Speaker 1: Happy Saturday, everybody. We have an upcoming episode about organized
Speaker 1: labor in the nineteen forties in the US, and it's
Speaker 1: got some connections to the National Labor Relations Act of
Speaker 1: nineteen thirty five, also known as the Wagner Act. We
Speaker 1: talked about the Wagner Act and how it related to workers'
Speaker 1: rights to unionize and strike in our episode on the
Speaker 1: Flint sit Down Strike, so we are replaying that episode
Speaker 1: as Today's Saturday Classic. This one originally came out on
Speaker 1: December sixth, twenty twenty one. Enjoy Welcome to Stuff You
Speaker 1: Missed in History Class, a production of iHeartRadio. Hello, and
Speaker 1: welcome to the podcast. I'm Tracy V. Wilson and I'm
Speaker 1: Holly Frye. The eighty fifth anniversary of the Flint sit
Speaker 1: Down Strike is this month. That's marked as starting on
Speaker 1: December thirtieth of nineteen thirty six, but that name and
Speaker 1: date don't quite capture the whole of the strike. Flint,
Speaker 1: Michigan was absolutely at the heart of auto manufacturing for
Speaker 1: General Motors, and the strike was largely centered around Flint,
Speaker 1: but this strike also involved workers at GM factories all
Speaker 1: over the United States, and while the major strike activity
Speaker 1: in Flint started on December thirtieth. It also followed earlier
Speaker 1: strikes in other parts of Michigan and in other states.
Speaker 1: So this name and date, as they're commonly known, it's
Speaker 1: really a little bit broader than that. We have talked
Speaker 1: about several strikes on the show before, including strikes in
Speaker 1: the United States, Canada, England, and Ireland. But this one
Speaker 1: in particular has been cited as one of the most
Speaker 1: significant and influential strikes in United States labor history, and
Speaker 1: this strike took place while the world was still trying
Speaker 1: to recover from the Great Depression. This economic catastrophe had,
Speaker 1: of course been devastating to people all over the globe.
Speaker 1: General Motors in particular had cut nearly half of its
Speaker 1: staff while also increasing requirements for workers productivity and implementing
Speaker 1: seasonal layoffs. Although the company would loan money to laid
Speaker 1: off workers, they had to pay it back out of
Speaker 1: their wages once they were back on the job. But
Speaker 1: even people who had steady work at GM during the
Speaker 1: Great Depression didn't really have a sense of job security.
Speaker 1: There were so many people who were out of work
Speaker 1: and just desperate for jobs that the company knew it
Speaker 1: could fire anyone for essentially any reason, and have a
Speaker 1: replacement waiting immediately. It was especially true in places like Flint,
Speaker 1: where GM was by far the biggest employer. The US
Speaker 1: government took various steps to try to bolster the nation's
Speaker 1: economy during the depression. One was the National Industrial Recovery
Speaker 1: Act of nineteen thirty three. This was part of President
Speaker 1: Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, and he signed it into
Speaker 1: law during his first one hundred days in office. This
Speaker 1: was an act quote to encourage national Industrial recovery, to
Speaker 1: foster fair competition, to provide for the construction of certain
Speaker 1: useful public works, and for other purposes. The National Industrial
Speaker 1: Recovery Act suspended a lot of the antitrust legislation that
Speaker 1: we talked about recently in our episodes on Ida Tarbell. Instead,
Speaker 1: this Act encouraged businesses to form alliances and to establish
Speaker 1: codes of fair competition. These codes were meant to apply
Speaker 1: across whole industries, setting standards for things like consumer protections,
Speaker 1: fair wages, and prices for goods. The idea was that
Speaker 1: these codes would reduce unfair business practices that were making
Speaker 1: it harder for struggling businesses to stay afloat during the crisis,
Speaker 1: so things like undercutting competitors' prices to the point that
Speaker 1: they just could not go that low. Section se an
Speaker 1: A of the Act read quote, Every code of fair competition, agreement,
Speaker 1: and license, approved, prescribed, or issued under this Title shall
Speaker 1: contain the following conditions. One that employees shall have the
Speaker 1: right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
Speaker 1: own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint,
Speaker 1: or coercion of employers of labor or their agents in
Speaker 1: the designation of such representatives or in self organization or
Speaker 1: in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
Speaker 1: or other mutual aid or protection. Two that no employee
Speaker 1: and no one seeking employment, shall be required, as a
Speaker 1: condition of employment, to join any company union, or to
Speaker 1: refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of
Speaker 1: his own choosing. And three that employers shall comply with
Speaker 1: the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and
Speaker 1: other conditions of employment approved or prescribed by the President.
Speaker 1: This Act contain lots of provisions that we haven't gotten
Speaker 1: into here, including authorizing the President to establish a federal
Speaker 1: emergency Administration of public works. But in terms of the
Speaker 1: Flint sit down strike, Section seven A was key. It
Speaker 1: protected employee's right to organize and bargain collectively, and this
Speaker 1: was a huge deal. Although the term collective bargaining had
Speaker 1: been coined by British social reformer Beatrice web in eighteen
Speaker 1: ninety one, workers had been trying to work together to
Speaker 1: secure better pay in working conditions for centuries, and in
Speaker 1: the US, trade unions and other efforts to collectively bargain
Speaker 1: had been illegal. They were treated as criminal conspiracies. The
Speaker 1: National Industrial Recovery Act was the first federal law legalizing
Speaker 1: union membership and collective bargaining, but in general employers were
Speaker 1: reluctant to comply with various provisions of the Act. There
Speaker 1: were also questions about whether the Supreme Court would find
Speaker 1: it to be unconstitutional. Some employers used this uncertainty to
Speaker 1: justify their non compliance with the law, and they kept
Speaker 1: working directly against their employees' legal right to unionize. As
Speaker 1: a result, labor disputes, including strikes, surged as workers and
Speaker 1: their unions fought for the kinds of rights and protections
Speaker 1: they were legally entitled to, and some of these disputes
Speaker 1: led to violence. In August of nineteen thirty three, Roosevelt
Speaker 1: established the National Labor Board, chaired by Senator Robert F.
Speaker 1: Wagner of New York, to try to mediate between the
Speaker 1: growing labor movement and industry leaders. In addition to Wagner,
Speaker 1: the Board had six members, three each representing labor and industry.
Speaker 1: But the board really didn't have much enforcement power. Companies
Speaker 1: that were operating under one of the codes that had
Speaker 1: been established under the new law were allowed to display
Speaker 1: an emblem of a blue eagle, and all that the
Speaker 1: NLB could really do when companies stopped following the rules
Speaker 1: was to make them take their eagle down. In May
Speaker 1: of nineteen thirty five, the Supreme Court issued its decision
Speaker 1: in Scheckter Poultry Corps versus United States, which did indeed
Speaker 1: find the National Industrial Recovery Act to be unconstitutional. At
Speaker 1: the same time, though the act's industrial provisions were supposed
Speaker 1: to expire after two years or sooner if the President
Speaker 1: or Congress decided they were no longer needed, this decision
Speaker 1: came just a few weeks before that expiration date. A
Speaker 1: big reason behind that decision was that this act delegated
Speaker 1: a lot of legislative power to the president without really
Speaker 1: setting guidelines on how the president could use that power.
Speaker 1: That was not the whole decision, obviously, but that's sort
Speaker 1: of the crux. People were divided as to whether or
Speaker 1: to what extent this Act had been effective at what
Speaker 1: it set out to do. It was supposed to quote,
Speaker 1: remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce.
Speaker 1: It was supposed to do that by reducing labor disputes,
Speaker 1: reducing unfair competitive practices, and making sure industries were working
Speaker 1: at full capacity. It had generally improved workers pay and
Speaker 1: working conditions, and it had cut down on some of
Speaker 1: the competitive practices that were undermining the economic recovery, but
Speaker 1: it was also blamed for things like making various goods
Speaker 1: more expensive and slowing the pace of production. The government
Speaker 1: still had a vested interest in this idea of removing
Speaker 1: obstructions to interstate commerce, including obstructions that stemmed from labor disputes,
Speaker 1: and labor activists were advocating for the protections that had
Speaker 1: been part of the National Industrial Recovery Act to be restored.
Speaker 1: This led to the National Labor Relations Act, introduced by
Speaker 1: Senator Wagner and also called the Wagner Act, which was
Speaker 1: signed into law on July sixth, nineteen thirty five. This
Speaker 1: was an act to quote diminish the causes of labor
Speaker 1: disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce, to create
Speaker 1: a National Labor Relations Board, and for other purposes. The
Speaker 1: Act applied to all employers involved in interstate commerce, with
Speaker 1: the exception of airlines, railroads, agriculture, and the government. It
Speaker 1: framed employer's refusal to respect their employee's right to unionize
Speaker 1: or to accept collective bargaining as the cause of industrial
Speaker 1: strife leading to strikes another unrest. The Act also noted
Speaker 1: that companies have a lot more of power than their
Speaker 1: employees do, especially when those employees aren't protected by a
Speaker 1: fair contract or allowed to collectively bargain. It once again
Speaker 1: legalized employee's right to organize and outlawed employer's interference with
Speaker 1: that right, and it also empowered the National Labor Relations
Speaker 1: Board to oversee this whole process and mediate disputes. But
Speaker 1: since the Supreme Court had overturned the National Industrial Recovery Act,
Speaker 1: many employers expected the National Labor Relations Act to be
Speaker 1: struck down as well. Even though the law barred employers
Speaker 1: from interfering with employees' right to unionize. Many employers kept
Speaker 1: doing exactly that, things like hiring detectives to investigate, spy
Speaker 1: on and harass union organizers and members, establishing company unions
Speaker 1: that really represented the interest of the business rather than
Speaker 1: its employees, and firing or demoting people who were suspected
Speaker 1: of organizing or joining a union. So this brings us
Speaker 1: to the US automotive industry and specifically to Flint, Michigan,
Speaker 1: which we will get to after a sponsor break. The
Speaker 1: American Federation of Labor was established in the late nineteenth
Speaker 1: century to bring craft and trade unions together under one umbrella.
Speaker 1: Its first member unions represented people like tailors, iron molders,
Speaker 1: and carpenters, and in its early years, the AFL did
Speaker 1: not work with industrial unions at all. Craft unions representing
Speaker 1: people like carpenters were considered to represent skilled workers, while
Speaker 1: industrial workers so people who worked on factory assembly lines
Speaker 1: were thought of as unskilled. But around the time the
Speaker 1: Wagner Act was passed, the AFL established a Committee for
Speaker 1: Industrial Organization. This committee soon split off from the AFL
Speaker 1: and it re established itself as its own organization, which
Speaker 1: was the Congress of Industrial Organizations United Auto Workers, was
Speaker 1: established in Detroit, Michigan, in nineteen thirty five, and at
Speaker 1: first it became part of the AFL, and like the AFL,
Speaker 1: its initial focus was mainly on the automotive industry skilled workers,
Speaker 1: not the people who worked on assembly lines in factories.
Speaker 1: But when the CIO split off from the AFL, the
Speaker 1: United Autoworkers went too soon. The UAW was trying to
Speaker 1: organize factory workers, especially at the Big three automakers, GM,
Speaker 1: Ford and Chrysler. GM was the largest auto manufacturer in
Speaker 1: the world at the time, with sixty nine plants in
Speaker 1: thirty five cities, many in the Midwest. Initially, the UAW
Speaker 1: focused more on GM and Chrysler because Henry Ford was
Speaker 1: vehemently anti union. GM actively worked against these unionization efforts.
Speaker 1: According to information unearthed and Senate committee hearings, between nineteen
Speaker 1: thirty four and nineteen thirty six, GM spent more than
Speaker 1: eight hundred thirty nine thousand dollars on labor detective services,
Speaker 1: more than half of it paid to the Pinkertons. This
Speaker 1: detective work involved everything from investigating union organizers to planting
Speaker 1: spies within the union to harassing and threatening workers. This
Speaker 1: Congressional committee described GM's spy work as quote a monument
Speaker 1: to the most colossal supersystem of spies yet devised in
Speaker 1: any American corporation. There are also reports that GM conscripted
Speaker 1: an organization known as the Black Legion to intimidate and
Speaker 1: threaten its employees. The Black Legion was compared to the
Speaker 1: KKK and was aggressively anti union, and this went beyond
Speaker 1: targeting the union itself and the workers at the factories.
Speaker 1: Part of GM's union busting effort involved telling male workers'
Speaker 1: wives that their husband's union activities were going to get
Speaker 1: them fired, as well as convincing women that their husbands
Speaker 1: were up to no good, suggesting that they were out
Speaker 1: late partying or soliciting sex workers, or that they were
Speaker 1: lying about the union and that they were really spending
Speaker 1: their afterwork time having extramarital affairs. As UAW organizers tried
Speaker 1: to unionize GM's factories, they were working against all of this,
Speaker 1: and they were finding common themes among the workers' gravances
Speaker 1: from plants a plant. A lot of it was in
Speaker 1: line with what we already discussed, like firings that seemed
Speaker 1: arbitrary or retaliatory. The factories were also poorly ventilated, and
Speaker 1: during periods of hot weather, workers passed out or even
Speaker 1: died from overheating, with their coworkers expected to keep working
Speaker 1: until someone came to remove the body. Many of the
Speaker 1: jobs were dangerous, including working around dangerous substances with no
Speaker 1: ventilation or protective equipment. There was also an immense focus
Speaker 1: on speed, to the point that workers on the assembly
Speaker 1: line did not have time to go to the bathroom.
Speaker 1: There was also nobody who could cover for a person
Speaker 1: who became ill or injured on the job. Workers talked
Speaker 1: about people who got sick during the day and kept
Speaker 1: working on the assembly line even though they were vomiting.
Speaker 1: There was also speed up during peak production times, with
Speaker 1: workers expected to complete their tasks on the assembly line
Speaker 1: at seemingly superhuman speeds. If a factory was in danger
Speaker 1: of missing its daily quota, speed up would start near
Speaker 1: the end of people's shifts, when they were already exhausted.
Speaker 1: For many workers, take home pay was not the biggest issue,
Speaker 1: but the way wages were calculated was a problem. Many
Speaker 1: workers on the line weren't paid an hourly or a
Speaker 1: daily rate. They were paid by the peace, and the
Speaker 1: rate for each piece didn't necessarily stay the same. It
Speaker 1: was often set at a higher amount at the start
Speaker 1: of a pay period to encourage the workers to go
Speaker 1: as quickly as possible, but then it would drop as
Speaker 1: payday approached. People wound up making less than they expected,
Speaker 1: and this whole shifting pay rate felt like a bait
Speaker 1: and switch. Women working at the GM factories faced an
Speaker 1: additional layer of hostility. Some reported being sexually harassed and
Speaker 1: even assaulted by their supervisors, who would then use the
Speaker 1: assault as leverage to try to guarantee the women compliance
Speaker 1: at work. All of these factors fed into the sit
Speaker 1: down strike. Most of the strikes that had taken place
Speaker 1: in the United States before this point had involved workers
Speaker 1: leaving their job sites and organizing things like picket lines, demonstrations, protests, pamphleteering,
Speaker 1: and speeches. While the strike at GM in nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: six and thirty seven still involved things like picket lines
Speaker 1: and other activities outside the building, those were primarily the
Speaker 1: work of the striking workers' supporters, because in a sit
Speaker 1: down strike, employees stayed inside the factory, physically occupying it.
Speaker 1: This strategy had some advantages for the striking workers. A
Speaker 1: typical strike could only be effective if the vast majority
Speaker 1: of the workers participated. If only a few people walked out,
Speaker 1: the company could just redistribute their work among their coworkers
Speaker 1: or higher replacements without too much trouble. But a sit
Speaker 1: down strike allowed a smaller number of people to take
Speaker 1: control of the whole workplace. Employers also couldn't simply hire
Speaker 1: replacement workers to take over, since the striking workers had
Speaker 1: control of the building. Remaining inside the workplace also gave
Speaker 1: the workers more protection from violence. Employers were reluctant to
Speaker 1: remove workers by force due to the risk of damaging
Speaker 1: expensive machinery and equipment, but there were also some downsides.
Speaker 1: Striking workers had to be separated from their families and
Speaker 1: their friends who didn't work with them, depending on where
Speaker 1: the strike was taking place. Striking workers didn't have access
Speaker 1: to things like bathing facilities or adequate sleeping spaces, although
Speaker 1: some of the GM strikers were able to make reasonably
Speaker 1: comfortable beds with the padding that was used to make
Speaker 1: car seats. Sit down strikes were also questionably legal at best,
Speaker 1: since strikers were essentially trespassing. The idea that a few
Speaker 1: workers could decide to go on strike and take over
Speaker 1: the whole building also ran against the spirit of the
Speaker 1: National Labor Relation Act, which was really focused on the
Speaker 1: idea of a majority of employees forming a union em bargaining,
Speaker 1: not on a smaller number of employees forcing the issue
Speaker 1: by occupying the building. In the US, the first sit
Speaker 1: down strike is generally noted as having happened in nineteen
Speaker 1: oh six, when members of the Industrial Workers of the
Speaker 1: World stopped working but stayed at their stations at a
Speaker 1: General Electric factory in Schenectady, New York. Workers in Europe
Speaker 1: started occupying their workplaces after World War One, including roughly
Speaker 1: half of the metal workers in Paris in the spring
Speaker 1: of nineteen thirty six, and that led to sweeping labor
Speaker 1: reforms in France. In the US, workers at a rubber
Speaker 1: plant in Akron, Ohio, sat down in early nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: six as well. Fisher Body was a division of GM
Speaker 1: and Fisher Body workers in Atlanta sat down at two
Speaker 1: different points in October and November of nineteen thirty six,
Speaker 1: with the November strike spreading to other plants in the
Speaker 1: Atlanta area as well. Well. Workers at Bendix Products in
Speaker 1: South Bend, Indiana sat down. In mid November and mid December,
Speaker 1: workers sat down at two GM plants in Kansas City, Missouri,
Speaker 1: and then at a body stamping plant in Cleveland, Ohio,
Speaker 1: as well as the Kelsey Hayes wheel plant in Detroit, Michigan.
Speaker 1: All of these were either divisions of or suppliers of GM.
Speaker 1: On December sixteenth, nineteen thirty six, the UAW asked for
Speaker 1: a meeting with GM upper management, but GM refused, maintaining
Speaker 1: that any collective bargaining would have to happen at the
Speaker 1: local level, from plant to plant. But the UAW argued
Speaker 1: that the issues that it wanted to discuss, things like
Speaker 1: recognizing the union for collective bargaining, a seniority system for workers,
Speaker 1: and the tremendous speeds expected of workers on the line,
Speaker 1: were things that applied for every GM factory in the nation.
Speaker 1: Late December also wasn't ideal for the UAW to be
Speaker 1: planning a huge strike. Most of GM's workers celebrated Christmas,
Speaker 1: so this was just not a great time for people
Speaker 1: to lose their wages or to be separated from their families.
Speaker 1: Since many of GM's factories were clustered together, in the Midwest,
Speaker 1: the weather at the end of the year would probably
Speaker 1: not be all that conducive to things like the pickets
Speaker 1: and the protests that were needed to support the strike.
Speaker 1: And Michigan had elected a new governor, Frank Murphy, who
Speaker 1: was expected to be far more sympathetic to organize labor
Speaker 1: than his predecessor had been, but he was not going
Speaker 1: to take office until January first. However, workers themselves took
Speaker 1: this decision out of the uaw's hands, and we're going
Speaker 1: to get to that after we pause for a sponsor break.
Speaker 1: As the UAW tried to organize GM workers in Flint, Michigan,
Speaker 1: GM tried to reduce its risk in the event of
Speaker 1: a strike. On December twenty ninth, nineteenth six, the company
Speaker 1: transferred union members out of its Chevrolet body stamping plant
Speaker 1: in Flint that was known as Fisher Body Number two. Then,
Speaker 1: on December thirtieth, the company started removing the dies that
Speaker 1: were used to stamp out body parts from another Flint plant,
Speaker 1: which was Fisher Body Number one. This was one of
Speaker 1: only two sets of dyes that GM was using to
Speaker 1: stamp out auto bodies, and their removal from the plant
Speaker 1: represented not only a loss of jobs because the people
Speaker 1: who did that work would not have work to do anymore,
Speaker 1: but also a loss of leverage. If the workers took
Speaker 1: over the plant with the dies still in it, that
Speaker 1: would stop production on multiple models of GM cars. So
Speaker 1: when the workers at Fisher I realized what was happening
Speaker 1: with the dies, they immediately started a strike, taking over
Speaker 1: the building and workers at Fisher iiO started striking on
Speaker 1: the same day. There are also oral history testimony suggesting
Speaker 1: that another factor might have been at work here as well.
Speaker 1: Flat glass workers had also gone on strike and that
Speaker 1: was leading to a potential glass shortage for car manufacturing.
Speaker 1: If the factories in Flint ran out of glass, production
Speaker 1: would shut down anyway, so workers decided to strike before
Speaker 1: that could happen. The strike's organizers decided that only men
Speaker 1: could occupy the plants during the strike, so while there
Speaker 1: were women working at GM, they could not be part
Speaker 1: of the sit down, but women's participation in other aspects
Speaker 1: of the strike was absolutely critical. The Women's Auxiliary, which
Speaker 1: was organized by twenty three year old Genora Johnson who
Speaker 1: was later Genora Johnson Dollinger, set up a strike kitchen
Speaker 1: to feed the striking workers and their families. They delivered
Speaker 1: food directly to the factories. The Women's Auxiliary also did
Speaker 1: the striker's laundry, and about three weeks into the strike,
Speaker 1: they started a daycare for the striking workers' children. They
Speaker 1: also brought to the factories to visit their family members,
Speaker 1: and they picketed and did other work in support of
Speaker 1: the strike. It took some time for some of these
Speaker 1: efforts to get off the ground, in part because the
Speaker 1: company had put so much effort into sowing distrust of
Speaker 1: the union among the workers wives who support the Women's
Speaker 1: Auxiliary needed. In oral histories recorded in the nineteen eighties
Speaker 1: and nineties, women described going to the factories after the
Speaker 1: strike started expecting to drag their husbands out of some
Speaker 1: kind of debauchery or a radical communist frenzy, but then
Speaker 1: staying to help make food once they realized what was
Speaker 1: actually going on. Whether they worked at GM or not,
Speaker 1: the women involved in the auxiliary faced hostility from company
Speaker 1: supporters and the strike's critics, including people questioning their morality
Speaker 1: and implying that they were sex workers. We should note
Speaker 1: that while there was not like a stereotypical, screaming radical
Speaker 1: conspiracy of communism happening in the strike. There were definitely
Speaker 1: communists and socialists among the strikers and within the labor
Speaker 1: movement in general. Both communism and socialism had and have
Speaker 1: a focus on fair treatment of workers. This is not
Speaker 1: really that surprising. Genora Johnson Dollinger, for example, had become
Speaker 1: a socialist at the age of sixteen. She was one
Speaker 1: of the more radical people involved with the strike, though
Speaker 1: many others had a general interest in communist or socialist
Speaker 1: ideals while not formally being a member of either party.
Speaker 1: And we should also take a moment to note that,
Speaker 1: at least as far as we know, all the women
Speaker 1: in the auxiliary in Flint were white. Although GM did
Speaker 1: employ black people in its factories, they were only hired
Speaker 1: in janitorial rules or to work in the foundry. Only
Speaker 1: one black employee, Roscoe van Zandt, is known to have
Speaker 1: sat down in Flint during this strike. During the sit
Speaker 1: down strike, workers inside the plants established rules for behavior,
Speaker 1: including maintaining order, keeping things clean and organized, and mediating disputes.
Speaker 1: As people were cooped up together for weeks, workers held
Speaker 1: lectures and classes for one another. They read and played games,
Speaker 1: and sang songs in order to keep their spirits up.
Speaker 1: Songs included a union anthem called Solidarity Forever that was
Speaker 1: sung to the theme of the Battle Hymn of the Republic,
Speaker 1: and at first GM's response was mostly not to engage.
Speaker 1: GM President Alfred P. Sloan stated quote, we will not
Speaker 1: negotiate with a union while its agents forcibly hold possession
Speaker 1: of our property, and Executive vice president William S. Knudsen
Speaker 1: called the striking workers trespassers and violators of the law
Speaker 1: of the land. GM also argued that the union's bargaining
Speaker 1: efforts were not legal under the National Labor Relations Act
Speaker 1: since fewer than half of the employees had joined the union.
Speaker 1: The UAW countered that GM had illegally interfered with its
Speaker 1: effort to get workers to join, preventing it from getting
Speaker 1: a large your membership. On January second, GM got a
Speaker 1: court order to have the striking workers removed from the factories,
Speaker 1: but the workers refused to go. Then it became public
Speaker 1: knowledge that the judge who issued this injunction, which was
Speaker 1: Edward D. Black, owned a whole bunch of stock in GM.
Speaker 1: It's the clear conflict of interest. People pretty much dropped
Speaker 1: the subject of trying to get this injunction enforced. On
Speaker 1: January fourth, the UAW submitted a list of demands, including
Speaker 1: that the UAW be given exclusive recognition as the bargaining
Speaker 1: agency for workers at GM, abolishing the piece work system,
Speaker 1: a thirty hour work week with time and a half
Speaker 1: for overtime, minimum pay rates, the reinstatement of people who
Speaker 1: had been fired unfairly, a seniority system, and a speed
Speaker 1: of production that was mutually agreed upon by managers and
Speaker 1: a committee from the union. But GM continued to refuse
Speaker 1: to negotiate. On January eleventh, nineteen thirty seven, GM turned
Speaker 1: off the heat and electricity at Fisher II, even though
Speaker 1: the temperature that day was only sixteen degrees fahrenheit or
Speaker 1: almost negative nine celsius. They also locked the factory gate
Speaker 1: to stop the women's auxiliary from delivering food. Workers and
Speaker 1: their supporters broke the gate open, and that escalated into
Speaker 1: a fight between law enforcement and the workers and their supporters.
Speaker 1: The police used tear gas and they fired upon the workers,
Speaker 1: and the workers defended themselves with things like fire hoses
Speaker 1: and thrown door hinges. Women who were outside the plant
Speaker 1: were also part of this fighting. They were armed with
Speaker 1: things like homemade blackjacks and bars of soap stuffed down
Speaker 1: in the toes of socks. At least sixteen workers and
Speaker 1: eleven police were injured, with most of the worker injuries
Speaker 1: coming from gunshot wounds. In a later oral history interview,
Speaker 1: Genora Johnson Dollinger said of this moment, quote, I was frightened,
Speaker 1: and you first lose all your power of thinking for
Speaker 1: just a matter of moments, and then you become terribly,
Speaker 1: terribly angry that armed policemen are shooting into unarmed men.
Speaker 1: She used the uaw's loudspeaker car to call for women
Speaker 1: to come to the factory and stand with the men,
Speaker 1: banking on the idea that police should be reluctant to
Speaker 1: shoot at a group of unarmed women. The striking workers
Speaker 1: nicknamed this incident the Battle of the Running Bulls or
Speaker 1: the Battle of bulls run with bulls being a slang
Speaker 1: term for police, and some of the more radical women
Speaker 1: in the women's auxiliary, including Genora Johnson Dollenger, decided to
Speaker 1: form a new organization afterward, that being the Emergency Brigade.
Speaker 1: Their job was to handle any emergency that arose during
Speaker 1: the strike. This included using their own bodies to shield
Speaker 1: the striking workers from the police, as they had done
Speaker 1: on January eleventh, but it included other things too. For
Speaker 1: the remainder of the strike, including at one point helping
Speaker 1: a striking worker's wife give birth to a baby. The
Speaker 1: Emergency Brigade were red berets and armbands with the letters EB,
Speaker 1: and some members kept working with the Women's Auxiliary while
Speaker 1: also working with the Emergency Brigade. After the violence on
Speaker 1: January eleventh, the UAW and GM reached a tentative agreement.
Speaker 1: The striking workers would leave the plants and GM would
Speaker 1: start good faith negotiations, with the union not restarting production
Speaker 1: until those negotiations were complete. Workers who had been striking
Speaker 1: in other cities, including Cleveland and Detroit, left their plants,
Speaker 1: but in Flint, the union heard that GM had also
Speaker 1: agreed to meet with another organization called the Flint Alliance,
Speaker 1: which the CIO and the UAW viewed as a company union.
Speaker 1: So workers in Flint refused to leave the factories, and
Speaker 1: GM asked Governor Frank Murphy to call out the National Guard.
Speaker 1: There's also some suggestion that GM it looked like GM
Speaker 1: wasn't going to abide by the promise to not restart
Speaker 1: production until the negotiations were done. So after they contacted
Speaker 1: the governor, Murphy did not act the way that many
Speaker 1: people would expect the governor to act during such an incident.
Speaker 1: He actually supported the worker's legal right to unionize them
Speaker 1: to strike, and he was really afraid that using National
Speaker 1: Guard troops to physically remove them would just lead to
Speaker 1: people getting killed. So while Murphy did call out the
Speaker 1: National Guard, their task was to keep a buffer between
Speaker 1: the workers on one side and gm GM security guards
Speaker 1: and police on the other. About twelve hundred National guardsmen
Speaker 1: arrived in Flint on January twelfth. On February first, UAW
Speaker 1: striker strategically took control of the Chevrolet Engine number four factory.
Speaker 1: To do this, they staged a diversion, telling a company
Speaker 1: stool pigeon that a strike was being planned at another factory,
Speaker 1: Chevy nine. Police and security guards from other plants, including
Speaker 1: Chevy four, converged on Chevy nine after hearing this rumor.
Speaker 1: Police threw tear gas grenades into the plant and women
Speaker 1: outside broke the windows to try to clear the air. Meanwhile,
Speaker 1: workers took over the real target of Chevy Flour and
Speaker 1: another group from the Emergency Brigade locked arms across the
Speaker 1: gate and stood guard. The governor called in an additional
Speaker 1: twenty two hundred National Guard troops, which surrounded Chevy four
Speaker 1: and nearby Chevy two, once again establishing a barrier around
Speaker 1: the striking workers and separating them from a force that
Speaker 1: now included police, private security guards, sheriffs, deputies, and civilians
Speaker 1: who had been deputized for this purpose. Chevy four built
Speaker 1: the engines for all Chevrolet vehicles, so this effectively stopped
Speaker 1: Chevrolet production throughout the company. At this point, the strike
Speaker 1: was seriously affecting GM's production. In December of nineteen thirty six,
Speaker 1: the company had built about fifty thousand cars. In February
Speaker 1: of nineteen thirty seven, that number was only one hundred
Speaker 1: twenty five. The strike grew to involving about one hundred
Speaker 1: thirty five thousand workers in plants from thirty five cities
Speaker 1: in fourteen states. President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged GM to
Speaker 1: start seriously negotiating. On February second, another judge, Paul Godola,
Speaker 1: who did not have a bunch of stock in GM,
Speaker 1: issued another injunction, this one to take effect in twenty
Speaker 1: four hours, again ordering the striking workers to leave the factories.
Speaker 1: He also fined the union fifteen million dollars. Thousands of
Speaker 1: supporters started gathering outside the occupied factories out of fear
Speaker 1: that this injunction would inspire vigilantes or hired security to
Speaker 1: try to remove the striking workers by force. It is
Speaker 1: a random side note the governor actually did own stock
Speaker 1: in GM as all this was happening, although that was
Speaker 1: not known at the time, and since he was generally
Speaker 1: on the striker's side, it wouldn't have had the same
Speaker 1: connotations as Judge Black stock ownership even if it had
Speaker 1: been known. This new injunction put the governor in a
Speaker 1: pretty precarious position. He was required by law to honor it,
Speaker 1: but he still really feared that doing so would lead
Speaker 1: to a loss of life. This was not an unreasonable fear,
Speaker 1: similarly to how businesses had thought the Supreme Court might
Speaker 1: overturn the National Labor Relations Act. He also noted that
Speaker 1: the Court had not weighed in on the legality of
Speaker 1: sit down strikes, so he tried to delay. He made
Speaker 1: some public statements calling the strike an unlawful seizure of property,
Speaker 1: but he still didn't take steps to actually clear the factories. Instead,
Speaker 1: he contacted the President again, encouraging Roosevelt to order GM
Speaker 1: to the bargaining table. Alfred P. Sloan delegated GMS, negotiating
Speaker 1: to Executive Vice President William Knudsen, along with representatives from
Speaker 1: the company's finance and legal departments. On the workers side
Speaker 1: was CIO President John L. Lewis, previously of United Mine Workers,
Speaker 1: and UAW Vice President Wyndam Mortimer. The negotiations were held
Speaker 1: in the office and jury room of Judge George Murphy,
Speaker 1: brother of Governor Murphy, and Governor Murphy acted as a mediator.
Speaker 1: Murphy kept both President Roosevelt and Secretary of Labor Francis
Speaker 1: Perkins updated on their progress. Although Murphy tried to get
Speaker 1: Judge Godola to delay the removal of the workers. On
Speaker 1: February fifth, the judge issued a writ of attachment which
Speaker 1: ordered the sheriff to arrest all the workers that were
Speaker 1: occupying GM buildings and to bring them into court to
Speaker 1: face charges of contempt. But, like the governor, Sheriff Thomas
Speaker 1: Walcott had some serious reservations about doing this and he
Speaker 1: would only agree to do it if he were explicitly
Speaker 1: ordered to do so by the governor. He asked Murphy
Speaker 1: for National Guard support. Murphy, of course, was not going
Speaker 1: to directly order him to do this. He thought it
Speaker 1: was going to get people killed. So Murphy informed the
Speaker 1: judge that he thought they were really close to an agreement.
Speaker 1: This was on a Friday, and the governor tried to
Speaker 1: get everybody to just hold tight till after the weekend,
Speaker 1: But by Monday, February eighth, GM and the UAW still
Speaker 1: had not reached an agreement. Murphy kept trying to reassure
Speaker 1: everyone that one was imminent, and he was later quoted
Speaker 1: as saying, if I sent those soldiers right in on
Speaker 1: the men, there'd be no telling how many would be killed.
Speaker 1: It would be inconsistent with everything I have ever stood
Speaker 1: for in my whole political life. An agreement between GM
Speaker 1: and the UAW finally came on February eleventh, nineteen thirty seven,
Speaker 1: forty four days after the start of the strike and
Speaker 1: after zero people getting killed. Under the terms of this deal,
Speaker 1: the strike would end and the striking workers would stop
Speaker 1: occupying the plants. Those plants would resume operation. GM agreed
Speaker 1: not to discriminate or retaliate against the employees for joining
Speaker 1: a union or for having participated in the strike. GM
Speaker 1: also agreed to start collective bargaining on February sixteenth, and
Speaker 1: that bargaining was meant to address the grievances that the
Speaker 1: union had presented to the company back in January. The
Speaker 1: union agreed not to implement any more strikes or work
Speaker 1: stoppages while that negotiation was taking place, although it was
Speaker 1: not officially part of the agreement. GM also announced a
Speaker 1: pay increase of five cents an hour, and in a
Speaker 1: separate letter, Nudsen informed Murphy that for a period of
Speaker 1: six months, GM would negotiate only with UAW, not with
Speaker 1: any other union. Strikers in Chevrolet Plant number four voted
Speaker 1: to have Roscoe van Zandt lead them out of the building,
Speaker 1: trying to track down whether that five cents an hour
Speaker 1: pay increase affected people who were being paid by the PEACE.
Speaker 1: And I don't know, but there were people that were
Speaker 1: not paid by the PEACE a lot of times not
Speaker 1: working directly on the assembly line. So this first agreement
Speaker 1: between GM and the UAW was not one that addressed
Speaker 1: all those demands that the UAW had submitted back in January.
Speaker 1: Some of those demands later became part of federal law,
Speaker 1: including the Fair Labor Standards Act that was first passed
Speaker 1: in nineteen thirty eight. Others were demands that the UAW
Speaker 1: kept working toward at GM and at other auto manufacturers
Speaker 1: for years. They weren't things that were just quickly wrapped
Speaker 1: up in a round of collective bargaining that started on
Speaker 1: February sixteenth, after the strike was over. Instead, this agreement's
Speaker 1: major accomplishment was GM's recognition of the union and its
Speaker 1: promise to participate in collective bargaining, and in that it
Speaker 1: was enormously influential. It established the UAW as a legitimate
Speaker 1: union in the auto industry, and its membership grew from
Speaker 1: about ninety eight thousand to nearly four hundred thousand in
Speaker 1: nineteen thirty seven alone, UAW started bargaining for workers for
Speaker 1: many other US auto manufacturers, including Studebaker, Hudson, Packard, and Chrysler,
Speaker 1: and four years after the fleet at strike at Ford,
Speaker 1: the success in Flint also sparked an enormous increase in
Speaker 1: union membership overall and a wave of sit down strikes
Speaker 1: as people tried to get better pay and working conditions
Speaker 1: There were one hundred and fifty sit down strikes in
Speaker 1: the United States in nineteen thirty seven alone, about one
Speaker 1: hundred of them in the area around Detroit, Michigan. About
Speaker 1: half a million workers across the country went on strike,
Speaker 1: and about two million joined a union between nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: seven and nineteen thirty eight. These were not confined to
Speaker 1: the auto industry or two industrial jobs. On February twenty seventh,
Speaker 1: nineteen thirty seven, clerks at Woolworth stopped working and took
Speaker 1: over stores for a week, winning a twenty percent pay
Speaker 1: increase and union involvement in hiring decisions. In March, workers
Speaker 1: at four locations of the hl Green department store chain
Speaker 1: in New York City implemented sit down strikes. Incarcerated people
Speaker 1: in Illinois and Pennsylvania went on strike as well, although
Speaker 1: these strikers' demands were not met. In April of nineteen
Speaker 1: thirty seven, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in National
Speaker 1: Labor Relations Board versus Jones and Lachlan Steel Corporation, which
Speaker 1: upheld the National Labor Relations Act. But over the course
Speaker 1: of the year, public sentiment really turned against the proliferation
Speaker 1: of sit down strikes. I mean the public had not
Speaker 1: overwhelmingly supported sit down strikes in the first place, but
Speaker 1: became a lot more critical. In the words of the
Speaker 1: Detroit News, quote, sitting down has replaced baseball as a
Speaker 1: national pastime, and citter downers clutter the landscape in every direction.
Speaker 1: In late nineteen thirty seven, a Gallup poll found that
Speaker 1: about seventy percent of Americans disapproved of sit down strikes.
Speaker 1: Then in nineteen thirty nine, the US Supreme Court issued
Speaker 1: a ruling in NLRB versus fan Steel Metallurgical Corp. Which
Speaker 1: found that fan Steel had violated the Wagner Act, but
Speaker 1: also that the the practice of the sit down strike
Speaker 1: was quote a high handed proceeding without shadow of illegal right.
Speaker 1: So labor organizers largely moved away from sit down strikes,
Speaker 1: but they have been cited as an inspiration for sit
Speaker 1: ins during movements for equal rights. Yeah, when we did
Speaker 1: that episode, that sort of rounded up like the sip
Speaker 1: In movement and the fish In movement and all of
Speaker 1: those things. The first one that we talked about was
Speaker 1: the Alexandria Public Library sit in, which was originally called
Speaker 1: a sit down strike. Also, we are not going to
Speaker 1: try to recap Then the next eighty five years of
Speaker 1: labor history. Well, there are lots of stories within it
Speaker 1: that we can tell at later times, and I mean
Speaker 1: stuff that's been in the headlines within the last year
Speaker 1: about everything from workers' rights to organize to like a
Speaker 1: big corruption scandal at the UAW. All of that is
Speaker 1: out of the scope of this podcast. Thanks so much
Speaker 1: for joy us on this Saturday. If you'd like to
Speaker 1: send us a note, our email addresses History Podcast at
Speaker 1: iHeartRadio dot com, and you can subscribe to the show
Speaker 1: on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen
Speaker 1: to your favorite shows.