1 00:00:00,320 --> 00:00:02,880 Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. 2 00:00:03,200 --> 00:00:08,960 Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With 3 00:00:09,039 --> 00:00:17,640 Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello, everybody, 4 00:00:17,640 --> 00:00:20,040 Speaker 1: welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Poulette, and 5 00:00:20,040 --> 00:00:22,400 Speaker 1: I am an editor at how stuff works dot Com. 6 00:00:22,400 --> 00:00:25,800 Speaker 1: Sitting across from me as usual as senior writer Jonathan Strickland. 7 00:00:26,120 --> 00:00:29,960 Speaker 1: Hey there, Oh my gosh, I know I've I've changed 8 00:00:29,960 --> 00:00:34,479 Speaker 1: things up. I got tired of pulling out quotes, and 9 00:00:34,560 --> 00:00:39,240 Speaker 1: so I have decided spontaneously and without precedent, to drop 10 00:00:39,280 --> 00:00:44,080 Speaker 1: it and uh and just just say Holly or whatever. 11 00:00:44,159 --> 00:00:46,839 Speaker 1: You know. I wonder how many listeners we have from 12 00:00:46,920 --> 00:00:49,120 Speaker 1: that early period when you used to do that all 13 00:00:49,159 --> 00:00:52,000 Speaker 1: the time. Yeah, the hey there, and then I after 14 00:00:52,080 --> 00:00:54,520 Speaker 1: Hey there. I think I went to various greetings from 15 00:00:54,520 --> 00:00:57,880 Speaker 1: around the world, and then I started doing random quotes 16 00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:01,720 Speaker 1: of I think it was for movies, and then music, 17 00:01:01,800 --> 00:01:04,720 Speaker 1: and then I went to novels. Yeah, you know, you've 18 00:01:04,720 --> 00:01:06,360 Speaker 1: got to change things up every now and then. We've 19 00:01:06,360 --> 00:01:09,880 Speaker 1: we've done more than four episodes now. So but let's 20 00:01:09,920 --> 00:01:12,520 Speaker 1: let's talk about Let's talk about what our topic is 21 00:01:12,560 --> 00:01:14,600 Speaker 1: going to be today, because it's it's a heavy topic 22 00:01:14,640 --> 00:01:17,360 Speaker 1: and this was something that was requested by several of 23 00:01:17,400 --> 00:01:20,120 Speaker 1: our listeners. Well, it's not much of a surprise that 24 00:01:20,160 --> 00:01:23,119 Speaker 1: people would be interested in hearing about it. It's been, uh, 25 00:01:23,160 --> 00:01:25,080 Speaker 1: spending a lot of time in the news right around 26 00:01:25,080 --> 00:01:27,360 Speaker 1: the time that we're recording this, which is very early. 27 00:01:27,480 --> 00:01:31,120 Speaker 1: May I just technically we're recording this on Star Wars Day. 28 00:01:31,520 --> 00:01:34,200 Speaker 1: May the fourth be with you, that's right. And uh, 29 00:01:34,280 --> 00:01:37,360 Speaker 1: it is all about the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection 30 00:01:37,440 --> 00:01:43,240 Speaker 1: Act of eleven, also known as SISPA and CISPA is 31 00:01:43,319 --> 00:01:44,920 Speaker 1: one of those things that a lot of people have 32 00:01:45,000 --> 00:01:47,520 Speaker 1: probably heard about. I mean, it's one of those you know, 33 00:01:47,680 --> 00:01:52,200 Speaker 1: like I've seen the acronym pop up on Twitter a lot. Yeah, 34 00:01:52,320 --> 00:01:54,200 Speaker 1: which makes sense. I mean, it's you know, it's it 35 00:01:54,240 --> 00:01:58,840 Speaker 1: does involve traffic on the Internet and uh, and so 36 00:01:59,000 --> 00:02:02,680 Speaker 1: clearly anyone who uses the Internet is interested in this 37 00:02:02,720 --> 00:02:05,720 Speaker 1: sort of thing, at least from a tangential perspective, even 38 00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:07,920 Speaker 1: if they don't know what all the deal is. Now 39 00:02:07,920 --> 00:02:10,040 Speaker 1: there's a lot of confusion out there too, because I 40 00:02:10,040 --> 00:02:13,760 Speaker 1: see a lot of people who assume that SISPA is 41 00:02:13,800 --> 00:02:19,600 Speaker 1: just a reworded approach to doing SOPA or Pippa, which 42 00:02:19,639 --> 00:02:24,840 Speaker 1: are the piracy acts that were proposed in Yeah, and 43 00:02:24,880 --> 00:02:28,239 Speaker 1: those were acts against piracy, not for so I don't 44 00:02:28,240 --> 00:02:31,040 Speaker 1: want to give the wrong impression, but yeah, but those 45 00:02:31,120 --> 00:02:35,760 Speaker 1: those were all um about, uh, you know, finding ways 46 00:02:35,840 --> 00:02:41,320 Speaker 1: to allow the government to to pursue people who pirated 47 00:02:41,440 --> 00:02:44,640 Speaker 1: intellectual property. Yeah, and we're talking about the United States government. 48 00:02:44,639 --> 00:02:46,919 Speaker 1: Of course, we do have a lot of foreign won't 49 00:02:46,919 --> 00:02:49,880 Speaker 1: foreign to us, foreign to US, their domestic to themselves. 50 00:02:50,520 --> 00:02:53,520 Speaker 1: But yeah, we have are more domestic than others. That's true. 51 00:02:53,600 --> 00:02:55,040 Speaker 1: That's true. Well, we we do have a lot of 52 00:02:55,040 --> 00:02:57,520 Speaker 1: listeners from around the world, many many countries around the world. 53 00:02:57,520 --> 00:03:02,320 Speaker 1: So nonetheless, since the Internet is uh a worldwide entity 54 00:03:02,360 --> 00:03:04,640 Speaker 1: and a lot of the content we're talking about is 55 00:03:05,120 --> 00:03:07,680 Speaker 1: born in the United States, it would have an effect 56 00:03:08,400 --> 00:03:11,520 Speaker 1: on traffic worldwide. And and Soap and Pippa were both 57 00:03:11,680 --> 00:03:15,680 Speaker 1: actually directed by the United States to to target sites 58 00:03:16,400 --> 00:03:19,320 Speaker 1: that were outside the jurisdiction of the United States in 59 00:03:19,440 --> 00:03:22,560 Speaker 1: order to find a way to combat piracy. Because as 60 00:03:22,760 --> 00:03:24,560 Speaker 1: christ just pointed out, you know, the Internet is a 61 00:03:24,560 --> 00:03:27,800 Speaker 1: global entity. It does not belong to the United States. 62 00:03:27,880 --> 00:03:30,840 Speaker 1: It is not housed in the United States. It is 63 00:03:30,880 --> 00:03:34,359 Speaker 1: truly all over the world. Which causes some issues when 64 00:03:34,360 --> 00:03:38,200 Speaker 1: you're talking about legislation, because clearly one country cannot claim 65 00:03:38,280 --> 00:03:41,360 Speaker 1: to be able to legislate over other countries in the 66 00:03:41,400 --> 00:03:45,600 Speaker 1: world that are our sovereign nations. So SOAP and PIPPA 67 00:03:45,720 --> 00:03:49,120 Speaker 1: were both approaches to try and head off piracy that 68 00:03:49,320 --> 00:03:52,320 Speaker 1: was hosted in in UH in countries other than the 69 00:03:52,400 --> 00:03:55,640 Speaker 1: United States, Like, how do you protect the interests of 70 00:03:55,720 --> 00:03:58,520 Speaker 1: companies within the United States when he attacks themselves or 71 00:03:58,600 --> 00:04:01,280 Speaker 1: the theft or however you want to frame it is 72 00:04:01,280 --> 00:04:05,360 Speaker 1: occurring outside the border. Well, CISPA is not about that, 73 00:04:05,400 --> 00:04:10,920 Speaker 1: at least not on its surface. CISPA was truly it's 74 00:04:10,960 --> 00:04:14,240 Speaker 1: it's the the actual purpose of it, according to the 75 00:04:14,280 --> 00:04:17,760 Speaker 1: act itself is and I quote, to provide for the 76 00:04:17,839 --> 00:04:21,920 Speaker 1: sharing of certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information 77 00:04:21,960 --> 00:04:26,040 Speaker 1: between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities and for other 78 00:04:26,120 --> 00:04:30,520 Speaker 1: purposes and for other purposes. I hate that phrase. That's 79 00:04:30,560 --> 00:04:34,359 Speaker 1: like the job description as a sign. Yes, that is 80 00:04:34,400 --> 00:04:36,960 Speaker 1: the worst thing to see on a job description because 81 00:04:37,000 --> 00:04:40,560 Speaker 1: you're you're like, I'm the senior vice president of finance 82 00:04:40,600 --> 00:04:43,000 Speaker 1: at such and such, like go make me some coffee. 83 00:04:43,200 --> 00:04:45,320 Speaker 1: What do you mean, Well, it's other duties and I 84 00:04:45,400 --> 00:04:53,080 Speaker 1: just assigned them to you exactly. Yeah. Anyway, So although 85 00:04:53,160 --> 00:04:56,920 Speaker 1: that rarely happens to senior executives, true from what I understand, 86 00:04:57,000 --> 00:05:01,880 Speaker 1: could it happens to senior writers any a? So the uh, 87 00:05:01,960 --> 00:05:04,040 Speaker 1: that's not that's not true. I'm making a joke. I 88 00:05:04,080 --> 00:05:06,960 Speaker 1: love you. How stuff words dot com and Discovery Communications 89 00:05:06,960 --> 00:05:11,880 Speaker 1: and sparing company. Uh, the some restrictions apply. Your knowledge 90 00:05:11,920 --> 00:05:15,400 Speaker 1: may vary. The so, yeah, this this is really to 91 00:05:15,720 --> 00:05:19,080 Speaker 1: protect The idea anyway, is that it would help protect 92 00:05:19,400 --> 00:05:23,080 Speaker 1: the United States from cyber attacks by allowing the government 93 00:05:23,360 --> 00:05:28,440 Speaker 1: to share information that's normally of classified or secret levels 94 00:05:28,880 --> 00:05:32,919 Speaker 1: with other entities, which could include cyber security firms, so 95 00:05:33,040 --> 00:05:37,440 Speaker 1: companies that are specifically formed around the idea of protecting 96 00:05:37,520 --> 00:05:41,120 Speaker 1: data and making secure systems and detecting intrusions that kind 97 00:05:41,160 --> 00:05:45,040 Speaker 1: of thing, as well as other companies so Internet service 98 00:05:45,040 --> 00:05:48,440 Speaker 1: providers could be an example, or even other types of 99 00:05:48,480 --> 00:05:52,680 Speaker 1: private companies. It's also meant to allow these companies, these 100 00:05:52,720 --> 00:05:56,280 Speaker 1: private entities that have no connection to the government other 101 00:05:56,320 --> 00:05:57,919 Speaker 1: than the fact that they happen to be within the 102 00:05:57,960 --> 00:06:01,039 Speaker 1: realm of the United States. UH, allows them to share 103 00:06:01,040 --> 00:06:04,560 Speaker 1: information with the government. And the key word there's it 104 00:06:04,600 --> 00:06:11,040 Speaker 1: allows because the fear among people who oppose this act 105 00:06:11,600 --> 00:06:15,880 Speaker 1: is that it would compel these companies to share information. So, 106 00:06:15,920 --> 00:06:20,640 Speaker 1: in other words, one of the main concerns around this act, 107 00:06:20,720 --> 00:06:24,159 Speaker 1: and it's it's a legitimate concern, is that the government 108 00:06:24,240 --> 00:06:28,360 Speaker 1: might come up to say a company like Facebook and say, hey, Facebook, 109 00:06:28,920 --> 00:06:32,719 Speaker 1: we suspect that there are eight or nine people that 110 00:06:32,800 --> 00:06:35,680 Speaker 1: we have on this list who are involved in some 111 00:06:35,760 --> 00:06:39,919 Speaker 1: sort of terrorism group cyber terrorism. You know, they're playing 112 00:06:39,920 --> 00:06:42,680 Speaker 1: a big hacking attack and they have, uh, they have 113 00:06:42,800 --> 00:06:45,680 Speaker 1: accounts on Facebook, and we're able to access some of 114 00:06:45,680 --> 00:06:48,640 Speaker 1: that information, but we really want all the information you 115 00:06:48,680 --> 00:06:51,240 Speaker 1: have on them. So could you please give us all 116 00:06:51,320 --> 00:06:54,080 Speaker 1: the data you have on these people, including all the 117 00:06:54,120 --> 00:06:56,839 Speaker 1: messages they send to each other, messages they send to 118 00:06:56,960 --> 00:06:59,880 Speaker 1: other people that are not connected to the eight names 119 00:06:59,880 --> 00:07:03,800 Speaker 1: on this list, uh, their their contact information, everything you 120 00:07:03,880 --> 00:07:07,719 Speaker 1: have on them we want And then Facebook would say sure, 121 00:07:08,120 --> 00:07:10,920 Speaker 1: here you go. And that's the big fear is that 122 00:07:11,120 --> 00:07:14,360 Speaker 1: this would allow the government to get access to private 123 00:07:14,360 --> 00:07:16,880 Speaker 1: information that most of the time we would say the 124 00:07:16,880 --> 00:07:20,000 Speaker 1: government has no business knowing um, and they would do 125 00:07:20,040 --> 00:07:23,840 Speaker 1: it under the the umbrella of trying to protect national 126 00:07:23,880 --> 00:07:29,360 Speaker 1: security from cyber threats. Now, if you actually read the 127 00:07:28,440 --> 00:07:34,480 Speaker 1: the full proposed legislation, which I have, you see that 128 00:07:35,080 --> 00:07:38,640 Speaker 1: you can kind of see where where the the representatives 129 00:07:38,680 --> 00:07:40,880 Speaker 1: who introduced this. In the United States, we have the 130 00:07:40,920 --> 00:07:43,280 Speaker 1: House of Representatives and we have the Senate. These are 131 00:07:43,480 --> 00:07:47,760 Speaker 1: two bodies that propose legislation, and once it passes through 132 00:07:47,840 --> 00:07:50,520 Speaker 1: one body, it has to go to the other and 133 00:07:50,600 --> 00:07:52,600 Speaker 1: pass through that one as well before it goes to 134 00:07:52,640 --> 00:07:55,080 Speaker 1: the President of the United States, who can then either 135 00:07:55,240 --> 00:07:59,200 Speaker 1: sign the the the bill into law, or veto it, 136 00:08:00,280 --> 00:08:03,240 Speaker 1: or just let it sit there. That's really those are 137 00:08:03,240 --> 00:08:06,080 Speaker 1: the three options. Really. Yeah, by the way, the President 138 00:08:06,080 --> 00:08:09,840 Speaker 1: of United States currently has said he would veto SISPA 139 00:08:10,280 --> 00:08:12,960 Speaker 1: vitos can be overridden. But that's you know, that's kind 140 00:08:12,960 --> 00:08:15,400 Speaker 1: of beyond the scope at this discussion. Anyway, it's it's 141 00:08:15,440 --> 00:08:17,680 Speaker 1: gone through the House of Representatives. It will next go 142 00:08:17,880 --> 00:08:21,040 Speaker 1: to the Senate. It was pasted, Yes, it was past. 143 00:08:21,200 --> 00:08:26,640 Speaker 1: Uh the vote, that's right, And it was not straight 144 00:08:26,680 --> 00:08:30,840 Speaker 1: down party lines, but in general, more Republicans voted in 145 00:08:30,960 --> 00:08:34,280 Speaker 1: favor of it and more Democrats voted against it. But 146 00:08:34,280 --> 00:08:38,640 Speaker 1: but there was bipartisan support and bipartisan opposition. So it's 147 00:08:38,679 --> 00:08:40,959 Speaker 1: not it's not cut and clear. It's not like this 148 00:08:41,000 --> 00:08:43,560 Speaker 1: is a Republican issue. Now, this is this is broader 149 00:08:43,600 --> 00:08:45,600 Speaker 1: than that. Yeah. And as a matter of fact, you 150 00:08:45,679 --> 00:08:50,160 Speaker 1: can you can see different lists of the organizations and 151 00:08:50,200 --> 00:08:53,360 Speaker 1: companies that are foreign against it and the same thing 152 00:08:53,440 --> 00:08:56,480 Speaker 1: you'll see. Uh, you'll see there. Um, some of the 153 00:08:56,520 --> 00:08:59,679 Speaker 1: companies that you might expect to be for it are 154 00:08:59,720 --> 00:09:01,880 Speaker 1: again said in vice versa, and some of the other 155 00:09:02,400 --> 00:09:07,679 Speaker 1: lobbying groups and grassroots support organizations that you know, try 156 00:09:07,720 --> 00:09:10,600 Speaker 1: to get people involved in the issues like this. Um, 157 00:09:10,640 --> 00:09:12,480 Speaker 1: it's very interesting to see the people who are working 158 00:09:12,520 --> 00:09:15,920 Speaker 1: together for or against the bill. Yeah. I mean, this 159 00:09:16,000 --> 00:09:19,400 Speaker 1: is another example of how SISPA is different from SOPA 160 00:09:19,480 --> 00:09:22,800 Speaker 1: and PIPPA because SOPA and PIPPA, there were quite a 161 00:09:22,840 --> 00:09:29,360 Speaker 1: few major companies, technology companies that opposed that legislation, right 162 00:09:29,720 --> 00:09:33,840 Speaker 1: the SOPA and PIPPA like companies like Google and Facebook 163 00:09:34,360 --> 00:09:37,680 Speaker 1: opposed those but in fact, sorry to interrupt ahead, some 164 00:09:37,720 --> 00:09:41,400 Speaker 1: of them were very outspoken. They they had the Internet 165 00:09:41,440 --> 00:09:44,960 Speaker 1: blackout days where they would take their sites, uh you know, 166 00:09:45,040 --> 00:09:48,640 Speaker 1: make the first page sort of uh uh, Well, this 167 00:09:48,720 --> 00:09:51,880 Speaker 1: is what you would see if this legislation passes, and 168 00:09:51,960 --> 00:09:54,920 Speaker 1: it would be a very drab you know, uh start 169 00:09:54,960 --> 00:09:56,920 Speaker 1: contrast to what you would see on the you know, 170 00:09:56,960 --> 00:09:59,439 Speaker 1: everyday site. Either this I would be taken down or 171 00:09:59,480 --> 00:10:02,520 Speaker 1: there was like a censored bar over the logo and 172 00:10:02,600 --> 00:10:04,800 Speaker 1: you could proceed from there into the site, but you know, 173 00:10:04,800 --> 00:10:07,000 Speaker 1: would be shut down and when you first got there, 174 00:10:07,040 --> 00:10:10,400 Speaker 1: just with an explanation. Yeah, yeah, so that it would 175 00:10:10,600 --> 00:10:12,640 Speaker 1: inform people what was going on. Well, some of those 176 00:10:12,640 --> 00:10:16,200 Speaker 1: companies are actually in support of SISPA, now, not Google. 177 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:18,400 Speaker 1: Google has yet to come out one way or the 178 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:20,480 Speaker 1: other on the issue. A lot of them are are 179 00:10:20,840 --> 00:10:25,040 Speaker 1: mute on the topic, right, But Facebook said that they 180 00:10:25,080 --> 00:10:29,920 Speaker 1: supported or they the company representatives in Facebook spoke out 181 00:10:29,960 --> 00:10:33,600 Speaker 1: in support of SISPA, and Microsoft did as well and 182 00:10:33,600 --> 00:10:37,160 Speaker 1: then sort of backed off. But um, there are several 183 00:10:37,200 --> 00:10:40,400 Speaker 1: companies that have spoken out in favor of it. And 184 00:10:40,720 --> 00:10:43,880 Speaker 1: uh again that that illustrates that there's a difference here. Now, 185 00:10:44,040 --> 00:10:47,360 Speaker 1: there were points during the debate of SISPA while it 186 00:10:47,400 --> 00:10:50,959 Speaker 1: was going through the House about adding in language or 187 00:10:51,679 --> 00:10:55,080 Speaker 1: or modifying language that would also have it applied to 188 00:10:55,160 --> 00:10:58,720 Speaker 1: intellectual property theft. Yeah, the Center for Democracy and Technology 189 00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:02,440 Speaker 1: used to support the bill but dropped off after the 190 00:11:02,440 --> 00:11:08,480 Speaker 1: bill was modified and then that language subsequently was dropped again. UH. 191 00:11:08,679 --> 00:11:11,320 Speaker 1: Problem pretty much at the last minute, so that it 192 00:11:11,360 --> 00:11:16,200 Speaker 1: didn't it didn't expressly include intellectual property theft as one 193 00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:19,200 Speaker 1: of the reasons for the bill itself. UH. And like 194 00:11:19,240 --> 00:11:21,839 Speaker 1: I said, the bill really what what its purposes is 195 00:11:21,880 --> 00:11:27,320 Speaker 1: to allow intelligence agencies like the FBI, the CIA, the 196 00:11:27,440 --> 00:11:30,280 Speaker 1: n s A. UH. These are all intelligence agencies within 197 00:11:30,320 --> 00:11:33,160 Speaker 1: the United States and law enforcement in the case of FBI. 198 00:11:33,679 --> 00:11:38,160 Speaker 1: But these are agencies that are all about collecting information 199 00:11:38,280 --> 00:11:42,320 Speaker 1: and using that to try and protect the interests of 200 00:11:42,360 --> 00:11:47,440 Speaker 1: the United States. And the issue is a lot of 201 00:11:47,440 --> 00:11:50,600 Speaker 1: the information is very sensitive and the government is not 202 00:11:50,760 --> 00:11:55,360 Speaker 1: allowed to share that information with with non government, non 203 00:11:55,920 --> 00:12:00,000 Speaker 1: UH certified entities. Yeah, don't talk badly about this information. 204 00:12:00,000 --> 00:12:02,000 Speaker 1: It will start to cry well at any rate. Like 205 00:12:02,280 --> 00:12:05,800 Speaker 1: they are not allowed to actually share that information by law. 206 00:12:06,080 --> 00:12:10,040 Speaker 1: And this this legislation would allow them to then share 207 00:12:10,080 --> 00:12:15,760 Speaker 1: information with parties that could actually affect whatever is going on. So, 208 00:12:15,960 --> 00:12:22,239 Speaker 1: for example, if the CIA has has created some dossier 209 00:12:22,440 --> 00:12:27,840 Speaker 1: about a domestic group of folks who are trying to 210 00:12:27,880 --> 00:12:31,560 Speaker 1: get together and cause problems on the internet. Let's say 211 00:12:31,559 --> 00:12:34,760 Speaker 1: that it's an anonymous group of people Let's say the 212 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:38,160 Speaker 1: CIA has gathered up this information to SEGA. The CIA 213 00:12:38,240 --> 00:12:41,120 Speaker 1: may want to pass on this information about these anonymous 214 00:12:41,160 --> 00:12:47,080 Speaker 1: individuals two to private companies. They might be cyber security companies, 215 00:12:47,080 --> 00:12:50,120 Speaker 1: they might be Internet service providers, and the purpose of 216 00:12:50,160 --> 00:12:52,600 Speaker 1: sending the information might be to help head off an 217 00:12:52,600 --> 00:12:56,559 Speaker 1: attack or to uh to just be on the alert 218 00:12:56,600 --> 00:12:59,960 Speaker 1: for potential attacks, or maybe even to track down these 219 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:04,440 Speaker 1: people so that whatever intelligence agency is interested in them 220 00:13:04,559 --> 00:13:08,640 Speaker 1: can actually go and say, hey, you know, we need 221 00:13:08,679 --> 00:13:13,480 Speaker 1: to talk remember that thing or you were going to 222 00:13:13,520 --> 00:13:16,800 Speaker 1: do about that, We need to chat about this. So 223 00:13:17,600 --> 00:13:21,720 Speaker 1: the you know, the idea of it being all about 224 00:13:21,840 --> 00:13:27,640 Speaker 1: sharing information on the surface seems like it's a wise thing, 225 00:13:28,080 --> 00:13:31,800 Speaker 1: and that the more people know about what's going on, 226 00:13:32,000 --> 00:13:34,960 Speaker 1: the more likely they can head off disaster. Because that's 227 00:13:34,960 --> 00:13:38,160 Speaker 1: one of the big issues about cybersecurity is that, you know, 228 00:13:38,240 --> 00:13:41,840 Speaker 1: the systems, the systems can only be so secure. What 229 00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:44,560 Speaker 1: can help us is knowing more about what's going on 230 00:13:44,640 --> 00:13:48,520 Speaker 1: so that we can anticipate things and uh either head 231 00:13:48,559 --> 00:13:52,360 Speaker 1: them off or reduce the effectiveness of an attack upon 232 00:13:52,400 --> 00:13:57,360 Speaker 1: any given system. The problem is that this is giving 233 00:13:57,400 --> 00:14:00,720 Speaker 1: the government and these entities a little bit more freedom 234 00:14:00,760 --> 00:14:03,160 Speaker 1: to share information than a lot of people are comfortable 235 00:14:03,200 --> 00:14:05,960 Speaker 1: with UM and that there are things built into the 236 00:14:06,000 --> 00:14:12,120 Speaker 1: bill itself that make it pretty worrisome. For example, one 237 00:14:12,320 --> 00:14:14,760 Speaker 1: of the amendments or or not an amendment, I'm sorry, 238 00:14:14,840 --> 00:14:19,400 Speaker 1: one of the passages within this bill gives all the 239 00:14:19,520 --> 00:14:25,880 Speaker 1: entities involved exemption from legal recourse if they cooperate with 240 00:14:25,920 --> 00:14:28,680 Speaker 1: the federal government. So, in other words, let's say that 241 00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:33,000 Speaker 1: your I s P sends the federal government a list 242 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:35,640 Speaker 1: of information about all the sites you visit, all the 243 00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:39,200 Speaker 1: packets of data that you send through that Internet service provider. 244 00:14:39,640 --> 00:14:43,080 Speaker 1: They send that information to the government in its efforts 245 00:14:43,120 --> 00:14:46,200 Speaker 1: to prosecute you for something. Well, you would not be 246 00:14:46,280 --> 00:14:50,480 Speaker 1: able to turn around and sue the Internet service provider 247 00:14:50,560 --> 00:14:55,119 Speaker 1: for violating your privacy because they would have exemption underneath 248 00:14:55,160 --> 00:14:59,000 Speaker 1: this legislation. So in other words, it's like a get 249 00:14:59,040 --> 00:15:02,000 Speaker 1: out of jail free hard for any company that is 250 00:15:02,560 --> 00:15:06,240 Speaker 1: part of this. That's that's you know, sharing information in 251 00:15:06,280 --> 00:15:10,360 Speaker 1: this way as covered by this bill, which is scary. 252 00:15:10,840 --> 00:15:13,120 Speaker 1: It's probably also why a lot of companies are like, yeah, 253 00:15:13,120 --> 00:15:16,840 Speaker 1: I'm behind this, because this means if the government comes 254 00:15:16,840 --> 00:15:18,840 Speaker 1: to me and says I need this information and I 255 00:15:18,920 --> 00:15:20,920 Speaker 1: give that information, I don't have to worry about a 256 00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:26,000 Speaker 1: multimillion dollar lawsuit hitting hitting me, and then I'm gonna 257 00:15:26,080 --> 00:15:28,040 Speaker 1: take a hit and my shareholders are going to be 258 00:15:28,120 --> 00:15:31,240 Speaker 1: really upset because my company just had to spend all 259 00:15:31,280 --> 00:15:34,280 Speaker 1: this money to settle out of court with this other 260 00:15:34,440 --> 00:15:37,920 Speaker 1: person because we sent their information to the government. This 261 00:15:37,920 --> 00:15:40,760 Speaker 1: this passage would say, uh, yeah, you can sue us, 262 00:15:40,800 --> 00:15:43,160 Speaker 1: but you have no grounds to stand on because the 263 00:15:43,240 --> 00:15:45,880 Speaker 1: law says we can do this and you can't sue us. 264 00:15:46,720 --> 00:15:49,480 Speaker 1: I wonder if there is a feeling among some of 265 00:15:49,520 --> 00:15:53,480 Speaker 1: the companies that going along with this legislation would make 266 00:15:54,000 --> 00:15:58,480 Speaker 1: the federal government more inclined to look favorably on them 267 00:15:58,640 --> 00:16:02,880 Speaker 1: and other business matters as well. I can't read their minds, 268 00:16:02,880 --> 00:16:04,800 Speaker 1: of course, and I don't know that anybody has come 269 00:16:04,800 --> 00:16:06,680 Speaker 1: out and said, well, you know, we really love the 270 00:16:06,720 --> 00:16:10,760 Speaker 1: government because hey, guys, you're awesome. Within within the bill itself, 271 00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:14,280 Speaker 1: there's language that that is meant to protect against that, 272 00:16:14,520 --> 00:16:18,880 Speaker 1: but whether or not that holds any real authority remains 273 00:16:18,920 --> 00:16:20,880 Speaker 1: to be seen. Like there's there's a passage in there 274 00:16:20,920 --> 00:16:26,440 Speaker 1: that says that the the uh, the articles within SISPA 275 00:16:26,520 --> 00:16:29,360 Speaker 1: could not be used for regulatory purposes. So the government 276 00:16:29,400 --> 00:16:32,440 Speaker 1: would not be able to regulate the Internet or Internet 277 00:16:32,440 --> 00:16:37,920 Speaker 1: traffic using CISPA as its foundation. Also, no entity can 278 00:16:38,080 --> 00:16:43,120 Speaker 1: use the information that they're sharing two uh to gain 279 00:16:43,240 --> 00:16:47,200 Speaker 1: a competitive advantage over some other entity. So in other words, 280 00:16:47,200 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 1: if you get you know, this information from the federal government, 281 00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:53,200 Speaker 1: you could not somehow leverage that to give yourself a 282 00:16:53,240 --> 00:16:57,360 Speaker 1: better business stance, because that's not what it's meant for. Now, 283 00:16:57,400 --> 00:17:01,880 Speaker 1: how that ends up being enforceable or detective? You got me? 284 00:17:02,400 --> 00:17:04,800 Speaker 1: I mean, I just don't. I don't understand, especially when 285 00:17:04,800 --> 00:17:10,320 Speaker 1: you're talk about classified information. This information remains classified, right, 286 00:17:10,359 --> 00:17:13,640 Speaker 1: So if the government has this classified information and they 287 00:17:13,640 --> 00:17:18,040 Speaker 1: have authorized a particular entity to have the information, that 288 00:17:18,200 --> 00:17:21,720 Speaker 1: entity can't share the information with other other you know people, 289 00:17:22,359 --> 00:17:25,480 Speaker 1: they if they're within that umbrella with the federal government. 290 00:17:25,520 --> 00:17:28,919 Speaker 1: There can be sharing between entities and the government, but 291 00:17:29,040 --> 00:17:33,199 Speaker 1: you can't release it to the general public. So, you know, 292 00:17:33,480 --> 00:17:37,000 Speaker 1: how would the government the government would have to acknowledge 293 00:17:37,280 --> 00:17:40,440 Speaker 1: what the information is if a company were to try 294 00:17:40,520 --> 00:17:45,080 Speaker 1: and use it to gain leverage in the competitive market space. Thus, 295 00:17:45,119 --> 00:17:49,840 Speaker 1: the information that was private becomes public. This is problematic, right, 296 00:17:49,920 --> 00:17:52,600 Speaker 1: How where where do you draw the line between, all right, 297 00:17:52,600 --> 00:17:55,560 Speaker 1: this intelligence is all about national security, and we need 298 00:17:55,600 --> 00:17:58,439 Speaker 1: to make sure it's secret. We cannot acknowledge it, we 299 00:17:58,480 --> 00:18:02,119 Speaker 1: cannot reveal it, and we need to make sure the 300 00:18:02,160 --> 00:18:06,360 Speaker 1: market remains fair and that companies don't take advantage of 301 00:18:06,400 --> 00:18:12,200 Speaker 1: this new avenue of information. Uh, you know, if they 302 00:18:12,240 --> 00:18:15,240 Speaker 1: if they do take action, then you've got a compromise 303 00:18:15,280 --> 00:18:19,280 Speaker 1: between those two silos. And and that's a problem. It's 304 00:18:19,320 --> 00:18:23,720 Speaker 1: not a big problem as far as the average consumers concern. 305 00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:27,159 Speaker 1: The average consumers more concerned about the fact that, hey, 306 00:18:27,200 --> 00:18:29,560 Speaker 1: this is kind of like wire tapping without a warrant. 307 00:18:30,359 --> 00:18:33,600 Speaker 1: The government essentially can ask a company to give it information, 308 00:18:33,880 --> 00:18:37,840 Speaker 1: and the company can give that information, no warrants, nothing, 309 00:18:38,080 --> 00:18:42,400 Speaker 1: no no legal uh loopholes that you have to leap through. 310 00:18:42,640 --> 00:18:47,040 Speaker 1: It's just request. Now, with that in mind, like I said, 311 00:18:47,080 --> 00:18:48,840 Speaker 1: with the way the information is worded in the bill, 312 00:18:48,920 --> 00:18:52,760 Speaker 1: the company is not compelled to share information. So the 313 00:18:52,800 --> 00:18:56,560 Speaker 1: federal government comes to Facebook and asks for that information 314 00:18:56,600 --> 00:19:00,520 Speaker 1: about those aid individuals, Facebook can tell the government, we're 315 00:19:00,520 --> 00:19:03,120 Speaker 1: not going to share that unless you have a warrant. 316 00:19:03,359 --> 00:19:07,440 Speaker 1: And in that case, whichever intelligence agency it is that's 317 00:19:07,800 --> 00:19:10,960 Speaker 1: in question. Would theoretically have to go through the whole 318 00:19:11,000 --> 00:19:14,320 Speaker 1: process of securing a warrant, serving at the Facebook, and 319 00:19:14,359 --> 00:19:18,480 Speaker 1: then waiting to get the information. Uh now, how likely 320 00:19:18,640 --> 00:19:21,359 Speaker 1: is it that companies are going that that support this 321 00:19:21,480 --> 00:19:24,760 Speaker 1: are going to do that. That depends on each individual company. 322 00:19:24,800 --> 00:19:27,480 Speaker 1: For some companies, it makes perfect sense for them to 323 00:19:27,520 --> 00:19:32,240 Speaker 1: say no, because if they said yes, they risk alienating 324 00:19:32,400 --> 00:19:36,200 Speaker 1: their user base. I know that if I if I 325 00:19:36,280 --> 00:19:38,960 Speaker 1: had an I s P and I found out that 326 00:19:39,000 --> 00:19:42,080 Speaker 1: I s P was sharing information about users to the 327 00:19:42,119 --> 00:19:45,439 Speaker 1: government without the use of a warrant, I would not 328 00:19:45,600 --> 00:19:47,720 Speaker 1: want that I s P as my I s P. 329 00:19:48,600 --> 00:19:51,360 Speaker 1: And it's not that I'm doing anything clandestine or illegal. 330 00:19:51,800 --> 00:19:54,639 Speaker 1: It's just I don't like the idea of companies just 331 00:19:54,760 --> 00:19:59,400 Speaker 1: freely handing over private information to the government without there 332 00:19:59,440 --> 00:20:03,600 Speaker 1: being a legal reason to do so, you know, I 333 00:20:03,640 --> 00:20:07,119 Speaker 1: mean that just that just doesn't seem right. It's almost 334 00:20:07,119 --> 00:20:11,040 Speaker 1: the same as imagine having a government official show up 335 00:20:11,040 --> 00:20:13,840 Speaker 1: at your door one day, and that government officials job 336 00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:16,440 Speaker 1: is to follow you around and watch everything you do 337 00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:19,399 Speaker 1: and write a report every single day about everything you do, 338 00:20:19,840 --> 00:20:22,119 Speaker 1: and it doesn't matter if you're doing something right or wrong. 339 00:20:23,119 --> 00:20:26,920 Speaker 1: That's just what they do. Wait, you mean they don't 340 00:20:26,920 --> 00:20:31,199 Speaker 1: do that to you? Well, you know, not that I'm guilty. 341 00:20:31,240 --> 00:20:33,679 Speaker 1: I feel guilty for putting you on that list. That 342 00:20:33,760 --> 00:20:37,160 Speaker 1: was a great aper fool's joke, but it's had implications 343 00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:40,840 Speaker 1: that went beyond what I had originally intended in five years. Yeah, 344 00:20:40,960 --> 00:20:44,000 Speaker 1: well you know, um aper fools. Well yeah, I think 345 00:20:44,000 --> 00:20:47,159 Speaker 1: the the I think the language in the bill is 346 00:20:47,160 --> 00:20:49,960 Speaker 1: what gives people uh so much trouble is that it 347 00:20:50,160 --> 00:20:54,040 Speaker 1: it's it started off broader, admittedly, but it's still broad 348 00:20:54,160 --> 00:20:57,880 Speaker 1: enough where it gives a lot of power that um. 349 00:20:58,520 --> 00:21:01,800 Speaker 1: You know, people feel that the government shouldn't have um. 350 00:21:01,840 --> 00:21:04,640 Speaker 1: But you know, that's that's the nature of a lot 351 00:21:04,680 --> 00:21:06,359 Speaker 1: of these these bills that have gone through. I was 352 00:21:06,400 --> 00:21:10,399 Speaker 1: one of the main criticisms of SOPA UM, so you 353 00:21:10,440 --> 00:21:13,480 Speaker 1: know that that's what's given so much pause to a 354 00:21:13,520 --> 00:21:16,600 Speaker 1: lot of these organizations that have come out against it. Well, 355 00:21:16,680 --> 00:21:21,560 Speaker 1: there's also there's a specific phrase within the bill itself 356 00:21:21,600 --> 00:21:27,119 Speaker 1: which says notwithstanding any other provision of law. So what 357 00:21:27,280 --> 00:21:32,000 Speaker 1: that means is that SISPA overrides all other laws when 358 00:21:32,040 --> 00:21:34,760 Speaker 1: it comes to sharing information. So any privacy law that 359 00:21:34,800 --> 00:21:38,800 Speaker 1: would protect your privacy is negated. By SISPA exactly. So 360 00:21:38,840 --> 00:21:41,960 Speaker 1: if even if you had a state law or there 361 00:21:42,000 --> 00:21:44,080 Speaker 1: was some other law in the books that would protect 362 00:21:44,119 --> 00:21:49,120 Speaker 1: your rights as a citizen to specific private information, SISPA 363 00:21:49,200 --> 00:21:52,320 Speaker 1: overrides it and says doesn't count. As long as it 364 00:21:52,359 --> 00:21:54,640 Speaker 1: falls under this category, it does not count. And there's 365 00:21:54,680 --> 00:21:57,439 Speaker 1: nothing there's no burden of evidence on the part of 366 00:21:57,480 --> 00:22:02,120 Speaker 1: any any entity, whether it's the government or the private company, 367 00:22:02,160 --> 00:22:05,720 Speaker 1: to show that this is a justifiable approach for any 368 00:22:05,880 --> 00:22:09,520 Speaker 1: given case. It's not like there's a burden of proof 369 00:22:09,560 --> 00:22:12,920 Speaker 1: that you must meet in order to count as this 370 00:22:12,960 --> 00:22:16,760 Speaker 1: whole sharing of information to head off cyber crime. There's 371 00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:20,560 Speaker 1: nothing there in the bill that says in order for 372 00:22:20,600 --> 00:22:23,800 Speaker 1: this to apply, you must meet these criteria. So, in 373 00:22:23,800 --> 00:22:27,080 Speaker 1: other words, you might as well just say privacy laws 374 00:22:27,119 --> 00:22:31,160 Speaker 1: don't exist, because CISPA means that it's not. It's they 375 00:22:31,160 --> 00:22:36,640 Speaker 1: don't they don't apply. Well. Mozilla UH, the organization that 376 00:22:37,480 --> 00:22:41,880 Speaker 1: creates and maintains the Firefox web browser, made a statement 377 00:22:41,880 --> 00:22:44,919 Speaker 1: against it that says, while we wholeheartedly support aim more 378 00:22:45,160 --> 00:22:47,840 Speaker 1: secure internet, SISPA has a broad and alarming reach that 379 00:22:47,880 --> 00:22:51,360 Speaker 1: goes far beyond internet security. The bill infringes on our privacy, 380 00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:55,160 Speaker 1: includes vague definitions of cybersecurity, and grants immunities to companies 381 00:22:55,160 --> 00:23:00,280 Speaker 1: and government that are too broad around information misuse. Um. 382 00:23:00,320 --> 00:23:02,720 Speaker 1: And then you know, end quote. And then they go 383 00:23:02,800 --> 00:23:06,080 Speaker 1: on to say that they hope the Senate takes a 384 00:23:06,080 --> 00:23:10,800 Speaker 1: a careful consideration of the issues before promoting, before passing 385 00:23:10,800 --> 00:23:13,199 Speaker 1: this legislation. And and we should also point out there 386 00:23:13,200 --> 00:23:16,439 Speaker 1: are at least two other bills within the Senate itself 387 00:23:16,800 --> 00:23:21,760 Speaker 1: that that also are cybersecurity bills. And so that's a 388 00:23:21,760 --> 00:23:24,880 Speaker 1: complicated matter in the Senate because it's you know, it's 389 00:23:24,880 --> 00:23:28,040 Speaker 1: this bill would also address the same issues that other 390 00:23:28,080 --> 00:23:31,679 Speaker 1: bills that are on in consideration are already you know, 391 00:23:31,800 --> 00:23:34,960 Speaker 1: they're already there. So so it may be that the 392 00:23:34,960 --> 00:23:36,880 Speaker 1: Senate just as you know, this doesn't even make sense 393 00:23:36,880 --> 00:23:39,000 Speaker 1: because we have these other bills here that address the 394 00:23:39,040 --> 00:23:42,680 Speaker 1: same problem but don't have the same issues. Or cybersecurity 395 00:23:42,800 --> 00:23:48,400 Speaker 1: is sort of difficult to to capture anyway, um, far 396 00:23:48,480 --> 00:23:52,760 Speaker 1: more than than you know, physical security. There there are 397 00:23:52,760 --> 00:23:56,840 Speaker 1: just so many loopholes and ways to get into electronic 398 00:23:56,920 --> 00:24:01,679 Speaker 1: systems compared to a physical system. Yes, and uh, you 399 00:24:01,720 --> 00:24:04,600 Speaker 1: know they're they're it's difficult to do. And I think 400 00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:09,240 Speaker 1: that's one of the reasons that the legislation is so broad. Um. Also, 401 00:24:09,280 --> 00:24:15,280 Speaker 1: it is much easier to um prosecute cybersecurity cases when 402 00:24:15,320 --> 00:24:18,000 Speaker 1: you have the help of other agencies working together, which 403 00:24:18,000 --> 00:24:20,680 Speaker 1: is what the idea is, is, you know, giving people 404 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:24,200 Speaker 1: the authority to share information like that. Yeah, no, the yeah, 405 00:24:24,240 --> 00:24:27,160 Speaker 1: the purpose for the challenge, Yeah, it's it's I completely 406 00:24:27,240 --> 00:24:30,840 Speaker 1: understand the government's approach and and uh and when I 407 00:24:30,840 --> 00:24:33,280 Speaker 1: say the government, I really should say that that. You know, 408 00:24:33,320 --> 00:24:36,119 Speaker 1: we're talking about people like Representative Mike Rodgers, who was 409 00:24:36,160 --> 00:24:40,000 Speaker 1: the guy who wrote this the original. Yes, he's the 410 00:24:40,000 --> 00:24:43,840 Speaker 1: one who who wrote the original as Sispa language. And um, 411 00:24:44,080 --> 00:24:47,200 Speaker 1: I can totally understand where he's coming from because one 412 00:24:47,240 --> 00:24:50,479 Speaker 1: of the if you ever have read any information about 413 00:24:50,800 --> 00:24:55,640 Speaker 1: criminal procedures, about investigative procedures that that ended up being 414 00:24:55,840 --> 00:25:00,879 Speaker 1: for cases that spanned either multiple jurisdictions or you had 415 00:25:00,920 --> 00:25:05,320 Speaker 1: both federal and state enforcement agencies involved. One of the 416 00:25:05,359 --> 00:25:08,680 Speaker 1: things that always struck me whenever I read those reports 417 00:25:09,200 --> 00:25:14,120 Speaker 1: was how much easier things could have gone had these 418 00:25:14,160 --> 00:25:20,800 Speaker 1: different agencies shared their resources more freely. And in many cases, 419 00:25:21,280 --> 00:25:25,600 Speaker 1: it's not that the agency is trying to hog all 420 00:25:25,640 --> 00:25:28,920 Speaker 1: the credit, which is often how it's portrayed. Right. Often 421 00:25:28,960 --> 00:25:32,000 Speaker 1: it's like the law enforcement official who wants to have 422 00:25:32,080 --> 00:25:34,399 Speaker 1: the collar and he doesn't want anyone else taking credit 423 00:25:34,440 --> 00:25:40,480 Speaker 1: for it. That's how popularly we perceive the TV shows 424 00:25:40,480 --> 00:25:44,240 Speaker 1: and books novels as well. But but in reality that 425 00:25:44,359 --> 00:25:48,960 Speaker 1: the cases that handling information is very delicate. You know, 426 00:25:49,000 --> 00:25:52,360 Speaker 1: the way you handle information is of paramount and importance 427 00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:57,320 Speaker 1: than any kind of investigative effort, whether it's law enforcement 428 00:25:57,400 --> 00:26:00,959 Speaker 1: or journalism whatever, right the way you into information is 429 00:26:01,359 --> 00:26:05,359 Speaker 1: as important as as anything else. And so whenever you 430 00:26:05,400 --> 00:26:08,320 Speaker 1: get into a situation where you're talking about sharing information, 431 00:26:08,840 --> 00:26:11,760 Speaker 1: you automatically have to worry about that because how strong 432 00:26:11,880 --> 00:26:15,000 Speaker 1: is the link between the two entities, you know, how 433 00:26:15,080 --> 00:26:19,160 Speaker 1: how secure is that is the other entity reliable if 434 00:26:19,160 --> 00:26:22,159 Speaker 1: you share information with that entity, is it going to 435 00:26:22,240 --> 00:26:26,280 Speaker 1: actually affect your investigation in a negative way? And these 436 00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:28,240 Speaker 1: are a lot of considerations you have to make. And 437 00:26:28,359 --> 00:26:31,320 Speaker 1: so while it's easy in hindsight to say, ah, if 438 00:26:31,359 --> 00:26:34,480 Speaker 1: only the FBI had talked to this one local police station, 439 00:26:34,800 --> 00:26:38,240 Speaker 1: they would have caught this guy, you know, years before hand, 440 00:26:38,560 --> 00:26:41,560 Speaker 1: very easy to say that in in hindsight, same sort 441 00:26:41,560 --> 00:26:44,399 Speaker 1: of thing here is that you know, you're thinking, well, 442 00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:47,760 Speaker 1: if only all these different groups, whether they are in 443 00:26:47,920 --> 00:26:52,040 Speaker 1: federal government agencies or private companies, if only they could 444 00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:54,680 Speaker 1: actually talk to each other, then perhaps they could head 445 00:26:54,720 --> 00:26:58,760 Speaker 1: off attacks from uh, say, hackers in China. You know, 446 00:26:58,920 --> 00:27:01,120 Speaker 1: they might be able to You might have one agency 447 00:27:01,160 --> 00:27:03,520 Speaker 1: that knows about it, but because of their policies, they 448 00:27:03,560 --> 00:27:07,119 Speaker 1: don't share the information and so the attack goes on 449 00:27:07,359 --> 00:27:11,080 Speaker 1: as planned and people are hurt by it. The idea 450 00:27:11,160 --> 00:27:13,880 Speaker 1: here is that by sharing all this information we would 451 00:27:13,880 --> 00:27:16,720 Speaker 1: be better off for it. The problem is that kind 452 00:27:16,720 --> 00:27:20,080 Speaker 1: of ignores the impact it can make on the actual 453 00:27:20,240 --> 00:27:26,800 Speaker 1: US citizen. So while it's while it's laudable that that 454 00:27:26,960 --> 00:27:30,840 Speaker 1: representatives are looking for ways to protect our cyber infrastructure, 455 00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:33,600 Speaker 1: which is, as you pointed out, a very difficult thing 456 00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:36,720 Speaker 1: to do. There's so many loopholes both technical and personal 457 00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:40,639 Speaker 1: in those systems that's hard to protect. It's laudable that 458 00:27:40,680 --> 00:27:44,680 Speaker 1: they're trying to do this, but unfortunately the fact that 459 00:27:44,880 --> 00:27:50,520 Speaker 1: it sort of throws out privacy rights for U. S 460 00:27:50,560 --> 00:27:54,359 Speaker 1: citizens means that it could potentially do far more harm 461 00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:58,320 Speaker 1: than good, and it also could mean another step toward 462 00:27:58,880 --> 00:28:03,600 Speaker 1: a very big brother kind of government, and I often 463 00:28:04,040 --> 00:28:07,040 Speaker 1: I mean I love that kind of science fiction. I mean, 464 00:28:07,080 --> 00:28:10,960 Speaker 1: I love the dystopian science fiction, this so brave new world, 465 00:28:11,920 --> 00:28:14,360 Speaker 1: that kind of stuff where you've got this uh this 466 00:28:14,440 --> 00:28:19,359 Speaker 1: government agency that is really oppressive and intrusive in our lives. 467 00:28:19,760 --> 00:28:22,919 Speaker 1: I honestly don't think we are anywhere close to that 468 00:28:23,040 --> 00:28:25,600 Speaker 1: kind of level. But when you see stuff like this 469 00:28:25,680 --> 00:28:29,720 Speaker 1: going through government and getting past, you think maybe that's 470 00:28:29,800 --> 00:28:33,760 Speaker 1: not entirely unrealistic, because these are sort of paving the 471 00:28:33,840 --> 00:28:36,960 Speaker 1: way to that sort of environment. And I think most 472 00:28:36,960 --> 00:28:41,120 Speaker 1: of us would agree that that's not a desirable outcome. 473 00:28:41,920 --> 00:28:45,080 Speaker 1: Like I don't want the thought police chasing me down 474 00:28:45,120 --> 00:28:49,400 Speaker 1: all the time, you know, but I don't again, not 475 00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:52,200 Speaker 1: to say that that's where we're we're definitely headed. But 476 00:28:52,240 --> 00:28:54,120 Speaker 1: when you see this kind of stuff, you can say, 477 00:28:54,560 --> 00:28:57,080 Speaker 1: all right, this it feels like it's a little just 478 00:28:57,240 --> 00:28:59,960 Speaker 1: it's stepped just a little further away from the fixed 479 00:29:00,080 --> 00:29:03,640 Speaker 1: inside of of the bookstore, right like that. It's just 480 00:29:03,800 --> 00:29:06,680 Speaker 1: edging a little closer to nonfiction. It's not there yet, 481 00:29:06,760 --> 00:29:10,680 Speaker 1: but if we aren't careful, then that could happen. So 482 00:29:11,520 --> 00:29:15,720 Speaker 1: it is completely understandable why people are uh up in 483 00:29:15,880 --> 00:29:20,000 Speaker 1: arms about this and um again, just as understandable as 484 00:29:20,040 --> 00:29:23,200 Speaker 1: it is that this kind of legislation is being debated 485 00:29:23,200 --> 00:29:26,720 Speaker 1: in the first place. It's not an easy issue to solve. 486 00:29:27,560 --> 00:29:29,880 Speaker 1: I wish it were, because then we wouldn't you know, 487 00:29:29,960 --> 00:29:34,200 Speaker 1: we would have had a podcast about video games. Well 488 00:29:34,240 --> 00:29:37,200 Speaker 1: it's about Star Wars. It is kind of funny though, 489 00:29:37,240 --> 00:29:43,560 Speaker 1: because after the the reaction to public reaction to SOPA 490 00:29:43,640 --> 00:29:48,120 Speaker 1: and Pippa, with so many people being aware of the bills, 491 00:29:48,200 --> 00:29:52,800 Speaker 1: especially SOPA. Um um, it's it's kind of funny to 492 00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:56,960 Speaker 1: see how SISPA has sort of snuck in under the 493 00:29:57,080 --> 00:30:00,000 Speaker 1: radar so far if you fewer people are talking about 494 00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:03,000 Speaker 1: at it. I see more information on it in the 495 00:30:03,000 --> 00:30:06,640 Speaker 1: the tech uh press than I do in uh you 496 00:30:06,680 --> 00:30:10,800 Speaker 1: know that the general media. Um. So it's it is 497 00:30:10,880 --> 00:30:15,280 Speaker 1: kind of funny that it's being Um it's out there 498 00:30:15,360 --> 00:30:18,400 Speaker 1: and people are interested in and curious about it, but 499 00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:21,960 Speaker 1: it's far on on a far lesser scale now. Um, 500 00:30:22,080 --> 00:30:24,880 Speaker 1: if you are interested in it, UM, I would recommend 501 00:30:24,960 --> 00:30:27,560 Speaker 1: a an interesting site that you might go to, open 502 00:30:27,600 --> 00:30:31,480 Speaker 1: Congress dot org. Um. There there's a lot of information there, 503 00:30:31,560 --> 00:30:34,560 Speaker 1: especially uh you know, on on all kinds of things, 504 00:30:34,560 --> 00:30:36,920 Speaker 1: not just SIS but this is um, this is basically 505 00:30:36,960 --> 00:30:40,120 Speaker 1: all kinds of legislation that's going through and uh, if 506 00:30:40,160 --> 00:30:42,400 Speaker 1: you're a member of the site, you can vote yea 507 00:30:42,640 --> 00:30:45,640 Speaker 1: or nay on it whether you're interested. Um. It's sort 508 00:30:45,640 --> 00:30:48,600 Speaker 1: of a a straw pole, if you will, on how 509 00:30:48,640 --> 00:30:50,720 Speaker 1: people feel about it. Of course, it's it's completely on 510 00:30:50,800 --> 00:30:54,720 Speaker 1: scientific and if you're uh, you know, somebody who lives 511 00:30:54,760 --> 00:30:57,480 Speaker 1: in the United States, you can um use tools on 512 00:30:57,520 --> 00:31:01,000 Speaker 1: the site to write for or against legislation UH to 513 00:31:01,120 --> 00:31:05,880 Speaker 1: your representatives and senators, which is a pretty cool tool. UM. 514 00:31:05,920 --> 00:31:08,680 Speaker 1: So I would totally recommend that site to anybody who's 515 00:31:08,680 --> 00:31:10,640 Speaker 1: interested in it. But it also gives you not opportunity 516 00:31:10,680 --> 00:31:14,280 Speaker 1: to read the uh the text of legislation CISPA and others, 517 00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:16,920 Speaker 1: UM and see where it is. Sure it is. We 518 00:31:16,920 --> 00:31:21,920 Speaker 1: should also mention whenever you read this legislation for the layman, 519 00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:24,360 Speaker 1: it can be a little dense. I was gonna say, 520 00:31:24,360 --> 00:31:26,960 Speaker 1: try not to doze off, because uh, you know, we 521 00:31:27,080 --> 00:31:31,600 Speaker 1: gotta remember our the United States is is governed by lawyers. 522 00:31:32,960 --> 00:31:35,560 Speaker 1: I mean, this is this is about creating law. So 523 00:31:35,640 --> 00:31:39,160 Speaker 1: it's written like a law. It's it's legal language doesn't 524 00:31:39,200 --> 00:31:43,400 Speaker 1: tend to be so dense that it's indecipherable. And also 525 00:31:43,440 --> 00:31:45,840 Speaker 1: I shouldn't mention CISPA itself is one of the more 526 00:31:46,200 --> 00:31:52,120 Speaker 1: succinct eleven pages eleven pages of document that I had 527 00:31:52,320 --> 00:31:55,920 Speaker 1: the one I've got eighteen. So yeah, so of course 528 00:31:55,960 --> 00:31:58,200 Speaker 1: I did not include the amendments that were added, and 529 00:31:58,280 --> 00:32:00,320 Speaker 1: I had those, I had to read those separate. But 530 00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:05,120 Speaker 1: I was disappointed that there weren't any pictures. Yeah, well, 531 00:32:05,360 --> 00:32:07,880 Speaker 1: what after all the pictures of various kinds of pirates 532 00:32:07,880 --> 00:32:10,080 Speaker 1: in the Sopa and Pippa stuff. You know, some of 533 00:32:10,120 --> 00:32:12,640 Speaker 1: them will let you connect some dots, and some of 534 00:32:12,680 --> 00:32:15,720 Speaker 1: them you could color in the peg leg. Yeah, the 535 00:32:16,000 --> 00:32:20,680 Speaker 1: buckled swashes were awesome. We're obviously being a little silly 536 00:32:20,760 --> 00:32:22,760 Speaker 1: right now, but no, yeah, I think it's I think 537 00:32:22,760 --> 00:32:26,600 Speaker 1: it's really good. And other nations also have similar tools, 538 00:32:26,640 --> 00:32:29,400 Speaker 1: depending upon where you are and and the kind of 539 00:32:29,440 --> 00:32:32,640 Speaker 1: government your nation has. Uh So it's always good to 540 00:32:32,960 --> 00:32:35,959 Speaker 1: take into account that sort of thing, to do some research, 541 00:32:36,000 --> 00:32:39,040 Speaker 1: see see what impact you as a citizen can have. 542 00:32:39,680 --> 00:32:41,720 Speaker 1: And in some cases it may be that you want 543 00:32:41,760 --> 00:32:46,240 Speaker 1: to uh to contact a representative, a senator or whatever, 544 00:32:46,840 --> 00:32:50,040 Speaker 1: and mentioned that you are in favor of something you 545 00:32:50,080 --> 00:32:52,360 Speaker 1: know not everything has to be Oh, this is bad, 546 00:32:52,400 --> 00:32:54,640 Speaker 1: it's going to destroy the world. It's also good for 547 00:32:54,640 --> 00:32:56,560 Speaker 1: you to show support for things that you think are 548 00:32:56,640 --> 00:33:02,200 Speaker 1: really UM applicable and import it in and uh, I 549 00:33:02,240 --> 00:33:06,000 Speaker 1: think taking an active role as a citizen is a 550 00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:07,840 Speaker 1: really important thing to do. I've done it on on 551 00:33:07,920 --> 00:33:10,000 Speaker 1: multiple occasions. I probably still don't do it as much 552 00:33:10,040 --> 00:33:14,120 Speaker 1: as I should, but um, I'm getting there. And beyond 553 00:33:14,200 --> 00:33:16,320 Speaker 1: just you know, going to the polls and voting, it's 554 00:33:16,920 --> 00:33:19,080 Speaker 1: that should not be the beginning and end of your 555 00:33:19,280 --> 00:33:21,680 Speaker 1: role as a citizen, if possible, especially if these things 556 00:33:21,680 --> 00:33:25,320 Speaker 1: are really important to you. So anyway that, do you 557 00:33:25,400 --> 00:33:27,880 Speaker 1: have anything else you wanted to add about CISPA in 558 00:33:27,920 --> 00:33:31,320 Speaker 1: particular and not in particular, but I I do think 559 00:33:31,360 --> 00:33:33,480 Speaker 1: it's interesting that you know, this is not a black 560 00:33:33,520 --> 00:33:36,960 Speaker 1: and white situation. You know, I personally have sort of 561 00:33:37,000 --> 00:33:40,040 Speaker 1: a grave view of of CISPA, where I see some 562 00:33:40,160 --> 00:33:42,960 Speaker 1: merit in and I see some problems with it. So UM, 563 00:33:43,000 --> 00:33:46,480 Speaker 1: I think it's especially important to become as informed. You know, 564 00:33:46,560 --> 00:33:50,720 Speaker 1: don't don't take accounts that you read uh online or 565 00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:53,920 Speaker 1: or you know, stories you hear in the news. Don't 566 00:33:53,920 --> 00:33:58,280 Speaker 1: take those uh too hard, too much without doing some 567 00:33:58,360 --> 00:34:01,280 Speaker 1: research yourself and and citing for yourself how you feel 568 00:34:01,280 --> 00:34:06,000 Speaker 1: about these issues. Um, at least that's my advice. Yeah, no, 569 00:34:06,120 --> 00:34:09,759 Speaker 1: I I agree entirely. So I'm going to go and 570 00:34:09,800 --> 00:34:13,040 Speaker 1: have some kind of meal tyn to settle my nerves 571 00:34:13,600 --> 00:34:16,120 Speaker 1: so that we can record our second podcast of our 572 00:34:16,200 --> 00:34:21,440 Speaker 1: podcast recording marathon. Yeah. I'm surprised Jonathan that you, uh you, 573 00:34:21,840 --> 00:34:25,759 Speaker 1: we didn't have the lad I told you. I told you. 574 00:34:25,880 --> 00:34:30,080 Speaker 1: It's it's because it's because things are not always It's 575 00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:34,000 Speaker 1: not evil empire versus the rebellion. May the fourth be 576 00:34:34,160 --> 00:34:38,640 Speaker 1: with you. Um, It's it's not that, it's it's one 577 00:34:39,120 --> 00:34:42,719 Speaker 1: group of legislators who are trying to tackle a legitimately 578 00:34:42,800 --> 00:34:47,920 Speaker 1: difficult problem and perhaps going about the wrong way, maybe 579 00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:50,400 Speaker 1: in ways that you know, they just don't anticipate the 580 00:34:50,480 --> 00:34:52,520 Speaker 1: kind of problems that would exist, whereas those of us 581 00:34:52,560 --> 00:34:57,000 Speaker 1: who it could affect anticipate it a lot. So, I mean, 582 00:34:57,000 --> 00:34:59,799 Speaker 1: it's I understand it's a complex issue, which is probably 583 00:34:59,840 --> 00:35:02,960 Speaker 1: why don't get so angry. Um, But if you want, 584 00:35:02,960 --> 00:35:05,320 Speaker 1: we can pick another topic and I'll get really ticked 585 00:35:05,320 --> 00:35:07,440 Speaker 1: off about it all. Right, then, how about how about 586 00:35:07,520 --> 00:35:10,640 Speaker 1: the progression of obi Wan Kenobi as a character through 587 00:35:10,760 --> 00:35:13,520 Speaker 1: the original trilogies and then the prequels of Star Wars. 588 00:35:13,600 --> 00:35:16,160 Speaker 1: That really gets me mad. And our producer Tyler can 589 00:35:16,239 --> 00:35:17,839 Speaker 1: let you know because I went on about a ten 590 00:35:17,880 --> 00:35:21,399 Speaker 1: minute rant about it before we started recording. Alright, then 591 00:35:21,520 --> 00:35:24,680 Speaker 1: I'm excited. Okay, so we'll we'll we'll chat about that offline, 592 00:35:24,719 --> 00:35:27,080 Speaker 1: because I mean, that's not really tech stuff. But you guys, 593 00:35:27,080 --> 00:35:29,640 Speaker 1: if you have any requests for topics that we should cover, 594 00:35:29,880 --> 00:35:32,840 Speaker 1: like why is Jonathan mad at Obi wan Kenobi, let 595 00:35:32,920 --> 00:35:37,000 Speaker 1: us know. Send us a message in Facebook or on Twitter. 596 00:35:37,320 --> 00:35:40,080 Speaker 1: Are handle there is tech Stuff h s W or 597 00:35:40,120 --> 00:35:43,080 Speaker 1: you can fire off a quick email. Our address is 598 00:35:43,239 --> 00:35:46,680 Speaker 1: tech Stuff at Discovery dot com and Chris and I 599 00:35:46,760 --> 00:35:50,799 Speaker 1: will talk to you again really soon for more on 600 00:35:50,880 --> 00:35:53,320 Speaker 1: this and thousands of other topics. Is it how Stuff 601 00:35:53,360 --> 00:35:59,919 Speaker 1: works dot Com brought to you by the reinvented tieth 602 00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:02,680 Speaker 1: thousand and twelve Camry. It's ready. Are you