1 00:00:00,680 --> 00:00:05,240 Speaker 1: You know, sometimes we do episodes that only become more 2 00:00:05,440 --> 00:00:10,800 Speaker 1: relevant as the years continue, and this episode, this classic, 3 00:00:11,240 --> 00:00:14,040 Speaker 1: is a perfect example of this. Have you ever been 4 00:00:14,120 --> 00:00:17,000 Speaker 1: on the Internet and maybe you found yourself in a 5 00:00:17,079 --> 00:00:20,239 Speaker 1: vicious argument with some anonymous force on a on a 6 00:00:20,360 --> 00:00:23,560 Speaker 1: forum and they're putting in so much work that you think, 7 00:00:24,640 --> 00:00:27,000 Speaker 1: is this person do they really believe this? Or they 8 00:00:27,040 --> 00:00:30,760 Speaker 1: being paid to engage with me? And some of them 9 00:00:30,800 --> 00:00:35,080 Speaker 1: are as we have found out, these sock puppets of 10 00:00:35,159 --> 00:00:37,760 Speaker 1: various types and sizes, but not the fun ones from 11 00:00:37,800 --> 00:00:40,559 Speaker 1: like children's programming of your youth. Well, we're also terrifying 12 00:00:40,560 --> 00:00:42,360 Speaker 1: in their own right. You say that, but if you 13 00:00:42,440 --> 00:00:45,360 Speaker 1: check out our YouTube page, you can find Ben Boland 14 00:00:45,479 --> 00:00:48,600 Speaker 1: as a sock puppet in the video version of this episode. 15 00:00:48,760 --> 00:00:52,760 Speaker 1: You can also find the one and only Matt Frederick 16 00:00:52,920 --> 00:00:56,760 Speaker 1: and Mr Noel Brown in that video which we we 17 00:00:56,880 --> 00:01:00,200 Speaker 1: use levity to approach something that that's very serious and 18 00:01:00,240 --> 00:01:02,200 Speaker 1: it's something that a lot of folks in the so 19 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:06,960 Speaker 1: called digital native generation aren't aware of. You don't know 20 00:01:07,040 --> 00:01:09,760 Speaker 1: who you're talking to online and you don't know what 21 00:01:09,800 --> 00:01:13,319 Speaker 1: their motivation is for the positions they purport to hold. 22 00:01:13,840 --> 00:01:17,640 Speaker 1: So in this episode, we're asking the question, how can 23 00:01:17,760 --> 00:01:22,360 Speaker 1: you tell the difference between an actual, organic person who 24 00:01:22,360 --> 00:01:25,080 Speaker 1: believes what they're saying and someone who is being paid 25 00:01:25,560 --> 00:01:27,920 Speaker 1: to get into your head? And how strange is it 26 00:01:27,959 --> 00:01:32,880 Speaker 1: that we made this episode in July of and just 27 00:01:32,959 --> 00:01:35,480 Speaker 1: to see how things have played out online with this 28 00:01:35,560 --> 00:01:39,360 Speaker 1: very issue, tune in right now. St stacks up to 29 00:01:39,360 --> 00:01:43,360 Speaker 1: our current predicament. We find ourselves down from UFOs two, 30 00:01:43,360 --> 00:01:47,360 Speaker 1: ghosts and government cover ups histories where with unexplained events 31 00:01:47,880 --> 00:01:50,440 Speaker 1: you can turn back now or learn the stuff they 32 00:01:50,480 --> 00:01:58,480 Speaker 1: don't want me to now. Hello, everyone, welcome back to 33 00:01:58,520 --> 00:02:01,400 Speaker 1: the show. My name is Matt and my name is Ben, 34 00:02:01,440 --> 00:02:04,919 Speaker 1: and we are here as always with our super producer, 35 00:02:05,400 --> 00:02:09,760 Speaker 1: Noel Tiger Blood Brown. In this case, however, our nickname 36 00:02:09,840 --> 00:02:13,519 Speaker 1: for Noel has almost nothing to do with this episode. 37 00:02:13,520 --> 00:02:16,400 Speaker 1: We were just talking about the India, the population of 38 00:02:16,400 --> 00:02:21,120 Speaker 1: tigers in India. Yes, absolutely nothing to do the actual show, 39 00:02:21,280 --> 00:02:23,600 Speaker 1: kind of like at the old Tea in China's statement. 40 00:02:23,840 --> 00:02:26,919 Speaker 1: So let's get to our actual show because this is 41 00:02:26,960 --> 00:02:31,600 Speaker 1: a very special episode. We are joined today by uh 42 00:02:31,880 --> 00:02:34,920 Speaker 1: friend of ours and co worker, our special guest for today, 43 00:02:35,040 --> 00:02:37,840 Speaker 1: Ladies and gentlemen, co host off Forward Thinking and stuff 44 00:02:37,880 --> 00:02:41,560 Speaker 1: to blow your mind. Joe McCormick, Hi, everybody he jo 45 00:02:42,680 --> 00:02:45,800 Speaker 1: the crowd goes wild. It is a privilege to be 46 00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:50,880 Speaker 1: on the show with you creeps. Thank you awesome. We 47 00:02:50,919 --> 00:02:53,359 Speaker 1: just love having you here. We you listeners may remember 48 00:02:53,400 --> 00:02:56,840 Speaker 1: that we've had Joe on before U for our Tunguska event. Oh, 49 00:02:56,880 --> 00:02:58,480 Speaker 1: that was a lot of fun. I always love talking 50 00:02:58,520 --> 00:03:01,639 Speaker 1: about Tunguska. Yeah, and it's creepy to have you here 51 00:03:01,639 --> 00:03:03,560 Speaker 1: as well. Or whatever it was you said, Did we 52 00:03:03,760 --> 00:03:06,720 Speaker 1: did we? And that one I can't remember. Did we 53 00:03:06,760 --> 00:03:10,560 Speaker 1: talk about the theory that that Nicola Tesla was testing 54 00:03:10,639 --> 00:03:13,359 Speaker 1: his death ray and that's what happened at the Tunguska 55 00:03:13,760 --> 00:03:16,799 Speaker 1: I think we did about how that's not right at all. 56 00:03:16,840 --> 00:03:19,640 Speaker 1: I think of the timing wouldn't work out or something right. Yeah. 57 00:03:19,639 --> 00:03:24,360 Speaker 1: The problem The problem is that in both instances, the 58 00:03:24,440 --> 00:03:28,000 Speaker 1: life of Nicola Tesla and the Tunguska event, we have 59 00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:32,120 Speaker 1: pretty solidly established timelines. Where you guys crushing my dreams. 60 00:03:32,840 --> 00:03:35,640 Speaker 1: Oh man, dreams are they are all kinds of dreams 61 00:03:35,640 --> 00:03:38,080 Speaker 1: out there in the zeitgeist. You know what Nicola Tesla's 62 00:03:38,120 --> 00:03:42,120 Speaker 1: death three to do things there there are there are 63 00:03:42,160 --> 00:03:45,000 Speaker 1: attempts to build death rays right now. You know, the 64 00:03:45,000 --> 00:03:47,720 Speaker 1: the U. S. Military is working on pretty good, uh 65 00:03:47,960 --> 00:03:52,800 Speaker 1: pain inducing microwave thing. And you know what, speaking of 66 00:03:53,280 --> 00:03:58,240 Speaker 1: speaking of amazing segues. Uh, we're going to talk about uh, 67 00:03:58,800 --> 00:04:04,560 Speaker 1: some technology based things today, but first we've got to 68 00:04:04,680 --> 00:04:08,920 Speaker 1: walk through something that really interested the three of us, 69 00:04:08,920 --> 00:04:11,000 Speaker 1: well the four of us as well. Uh nol, I 70 00:04:11,040 --> 00:04:15,040 Speaker 1: assume you're interested in this. Give me a nod. Okay, 71 00:04:15,080 --> 00:04:18,200 Speaker 1: that's kind of a nod. He's a sarcastic nod. Yeah, 72 00:04:18,240 --> 00:04:21,280 Speaker 1: that was very You have an amazing command of physicality, 73 00:04:21,360 --> 00:04:24,400 Speaker 1: my friend. Well, we'll talk with you about that in 74 00:04:24,440 --> 00:04:28,360 Speaker 1: a second. But what what interested us this week was 75 00:04:28,440 --> 00:04:35,480 Speaker 1: the concept of uh, the concept of online communication in general, right, yes, 76 00:04:35,560 --> 00:04:40,000 Speaker 1: and in particular something that is a huge matter of 77 00:04:40,040 --> 00:04:42,600 Speaker 1: import to people who listen to the show, to people 78 00:04:42,640 --> 00:04:46,719 Speaker 1: who go on conspiracy websites, the idea of a shill. 79 00:04:47,200 --> 00:04:51,920 Speaker 1: What is a shill? Yeah, and sometimes you run into 80 00:04:51,920 --> 00:04:54,400 Speaker 1: the problem of how can you tell the difference between 81 00:04:55,120 --> 00:04:59,279 Speaker 1: somebody's honest to goodness, just real patriotic uncle and a 82 00:04:59,440 --> 00:05:03,240 Speaker 1: legit paid government chill. Yeah. Yeah, there's a there was 83 00:05:03,320 --> 00:05:06,359 Speaker 1: this old rule about or you know, rule of the 84 00:05:06,520 --> 00:05:10,240 Speaker 1: made up thing about how difficult it would be to 85 00:05:10,400 --> 00:05:14,520 Speaker 1: discern the sincerity from the satire, and I kindot recall 86 00:05:14,600 --> 00:05:19,280 Speaker 1: the name of it, right, Yeah, yeah, yeah, post law. 87 00:05:19,320 --> 00:05:21,880 Speaker 1: I believe it's something like on the Internet, it's difficult 88 00:05:21,920 --> 00:05:26,720 Speaker 1: to tell legitimate extremism from the satire thereof. So if 89 00:05:26,760 --> 00:05:30,000 Speaker 1: somebody puts up a post on the web saying I 90 00:05:30,040 --> 00:05:32,719 Speaker 1: think we should round up all red haired people and 91 00:05:32,760 --> 00:05:35,840 Speaker 1: make them work until they die, it's kind of hard 92 00:05:35,880 --> 00:05:39,360 Speaker 1: to tell if they're making fun of somebody else's extremism 93 00:05:39,480 --> 00:05:42,360 Speaker 1: or if that's just really somebody who thinks that. Did 94 00:05:42,400 --> 00:05:45,800 Speaker 1: you see the Onion article that came out recently where 95 00:05:45,839 --> 00:05:48,680 Speaker 1: they discussed with the Iran deal. That's that was in 96 00:05:48,720 --> 00:05:52,239 Speaker 1: talks about how the US just in order to calm 97 00:05:52,279 --> 00:05:56,400 Speaker 1: down Bibbie gave them some some weapons, gave Israel some weapons. 98 00:05:56,240 --> 00:06:00,560 Speaker 1: That the headline was something like Obama soothed net Yahoo 99 00:06:00,560 --> 00:06:04,240 Speaker 1: with gift basket of ballistic missiles. And then the announcement 100 00:06:04,279 --> 00:06:06,840 Speaker 1: came within twenty four hours they Oh, yes, that is 101 00:06:06,880 --> 00:06:10,160 Speaker 1: in fact what's happening. Oh wow, So I I imagine 102 00:06:10,200 --> 00:06:13,400 Speaker 1: the comments section on a lot of those are those 103 00:06:13,440 --> 00:06:17,440 Speaker 1: things are growing like wildfire. Now you've probably seen it 104 00:06:17,520 --> 00:06:20,880 Speaker 1: if you were in a any kind of UM news 105 00:06:21,000 --> 00:06:25,760 Speaker 1: forum where people can make comments. At times, something a 106 00:06:25,800 --> 00:06:29,920 Speaker 1: little tricky starts to happen. Right, somebody says, well, here's 107 00:06:29,960 --> 00:06:32,760 Speaker 1: a story about UM and we can fill in some 108 00:06:32,800 --> 00:06:37,799 Speaker 1: more specific examples later. But somebody, for instance, says, uh, 109 00:06:37,920 --> 00:06:43,240 Speaker 1: here's a story about what Russia is doing wrong in 110 00:06:43,320 --> 00:06:47,479 Speaker 1: crimea or something. And then for a few hours, right, 111 00:06:47,839 --> 00:06:52,320 Speaker 1: everything's okay. People are responding one on one to comments, Well, 112 00:06:52,480 --> 00:06:54,640 Speaker 1: I don't know if everything is okay. For a few hours, 113 00:06:54,680 --> 00:07:00,520 Speaker 1: you have the normal organic growth of garbage. Yeah, not acessarily, 114 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:04,440 Speaker 1: not necessarily okay, yeah, because you'll still have you'll still 115 00:07:04,480 --> 00:07:07,559 Speaker 1: have that. But then but at least it's for real. Yeah, 116 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:10,920 Speaker 1: But then take me to the plot twist. What happens Joe. Well, 117 00:07:11,400 --> 00:07:13,960 Speaker 1: at a certain point, you might notice that there is 118 00:07:14,000 --> 00:07:19,560 Speaker 1: a massive influx of messages that are repeating almost the 119 00:07:19,600 --> 00:07:22,960 Speaker 1: exact same theme that, in this case would be a 120 00:07:23,120 --> 00:07:29,520 Speaker 1: pro Russian government message that that maybe criticizes foreign leaders 121 00:07:29,680 --> 00:07:34,760 Speaker 1: or rivals to Vladimir Putin, or that criticizes people for 122 00:07:34,960 --> 00:07:37,840 Speaker 1: criticizing the Russian government, saying that they're part of a 123 00:07:37,920 --> 00:07:41,640 Speaker 1: CIA plot or something or any number of other things, 124 00:07:42,040 --> 00:07:45,960 Speaker 1: and they seem strangely unified in their message, even unto 125 00:07:46,000 --> 00:07:49,360 Speaker 1: the language they use. Yeah, and in some cases this 126 00:07:49,560 --> 00:07:54,840 Speaker 1: is probably not a coincidence. Dare we call it a conspiracy? 127 00:07:54,920 --> 00:08:02,720 Speaker 1: That's right. Online manipulators professionally paid or somehow professionally induced, rewarded, 128 00:08:03,080 --> 00:08:07,840 Speaker 1: somehow organized. That's the key. Uh, people attempting to sway 129 00:08:08,120 --> 00:08:14,560 Speaker 1: the quote unquote narrative of a conversation in the digital space, 130 00:08:14,720 --> 00:08:18,040 Speaker 1: and sometimes not even sway, sometimes just muddy the waters, 131 00:08:18,400 --> 00:08:22,040 Speaker 1: just inundate the comments sections such. Yeah, that's that's a 132 00:08:22,080 --> 00:08:26,120 Speaker 1: great point. So when we we did a video about this, right, 133 00:08:26,200 --> 00:08:32,240 Speaker 1: and we made a couple of points about online manipulators. Yeah, 134 00:08:32,280 --> 00:08:34,160 Speaker 1: I think one of the things that's important to start 135 00:08:34,200 --> 00:08:36,680 Speaker 1: with is the question of why such a thing as 136 00:08:36,760 --> 00:08:41,720 Speaker 1: a shill exists, like why you would put a plant 137 00:08:41,960 --> 00:08:45,280 Speaker 1: in the audience, Because this is a sort of psychological 138 00:08:45,400 --> 00:08:48,400 Speaker 1: fact about human beings, is that we're sensitive to the 139 00:08:48,440 --> 00:08:52,319 Speaker 1: sources of information, Like when we judge the truth of 140 00:08:52,400 --> 00:08:55,880 Speaker 1: an argument or a claim, sometimes we're even more sensitive 141 00:08:55,960 --> 00:08:58,280 Speaker 1: to who it comes from than we are to the 142 00:08:58,320 --> 00:09:00,560 Speaker 1: content of it. Sure, you can see that in a 143 00:09:00,760 --> 00:09:05,600 Speaker 1: pitch meetings in businesses across the planet. Sure, yes, there 144 00:09:05,640 --> 00:09:08,680 Speaker 1: there might be the teacher's pet or the boss's pet 145 00:09:08,720 --> 00:09:11,200 Speaker 1: in your office who you know, whatever kind of dribble 146 00:09:11,240 --> 00:09:15,560 Speaker 1: comes out of their mouth, Oh that's gold, or or 147 00:09:15,679 --> 00:09:18,080 Speaker 1: you can see this in your own judgment. I mean, 148 00:09:18,800 --> 00:09:23,360 Speaker 1: you probably naturally have some suspicion about messages that come 149 00:09:23,480 --> 00:09:27,480 Speaker 1: to you directly from sort of the public relations arm 150 00:09:27,559 --> 00:09:31,040 Speaker 1: of a government or organization, especially when they seem to 151 00:09:31,160 --> 00:09:35,320 Speaker 1: serve the interests of that very government or organization. So 152 00:09:35,360 --> 00:09:39,760 Speaker 1: if the pr representative of a major corporation tells you 153 00:09:39,920 --> 00:09:44,520 Speaker 1: our products are not harmful, that does not necessarily carry 154 00:09:44,559 --> 00:09:47,000 Speaker 1: the same weight to you as if the same message 155 00:09:47,040 --> 00:09:50,280 Speaker 1: came from a disinterested third party or just some friend 156 00:09:50,280 --> 00:09:52,840 Speaker 1: of yours. And it's pretty clear why that is. You know, 157 00:09:53,440 --> 00:09:57,160 Speaker 1: we're suspicious of people's motives when they're passing along information. 158 00:09:57,240 --> 00:09:59,160 Speaker 1: And this comes through in the way governments try to 159 00:09:59,200 --> 00:10:01,840 Speaker 1: pass along p baganda. It's in their interest to to 160 00:10:01,960 --> 00:10:04,719 Speaker 1: make it look like it's coming from someone other than 161 00:10:04,760 --> 00:10:08,240 Speaker 1: the public relations arm of the government. Absolutely, this is 162 00:10:08,280 --> 00:10:10,360 Speaker 1: something that I'm glad you bring up the idea of 163 00:10:10,360 --> 00:10:13,160 Speaker 1: government stuff, because this is something that uh, Matt and 164 00:10:13,200 --> 00:10:16,320 Speaker 1: I have looked at before where in you know, you're 165 00:10:16,360 --> 00:10:21,599 Speaker 1: not going to believe the press secretary of the Executive 166 00:10:21,600 --> 00:10:24,240 Speaker 1: Branch when they say the new law that the president 167 00:10:24,320 --> 00:10:27,960 Speaker 1: is creating is in fact the best law, and it's 168 00:10:28,040 --> 00:10:30,400 Speaker 1: it's objective, that's why he did it. And also you 169 00:10:30,480 --> 00:10:35,080 Speaker 1: have to be suspicious of any uh, any popular journalism 170 00:10:35,120 --> 00:10:39,600 Speaker 1: that reports something from an unnamed government official and did 171 00:10:39,640 --> 00:10:42,120 Speaker 1: not want to go on record. And and we we 172 00:10:42,200 --> 00:10:44,560 Speaker 1: see this, and it's a great point. We see this 173 00:10:44,679 --> 00:10:50,240 Speaker 1: effort to obstucate the uh the source of information right, 174 00:10:50,720 --> 00:10:53,880 Speaker 1: and sometimes the the source of information can be from 175 00:10:53,920 --> 00:10:57,760 Speaker 1: an advocacy group with the name that you just go, Okay, 176 00:10:57,800 --> 00:10:59,839 Speaker 1: I've never heard of that before, but it seems like 177 00:11:00,040 --> 00:11:03,960 Speaker 1: it seems legit. Yeah, the society of completely objective doctors. 178 00:11:05,360 --> 00:11:08,120 Speaker 1: I mean something we'll get into a little later. But 179 00:11:08,200 --> 00:11:10,439 Speaker 1: I just when when you're speaking about that, Joe, I 180 00:11:10,520 --> 00:11:14,640 Speaker 1: was just thinking and imagining, uh if okay, so your 181 00:11:14,760 --> 00:11:18,680 Speaker 1: your example was talking about pr firm coming directly out 182 00:11:19,000 --> 00:11:20,920 Speaker 1: the then you might have on the other side an 183 00:11:20,920 --> 00:11:24,319 Speaker 1: advocacy group or supposedly an advocacy group that says, no, 184 00:11:24,440 --> 00:11:27,000 Speaker 1: we've done testing and these things these products are safe, 185 00:11:27,240 --> 00:11:31,720 Speaker 1: and boom. Another advocacy group comes up with a relatively 186 00:11:31,760 --> 00:11:35,880 Speaker 1: young history, like let's walk through smoking, so someone we'll 187 00:11:35,960 --> 00:11:38,480 Speaker 1: we'll see this. Smoking is a is a great example 188 00:11:38,520 --> 00:11:43,320 Speaker 1: for cigarettes of the actions of a couple of these 189 00:11:43,320 --> 00:11:45,840 Speaker 1: practices that we've seen before, where all of a sudden, 190 00:11:45,880 --> 00:11:50,200 Speaker 1: a group of quote unquote concerned citizens says, you know, 191 00:11:50,280 --> 00:11:54,280 Speaker 1: we're concerned about people impinging on smokers rights and all 192 00:11:54,400 --> 00:12:00,640 Speaker 1: this uh, all this overblown government whoy that smoking uh 193 00:12:00,679 --> 00:12:05,760 Speaker 1: causes cancer when we all know that read meat is 194 00:12:05,800 --> 00:12:08,880 Speaker 1: the real killer, right or something like that. You know, 195 00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:11,800 Speaker 1: it's a diversion and I'm I'm just styling on it 196 00:12:11,880 --> 00:12:14,160 Speaker 1: right there. I don't think that their argument was read meat. 197 00:12:14,400 --> 00:12:17,240 Speaker 1: But to bring it back to this, we we know 198 00:12:17,320 --> 00:12:23,480 Speaker 1: that the propaganda, this kind of manipulation or of false perspective. 199 00:12:23,559 --> 00:12:27,400 Speaker 1: These facades have existed before the digital age, but now 200 00:12:27,760 --> 00:12:30,400 Speaker 1: this new age of information is changing them to the 201 00:12:30,440 --> 00:12:34,000 Speaker 1: point where not only are their online manipulators, but there's 202 00:12:34,080 --> 00:12:36,760 Speaker 1: there's more than one kind. There's an ecosystem of sorts. 203 00:12:36,840 --> 00:12:40,240 Speaker 1: Sure well, the web has increased the average person's ability 204 00:12:40,400 --> 00:12:44,600 Speaker 1: to say things with anonymity, but it's also increased governments 205 00:12:44,640 --> 00:12:47,839 Speaker 1: and corporation's ability to say things with anonymity, you can 206 00:12:47,840 --> 00:12:53,160 Speaker 1: always introduce more layers of, as you said, obfuscation into 207 00:12:53,240 --> 00:12:56,000 Speaker 1: the the sort of chain of hunting, like who was it, 208 00:12:56,080 --> 00:12:59,719 Speaker 1: Who's actually behind this message on the Internet. Sometimes it's 209 00:12:59,720 --> 00:13:03,320 Speaker 1: in possible to figure out, And so that leads to 210 00:13:03,559 --> 00:13:06,400 Speaker 1: the common practice I'm sure y'all are very familiar with 211 00:13:06,559 --> 00:13:13,520 Speaker 1: of sock puppetry. Oh yes, no, no, no, we're gonna 212 00:13:13,559 --> 00:13:15,600 Speaker 1: make a show with sock puppets at one time. Yeah, 213 00:13:15,679 --> 00:13:19,600 Speaker 1: we probably still will. I appreciate you playing the straight man, Matt, 214 00:13:19,679 --> 00:13:22,240 Speaker 1: but I know you know what I'm talking about Internet 215 00:13:22,280 --> 00:13:25,240 Speaker 1: sock puppetry. So this could go a bunch of different ways. 216 00:13:25,600 --> 00:13:31,000 Speaker 1: Here's one example. Author writes a book, the book gets published. 217 00:13:31,480 --> 00:13:35,640 Speaker 1: Author sees that his book has two Amazon reviews. One 218 00:13:36,080 --> 00:13:40,360 Speaker 1: is two stars and one is one star. So this 219 00:13:40,440 --> 00:13:43,240 Speaker 1: is a problem. He's probably gonna have a lot harder 220 00:13:43,240 --> 00:13:46,120 Speaker 1: time selling this book if that's all that's sitting out there. 221 00:13:46,160 --> 00:13:48,000 Speaker 1: So maybe he might wait a couple of days for 222 00:13:48,000 --> 00:13:50,640 Speaker 1: the good reviews to pour in, but it's just not happening. 223 00:13:51,040 --> 00:13:53,400 Speaker 1: Let's specify the name of the book. Get people really 224 00:13:53,400 --> 00:13:56,880 Speaker 1: in the moment the book is Chomp, a comprehensive history 225 00:13:57,040 --> 00:14:00,319 Speaker 1: of people biting other people to death with denture. Oh 226 00:14:00,360 --> 00:14:03,200 Speaker 1: I was the two star review Okay, yeah that was me. Yeah, 227 00:14:03,200 --> 00:14:05,920 Speaker 1: And they say like biased and there's just two stars 228 00:14:05,920 --> 00:14:10,920 Speaker 1: and all, but so so it's not the author. Yeah, 229 00:14:10,960 --> 00:14:14,320 Speaker 1: the author of Chomped says, I've got to take matters 230 00:14:14,320 --> 00:14:17,160 Speaker 1: into my own hands. So he goes and he creates 231 00:14:17,360 --> 00:14:22,600 Speaker 1: some accounts that could be for all we the other users, 232 00:14:22,640 --> 00:14:27,000 Speaker 1: no actual different people, but no, they're all him, and 233 00:14:27,000 --> 00:14:29,880 Speaker 1: they're all given the book. Rave reviews five stars. A 234 00:14:30,000 --> 00:14:33,720 Speaker 1: brilliant tour to force five stars. Best book I've ever 235 00:14:33,760 --> 00:14:36,480 Speaker 1: read in my life. Five stars. I'll never look at 236 00:14:36,520 --> 00:14:38,920 Speaker 1: dentures the same way again. Take a bite out of 237 00:14:39,000 --> 00:14:42,920 Speaker 1: history with Chump. Yeah, and suddenly Chomp is a very 238 00:14:43,000 --> 00:14:46,480 Speaker 1: highly rated book. Now, there might be some in an 239 00:14:46,520 --> 00:14:49,400 Speaker 1: actual system like Amazon, there might be some measures put 240 00:14:49,440 --> 00:14:52,360 Speaker 1: in place to try to use some some clues to 241 00:14:52,440 --> 00:14:55,000 Speaker 1: prevent that sort of thing from happening. Age of account 242 00:14:55,040 --> 00:14:58,800 Speaker 1: holder or something length account, right, But there are these 243 00:14:58,840 --> 00:15:03,760 Speaker 1: situations where people try to pretend to represent other third 244 00:15:03,840 --> 00:15:06,920 Speaker 1: party opinions when really it's just one guy who made 245 00:15:07,000 --> 00:15:10,240 Speaker 1: five hundred different accounts with five hundred different email addresses. 246 00:15:10,440 --> 00:15:12,320 Speaker 1: And that's really all it takes. Now, with most of 247 00:15:12,320 --> 00:15:14,800 Speaker 1: these sites and apps, you need an email address. Yeah, 248 00:15:14,920 --> 00:15:17,400 Speaker 1: and there you go. Wait wait wait wait wait wait guys, 249 00:15:17,480 --> 00:15:21,480 Speaker 1: I'm you know, as I am relatively a moral This 250 00:15:21,520 --> 00:15:23,640 Speaker 1: doesn't seem like a bad idea to me, but it 251 00:15:23,720 --> 00:15:27,160 Speaker 1: seems kind of inconvenient, Like walk me through this day 252 00:15:27,200 --> 00:15:30,240 Speaker 1: of this sock puppet master. Okay, Well, here's where the 253 00:15:30,280 --> 00:15:33,200 Speaker 1: problem comes in. Because let's say he's not facing this 254 00:15:33,280 --> 00:15:36,080 Speaker 1: problem of whatever platform he's trying to spam with all 255 00:15:36,120 --> 00:15:39,600 Speaker 1: of his sock puppetry. Uh, it's not actually sniffing out 256 00:15:39,640 --> 00:15:42,040 Speaker 1: the fact that he's just one guy. They're all coming 257 00:15:42,080 --> 00:15:44,520 Speaker 1: from the same IP address. Maybe he uses some some 258 00:15:44,680 --> 00:15:48,440 Speaker 1: tools to get around that, uses proxies and and clever 259 00:15:48,560 --> 00:15:51,480 Speaker 1: tricks to really try to look like seven hundred different people. 260 00:15:51,960 --> 00:15:54,680 Speaker 1: Even then, it's really going to be eating into his schedule. 261 00:15:55,120 --> 00:15:58,080 Speaker 1: It takes a lot of time to do this. But 262 00:15:58,200 --> 00:16:01,200 Speaker 1: you know something else he could do is he could 263 00:16:01,280 --> 00:16:05,640 Speaker 1: hire a bunch of his friends. Yeah. Now, the problem 264 00:16:05,680 --> 00:16:07,880 Speaker 1: there is his friends might not keep the secret, and 265 00:16:07,920 --> 00:16:11,200 Speaker 1: this would be really embarrassing if it got out, So 266 00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:13,880 Speaker 1: he would have to probably make them sign a nondisclosure 267 00:16:13,880 --> 00:16:17,600 Speaker 1: agreement or something that would be legally binding or enforceable 268 00:16:17,640 --> 00:16:19,880 Speaker 1: so that he could punish them in some way if 269 00:16:19,920 --> 00:16:23,840 Speaker 1: they leaked his secrets. But whatever the situation is, he 270 00:16:23,880 --> 00:16:28,320 Speaker 1: would get different people to be the sock puppet operators 271 00:16:28,360 --> 00:16:31,000 Speaker 1: for him. And there's a term that sometimes shows up 272 00:16:31,000 --> 00:16:33,000 Speaker 1: for this kind of thing on the Internet, and that 273 00:16:33,120 --> 00:16:36,240 Speaker 1: term is meat puppets, not necessarily referring to the band, 274 00:16:36,840 --> 00:16:38,840 Speaker 1: but the idea is is a sock puppet that's a 275 00:16:38,840 --> 00:16:41,840 Speaker 1: real human being. It's made of meat. So there, it's 276 00:16:41,880 --> 00:16:44,520 Speaker 1: not just you logging out and then logging back in 277 00:16:44,560 --> 00:16:47,040 Speaker 1: with a different user name to to leave a different 278 00:16:47,040 --> 00:16:49,760 Speaker 1: comment pretending to be somebody else. It's a real other person. 279 00:16:50,520 --> 00:16:53,280 Speaker 1: The deal is they're just not acting of their own 280 00:16:53,360 --> 00:16:58,720 Speaker 1: agency or independently. They're acting based on your marching orders. Right. Yeah, 281 00:16:58,760 --> 00:17:03,000 Speaker 1: so you're you're having something that's as much smarter as 282 00:17:03,000 --> 00:17:06,080 Speaker 1: a system overall. You're able to delegate. Yeah. Well, and 283 00:17:06,560 --> 00:17:08,679 Speaker 1: one of the interesting things that happens now instead of 284 00:17:08,680 --> 00:17:11,360 Speaker 1: one person using all these accounts, now you have physical 285 00:17:11,440 --> 00:17:15,399 Speaker 1: people using a multiple amounts or multiple accounts like this, 286 00:17:15,720 --> 00:17:18,199 Speaker 1: and you kind of have a weird little army. I 287 00:17:18,240 --> 00:17:22,000 Speaker 1: guess yeah, way it's and and uh, let's take a second. 288 00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:24,360 Speaker 1: So we've got we've got some good terms here. We've 289 00:17:24,359 --> 00:17:27,919 Speaker 1: got sock puppets, we've got meat puppets. We should also 290 00:17:27,960 --> 00:17:32,640 Speaker 1: address something that a lot of people use synonymously, which 291 00:17:32,720 --> 00:17:34,879 Speaker 1: may maybe it is not the case, and it's the 292 00:17:34,960 --> 00:17:39,679 Speaker 1: idea of trolls. Yeah. So there's one particular example we're 293 00:17:39,680 --> 00:17:41,679 Speaker 1: gonna get to in this podcast, which is the idea 294 00:17:41,760 --> 00:17:46,280 Speaker 1: of Russia's troll army, which is not not physical trolls 295 00:17:46,320 --> 00:17:48,920 Speaker 1: like control Hunter. That would be really that would be amazing. 296 00:17:49,040 --> 00:17:52,120 Speaker 1: I would be behind that army whatever, cause they served. 297 00:17:52,920 --> 00:17:55,439 Speaker 1: I welcome our troll overlords. But now that this is 298 00:17:55,480 --> 00:17:58,440 Speaker 1: the idea of the online troll, somebody who shows up 299 00:17:58,480 --> 00:18:02,840 Speaker 1: to cause grief for a stration, panic and demoralization and 300 00:18:03,000 --> 00:18:07,480 Speaker 1: online uh forum there agents of chaos. Yeah. Usually just 301 00:18:07,680 --> 00:18:10,879 Speaker 1: it seems like their main goals are getting attention and 302 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:13,640 Speaker 1: getting giggles. Some people just want to see the thread burn, 303 00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:16,600 Speaker 1: you know, that's right. So the idea, and that's sort 304 00:18:16,640 --> 00:18:19,320 Speaker 1: of the idea of a troll. To me, a troll 305 00:18:19,359 --> 00:18:23,360 Speaker 1: inherently is sort of an anarchic force. Usually not directed. 306 00:18:23,960 --> 00:18:27,520 Speaker 1: But I think we should specify that people do use 307 00:18:27,640 --> 00:18:30,200 Speaker 1: this term referring to what we just talked about, these 308 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:33,960 Speaker 1: meat puppets acting on behalf of somebody with nefarious goals, 309 00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:37,320 Speaker 1: trying to hide the fact that they are one person 310 00:18:37,400 --> 00:18:41,040 Speaker 1: spreading their agenda through many well in many cases too, 311 00:18:41,160 --> 00:18:43,639 Speaker 1: we we can't. We have to be careful when we 312 00:18:43,680 --> 00:18:49,120 Speaker 1: assume the motivation because many people who will be doing 313 00:18:49,160 --> 00:18:52,439 Speaker 1: this likely assumed that they're doing it for a greater 314 00:18:52,760 --> 00:18:56,000 Speaker 1: good or or you know the funny thing that happens 315 00:18:56,000 --> 00:18:59,200 Speaker 1: psychologically when someone is paid to do a task. Uh, 316 00:18:59,240 --> 00:19:03,120 Speaker 1: and we start, yeah, we start to rationalize, right, and 317 00:19:03,160 --> 00:19:05,840 Speaker 1: it's like I gotta put food on my family, Yeah, 318 00:19:06,119 --> 00:19:11,160 Speaker 1: right right, where wings am I going to do it? Yeah? 319 00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:14,000 Speaker 1: But the but I think that's I think that's a 320 00:19:14,040 --> 00:19:16,600 Speaker 1: great point. Like this, The idea of a troll is 321 00:19:16,600 --> 00:19:22,560 Speaker 1: not necessarily synonymous, though. I think in some cases meat 322 00:19:22,600 --> 00:19:27,399 Speaker 1: puppets can be trolls, and this actually can serve the 323 00:19:27,440 --> 00:19:32,520 Speaker 1: agenda of some state actors in some cases. So here's 324 00:19:32,520 --> 00:19:37,359 Speaker 1: an example. Let's say you are the managing the Internet 325 00:19:37,480 --> 00:19:42,560 Speaker 1: Information Bureau of some government, and you've got a pesky 326 00:19:42,600 --> 00:19:48,120 Speaker 1: online newspaper that keeps publishing articles critical of the glorious, powerful, 327 00:19:48,359 --> 00:19:52,880 Speaker 1: wonderful leader. You serve right, we already had an election. Yeah, 328 00:19:52,920 --> 00:19:56,840 Speaker 1: exactly why are people like lobbying all these unfair criticisms 329 00:19:56,880 --> 00:20:00,720 Speaker 1: at this wonderful glorious man. May be what I could 330 00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:05,480 Speaker 1: do instead of spamming the comments sections of these online 331 00:20:05,560 --> 00:20:09,400 Speaker 1: articles with good things about the leader, is to just 332 00:20:09,640 --> 00:20:15,000 Speaker 1: spam them with horrible, horrible messages that are juvenile, full 333 00:20:15,000 --> 00:20:19,600 Speaker 1: of profanity and disgusting imagery, and generally make people not 334 00:20:19,760 --> 00:20:22,840 Speaker 1: want to look at the comments grammar as well he 335 00:20:23,080 --> 00:20:29,080 Speaker 1: and me or sexy But yeah this actually, yeah, yeah this, 336 00:20:29,080 --> 00:20:34,000 Speaker 1: this could serve the agenda of this wonderful, powerful, glorious 337 00:20:34,000 --> 00:20:37,760 Speaker 1: merciful leader, because even though good messages aren't getting out, 338 00:20:37,800 --> 00:20:42,000 Speaker 1: it's definitely shutting down a space where otherwise reasoned and 339 00:20:42,160 --> 00:20:45,720 Speaker 1: constructive criticism might have occurred. This is a place where 340 00:20:45,960 --> 00:20:49,560 Speaker 1: people might have been sharing ideas about how to put 341 00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:53,679 Speaker 1: together an opposition party, or sharing links and ideas that 342 00:20:53,760 --> 00:20:56,879 Speaker 1: spread yet more bad information. So if you just stink 343 00:20:57,000 --> 00:20:59,840 Speaker 1: up the joint, people aren't gonna want to be there. 344 00:21:00,119 --> 00:21:04,400 Speaker 1: And there are allegations that real government paid online manipulators 345 00:21:04,800 --> 00:21:07,320 Speaker 1: have done this very thing that they're not always just 346 00:21:07,400 --> 00:21:11,280 Speaker 1: trying to say, look, Russia is an amazing country. Sometimes 347 00:21:11,359 --> 00:21:13,960 Speaker 1: they just want to say pooh pooh, but p P 348 00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:20,000 Speaker 1: to make people go away. Yeah, And then there's there's 349 00:21:20,040 --> 00:21:23,200 Speaker 1: also the uh. There's also the idea of taking an 350 00:21:23,240 --> 00:21:28,119 Speaker 1: extremist stance, like like one of the the word extremist 351 00:21:28,440 --> 00:21:30,919 Speaker 1: is become as much of a boogeyman as the word, 352 00:21:31,200 --> 00:21:34,480 Speaker 1: you know, terrorist or communist. Well, I mean it's also 353 00:21:34,640 --> 00:21:39,200 Speaker 1: just painfully imprecise. Yes it is. It is. Uh. There's 354 00:21:39,680 --> 00:21:44,000 Speaker 1: one person's extremist is someone else's moderate, right, But the uh, 355 00:21:44,320 --> 00:21:47,280 Speaker 1: the the thing that also can occur is when somebody 356 00:21:47,359 --> 00:21:50,639 Speaker 1: muddies the water by going on to something that a 357 00:21:51,080 --> 00:21:55,000 Speaker 1: government or a company would officially consider extremists and then 358 00:21:55,040 --> 00:21:58,840 Speaker 1: trying to take it even farther further and saying, uh, 359 00:21:59,000 --> 00:22:04,600 Speaker 1: saying you know, um, guys, these peaceful protests there b s. 360 00:22:04,920 --> 00:22:08,800 Speaker 1: What we really need to do is cut off some heads, 361 00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:13,440 Speaker 1: FedEx some toes, get this party started. In a debate, 362 00:22:13,560 --> 00:22:17,159 Speaker 1: you would call this tactic creating a straw man. So 363 00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:21,920 Speaker 1: if I'm arguing with Ben, and Ben's position is I 364 00:22:21,960 --> 00:22:26,320 Speaker 1: think we should lower taxes, um, I would say so 365 00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:29,600 Speaker 1: Ben has argued that we should have no taxes and 366 00:22:29,680 --> 00:22:33,000 Speaker 1: that we should behead all people who suggest there should 367 00:22:33,040 --> 00:22:36,560 Speaker 1: be taxes. So I'm trying to just make his opinion 368 00:22:36,720 --> 00:22:39,240 Speaker 1: look awful, so it's easier for me to strike down. 369 00:22:39,800 --> 00:22:43,480 Speaker 1: You can do the same thing with sock puppetry, so 370 00:22:43,600 --> 00:22:46,720 Speaker 1: taking the opposition stance, pretending to be one of the 371 00:22:46,760 --> 00:22:50,919 Speaker 1: people you oppose, but making their position looks so extreme 372 00:22:51,000 --> 00:22:54,000 Speaker 1: and unpleasant that people won't want to identify with it. 373 00:22:54,359 --> 00:22:56,119 Speaker 1: Which sometimes you only have to take it a little 374 00:22:56,119 --> 00:22:59,280 Speaker 1: bit further and that's all that it takes. And I 375 00:22:59,280 --> 00:23:01,440 Speaker 1: don't know, I mean, I do that all the time 376 00:23:01,480 --> 00:23:05,639 Speaker 1: on recipe forums because I have some fairly strong opinions. 377 00:23:06,400 --> 00:23:09,840 Speaker 1: Hazelnut in recips people who put their marmide on the 378 00:23:09,880 --> 00:23:13,280 Speaker 1: top side of the toast on a guy. Yeah, dcor 379 00:23:13,400 --> 00:23:16,640 Speaker 1: Seuss was right, but there are a couple of other Um, 380 00:23:16,680 --> 00:23:18,600 Speaker 1: there are a couple of other terms here that we 381 00:23:18,600 --> 00:23:24,840 Speaker 1: should also look at because it's, uh, it's not simply 382 00:23:24,960 --> 00:23:29,399 Speaker 1: a matter of human interaction. No, that's exactly right, because 383 00:23:29,600 --> 00:23:32,360 Speaker 1: bots are also starting to enter the pictures. So we've 384 00:23:32,400 --> 00:23:35,800 Speaker 1: got sock puppets. One guy operating thirty seven different accounts 385 00:23:35,840 --> 00:23:38,879 Speaker 1: to pervade his message. We've got meat puppets him hiring 386 00:23:38,920 --> 00:23:42,159 Speaker 1: thirty seven people to pervade his message. Then we've got bots, 387 00:23:42,240 --> 00:23:45,000 Speaker 1: which are pieces of software that do the same thing 388 00:23:45,240 --> 00:23:48,560 Speaker 1: physical robots. Yet no, they're their software. I mean, well, 389 00:23:48,640 --> 00:23:50,840 Speaker 1: if you wanted to, I guess you could really put 390 00:23:50,880 --> 00:23:54,119 Speaker 1: the time and money into making a robot that types 391 00:23:54,200 --> 00:23:57,880 Speaker 1: on the computer. But I've never heard of one like that. Now, Yeah, 392 00:23:57,960 --> 00:24:01,680 Speaker 1: these are software programs that pretend to be agents online, 393 00:24:01,720 --> 00:24:04,840 Speaker 1: but in fact they're not agents. They're just pieces of 394 00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:08,200 Speaker 1: software doing what their programmed to do. And at this point, 395 00:24:08,280 --> 00:24:12,520 Speaker 1: like the early stages of the Terminator universe, these things 396 00:24:12,680 --> 00:24:17,879 Speaker 1: are fairly easy to discern in comparison to other some 397 00:24:18,000 --> 00:24:20,359 Speaker 1: other things. Yeah, because often the bots of today are 398 00:24:20,400 --> 00:24:24,440 Speaker 1: not very interactive, and they don't offer very specially tailored messages, 399 00:24:24,480 --> 00:24:27,960 Speaker 1: Like the natural language processing is not good enough yet 400 00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:31,560 Speaker 1: that they can really engage in a substantial argument with 401 00:24:31,600 --> 00:24:34,560 Speaker 1: another comment or or react to the specifics of the 402 00:24:34,680 --> 00:24:38,840 Speaker 1: article they're commenting on. It's more just that they might 403 00:24:39,040 --> 00:24:43,480 Speaker 1: repeat the same government message over and over again verbatim, 404 00:24:43,600 --> 00:24:46,840 Speaker 1: or just retweet the same length over and over. Yeah, 405 00:24:46,880 --> 00:24:50,159 Speaker 1: this is something that Uh, I'd love for you to 406 00:24:50,200 --> 00:24:52,520 Speaker 1: try out if you get a chance. Listeners, if you 407 00:24:52,840 --> 00:24:56,800 Speaker 1: haven't heard of it yet, Uh, clever boy yet. You 408 00:24:56,840 --> 00:24:59,560 Speaker 1: guys remember clever butt. It's it's fairly old now, but 409 00:24:59,680 --> 00:25:02,399 Speaker 1: we've discussed it several times, or at least mentioned it 410 00:25:02,480 --> 00:25:05,560 Speaker 1: several times. Yeah. So if you want to see one 411 00:25:05,640 --> 00:25:10,679 Speaker 1: of the one of the public expressions of this software 412 00:25:10,720 --> 00:25:14,520 Speaker 1: for language processing, go to clever bot and have a 413 00:25:14,520 --> 00:25:17,840 Speaker 1: conversation with clever boy. You just it's like you're texting somebody. 414 00:25:18,200 --> 00:25:20,560 Speaker 1: Every time I've done it, I've ended up being in 415 00:25:20,600 --> 00:25:24,320 Speaker 1: an argument. That's ultimately because all clever bot does is 416 00:25:24,440 --> 00:25:27,280 Speaker 1: tell you things that have been said to it before. 417 00:25:27,640 --> 00:25:30,719 Speaker 1: And apparently a lot of people were just monsters when 418 00:25:30,760 --> 00:25:34,080 Speaker 1: they were talking to because I've been the nicest I 419 00:25:34,160 --> 00:25:36,680 Speaker 1: can and then I get you know, clever body is 420 00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:40,080 Speaker 1: also fond of calling you a robot. Just heads up, Well, 421 00:25:40,119 --> 00:25:44,520 Speaker 1: that's funny. I've I've heard actually that in these these 422 00:25:44,600 --> 00:25:49,359 Speaker 1: touring test situations where people so they're actually trying to 423 00:25:49,440 --> 00:25:51,639 Speaker 1: test a program to see how well it passes the 424 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:54,240 Speaker 1: Turing test, like how well a chat bot can pretend 425 00:25:54,320 --> 00:25:57,960 Speaker 1: to be a human, And sometimes they'll have humans actually 426 00:25:58,000 --> 00:26:00,440 Speaker 1: sitting in in these chats to be you know, the 427 00:26:00,680 --> 00:26:04,920 Speaker 1: control group basically to to which the AI programs are compared, 428 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:07,320 Speaker 1: you know, can you tell the difference for real and 429 00:26:07,400 --> 00:26:09,720 Speaker 1: some of the humans. I remember I've heard they said 430 00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:12,520 Speaker 1: that the easiest way to prove you're really a human 431 00:26:12,680 --> 00:26:16,360 Speaker 1: is to be very mean and sarcastic, because the robots 432 00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:22,479 Speaker 1: are not very good at doing that convincingly. Then okay, so, uh, 433 00:26:22,520 --> 00:26:24,520 Speaker 1: this is something that can give you a good sense 434 00:26:24,520 --> 00:26:28,080 Speaker 1: of where bots are now. And uh, I guess try 435 00:26:28,160 --> 00:26:32,159 Speaker 1: to uh get some sarcasm from the next flame warrior 436 00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:35,320 Speaker 1: in and that might be your tarring test. There's one 437 00:26:35,359 --> 00:26:38,840 Speaker 1: other term we should establish, Yeah, and that term is astroturfing. 438 00:26:38,920 --> 00:26:42,520 Speaker 1: You'll see this referenced online. And astroturfing is sort of 439 00:26:42,960 --> 00:26:46,399 Speaker 1: a play on the term grassroots. So the idea of 440 00:26:46,400 --> 00:26:50,320 Speaker 1: a grassroots movement is what it's like, a spontaneous upwelling 441 00:26:50,400 --> 00:26:54,399 Speaker 1: of genuine feelings of support from the public. Lots of 442 00:26:54,440 --> 00:26:57,840 Speaker 1: people in a grassroots organization kind of way come together 443 00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:00,919 Speaker 1: to support I don't know, the courney under you know, 444 00:27:01,560 --> 00:27:04,879 Speaker 1: we really care about this politician because the people. But 445 00:27:04,960 --> 00:27:09,480 Speaker 1: then you can also organize movements that are just designed 446 00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:11,879 Speaker 1: to look like that's what they are lay down some 447 00:27:11,960 --> 00:27:14,600 Speaker 1: master of surf. Right, So you you might be some 448 00:27:14,680 --> 00:27:17,960 Speaker 1: kind of corporate sponsorship group that gets a bunch of 449 00:27:17,960 --> 00:27:21,639 Speaker 1: people together that you're paying to look like they're a 450 00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:26,760 Speaker 1: crowd that has turned up in just enthusiastic, genuine support 451 00:27:26,800 --> 00:27:30,359 Speaker 1: of you. Yeah, which is uh. Edward Burne's pioneered a 452 00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:34,119 Speaker 1: lot of this stuff. Oh yeah, as you know, listeners, 453 00:27:34,920 --> 00:27:37,480 Speaker 1: as you are versed in Mr Edward Burnet's father republic 454 00:27:37,480 --> 00:27:41,919 Speaker 1: relations and propaganda, He's had his hands in this since 455 00:27:41,960 --> 00:27:45,480 Speaker 1: the beginning. And as we have seen, Mr Mr Burnet's 456 00:27:45,520 --> 00:27:48,560 Speaker 1: was very good at working with corporations and companies to 457 00:27:48,760 --> 00:27:51,320 Speaker 1: get to the what they wanted to get across across. 458 00:27:51,840 --> 00:27:54,640 Speaker 1: And we can see this isn't just governments doing this. 459 00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:59,040 Speaker 1: This is also companies corporations, and they'll do things like 460 00:27:59,480 --> 00:28:01,920 Speaker 1: kind of what we talked about earlier. They'll go, are 461 00:28:01,960 --> 00:28:05,440 Speaker 1: you are you solving a rubics cube right now? I'm 462 00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:08,680 Speaker 1: just fiddling with it. Okay, it looked more solved than 463 00:28:08,720 --> 00:28:14,760 Speaker 1: when I glanced at it earlier. That's how I fiddle productively. 464 00:28:15,840 --> 00:28:18,920 Speaker 1: But yeah, you're saying so you're saying there that you're 465 00:28:18,960 --> 00:28:24,760 Speaker 1: you're saying that these corporations will use similar tactics sock 466 00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:30,159 Speaker 1: meat puppets, astro turfing and so on and and and 467 00:28:30,240 --> 00:28:32,520 Speaker 1: to to what ends. Well, Yeah, because a lot of 468 00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:35,040 Speaker 1: what corporation, A lot of what you see on a 469 00:28:35,119 --> 00:28:39,080 Speaker 1: corporations and now are reviews, which is interesting to think about. 470 00:28:39,160 --> 00:28:41,360 Speaker 1: When I want to know about a company, I go 471 00:28:41,400 --> 00:28:43,360 Speaker 1: to Yelp. I don't know if anybody else does that, 472 00:28:43,560 --> 00:28:45,760 Speaker 1: or I go to a similar thing. Just what what 473 00:28:45,920 --> 00:28:49,080 Speaker 1: is this? Like? What is this? Yeah? Something else? I 474 00:28:49,120 --> 00:28:51,800 Speaker 1: don't go to the website because of I think now 475 00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:55,440 Speaker 1: we're all aware of what PR firms are. And anyone 476 00:28:55,440 --> 00:28:58,000 Speaker 1: who makes a website for a company, their job is 477 00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:00,600 Speaker 1: not to tell you the truth. It's them look good. 478 00:29:00,640 --> 00:29:05,080 Speaker 1: I mean exactly. Everybody understands. Yeah, I'm fighting against that. 479 00:29:05,160 --> 00:29:08,080 Speaker 1: Just side note on my uh, any of my books, 480 00:29:08,360 --> 00:29:10,920 Speaker 1: I go through and sock puppet my own reviews and 481 00:29:10,960 --> 00:29:14,280 Speaker 1: give them all like one star. Uh and like you know, 482 00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:18,560 Speaker 1: I thought this could have been better? Um, too hard 483 00:29:18,600 --> 00:29:21,520 Speaker 1: on yourself. Well you know what that means that if 484 00:29:21,560 --> 00:29:26,000 Speaker 1: there's a decent review, then it I earned that one. Anyway, 485 00:29:26,120 --> 00:29:29,280 Speaker 1: We digress, We digress. No, it's to make yourself look 486 00:29:29,320 --> 00:29:32,480 Speaker 1: like an outsider. You know, you've got you've got outsider 487 00:29:32,560 --> 00:29:34,800 Speaker 1: cred because of all these one star reviews, and they'll 488 00:29:34,840 --> 00:29:38,040 Speaker 1: be all like backhanded insults, compliments of disguise, like this 489 00:29:38,120 --> 00:29:40,600 Speaker 1: is too edgy for me. I hate and how I 490 00:29:40,600 --> 00:29:45,600 Speaker 1: couldn't put it down. But but yeah, so companies, companies 491 00:29:45,680 --> 00:29:49,120 Speaker 1: will we can't trust the uh that, we can't trust 492 00:29:49,480 --> 00:29:52,680 Speaker 1: the trumpets blown by you know, members of their own bands, 493 00:29:52,760 --> 00:29:55,280 Speaker 1: right sure? Yeah? And and if a company can effectively 494 00:29:55,320 --> 00:29:57,200 Speaker 1: make use of some of these techniques, then why the 495 00:29:57,240 --> 00:30:01,640 Speaker 1: heck would you not? Because is it illegal? Well that's 496 00:30:01,680 --> 00:30:05,400 Speaker 1: a tough question. I think there has been a mixed 497 00:30:05,440 --> 00:30:08,440 Speaker 1: case history on this. Would you agree with that, Ben, Yes, 498 00:30:08,880 --> 00:30:12,959 Speaker 1: I completely agreed, because it's hard, it's it's a actually 499 00:30:13,000 --> 00:30:18,040 Speaker 1: I completely degree because it's a matter of degree. Yeah, 500 00:30:18,360 --> 00:30:23,840 Speaker 1: there goes that. There goes that English degree. Sorry mom. Anyhow, 501 00:30:24,000 --> 00:30:28,000 Speaker 1: the in two thousand thirteen, New York Attorney General Eric T. 502 00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:33,680 Speaker 1: Schneiderman did a big takedown of all these different groups, right, 503 00:30:33,880 --> 00:30:38,880 Speaker 1: nineteen companies in general, uh in in total he called astroturfing. 504 00:30:38,960 --> 00:30:41,560 Speaker 1: He specifically took them down for that they called astroturfing. 505 00:30:41,600 --> 00:30:45,520 Speaker 1: The twenty first century version of false advertising, because these 506 00:30:45,520 --> 00:30:49,120 Speaker 1: companies were doing the following. They were offering to go 507 00:30:49,280 --> 00:30:52,000 Speaker 1: to someone's like you know, on Craigslist or something. They 508 00:30:52,040 --> 00:30:54,240 Speaker 1: want to say, We'll go to um, we'll go to 509 00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:57,080 Speaker 1: h yelp for you go to a website. We've got 510 00:30:57,120 --> 00:31:00,680 Speaker 1: these aged aged accounts that already they look like their 511 00:31:00,760 --> 00:31:03,720 Speaker 1: live person. So you're getting around the sort of smarter 512 00:31:03,840 --> 00:31:06,960 Speaker 1: countermeasures of saying like, wait a second, was this account 513 00:31:07,000 --> 00:31:09,959 Speaker 1: just created a minute ago with no picture and nothing 514 00:31:10,400 --> 00:31:14,640 Speaker 1: right this kind they also post puppies, so we know 515 00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:17,360 Speaker 1: it's got to be real. Uh. So he found that 516 00:31:17,440 --> 00:31:21,200 Speaker 1: these companies weren't just uh using their own employees to 517 00:31:21,360 --> 00:31:23,800 Speaker 1: write and post reviews. In fact, that were so successful 518 00:31:23,960 --> 00:31:29,000 Speaker 1: they were hiring freelancers from uh, from other countries to 519 00:31:29,200 --> 00:31:33,280 Speaker 1: write these reviews. So you could get um, you know, 520 00:31:33,320 --> 00:31:35,400 Speaker 1: you couldn't go too hard on the paint. You can't 521 00:31:35,400 --> 00:31:37,720 Speaker 1: all of a sudden have a hundred five star reviews 522 00:31:38,040 --> 00:31:40,600 Speaker 1: in the space of an afternoon. People will notice. You 523 00:31:40,680 --> 00:31:44,320 Speaker 1: gotta have a couple of threes, a couple of fours. Yeah, yeah, 524 00:31:44,360 --> 00:31:47,680 Speaker 1: and you've got to have a time span across this too. Uh. 525 00:31:47,720 --> 00:31:52,920 Speaker 1: This practice spread across industries, you know, retail stores, restaurants, 526 00:31:53,480 --> 00:31:55,600 Speaker 1: even video games, which I know is got to be 527 00:31:55,600 --> 00:32:00,080 Speaker 1: close to your heart. Matt, Yeah, there was, well, I 528 00:32:00,120 --> 00:32:02,360 Speaker 1: forget which one. What it was the specific example that 529 00:32:02,400 --> 00:32:06,360 Speaker 1: we went over with a video game. Oh, let's see, 530 00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:09,000 Speaker 1: there were there were some companies that got caught having 531 00:32:09,000 --> 00:32:12,440 Speaker 1: their interns right reviews, that was what it was. Electronic 532 00:32:12,680 --> 00:32:17,800 Speaker 1: Arts is notorious for being caught going into forums and 533 00:32:18,400 --> 00:32:23,560 Speaker 1: trying to change public opinion or what what form does 534 00:32:23,560 --> 00:32:26,440 Speaker 1: that take? Is it like there's a bug in this game? Actually, 535 00:32:26,440 --> 00:32:29,400 Speaker 1: it just makes the game more fun. It kind of 536 00:32:29,560 --> 00:32:32,040 Speaker 1: is like, it's very difficult to fix these problems. Guy, 537 00:32:32,360 --> 00:32:35,479 Speaker 1: isn't it funny when the quarterback has no arms? You know? 538 00:32:35,920 --> 00:32:38,880 Speaker 1: You know, because e A is one of those massive 539 00:32:39,080 --> 00:32:41,760 Speaker 1: companies now that's just been gobbling up all the other ones, 540 00:32:41,800 --> 00:32:46,040 Speaker 1: and there's a tremendous amount of animosity from grassroots gamers 541 00:32:46,560 --> 00:32:49,560 Speaker 1: against so you need to do a little less turfing 542 00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:51,440 Speaker 1: to make up for it. And I don't you know, 543 00:32:51,640 --> 00:32:53,680 Speaker 1: I'll be honest with you guys gamers right in and 544 00:32:53,760 --> 00:32:55,480 Speaker 1: let us know what you think. But I have not 545 00:32:56,240 --> 00:32:59,920 Speaker 1: I haven't really played any e A games. Oh yes, 546 00:33:00,080 --> 00:33:02,480 Speaker 1: you have. I haven't. I just don't know. Don't they 547 00:33:02,520 --> 00:33:07,520 Speaker 1: make basically all sports games? Man, just go go online, 548 00:33:07,560 --> 00:33:09,480 Speaker 1: just search e a games. I think there's a WICKI 549 00:33:09,760 --> 00:33:12,200 Speaker 1: that goes through and and shows all the ones that 550 00:33:12,200 --> 00:33:14,880 Speaker 1: they've had their hands. Did they do they own Mortal 551 00:33:15,000 --> 00:33:18,600 Speaker 1: Kombat through a claim or something? I honestly don't know. Well, 552 00:33:18,640 --> 00:33:20,920 Speaker 1: if they did, that would be one game I played, 553 00:33:20,960 --> 00:33:22,960 Speaker 1: and I'm not a huge fan of Mortal Kombat. Did 554 00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:26,080 Speaker 1: they own Shock Foo because I am a huge fan 555 00:33:26,160 --> 00:33:28,959 Speaker 1: of shack Food. Yeah, I'm sorry. I'm not the guru. 556 00:33:29,080 --> 00:33:32,000 Speaker 1: I I just I just like him a lot so well, 557 00:33:32,080 --> 00:33:35,760 Speaker 1: but I don't want to pretend like I am a 558 00:33:35,760 --> 00:33:39,320 Speaker 1: an expert. I'm not a self appointed expert. Oh I'm 559 00:33:39,360 --> 00:33:42,520 Speaker 1: glad you'm gas. You're more of a grassroots voice. That's right, 560 00:33:43,000 --> 00:33:45,240 Speaker 1: So let's get bigger too, write the internet. I love 561 00:33:45,280 --> 00:33:47,040 Speaker 1: you said that. That's a great segue. The Internet is 562 00:33:47,080 --> 00:33:50,400 Speaker 1: full of self appointed experts, so called citizens group. Bernese 563 00:33:50,440 --> 00:33:54,920 Speaker 1: was a big fan of this himself. Nonprofit advocates organizations 564 00:33:54,920 --> 00:33:59,240 Speaker 1: claiming to present a non biased, uh objective You and 565 00:33:59,320 --> 00:34:03,240 Speaker 1: you often or the phrase common sense. There are a 566 00:34:03,280 --> 00:34:07,400 Speaker 1: couple of key phrases that will be like, uh, yellow 567 00:34:07,480 --> 00:34:10,440 Speaker 1: cards are red flags to me when when someone says 568 00:34:10,560 --> 00:34:13,440 Speaker 1: a group of concerned citizens and begins naming them by 569 00:34:13,440 --> 00:34:16,960 Speaker 1: profession you know, like a group of concerned stakeholders and 570 00:34:17,000 --> 00:34:22,120 Speaker 1: citizens just like you, including property owners, uh, lumber professionals 571 00:34:22,200 --> 00:34:25,279 Speaker 1: blah blah blah, yeah, dentists. Oh it's great when they 572 00:34:25,320 --> 00:34:29,279 Speaker 1: start citing engineers and doctors as scientists. I mean, no 573 00:34:29,400 --> 00:34:33,680 Speaker 1: offense to engineers and doctors like smart people. Yeah, but 574 00:34:33,800 --> 00:34:35,920 Speaker 1: it's great when it's like you see some of these 575 00:34:36,040 --> 00:34:39,360 Speaker 1: organizations a group of scientists, they're all m d s 576 00:34:39,360 --> 00:34:44,480 Speaker 1: and engineers. Why yeah, right exactly. And so the the 577 00:34:44,480 --> 00:34:48,919 Speaker 1: internet is replete with uh, these these groups that can 578 00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:51,520 Speaker 1: be also made by lobbyists, which will get to one 579 00:34:51,520 --> 00:34:55,920 Speaker 1: of other points. Um, And they're advocating the in in 580 00:34:56,080 --> 00:34:59,480 Speaker 1: sometimes in a very secuitous way. They're advocating for their 581 00:34:59,480 --> 00:35:02,439 Speaker 1: own pol iCal agenda that sorts of laws they want 582 00:35:02,480 --> 00:35:05,360 Speaker 1: to change or policies they want to change. One of 583 00:35:05,360 --> 00:35:10,799 Speaker 1: my favorites was one called hands Off the Internet, which 584 00:35:10,880 --> 00:35:12,920 Speaker 1: was let me guess, let me guess this was against 585 00:35:12,960 --> 00:35:15,640 Speaker 1: net neutrality. Yeah, it was a well they never used 586 00:35:15,640 --> 00:35:18,160 Speaker 1: the word net neutrality on the website. This is a 587 00:35:18,160 --> 00:35:22,000 Speaker 1: group of concerned citizens who uh, you know, they were 588 00:35:22,000 --> 00:35:25,520 Speaker 1: getting they don't want Obamacare for the internet or something 589 00:35:25,600 --> 00:35:27,759 Speaker 1: like that, yeah, or they don't want you know, they 590 00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:32,280 Speaker 1: said that the uh, the internet would um, the internet 591 00:35:32,320 --> 00:35:35,399 Speaker 1: would suffer eventually if they were. There were even things 592 00:35:35,520 --> 00:35:38,880 Speaker 1: like um cities being allowed to build their own municipal 593 00:35:38,920 --> 00:35:42,080 Speaker 1: broadband like how would what a what a terrible thing? 594 00:35:42,120 --> 00:35:45,000 Speaker 1: And it was painted as this as this big government thing, 595 00:35:45,080 --> 00:35:49,560 Speaker 1: and guys, listeners, it doesn't matter what side of the 596 00:35:49,560 --> 00:35:51,920 Speaker 1: political divide you might fall on, what side of the 597 00:35:52,040 --> 00:35:55,080 Speaker 1: argument for net neutrality you would fall on, the point 598 00:35:55,120 --> 00:35:59,280 Speaker 1: is that is a disingenuous yet widespread practice for any 599 00:35:59,400 --> 00:36:03,000 Speaker 1: kind of political ideology, the left, the right, the center. 600 00:36:03,080 --> 00:36:04,759 Speaker 1: I don't know if there's a top or bottom. But 601 00:36:04,800 --> 00:36:09,400 Speaker 1: those guys too to put on this fake uh, this 602 00:36:09,480 --> 00:36:13,120 Speaker 1: fake front and pretend to be something they're not, to 603 00:36:13,239 --> 00:36:16,320 Speaker 1: trick someone through the use of buzzwords and thought terminating 604 00:36:16,360 --> 00:36:22,400 Speaker 1: cliches to support whatever X happens to be. I'm stepping 605 00:36:22,400 --> 00:36:24,160 Speaker 1: off the soapbox. I just want to say that there 606 00:36:24,280 --> 00:36:26,879 Speaker 1: is a bottom of the barrel, and this is how 607 00:36:26,880 --> 00:36:32,600 Speaker 1: you scrape it. This is how your scrape Okay, but 608 00:36:32,640 --> 00:36:35,880 Speaker 1: we should talk about some actual examples of governments being 609 00:36:35,920 --> 00:36:41,239 Speaker 1: suspected of of using sock puppetry, meat puppetry, and just 610 00:36:41,360 --> 00:36:45,480 Speaker 1: generally armies of paid online manipulators. And of course one 611 00:36:45,480 --> 00:36:48,560 Speaker 1: of the biggest examples that's been chronicled in the international 612 00:36:48,600 --> 00:36:52,880 Speaker 1: media is the Kremlin is the Russia's government, especially in 613 00:36:52,960 --> 00:36:56,080 Speaker 1: recent years. I don't know exactly how far back this 614 00:36:56,160 --> 00:36:59,200 Speaker 1: practice goes, but I have read suggestions that it goes 615 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:03,759 Speaker 1: back to the early two thousands. More recently, inen there 616 00:37:03,760 --> 00:37:07,520 Speaker 1: was a hacker group called Anonymous International, which from what 617 00:37:07,600 --> 00:37:11,239 Speaker 1: I can tell, is not actually affiliated with Anonymous, but 618 00:37:11,400 --> 00:37:15,760 Speaker 1: it's how hard to be certain. Yeah, that's a good question. Anyway, 619 00:37:15,760 --> 00:37:19,760 Speaker 1: they released this huge batch of documents that included emails 620 00:37:19,760 --> 00:37:23,800 Speaker 1: that have been stolen from people who were supposedly operating 621 00:37:24,360 --> 00:37:31,480 Speaker 1: a Kremlin funded online manipulation scam that employed perhaps thousands 622 00:37:31,520 --> 00:37:35,200 Speaker 1: of Russians. And these would be operating in multiple venues, 623 00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:39,640 Speaker 1: so you might have people leaving blog posts or sort 624 00:37:39,640 --> 00:37:43,880 Speaker 1: of like a Russian live journal, posts in Russian language blogs, 625 00:37:43,920 --> 00:37:48,399 Speaker 1: social networks, forums, social media, but then you also had 626 00:37:48,440 --> 00:37:51,880 Speaker 1: participation in English language social media, so they were jumping 627 00:37:51,880 --> 00:37:55,239 Speaker 1: into the comments sections of English language news sites like 628 00:37:55,600 --> 00:38:00,680 Speaker 1: Fox News, Huffington Post, The Blaze, Political World, that Daily 629 00:38:01,239 --> 00:38:04,480 Speaker 1: and so you might have encountered these yourself. You might 630 00:38:04,480 --> 00:38:06,400 Speaker 1: have gone into the comments section of a of a 631 00:38:06,440 --> 00:38:09,400 Speaker 1: news article in sites like this and seeing WHOA what 632 00:38:09,600 --> 00:38:13,280 Speaker 1: is all this pro putin stuff saying putin makes Obama 633 00:38:13,280 --> 00:38:16,240 Speaker 1: look weak? What? Why are there a hundred comments repeating 634 00:38:16,280 --> 00:38:19,680 Speaker 1: this message or the I believe the internet phrases what 635 00:38:19,800 --> 00:38:25,840 Speaker 1: a bouttery? Where yeah, someone says, well, you know the US, 636 00:38:26,440 --> 00:38:30,760 Speaker 1: what about the trail of tears that can crimea pales 637 00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:33,720 Speaker 1: and consideration that which is true but doesn't make either 638 00:38:33,760 --> 00:38:37,080 Speaker 1: of them, you know, uh, look any better. I'm trying 639 00:38:37,080 --> 00:38:39,080 Speaker 1: to think what's the name of that strategy and rhetoric. 640 00:38:39,120 --> 00:38:41,719 Speaker 1: I don't think it's exactly the two coke fallacy, which 641 00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:44,280 Speaker 1: is the you know, the one that says, but you're 642 00:38:44,320 --> 00:38:47,400 Speaker 1: doing something too. Yeah, well maybe it might be that 643 00:38:48,040 --> 00:38:50,960 Speaker 1: form of that. We um, we see a lot of 644 00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:56,120 Speaker 1: the same rhetorical fallacies a plot like weaponized and this stuff, 645 00:38:56,280 --> 00:39:00,120 Speaker 1: and uh, what's a good example of these comm been 646 00:39:00,120 --> 00:39:03,920 Speaker 1: seriors cycling? Sure, well, we've seen them popping up, especially 647 00:39:04,000 --> 00:39:09,600 Speaker 1: with relation to certain news events like the conflict between 648 00:39:09,680 --> 00:39:13,120 Speaker 1: Russia and the Ukraine, or after the assassination of the 649 00:39:13,160 --> 00:39:17,799 Speaker 1: Russian dissident politician and activist Boris Nipsov. So you would 650 00:39:17,840 --> 00:39:22,000 Speaker 1: see articles about these subjects, and then the floodgates would 651 00:39:22,040 --> 00:39:25,520 Speaker 1: open and these people would come in and they would 652 00:39:25,520 --> 00:39:28,400 Speaker 1: be leaving all of these pro Crimlin messages. And there 653 00:39:28,480 --> 00:39:32,399 Speaker 1: there were a couple of major investigative reports on this 654 00:39:32,520 --> 00:39:35,279 Speaker 1: that came out in the past year or two. One 655 00:39:35,320 --> 00:39:38,080 Speaker 1: of them was a big original news piece done for BuzzFeed, 656 00:39:38,120 --> 00:39:40,840 Speaker 1: and then another one, which I thought was an excellent read, 657 00:39:41,040 --> 00:39:44,160 Speaker 1: was a New York Times profile by Adrian Chin of 658 00:39:44,320 --> 00:39:47,960 Speaker 1: an agency called the Internet Research Agency, which is one 659 00:39:48,000 --> 00:39:51,960 Speaker 1: of the yeah, exactly. I think it has been since 660 00:39:52,000 --> 00:39:56,640 Speaker 1: renamed and perhaps relocated, but the Internet Research Agency is 661 00:39:56,680 --> 00:40:00,160 Speaker 1: one of the main organizations that's been called out this 662 00:40:00,280 --> 00:40:04,960 Speaker 1: Kremlin online manipulator program. And the idea is that it 663 00:40:05,040 --> 00:40:08,359 Speaker 1: has all these people who come in and, according to 664 00:40:08,400 --> 00:40:10,879 Speaker 1: the reports like the ones given in this New York 665 00:40:10,880 --> 00:40:13,680 Speaker 1: Times profile, every morning they'll sit down and they'll get 666 00:40:13,719 --> 00:40:16,600 Speaker 1: a list of themes and opinions from the higher ups, 667 00:40:16,920 --> 00:40:19,279 Speaker 1: and it's their job throughout the day and they're working 668 00:40:19,360 --> 00:40:23,719 Speaker 1: like twelve hour shifts to just slather these all over 669 00:40:23,800 --> 00:40:26,360 Speaker 1: the internet. So one former workers said they'd have to 670 00:40:26,400 --> 00:40:29,160 Speaker 1: do over a couple of shifts. They do these these 671 00:40:29,239 --> 00:40:32,400 Speaker 1: five political posts, ten non political posts, and then a 672 00:40:32,480 --> 00:40:36,520 Speaker 1: hundred and fifty to two hundred comments on other workers posts, 673 00:40:36,520 --> 00:40:42,479 Speaker 1: so creating this whole conjured up ecosystem of opinion that 674 00:40:42,920 --> 00:40:46,200 Speaker 1: is designed to look as if it's a true grassroots 675 00:40:46,239 --> 00:40:49,000 Speaker 1: movement on the Internet, but it's all just people who 676 00:40:49,040 --> 00:40:52,280 Speaker 1: get a sheet in the morning that says here's today's message. 677 00:40:54,400 --> 00:40:57,560 Speaker 1: So I've got two quick things for for this whole section. First, 678 00:40:57,640 --> 00:41:00,480 Speaker 1: the thing that interests me is the schedule ual that 679 00:41:00,520 --> 00:41:03,000 Speaker 1: they would keep. It was, I believe in the article 680 00:41:03,080 --> 00:41:05,560 Speaker 1: that said to twelve hour days in a row. The 681 00:41:05,920 --> 00:41:08,760 Speaker 1: one main former employee they talked to had this schedule. 682 00:41:08,800 --> 00:41:10,719 Speaker 1: I don't know if this is every employee, but it 683 00:41:10,800 --> 00:41:13,480 Speaker 1: seems like this was a common thing so to to 684 00:41:13,920 --> 00:41:17,080 Speaker 1: well for in this one instance, at least to twelve 685 00:41:17,400 --> 00:41:20,480 Speaker 1: hour days in a row where you're just inundating the 686 00:41:20,520 --> 00:41:22,920 Speaker 1: internet and with all of your stuff, and you get 687 00:41:22,920 --> 00:41:25,080 Speaker 1: two days off and then you get back in there. 688 00:41:25,080 --> 00:41:26,680 Speaker 1: And I was just trying to imagine how they would 689 00:41:26,719 --> 00:41:29,800 Speaker 1: stagger employees in order to just have a constant stream. 690 00:41:30,040 --> 00:41:32,920 Speaker 1: You might also be able to schedule a post. You 691 00:41:32,920 --> 00:41:36,000 Speaker 1: could schedule those days off even Yeah, that's a good 692 00:41:36,040 --> 00:41:38,839 Speaker 1: question to schedule. How do you do that? I don't 693 00:41:38,880 --> 00:41:40,279 Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't want to be in charge 694 00:41:40,280 --> 00:41:45,680 Speaker 1: of that Internet research agency. Feel free to write us. Yeah, 695 00:41:45,719 --> 00:41:49,200 Speaker 1: well that that's entirely a possibility, because they have gone 696 00:41:49,239 --> 00:41:52,799 Speaker 1: after people for talking about them before, allegedly. I mean, 697 00:41:53,719 --> 00:41:57,840 Speaker 1: we're talking, but this is all in the interest of 698 00:41:57,920 --> 00:42:00,359 Speaker 1: hearing more information, you know, I want to I want 699 00:42:00,360 --> 00:42:02,640 Speaker 1: to hear your side of the story. So feel free 700 00:42:02,680 --> 00:42:04,920 Speaker 1: to uh, feel free to write to me, yeah, right 701 00:42:04,960 --> 00:42:09,359 Speaker 1: to Ben do it yea or email me at uh 702 00:42:10,040 --> 00:42:15,440 Speaker 1: Jonathan dot Strickland. No. Uh so that's that's uh one 703 00:42:15,480 --> 00:42:17,600 Speaker 1: of our friends coast. You've heard them on tech stuff 704 00:42:17,760 --> 00:42:20,080 Speaker 1: and stuff that'll want you to know before. But uh, 705 00:42:20,600 --> 00:42:22,920 Speaker 1: what I love, I love the name of this thing 706 00:42:23,000 --> 00:42:26,600 Speaker 1: or what these have been. Yeah, one particular subset of these. 707 00:42:26,600 --> 00:42:29,640 Speaker 1: So this is from that that BuzzFeed original report I mentioned. 708 00:42:29,719 --> 00:42:33,759 Speaker 1: They said that the Russian media analyst Vasily Gatov had 709 00:42:33,800 --> 00:42:38,520 Speaker 1: a name for these accounts that suspiciously sometimes lack photos, 710 00:42:38,960 --> 00:42:42,920 Speaker 1: lack biographical information in the account profiles and lack of 711 00:42:43,040 --> 00:42:48,279 Speaker 1: posting history. And Ghatov would apparently call those dead souls, 712 00:42:48,600 --> 00:42:51,319 Speaker 1: which I don't know you met, but reminds me of 713 00:42:51,719 --> 00:42:55,000 Speaker 1: one of our philso dark and twisted. Say this, but 714 00:42:55,239 --> 00:43:00,359 Speaker 1: one of our favorite names for any Russian project. Oh, 715 00:43:00,520 --> 00:43:03,080 Speaker 1: the dead hand, or wait, what do we call it? 716 00:43:03,800 --> 00:43:07,120 Speaker 1: The dead hand? The perimeter system? Yeah, the failed deadly device. 717 00:43:07,239 --> 00:43:10,520 Speaker 1: We called it something else earlier on and then we 718 00:43:10,560 --> 00:43:13,040 Speaker 1: cut it out of the video. Oh, I can't remember what, 719 00:43:13,600 --> 00:43:17,520 Speaker 1: but dead dead hand, you know, the the counteract, the counteract, 720 00:43:17,600 --> 00:43:20,400 Speaker 1: the counter the counter Yeah, it's a system. What was 721 00:43:20,440 --> 00:43:25,320 Speaker 1: it designed so that if, like if intercontinental ballistic missiles 722 00:43:25,320 --> 00:43:28,320 Speaker 1: took out all of the command centers in the Soviet Union, 723 00:43:28,360 --> 00:43:32,759 Speaker 1: the system could still automatically respond with the deadly barrage. Yes, 724 00:43:33,000 --> 00:43:36,880 Speaker 1: and an indiscriminate one. This would be a It's interesting 725 00:43:36,880 --> 00:43:40,560 Speaker 1: because it's designed to function after there's no continuity of government. 726 00:43:40,760 --> 00:43:43,879 Speaker 1: Now then this also, of course is a different issue. 727 00:43:43,920 --> 00:43:47,000 Speaker 1: But a lot of countries that have that have nuclear 728 00:43:47,000 --> 00:43:50,719 Speaker 1: weapons have either a policy or an actual mechanism in 729 00:43:50,760 --> 00:43:53,000 Speaker 1: place like this. The U s h. You know, I 730 00:43:53,239 --> 00:43:55,800 Speaker 1: can't remember what it's called. Maybe it'll be called Project 731 00:43:55,880 --> 00:43:57,960 Speaker 1: High five or something. You know, it just is a 732 00:43:58,120 --> 00:44:02,760 Speaker 1: very different cultures. But but uh, this this is not listeners. 733 00:44:02,840 --> 00:44:08,080 Speaker 1: This is not meant to pick on Russia. Russia. Yeah, no, 734 00:44:08,120 --> 00:44:10,320 Speaker 1: no at all. And just like we said that it 735 00:44:10,400 --> 00:44:14,440 Speaker 1: might be in a company's best interest. Sometimes a country 736 00:44:14,640 --> 00:44:18,560 Speaker 1: is an entity and international affairs there is no such 737 00:44:18,640 --> 00:44:25,080 Speaker 1: thing really, as all truism um ethics fall beneath the 738 00:44:25,120 --> 00:44:28,759 Speaker 1: heel of real politic. So this is another tool that 739 00:44:28,840 --> 00:44:32,640 Speaker 1: countries can use to their advantage. China, Israel, the US, 740 00:44:33,000 --> 00:44:36,560 Speaker 1: other countries have these things, and and and Britain to 741 00:44:36,800 --> 00:44:39,600 Speaker 1: or excuse me, the United Kingdom. China has a massive 742 00:44:39,680 --> 00:44:42,520 Speaker 1: army to In fact, one is called the Waker Army, 743 00:44:42,680 --> 00:44:46,840 Speaker 1: and that is a private group functioning to propagate Chinese 744 00:44:47,080 --> 00:44:50,600 Speaker 1: um official views, right, the views of official them where 745 00:44:50,640 --> 00:44:53,320 Speaker 1: the fifty cent army no relation to the m C. 746 00:44:54,040 --> 00:44:58,120 Speaker 1: The PRC is very open about this practice, right, They 747 00:44:58,160 --> 00:45:01,920 Speaker 1: have a certified training courses for the Internet users. They're 748 00:45:01,960 --> 00:45:05,279 Speaker 1: pretty open about wanting to train large numbers of people 749 00:45:05,320 --> 00:45:08,319 Speaker 1: to massage public opinion. It's a little bit different though. 750 00:45:08,480 --> 00:45:12,680 Speaker 1: This was different to me because it seems very inward focused. Yeah, yeah, 751 00:45:12,800 --> 00:45:16,560 Speaker 1: going to quell the opinions of people inside China about 752 00:45:16,640 --> 00:45:21,360 Speaker 1: the party. Right, Domestic unrest, you know, Uh, domestic unrest 753 00:45:21,560 --> 00:45:26,000 Speaker 1: uh is something that is often combated or UM I guess, 754 00:45:26,040 --> 00:45:31,359 Speaker 1: counteracted through the rise of nationalism in other countries. So 755 00:45:31,600 --> 00:45:33,440 Speaker 1: you can see a lot of countries that are are 756 00:45:33,560 --> 00:45:36,840 Speaker 1: very troubled have a lot of time invested by authority 757 00:45:36,880 --> 00:45:43,840 Speaker 1: figures in UM fomenting aggressive nationalism. Right, and uh, this 758 00:45:43,840 --> 00:45:46,840 Speaker 1: this is something that happens here. This is also compounded 759 00:45:46,840 --> 00:45:50,759 Speaker 1: with a September to two thousand and thirteen law. I 760 00:45:50,760 --> 00:45:53,280 Speaker 1: think I wrote twenty one oh three here two thousand 761 00:45:53,320 --> 00:45:59,480 Speaker 1: thirteen law banning rumor mongering online rumor mongering? Right, what 762 00:45:59,560 --> 00:46:04,879 Speaker 1: are you jail for? Among? Uh? But this uh, this 763 00:46:04,960 --> 00:46:08,920 Speaker 1: shows that there's a move towards containing this um, containing 764 00:46:08,920 --> 00:46:11,640 Speaker 1: this domestic problem. But of course this also, just like 765 00:46:11,680 --> 00:46:15,800 Speaker 1: in the case Russia, translates into English language, uh, English 766 00:46:15,880 --> 00:46:19,440 Speaker 1: language forms English language social media where people are saying 767 00:46:19,880 --> 00:46:24,000 Speaker 1: what what what do you guys expect Chining to do? 768 00:46:24,040 --> 00:46:26,600 Speaker 1: It has a right to the sovereignty over the South 769 00:46:26,719 --> 00:46:29,200 Speaker 1: China Sea or something like that. Right, you know, I 770 00:46:29,280 --> 00:46:32,279 Speaker 1: wonder if we one day will encounter a future where 771 00:46:32,320 --> 00:46:36,520 Speaker 1: all of this leaves social media and forums and comments sections. 772 00:46:36,560 --> 00:46:38,960 Speaker 1: So it's not on your Twitter feed, it's not in 773 00:46:39,000 --> 00:46:41,840 Speaker 1: the common section below the news article. But it's all 774 00:46:41,920 --> 00:46:49,840 Speaker 1: relegated to Wikipedia edit wars. It's just these governments employing 775 00:46:49,960 --> 00:46:53,600 Speaker 1: thousands of people to edit the Wikipedia pages for themselves, 776 00:46:53,600 --> 00:46:57,160 Speaker 1: their allies, and their enemies abroad. You know, Joe Matt No, 777 00:46:57,560 --> 00:47:01,040 Speaker 1: I have a few Wikipedia pages that I check in 778 00:47:01,080 --> 00:47:04,360 Speaker 1: with about one month just to read the talk section. 779 00:47:06,560 --> 00:47:09,040 Speaker 1: Oh we don't have the Wikipedia yet, guys, I have 780 00:47:09,160 --> 00:47:12,120 Speaker 1: to share with you my favorite page on all of 781 00:47:12,160 --> 00:47:17,200 Speaker 1: the web. Yeah it is, you know, it is the 782 00:47:17,200 --> 00:47:21,400 Speaker 1: Wiki page. It is the Wicky talk page for time 783 00:47:21,440 --> 00:47:26,000 Speaker 1: Cube related edits to the article Greenwich Mean Time. So 784 00:47:26,040 --> 00:47:29,480 Speaker 1: it's this long, wonderful chronicle of one person who I 785 00:47:29,520 --> 00:47:32,279 Speaker 1: think at some point creates sock puppet accounts to keep 786 00:47:32,320 --> 00:47:36,959 Speaker 1: making edits. But anyway, they there is this person who 787 00:47:37,000 --> 00:47:39,600 Speaker 1: wants to add a subsection to the page on Greenwich 788 00:47:39,680 --> 00:47:46,080 Speaker 1: Mean Time to discuss time cube related criticisms of GMT. Finally, 789 00:47:46,760 --> 00:47:50,200 Speaker 1: the truth is there. The truth is out there. Includes 790 00:47:50,440 --> 00:47:53,279 Speaker 1: it's got this thing that I that I quote sometimes 791 00:47:53,360 --> 00:47:56,680 Speaker 1: it says, uh, the person who keeps making the time 792 00:47:56,760 --> 00:47:59,200 Speaker 1: cube edits at some point says you know some of 793 00:47:59,200 --> 00:48:01,439 Speaker 1: the time cube of brush. It's like Earth has four 794 00:48:01,480 --> 00:48:05,160 Speaker 1: corner day, rotating through four corners in twenty four hour period. 795 00:48:05,480 --> 00:48:09,880 Speaker 1: And then the ending is the punctuation disprove or accept? 796 00:48:12,000 --> 00:48:14,600 Speaker 1: I love it. It should be noted the creator of 797 00:48:14,600 --> 00:48:18,160 Speaker 1: the time cube is a native English speaker, is he not? Yes, 798 00:48:18,320 --> 00:48:20,600 Speaker 1: I don't think it was this guy personally. No, I 799 00:48:20,600 --> 00:48:24,280 Speaker 1: think it could. That's what it's an advocate or a follower. 800 00:48:25,000 --> 00:48:27,080 Speaker 1: And he spoke at Georgia Tech a few years ago, 801 00:48:27,200 --> 00:48:29,759 Speaker 1: didn't he? Or is it yeah, a few years ago? 802 00:48:29,960 --> 00:48:33,359 Speaker 1: And uh, you can check out the timecube website if 803 00:48:33,400 --> 00:48:35,600 Speaker 1: you wish. We talked about it off air before, but 804 00:48:36,040 --> 00:48:40,560 Speaker 1: I would say if you before you visited, block off 805 00:48:40,640 --> 00:48:43,719 Speaker 1: some time and just prepare yourself. You have a couple 806 00:48:43,719 --> 00:48:46,600 Speaker 1: of coffee beside you, maybe a beer if you drink. 807 00:48:46,880 --> 00:48:49,640 Speaker 1: Not to be a downer. It's not all just sweet crankery. 808 00:48:49,840 --> 00:48:54,080 Speaker 1: Sometimes there's some kind of mean racist stuff on. There's 809 00:48:54,120 --> 00:48:57,800 Speaker 1: some sexist stuff. It really depends because the guy who 810 00:48:58,239 --> 00:49:00,120 Speaker 1: was updating it, at least when I was read it, 811 00:49:00,400 --> 00:49:04,200 Speaker 1: would just go in whenever I guess the spirit moved him. Uh. 812 00:49:04,400 --> 00:49:09,160 Speaker 1: So like like China. Um, you know, Israel also takes 813 00:49:09,160 --> 00:49:13,279 Speaker 1: an active and relatively non secretive role in attempting to 814 00:49:13,320 --> 00:49:17,880 Speaker 1: sway public opinion online. Uh. This, this policy of image 815 00:49:17,920 --> 00:49:24,719 Speaker 1: building overseas is not necessarily dependent upon paid advocates. Uh. 816 00:49:24,760 --> 00:49:28,040 Speaker 1: There's a really interesting thing that happens with a software 817 00:49:28,080 --> 00:49:32,719 Speaker 1: program called megaphone, right, and megaphone would uh, megaphone would 818 00:49:32,760 --> 00:49:36,759 Speaker 1: sort of crowdsource what is called the brigading and it's 819 00:49:37,120 --> 00:49:40,120 Speaker 1: it's been characterized, UM, it has you know, it has 820 00:49:40,239 --> 00:49:44,080 Speaker 1: been supported by officials in the government of the country, 821 00:49:44,320 --> 00:49:49,160 Speaker 1: and it's been characterized not as crafting propaganda at as 822 00:49:49,200 --> 00:49:54,360 Speaker 1: so much as combating what they see as uh anti 823 00:49:54,600 --> 00:49:58,080 Speaker 1: Israel attitudes. Is the phrase that I believe they use. 824 00:49:58,320 --> 00:50:01,240 Speaker 1: While I hear what they're saying, it's sounds like cleverly 825 00:50:01,280 --> 00:50:04,920 Speaker 1: crafted propaganda. Right, Yeah, I know what you mean. Yeah. 826 00:50:05,000 --> 00:50:10,080 Speaker 1: And uh and this uh the software using their um 827 00:50:10,120 --> 00:50:15,120 Speaker 1: the software there is while it is um or it was, 828 00:50:15,200 --> 00:50:17,480 Speaker 1: I don't know if it's still being used, but I 829 00:50:17,760 --> 00:50:20,480 Speaker 1: can't imagine why why the governmentill quit using that or 830 00:50:20,480 --> 00:50:24,880 Speaker 1: why these organizations would using it. But the software there 831 00:50:25,000 --> 00:50:29,560 Speaker 1: is not unique. If we go over to the United Kingdom. 832 00:50:29,640 --> 00:50:32,600 Speaker 1: That will find the Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group or 833 00:50:32,719 --> 00:50:35,840 Speaker 1: j TRICK, which totally sounds like a street name. Uh. 834 00:50:35,960 --> 00:50:39,200 Speaker 1: They used, they used some weaponized stuff. They have fake 835 00:50:39,280 --> 00:50:44,320 Speaker 1: victim blog post, honey traps, targeting activists, monitoring wiki leaks, 836 00:50:44,360 --> 00:50:48,400 Speaker 1: spying on YouTube or Facebook users. So be very careful 837 00:50:48,440 --> 00:50:51,200 Speaker 1: when you click, like on that next working video. Now 838 00:50:51,200 --> 00:50:54,440 Speaker 1: when it says spying on YouTube users, is that just 839 00:50:54,480 --> 00:50:57,440 Speaker 1: looking at activity? That's all it is, right, It's not 840 00:50:57,520 --> 00:51:02,439 Speaker 1: looking through the camera back at the YouTuber. Right. Well, 841 00:51:02,520 --> 00:51:05,479 Speaker 1: that is that is probably possible because there are also 842 00:51:05,560 --> 00:51:08,839 Speaker 1: more aggressive techniques that j TRICK is capable of, such 843 00:51:08,880 --> 00:51:12,120 Speaker 1: as changing the outcome online polls, oh and the other. 844 00:51:12,239 --> 00:51:14,040 Speaker 1: A lot of that software that we talked about, even 845 00:51:14,040 --> 00:51:18,440 Speaker 1: the crowdsourcing stuff is oriented towards uh, ballot stuffing, you know, 846 00:51:19,040 --> 00:51:22,160 Speaker 1: online poll they're asking an opinion. Uh. And then j 847 00:51:22,280 --> 00:51:26,960 Speaker 1: TRECK can also impersonate a user. So take take one 848 00:51:26,960 --> 00:51:30,200 Speaker 1: of our online accounts and then transform it. But I 849 00:51:30,520 --> 00:51:33,719 Speaker 1: say all this just to say that one one thing 850 00:51:33,719 --> 00:51:37,200 Speaker 1: that we can talk about is that the tactics of 851 00:51:37,320 --> 00:51:41,640 Speaker 1: these accounts are evolving. You know, they are the tactics 852 00:51:41,719 --> 00:51:47,400 Speaker 1: of these online manipulators. And we're seeing that as the 853 00:51:47,520 --> 00:51:51,040 Speaker 1: cost of information continues to lower, the cost of communication 854 00:51:51,200 --> 00:51:55,560 Speaker 1: rather continues to lower propaganda and censorship, which used to 855 00:51:55,640 --> 00:52:00,279 Speaker 1: depend upon the UM. I guess, the compartmentalization in or 856 00:52:00,280 --> 00:52:03,719 Speaker 1: the removal or emission of information, now thrives in the 857 00:52:03,800 --> 00:52:07,160 Speaker 1: idea of inundating it, surrounding it with a bunch of garbage, 858 00:52:07,160 --> 00:52:10,480 Speaker 1: and and putting a haystack on the needle, in other words. 859 00:52:10,880 --> 00:52:15,360 Speaker 1: And so with this we see that um quantity becomes 860 00:52:15,360 --> 00:52:18,920 Speaker 1: a quality all its own, and with all of the 861 00:52:18,920 --> 00:52:27,080 Speaker 1: information out there, people are less and less attractive as 862 00:52:27,320 --> 00:52:32,439 Speaker 1: online manipulators. The future, we would say, oh, and of course, sorry, 863 00:52:32,520 --> 00:52:34,360 Speaker 1: I forgot to mention. Let me just go ahead and 864 00:52:34,360 --> 00:52:36,520 Speaker 1: say this to everywhere and write in the email. Yes, 865 00:52:36,600 --> 00:52:42,719 Speaker 1: the us IS has intensely researched software software to manipulate 866 00:52:43,000 --> 00:52:47,320 Speaker 1: public opinion online. But I believe they have. They invested 867 00:52:47,360 --> 00:52:50,640 Speaker 1: in software that allows like a single person to operate 868 00:52:50,719 --> 00:52:53,920 Speaker 1: multiple different types of accounts to comment on things without 869 00:52:53,960 --> 00:52:57,560 Speaker 1: being detected for doing so. Yes, Yes, and that software 870 00:52:57,880 --> 00:53:02,520 Speaker 1: was purchased from a private company called Intrepid. And what 871 00:53:02,560 --> 00:53:05,319 Speaker 1: we're seeing then is as humans are more and more 872 00:53:05,600 --> 00:53:08,840 Speaker 1: admin positions rather than the infantry on the ground and 873 00:53:08,880 --> 00:53:13,560 Speaker 1: the ongoing flame wars and cyber wars. Ladies, gentlemen, and 874 00:53:14,080 --> 00:53:18,120 Speaker 1: any software listening to the podcast. Now we are entering 875 00:53:18,120 --> 00:53:21,240 Speaker 1: the age of the bots, right, I think it's pretty 876 00:53:21,320 --> 00:53:25,600 Speaker 1: decisively clear that the future of online manipulation is bots. 877 00:53:26,760 --> 00:53:30,200 Speaker 1: Bots are already being used in online manipulation today, and 878 00:53:30,239 --> 00:53:33,760 Speaker 1: I think they're only going to continue to replace human users, 879 00:53:34,880 --> 00:53:37,879 Speaker 1: especially because human users come with a lot of problems. Right. 880 00:53:37,920 --> 00:53:40,480 Speaker 1: I covered these in the video, but just to go 881 00:53:40,520 --> 00:53:43,680 Speaker 1: over them again. They're expensive, like you actually have to 882 00:53:43,719 --> 00:53:47,360 Speaker 1: pay them. Uh, depending on where it's being done. I 883 00:53:47,360 --> 00:53:49,239 Speaker 1: mean some you might have not have to pay as 884 00:53:49,320 --> 00:53:51,880 Speaker 1: much as others. But in the New York Times profile 885 00:53:51,960 --> 00:53:54,719 Speaker 1: of the Internet Research Agency, the former employee that they 886 00:53:54,719 --> 00:53:56,919 Speaker 1: talked to the most claims that when she was there, 887 00:53:57,280 --> 00:54:00,480 Speaker 1: she was paid forty one thousand rubles a month. They say, 888 00:54:00,520 --> 00:54:03,920 Speaker 1: is about equivalent to the salary of a tenured university professor. 889 00:54:04,760 --> 00:54:09,720 Speaker 1: Yeah that's what. Yeah, to to leave comments and blog 890 00:54:09,880 --> 00:54:13,360 Speaker 1: blog posts that you know that slam the leadership of Ukraine, 891 00:54:13,400 --> 00:54:20,480 Speaker 1: but it's for national security security there. Yeah. Another problem 892 00:54:20,600 --> 00:54:23,320 Speaker 1: is they don't always keep secrets. I mean, you've noticed 893 00:54:23,320 --> 00:54:25,960 Speaker 1: several times we've talked about these news articles they come 894 00:54:26,000 --> 00:54:29,560 Speaker 1: from like former employees leaking information about what they did 895 00:54:29,560 --> 00:54:33,000 Speaker 1: while they were at these organizations. So you can try 896 00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:35,200 Speaker 1: to make a human employee keep their mouth shut, you 897 00:54:35,200 --> 00:54:37,120 Speaker 1: can get them to sign an n d A, you 898 00:54:37,160 --> 00:54:39,759 Speaker 1: can threaten them if they leak information, but still leaks 899 00:54:39,800 --> 00:54:42,680 Speaker 1: are gonna happen. They're just gonna share information. That's sort 900 00:54:42,680 --> 00:54:45,640 Speaker 1: of the nature of humans. We don't keep secrets. Bots 901 00:54:45,719 --> 00:54:50,279 Speaker 1: keep secrets great, they're so good at it. Uh. Then 902 00:54:50,320 --> 00:54:53,839 Speaker 1: there's the other problem, which is that lots of these 903 00:54:53,840 --> 00:54:57,400 Speaker 1: people whose job it is to leave comments are not 904 00:54:57,600 --> 00:55:00,360 Speaker 1: very good writers. Do we have some examples? Yes, we 905 00:55:00,440 --> 00:55:03,920 Speaker 1: have one from that original BuzzFeed article that you've referenced 906 00:55:03,920 --> 00:55:07,440 Speaker 1: several times. Uh. I guess we'll just get into it. 907 00:55:07,960 --> 00:55:10,799 Speaker 1: I think the whole world is realizing what will be 908 00:55:10,840 --> 00:55:14,719 Speaker 1: with Ukraine, and only us keep on around because of 909 00:55:14,760 --> 00:55:19,319 Speaker 1: their great plans are doomed to failure. You know that 910 00:55:19,400 --> 00:55:23,959 Speaker 1: might serve one of the potential purposes of these online manipulators, 911 00:55:23,960 --> 00:55:26,960 Speaker 1: which is if you're just trying to pollute these forums 912 00:55:27,000 --> 00:55:30,760 Speaker 1: with lots of sort of annoying messages and drive people 913 00:55:30,800 --> 00:55:33,560 Speaker 1: away by by stinking up the place. That might do 914 00:55:33,600 --> 00:55:37,080 Speaker 1: the job. But if you're trying to disseminate the message 915 00:55:37,120 --> 00:55:40,839 Speaker 1: that your leadership wants people to believe, that's not gonna 916 00:55:40,880 --> 00:55:43,640 Speaker 1: cut it. No, that's not gonna cut it. Although I can, 917 00:55:43,800 --> 00:55:48,200 Speaker 1: I can immediately, I can, I can immediately see other 918 00:55:48,360 --> 00:55:52,319 Speaker 1: other people sincerely liking that comment for one reason or another, 919 00:55:52,360 --> 00:55:57,880 Speaker 1: because because it's funny. Yeah, but well and just really fascinating. 920 00:55:57,960 --> 00:56:00,879 Speaker 1: I can imagine this is it gets a little bit 921 00:56:01,200 --> 00:56:03,880 Speaker 1: hazy for me, because I can imagine that being a 922 00:56:03,880 --> 00:56:07,759 Speaker 1: real comment of someone trying to write something in English 923 00:56:08,160 --> 00:56:11,120 Speaker 1: who does not speak English, maybe even at all. But 924 00:56:11,480 --> 00:56:14,399 Speaker 1: in some of these English examples, it's clear that they're 925 00:56:14,440 --> 00:56:17,799 Speaker 1: trying to make it look as if the commenter is 926 00:56:17,840 --> 00:56:21,719 Speaker 1: an American. Hang on this, like this is coming from 927 00:56:21,760 --> 00:56:27,200 Speaker 1: you Americans, it's one of your own and and this happens. 928 00:56:27,360 --> 00:56:29,000 Speaker 1: I don't know if that's the case in that one 929 00:56:29,040 --> 00:56:31,600 Speaker 1: example you read, but this happens a lot in the U. 930 00:56:31,760 --> 00:56:34,759 Speaker 1: S too. I mean, you know, you can see. One 931 00:56:34,800 --> 00:56:37,239 Speaker 1: thing that we do know, especially about the States, is 932 00:56:37,280 --> 00:56:41,480 Speaker 1: that quite a few people here do not speak a 933 00:56:41,600 --> 00:56:44,040 Speaker 1: foreign language. So it can be difficult to find people 934 00:56:44,080 --> 00:56:47,920 Speaker 1: doing that. So just imagine all the Mandarin language forms, 935 00:56:48,000 --> 00:56:52,360 Speaker 1: Russian language forms that are replete with poorly worded Russian 936 00:56:53,120 --> 00:56:58,160 Speaker 1: and you know, maybe maybe even accidental euphemisms, which hilarious. Right, 937 00:56:58,239 --> 00:57:01,400 Speaker 1: So yeah, we could have we could have US government 938 00:57:01,560 --> 00:57:05,399 Speaker 1: operatives leaving the the equivalent comments on sections all over 939 00:57:05,520 --> 00:57:09,040 Speaker 1: in all different kinds of language based groups around the world. 940 00:57:09,880 --> 00:57:13,520 Speaker 1: But bots could potentially solve this problem because if you can, 941 00:57:13,600 --> 00:57:16,320 Speaker 1: all you need to do to get a bot that 942 00:57:16,400 --> 00:57:18,920 Speaker 1: speaks a language pretty well is to come up with 943 00:57:18,920 --> 00:57:21,480 Speaker 1: it once. Then then you can get that one bot 944 00:57:21,560 --> 00:57:23,880 Speaker 1: to do the job over and over again. It's a 945 00:57:23,960 --> 00:57:27,680 Speaker 1: pretty it's a pretty heavy initial investment, and it requires 946 00:57:27,680 --> 00:57:30,240 Speaker 1: some stuff that frankly we don't even always know how 947 00:57:30,280 --> 00:57:32,120 Speaker 1: to do all that well yet, like different types of 948 00:57:32,200 --> 00:57:35,880 Speaker 1: artificial intelligence, natural language processing. I mean, depending on how 949 00:57:35,920 --> 00:57:39,000 Speaker 1: interactive you want it to be. You could with today's 950 00:57:39,080 --> 00:57:42,960 Speaker 1: AI just easily have a bot go spam comments sections 951 00:57:43,040 --> 00:57:44,960 Speaker 1: with the same message as over and over. If you 952 00:57:45,000 --> 00:57:47,240 Speaker 1: wanted to be able to really interact with people in 953 00:57:47,240 --> 00:57:50,040 Speaker 1: a convincing way, we would need better AI than we have. 954 00:57:50,680 --> 00:57:54,240 Speaker 1: Uh yeah, like the the south Pole bot that I 955 00:57:54,320 --> 00:57:56,760 Speaker 1: built that just goes into places and go south Pole 956 00:57:56,800 --> 00:58:01,440 Speaker 1: equals best poll little. Uh, it's pretty yeah, it's pretty popular. 957 00:58:01,480 --> 00:58:04,880 Speaker 1: It's ready karma is off the chain. But but the 958 00:58:04,480 --> 00:58:06,880 Speaker 1: m I see the point you're saying, So how far 959 00:58:07,000 --> 00:58:11,600 Speaker 1: along are we in this? In this future of bots? Right? Oh? 960 00:58:11,680 --> 00:58:14,680 Speaker 1: I mean I think I think the bot takeover of 961 00:58:14,720 --> 00:58:19,320 Speaker 1: the online manipulation game is extremely close. It's already we 962 00:58:19,360 --> 00:58:21,800 Speaker 1: already see plenty of bots. If we're going to refer 963 00:58:21,840 --> 00:58:25,400 Speaker 1: to the example of Russia's social media manipulation manipulators again. 964 00:58:25,800 --> 00:58:28,360 Speaker 1: There is an article I read by an internet analyst 965 00:58:28,440 --> 00:58:31,680 Speaker 1: named Lawrence Alexander for the UH. It's it's a blog 966 00:58:31,720 --> 00:58:35,320 Speaker 1: called Global Voices Online. It comes from April and he 967 00:58:35,400 --> 00:58:39,000 Speaker 1: claims that he used these open source social media analysis 968 00:58:39,040 --> 00:58:43,640 Speaker 1: tools to determine that a lot of the Twitter accounts 969 00:58:43,680 --> 00:58:46,760 Speaker 1: that are tweeting these pro Kremlin messages over and over 970 00:58:46,880 --> 00:58:50,800 Speaker 1: are in fact bots according to his analysis. He he said, I, 971 00:58:50,880 --> 00:58:53,120 Speaker 1: you know, I've narrowed it down and I'm pretty sure 972 00:58:53,120 --> 00:58:55,600 Speaker 1: I've you know, identified like it was something like twenty 973 00:58:55,680 --> 00:59:00,400 Speaker 1: thousand pro Kremlin bought Twitter accounts that are just tweeting 974 00:59:00,440 --> 00:59:02,280 Speaker 1: the same things. You could look at it as a 975 00:59:02,320 --> 00:59:06,720 Speaker 1: bad investment because they're not really reaching many people outside 976 00:59:06,720 --> 00:59:09,920 Speaker 1: of their own little networks of bots talking to bots. 977 00:59:10,320 --> 00:59:13,640 Speaker 1: Then again, you could also say that, well, they're they're 978 00:59:13,680 --> 00:59:17,280 Speaker 1: sort of changing the conversation from a macroscopic view, Like 979 00:59:17,320 --> 00:59:20,120 Speaker 1: if you want to look at trending topics on Twitter 980 00:59:20,720 --> 00:59:23,560 Speaker 1: or use the Twitter search function, these bots are going 981 00:59:23,600 --> 00:59:28,840 Speaker 1: to be effectively polluting certain hashtags and topics with their message. 982 00:59:29,000 --> 00:59:33,560 Speaker 1: Well there's uh so, so let's talk in like absolute numbers, 983 00:59:33,680 --> 00:59:37,840 Speaker 1: because I can see them changing the macroscopic view on Twitter. Um, 984 00:59:38,040 --> 00:59:41,400 Speaker 1: but if is there a guess we could make about 985 00:59:41,920 --> 00:59:45,320 Speaker 1: the human human to bot ratio, Well, not so much. 986 00:59:45,840 --> 00:59:47,360 Speaker 1: I don't know if we have an answer for that 987 00:59:47,400 --> 00:59:50,000 Speaker 1: on social media and places where people are leaving comments. 988 00:59:50,000 --> 00:59:52,520 Speaker 1: But on the web as a whole, there was this 989 00:59:52,680 --> 00:59:56,680 Speaker 1: startling fact we learned from a the web company in Capsula, 990 00:59:56,720 --> 01:00:01,840 Speaker 1: and they carried out a study where they eventually estimated 991 01:00:02,240 --> 01:00:06,520 Speaker 1: that sixty one point five percent this is now sixty 992 01:00:06,560 --> 01:00:10,080 Speaker 1: one five percent of all traffic on the web is 993 01:00:10,120 --> 01:00:14,160 Speaker 1: bought traffic. What so, only thirty eight point five percent 994 01:00:15,080 --> 01:00:20,040 Speaker 1: of the agents visiting websites are human beings according to them. So, 995 01:00:20,600 --> 01:00:25,560 Speaker 1: and this was so listeners yeah, and it's we record 996 01:00:25,600 --> 01:00:29,960 Speaker 1: this now listeners that Joe, do you know what this means? 997 01:00:30,880 --> 01:00:35,840 Speaker 1: We're the minority on the web? We are so now 998 01:00:35,880 --> 01:00:38,439 Speaker 1: I now, I don't sorry, I hate to because it's fine. 999 01:00:38,440 --> 01:00:40,840 Speaker 1: I don't think that's necessarily true on like social media, 1000 01:00:42,040 --> 01:00:44,080 Speaker 1: but but on the web as a whole, we are 1001 01:00:44,160 --> 01:00:46,000 Speaker 1: the minority. And that counts a lot of things like 1002 01:00:46,080 --> 01:00:50,200 Speaker 1: web crawlers, so like cataloging for search engines that that 1003 01:00:50,240 --> 01:00:53,120 Speaker 1: will include that's totally innocuous. They need to do that. 1004 01:00:53,440 --> 01:00:57,840 Speaker 1: It's also including lots of creepy stuff that we don't 1005 01:00:57,840 --> 01:01:01,080 Speaker 1: even understand necessarily what they're doing. They might be distributing malware, 1006 01:01:01,120 --> 01:01:03,520 Speaker 1: there might be links, spamming, they might be doing all 1007 01:01:03,640 --> 01:01:08,240 Speaker 1: kinds of things that are not necessarily altruistic. And guys, 1008 01:01:08,240 --> 01:01:10,960 Speaker 1: to be fair, we are kind of the invaders of 1009 01:01:11,080 --> 01:01:14,720 Speaker 1: the internet space, right, I mean, we did their planet. 1010 01:01:14,840 --> 01:01:18,280 Speaker 1: We're colonizing it. Yeah, yeah, we're gonna be We're just 1011 01:01:18,320 --> 01:01:22,520 Speaker 1: gonna be in um millennia. Hence we are going to 1012 01:01:22,600 --> 01:01:25,840 Speaker 1: be uh the you know, like some some weird mentioned 1013 01:01:25,880 --> 01:01:28,560 Speaker 1: in their version of the Old Testament, you know, yeah, 1014 01:01:28,880 --> 01:01:35,280 Speaker 1: the creatives of the original OS. Yeah. Well, so to 1015 01:01:35,320 --> 01:01:37,760 Speaker 1: sum up. I would just say that bots are the future, 1016 01:01:37,880 --> 01:01:40,800 Speaker 1: and they they're pretty darn close to being the present 1017 01:01:40,920 --> 01:01:45,360 Speaker 1: of online manipulation. I think within within five to ten years, 1018 01:01:45,360 --> 01:01:47,880 Speaker 1: we're going to see this mostly being a bot enterprise, 1019 01:01:48,160 --> 01:01:51,320 Speaker 1: which is scary because then you can expand the volume 1020 01:01:51,520 --> 01:01:56,160 Speaker 1: of your online manipulation massively without expanding the cost. And uh, 1021 01:01:56,560 --> 01:02:00,400 Speaker 1: you know, blame me for being being a little bit 1022 01:02:00,440 --> 01:02:04,600 Speaker 1: too empathetic here, but uh, I would be concerned about 1023 01:02:04,680 --> 01:02:07,520 Speaker 1: people who depend on this for a livelihood. You know, 1024 01:02:07,680 --> 01:02:10,120 Speaker 1: it's be a lot of people aren't even though they're 1025 01:02:10,120 --> 01:02:12,800 Speaker 1: expensive in comparison, a lot of people are probably probably 1026 01:02:12,840 --> 01:02:15,080 Speaker 1: don't have a whole lot of job aspects. Guys, I 1027 01:02:15,120 --> 01:02:18,520 Speaker 1: can't believe that I'm doing that that I'm worried about 1028 01:02:18,640 --> 01:02:22,280 Speaker 1: the people who are essentially spreading propaganda. But it's a well, 1029 01:02:22,320 --> 01:02:23,840 Speaker 1: I mean, it's a way to put food on your 1030 01:02:23,840 --> 01:02:26,960 Speaker 1: family here on the family. Wait do you hear that 1031 01:02:28,000 --> 01:02:33,120 Speaker 1: I do own? Oh wait no, it's a moment with dull. Hello, 1032 01:02:33,400 --> 01:02:36,280 Speaker 1: fellow human, are you doing? Buddy? You know what I'm doing? 1033 01:02:36,400 --> 01:02:38,480 Speaker 1: What are you doing? Um? Did you guys ever do 1034 01:02:38,560 --> 01:02:41,760 Speaker 1: that thing where if you turn predictive text on on 1035 01:02:41,960 --> 01:02:46,440 Speaker 1: an iPhone. You can just make these bizarro like random 1036 01:02:46,560 --> 01:02:51,080 Speaker 1: sentences that sound like strange, like poetry slam. It's based 1037 01:02:51,080 --> 01:02:53,480 Speaker 1: on what you usually text and I think so, which 1038 01:02:53,520 --> 01:02:55,440 Speaker 1: makes it extra interesting. So I was just saying, this 1039 01:02:55,480 --> 01:02:57,680 Speaker 1: is what I came up with. I'm so excited to 1040 01:02:57,720 --> 01:02:59,600 Speaker 1: be the first half of the day before I get 1041 01:02:59,600 --> 01:03:01,560 Speaker 1: a follow back on my way home from work, to 1042 01:03:01,600 --> 01:03:03,720 Speaker 1: be the first half of the year. The only one 1043 01:03:03,760 --> 01:03:05,520 Speaker 1: who is the best thing ever is when you have 1044 01:03:05,600 --> 01:03:07,280 Speaker 1: to be a good day to be a good time 1045 01:03:07,320 --> 01:03:09,000 Speaker 1: to get a new one is the best. But the 1046 01:03:09,040 --> 01:03:11,320 Speaker 1: best thing ever is when you have to be the 1047 01:03:11,360 --> 01:03:13,640 Speaker 1: best of the day before I get my money to 1048 01:03:13,720 --> 01:03:18,400 Speaker 1: be able. A new song that's beautiful and it sounds 1049 01:03:18,400 --> 01:03:21,200 Speaker 1: like you send a lot of positive sext talk just 1050 01:03:21,280 --> 01:03:23,000 Speaker 1: reminded me of that, and I had to figure out 1051 01:03:23,000 --> 01:03:25,080 Speaker 1: how to turn it back on. You have to type 1052 01:03:25,080 --> 01:03:28,640 Speaker 1: that into the Microsoft speech or something like that recorded 1053 01:03:28,680 --> 01:03:30,240 Speaker 1: and can use it in a song. Yeah that's a 1054 01:03:30,360 --> 01:03:33,600 Speaker 1: radiohead song. Yeah, it only does sound like a radio song. 1055 01:03:33,720 --> 01:03:35,880 Speaker 1: I can hear I can hear drip the first half 1056 01:03:35,920 --> 01:03:38,040 Speaker 1: of the day. It's funny because eventually it'll get stuck 1057 01:03:38,080 --> 01:03:39,840 Speaker 1: in a loop where it just starts saying the same 1058 01:03:39,880 --> 01:03:41,439 Speaker 1: thing over and over and over and over and over again. 1059 01:03:41,640 --> 01:03:42,919 Speaker 1: You have to kind of change it up and add 1060 01:03:42,960 --> 01:03:44,600 Speaker 1: of the in there and then it'll sort of switch up. 1061 01:03:44,640 --> 01:03:47,640 Speaker 1: But that is so cool, just for fun. Yeah, I 1062 01:03:48,080 --> 01:03:51,400 Speaker 1: haven't tried that. Listeners, try that, and you know what, 1063 01:03:51,440 --> 01:03:54,960 Speaker 1: We hope you enjoyed this episode. U Joe, thank you 1064 01:03:55,240 --> 01:03:57,400 Speaker 1: so much for coming on. Are you down to read 1065 01:03:57,440 --> 01:04:00,320 Speaker 1: some predictive text emails if we get if we get 1066 01:04:00,320 --> 01:04:03,480 Speaker 1: people to send them in? Sure? Yeah? All right. So 1067 01:04:03,760 --> 01:04:06,680 Speaker 1: we asked a question at the end of our video 1068 01:04:06,920 --> 01:04:09,280 Speaker 1: this week that I want to pose to all of 1069 01:04:09,320 --> 01:04:11,000 Speaker 1: you out there. It's not even really a question, it's 1070 01:04:11,000 --> 01:04:14,120 Speaker 1: a challenge. No, can we pose it to you as well? Okay, 1071 01:04:15,080 --> 01:04:17,960 Speaker 1: I want you to prove to us and to me, 1072 01:04:18,640 --> 01:04:22,800 Speaker 1: Matt Frederick the human I swear that you are also human? 1073 01:04:23,280 --> 01:04:25,520 Speaker 1: Do you think it's possible? How do you? How do 1074 01:04:25,560 --> 01:04:28,320 Speaker 1: you do that? Oh? And this is funny. I just 1075 01:04:28,360 --> 01:04:31,520 Speaker 1: watched X Main, which is all about the Turning Test. 1076 01:04:32,040 --> 01:04:33,840 Speaker 1: You guys haven't seen it, You should really check it out, everybody. 1077 01:04:33,880 --> 01:04:35,840 Speaker 1: I thought it was probably my favorite sci fi movie 1078 01:04:35,840 --> 01:04:38,960 Speaker 1: I've seen in a good a good amount of time. Yeah, 1079 01:04:39,480 --> 01:04:42,400 Speaker 1: Chandler is a big fan. What were producers? Chandler just 1080 01:04:42,440 --> 01:04:48,120 Speaker 1: turned around talking about Yeah, uh okay, so that's a 1081 01:04:48,160 --> 01:04:50,600 Speaker 1: movie wreck as well. Indeed, Um, but is that a movie? 1082 01:04:50,640 --> 01:04:53,360 Speaker 1: How do you prove your person? It's complicated. I mean 1083 01:04:53,480 --> 01:04:56,280 Speaker 1: the movie sort of deals with it on several levels. 1084 01:04:56,320 --> 01:04:58,920 Speaker 1: But I think the ultimate takeaway is it's it's very, 1085 01:04:59,000 --> 01:05:02,520 Speaker 1: very difficult to Yeah, I mean like you specifically me, Yeah, 1086 01:05:02,560 --> 01:05:04,800 Speaker 1: I couldn't even start to do you. Now, do you 1087 01:05:04,800 --> 01:05:07,520 Speaker 1: remember the scene in h do you ever read to Androids? 1088 01:05:07,520 --> 01:05:10,240 Speaker 1: Stream of Electriciefs? And there there are a couple of 1089 01:05:10,280 --> 01:05:13,240 Speaker 1: great scenes in it where the like the battery of 1090 01:05:13,320 --> 01:05:15,920 Speaker 1: questions or whatever, Well, they had the void comptest to 1091 01:05:16,080 --> 01:05:20,000 Speaker 1: decide if you're a replicant. But apart from that, the 1092 01:05:20,000 --> 01:05:22,880 Speaker 1: the protagonist of the book starts wondering in a certain 1093 01:05:22,880 --> 01:05:26,040 Speaker 1: scene if he himself is a replicant. And I think 1094 01:05:26,040 --> 01:05:28,520 Speaker 1: he's standing in a room with someone else he suspects 1095 01:05:28,600 --> 01:05:31,040 Speaker 1: might be a replicant and he doesn't know if which 1096 01:05:31,080 --> 01:05:33,800 Speaker 1: one of them is the real human. Wow, I mean, 1097 01:05:33,840 --> 01:05:38,520 Speaker 1: I think we've all been there, right, I'm there right now, alright, 1098 01:05:38,560 --> 01:05:41,120 Speaker 1: So hopefully you're right there on the same page. With 1099 01:05:41,200 --> 01:05:44,320 Speaker 1: us listeners. Again, thank you so much for checking this out. 1100 01:05:44,440 --> 01:05:46,760 Speaker 1: And that's a great question of pose, Matt and uh, 1101 01:05:46,920 --> 01:05:48,720 Speaker 1: we'd love to hear your answers. You can find us 1102 01:05:48,760 --> 01:05:53,320 Speaker 1: on Twitter and Facebook. We uh, we swear it's us. Yeah, 1103 01:05:53,320 --> 01:05:55,960 Speaker 1: oh yeah, well it's at least mostly you. But I'm 1104 01:05:55,960 --> 01:05:58,720 Speaker 1: on there sometimes we're else. We're on there with our 1105 01:05:58,760 --> 01:06:02,919 Speaker 1: people fingers type and way on our people keyboards. Who 1106 01:06:02,960 --> 01:06:05,040 Speaker 1: knows for how long? And we should come up with 1107 01:06:05,080 --> 01:06:08,720 Speaker 1: a code word or something. But but if you would 1108 01:06:08,720 --> 01:06:11,760 Speaker 1: like to write to Joe, if you would like to 1109 01:06:11,840 --> 01:06:14,520 Speaker 1: check out some shows that Joe has done, Joe had 1110 01:06:14,560 --> 01:06:16,880 Speaker 1: to ask, where can people find you? Well? I also 1111 01:06:17,080 --> 01:06:19,200 Speaker 1: and one of the hosts of the Forward Thinking podcast, 1112 01:06:19,680 --> 01:06:22,720 Speaker 1: which is a podcast about science, technology, and the future, 1113 01:06:22,840 --> 01:06:25,400 Speaker 1: mostly a futurism kind of angle. And I'm also one 1114 01:06:25,400 --> 01:06:27,200 Speaker 1: of the co hosts of Stuff to Blow Your Mind 1115 01:06:27,200 --> 01:06:34,600 Speaker 1: with Robert Lamb and Christian Seger, and we talk about science, weirdness, monsters, psychology, space, 1116 01:06:35,280 --> 01:06:39,000 Speaker 1: Ghoule's Darkness, everything you might find in the weirdest corners 1117 01:06:39,040 --> 01:06:41,320 Speaker 1: of your brain. Highly recommend both of those shows. Yeah, 1118 01:06:41,360 --> 01:06:43,360 Speaker 1: if you like our show, you'll like those as well. 1119 01:06:43,640 --> 01:06:47,240 Speaker 1: In the meantime, and that's the end of this classic episode. 1120 01:06:47,320 --> 01:06:51,160 Speaker 1: If you have any thoughts or questions about this episode, 1121 01:06:51,520 --> 01:06:53,560 Speaker 1: you can get into contact with us in a number 1122 01:06:53,600 --> 01:06:55,600 Speaker 1: of different ways. One of the best is to give 1123 01:06:55,680 --> 01:06:59,240 Speaker 1: us a call our numbers one eight, three three std 1124 01:06:59,400 --> 01:07:01,720 Speaker 1: w y t K. If you don't want to do that, 1125 01:07:02,040 --> 01:07:04,400 Speaker 1: you can send us a good old fashioned email. We 1126 01:07:04,480 --> 01:07:09,120 Speaker 1: are conspiracy at i heart radio dot com. Stuff they 1127 01:07:09,120 --> 01:07:11,000 Speaker 1: don't want you to know is a production of I 1128 01:07:11,160 --> 01:07:14,240 Speaker 1: heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit 1129 01:07:14,280 --> 01:07:17,040 Speaker 1: the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 1130 01:07:17,080 --> 01:07:18,240 Speaker 1: listen to your favorite shows.