1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,760 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,840 --> 00:00:28,880 Speaker 1: My name is Matt. Our colleague Nol is on an adventure, 6 00:00:28,920 --> 00:00:32,320 Speaker 1: but will return shortly. They call me Ben. We're joined 7 00:00:32,320 --> 00:00:35,800 Speaker 1: as always with our super producer Paul Mission controled decades. 8 00:00:36,000 --> 00:00:39,159 Speaker 1: Most importantly, you are you, You are here, and that 9 00:00:39,240 --> 00:00:42,519 Speaker 1: makes this the stuff they don't want you to know. 10 00:00:43,159 --> 00:00:47,360 Speaker 1: It's a new year. Hope everybody was able to get 11 00:00:47,640 --> 00:00:51,280 Speaker 1: some kind of vacations, some kind of holiday slash family time, 12 00:00:52,000 --> 00:00:56,120 Speaker 1: and a lot of us listening now are officially returned 13 00:00:56,480 --> 00:01:01,880 Speaker 1: to work. A holiday season has uh sadly concluded, and 14 00:01:01,960 --> 00:01:05,760 Speaker 1: so as we speak, there are billions of people across 15 00:01:05,800 --> 00:01:08,360 Speaker 1: the planet who are firing up the old laptop, or 16 00:01:08,400 --> 00:01:11,680 Speaker 1: they're you know, putting on the uniform. They're they're starting 17 00:01:11,720 --> 00:01:17,160 Speaker 1: the company van, and they're off on another another episode 18 00:01:17,360 --> 00:01:23,080 Speaker 1: of trying to stay alive in may fortune what they 19 00:01:23,120 --> 00:01:27,119 Speaker 1: say in the Hunger Games and fortunate favorite the Bold, 20 00:01:27,120 --> 00:01:30,720 Speaker 1: Maybe odds be ever in your favor. Matt, you remember 21 00:01:30,760 --> 00:01:34,560 Speaker 1: that song. I always feel like someone's watching me. Somebody 22 00:01:34,640 --> 00:01:39,440 Speaker 1: was watching me. Oh yeah, I've been thinking about that 23 00:01:39,520 --> 00:01:43,679 Speaker 1: a lot as we were researching today's episode. This is 24 00:01:43,840 --> 00:01:48,360 Speaker 1: Orwellian and you know what, fellow conspiracy realist, after thinking 25 00:01:48,400 --> 00:01:50,760 Speaker 1: about it and after digging into this, I can't speak 26 00:01:50,800 --> 00:01:53,920 Speaker 1: for Matt or Mission control, but I do hope you're 27 00:01:53,960 --> 00:01:56,960 Speaker 1: listening to this episode at work, yes, just hopefully not 28 00:01:57,200 --> 00:02:02,640 Speaker 1: on your company issued device. Don't don't do that, right right? Uh? 29 00:02:02,680 --> 00:02:05,480 Speaker 1: If you? The reason this is a cool thing to 30 00:02:05,520 --> 00:02:09,000 Speaker 1: listen to while you're at work is because it gives 31 00:02:09,040 --> 00:02:12,480 Speaker 1: it a little extra punch, a little extra immediacy, right, 32 00:02:12,680 --> 00:02:15,360 Speaker 1: you know, Uh, Matt. People have heard this joke on 33 00:02:15,360 --> 00:02:18,680 Speaker 1: the show before about how stuff they don't want you 34 00:02:18,720 --> 00:02:21,800 Speaker 1: to know has ruined our search histories, and that is 35 00:02:22,400 --> 00:02:26,359 Speaker 1: that is true. But the hazard of an oddball search 36 00:02:26,440 --> 00:02:29,920 Speaker 1: history pales in comparison to what many other people have 37 00:02:30,000 --> 00:02:33,519 Speaker 1: experienced in the workplace. Especially over the past couple of years, 38 00:02:33,960 --> 00:02:37,920 Speaker 1: life turned upside down across the planet. Millions and millions 39 00:02:37,919 --> 00:02:42,600 Speaker 1: of people found themselves let's see, battling disease, financial woes, 40 00:02:42,800 --> 00:02:47,160 Speaker 1: mental health, social unrest, all the while still trying to 41 00:02:47,240 --> 00:02:50,120 Speaker 1: hold down a solid job for a lot of people. 42 00:02:50,160 --> 00:02:53,720 Speaker 1: The world will never be the same. And this this 43 00:02:53,760 --> 00:02:58,919 Speaker 1: goes for employers as well as employee ease. Our episode 44 00:02:58,919 --> 00:03:03,480 Speaker 1: today is about work, it's about watching, It's about ultimately 45 00:03:03,680 --> 00:03:09,200 Speaker 1: who watches the Watchman. So yeah, yeah, and this I 46 00:03:09,680 --> 00:03:12,000 Speaker 1: don't know about you, man, but this, this one spooked 47 00:03:12,000 --> 00:03:15,400 Speaker 1: me out a little too. Oh, definitely, especially because of 48 00:03:15,440 --> 00:03:18,200 Speaker 1: the way work has changed for many of us, especially 49 00:03:18,200 --> 00:03:22,600 Speaker 1: the people right now making this show. Uh, we work 50 00:03:22,639 --> 00:03:25,839 Speaker 1: from home now and for to a large extent, and 51 00:03:25,880 --> 00:03:29,560 Speaker 1: we probably will for oh, I don't know the foreseeable future, 52 00:03:30,360 --> 00:03:34,519 Speaker 1: because because of the safety benefits of being all isolated 53 00:03:34,600 --> 00:03:37,840 Speaker 1: in separate places. And we're we're gonna get into it. 54 00:03:37,840 --> 00:03:40,280 Speaker 1: So let's just talk about statistics while we're sitting here 55 00:03:40,320 --> 00:03:44,160 Speaker 1: and discussing this stuff, right, Yeah, here are the facts. 56 00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:46,640 Speaker 1: If you go to the U. S. Bureau of Labor 57 00:03:46,640 --> 00:03:52,560 Speaker 1: and Statistics, you'll see that across about one in four 58 00:03:52,880 --> 00:03:57,960 Speaker 1: employed people teleworked or worked from home for pay in 59 00:03:58,120 --> 00:04:00,960 Speaker 1: some capacity. That doesn't mean they were all locked up 60 00:04:01,640 --> 00:04:04,560 Speaker 1: hermiting away. That means there were a lot of people 61 00:04:04,560 --> 00:04:06,560 Speaker 1: who were like, I'll go in one day a week, 62 00:04:06,880 --> 00:04:10,320 Speaker 1: or I will be gone for you know, my office 63 00:04:10,400 --> 00:04:13,200 Speaker 1: is closed for a month and we're working remotely. So 64 00:04:13,360 --> 00:04:16,680 Speaker 1: all at all, more than a third of all the 65 00:04:16,760 --> 00:04:21,640 Speaker 1: households in the US reported working from home more frequently 66 00:04:21,760 --> 00:04:25,560 Speaker 1: than they had before COVID hit. But we also found 67 00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:31,960 Speaker 1: some socio economic sociodemographic divides. If you are a younger worker, 68 00:04:32,320 --> 00:04:36,120 Speaker 1: you're less likely to have teleworked due to the pandemic. 69 00:04:36,240 --> 00:04:39,480 Speaker 1: And that's where you know, we learned things like essential workers. 70 00:04:39,520 --> 00:04:42,440 Speaker 1: A lot of younger people who were maybe just getting 71 00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:46,040 Speaker 1: their first job out of high school, during high school 72 00:04:46,120 --> 00:04:50,839 Speaker 1: something like that, they started off in places like retail 73 00:04:51,080 --> 00:04:56,039 Speaker 1: operations or the service industry, and they had to go 74 00:04:56,080 --> 00:04:59,240 Speaker 1: into work in person because of the nature of their profession. Yeah, 75 00:04:59,240 --> 00:05:02,680 Speaker 1: and that's something that also comes into play with these statistics. 76 00:05:03,120 --> 00:05:07,160 Speaker 1: The Census Bureau found that that economic divide that we're 77 00:05:07,200 --> 00:05:11,719 Speaker 1: all seeing accelerate came into play here as well. People 78 00:05:11,760 --> 00:05:15,600 Speaker 1: who made more money tended to more easily telework than 79 00:05:15,640 --> 00:05:17,880 Speaker 1: those who made less money. So if you look at 80 00:05:17,880 --> 00:05:20,640 Speaker 1: the Census Bureau, they found that in the highest earning 81 00:05:20,680 --> 00:05:24,680 Speaker 1: households with incomes of two hundred thousand dollars or more, 82 00:05:24,760 --> 00:05:30,120 Speaker 1: that's combined household seventy three point one. Seventy three point one, 83 00:05:30,160 --> 00:05:33,000 Speaker 1: we're able to switch to telework. Again, like we're able 84 00:05:33,040 --> 00:05:36,480 Speaker 1: to switch to telework. And in contrast to that, only 85 00:05:36,600 --> 00:05:40,040 Speaker 1: twelve point seven percent of households earning under twenty five 86 00:05:40,080 --> 00:05:44,000 Speaker 1: thousand dollars a year where we're able to telework at 87 00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:46,440 Speaker 1: all because they again, like you said, then they had 88 00:05:46,480 --> 00:05:49,520 Speaker 1: to go into work for one reason or another. Yeah, exactly. No. 89 00:05:50,160 --> 00:05:53,000 Speaker 1: Let's do a thought experiment, folks. Imagine that you are 90 00:05:53,040 --> 00:05:57,400 Speaker 1: a manager. Imagine you're a CEO or what have you. 91 00:05:57,400 --> 00:05:59,680 Speaker 1: You have a team of people, and you have a 92 00:05:59,720 --> 00:06:02,760 Speaker 1: group of task If you have your own boss to 93 00:06:02,800 --> 00:06:05,000 Speaker 1: report to, you need to be able to tell that 94 00:06:05,080 --> 00:06:07,839 Speaker 1: person that you've knocked out these tasks or you've made 95 00:06:07,839 --> 00:06:09,920 Speaker 1: progress on them. And of course, if you are a 96 00:06:09,960 --> 00:06:13,320 Speaker 1: good manager, your goal is to make sure your employees 97 00:06:13,480 --> 00:06:16,600 Speaker 1: grow professionally. You want to set them up for success. 98 00:06:16,640 --> 00:06:20,400 Speaker 1: But now your whole team, your whole posse, has turned 99 00:06:20,480 --> 00:06:26,000 Speaker 1: their homes into isolated work cubicles. You can't walk by 100 00:06:26,160 --> 00:06:28,920 Speaker 1: like that office space guy with a cup of coffee anymore. 101 00:06:29,320 --> 00:06:32,400 Speaker 1: You have to find some other way to keep track 102 00:06:32,520 --> 00:06:35,880 Speaker 1: of what they're doing. Could you do a weekly zoom meeting. Sure, 103 00:06:36,240 --> 00:06:40,760 Speaker 1: why not? But is that enough? That's when managers and 104 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:45,479 Speaker 1: employers started asking themselves what else can we do? And 105 00:06:45,600 --> 00:06:50,680 Speaker 1: this leads us to the new age of work surveillance. 106 00:06:51,160 --> 00:06:53,920 Speaker 1: And you know, I just think about this too. Um folks, 107 00:06:53,920 --> 00:06:57,919 Speaker 1: If you remember the last time you got a new job, 108 00:06:58,320 --> 00:07:01,680 Speaker 1: you probably had a bunch of paperwork. I know that. 109 00:07:01,960 --> 00:07:06,599 Speaker 1: You know, when our overlords have changed over the years, 110 00:07:06,880 --> 00:07:10,240 Speaker 1: we have to go through the rigamarole of reading all 111 00:07:10,240 --> 00:07:14,160 Speaker 1: the paperwork again. You know, codes of ethics, financial info, 112 00:07:14,320 --> 00:07:17,600 Speaker 1: insurance stuff, all the all the really juicy reads. But 113 00:07:17,840 --> 00:07:20,720 Speaker 1: in this mountain of paperwork, there's some interesting things. You 114 00:07:20,760 --> 00:07:24,680 Speaker 1: will often find tucked away somewhere in there a statement 115 00:07:24,800 --> 00:07:28,080 Speaker 1: saying something like, any activity you do on company time 116 00:07:28,120 --> 00:07:31,680 Speaker 1: with company equipment needs to be work related. Uh, and 117 00:07:32,160 --> 00:07:36,840 Speaker 1: you don't have maybe intellectual property rights, which sounds abstract, 118 00:07:36,840 --> 00:07:40,040 Speaker 1: but it's really important. This applies to the idea of 119 00:07:40,160 --> 00:07:45,440 Speaker 1: patents and inventions. Like let's say mission control. While we're recording, 120 00:07:45,520 --> 00:07:49,440 Speaker 1: he's secretly using his work machine to invent a new 121 00:07:49,520 --> 00:07:54,440 Speaker 1: kind of case. Ada. That's what. Yeah, then our bosses, 122 00:07:54,760 --> 00:07:56,600 Speaker 1: let's say this case to do blows up. It's like 123 00:07:56,920 --> 00:08:01,760 Speaker 1: transformed the world's understanding of sandwiches. But our bosses, say, 124 00:08:02,800 --> 00:08:06,600 Speaker 1: came up with this while you were at work using 125 00:08:06,600 --> 00:08:11,280 Speaker 1: our equipment, So this case idea belongs to us, pal. 126 00:08:12,080 --> 00:08:14,360 Speaker 1: The problem is how do you improve that it occurred 127 00:08:14,400 --> 00:08:20,080 Speaker 1: on that computer? And when yes, yes, and that's I mean, 128 00:08:20,080 --> 00:08:24,600 Speaker 1: obviously that's an extreme example. It's not unprecedented. Most people, 129 00:08:24,800 --> 00:08:27,840 Speaker 1: most companies aren't going to go to court over case ideas. 130 00:08:27,880 --> 00:08:30,920 Speaker 1: Though for the record, I would watch a show called 131 00:08:31,000 --> 00:08:33,680 Speaker 1: case Adia Court. I think the idea has got legs. 132 00:08:34,559 --> 00:08:39,040 Speaker 1: But you're absolutely right, Matt, Like you're you're if you're 133 00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:43,040 Speaker 1: listening to this, your job, in some way, shape or form, 134 00:08:43,320 --> 00:08:46,439 Speaker 1: is monitoring you. Like, that's as old as the idea 135 00:08:46,480 --> 00:08:48,880 Speaker 1: of clocking in and clocking out on a punch card. 136 00:08:49,720 --> 00:08:54,480 Speaker 1: The issue is, especially nowadays, the process may be much 137 00:08:54,520 --> 00:08:59,559 Speaker 1: more robust, much more conspiratorial, and much less visible, and 138 00:08:59,640 --> 00:09:02,880 Speaker 1: you might think, and it's only going to accelerate in 139 00:09:02,920 --> 00:09:06,200 Speaker 1: the future. Before we move on, I have to ask you, Matt. 140 00:09:06,240 --> 00:09:07,640 Speaker 1: I want to put you on the spot. But do 141 00:09:07,679 --> 00:09:11,640 Speaker 1: you remember please? Oh good, all right, we'll put us 142 00:09:11,679 --> 00:09:13,320 Speaker 1: both on the spot. Do you remember a few months 143 00:09:13,320 --> 00:09:16,600 Speaker 1: ago we were talking about how to get under kind 144 00:09:16,600 --> 00:09:20,240 Speaker 1: of under the hood of your laptop and see what 145 00:09:20,360 --> 00:09:25,880 Speaker 1: other entities were contacting your machine. Well, yes, Ben, one 146 00:09:25,880 --> 00:09:27,840 Speaker 1: of the things you can do if you have a Mac, 147 00:09:28,000 --> 00:09:30,760 Speaker 1: you can check your activity monitor. That's a fun way 148 00:09:30,800 --> 00:09:33,679 Speaker 1: to find out if there's software running in the background 149 00:09:33,679 --> 00:09:36,600 Speaker 1: that you're unaware of that's maybe been installed without your knowledge, 150 00:09:36,640 --> 00:09:39,120 Speaker 1: because you can do that with boss wear. If you're 151 00:09:39,160 --> 00:09:41,600 Speaker 1: running a Windows machine, you check your task Manager and 152 00:09:41,640 --> 00:09:43,920 Speaker 1: do the same thing. We can talk about it and 153 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:46,760 Speaker 1: get into a little later. But if you somehow block 154 00:09:47,080 --> 00:09:51,880 Speaker 1: the monitoring that your employers have installed on your computer, um, 155 00:09:51,920 --> 00:09:55,680 Speaker 1: that's probably going to cause more problems than just if 156 00:09:55,720 --> 00:10:00,000 Speaker 1: you don't know work around it in some other way. Uh, 157 00:10:00,040 --> 00:10:02,440 Speaker 1: but yeah, we've we found out you could do that. 158 00:10:02,520 --> 00:10:06,760 Speaker 1: There's also certain things like antivirus software that might be 159 00:10:06,800 --> 00:10:09,800 Speaker 1: on your machine that's either installed by you or your employer, 160 00:10:10,120 --> 00:10:13,400 Speaker 1: and that's a good way to monitor when things connect 161 00:10:13,400 --> 00:10:16,320 Speaker 1: to your computer, right if something physically has been plugged 162 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:19,240 Speaker 1: in of some device, or if something virtually connects to 163 00:10:19,240 --> 00:10:24,240 Speaker 1: your machine. And a lot of these things aren't necessarily nefarious, 164 00:10:24,360 --> 00:10:28,040 Speaker 1: it's it's important to establish that from the get go 165 00:10:28,440 --> 00:10:31,760 Speaker 1: because it turns out a lot of them are very 166 00:10:31,840 --> 00:10:39,040 Speaker 1: much nefarious, insidious, dangerous. Here's where it gets crazy. So 167 00:10:39,559 --> 00:10:44,840 Speaker 1: companies struggled during the pandemic to maintain control and visibility 168 00:10:45,000 --> 00:10:49,920 Speaker 1: with an increasingly remote workforce. You used at our word 169 00:10:49,960 --> 00:10:53,840 Speaker 1: of the day just a second ago, Matt bossware. This 170 00:10:53,960 --> 00:11:00,280 Speaker 1: is just like malware software hardware. Bossware is described vibes 171 00:11:00,800 --> 00:11:04,839 Speaker 1: types of software genre software, as well as an industry 172 00:11:04,880 --> 00:11:11,920 Speaker 1: that is built entirely upon monitoring employees, monitoring productivity, even 173 00:11:12,000 --> 00:11:16,839 Speaker 1: gamifying as Microsoft and Amazon have have done. And if 174 00:11:16,880 --> 00:11:19,440 Speaker 1: you're if you're a data nerd, there's a lot of 175 00:11:19,440 --> 00:11:22,319 Speaker 1: cool stuff you can do. You can compare things, you 176 00:11:22,360 --> 00:11:26,040 Speaker 1: can build tables, you can look at, uh, the metadata 177 00:11:26,080 --> 00:11:29,240 Speaker 1: of people's time and how they spend it. So if 178 00:11:29,280 --> 00:11:32,400 Speaker 1: you you know, if one of your employees is a 179 00:11:32,520 --> 00:11:37,440 Speaker 1: night owl, like someone who is regularly burning the midnight oil, 180 00:11:37,679 --> 00:11:41,120 Speaker 1: then you will know. You will see, oh, these emails 181 00:11:41,160 --> 00:11:43,920 Speaker 1: are being sent out at eight am, but they're being 182 00:11:44,000 --> 00:11:48,320 Speaker 1: scheduled at like midnight. You know that that gives you 183 00:11:48,360 --> 00:11:53,160 Speaker 1: a sense of what your crew is doing. And boss 184 00:11:53,200 --> 00:11:57,400 Speaker 1: wear is usually going to be on a computer, a smartphone, 185 00:11:57,520 --> 00:12:00,560 Speaker 1: maybe a tablet. The important thing about it is it 186 00:12:00,600 --> 00:12:04,280 Speaker 1: has admin privileges. It can access all the info that 187 00:12:04,360 --> 00:12:07,160 Speaker 1: happens on that device. Yeah, it more or less can 188 00:12:07,200 --> 00:12:13,480 Speaker 1: collect anything and everything that happens. Right, And theoretically, these systems, 189 00:12:13,520 --> 00:12:18,440 Speaker 1: the software, and these enterprise clients, they're all about a 190 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:25,600 Speaker 1: TPS BEEN that's attendance, time, productivity and security. Yes, yeah, 191 00:12:26,120 --> 00:12:29,480 Speaker 1: that's that's what it is, a t p S. This 192 00:12:29,520 --> 00:12:33,439 Speaker 1: stuff already existed in some form or another. As we said, 193 00:12:33,520 --> 00:12:36,120 Speaker 1: you know, regardless of where you work, if you have 194 00:12:36,360 --> 00:12:40,080 Speaker 1: a quote unquote office job, then you probably have some 195 00:12:40,200 --> 00:12:43,880 Speaker 1: kind of I T department or some kind of subcontracted 196 00:12:43,880 --> 00:12:49,679 Speaker 1: I T service, and they will, for instance, probably get 197 00:12:49,760 --> 00:12:54,320 Speaker 1: alerts if someone accesses a not Safer work website on 198 00:12:54,480 --> 00:12:59,280 Speaker 1: company equipment. And I think everybody can agree that's pretty reasonable, right, 199 00:13:00,800 --> 00:13:04,600 Speaker 1: I'm with come on that. That's it's a small battle 200 00:13:04,640 --> 00:13:07,120 Speaker 1: you've had to fight a few times over the years 201 00:13:07,200 --> 00:13:10,679 Speaker 1: just because this show is not safe for work. Again, like, 202 00:13:10,760 --> 00:13:13,760 Speaker 1: I hope you're not listening on your work device, but 203 00:13:13,880 --> 00:13:18,040 Speaker 1: I hope you are listening at work. Yes, yes, so 204 00:13:18,679 --> 00:13:21,680 Speaker 1: so yeah, this this is something that we have run 205 00:13:21,679 --> 00:13:24,360 Speaker 1: into in the course of stuff. They don't want you 206 00:13:24,440 --> 00:13:28,440 Speaker 1: to know with you know, not not too much sort 207 00:13:28,480 --> 00:13:31,920 Speaker 1: of sound and fury from the suits, but we have 208 00:13:32,640 --> 00:13:35,040 Speaker 1: you know, we we've had to like this has happened 209 00:13:35,040 --> 00:13:37,520 Speaker 1: to Jonathan Strickland on tech stuff too. This happened to 210 00:13:37,600 --> 00:13:40,040 Speaker 1: a lot of our colleagues because you have to dive 211 00:13:40,120 --> 00:13:43,720 Speaker 1: into primary sources, and some of those primary sources are 212 00:13:43,760 --> 00:13:48,480 Speaker 1: in some pretty dicey places online. Uh. And that's just 213 00:13:48,559 --> 00:13:52,679 Speaker 1: the nature of our pursuit, which is somewhat distinct and 214 00:13:52,720 --> 00:13:56,560 Speaker 1: different from a lot of other jobs. But the same 215 00:13:56,640 --> 00:13:59,160 Speaker 1: rules still apply. If you have an I T department 216 00:13:59,200 --> 00:14:04,560 Speaker 1: that gets these alert they're probably not obsessively like going 217 00:14:04,679 --> 00:14:08,559 Speaker 1: employee by employee and reading everyone's browser history. The process 218 00:14:08,600 --> 00:14:11,840 Speaker 1: has probably automated and it gets flagged, sort of the 219 00:14:11,880 --> 00:14:16,880 Speaker 1: way that state level surveillance of citizens works. Uh. And 220 00:14:17,160 --> 00:14:22,320 Speaker 1: that is changing in the remote set up right, it 221 00:14:22,360 --> 00:14:26,240 Speaker 1: was it was much more of a flagging system before 222 00:14:26,440 --> 00:14:31,040 Speaker 1: employees were far far away from the manager's physical position. 223 00:14:32,000 --> 00:14:36,360 Speaker 1: M hm. And this goes more extreme. Here's one that 224 00:14:36,920 --> 00:14:40,680 Speaker 1: you may have on your on your workplace gadgets that 225 00:14:40,760 --> 00:14:44,960 Speaker 1: you don't know about. It's something called a key logger, Matt. 226 00:14:45,640 --> 00:14:50,120 Speaker 1: Key loggers are scary partially because of how effective they are, 227 00:14:50,160 --> 00:14:54,080 Speaker 1: but I said, I think also because of how invisible 228 00:14:54,320 --> 00:14:58,840 Speaker 1: they can be and how just how much information they 229 00:14:58,840 --> 00:15:04,160 Speaker 1: can give out, there's a lot potential for shenanigans. Oh yeah, yeah. 230 00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:08,240 Speaker 1: I imagine that someone can monitor every single key stroke 231 00:15:08,360 --> 00:15:11,880 Speaker 1: that you make. That means every website you've ever visited, 232 00:15:11,920 --> 00:15:15,200 Speaker 1: if you type it in, every password you've ever entered, 233 00:15:15,680 --> 00:15:19,160 Speaker 1: if you type it in, uh, any message that you 234 00:15:19,200 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 1: send to anyone with a maybe a messages app or 235 00:15:23,160 --> 00:15:26,040 Speaker 1: with a text messaging service, or even WhatsApp or anything 236 00:15:26,080 --> 00:15:30,600 Speaker 1: like that. Uh, it can get monitored. And it's way scarier. 237 00:15:30,680 --> 00:15:33,960 Speaker 1: I think if this is being monitored by somebody that 238 00:15:34,040 --> 00:15:37,040 Speaker 1: you just don't know, if it's you know, your employer, 239 00:15:37,520 --> 00:15:41,480 Speaker 1: maybe your direct boss or their boss, that's could stink. 240 00:15:41,960 --> 00:15:43,840 Speaker 1: But it's not the same as if it's you know, 241 00:15:43,920 --> 00:15:46,880 Speaker 1: being tracked by some other third party that you're unaware 242 00:15:46,920 --> 00:15:53,000 Speaker 1: of exactly. Your email can also be searched. Calls made 243 00:15:53,040 --> 00:15:57,240 Speaker 1: from company issued devices can be not just recorded, but 244 00:15:57,400 --> 00:16:00,920 Speaker 1: monitoring in real time. So there's definitely the potential for 245 00:16:01,000 --> 00:16:04,400 Speaker 1: someone to be eavesdropping, which again is something that a 246 00:16:04,440 --> 00:16:07,240 Speaker 1: lot of people have just sort of accepted as normal. 247 00:16:07,640 --> 00:16:09,520 Speaker 1: Like I I don't know about you. Well, I do 248 00:16:09,600 --> 00:16:11,840 Speaker 1: know about you. We both, for a very long time 249 00:16:11,880 --> 00:16:14,200 Speaker 1: have taken it for granted that if a camera is 250 00:16:14,240 --> 00:16:18,200 Speaker 1: not physically covered up, you should treat it as though 251 00:16:18,200 --> 00:16:20,760 Speaker 1: it is recording, sort of like a gun should always 252 00:16:20,760 --> 00:16:23,800 Speaker 1: be treated as though it is loaded. Dude, do you 253 00:16:23,840 --> 00:16:26,280 Speaker 1: remember when we were we went around the office and 254 00:16:26,320 --> 00:16:29,120 Speaker 1: in all the studios we started, Well, I I don't know. 255 00:16:29,200 --> 00:16:31,440 Speaker 1: I think you did it too, but I know I 256 00:16:31,480 --> 00:16:35,960 Speaker 1: personally applied tape to many of the studio imax and 257 00:16:35,960 --> 00:16:39,440 Speaker 1: and other machines that just have cameras installed on them, 258 00:16:39,880 --> 00:16:42,520 Speaker 1: just as a like, if you need it, you can 259 00:16:42,560 --> 00:16:45,760 Speaker 1: take the tape off. Yeah, and you were I important 260 00:16:45,800 --> 00:16:49,760 Speaker 1: in your defense. In our defense, we weren't doing like 261 00:16:49,920 --> 00:16:52,960 Speaker 1: sketchy stuff. We weren't even you know, It's not like 262 00:16:53,280 --> 00:16:58,040 Speaker 1: it wasn't like, oh, no, one, we're secretly selling quayludes 263 00:16:58,160 --> 00:17:00,040 Speaker 1: or something like that. We weren't even you know, in 264 00:17:00,080 --> 00:17:04,920 Speaker 1: our noses. Well, I wasn't. No, we weren't doing anything 265 00:17:04,960 --> 00:17:07,040 Speaker 1: to ferries. It's just the fact that it's what you said. 266 00:17:07,080 --> 00:17:09,640 Speaker 1: It's a it's like a loaded gun that's pointed at 267 00:17:09,640 --> 00:17:12,879 Speaker 1: all times, not really obviously and you know, I'm not 268 00:17:12,920 --> 00:17:15,919 Speaker 1: trying to downplay guns or up play cameras. It's just 269 00:17:16,400 --> 00:17:19,480 Speaker 1: something we should be aware of exactly. And there are 270 00:17:19,880 --> 00:17:24,760 Speaker 1: numerous other examples of this monitoring, like some software. We'll 271 00:17:24,800 --> 00:17:30,080 Speaker 1: just take frequent, periodic screenshots of whatever is on your monitor. 272 00:17:30,440 --> 00:17:34,600 Speaker 1: And at this point let's pause for word from our sponsors. 273 00:17:34,600 --> 00:17:37,320 Speaker 1: See who at our job is spying on us, and 274 00:17:37,359 --> 00:17:42,000 Speaker 1: then we'll return to dive into the deeper waters surrounding 275 00:17:42,119 --> 00:17:53,119 Speaker 1: workplace surveillance. Okay, we're back. Like we said, this is 276 00:17:53,200 --> 00:17:56,639 Speaker 1: kind of normalized now. This idea of being monitored at 277 00:17:56,680 --> 00:18:00,480 Speaker 1: work is something that the majority of employees were guardless 278 00:18:00,520 --> 00:18:05,400 Speaker 1: of their specific industries, have come to accept. Some employers, yes, 279 00:18:05,560 --> 00:18:08,520 Speaker 1: are much more extreme than others. Our Offit is pretty 280 00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:11,200 Speaker 1: las fair so far as we know, which is another 281 00:18:11,240 --> 00:18:13,520 Speaker 1: thing we have to bring up in today's episode. But 282 00:18:14,840 --> 00:18:18,080 Speaker 1: there are really really extreme examples, and one that you 283 00:18:18,119 --> 00:18:21,800 Speaker 1: will run into time and time again is Amazon. Oh 284 00:18:21,840 --> 00:18:27,200 Speaker 1: my gosh, Amazon, so many methods to track your employers 285 00:18:27,920 --> 00:18:32,520 Speaker 1: in so many different positions. And let's just use one 286 00:18:32,560 --> 00:18:35,439 Speaker 1: quick example here. Imagine that you drive for a living. 287 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:41,159 Speaker 1: This is what you do. You're You're an Amazon delivery 288 00:18:41,240 --> 00:18:44,920 Speaker 1: person and inside the vehicle with you at all times. 289 00:18:45,359 --> 00:18:49,440 Speaker 1: At all times is a three sixty degree camera that 290 00:18:49,560 --> 00:18:52,600 Speaker 1: can see anything and everything that you do, every action, 291 00:18:52,960 --> 00:18:58,200 Speaker 1: and it's constantly monitoring and judging you. Did you yawn 292 00:18:58,480 --> 00:19:02,240 Speaker 1: a little bit? Oh bro? Why did you do that? 293 00:19:02,320 --> 00:19:04,359 Speaker 1: Don't do that? Did you take a hand off the 294 00:19:04,359 --> 00:19:07,080 Speaker 1: wheel for a second? You didn't just touch your cell phone? 295 00:19:07,080 --> 00:19:11,600 Speaker 1: Did you like there? It really does monitor everything, and 296 00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:14,359 Speaker 1: it monitors what how much time you spend behind the wheel, 297 00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:17,080 Speaker 1: how much time you're away from that driver's seat to 298 00:19:17,200 --> 00:19:21,959 Speaker 1: deliver packages at a certain location. It's intense stuff, and 299 00:19:22,000 --> 00:19:24,600 Speaker 1: that's why you know it's I would say it's a 300 00:19:24,680 --> 00:19:28,720 Speaker 1: direct reason why you you may have heard these stories. 301 00:19:28,800 --> 00:19:33,080 Speaker 1: We've heard many about drivers having to urinate in the 302 00:19:33,119 --> 00:19:36,399 Speaker 1: car in order to keep their productivity rating up and 303 00:19:36,440 --> 00:19:39,280 Speaker 1: to prevent them from getting in trouble with their little 304 00:19:39,320 --> 00:19:43,919 Speaker 1: three sixty spy that lives with them. And transporting packages 305 00:19:44,359 --> 00:19:48,320 Speaker 1: is an incredibly difficult job. Whether it's the postal service, 306 00:19:48,320 --> 00:19:52,000 Speaker 1: whether it's FedEx, whether it's Amazon, people are pretty hard 307 00:19:52,000 --> 00:19:54,800 Speaker 1: on delivery drivers and it's important to remember that a 308 00:19:54,840 --> 00:20:00,040 Speaker 1: lot of times drivers are being forced to go go 309 00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:04,000 Speaker 1: through certain optimized routes they are, you know, they have 310 00:20:04,320 --> 00:20:07,240 Speaker 1: a route dictated to them, and they can in some 311 00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:10,440 Speaker 1: cases be penalized if they say, well, it doesn't make 312 00:20:10,480 --> 00:20:12,000 Speaker 1: sense for me to go this way, so I'm gonna 313 00:20:12,040 --> 00:20:14,439 Speaker 1: go this other way, you know traffic, or I have 314 00:20:14,480 --> 00:20:17,000 Speaker 1: another drop that's just down the street, let me knock 315 00:20:17,040 --> 00:20:19,640 Speaker 1: that out. Well, you know, Ben, it makes a lot 316 00:20:19,680 --> 00:20:24,000 Speaker 1: more sense why there's been a massive uptick in videos 317 00:20:24,119 --> 00:20:27,800 Speaker 1: of delivery drivers like maybe tossing a package a little 318 00:20:27,800 --> 00:20:29,920 Speaker 1: bit to keep down the amount of time they're spending 319 00:20:29,920 --> 00:20:32,639 Speaker 1: in one place. That's it's crazy to think about. And 320 00:20:32,680 --> 00:20:36,040 Speaker 1: you know, it certainly doesn't excuse destroying the contents of 321 00:20:36,040 --> 00:20:37,840 Speaker 1: a package by throwing it or something. But you could 322 00:20:37,840 --> 00:20:43,000 Speaker 1: totally see why what happened. Yeah, absolutely can. And the 323 00:20:43,040 --> 00:20:46,960 Speaker 1: companies that are selling this tracking software, they're making it killing. 324 00:20:47,520 --> 00:20:50,560 Speaker 1: Don't worry about them. They're they're doing fine, we assure you. 325 00:20:51,000 --> 00:20:53,440 Speaker 1: But there's a lot of criticism coming out, and many 326 00:20:53,440 --> 00:20:57,960 Speaker 1: critics are increasingly concerned about what happens when your office 327 00:20:58,119 --> 00:21:02,960 Speaker 1: becomes your home and your company's little version of Big 328 00:21:02,960 --> 00:21:06,440 Speaker 1: Brother becomes in a very real way, like a nosy 329 00:21:06,560 --> 00:21:10,920 Speaker 1: roommate that's hovering over your shoulder. Like, for instance, Matt, 330 00:21:11,080 --> 00:21:15,440 Speaker 1: you are you are recording in your house, in your office. 331 00:21:15,600 --> 00:21:18,479 Speaker 1: I'm recording in a room in my place that I 332 00:21:18,560 --> 00:21:23,119 Speaker 1: just converted into an office. You know, this is just 333 00:21:23,160 --> 00:21:26,520 Speaker 1: a room that I converted into an office as well. Yes, yes, yes, 334 00:21:26,720 --> 00:21:30,639 Speaker 1: we just we're working in conversion rooms, I guess. But 335 00:21:30,960 --> 00:21:35,600 Speaker 1: our personal lives also occur in these rooms, you know. 336 00:21:35,760 --> 00:21:41,359 Speaker 1: And the question then becomes a question about thresholds, boundaries, 337 00:21:41,760 --> 00:21:46,040 Speaker 1: and comfort levels. How much should your employer be able 338 00:21:46,080 --> 00:21:50,160 Speaker 1: to know about your personal life? Uh? Found a great 339 00:21:50,240 --> 00:21:54,119 Speaker 1: quote by an outfit called the Electronic Frontier Foundation the 340 00:21:54,119 --> 00:21:56,240 Speaker 1: e f F. We've talked about them on the show before, 341 00:21:56,720 --> 00:21:59,159 Speaker 1: and I like how they put this. They put it 342 00:21:59,320 --> 00:22:05,320 Speaker 1: pretty succinctly when they talk about when when they introduce 343 00:22:05,400 --> 00:22:09,479 Speaker 1: the concept of bosswear, and when they talk about how 344 00:22:09,800 --> 00:22:13,119 Speaker 1: these tools are sold to employers and how they can 345 00:22:13,160 --> 00:22:18,400 Speaker 1: affect employees. And they say, some vendors build their tools 346 00:22:18,440 --> 00:22:23,280 Speaker 1: as automatic time tracking or workplace analytics software. Others market 347 00:22:23,320 --> 00:22:27,240 Speaker 1: to companies concerned about data breaches or intellectual property theft. 348 00:22:27,640 --> 00:22:32,480 Speaker 1: We'll call these tools collectively bosswear. Hey, here's the term there. 349 00:22:32,480 --> 00:22:35,399 Speaker 1: It is the e f F is using it. So 350 00:22:35,440 --> 00:22:38,480 Speaker 1: I think we were totally fine and using bosswear. Yeah, 351 00:22:38,600 --> 00:22:41,960 Speaker 1: let's continue with the quote. While aimed at helping employers, 352 00:22:42,040 --> 00:22:45,640 Speaker 1: boss ware puts workers privacy and security at risk by 353 00:22:45,680 --> 00:22:50,480 Speaker 1: logging every click and key stroke, covertly gathering information for lawsuits, 354 00:22:50,680 --> 00:22:53,600 Speaker 1: and using other spying features that go far beyond what 355 00:22:53,760 --> 00:22:58,280 Speaker 1: is necessary and proportionate to manage a workforce. Yeah, so 356 00:22:59,080 --> 00:23:03,200 Speaker 1: their their idea is that this is overkilled basically, That's 357 00:23:03,280 --> 00:23:05,359 Speaker 1: that's kind of the crux of their argument. And yeah, 358 00:23:05,400 --> 00:23:08,240 Speaker 1: it's clear that the e f F has a horse 359 00:23:08,280 --> 00:23:11,040 Speaker 1: in this race. They have an opinion, they have a 360 00:23:11,080 --> 00:23:14,359 Speaker 1: badger in the bag because again, they're a nonprofit that 361 00:23:14,480 --> 00:23:18,240 Speaker 1: is intensely focused on worrying about privacy and the digital sphere. 362 00:23:18,400 --> 00:23:20,840 Speaker 1: That is their job, right, So it's not hard to 363 00:23:20,880 --> 00:23:23,439 Speaker 1: see why they have all people would think this is 364 00:23:23,440 --> 00:23:27,360 Speaker 1: a bad thing. Remotely controlling a laptop camera in an office, 365 00:23:27,640 --> 00:23:31,480 Speaker 1: that's one thing. But then imagine you have a camera 366 00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:35,560 Speaker 1: that turns on without your consent in your own bedroom, 367 00:23:36,200 --> 00:23:40,960 Speaker 1: like after work hours. You know, now it's like nine thirty, 368 00:23:41,160 --> 00:23:45,240 Speaker 1: you're kicking it, you know, on the bed, uh, next 369 00:23:45,280 --> 00:23:47,520 Speaker 1: to your desk or something. I don't know, you're watching 370 00:23:47,640 --> 00:23:51,480 Speaker 1: always sunning in Philadelphia, or you're you're knitting because that's 371 00:23:51,480 --> 00:23:53,879 Speaker 1: your new hobby during the pandemic for some reason. In 372 00:23:53,920 --> 00:23:58,959 Speaker 1: this scenario, and all of a sudden, you notice that 373 00:23:59,040 --> 00:24:03,160 Speaker 1: little little red light on your camera whatever your devices 374 00:24:03,720 --> 00:24:05,680 Speaker 1: has popped on and you don't know how long it's 375 00:24:05,720 --> 00:24:08,360 Speaker 1: been on, and you don't know why it's on. You 376 00:24:08,400 --> 00:24:10,960 Speaker 1: can go and shut it off yourself or cover it, 377 00:24:11,440 --> 00:24:14,359 Speaker 1: but now you know someone else can drive your car 378 00:24:14,560 --> 00:24:17,879 Speaker 1: as it were. Add to this the even more black 379 00:24:17,920 --> 00:24:22,200 Speaker 1: mirrorsque part of this. I believe there's functionality in some 380 00:24:22,280 --> 00:24:25,240 Speaker 1: devices to have the camera on without seeming as though 381 00:24:25,280 --> 00:24:30,080 Speaker 1: it is on. But just in in many of these 382 00:24:30,119 --> 00:24:34,680 Speaker 1: software's defense, it is only used on company time, right, 383 00:24:35,040 --> 00:24:37,919 Speaker 1: So if there's a certain number of work hours you're 384 00:24:37,960 --> 00:24:40,119 Speaker 1: supposed to keep in a week, and those work hours 385 00:24:40,119 --> 00:24:43,639 Speaker 1: are between a certain time, then generally it could or 386 00:24:43,680 --> 00:24:46,720 Speaker 1: would be active and then would be inactive, and other 387 00:24:46,760 --> 00:24:49,800 Speaker 1: times that isn't always the case. And you know, there's 388 00:24:49,800 --> 00:24:52,479 Speaker 1: so many variables that go into that. This is a 389 00:24:52,520 --> 00:24:56,000 Speaker 1: real scenario that could happen. Yeah, yeah, And at this 390 00:24:56,040 --> 00:24:58,560 Speaker 1: point there might be some folks in the audience who 391 00:24:58,640 --> 00:25:00,840 Speaker 1: some of us are thinking, well, well, this is kind 392 00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:04,600 Speaker 1: of are we being a sensationalistic or guys, calm down, 393 00:25:04,720 --> 00:25:08,959 Speaker 1: it's the Internet. Privacy doesn't exist anymore. But before we 394 00:25:09,000 --> 00:25:11,800 Speaker 1: ask if this is alarmist, let's look at some of 395 00:25:11,840 --> 00:25:16,440 Speaker 1: those general categories of monitoring. What we have just talked 396 00:25:16,480 --> 00:25:20,760 Speaker 1: about is the most common type of surveillance activity monitoring. 397 00:25:21,160 --> 00:25:24,760 Speaker 1: It's a log of which apps you use, which websites 398 00:25:24,800 --> 00:25:28,280 Speaker 1: you visit. It could include stuff like who you email 399 00:25:28,880 --> 00:25:33,000 Speaker 1: and when, including the subject line metadata. It could also 400 00:25:33,040 --> 00:25:37,120 Speaker 1: include posts you make on social media on your work computer, tablet, 401 00:25:37,240 --> 00:25:41,679 Speaker 1: or phones. Let's say you just got hot news story 402 00:25:41,880 --> 00:25:44,560 Speaker 1: or an announcement and you go to Twitter or you 403 00:25:44,600 --> 00:25:46,800 Speaker 1: go to Facebook and you just pop it up there 404 00:25:46,840 --> 00:25:49,560 Speaker 1: while you're thinking about it. Then your employer will know 405 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:54,119 Speaker 1: about that as well. And this is one of the 406 00:25:54,160 --> 00:25:57,160 Speaker 1: most widely accepted things. Just assume people know what you're 407 00:25:57,160 --> 00:26:01,600 Speaker 1: doing on the work computer, but the boss where that records, 408 00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:04,080 Speaker 1: you know, physical input on your mouth or your keyboard, 409 00:26:05,119 --> 00:26:10,280 Speaker 1: You might be surprised by by the process that occurs there. 410 00:26:10,320 --> 00:26:14,040 Speaker 1: This takes a look at a minute by minute breakdown, 411 00:26:14,240 --> 00:26:16,720 Speaker 1: you know what I mean, Like, what are Ben and 412 00:26:16,760 --> 00:26:20,240 Speaker 1: Matt typing what are Matt and Ben reading and when 413 00:26:20,240 --> 00:26:23,000 Speaker 1: are they reading it? And then that is used as 414 00:26:23,080 --> 00:26:26,600 Speaker 1: kind of a stand in for productivity, and anybody has 415 00:26:26,600 --> 00:26:29,560 Speaker 1: worked in the field of research before, you know that 416 00:26:30,520 --> 00:26:32,719 Speaker 1: there's a lot of stuff you might be doing that 417 00:26:32,880 --> 00:26:36,760 Speaker 1: looks inactive because you're just you're reading a book, right, 418 00:26:37,040 --> 00:26:40,800 Speaker 1: or you're deep in a weird government PDF. And that's 419 00:26:40,840 --> 00:26:44,560 Speaker 1: the one pager on for like three hours. Yeah, no, 420 00:26:44,680 --> 00:26:46,760 Speaker 1: you're right, And it's a weird thing to bring into 421 00:26:46,800 --> 00:26:50,600 Speaker 1: our world. Been because for me, and let's say the 422 00:26:50,680 --> 00:26:54,600 Speaker 1: last the forty five minutes to the run up of recording, 423 00:26:55,480 --> 00:26:58,679 Speaker 1: I stopped reading and I started jumping in YouTube to 424 00:26:58,720 --> 00:27:02,560 Speaker 1: see how this has been reported on by other outfits, right, 425 00:27:02,640 --> 00:27:06,040 Speaker 1: And so I'm literally sitting here at my computer with 426 00:27:06,080 --> 00:27:10,080 Speaker 1: my cameras covered of course, and my microphone turned off, 427 00:27:10,440 --> 00:27:13,200 Speaker 1: but I'm watching YouTube videos and I'm just trying to 428 00:27:13,320 --> 00:27:15,800 Speaker 1: take in as much information as i can to see 429 00:27:15,800 --> 00:27:18,720 Speaker 1: how other people have covered it. And if this, you know, 430 00:27:18,760 --> 00:27:21,000 Speaker 1: if this system or one of these systems was watching 431 00:27:21,080 --> 00:27:23,520 Speaker 1: me and monitoring me, it would look like I'm literally 432 00:27:23,560 --> 00:27:27,400 Speaker 1: just watching YouTube videos, um, which is what I was doing. 433 00:27:27,920 --> 00:27:29,840 Speaker 1: But it was part of my job. So It's just 434 00:27:30,040 --> 00:27:34,480 Speaker 1: a strange thing. You know, if you're if your job 435 00:27:34,680 --> 00:27:39,000 Speaker 1: is based on you know, a quantitative number of tasks, 436 00:27:39,040 --> 00:27:43,440 Speaker 1: like in you know, the let's say the Amazon drivers circumstance, 437 00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:47,480 Speaker 1: this specific thing monitoring your computer isn't gonna help. But 438 00:27:47,680 --> 00:27:50,199 Speaker 1: a you know, watching how many tasks are done in 439 00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:53,320 Speaker 1: a certain amount of time is like, in a weird, 440 00:27:53,640 --> 00:27:58,040 Speaker 1: messed up, dystopian way, something that an employer should kind 441 00:27:58,040 --> 00:28:01,719 Speaker 1: of be interested in, Um, that kind of metric, I guess, 442 00:28:02,560 --> 00:28:07,040 Speaker 1: but when it comes I mean to an extent, right, yeah, 443 00:28:07,080 --> 00:28:12,399 Speaker 1: But you know, in many office employees situations, it's a 444 00:28:12,520 --> 00:28:17,040 Speaker 1: very different scenario. It's it's almost like you should be 445 00:28:17,200 --> 00:28:21,399 Speaker 1: more focused on the results of whatever those hours are 446 00:28:21,440 --> 00:28:24,120 Speaker 1: spent doing. What are the results of those hours, rather 447 00:28:24,200 --> 00:28:28,880 Speaker 1: than here's all the stuff that's occurring during those hours. Right. 448 00:28:29,040 --> 00:28:33,240 Speaker 1: It changes based on the nature of the task, the 449 00:28:33,359 --> 00:28:36,400 Speaker 1: nature of the work. So for example, if you are 450 00:28:36,560 --> 00:28:41,200 Speaker 1: working in a call center, then the phone becomes a 451 00:28:41,440 --> 00:28:46,120 Speaker 1: very robust way of monitoring how this person made X, 452 00:28:46,160 --> 00:28:50,040 Speaker 1: took X calls or processed why claims in Z space 453 00:28:50,080 --> 00:28:54,400 Speaker 1: of time they spent you know, X amount of time 454 00:28:55,040 --> 00:28:57,600 Speaker 1: on a bathroom break or something like that, you know, 455 00:28:57,680 --> 00:29:01,120 Speaker 1: and even down breaking it down into it by minute increments, 456 00:29:01,920 --> 00:29:07,000 Speaker 1: whereas which is pretty gross. Yeah, yeah, I get that. 457 00:29:07,080 --> 00:29:11,600 Speaker 1: It's like necessary, you know, because maybe somebody just doesn't 458 00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:13,360 Speaker 1: want to be on the phone for a minute and 459 00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:15,720 Speaker 1: they're out of break time, so they just go and 460 00:29:16,480 --> 00:29:19,480 Speaker 1: sit in the bathroom. That happens. People at call centers 461 00:29:19,520 --> 00:29:24,600 Speaker 1: have done that, um, just to get away. But it 462 00:29:24,800 --> 00:29:29,240 Speaker 1: is kind of weird, right because like over time, does 463 00:29:29,280 --> 00:29:33,920 Speaker 1: that mean that your employer has has modeled out your 464 00:29:34,400 --> 00:29:40,600 Speaker 1: bowel movements? Yeah, like three fifteen, we're gonna lose Norman 465 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:47,640 Speaker 1: or Henrietta for about five minutes. Man Shavid has taken 466 00:29:47,680 --> 00:29:50,840 Speaker 1: a long time to make his sandwich today, All right, 467 00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:54,800 Speaker 1: Well we'll see what happens when he gets back. And 468 00:29:55,280 --> 00:30:01,400 Speaker 1: there are generally two ways boss wear is deployed. Well industry, Yeah, 469 00:30:01,480 --> 00:30:04,280 Speaker 1: this is really important. There could be an app that 470 00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:08,560 Speaker 1: is visible to you or maybe even controllable by the 471 00:30:08,680 --> 00:30:12,640 Speaker 1: worker something where like Okay, I am officially starting my day, 472 00:30:12,720 --> 00:30:16,600 Speaker 1: so I'm going to log into some program and then 473 00:30:16,640 --> 00:30:19,320 Speaker 1: I'm going to log out of that program and the 474 00:30:19,320 --> 00:30:23,480 Speaker 1: stuff I've done is documented, that's transparent. That's just a 475 00:30:23,480 --> 00:30:26,360 Speaker 1: way of keeping people you know, accountable, and it could 476 00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:28,840 Speaker 1: be a win win for everyone because that kind of 477 00:30:28,880 --> 00:30:35,280 Speaker 1: thing also in theory, helps employees establish their boundaries. Right, 478 00:30:35,320 --> 00:30:39,479 Speaker 1: I have logged out. I am no longer Paul Mission 479 00:30:39,480 --> 00:30:42,600 Speaker 1: Control decade. I am Paul the case of thea king, 480 00:30:43,120 --> 00:30:46,680 Speaker 1: uh that that kind of stuff. But the other way 481 00:30:48,320 --> 00:30:52,640 Speaker 1: is not near as as um above board. The other 482 00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:58,680 Speaker 1: way is a secret background process that you cannot see 483 00:30:58,840 --> 00:31:01,600 Speaker 1: unless you know what you're looking for. And a lot 484 00:31:01,640 --> 00:31:05,400 Speaker 1: of people were so overworked these days, frankly, don't consider 485 00:31:05,400 --> 00:31:08,000 Speaker 1: it a good use of time to go digging into that, 486 00:31:08,200 --> 00:31:10,640 Speaker 1: you know, And and the companies that sell this stuff, 487 00:31:11,080 --> 00:31:16,560 Speaker 1: they don't have a strong opinion about which approach organizations 488 00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:19,600 Speaker 1: should take. They will say, hey, well install it either way. 489 00:31:19,680 --> 00:31:21,840 Speaker 1: You want them to know what's up, that's fine. You 490 00:31:21,880 --> 00:31:24,200 Speaker 1: want to you want a secret, you like secrets, will 491 00:31:24,200 --> 00:31:28,520 Speaker 1: do a secret will do a secret one? Yeah, I mean, 492 00:31:28,840 --> 00:31:31,560 Speaker 1: it's just creepy to imagine that it could be happening 493 00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:34,920 Speaker 1: without your knowledge. There are several videos you can find 494 00:31:34,960 --> 00:31:40,360 Speaker 1: on YouTube where there's like a zoom session essentially of 495 00:31:40,400 --> 00:31:43,920 Speaker 1: someone pitching their employee monitoring software and they go into 496 00:31:44,000 --> 00:31:48,040 Speaker 1: a spiel where they they discussed this thing exactly how 497 00:31:48,080 --> 00:31:51,400 Speaker 1: to install it covertly if you wish to, so it 498 00:31:51,440 --> 00:31:53,920 Speaker 1: just goes out to all your employees machines on the 499 00:31:53,960 --> 00:31:58,800 Speaker 1: network at once. Um yikes. And then it gets a 500 00:31:58,800 --> 00:32:02,680 Speaker 1: little complicated depends on if you're like logged into your 501 00:32:02,680 --> 00:32:05,200 Speaker 1: company's VPN or something like that, or how you could 502 00:32:05,200 --> 00:32:09,080 Speaker 1: actually get access in that way. But it is something 503 00:32:09,120 --> 00:32:11,920 Speaker 1: that can happen, and it is designed. Many of these 504 00:32:11,920 --> 00:32:15,600 Speaker 1: softwares are designed to be installed that way. Uh Ben. 505 00:32:15,680 --> 00:32:18,320 Speaker 1: I wanted to take one second, just as we're going 506 00:32:18,360 --> 00:32:20,400 Speaker 1: through all this stuff and just name off a couple 507 00:32:20,440 --> 00:32:23,280 Speaker 1: of these pieces of software so people can be aware. 508 00:32:24,600 --> 00:32:28,080 Speaker 1: I jumped over to PC mag the old PC magazine 509 00:32:28,080 --> 00:32:31,000 Speaker 1: that I used to get in the mail. Really miss 510 00:32:31,000 --> 00:32:35,280 Speaker 1: it and miss it? That's okay, um there, This is 511 00:32:35,320 --> 00:32:39,400 Speaker 1: their best employee monitoring software for two. You can find 512 00:32:39,440 --> 00:32:44,880 Speaker 1: this online right now. One is called Tara Mind. Tara Mind. 513 00:32:45,360 --> 00:32:47,360 Speaker 1: I heard a lot about this one, and in the 514 00:32:47,360 --> 00:32:51,520 Speaker 1: research for this there's also active track heard about that 515 00:32:51,560 --> 00:32:56,680 Speaker 1: one one called I've been I'm gonna say very atto cerebral. 516 00:32:58,000 --> 00:33:02,440 Speaker 1: So it looks like it looks like riato cerebral um 517 00:33:02,680 --> 00:33:08,800 Speaker 1: Controlo's hub staff that sounds more like like an actual 518 00:33:08,840 --> 00:33:13,360 Speaker 1: staffing saying, um like it sounds like a service that 519 00:33:13,760 --> 00:33:18,040 Speaker 1: rents out husbands for people. That's the old hub staff. 520 00:33:19,440 --> 00:33:23,520 Speaker 1: Oh man. Uh, there's also inter Guard. You can learn 521 00:33:23,560 --> 00:33:26,920 Speaker 1: a lot about Interguard. That one has been featured I 522 00:33:26,960 --> 00:33:29,680 Speaker 1: think by the BBC and CBS and a couple other 523 00:33:29,840 --> 00:33:39,040 Speaker 1: couple other outlets staff cop. I don't like that one. Nope, nope. Uh. 524 00:33:39,160 --> 00:33:43,080 Speaker 1: There's also vera clock sounds like a timekeeping one, desk, 525 00:33:43,200 --> 00:33:50,080 Speaker 1: time Pro and work Pulse without the new LS. Yeah, 526 00:33:50,560 --> 00:33:53,120 Speaker 1: that's just that. That's just a few because there are 527 00:33:53,160 --> 00:33:56,080 Speaker 1: there are so many. There are too many really for 528 00:33:56,200 --> 00:34:00,920 Speaker 1: us to name in today's show. But the f did 529 00:34:00,960 --> 00:34:04,040 Speaker 1: some great work digging into these. Again, yes they are 530 00:34:04,160 --> 00:34:08,480 Speaker 1: biased source, but we want to acknowledge that they found 531 00:34:08,560 --> 00:34:14,160 Speaker 1: some commonalities across these many, many companies and services. First 532 00:34:14,200 --> 00:34:18,440 Speaker 1: thing first, every piece of software, every product they looked at, 533 00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:22,719 Speaker 1: had the ability to take those regular, frequent screenshots of 534 00:34:22,719 --> 00:34:27,320 Speaker 1: a company device. Ben is up at three am reading 535 00:34:27,560 --> 00:34:32,560 Speaker 1: you know about the history of her Hermetic Magic. Okay, okay, 536 00:34:32,800 --> 00:34:37,360 Speaker 1: says you know, whatever whatever I have saw on department 537 00:34:37,560 --> 00:34:40,200 Speaker 1: is watching my computer at the time. He better do 538 00:34:40,239 --> 00:34:43,719 Speaker 1: an episode about this, because otherwise this guy is just 539 00:34:44,320 --> 00:34:49,239 Speaker 1: being a midnight wizard. It's PM Eastern and Matt has 540 00:34:49,280 --> 00:34:52,319 Speaker 1: recorded another piano riff and he's attempting to edit it 541 00:34:52,360 --> 00:34:57,239 Speaker 1: on his work machine. Crap, I love this. Yeah, yeah, 542 00:34:57,360 --> 00:35:01,520 Speaker 1: it's uh. Let's see it's uh. At the same time, 543 00:35:01,920 --> 00:35:06,840 Speaker 1: this is saar On sees At for some reason, then 544 00:35:06,880 --> 00:35:11,200 Speaker 1: has twenty three tabs open on the history of the 545 00:35:11,200 --> 00:35:14,240 Speaker 1: refugee crisis in Bhutan, and now he's going to wiki 546 00:35:14,280 --> 00:35:23,719 Speaker 1: travel and now he's looking up a recipe for casseroles. 547 00:35:23,719 --> 00:35:25,960 Speaker 1: So the screen scots are one thing, they can see 548 00:35:25,960 --> 00:35:30,239 Speaker 1: what's actively happening on your machine, but it's still contained 549 00:35:30,280 --> 00:35:34,560 Speaker 1: within your machine, right. The other thing many of them 550 00:35:34,640 --> 00:35:38,000 Speaker 1: can do, not all of them. Many of them can 551 00:35:38,080 --> 00:35:43,040 Speaker 1: provide real time video links to your the device, So 552 00:35:43,160 --> 00:35:46,480 Speaker 1: can you can actually monitor the employee themselves rather than 553 00:35:46,520 --> 00:35:49,600 Speaker 1: just what the employee is in putting into the computer. 554 00:35:50,680 --> 00:35:53,240 Speaker 1: You can see that you can see that person's face 555 00:35:53,760 --> 00:35:58,760 Speaker 1: as they read an email, right or as they listen 556 00:35:58,840 --> 00:36:01,080 Speaker 1: to a zoom call with the belief that they have 557 00:36:01,160 --> 00:36:05,439 Speaker 1: turned their camera off. This also I'm getting a little 558 00:36:05,440 --> 00:36:07,600 Speaker 1: sci fi here, but this is also really interesting to 559 00:36:07,680 --> 00:36:09,880 Speaker 1: me because if it was coupled with the right kind 560 00:36:09,920 --> 00:36:14,239 Speaker 1: of algorithm, with the right kind of AI, you could 561 00:36:14,320 --> 00:36:19,880 Speaker 1: conceivably measure people's micro expressions, the little little emotional ticks 562 00:36:19,880 --> 00:36:23,560 Speaker 1: that folks can't often control, and then you would get 563 00:36:23,600 --> 00:36:28,920 Speaker 1: great insight into what those employees were actually thinking. Legally, 564 00:36:29,000 --> 00:36:31,480 Speaker 1: that is something you can do, but it feels really 565 00:36:31,680 --> 00:36:35,880 Speaker 1: ethically fraught, doesn't it. I mean, let's let's see. Okay, 566 00:36:35,880 --> 00:36:38,920 Speaker 1: so let's say this, you're, for some reason, checking on 567 00:36:39,200 --> 00:36:43,520 Speaker 1: checking on Matt as he learns about vitamin D and 568 00:36:43,560 --> 00:36:47,680 Speaker 1: its effects with a macron for his newest song that 569 00:36:47,760 --> 00:36:51,759 Speaker 1: he's writing. And sure, yeah, sure, and uh and so 570 00:36:52,560 --> 00:36:56,560 Speaker 1: uh the soone, the I T or whatever monitoring apartment says, Oh, 571 00:36:56,560 --> 00:36:58,560 Speaker 1: this is interesting. I like that. I like that riff. 572 00:36:58,560 --> 00:37:02,960 Speaker 1: He's really he's really spreading his wings musically. I wonder 573 00:37:03,040 --> 00:37:05,879 Speaker 1: what it looks like right now when he's playing this, 574 00:37:06,000 --> 00:37:09,160 Speaker 1: and they could turn on the feed and maybe they see, 575 00:37:09,360 --> 00:37:12,920 Speaker 1: you know, they see you diligently editing the song you 576 00:37:12,960 --> 00:37:20,920 Speaker 1: have created, but then they say sorry, But then they say, 577 00:37:20,960 --> 00:37:25,839 Speaker 1: I'm suspicious of this new kind of like app or 578 00:37:25,880 --> 00:37:30,640 Speaker 1: this program that he downloaded for this music editing mission. 579 00:37:31,160 --> 00:37:35,319 Speaker 1: So I'm gonna jump in. I'm gonna take control of 580 00:37:35,360 --> 00:37:39,480 Speaker 1: his desktop, remotely access it, and I'm gonna learn more 581 00:37:39,480 --> 00:37:41,560 Speaker 1: about this program, and I might delete it if I 582 00:37:41,640 --> 00:37:44,200 Speaker 1: want to, and I don't have to. I don't have 583 00:37:44,239 --> 00:37:46,160 Speaker 1: to say that I did it. I'm just gonna do it. 584 00:37:47,080 --> 00:37:51,719 Speaker 1: So the problem here is that these these pieces of 585 00:37:51,760 --> 00:37:55,200 Speaker 1: software don't really distinguish between your work related stuff and 586 00:37:55,239 --> 00:37:59,080 Speaker 1: your personal stuff. So if you have an office job 587 00:37:59,120 --> 00:38:01,680 Speaker 1: and you have a compute, or you've probably used it 588 00:38:01,760 --> 00:38:05,719 Speaker 1: for some personal thing, a small digital errand that's very, 589 00:38:05,800 --> 00:38:09,320 Speaker 1: very common almost everywhere, except for the kind of offices 590 00:38:09,360 --> 00:38:12,960 Speaker 1: you need a security clearance to work in. So imagine this. 591 00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:14,480 Speaker 1: This is what I was thinking of. I think a 592 00:38:14,560 --> 00:38:18,160 Speaker 1: lot of people have experienced this. You're working on something 593 00:38:18,719 --> 00:38:20,360 Speaker 1: and then it hits you. You You go, oh, it's the 594 00:38:20,360 --> 00:38:22,560 Speaker 1: twenty nine I need to pay that utility bill. I 595 00:38:22,600 --> 00:38:24,480 Speaker 1: don't want to be late on it. Or oh I 596 00:38:24,520 --> 00:38:26,640 Speaker 1: should check my bank account just to make sure you 597 00:38:26,680 --> 00:38:29,720 Speaker 1: know a charge went through or something. The vast majority 598 00:38:29,719 --> 00:38:31,839 Speaker 1: of people are not going to think twice about just 599 00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:35,800 Speaker 1: knocking out that little task. They're gonna open another tab 600 00:38:35,840 --> 00:38:38,200 Speaker 1: and whatever their browser is, they're gonna go to the 601 00:38:38,200 --> 00:38:41,160 Speaker 1: website they need, they're going to enter their password, their 602 00:38:41,280 --> 00:38:43,640 Speaker 1: use their name, and they're gonna pay up. And the 603 00:38:43,719 --> 00:38:47,760 Speaker 1: monitary service sucks that up as well. So your employer 604 00:38:47,920 --> 00:38:51,600 Speaker 1: might not you know, I know that you're making pasta 605 00:38:51,719 --> 00:38:54,439 Speaker 1: for dinner or something, but they can definitely know your 606 00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:58,920 Speaker 1: bank information, your personal log It's for everything, for social 607 00:38:58,960 --> 00:39:02,200 Speaker 1: media as well. That can spell trouble if a hack occurs, 608 00:39:02,520 --> 00:39:06,520 Speaker 1: if corruption occurs, and it can also is the scary part. 609 00:39:07,040 --> 00:39:12,960 Speaker 1: It could conceivably be used to pressure employees. Man, I 610 00:39:13,200 --> 00:39:17,840 Speaker 1: I check my bank account today on my work machine. 611 00:39:19,239 --> 00:39:26,040 Speaker 1: Uh well, let's pause for a second so we can 612 00:39:26,040 --> 00:39:29,400 Speaker 1: all go change our passwords and then we'll return to 613 00:39:29,520 --> 00:39:41,239 Speaker 1: explore the future of the workplace surveillance conspiracy. Okay, so 614 00:39:41,280 --> 00:39:43,239 Speaker 1: this is this is the thing I wanted to bring 615 00:39:43,320 --> 00:39:45,439 Speaker 1: up with you, Matt, and I'm really interested to see 616 00:39:45,440 --> 00:39:50,479 Speaker 1: what our fellow listeners think about this. So what if 617 00:39:51,080 --> 00:39:55,279 Speaker 1: an employer finds something and finds evidence of something that 618 00:39:55,400 --> 00:40:01,200 Speaker 1: is against company policy, not like not necessarily um a crime, 619 00:40:02,000 --> 00:40:05,239 Speaker 1: maybe just some like they were they were sloppy with 620 00:40:05,280 --> 00:40:10,520 Speaker 1: confidential information, or they did some kind of violation of policy, 621 00:40:10,560 --> 00:40:16,320 Speaker 1: like they're not allowed to be on personal uh personal 622 00:40:16,360 --> 00:40:19,000 Speaker 1: sites or something like that during work hours, but they were. 623 00:40:19,400 --> 00:40:22,160 Speaker 1: What if the employer doesn't, you know, immediately flag that 624 00:40:22,280 --> 00:40:25,000 Speaker 1: and ask them to discontinue that behavior. What if they 625 00:40:25,080 --> 00:40:31,120 Speaker 1: save that as AMMO as leverage for the future, you 626 00:40:31,160 --> 00:40:33,879 Speaker 1: know what I mean? Like that that is possible? Yeah, 627 00:40:33,960 --> 00:40:36,839 Speaker 1: I guess so, I'm trying to imagine this. I think 628 00:40:36,840 --> 00:40:39,240 Speaker 1: there are only a few scenarios where that could occur. 629 00:40:40,120 --> 00:40:42,239 Speaker 1: It reminds me of a discussion we had with a 630 00:40:42,239 --> 00:40:45,399 Speaker 1: certain person that came on our show that I won't 631 00:40:45,520 --> 00:40:52,360 Speaker 1: name of like saving Ammo for like contract disputes, you know, um, 632 00:40:52,360 --> 00:40:55,920 Speaker 1: for the future. But I don't know. I can't imagine. 633 00:40:56,520 --> 00:40:59,880 Speaker 1: I can't imagine they're not being some pr nightmare for 634 00:40:59,880 --> 00:41:05,279 Speaker 1: a company that like saves compromise on their employees, right right, Well, 635 00:41:05,320 --> 00:41:08,880 Speaker 1: think about it. Maybe, I agree would be a rarefied field, 636 00:41:08,960 --> 00:41:11,960 Speaker 1: But think about it. Maybe in the world of politics 637 00:41:13,320 --> 00:41:17,400 Speaker 1: that that's where that information could be useful and actionable. 638 00:41:18,280 --> 00:41:21,120 Speaker 1: When we're looking at the future workplace surveillance. That is 639 00:41:21,160 --> 00:41:24,080 Speaker 1: an extreme example. I think it's safe to say that 640 00:41:24,160 --> 00:41:28,160 Speaker 1: the majority of companies are not scheming to like blackmail 641 00:41:28,200 --> 00:41:33,760 Speaker 1: and extort their employees, not necessarily because it's an ethical quantry, 642 00:41:34,120 --> 00:41:37,080 Speaker 1: more so because it's like why it's not worth the effort. 643 00:41:37,320 --> 00:41:40,719 Speaker 1: It's kind of like a Rube Goldberg esque approach to 644 00:41:41,000 --> 00:41:43,759 Speaker 1: getting people to do stuff you want. You could just 645 00:41:43,920 --> 00:41:48,399 Speaker 1: ask them, you do pay them to work? Yeah, you know, Yeah, 646 00:41:48,440 --> 00:41:52,319 Speaker 1: that's the thing. A lot of this feels like, so, 647 00:41:52,560 --> 00:41:56,560 Speaker 1: I don't know, covert coercion to get your employees to 648 00:41:56,600 --> 00:41:58,400 Speaker 1: do what you want them to do, rather than just 649 00:41:58,480 --> 00:42:03,680 Speaker 1: being an active you know, an active boss without monitoring, 650 00:42:03,680 --> 00:42:08,040 Speaker 1: an active manager, without micromanaging. There's a you know, you 651 00:42:08,080 --> 00:42:10,920 Speaker 1: can do it. I I don't know if I don't 652 00:42:10,920 --> 00:42:12,680 Speaker 1: want to see it. I don't know. We run teams 653 00:42:12,719 --> 00:42:15,400 Speaker 1: here and and I don't know if we're good at 654 00:42:15,400 --> 00:42:17,600 Speaker 1: it or not. I I guess we have to get 655 00:42:17,600 --> 00:42:20,879 Speaker 1: feedback from our people. But it feels like you can 656 00:42:20,920 --> 00:42:24,280 Speaker 1: be hands on without being a micro manager and without 657 00:42:24,320 --> 00:42:30,680 Speaker 1: employing the most massive, intrusive micromanagement available, which is this 658 00:42:30,800 --> 00:42:35,319 Speaker 1: boss ware. Yeah, and the concerns are pretty self evident here. 659 00:42:36,000 --> 00:42:40,000 Speaker 1: Your job is conspiring, but they're not necessarily conspiring against you. 660 00:42:40,040 --> 00:42:43,280 Speaker 1: They're conspiring to make sure that you're focused. And most people, 661 00:42:43,600 --> 00:42:45,799 Speaker 1: if we're being honest are not about to risk their 662 00:42:45,840 --> 00:42:50,279 Speaker 1: livelihoods rocking the boat for privacy. You know what I mean. Like, 663 00:42:50,320 --> 00:42:54,920 Speaker 1: if you are not somehow being monitored yet, your odds 664 00:42:54,920 --> 00:42:58,279 Speaker 1: to be monitored in the future are incredibly high. And 665 00:42:58,360 --> 00:43:03,360 Speaker 1: that is because of is explosion of people working remotely 666 00:43:03,440 --> 00:43:06,960 Speaker 1: or working from home. Back in in fact, found this 667 00:43:07,120 --> 00:43:10,680 Speaker 1: survey by an off it called Gardner, and their survey 668 00:43:10,800 --> 00:43:17,520 Speaker 1: showed that of organizations across the planet are already using 669 00:43:18,160 --> 00:43:23,880 Speaker 1: some form of employee movement data, seventeen percent again across 670 00:43:23,920 --> 00:43:29,440 Speaker 1: the planet, we're already monitoring computer usage information and sixteen 671 00:43:29,560 --> 00:43:35,280 Speaker 1: percent we're monitoring activity on Microsoft Outlook or generic calendar usage. 672 00:43:35,560 --> 00:43:40,520 Speaker 1: That was pre pandemic. The numbers have skyrocketed since and 673 00:43:40,600 --> 00:43:45,799 Speaker 1: it's pretty difficult to find accurate numbers right now, just 674 00:43:45,840 --> 00:43:50,800 Speaker 1: because it all happened so quickly. Your employer can legally 675 00:43:50,880 --> 00:43:55,560 Speaker 1: monitor almost anything you do at work. They're like the 676 00:43:55,680 --> 00:43:59,000 Speaker 1: laws are written such that they they can't follow you 677 00:43:59,080 --> 00:44:01,919 Speaker 1: in the bathroom basically, but they know when you're going, 678 00:44:02,520 --> 00:44:05,120 Speaker 1: they know Norman, they know what you're doing, and really 679 00:44:05,960 --> 00:44:09,319 Speaker 1: it makes sense they can do this as long as 680 00:44:09,360 --> 00:44:13,320 Speaker 1: the reason for their monitoring. The rationale is important enough 681 00:44:13,680 --> 00:44:17,799 Speaker 1: to them. This is this goes into like reading mail. 682 00:44:17,920 --> 00:44:21,280 Speaker 1: You get snail mail that goes to a business. Uh, 683 00:44:21,400 --> 00:44:25,640 Speaker 1: for instance, our job. Our job has never like gone 684 00:44:25,640 --> 00:44:30,040 Speaker 1: through packages sent to us. But that's that's not because 685 00:44:30,080 --> 00:44:32,839 Speaker 1: they can't. It's because most of the people who work 686 00:44:32,880 --> 00:44:37,280 Speaker 1: with really cool and then also there frankly, they're probably 687 00:44:37,280 --> 00:44:40,360 Speaker 1: too busy. Yeah, we definitely Uh, I don't think anyone's 688 00:44:40,400 --> 00:44:43,239 Speaker 1: gone through that. I did notice one time we had 689 00:44:43,480 --> 00:44:47,960 Speaker 1: a letter, and actual snail mail letter that looked as 690 00:44:47,960 --> 00:44:50,799 Speaker 1: though it had been opened and then reclosed, you know, 691 00:44:50,960 --> 00:44:57,359 Speaker 1: using Steam. What that's flattering. It's a long time ago. 692 00:44:58,400 --> 00:45:01,280 Speaker 1: I cared enough. Wow, and they were just checking for anthrax. 693 00:45:01,320 --> 00:45:05,640 Speaker 1: I think, so, yeah, this this thing is real. It's 694 00:45:05,719 --> 00:45:09,680 Speaker 1: very real. I'd like to just quickly mentioned Ben. Right 695 00:45:09,719 --> 00:45:16,320 Speaker 1: before we started rolling, I texted our boss and asked 696 00:45:16,400 --> 00:45:21,160 Speaker 1: that person if there's any employee monitoring software installed in 697 00:45:21,200 --> 00:45:24,680 Speaker 1: our computers or if they use any kind of productivity analytics, 698 00:45:25,440 --> 00:45:29,920 Speaker 1: and this person said they were unaware of such software. 699 00:45:30,360 --> 00:45:34,040 Speaker 1: I was unable to locate anything physically running on my machine, 700 00:45:34,760 --> 00:45:39,399 Speaker 1: and that makes me feel pretty good about our situation. Yeah, 701 00:45:39,440 --> 00:45:43,920 Speaker 1: we're fortunate, especially when you consider how closely other people 702 00:45:44,160 --> 00:45:48,040 Speaker 1: are monitored to a degree it becomes tyrannical. You know, 703 00:45:48,520 --> 00:45:53,040 Speaker 1: uh this, of course, it's not necessarily sinister. Of course, 704 00:45:53,120 --> 00:45:56,280 Speaker 1: not all companies are the same. There are almost certainly 705 00:45:56,360 --> 00:46:00,640 Speaker 1: bad faith actors out there, right. It is completely possible, 706 00:46:00,719 --> 00:46:03,879 Speaker 1: I would even say plausible, that there's you know, a 707 00:46:03,880 --> 00:46:08,040 Speaker 1: creepy individual who might be using this to spy on 708 00:46:08,200 --> 00:46:12,720 Speaker 1: someone inappropriately. But that doesn't mean that the entire company 709 00:46:12,840 --> 00:46:16,080 Speaker 1: is doing right. But the problem there is that there 710 00:46:16,160 --> 00:46:20,680 Speaker 1: is no uniform process to address like data breaches, for instance, 711 00:46:21,000 --> 00:46:23,160 Speaker 1: and there's not really a lot of leeway on the 712 00:46:23,160 --> 00:46:29,160 Speaker 1: employees side to draw clear work home boundaries. The legislation 713 00:46:29,239 --> 00:46:32,319 Speaker 1: just isn't there yet. And until that stuff catches up, 714 00:46:32,719 --> 00:46:36,719 Speaker 1: it is seriously, I know it sounds a little stereotypical 715 00:46:36,760 --> 00:46:39,279 Speaker 1: to say this, It is seriously best to assume that 716 00:46:39,320 --> 00:46:43,400 Speaker 1: you are being observed whenever you are around work equipment. 717 00:46:45,000 --> 00:46:50,680 Speaker 1: Just just just know it, embrace it. And it's a 718 00:46:50,760 --> 00:46:56,520 Speaker 1: weird scenario mm hmm, yeah, but also it's it's strange. 719 00:46:56,560 --> 00:46:58,799 Speaker 1: One thing that really stuck out to me about a 720 00:46:58,800 --> 00:47:03,600 Speaker 1: lot of this criticism is that state level actors can 721 00:47:03,680 --> 00:47:05,759 Speaker 1: do a lot of the same stuff you know what 722 00:47:05,800 --> 00:47:08,560 Speaker 1: I mean. This is what we're seeing is a strategy 723 00:47:08,719 --> 00:47:13,720 Speaker 1: and a technique across the public private sphere. Don't do anything. 724 00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:17,280 Speaker 1: You're a camera if you don't want your boss, possibly 725 00:47:17,360 --> 00:47:20,719 Speaker 1: our n ESA in turn steve to see it. And 726 00:47:20,880 --> 00:47:23,880 Speaker 1: be careful with your personal devices to Like Matt, you 727 00:47:23,880 --> 00:47:26,319 Speaker 1: made the excellent point earlier. He said, Hey, maybe you 728 00:47:26,320 --> 00:47:28,040 Speaker 1: can listen at work, but don't listen on your on 729 00:47:28,080 --> 00:47:31,839 Speaker 1: your work device. Here's the thing, though, There's a question 730 00:47:31,920 --> 00:47:34,759 Speaker 1: I have for you. If say, for instance, you have 731 00:47:35,000 --> 00:47:40,960 Speaker 1: your own personal smartphone and you have installed work apps 732 00:47:41,320 --> 00:47:44,960 Speaker 1: on there of some sort, like a productivity thing or 733 00:47:45,000 --> 00:47:49,160 Speaker 1: an email app of some kind, how much access does 734 00:47:49,239 --> 00:47:51,799 Speaker 1: that give your employer to the other stuff on your 735 00:47:51,840 --> 00:47:59,040 Speaker 1: personal device. That's interesting Theoretically with something like Microsoft, they've 736 00:47:59,040 --> 00:48:04,759 Speaker 1: got Viva insights and monitoring that occurs with us, that 737 00:48:04,840 --> 00:48:09,560 Speaker 1: that happens to us, ben our Microsoft Outlook and our 738 00:48:09,640 --> 00:48:14,239 Speaker 1: calendar and all the other massive Microsoft three sweet can 739 00:48:14,280 --> 00:48:18,080 Speaker 1: be monitored if it's on your device. But that doesn't 740 00:48:18,239 --> 00:48:21,160 Speaker 1: mean that they can look at everything else that you 741 00:48:21,200 --> 00:48:23,399 Speaker 1: do on your phone. At least to my knowledge from 742 00:48:23,560 --> 00:48:27,080 Speaker 1: my understanding of reading several articles here, all kind of 743 00:48:27,120 --> 00:48:33,520 Speaker 1: associated with stuff life life hackers, security gladiators, Gizmoto. I 744 00:48:33,600 --> 00:48:35,320 Speaker 1: looked at a bunch of that stuff just to see 745 00:48:35,960 --> 00:48:39,880 Speaker 1: what can happen. But that does mean that certain activity 746 00:48:40,000 --> 00:48:44,799 Speaker 1: on your personal device is monitored, um in some way, 747 00:48:45,080 --> 00:48:49,000 Speaker 1: whether it's just by Microsoft and with Viva, it's just 748 00:48:49,040 --> 00:48:51,880 Speaker 1: giving you insights on your activity, and it's not sharing 749 00:48:51,920 --> 00:48:57,799 Speaker 1: that necessarily with your boss. But I don't know if 750 00:48:57,840 --> 00:49:00,759 Speaker 1: it can access your microphone or camera, and in that 751 00:49:01,080 --> 00:49:04,520 Speaker 1: in that case, you would have to give that system 752 00:49:04,560 --> 00:49:07,359 Speaker 1: like you'd have to give Microsoft teams access to your 753 00:49:07,480 --> 00:49:14,120 Speaker 1: camera and microphone. Oh shoot, which we all do right, yeah, 754 00:49:14,239 --> 00:49:16,600 Speaker 1: well said. And this is where we stand on the 755 00:49:16,640 --> 00:49:22,080 Speaker 1: precipice right of all the surveillance to come, it's important 756 00:49:22,080 --> 00:49:25,480 Speaker 1: to know that it's not just your employer doing it. 757 00:49:25,480 --> 00:49:30,040 Speaker 1: It's kind of like, obviously every country that can afford 758 00:49:30,080 --> 00:49:34,319 Speaker 1: spies is gonna hire spies because they work your job. 759 00:49:34,520 --> 00:49:38,239 Speaker 1: Isn't out to get you, quote unquote, but they do 760 00:49:38,440 --> 00:49:42,080 Speaker 1: want to have as much visibility as possible, and they've 761 00:49:42,160 --> 00:49:45,520 Speaker 1: kind of I think the pendulum swung. And what's happened 762 00:49:45,560 --> 00:49:48,160 Speaker 1: is that because so many people are working from home, 763 00:49:48,280 --> 00:49:51,560 Speaker 1: and because so many leaders in a given company or 764 00:49:51,680 --> 00:49:55,239 Speaker 1: organization want to be able to show that they produce results. 765 00:49:55,719 --> 00:49:59,120 Speaker 1: They're clamping down and they're they're trying to learn as 766 00:49:59,239 --> 00:50:03,319 Speaker 1: much about what their employees are doing as possible. That 767 00:50:03,440 --> 00:50:08,040 Speaker 1: itself is not necessarily a bad thing. The problem is 768 00:50:08,440 --> 00:50:14,080 Speaker 1: that the line between your expectations, your completely reasonable expectations 769 00:50:14,080 --> 00:50:18,640 Speaker 1: of privacy, and the desires of an employer, that line 770 00:50:18,719 --> 00:50:22,440 Speaker 1: is really fuzzy, and it's align that's easy to step on. 771 00:50:22,600 --> 00:50:25,239 Speaker 1: It's a line that's easy to cross, and it's very 772 00:50:25,239 --> 00:50:29,480 Speaker 1: difficult to pull things back once you've gone over that threshold. 773 00:50:29,960 --> 00:50:32,719 Speaker 1: So be safe out there, folks. Can't wait to hear 774 00:50:33,040 --> 00:50:38,279 Speaker 1: your war stories about odd surveillance monitoring. I can't. You know, 775 00:50:38,360 --> 00:50:41,920 Speaker 1: these are kind of episodes that UH sometimes lead like 776 00:50:42,040 --> 00:50:45,240 Speaker 1: I t experts to write to us with tips and tricks, 777 00:50:45,280 --> 00:50:47,759 Speaker 1: and I love that. So shout out to our pal 778 00:50:47,880 --> 00:50:52,279 Speaker 1: James if you're listening that. Uh. I always enjoyed those conversations. 779 00:50:52,840 --> 00:50:55,000 Speaker 1: But yeah, give us tips and tricks that we can 780 00:50:55,040 --> 00:50:58,520 Speaker 1: share with your fellow listeners about how to how to 781 00:50:58,640 --> 00:51:01,800 Speaker 1: maintain that boundary as best as you can to be safe, 782 00:51:02,000 --> 00:51:05,200 Speaker 1: you know, Yeah, no matter what you're doing or what's 783 00:51:05,280 --> 00:51:09,080 Speaker 1: what you think might be monitoring. Just remember that Cortana 784 00:51:09,160 --> 00:51:13,719 Speaker 1: and Alexa and your Google Home and your phone can 785 00:51:13,760 --> 00:51:16,239 Speaker 1: always hear you because it's always listening for you to 786 00:51:16,280 --> 00:51:24,120 Speaker 1: wake it up, so it doesn't really matter. That's very inspiring, yep, 787 00:51:24,800 --> 00:51:28,480 Speaker 1: very inspiring. Mr Frederick uh We we want to hear 788 00:51:28,520 --> 00:51:30,719 Speaker 1: from you. What do you think the future of workplace 789 00:51:30,760 --> 00:51:33,920 Speaker 1: surveillance is? Let us know. We try to be easy 790 00:51:33,960 --> 00:51:36,560 Speaker 1: to find online. You can find us on Facebook and 791 00:51:36,600 --> 00:51:40,920 Speaker 1: Twitter and YouTube at Conspiracy Stuff on Instagram. We are 792 00:51:40,960 --> 00:51:43,719 Speaker 1: a Conspiracy Stuff show. If you don't want to use 793 00:51:43,760 --> 00:51:47,160 Speaker 1: social media, you can instead use your phone and your 794 00:51:47,239 --> 00:51:51,200 Speaker 1: mouth to contact us via voice. Our number is one 795 00:51:51,280 --> 00:51:54,759 Speaker 1: eight three three st d w y t K. Yes, 796 00:51:54,800 --> 00:51:58,920 Speaker 1: you'll have three minutes. Those three minutes are yours. Go nuts, 797 00:51:59,760 --> 00:52:03,480 Speaker 1: give weird with it, give yourself a cool nickname. Let 798 00:52:03,560 --> 00:52:05,600 Speaker 1: us know if we can use your name and door 799 00:52:05,760 --> 00:52:08,960 Speaker 1: voice on the air, and most importantly, when you call 800 00:52:09,040 --> 00:52:11,879 Speaker 1: one three three st d w y t K, I'd 801 00:52:11,920 --> 00:52:14,359 Speaker 1: just like to say it um when you call. Don't 802 00:52:14,400 --> 00:52:16,719 Speaker 1: feel like you have to censor yourself. 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