed a serious risk of being a scam operation.

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Speaker 1: It concluded that the site hadn't been around long, the

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Speaker 1: details behind who registered it and where it was registered

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Speaker 1: weren't public, and based off similar sites, the tool predicted

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Speaker 1: that this particular shop wouldn't be around for very long.

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Speaker 1: It was sort of a fly by night thing, which

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Speaker 1: is not a good indication that you're dealing with someone

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Speaker 1: on the up and up. Now, I reported the ad

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Speaker 1: as misleading and a scam to Facebook there's a little tool.

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Speaker 1: If you ever see a Facebook ad and you're thinking, well,

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Speaker 1: this looks shifty and I want to report it. There

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Speaker 1: are these little three dots in the upper right corner.

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Speaker 1: If you click on that, one of the options there's

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Speaker 1: to report an ad, and then you have different options

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Speaker 1: on why you reported it. So I chose misleading and scam.

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Speaker 1: But here's the thing. Now, remember when I said that

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Speaker 1: searching that email address brought up numerous other websites, all

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Speaker 1: of them similar shops to the one I had just visited.

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Speaker 1: In fact, many of them were using the same web template,

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Speaker 1: although they had different names. Well that's just a tiny

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Speaker 1: sample of the bogus businesses that are all using this

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Speaker 1: exact same tactic on Facebook. While I had reported the

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Speaker 1: original ad that I saw, and while Facebook would then

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Speaker 1: block that ad from appearing in my feed, ever again,

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Speaker 1: Facebook couldn't block all the identical ads that were registered

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Speaker 1: to different stores. So I kept seeing the same or

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Speaker 1: similar ads for this mask or masks that were just

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Speaker 1: like this one, maybe of a slightly different design, but

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Speaker 1: they were also high quality silicone masks. I kept seeing

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Speaker 1: these sorts of ads, one after another, and I would

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Speaker 1: go through the process of blocking saying misleading or scam

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Speaker 1: and then scroll through it and yet another one would

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Speaker 1: pop up. So this doesn't stop me from reporting the

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Speaker 1: bogus ads because I don't want anyone to fall victim

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Speaker 1: to them if I can help it. But it's very discouraging.

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Speaker 1: It's telling me that there are several people, maybe several companies,

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Speaker 1: most likely in places like China, that are popping up

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Speaker 1: and using this same approach to cast as wide a

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Speaker 1: net as possible to catch as many suckers as possible.

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Speaker 1: So I likened it to squishing a bug in a

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Speaker 1: room that's teeming with thousands of bugs. Sure, there's one

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Speaker 1: fewer bug in the mix, but there's still thousands more

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Speaker 1: to deal with. Okay, So what's actually at stake here?

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Speaker 1: Why am I so head up about this? Well, some

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Speaker 1: of these sites actually do sell you something. It's not

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Speaker 1: likely to look like the image or the video that

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Speaker 1: was attached to the original ad, but it's something. It

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Speaker 1: might be the wrong product entirely. It's almost certainly a cheap,

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Speaker 1: poorly made product, and you might chalk it up as

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Speaker 1: just a learning experience like I did in the past,

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Speaker 1: and you might say, well, I won't let that happen

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Speaker 1: to me again, and you'll think, well, I'm out however

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Speaker 1: much money I spent. But that's as far as the

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Speaker 1: the damage is gonna go. But you're still out of

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Speaker 1: however much money the thing costs. And nobody wants to

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Speaker 1: just throw money away. Maybe it's not that much money.

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Speaker 1: Maybe you decide you're going to eat the cost and

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Speaker 1: you'll just deal with it, but no one wants to

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Speaker 1: do that some. In fact, many of these sites that

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Speaker 1: are up there say they offer free refunds, but that

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Speaker 1: itself comes with a set of caveats. So I saw

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Speaker 1: one of these sites that listed uh product like this

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Speaker 1: and said refunds are free within the first thirty days

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Speaker 1: of purchase. But then and another part of the exact

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Speaker 1: same site, I saw a discussion that explained that all

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Speaker 1: refund requests must first go through a verification process, they

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Speaker 1: have to be reviewed by a team, and that you

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Speaker 1: have to submit your refund request within seven days of

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Speaker 1: having received the product. There's no indication of how long

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Speaker 1: that process is supposed to last either, So it may

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Speaker 1: be that, oh, yeah, you get a free refund within

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Speaker 1: thirty days, but if the review process lasts longer than

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Speaker 1: thirty days, then maybe the company argues, well, it doesn't

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Speaker 1: fall within that thirty day period, and so you're not

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Speaker 1: entitled to a refund. In addition, while the refund might

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Speaker 1: be free, return shipping is almost never uh an included benefit.

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Speaker 1: So in other words, if you want a refund, you're

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Speaker 1: gonna have to pay to ship the thing back to

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Speaker 1: where it came from. And because these items are mostly

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Speaker 1: being shipped from places like China, you know, primarily China,

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Speaker 1: you're looking at shipping costs that can be much higher

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Speaker 1: than what you paid for the product in the first place. So, yeah,

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Speaker 1: you can get a refund. You could send the stuff back,

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Speaker 1: but it's actually going to cost you more money to

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Speaker 1: send it back than it did for you to purchase it.

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Speaker 1: So you would be losing money on the refund. And

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Speaker 1: that's assuming the company actually refunds your money. So there's

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Speaker 1: no incentive to actually pursue a refund. It would cost

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Speaker 1: you more money than you would get. Moreover, since many

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Speaker 1: of these companies are overseas and again mostly in China,

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Speaker 1: there's not a lot you can do legally to go

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Speaker 1: after your money. You can't really hold the company accountable.

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Speaker 1: There's very little chance that the Chinese government's going to

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Speaker 1: jump in and say, oh, you're you're cheating people overseas

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Speaker 1: out of their money. Bad, that's probably not going to happen.

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Speaker 1: So the bogus businesses are protected and can generate revenue

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Speaker 1: by depending upon naive customers who take the bait, and

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Speaker 1: thanks to Facebook's algorithms for serving up ads, those ads

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Speaker 1: can reach a pretty big base of potential customers. So

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Speaker 1: even if you only get one bite out of a thousand,

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Speaker 1: if millions of people are seeing the ad, that still

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Speaker 1: adds up. And this brings me to another red flag. Though,

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Speaker 1: I think it's pretty safe to say we've established from

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Speaker 1: this example that I'm citing that it definitely was not

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Speaker 1: a legit business. When I visited the shop by clicking

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Speaker 1: through the ad, I decided I would also look at

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Speaker 1: their home page to get a look at the types

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Speaker 1: of stuff that the store sold. If all the stuff

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Speaker 1: on the store had been thematically linked, let's say that

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Speaker 1: they were all like Halloween or cost supplies, or maybe

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Speaker 1: even party supplies, I might have felt like it was

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Speaker 1: a more legitimate business that perhaps engaged in some bad

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Speaker 1: marketing decisions, primarily snagging someone else's video without their permission

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Speaker 1: to act as part of their ad. But instead I

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Speaker 1: saw an eclectic mix of products across all sorts of

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Speaker 1: different categories. They had wigs, not not costume wigs, but

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Speaker 1: fashion wigs. They had kitchen items, they had automotive items,

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Speaker 1: and more. There's stuff from you know, no rhyme or

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Speaker 1: reason to what was on there, the stuff from every

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Speaker 1: conceivable category, unless you happen to know how Facebook's algorithms work,

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Speaker 1: in which case you would see a rhyme and reason

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Speaker 1: to this approach. See Advertisers can tag their ads with keywords,

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Speaker 1: and this is important because Facebook can then use that

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Speaker 1: in order to serve the ads to the most receptive audiences,

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Speaker 1: in other words, to pair up ads to potential customers.

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Speaker 1: So your activity on Facebook and on the web at

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Speaker 1: large teaches Facebook what you like and what you don't like.

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Speaker 1: So if you've liked certain pages on Facebook or images

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Speaker 1: on Facebook, or you've engaged in conversations, or you've shared

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Speaker 1: certain posts, all of that activity is logged and analyzed

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Speaker 1: by Facebook, and Facebook starts to build a profile of you.

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Speaker 1: What are the things you're interested in, What are the

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Speaker 1: things you like? What are the things you tend to

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Speaker 1: ignore or or you seem not to like. That way,

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Speaker 1: Facebook can say, well, let's serve up the ads that

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Speaker 1: are most likely going to be relevant to this person,

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Speaker 1: and that way you get ads that most closely aligned

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Speaker 1: with your interests. So if you've liked a lot of

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Speaker 1: posts about cars, for example, you're more likely to see

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Speaker 1: ads related to car stuff. Similarly, if you've been browsing

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Speaker 1: the web for certain types of products, you're more likely

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Speaker 1: to see those types of products advertised to you as well,

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Speaker 1: due to web tracking tools that lots of advertisers and

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Speaker 1: web page administrators use. So if you're running a scam company,

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Speaker 1: one in which you send out cheap products for low prices,

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Speaker 1: but they're presented to look like incredible deals on high

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Speaker 1: quality items, it behooves you to have a wide selection

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Speaker 1: of crab to pedal. On Facebook, you can arrange for

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Speaker 1: ads on multiple categories of products. So some people will

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Speaker 1: get that Halloween mask ad I was talking about because

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Speaker 1: their interests happened to fall in that kind of category.

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Speaker 1: Some other people might get hair care products I rarely

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Speaker 1: see those for some reason. Or they might get automotive

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Speaker 1: accessories or computer peripherals or kitchen gadgets. One online store

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Speaker 1: might have dozens of ads running on Facebook, with each

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Speaker 1: ad served to a different segment of the population that

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Speaker 1: has been predisposed to shopping for those items, as indicated

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Speaker 1: by their online behaviors. Now, I want to be clear here,

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Speaker 1: I don't think the actual process of matching ads to

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Speaker 1: users is totally awful. I do think it tends to

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Speaker 1: be pretty invasive, But then I also think it's nice

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Speaker 1: to encounter ads that align with my interests as opposed

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Speaker 1: to seeing ads that have no real relevance to me.

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Speaker 1: I don't need to see ads for childcare products and services,

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Speaker 1: for example, because I don't have kids, But if you

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Speaker 1: serve me up ads for doggy toys, I'm all over it.

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Speaker 1: So that part I don't really object to that much,

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Speaker 1: though I recognize it gets pretty creepy when you realize

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Speaker 1: how well Facebook knows its users based on the massive

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Speaker 1: amounts of data we users provide every time we're online,

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Speaker 1: even if we're not currently using Facebook while we're online.

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Speaker 1: What I really object to is Facebook's failure to vet

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Speaker 1: advertising in any meaningful way. I think as users, we

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Speaker 1: each have a responsibility to use critical thinking and to

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Speaker 1: protect ourselves and I'll talk more about that later in

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Speaker 1: this episode. But I also think Facebook and other platforms

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Speaker 1: have a responsibility to be good stewards of their platforms

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Speaker 1: and to weed out scams that target users. I don't

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Speaker 1: subscribe to the philosophy that Facebook should be just a

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Speaker 1: passive platform that allows this to happen, because the company

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Speaker 1: is getting paid by these hoax shops to post ads.

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Speaker 1: Facebook is benefiting from this arrangement. It profits from the

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Speaker 1: whole process. To me, that makes them at least partly

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Speaker 1: responsible for the perpetuation of scams. I've got a little

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Speaker 1: more to say about Facebook's role in this, but first

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Speaker 1: let's take a quick break for you know, a real ad.

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Speaker 1: In the UK, Facebook was hit by a defamation lawsuit

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Speaker 1: by Martin Lewis, who is a financial expert who runs

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Speaker 1: a financial advice service. Lewis sued Facebook because there were

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Speaker 1: ads running on Facebook that feats Lewis's image or it

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Speaker 1: implied that he had endorsed various services with which he

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Speaker 1: had no connection. He successfully argued that these services were

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Speaker 1: profiting off of his reputation and his image without his permission,

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Speaker 1: and that Facebook was letting it happen. Moreover, after reporting

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Speaker 1: the issue, Facebook continued running the ads for some time.

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Speaker 1: Facebook responded by rolling out a tool that lets users

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Speaker 1: report ads for various reasons, including for being misleading or

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Speaker 1: a scam. That's similar to the tool I used when

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Speaker 1: I reported the ad, and I'm in the United States,

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Speaker 1: not in the UK. And yes, that is a positive step,

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Speaker 1: it's a good one, but it's also a reactive step, right.

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Speaker 1: It only works after people have either noticed something hinky

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Speaker 1: is going on, or they didn't notice it in time

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Speaker 1: and they were victimized, and then they respond to Facebook.

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Speaker 1: That's really too late, you know you you would prefer

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Speaker 1: to see an approach that prevents this stuff from ever

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Speaker 1: reaching an audience in the first place, as opposed to

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Speaker 1: reaching an audience. And now it's the audience's responsibility to say, hey,

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Speaker 1: this doesn't look right to me. So by the time

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Speaker 1: someone on Facebook actually takes that step, the ad has

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Speaker 1: already been served up to potentially millions of people. I

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Speaker 1: suggest that perhaps Facebook should develop some sort of process

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Speaker 1: to try and catch these things before the ads are

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Speaker 1: accepted to run on the site, to verify that the

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Speaker 1: party that's purchasing the ad is in fact what they

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Speaker 1: say they are and granted this is way more work

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Speaker 1: for Facebook, but it would go a long way to

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Speaker 1: improving the reputation of the company, which has been under

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Speaker 1: fire recently for multiple reasons, not just the dodgy ads

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Speaker 1: appearing on the site. Now, since I started writing up

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Speaker 1: these notes, Facebook has sent me a few notifications telling

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Speaker 1: me that their teams are reviewing the various ads I

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Speaker 1: have flagged as being misleading or a scam. Now, I

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Speaker 1: don't have a high level of confidence that this is

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Speaker 1: going to result in very much other than maybe Facebook

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Speaker 1: telling me to chill out. I'm fairly sure the review

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Speaker 1: teams won't take the steps I took to investigate those instances.

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Speaker 1: At the time I'm writing this, I must have reported

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Speaker 1: at least fifteen or twenty ads, all using similar video

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Speaker 1: many of them using the exact same video clips and

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Speaker 1: the same images, and all marketing items for far less

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Speaker 1: than what they go for elsewhere. And when I say

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Speaker 1: far less, I'm talking in the hundreds of dollars less

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Speaker 1: like the too good to be true level of a sale.

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Speaker 1: Facebook has posted some tips to help users avoid these scams,

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Speaker 1: and they include making sure that the posted ad or

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Speaker 1: corresponding product page includes clear details about the product, like

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Speaker 1: its dimensions or its weight, as well as its quality,

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Speaker 1: and that there should also be your photographs of the product. Now,

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Speaker 1: while fuzzy photos are pretty much a dead giveaway that

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Speaker 1: it's a fake, I also counter that it's very easy

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Speaker 1: these days to lift good images online and there's no

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Speaker 1: shortage of high res photographs of tons of different products,

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Speaker 1: particularly for stuff like the mask I was referring to earlier,

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Speaker 1: and so it doesn't take very much to steal those

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Speaker 1: images and then use them for another purpose on another site.

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Speaker 1: And you can always do a reverse image search as

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Speaker 1: a user to see if something you're looking at has

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Speaker 1: been nicked from somewhere else, but that's yet another step

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Speaker 1: that the user has to take. The onus falls on

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Speaker 1: you so that you aren't made into a victim. Another

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Speaker 1: tip that Facebook gives is that the seller should include

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Speaker 1: clear information about the amount of time it will take

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Speaker 1: to ship items to the customer, how long will it

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Speaker 1: take to get from door to door, and also whether

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Speaker 1: or not the seller offers up tracking information so that

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Speaker 1: users can track orders as they go through the shipping process.

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Speaker 1: Companies only list something like a dispatch time. That's another

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Speaker 1: warning flag. Also legitimate companies should have a clear way

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Speaker 1: to contact customer service. So in the pages I looked

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Speaker 1: at the morning and that I'm recording this, I saw

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Speaker 1: email addresses for some unnamed person who is supposedly the

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Speaker 1: customer service representative. But the email address didn't indicate that

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Speaker 1: in of itself right. The email address wasn't like customer

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Speaker 1: representative at store dot com. Instead, it would be something

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Speaker 1: seemingly random like l f U r Z three one

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Speaker 1: one at b E r Q dot shop, and it

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Speaker 1: has no connection to whatever the U r L for

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Speaker 1: the website is at all. That's not exactly a confidence booster.

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Speaker 1: In a couple of other cases, I saw an online

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Speaker 1: field into which you would type your email address, and

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Speaker 1: it would include a promise that a customer service rep

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Speaker 1: would get in touch with you, quote unquote soon. I

433
00:25:58,920 --> 00:26:02,159
Speaker 1: have no clue how honest that claim is. And in

434
00:26:02,200 --> 00:26:05,280
Speaker 1: a few cases there was no contact page at all,

435
00:26:05,640 --> 00:26:07,800
Speaker 1: so there's no obvious way for you to get in

436
00:26:07,880 --> 00:26:13,400
Speaker 1: contact with the company. That is another clear warning. While

437
00:26:13,520 --> 00:26:16,720
Speaker 1: these tips from Facebook are helpful, they still place the

438
00:26:16,760 --> 00:26:20,760
Speaker 1: responsibility of not getting scammed on the end user. There

439
00:26:20,800 --> 00:26:23,719
Speaker 1: doesn't seem to be much acknowledgement that Facebook shoulders at

440
00:26:23,800 --> 00:26:26,760
Speaker 1: least some of the blame here, and that the site

441
00:26:26,840 --> 00:26:29,680
Speaker 1: has to find a better way to evaluate businesses before

442
00:26:29,720 --> 00:26:33,119
Speaker 1: accepting ads from them. The company has stated that bad

443
00:26:33,200 --> 00:26:38,280
Speaker 1: shopping experiences hurt everyone, not just the user but also Facebook,

444
00:26:38,760 --> 00:26:41,840
Speaker 1: and that's true, so you would think the company would

445
00:26:41,840 --> 00:26:44,520
Speaker 1: have a pretty strong incentive to prevent these ads from

446
00:26:44,600 --> 00:26:47,760
Speaker 1: going onto the platform. But I guess that money all

447
00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:51,400
Speaker 1: spends the same, whether it's from a legitimate business or not.

448
00:26:52,119 --> 00:26:54,440
Speaker 1: And yes, I am bitter about this because I hate

449
00:26:54,440 --> 00:26:57,400
Speaker 1: when people get scammed out of their cash or their

450
00:26:57,440 --> 00:27:01,639
Speaker 1: personal information. Now there's an opinion and the Harvard Business

451
00:27:01,680 --> 00:27:04,160
Speaker 1: Review that I feel really gets to why this has

452
00:27:04,200 --> 00:27:07,680
Speaker 1: become such a troubling issue for Facebook users. The article

453
00:27:07,760 --> 00:27:11,600
Speaker 1: is titled Facebook's oversight board is not Enough, and it's

454
00:27:11,640 --> 00:27:15,080
Speaker 1: by Dipayan Gosh And I apologize for doing a terrible

455
00:27:15,160 --> 00:27:19,199
Speaker 1: job pronouncing that name. That's entirely due to my own ignorance,

456
00:27:19,760 --> 00:27:22,920
Speaker 1: So I apologize for that. But the article is really good.

457
00:27:23,000 --> 00:27:26,080
Speaker 1: It points out that Facebook's business model is such that

458
00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:30,200
Speaker 1: depends upon ads, and I'm going to quote a passage,

459
00:27:30,440 --> 00:27:33,600
Speaker 1: so here's the quote. The same model lies at the

460
00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:36,760
Speaker 1: center of the consumer Internet as a whole, and is

461
00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:41,760
Speaker 1: based on maximizing consumer engagement and injecting ads throughout our

462
00:27:41,760 --> 00:27:45,639
Speaker 1: digital experience. It relies on collecting personal data and on

463
00:27:45,760 --> 00:27:50,600
Speaker 1: sophisticated algorithms that curate social feeds and target those ads.

464
00:27:51,040 --> 00:27:54,560
Speaker 1: Because there is no earnest consideration of what consumers wish

465
00:27:54,680 --> 00:27:58,280
Speaker 1: to or should see in this equation, they are subjected

466
00:27:58,280 --> 00:28:02,960
Speaker 1: to whatever content the platform believes will maximize profits. These

467
00:28:02,960 --> 00:28:08,439
Speaker 1: practices in turn generate negative externalities, of which disinformation is

468
00:28:08,520 --> 00:28:12,639
Speaker 1: only one end quote. And in this case, the article

469
00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:17,040
Speaker 1: was more about fake news and propaganda and how Facebook

470
00:28:17,080 --> 00:28:20,480
Speaker 1: is incented to share that because it's part and parcel

471
00:28:20,600 --> 00:28:25,920
Speaker 1: with its business model. That wasn't Facebook's intent when they

472
00:28:25,960 --> 00:28:28,960
Speaker 1: built that business model. That's a reflection of how people

473
00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:33,680
Speaker 1: recognized how Facebook's business model works, and then they gamed

474
00:28:33,840 --> 00:28:37,080
Speaker 1: the system. By knowing how the system works, they took

475
00:28:37,080 --> 00:28:41,760
Speaker 1: advantage of it, and that's the issue. Now. I didn't

476
00:28:41,800 --> 00:28:44,640
Speaker 1: really go into other problems with Facebook ads, such as

477
00:28:44,680 --> 00:28:48,200
Speaker 1: it's shifting policies with regard to political ads, which is

478
00:28:48,600 --> 00:28:51,600
Speaker 1: a huge can of worms here in the United States

479
00:28:51,720 --> 00:28:55,160
Speaker 1: right now, But that's because it is really another kettle

480
00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:57,200
Speaker 1: of fish, I said, ken of worms, kettle of fish.

481
00:28:57,240 --> 00:29:00,280
Speaker 1: I'm gonna mix metaphors left and right, come at me.

482
00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:04,800
Speaker 1: Ultimately it gets wrapped in a bigger discussion about propaganda,

483
00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:09,400
Speaker 1: and frankly, I am exhausted over the concept of political

484
00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:12,160
Speaker 1: ads for the moment, probably for the next year and

485
00:29:12,240 --> 00:29:14,920
Speaker 1: a half. So I'm going to spare all of that

486
00:29:15,720 --> 00:29:21,959
Speaker 1: discussion for some future episode when I'm not as irritated

487
00:29:21,960 --> 00:29:27,440
Speaker 1: by it. Instead, let's talk about other common scam techniques. Well,

488
00:29:27,720 --> 00:29:31,360
Speaker 1: will slowly ease off Facebook here for a second. And

489
00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:35,080
Speaker 1: I've touched on this next topic in the past because

490
00:29:35,120 --> 00:29:39,080
Speaker 1: I remember getting really upset about it when I chatted

491
00:29:39,480 --> 00:29:42,520
Speaker 1: about the topic with my then co host Chris Pallette.

492
00:29:42,760 --> 00:29:45,520
Speaker 1: So this was an old, old episode of Tech Stuff,

493
00:29:45,760 --> 00:29:50,560
Speaker 1: and it's about hiring scams. So these scams target a

494
00:29:50,720 --> 00:29:55,080
Speaker 1: very vulnerable population, people who are looking for a job.

495
00:29:55,560 --> 00:29:58,560
Speaker 1: Maybe they are out of work and they're looking to

496
00:29:58,960 --> 00:30:01,880
Speaker 1: actually find job so they can make ends meet. Maybe

497
00:30:01,880 --> 00:30:04,240
Speaker 1: they're just looking for a better opportunity. They're in a

498
00:30:04,360 --> 00:30:06,520
Speaker 1: job already, but it's not a great one. They want

499
00:30:06,520 --> 00:30:09,960
Speaker 1: a better chance. Now, as I'm sure many of you know,

500
00:30:10,400 --> 00:30:13,880
Speaker 1: hunting for a job is exhausting, and it can get

501
00:30:13,920 --> 00:30:17,600
Speaker 1: pretty discouraging if it starts to take a while. And

502
00:30:17,720 --> 00:30:20,239
Speaker 1: I've been in that situation myself. I worked for a

503
00:30:20,240 --> 00:30:24,880
Speaker 1: company for seven years and that company then eliminated my position.

504
00:30:25,240 --> 00:30:28,080
Speaker 1: I wasn't fired, I just didn't have a job anymore.

505
00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:34,000
Speaker 1: That the the definition of that, and the difference between

506
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:36,120
Speaker 1: being fired and not having a job was kind of

507
00:30:36,160 --> 00:30:39,360
Speaker 1: lost on me at the time. For three months, I

508
00:30:39,440 --> 00:30:41,880
Speaker 1: worked hard trying to land a gig that I really

509
00:30:41,880 --> 00:30:44,640
Speaker 1: wanted to do. I thought, this is my chance to

510
00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:47,440
Speaker 1: not just do something I can do, but do something

511
00:30:47,480 --> 00:30:50,360
Speaker 1: I really want to do. I had stars in my eyes.

512
00:30:51,800 --> 00:30:54,920
Speaker 1: Well that didn't pan out after three months, so then

513
00:30:54,960 --> 00:30:58,200
Speaker 1: I spent the following three months trying to land a

514
00:30:58,240 --> 00:31:01,800
Speaker 1: decent gig at all. I ended up working for a

515
00:31:01,840 --> 00:31:04,760
Speaker 1: company not that different from the one that let me

516
00:31:04,800 --> 00:31:07,640
Speaker 1: go in the first place. This was very rough on

517
00:31:07,800 --> 00:31:10,240
Speaker 1: me and my psyche, but I had been out of

518
00:31:10,240 --> 00:31:13,960
Speaker 1: work for nearly six months at that point. It was

519
00:31:14,360 --> 00:31:17,920
Speaker 1: really tough on me. Well, scammers know that people who

520
00:31:17,920 --> 00:31:21,560
Speaker 1: are looking for jobs are in that vulnerable space, and

521
00:31:21,600 --> 00:31:25,000
Speaker 1: by promising a little, the scammers can get what they're after.

522
00:31:25,480 --> 00:31:28,160
Speaker 1: They might be after the person's money, they might be

523
00:31:28,200 --> 00:31:32,760
Speaker 1: after their personal information, or they might be after their cooperation.

524
00:31:32,800 --> 00:31:36,480
Speaker 1: And one amounts to an illegal operation, and they're probably

525
00:31:36,520 --> 00:31:40,760
Speaker 1: not upfront about that. They're probably not telling the applicant, hey,

526
00:31:41,520 --> 00:31:44,360
Speaker 1: just so you know, what we're doing is illegal, So

527
00:31:44,560 --> 00:31:48,920
Speaker 1: the applicant becomes an unwilling participant of a crime. This

528
00:31:48,960 --> 00:31:52,000
Speaker 1: practice also gets me really angry. I hate seeing folks

529
00:31:52,040 --> 00:31:55,600
Speaker 1: who are trying to get a job be targeted like that.

530
00:31:55,720 --> 00:31:59,560
Speaker 1: Often these are people who can least afford the hardships

531
00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:03,120
Speaker 1: that could follow if they're tricked by the scammers. Meanwhile,

532
00:32:03,280 --> 00:32:06,000
Speaker 1: the scammers are profiting off people who are just trying

533
00:32:06,000 --> 00:32:09,800
Speaker 1: to improve their own lives. It is gross. So these

534
00:32:09,840 --> 00:32:13,600
Speaker 1: schemes tend to fall into a few broad categories, and

535
00:32:13,680 --> 00:32:16,400
Speaker 1: some of them fall into just outright theft. So a

536
00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:20,560
Speaker 1: common example of this is a payment representative scam. And

537
00:32:20,600 --> 00:32:24,560
Speaker 1: here's how the scam works. The fraudsters identify a mark.

538
00:32:25,000 --> 00:32:27,840
Speaker 1: This could be a totally cold call on their part.

539
00:32:27,920 --> 00:32:31,360
Speaker 1: You know, they're just pulling off email addresses and sending

540
00:32:31,400 --> 00:32:34,280
Speaker 1: out emails hoping to get a hit. Maybe they're using

541
00:32:34,320 --> 00:32:38,120
Speaker 1: some job hunting sites to have a more targeted approach

542
00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:41,600
Speaker 1: to their marks, or they might even post a job

543
00:32:41,800 --> 00:32:43,680
Speaker 1: on a site to see if they get any bites.

544
00:32:44,200 --> 00:32:47,040
Speaker 1: However they do this, it doesn't really matter whenever they

545
00:32:47,080 --> 00:32:51,000
Speaker 1: make that first contact. Here's how the supposed job pans out.

546
00:32:51,040 --> 00:32:53,760
Speaker 1: So let's assume you are the person who has been

547
00:32:53,800 --> 00:32:58,840
Speaker 1: targeted by these fraudsters. They claim that the company they

548
00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:03,000
Speaker 1: represent needs someone in your home country to handle some

549
00:33:03,040 --> 00:33:07,440
Speaker 1: financial transactions because for some reason, the company itself has

550
00:33:07,560 --> 00:33:12,640
Speaker 1: difficulty working within the financial institutions in your country. So

551
00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:16,520
Speaker 1: this is a company that exists outside your country and

552
00:33:16,560 --> 00:33:20,000
Speaker 1: needs to be able to process payments inside your country.

553
00:33:20,400 --> 00:33:24,960
Speaker 1: Your job is to accept payments from this company, typically

554
00:33:25,000 --> 00:33:28,960
Speaker 1: for really large sums of money. You're meant to deposit

555
00:33:29,360 --> 00:33:32,800
Speaker 1: those payments in the form of checks. Check comes to you,

556
00:33:32,800 --> 00:33:36,400
Speaker 1: you're supposed to deposit that check into your own personal account.

557
00:33:36,840 --> 00:33:39,640
Speaker 1: Then you're meant to send on a payment from the

558
00:33:39,680 --> 00:33:43,240
Speaker 1: amount that was given to you to some other entity,

559
00:33:43,520 --> 00:33:47,360
Speaker 1: and you deduct your representative fee from that amount. So

560
00:33:47,440 --> 00:33:50,520
Speaker 1: let's use an example because this gets confusing otherwise. All right,

561
00:33:50,600 --> 00:33:54,760
Speaker 1: So you have accepted the job of payment representative from

562
00:33:54,760 --> 00:33:57,920
Speaker 1: this company. The company tells you you get a ten

563
00:33:58,000 --> 00:34:02,440
Speaker 1: percent fee off of all the transactions you process. The

564
00:34:02,480 --> 00:34:06,440
Speaker 1: company sends you a check for fifteen thousand dollars, and

565
00:34:06,480 --> 00:34:10,040
Speaker 1: you deposit the check into your account, and the company says,

566
00:34:10,280 --> 00:34:13,799
Speaker 1: we need you to then send a payment to this

567
00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:17,840
Speaker 1: other entity. And you pay out thirteen thousand, five hundred

568
00:34:17,880 --> 00:34:22,200
Speaker 1: dollars because you deducted your ten percent your fifteen hundred dollars,

569
00:34:22,200 --> 00:34:25,600
Speaker 1: so fifteen hundred dollars of that fifteen thousand dollars is

570
00:34:25,640 --> 00:34:28,320
Speaker 1: yours to keep. You send out the other thirteen thousand,

571
00:34:28,400 --> 00:34:32,160
Speaker 1: five hundred and then the scam becomes apparent because the

572
00:34:32,280 --> 00:34:38,280
Speaker 1: fifteen thousand dollar check bounces. Meanwhile, you've already paid out thousand,

573
00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:42,160
Speaker 1: five hundred dollars from your own account to that person

574
00:34:42,239 --> 00:34:45,600
Speaker 1: that the company indicated. You're on the line for all

575
00:34:45,680 --> 00:34:49,040
Speaker 1: of that money. In the United States, the Internal Revenue

576
00:34:49,080 --> 00:34:51,279
Speaker 1: Service the i r S would want to talk to

577
00:34:51,320 --> 00:34:54,239
Speaker 1: you about that fifteen grand. The bank would expect you

578
00:34:54,280 --> 00:34:56,400
Speaker 1: to cover the amount of money you paid out, and

579
00:34:56,400 --> 00:34:58,759
Speaker 1: the fraud sters get away with your money and your

580
00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:02,040
Speaker 1: left holding the bag. It is a pretty awful scheme.

581
00:35:02,960 --> 00:35:08,040
Speaker 1: Another scheme is the re shipper scam. This scam seems

582
00:35:08,080 --> 00:35:11,319
Speaker 1: to ask a pretty simple favor of the employee. Your

583
00:35:11,440 --> 00:35:14,560
Speaker 1: job is to accept packages that are sent to you.

584
00:35:15,040 --> 00:35:19,840
Speaker 1: Then you either forward those packages onward to another address,

585
00:35:20,000 --> 00:35:22,520
Speaker 1: or you might even have to open up a package,

586
00:35:22,520 --> 00:35:26,839
Speaker 1: pull stuff out of the package, pack it into smaller boxes,

587
00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:30,680
Speaker 1: and then send those packages on their way. But this

588
00:35:30,800 --> 00:35:34,280
Speaker 1: raises a question, why would any company need a middleman

589
00:35:34,600 --> 00:35:37,960
Speaker 1: to do this? Why not just send the packages directly

590
00:35:38,360 --> 00:35:41,160
Speaker 1: to the customers. Well, the most common reason for this

591
00:35:41,239 --> 00:35:45,920
Speaker 1: is that the packages actually contain illegal or stolen materials. Typically,

592
00:35:46,320 --> 00:35:49,840
Speaker 1: it means the fraudsters have used stolen credit cards to

593
00:35:49,960 --> 00:35:54,279
Speaker 1: purchase items online and then they use your address as

594
00:35:54,320 --> 00:35:58,560
Speaker 1: the shipping address. You are then responsible for reshipping these

595
00:35:58,600 --> 00:36:03,000
Speaker 1: packages to some other destination, frequently to an overseas address,

596
00:36:03,040 --> 00:36:05,759
Speaker 1: where the goods will enter the black market and be

597
00:36:05,920 --> 00:36:10,200
Speaker 1: sold for a much higher markup price. By accepting the package,

598
00:36:10,520 --> 00:36:14,120
Speaker 1: you effectively become an accessory to the crime, and when

599
00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:17,480
Speaker 1: you forward it on those packages came from you, not

600
00:36:17,719 --> 00:36:20,400
Speaker 1: the original criminals. It's a way for the criminals to

601
00:36:20,440 --> 00:36:24,719
Speaker 1: get illegal goods to a destination while insulating themselves from prosecution,

602
00:36:25,239 --> 00:36:28,759
Speaker 1: and when the credit card gets reported as stolen, the

603
00:36:29,000 --> 00:36:34,000
Speaker 1: point of contact for those fraudulent charges is you because

604
00:36:34,080 --> 00:36:36,759
Speaker 1: you're the person that the fraudsters were using for the

605
00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:42,000
Speaker 1: shipping address. Yeah. I've got some more job hiring scams

606
00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:44,680
Speaker 1: to chat about in a second, but first let's take

607
00:36:44,840 --> 00:36:56,720
Speaker 1: another quick break. Okay, So the previous examples I gave

608
00:36:57,040 --> 00:37:00,520
Speaker 1: of job hiring scams that you'll typically find line are

609
00:37:00,520 --> 00:37:04,880
Speaker 1: all about involving you the mark in crimes that ultimately

610
00:37:04,920 --> 00:37:09,319
Speaker 1: rest on you while the real criminals continue their illegal activities.

611
00:37:09,680 --> 00:37:13,000
Speaker 1: But many job hiring scams are more about harvesting personal

612
00:37:13,040 --> 00:37:16,360
Speaker 1: information from people, often to do stuff like open up

613
00:37:16,400 --> 00:37:20,120
Speaker 1: credit cards in those those employees names, or to get

614
00:37:20,200 --> 00:37:24,560
Speaker 1: access to those employees bank accounts, or otherwise exploit them

615
00:37:24,600 --> 00:37:27,400
Speaker 1: in some way. And you might encounter these scams on

616
00:37:27,480 --> 00:37:31,000
Speaker 1: social media platforms like Facebook or linked In, or you

617
00:37:31,080 --> 00:37:33,920
Speaker 1: might get targeted by them in an email that's attempting

618
00:37:33,920 --> 00:37:36,680
Speaker 1: to phish the data out of you. The job postings

619
00:37:36,719 --> 00:37:40,120
Speaker 1: typically use a few common tactics in an effort to

620
00:37:40,160 --> 00:37:43,520
Speaker 1: get you to lower your guard and to respond quickly

621
00:37:43,640 --> 00:37:47,080
Speaker 1: without thinking too much. For example, there's often a sense

622
00:37:47,120 --> 00:37:50,640
Speaker 1: of urgency that goes along with these messages. That is,

623
00:37:50,840 --> 00:37:54,200
Speaker 1: if you don't respond quickly, the opportunity is going to

624
00:37:54,320 --> 00:37:58,800
Speaker 1: go away. Frequently, the job description will sound pretty simple

625
00:37:59,080 --> 00:38:02,440
Speaker 1: and yet could have of a really generous salary range

626
00:38:02,520 --> 00:38:06,080
Speaker 1: quoted as part of the gig. The message might also

627
00:38:06,120 --> 00:38:09,480
Speaker 1: state that there's no experience necessary, which, if you think

628
00:38:09,520 --> 00:38:12,680
Speaker 1: about it, undercuts the whole argument that you are the

629
00:38:12,719 --> 00:38:16,680
Speaker 1: ideal candidates, since if no experience is necessary, you'd figure

630
00:38:16,880 --> 00:38:19,960
Speaker 1: lots of people would qualify for the job. Another warning

631
00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:23,000
Speaker 1: sign is if there's no interview as part of the

632
00:38:23,040 --> 00:38:27,040
Speaker 1: whole process. Maybe the supposed recruiter says that the interactions

633
00:38:27,080 --> 00:38:31,439
Speaker 1: across something like instant messenger or email exchanges are enough

634
00:38:31,480 --> 00:38:34,400
Speaker 1: to forego the need to have an in person interview.

635
00:38:34,719 --> 00:38:37,279
Speaker 1: That's often a way for the scammer to avoid the

636
00:38:37,280 --> 00:38:41,440
Speaker 1: pitfalls of you getting wise and asking some tricky questions.

637
00:38:41,640 --> 00:38:45,480
Speaker 1: They just sidestep that entirely, and they appeal to your vanity. Oh,

638
00:38:45,560 --> 00:38:48,440
Speaker 1: you're so amazing, we don't even need to have an interview.

639
00:38:48,480 --> 00:38:51,439
Speaker 1: You're hired. Well, it's a very flattering thing to hear.

640
00:38:52,239 --> 00:38:55,280
Speaker 1: Often these scammers will say they came across your resume

641
00:38:55,440 --> 00:38:58,279
Speaker 1: on a job recruiting site. Sometimes it will be a

642
00:38:58,320 --> 00:39:01,520
Speaker 1: site that you've never even visited, or heard of and yeah,

643
00:39:01,640 --> 00:39:04,360
Speaker 1: that's a warning sign. Or they might even claim that

644
00:39:04,400 --> 00:39:07,400
Speaker 1: you actively applied for the job, and they're counting on

645
00:39:07,440 --> 00:39:10,200
Speaker 1: the fact that maybe you you feel like you forgot

646
00:39:10,200 --> 00:39:11,960
Speaker 1: about it, maybe you were applying to a lot of

647
00:39:12,040 --> 00:39:15,360
Speaker 1: jobs and so I don't know, maybe I did, or

648
00:39:15,400 --> 00:39:18,320
Speaker 1: maybe you're just thinking, oh, shut up. They this is

649
00:39:18,320 --> 00:39:22,280
Speaker 1: an opportunity, don't question it a dead giveaway in these circumstances.

650
00:39:22,719 --> 00:39:25,360
Speaker 1: If it is. If there's an email contact for you

651
00:39:25,400 --> 00:39:28,360
Speaker 1: to reach out to and the domain on that email

652
00:39:28,400 --> 00:39:31,960
Speaker 1: contact doesn't match whatever the company is that's supposedly reaching

653
00:39:31,960 --> 00:39:35,880
Speaker 1: out to you. Some scammers like to use recognizable, real

654
00:39:36,160 --> 00:39:39,040
Speaker 1: companies when they reach out. They know that it will

655
00:39:39,080 --> 00:39:41,600
Speaker 1: get more hits than if they just make a company

656
00:39:41,600 --> 00:39:45,040
Speaker 1: out of whole cloth. Plus, if you rely on an

657
00:39:45,080 --> 00:39:49,319
Speaker 1: existing company as your cover, you can trade upon that

658
00:39:49,360 --> 00:39:53,040
Speaker 1: company's reputation as well as it's pre existing presence of

659
00:39:53,080 --> 00:39:57,399
Speaker 1: the company online. Right if I say that I am

660
00:39:57,480 --> 00:40:01,280
Speaker 1: coming from X y Z company and it's a real company,

661
00:40:01,400 --> 00:40:03,400
Speaker 1: there's already a website out there. I don't have to

662
00:40:03,440 --> 00:40:07,640
Speaker 1: create anything. If you make up a company, you need

663
00:40:07,680 --> 00:40:10,440
Speaker 1: to go through some extra trouble. It's pretty suspicious to

664
00:40:10,480 --> 00:40:13,080
Speaker 1: come across a company that's using the Internet to recruit

665
00:40:13,120 --> 00:40:16,040
Speaker 1: people when that same company doesn't have a web page.

666
00:40:16,200 --> 00:40:19,080
Speaker 1: So scammers typically have to make a choice. Do you

667
00:40:19,160 --> 00:40:22,680
Speaker 1: pose as someone from a reputable company that really exists,

668
00:40:23,120 --> 00:40:26,080
Speaker 1: or do you create a fake company complete with a

669
00:40:26,120 --> 00:40:30,560
Speaker 1: website to help lure in job hunters. Those posing as

670
00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:33,839
Speaker 1: representatives for an existing company are often found out when

671
00:40:33,840 --> 00:40:37,000
Speaker 1: their emails do not match that company in question. They

672
00:40:37,040 --> 00:40:40,120
Speaker 1: also run another risk. You could always reach out to

673
00:40:40,280 --> 00:40:43,480
Speaker 1: the real company to confirm that a message actually did

674
00:40:43,560 --> 00:40:46,680
Speaker 1: originate from within that company, and if you get a

675
00:40:46,680 --> 00:40:51,240
Speaker 1: negative response, if you say, hey, I got this job offer,

676
00:40:51,640 --> 00:40:53,440
Speaker 1: I want to make sure that it's legitimate, and the

677
00:40:53,480 --> 00:40:56,560
Speaker 1: response you get is this is the first we've ever

678
00:40:56,560 --> 00:41:00,600
Speaker 1: heard of it, you know it's most likely a scam

679
00:41:00,640 --> 00:41:04,000
Speaker 1: making up a company can get around that problem, right,

680
00:41:04,080 --> 00:41:08,000
Speaker 1: because now you're controlling the whole lie. It's not just well,

681
00:41:08,040 --> 00:41:11,400
Speaker 1: hopefully they don't reach out to the real company because

682
00:41:11,600 --> 00:41:14,319
Speaker 1: there is no real company to reach out to. So

683
00:41:14,360 --> 00:41:18,000
Speaker 1: in this case, if you are the one targeted, you

684
00:41:18,080 --> 00:41:20,840
Speaker 1: have no other authority to turn to in order to

685
00:41:20,880 --> 00:41:24,320
Speaker 1: confirm that a message is legitimate. But this also requires

686
00:41:24,320 --> 00:41:26,239
Speaker 1: a lot more work on the part of the scammers.

687
00:41:26,440 --> 00:41:29,600
Speaker 1: Several years ago, a friend of mine was job hunting

688
00:41:29,680 --> 00:41:32,480
Speaker 1: and got an offer that seemed too good to be true.

689
00:41:32,880 --> 00:41:36,640
Speaker 1: So that was a warning right there. So she asked

690
00:41:36,640 --> 00:41:39,040
Speaker 1: for my help to investigate to make sure it was

691
00:41:39,080 --> 00:41:42,520
Speaker 1: a legitimate offer and not just a scam. You know.

692
00:41:42,680 --> 00:41:45,319
Speaker 1: She thought that it sounded like a really promising job,

693
00:41:45,360 --> 00:41:47,719
Speaker 1: but she was a little worried. So she forwarded a

694
00:41:47,760 --> 00:41:50,239
Speaker 1: message that she received and she sent it to me,

695
00:41:50,560 --> 00:41:52,359
Speaker 1: and I did some digging, and it turned out her

696
00:41:52,360 --> 00:41:56,640
Speaker 1: suspicions were very well placed. The company was a supposed

697
00:41:56,800 --> 00:41:59,919
Speaker 1: architectural firm that was looking to hire someone in an

698
00:42:00,000 --> 00:42:03,040
Speaker 1: in the straight of position. And I can't even remember

699
00:42:03,480 --> 00:42:06,200
Speaker 1: what the name of this fake company was anymore. This

700
00:42:06,280 --> 00:42:09,000
Speaker 1: happened years ago, but I do remember the process. The

701
00:42:09,040 --> 00:42:12,279
Speaker 1: message referred my friend to the company website, and so

702
00:42:12,320 --> 00:42:14,799
Speaker 1: I visited the website and it was pretty slick. It

703
00:42:14,800 --> 00:42:17,719
Speaker 1: looked nice and had a decent design to it, and

704
00:42:17,760 --> 00:42:21,640
Speaker 1: it included photographs of supposed construction sites that this company

705
00:42:21,680 --> 00:42:24,680
Speaker 1: claimed were official projects. So they're saying, you know, we're

706
00:42:24,719 --> 00:42:29,400
Speaker 1: responsible for building this amazing building at the x y

707
00:42:29,560 --> 00:42:32,920
Speaker 1: Z address, but none of this looked legit to me.

708
00:42:33,160 --> 00:42:37,680
Speaker 1: For one thing, the website actually looked a little template ish,

709
00:42:37,800 --> 00:42:39,919
Speaker 1: as if the person who had made the site had

710
00:42:40,080 --> 00:42:44,200
Speaker 1: used a web hosting service that comes with templates for

711
00:42:44,239 --> 00:42:46,920
Speaker 1: web pages, and then they built out a few web pages,

712
00:42:46,920 --> 00:42:49,319
Speaker 1: but they didn't go too much trouble to customize it

713
00:42:49,400 --> 00:42:53,520
Speaker 1: beyond the generic template. I also looked at the address

714
00:42:53,560 --> 00:42:57,000
Speaker 1: for the supposed construction site and I plugged it into

715
00:42:57,080 --> 00:42:59,560
Speaker 1: Google Maps to take a look at it from there,

716
00:43:00,040 --> 00:43:02,759
Speaker 1: and that presented a very different image than what was

717
00:43:02,800 --> 00:43:05,560
Speaker 1: on their web page, and it was clearly not the

718
00:43:05,600 --> 00:43:09,800
Speaker 1: same location despite the claims. That's when I knew something

719
00:43:09,880 --> 00:43:13,440
Speaker 1: was up. Then I did something that proved to me

720
00:43:13,640 --> 00:43:16,719
Speaker 1: that this was a total scam. I found a paragraph

721
00:43:16,800 --> 00:43:19,200
Speaker 1: of text that I found to be a little odd.

722
00:43:19,320 --> 00:43:22,320
Speaker 1: The wording was just a little off and and unusual,

723
00:43:22,840 --> 00:43:26,120
Speaker 1: So I highlighted the text and I searched Google for

724
00:43:26,200 --> 00:43:29,040
Speaker 1: that text. Now, if this were a legit site for

725
00:43:29,120 --> 00:43:33,480
Speaker 1: a local business, maybe one where the web administrator doesn't

726
00:43:33,480 --> 00:43:36,719
Speaker 1: have the best way with words, but otherwise it's completely legitimate.

727
00:43:37,080 --> 00:43:40,399
Speaker 1: The only response I should have seen from Google would

728
00:43:40,400 --> 00:43:44,120
Speaker 1: have been that one web page, but instead I got

729
00:43:44,160 --> 00:43:48,360
Speaker 1: seven or eight different hits, two different web pages, all

730
00:43:48,400 --> 00:43:52,880
Speaker 1: with the exact same wording. Going to those links, I

731
00:43:52,920 --> 00:43:56,320
Speaker 1: found duplicates of the website that I had just visited.

732
00:43:56,680 --> 00:44:00,360
Speaker 1: The company name was different from site to site, but

733
00:44:00,440 --> 00:44:04,200
Speaker 1: all the content was exactly the same. They're all located

734
00:44:04,239 --> 00:44:07,799
Speaker 1: in different cities, and they even all had pictures of

735
00:44:07,840 --> 00:44:12,760
Speaker 1: that same construction site, but the address had been localized

736
00:44:12,840 --> 00:44:17,400
Speaker 1: to whatever site, you know, whatever place the company was

737
00:44:17,440 --> 00:44:21,440
Speaker 1: claiming to be in. So there was one for Atlanta, Georgia,

738
00:44:21,560 --> 00:44:26,399
Speaker 1: there was one for Phoenix, there was one for Helena, Montana.

739
00:44:26,719 --> 00:44:32,120
Speaker 1: They all mysteriously had the exact same content, same staff

740
00:44:32,480 --> 00:44:36,600
Speaker 1: working for the company, and exact same construction site, just

741
00:44:36,680 --> 00:44:39,840
Speaker 1: in different parts of the United States. I alerted my friend,

742
00:44:40,160 --> 00:44:42,520
Speaker 1: who was glad that I had caught the scam, but

743
00:44:42,560 --> 00:44:45,279
Speaker 1: she was obviously discouraged that what initially seemed to be

744
00:44:45,360 --> 00:44:47,880
Speaker 1: a real job offer had turned out to be a trap.

745
00:44:48,280 --> 00:44:51,520
Speaker 1: Now fortunately she found out before it went any further,

746
00:44:51,719 --> 00:44:54,120
Speaker 1: but was still a discouraging thing to happen when you're

747
00:44:54,120 --> 00:44:56,719
Speaker 1: in the middle of a job search. Now. I'm not

748
00:44:56,760 --> 00:45:00,000
Speaker 1: trying to pat myself on the back here about uncovered

749
00:45:00,040 --> 00:45:03,279
Speaker 1: ring this one. It was a pretty sloppy attempt when

750
00:45:03,320 --> 00:45:06,319
Speaker 1: all things are considered too. I was able to go

751
00:45:06,360 --> 00:45:10,319
Speaker 1: about this investigation because I could think critically about it.

752
00:45:10,640 --> 00:45:13,160
Speaker 1: I care for my friends, but I was not as

753
00:45:13,160 --> 00:45:17,640
Speaker 1: emotionally invested in this opportunity as she was. I had

754
00:45:17,680 --> 00:45:21,319
Speaker 1: fewer blinders up because I wasn't counting on this being

755
00:45:21,320 --> 00:45:24,239
Speaker 1: a real offer. If I had been hunting for a job,

756
00:45:24,280 --> 00:45:26,960
Speaker 1: if I had been in my friends position, I might

757
00:45:27,120 --> 00:45:31,560
Speaker 1: very well have totally bought that scam, hook line and sinker.

758
00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:35,560
Speaker 1: The investigation I did was pretty simple stuff. It didn't

759
00:45:35,600 --> 00:45:38,719
Speaker 1: require any advanced search techniques. Had just involved looking at

760
00:45:38,760 --> 00:45:41,359
Speaker 1: the information that was presented and then doing my best

761
00:45:41,360 --> 00:45:43,680
Speaker 1: to fact check it. When things didn't match up, I

762
00:45:43,719 --> 00:45:46,319
Speaker 1: figured I was onto a trick and that's it. And

763
00:45:46,320 --> 00:45:48,680
Speaker 1: the fact that there were several duplicate websites told me

764
00:45:48,760 --> 00:45:52,600
Speaker 1: I had hit upon some sort of scheme. There's one

765
00:45:52,640 --> 00:45:56,399
Speaker 1: other type of job scam I should mention. This one

766
00:45:56,520 --> 00:45:59,480
Speaker 1: is harder to spot, but it's also a crappy thing

767
00:45:59,520 --> 00:46:02,200
Speaker 1: to do to people. And this is the old bait

768
00:46:02,280 --> 00:46:05,800
Speaker 1: and switch. This is when a company advertises a particular

769
00:46:05,840 --> 00:46:09,560
Speaker 1: position in order to get applicants, but then when someone

770
00:46:09,640 --> 00:46:12,800
Speaker 1: actually does apply and perhaps comes in for an interview.

771
00:46:13,120 --> 00:46:16,920
Speaker 1: The company reveals that the position that the applicant is

772
00:46:16,960 --> 00:46:20,440
Speaker 1: interested in isn't actually available, maybe it doesn't even exist,

773
00:46:21,320 --> 00:46:24,640
Speaker 1: maybe it was never available. Instead, they're offering a different

774
00:46:24,760 --> 00:46:27,959
Speaker 1: job that is available. Most likely it's a job that's

775
00:46:27,960 --> 00:46:31,399
Speaker 1: not nearly as desirable as the one that was advertised.

776
00:46:31,680 --> 00:46:34,360
Speaker 1: It might be grunt work for low pay. It's the

777
00:46:34,360 --> 00:46:37,080
Speaker 1: type of job that could be difficult to fill on

778
00:46:37,120 --> 00:46:39,839
Speaker 1: its own if you were to list it, so they

779
00:46:39,920 --> 00:46:42,279
Speaker 1: might not get any applicants if they had listed the

780
00:46:42,360 --> 00:46:45,719
Speaker 1: real job, or maybe they would only get people that

781
00:46:45,760 --> 00:46:48,760
Speaker 1: the company isn't keen on hiring in the first place,

782
00:46:49,040 --> 00:46:51,239
Speaker 1: So the bait and switch might bring in, you know,

783
00:46:51,320 --> 00:46:55,040
Speaker 1: a better class of applicant. And all it takes is

784
00:46:55,080 --> 00:46:58,759
Speaker 1: being dishonest to trick someone into coming in for an interview.

785
00:46:59,239 --> 00:47:01,880
Speaker 1: Companies that do this know that people who are looking

786
00:47:01,880 --> 00:47:04,600
Speaker 1: for a job might be tempted to say yes to

787
00:47:04,719 --> 00:47:09,080
Speaker 1: a less desirable position because it's still represents an opportunity,

788
00:47:09,480 --> 00:47:12,040
Speaker 1: even if it's for a job that they wouldn't normally

789
00:47:12,080 --> 00:47:15,280
Speaker 1: apply for if they just saw it online by itself.

790
00:47:15,960 --> 00:47:18,920
Speaker 1: Don't fall for this one, either, folks. If you wouldn't

791
00:47:18,920 --> 00:47:21,360
Speaker 1: apply for the job if you saw it listed online.

792
00:47:21,760 --> 00:47:25,000
Speaker 1: Don't take it just because it's offered to you. No

793
00:47:25,120 --> 00:47:27,640
Speaker 1: one will end up being happy with that decision in

794
00:47:27,680 --> 00:47:30,080
Speaker 1: the long run, and you don't ever want to work

795
00:47:30,120 --> 00:47:32,880
Speaker 1: for a company that depends on tricks to get people

796
00:47:32,920 --> 00:47:35,120
Speaker 1: to work for them. Now, I don't think I can

797
00:47:35,120 --> 00:47:38,920
Speaker 1: really go into stuff like multi level marketing businesses or

798
00:47:39,000 --> 00:47:43,040
Speaker 1: pyramid schemes, which are not necessarily the same thing, but

799
00:47:43,440 --> 00:47:47,520
Speaker 1: frequently an MLM can turn into a pyramid scheme. The

800
00:47:47,560 --> 00:47:51,640
Speaker 1: two can share a lot of qualities. I think that

801
00:47:51,840 --> 00:47:54,880
Speaker 1: is better left as a subject for a different podcast,

802
00:47:54,920 --> 00:47:58,400
Speaker 1: because it's not as dependent upon technology as the variations

803
00:47:58,400 --> 00:48:01,759
Speaker 1: I've been speaking about today. Once again, I gotta put

804
00:48:01,840 --> 00:48:04,800
Speaker 1: forth the argument for critical thinking. It's all about asking

805
00:48:04,840 --> 00:48:08,879
Speaker 1: important questions and looking for the most truthful answers. It's

806
00:48:08,880 --> 00:48:13,040
Speaker 1: about not taking things at face value and digging a

807
00:48:13,080 --> 00:48:16,600
Speaker 1: little deeper. This is particularly important when you've got a

808
00:48:16,680 --> 00:48:19,960
Speaker 1: strong motivation to believe the story being told to you.

809
00:48:20,360 --> 00:48:24,160
Speaker 1: If you have a predisposition to believe, you really got

810
00:48:24,160 --> 00:48:27,080
Speaker 1: to employ that critical thinking. If you're a person looking

811
00:48:27,120 --> 00:48:30,280
Speaker 1: for a new job, or you're someone who's really hunting

812
00:48:30,360 --> 00:48:34,200
Speaker 1: for a bargain, You're more liable to believe the lie

813
00:48:34,320 --> 00:48:36,439
Speaker 1: because lie is telling you what you want to hear,

814
00:48:36,480 --> 00:48:39,200
Speaker 1: So you've got to really use that critical thinking. The

815
00:48:39,280 --> 00:48:43,960
Speaker 1: motivation for believing is what these con artists are counting on.

816
00:48:44,719 --> 00:48:48,600
Speaker 1: Your motivation is doing the work for these con artists,

817
00:48:49,120 --> 00:48:52,240
Speaker 1: whether it's an ad on social media, a job listing,

818
00:48:52,680 --> 00:48:58,319
Speaker 1: or a crowdfunding campaign for a seemingly incredible idea. It's

819
00:48:58,320 --> 00:49:02,240
Speaker 1: always good to check your expectations and do some research first.

820
00:49:02,600 --> 00:49:05,040
Speaker 1: You may find that everything is totally legit and then

821
00:49:05,080 --> 00:49:07,799
Speaker 1: you're good to go, or you might save yourself some

822
00:49:07,840 --> 00:49:13,120
Speaker 1: money or your credit score, your bank account, or other

823
00:49:13,200 --> 00:49:17,239
Speaker 1: things that are equally important. So it pays to be

824
00:49:17,280 --> 00:49:21,840
Speaker 1: a critical thinker. And that wraps up this episode. Totally

825
00:49:21,920 --> 00:49:26,200
Speaker 1: inspired by my Facebook experience this morning. It's something I

826
00:49:26,239 --> 00:49:30,160
Speaker 1: really am very passionate about. I do not want people

827
00:49:30,640 --> 00:49:33,720
Speaker 1: to be taken advantage of. I want a world where

828
00:49:34,160 --> 00:49:38,880
Speaker 1: con artists don't get any opportunities and they realize that

829
00:49:38,960 --> 00:49:42,560
Speaker 1: they need to spend their efforts doing something else rather

830
00:49:42,640 --> 00:49:47,080
Speaker 1: than tricking people and making their lives more difficult. So

831
00:49:47,360 --> 00:49:50,880
Speaker 1: let's make it hard for those jerks, shall we. If

832
00:49:50,920 --> 00:49:53,400
Speaker 1: you guys have suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff,

833
00:49:53,760 --> 00:49:56,680
Speaker 1: send me an email. The addresses tex stuff at how

834
00:49:56,760 --> 00:50:00,799
Speaker 1: stuff works dot com. If you want you learn more

835
00:50:00,800 --> 00:50:03,280
Speaker 1: about the show, go to our website that's tech stuff

836
00:50:03,320 --> 00:50:07,439
Speaker 1: podcast dot com. We've got a list of every single

837
00:50:07,480 --> 00:50:10,400
Speaker 1: episode that has ever published. We have links to our

838
00:50:10,440 --> 00:50:12,560
Speaker 1: online store, where every purchase you make goes to help

839
00:50:12,600 --> 00:50:15,200
Speaker 1: the show. We greatly appreciate it, and we have links

840
00:50:15,200 --> 00:50:17,080
Speaker 1: to where we are on social media. You can reach

841
00:50:17,120 --> 00:50:19,839
Speaker 1: out to me on Facebook or Twitter and I will

842
00:50:19,840 --> 00:50:27,880
Speaker 1: talk to you again really soon. Y text Stuff is

843
00:50:27,920 --> 00:50:30,400
Speaker 1: a production of I Heart Radio's How Stuff Works. For

844
00:50:30,520 --> 00:50:33,480
Speaker 1: more podcasts from i heeart Radio, visit the I heart

845
00:50:33,560 --> 00:50:36,719
Speaker 1: Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your

846
00:50:36,760 --> 00:50:37,480
Speaker 1: favorite shows.