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Speaker 1: There is now an Apple learning people when ICE agents

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Speaker 1: are operating in their area.

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Speaker 2: It's called ice Block, which allowed users to track and

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Speaker 2: report any public sightings that immigration agents deployed or detaining people.

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Speaker 3: Apple says they have pulled an app that allows users

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Speaker 3: to track ICE agents after getting pressure from the Department

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Speaker 3: of Justice.

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Speaker 4: So ice Block was an iPhone app that helps people

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Speaker 4: anonymously report ice sightings that are in their neighborhood, that

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Speaker 4: are nearby within a five miler adias, and you've got

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Speaker 4: notifications when other people are report ice sightings near you.

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Speaker 1: Michael Lee is an independent security researcher and journalist. He's

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Speaker 1: talking about an ice reporting app called ice Block. The

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Speaker 1: tagline was quote see something, tap something. A lot of

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Speaker 1: people were looking for ways to deal with the Trump

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Speaker 1: administration's immigration policies, and in June, ice block went viral.

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Speaker 4: And I think the thing that makes it different than

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Speaker 4: other various products is that it went viral. CNN did

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Speaker 4: some reporting on ice block, like early on, they had

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Speaker 4: like on TV all day one day, and then the

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Speaker 4: right wing Twitter or x blew up and started attacking it,

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Speaker 4: and so then it ended up getting like a million users.

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Speaker 1: Despite the popularity Micah was skeptical of ice block, so

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Speaker 1: he did some digging.

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Speaker 4: I called it active as in theater because it seemed

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Speaker 4: like it wasn't actually like aimed at helping people. It

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Speaker 4: was just aimed at, like, you know, making his app

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Speaker 4: that was going viral, get more users and stuff like that.

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Speaker 1: I'm afraid with a kaleidoscope and iHeart podcasts. This is

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Speaker 1: kill switch. I'm dextrats, I'm sing.

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Speaker 2: I'm goodbye.

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Speaker 1: When did you first hear about ice block?

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Speaker 4: I heard ice black after I was on the and

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Speaker 4: then I heard about the right wing backlash.

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Speaker 1: The backlash that MICA's referring to is the White House

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Speaker 1: Press Secretary saying.

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Speaker 2: Sounds like this would be an incitement of further violence

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Speaker 2: against our ice The.

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Speaker 1: White House boarders are saying THEO Jane's look at this

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Speaker 1: and see if they're crossing that line. And United States

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Speaker 1: Attorney General Pam Bondi.

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Speaker 2: Saying we are looking at it, we are looking at him,

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Speaker 2: and he better watch out because that's not a protected speech.

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Speaker 1: And the United States Secretary of Homeland Security Christy Nome

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Speaker 1: posted on Twitter or x calling it an obstruction of

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Speaker 1: justice and said quote, if you obstruct or assault or

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Speaker 1: law enforcement. We will hunt you down and you will

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Speaker 1: be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law end quote.

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Speaker 4: I thought it was very interesting, but at the same time,

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Speaker 4: I have been doing some local work in my own

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Speaker 4: community in northern California, and I was very skeptical about

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Speaker 4: how useful it was just from my own experiences.

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Speaker 1: If you were to describe how ice block works in

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Speaker 1: terms of the reporting function, is there anything you would

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Speaker 1: use to compare it to.

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Speaker 4: I mean, it's super similar to just on typical map

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Speaker 4: apps where warns you have a speed trap right like

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Speaker 4: you're driving, and then it says cops have been reported

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Speaker 4: up ahead, and then you know, people all get that

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Speaker 4: on their phones and they start slowing down. That's basically

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Speaker 4: what it is. It's just like a location based app

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Speaker 4: where people can report here's an ice sighting, and then

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Speaker 4: other people who are nearby get the notification and then

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Speaker 4: they're like, oh, there's an ice sighting there. It's actually

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Speaker 4: overall pretty simple.

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Speaker 1: Ice Block was created by a solo developer named Joshua

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Speaker 1: Aaron back in April, just a few months into President

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Speaker 1: Trump's second term. He told CNN that he made the

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Speaker 1: app because he wanted to do something to fight back

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Speaker 1: against what was happening in the US. He made ice

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Speaker 1: Block only available on iPhone because he said that making

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Speaker 1: it available on Android could require collecting information that could

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Speaker 1: put users at risk. Maybe that's annoyed Android users, but

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Speaker 1: there is some merit to this, at least in the

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Speaker 1: way that the app was doing things.

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Speaker 4: From my understanding is it uses the Apple Cloud cat.

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Speaker 4: So normally what you'd have as an app running on

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Speaker 4: phones and then you'd have a server, and so when

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Speaker 4: you report something, it would communicate with the server and

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Speaker 4: save stuff in the database. So he's saying he's not

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Speaker 4: collecting any data, but instead he's essentially outsourcing this to Apples.

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Speaker 4: He doesn't need to like collect the location of users

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Speaker 4: who have this app installed. Instead, Apple's already collecting everyone's

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Speaker 4: location who has location services on and so it's just

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Speaker 4: relying on that. So that's that's like roughly the technical

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Speaker 4: way that he's keeping it completely anonymous, although it's really

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Speaker 4: not completely anonymous because you know, Apple can see everything.

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Speaker 5: If ice Block.

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Speaker 4: Gets data requests from you know, the FBI or DHS

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Speaker 4: or something, maybe they won't be able to comply because

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Speaker 4: they don't have data. But if Apple gets data requests

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Speaker 4: from the FBI or DHS, Apple actually has a lot

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Speaker 4: of data that they can turn over, including you know,

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Speaker 4: everyone who's installed the.

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Speaker 1: App, right because relatively speaking, Apple does have a fairly

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Speaker 1: good reputation or good record in not just turning stuff

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Speaker 1: over willingly to the authorities. Like somebody comes and asks

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Speaker 1: for it, and they generally say no, right.

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Speaker 4: When it's a valid law enforcement request. They like don't

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Speaker 4: really have much of the option to say no. They

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Speaker 4: can fight it with lawyers, but if they lose, then

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Speaker 4: they have to turn it over. And so what Apple

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Speaker 4: has a good reputation for is building in extra security

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Speaker 4: to make it so that it's harder for them to

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Speaker 4: turn stuff over. They have something called the Advanced Data

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Speaker 4: Production and anyone that wants to can turn it on

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Speaker 4: in their iCloud account, and it means that all that

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Speaker 4: data in your iCloud account is encrypted. So if Apple's

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Speaker 4: forced to turn it over, they can still turn it over.

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Speaker 4: It's just that it'll be encrypted data they're turning over,

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Speaker 4: and you, the user, will have a key that can

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Speaker 4: decrypt it. So they're doing work to make it harder

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Speaker 4: to turnover data, but they still are you know they're

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Speaker 4: a US company.

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Speaker 5: They give data to the BLISS.

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Speaker 1: There were some researchers who initially were a little skeptical

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Speaker 1: of how ice block worked. A colleague of MICA has

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Speaker 1: looked into it and confirmed that it did seem to

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Speaker 1: legitimately be working how it promised.

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Speaker 4: I didn't spend much time digging and stuff until a

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Speaker 4: Hope conference Hackers on Planet Earth that now happens every year.

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Speaker 4: It's in New York, and Joshua Aaron, the developer of

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Speaker 4: ice block, was giving a talk about ice block at Hope.

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Speaker 4: And as he was talking and then especially throughout the

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Speaker 4: Q and A, the audience was getting more and more

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Speaker 4: visibly frustrated because it was very clear that this guy

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Speaker 4: just doesn't know what he's talking about, and he kept

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Speaker 4: like making these big promises. He kept talking about how

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Speaker 4: he runs a server and he's like, believe me, my

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Speaker 4: server is highly secure, no one could hack it. I

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Speaker 4: built it myself, and I think of everything, and like

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Speaker 4: this is like an audience full of hackers and people

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Speaker 4: are like scanning his server and being like there's various

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Speaker 4: problems already.

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Speaker 5: Just starting the.

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Speaker 1: Talk, maybe a little late here, but it's probably worth

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Speaker 1: mentioning here that Micah isn't just some hobbyist programmer. In

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Speaker 1: twenty thirteen, he helped Edward Snowden league government spying documents.

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Speaker 1: So if Micah says that he's concerned about security, that's

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Speaker 1: going to hold some weight for people. And one big

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Speaker 1: issue that he and some other researchers had at this

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Speaker 1: conference was the fact that the developer didn't want to

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Speaker 1: make the apps code open source, which raised a big

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Speaker 1: red flag from Mica.

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Speaker 4: In computer security, if you're making security products or privacy

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Speaker 4: products and you want people to trust you, the way

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Speaker 4: of doing this is to show your work to like

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Speaker 4: make your software open source, to invite outside researchers to

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Speaker 4: like look into it to try and find flaws. Anyone

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Speaker 4: can look at the code, anyone can use the code.

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Speaker 4: Anyone can, you know, take a copy of the code

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Speaker 4: and change it and release their own version. The big

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Speaker 4: benefit from a privacy and security perspective of open source

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Speaker 4: is it means that you're not like hiding how you

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Speaker 4: do stuff.

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Speaker 5: You're being transparent about it.

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Speaker 4: And for something like this where people are very concerned

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Speaker 4: that it's collecting their data, the basic stuff that a

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Speaker 4: developer can do is make it open source, and then

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Speaker 4: this way they can just like be like, look, you

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Speaker 4: don't have to trust us as much because maybe you

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Speaker 4: don't read code, but like someone else who does readcode

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Speaker 4: can like look through the code and confirm that it's

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Speaker 4: done what I say it's done. It has other benefits too,

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Speaker 4: like other people can actually help you fix bugs. Other

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Speaker 4: people can help you find vulnerabilities. Other people can add

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Speaker 4: features to it, and this is like common for security

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Speaker 4: software and privacy software.

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Speaker 1: When he was asked in the Q and A if

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Speaker 1: you would accept help programming the app, Joshua Aaron said, no.

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Speaker 2: Believe me when I say I would love help. Okay,

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Speaker 2: I'm supporting over a million users myself. There's not some

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Speaker 2: giant company behind this, but it's really really hard for

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Speaker 2: me to put my trust in somebody and share the

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Speaker 2: source code and share the access to this. So I

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Speaker 2: got to just say, so far, the answer is I'm

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Speaker 2: just not the trusting person. So no, I haven't entertained

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Speaker 2: having anybody else involved with it.

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Speaker 1: Joshua Aaron was adamant that his ice block app is secure,

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Speaker 1: but he wouldn't budge on this open source issue. So

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Speaker 1: I could decided to ask a different question.

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Speaker 4: I actually went and said another question, which was basically,

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Speaker 4: would you be open to publishing like a white paper

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Speaker 4: that explains how it works, so that you know, researchers

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Speaker 4: could like look at this and give feedback and make

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Speaker 4: it better, and also like security audits, Like you don't

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Speaker 4: need to open the source code to everyone, but there

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Speaker 4: are all of these security firms that will do a

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Speaker 4: like a penetration test of your code. They try to

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Speaker 4: hack it, and then if they find any problems, they

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Speaker 4: give you a report and then you fix them all.

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Speaker 4: And we were even like we could raise money for

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Speaker 4: a security audit. These are things that you can do

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Speaker 4: without making an open source it'll still make people trust

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Speaker 4: it more. But he was just like, Nope, I'm not

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Speaker 4: doing any of this stuff.

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Speaker 1: All right, let's just leave aside the cybersecurity talk for

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Speaker 1: a second. Micah had another concern what would happen if

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Speaker 1: someone falsely reported in ice sighting or if they just

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Speaker 1: made a mistake. Mike has been volunteering with an organization

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Speaker 1: in his area called Norkel Resist. This group does a

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Speaker 1: lot of things, from fixing your car's break lights were free,

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Speaker 1: to distributing food to families who need it. But recently

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Speaker 1: they've been doing a lot of work supporting immigrants and

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Speaker 1: because of this, Micah has seen firsthand how a false

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Speaker 1: eye sighting can really cause panic.

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Speaker 4: And a big thing is that lots of people are like,

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Speaker 4: oh my god, there's ice in this neighborhood, and they

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Speaker 4: like post that online and then a lot of people

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Speaker 4: like boost it, and most of the time that's not

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Speaker 4: actually true. One that I checked out there was this

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Speaker 4: overpass bridge looked like there was like a bunch of

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Speaker 4: people in uniforms on the bridge what looked kind of

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Speaker 4: like police vehicles, and like multiple people reported this bridge

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Speaker 4: and I went and confirmed that it was like a

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Speaker 4: fireman funeral service then, so.

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Speaker 5: It wasn't ice at all.

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Speaker 4: Sometimes it's actually just like a local police action, and

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Speaker 4: it just causes people to panic because the problem is

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Speaker 4: that there's like millions of people who are undocumented, and

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Speaker 4: then there's even more millions of people who are friends

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Speaker 4: and loves ones with people who are undocumented. There's all

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Speaker 4: of these teenagers whose parents are undocumented in their citizens

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Speaker 4: and stuff, and they're like scared out of their minds,

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Speaker 4: like constantly, and so if you're sitting there scrolling on

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Speaker 4: social media, and you're just seeing like, oh my god,

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Speaker 4: there's ice everywhere. It's really scary. And so it's like

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Speaker 4: very important to not cause panic and instead to just

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Speaker 4: spread the news about real things that are happening and

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Speaker 4: not just a bunch of big things that aren't happening.

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Speaker 1: So at this Hacker's Conference talk, Micah asked Joshua Aaron

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Speaker 1: about this directly, and I.

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Speaker 4: Guess my question is, how do you know that ice

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Speaker 4: block isn't just full of false positives? And have you

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Speaker 4: done any like user research or work with local immigration

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Speaker 4: groups to like figure out, you know, how reliable this is,

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Speaker 4: how much it's actually helping people versus causing panic.

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Speaker 2: I'm not going to tell you there's no false sightings

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Speaker 2: in ice Block.

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Speaker 5: Of course there are. That's what nefarious users do.

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Speaker 2: They think it's really funny to scare people and hurt people.

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Speaker 2: But there are safeguards in the app.

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Speaker 4: He eventually said that, like in the off chance that

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Speaker 4: someone posts something that's not real, then people will just

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Speaker 4: stay away from that area for a little.

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Speaker 5: Bit, and that's not that bad.

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Speaker 2: So, in an effort for user anonymity, the decision was

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Speaker 2: made that if there are false sightings, the worst case

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Speaker 2: scenario is that those people simply stay away from that

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Speaker 2: location for a few hours, much better than having user

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Speaker 2: identifiable data that could come under government subpoena. So I

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Speaker 2: hope that answers your question and kind of alleviates those concerns.

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Speaker 1: That does sound kind of bad, though.

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Speaker 4: I do think it's kind of bad because it's causing

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Speaker 4: people to like panic and to worry that there's way

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Speaker 4: more ice activity than there actually is. There was this

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Speaker 4: one other person who who also asked about you know,

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Speaker 4: there's all of these immigrant communities across the country that

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Speaker 4: have these pretty strong support networks and they're already doing

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Speaker 4: stuff in their own ways. As she asked, have you

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Speaker 4: planned on working with any of these groups? And basically

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Speaker 4: his answer was, I've talked to some community organizers and

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Speaker 4: they all do things their own way, and I wouldn't

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Speaker 4: be able to like make ice block work for this

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Speaker 4: group and then for this group and then for this group,

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Speaker 4: so he's just going to ignore their advice.

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Speaker 1: After the conference, Micah did some more digging around and

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Speaker 1: he tried to ask the developers some questions via DMS.

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Speaker 1: That's when things started to get weird. More on that

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Speaker 1: after the.

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Speaker 4: Break, After this Hope Talk. A group of us started

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Speaker 4: a signal group and we were basically like, Okay, this

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Speaker 4: app has promise. We think that the developer is like

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Speaker 4: not malicious, we think his heart is in the right place.

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Speaker 4: Maybe we can affect us to make it so that

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Speaker 4: it's actually a useful app for people, and then especially

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Speaker 4: like that will be so much better because there's already

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Speaker 4: like a million users. So we spent a bunch of

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Speaker 4: energy trying to figure out how to improve the app.

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Speaker 4: We wrote him a letter and then he just like

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Speaker 4: immediately rejected the letter and rejected our offer of various support.

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Speaker 4: Then I was like, okay, I'm going to write basically

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Speaker 4: about the Hope Talk. So I just started a blog

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Speaker 4: post about the Hope Talk and with like little clips

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Speaker 4: from the most frustrating parts. And then at the end

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Speaker 4: of my blog post.

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Speaker 1: Michael wrote about all this in a post on his blog.

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Speaker 1: The title was Unfortunately the ice Block app is activism Theater.

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Speaker 1: But before we published it, he gave Joshua Aaron heads

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Speaker 1: up and he also flagged a potential security problem that

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Speaker 1: he'd found.

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Speaker 4: So I messaged him on Blue Sky being like, I'm

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Speaker 4: that published this blog post about the hope talk. It's

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Speaker 4: not very flattering, but I also wanted to like privately

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Speaker 4: tell you that I discovered a problem with your server.

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Speaker 5: I basically did a n MAP scan real quick.

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Speaker 1: Aside here in map or a network mapper is basically

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Speaker 1: a tool that lets you find devices on a network

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Speaker 1: and also potentially detect vulnerabilities.

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Speaker 4: So I didn't en map scan to see what ports

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Speaker 4: were a and then I also use this one feature

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Speaker 4: that just does version detection, so like, if it sees

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Speaker 4: that this server runs a web server, it tells you

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Speaker 4: what software is running on that web server. And this

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Speaker 4: was like the step zero before you start like trying

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Speaker 4: to hack something, you do basic reconnaissance. So this was

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Speaker 4: a very basic reconnaissance.

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Speaker 1: Right, just see what software they running?

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Speaker 5: Yeah, exactly.

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Speaker 4: And I saw that he was running Apache, which is

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Speaker 4: a common web server software. But the version of Apache

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Speaker 4: that was running was like eight months old or something.

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Speaker 4: And the thing about this is it's always important to

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Speaker 4: install updates, and the reason is because updates fixed security problems.

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Speaker 4: And so I like looked up that version and there

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Speaker 4: were all of these known vulnerabilities in that version of

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Speaker 4: apatching I just told him, hey, your version of Apache

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Speaker 4: has all these known vulnerabilities and some of them are

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Speaker 4: marked critical. You should probably update and he blocked me.

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Speaker 4: So that was the response, and then he uh sent

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Speaker 4: me a message on his other blue Sky account and

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Speaker 4: his personal account and was like, stop telling lies about

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Speaker 4: me and ice block. This is my last communication. And

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Speaker 4: I was like, hey, let me know if I got

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Speaker 4: anything wrong in the blog post, I'm happy to post

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Speaker 4: a correction. But then a few days later I checked

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Speaker 4: and his server was still running the vulnerable version of Apache.

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Speaker 4: So I sent him another message and I was like, hey,

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Speaker 4: you should really update this. I'll give you a deadline.

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Speaker 4: I'll give you a week to fix it. And it's

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Speaker 4: like really really really easy to fix. It's just running

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Speaker 4: the update command. That's it. That will fix the problem.

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Speaker 4: And so then he blocked me there too, And this

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Speaker 4: is just basically like really bad way to handle a

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Speaker 4: vulnerability report. I would imagine that at the very least

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Speaker 4: he will walk his server to not get hacked. I

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Speaker 4: waited until the week was up, and then I just

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Speaker 4: like wrote a short blog post being like here's what

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Speaker 4: I found. I hope this encourages them to actually install updates,

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Speaker 4: and then like within two hours he installed updates after

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Speaker 4: I published the blog post, so it worked.

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Speaker 1: I mean, you publicly bullied my man into updating the

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Speaker 1: Apache server. Yeah, we'll talk. You can come off is

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Speaker 1: kind of being just like a hater, Like, what's this

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Speaker 1: dude doing? Why is this guy being being on the

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Speaker 1: internet about this really well intentioned software, right?

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Speaker 4: I mean, so I don't want to come off as

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Speaker 4: a hater. And the entire time I've tried to help

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Speaker 4: make his app useful, but it was just so frustrating.

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Speaker 4: He's just saying all these things with such confidence that

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Speaker 4: aren't true. And honestly, like, I think that the problems

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Speaker 4: that we're facing with mass deportation, they're not solved by

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Speaker 4: an app. They're much bigger than an app, And so

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Speaker 4: I think the apps can be maybe a helpful component,

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Speaker 4: but there's a much bigger situation. And I think that

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Speaker 4: maybe if ice block was like working directly with a

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Speaker 4: network of local groups around the country and had betting

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Speaker 4: built in, that would actually make it really usefulat for

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Speaker 4: people to get like verified information. But like you know,

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Speaker 4: and if he's not doing any of that, then like

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Speaker 4: what's the point?

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Speaker 1: To some people, it might sound weird that computer programmers

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Speaker 1: would publicly have an argument over an app, but trust me,

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00:19:09,480 --> 00:19:12,919
Speaker 1: this stuff is very normal. Entire operating systems have been

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Speaker 1: written because someone couldn't agree on something as minor as

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Speaker 1: how the computer should boot up. The stakes just feel

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Speaker 1: a lot higher here because both of these people really

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Speaker 1: care about the cause of helping immigrants, and applying technology

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Speaker 1: to civil rights issues is way harder than most people think.

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Speaker 1: Just as an example, I have a friend who is

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Speaker 1: working on a totally different national campaign to help undocumented immigrants.

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Speaker 1: The project wasn't an app, but they created basically this

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Speaker 1: downloadable infocard. The idea was that if you get stopped

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Speaker 1: by ice, you could pull out your phone and you

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Speaker 1: could pull up this card from a digital wallet and

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Speaker 1: would have all this information on it, like your rights

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Speaker 1: stay silent, your right to a lawyer, people to contact,

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Speaker 1: things like that. And it looked really slick, and they

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Speaker 1: had all these social media influencers who are excited about it,

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Speaker 1: and they wanted to help them promote it, and things

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Speaker 1: were looking great. But then they showed their project to

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Speaker 1: some local groups who actually work with assisting undocumented immigrants,

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Speaker 1: and the group said, no, this is not a good idea.

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Speaker 1: You do not want people opening up their phone around

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Speaker 1: ice because they might take it or they might coerce

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Speaker 1: them into showing personal information. They said, look, here's what

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00:20:20,480 --> 00:20:23,960
Speaker 1: actually works in this community. Paper cards with your rights

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Speaker 1: printed on it. If you want to help us, help

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Speaker 1: us print those up and distribute them in a bunch

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Speaker 1: of different languages. No digital nonsense, just paper. Now. The

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Speaker 1: activists who worked on this other digital wallet thing were

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Speaker 1: pretty humiliated, but they ended up taking the local group's

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Speaker 1: advice and said, you know what, this is what's called

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Speaker 1: being a good ally, and you know, maybe so. In

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Speaker 1: software development, though there's a simpler term for it, we

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Speaker 1: just call it user research, putting aside all the cool

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Speaker 1: things that you want the user to do with your

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Speaker 1: software and figuring out what the people who would actually

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Speaker 1: use your software actually need.

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Speaker 4: I think that if you're actually like doing user research,

401
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Speaker 4: trying to figure out what do we need, there's a

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Speaker 4: lot of undocumented people who work in like the service

403
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Speaker 4: industry or who work in farming, and actually talking to

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Speaker 4: those people, I think that what will be really helpful

405
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Speaker 4: is to make it so that a bunch of people

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Speaker 4: who like work in the kitchen at restaurants they know

407
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Speaker 4: how to report an ICE sighting, because what happens when

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Speaker 4: like ice comes into the restaurant, like someone should report it? Like,

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Speaker 4: I don't know if you're going to get like the

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Speaker 4: people who really need this, most of them don't have

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Speaker 4: iPhones right to begin with. What you really need is

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Speaker 4: like how do you get this person working in the

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Speaker 4: kitchen to be able to report, oh, God, ice is here.

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Speaker 4: And then at that point, what do you actually want?

415
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Speaker 4: Do you just want to like tell people that ice

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Speaker 4: is at this restaurant and then that's it, or do

417
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Speaker 4: you want to actually like have community come out and

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Speaker 4: support of the people there, start documenting stuff, start providing

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Speaker 4: legal support. I think it's kind of shortsighted, Like none

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Speaker 4: of this has been really like thought through. It's more

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Speaker 4: just like, ooh, location based apps are cool. It's a

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Speaker 4: really hard problem. We can't use technology to solve this problem.

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Speaker 4: It's a political problem. We need your restore democracy, and

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Speaker 4: an app is not gonna help us restore democracy.

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Speaker 1: So after all this, you've written about this, you've kind

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Speaker 1: of gone back and forth, but then just recently the

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Speaker 1: app gets taken out of the app store m H.

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Speaker 1: And then the day after that there's a similar app

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Speaker 1: that gets pulled off the Google Play Store.

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Speaker 3: Apple says it took it down due to safety risks,

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Speaker 3: and they're not the only ones. Google says they removed

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Speaker 3: similar apps from the app store for Android devices, and

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Speaker 3: all of it coming as Ice is ramping upraids across

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Speaker 3: the country.

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Speaker 1: Apple removed ice Block from their app store and Google

436
00:22:46,280 --> 00:22:49,520
Speaker 1: removed a similar app called red Dot. Considering that Micah

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00:22:49,560 --> 00:22:52,120
Speaker 1: had been criticizing ice Block, you might think that he'd

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Speaker 1: be happy about this. Well, no, he's not, and he

439
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Speaker 1: says that this is a sign of a bigger problem.

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Speaker 1: That's after the break in early October, Apple removed ice

441
00:23:15,760 --> 00:23:18,960
Speaker 1: Block from the app store, no warning, just gone. But

442
00:23:19,160 --> 00:23:22,280
Speaker 1: it wasn't just ice Block. Other apps also disappeared, like,

443
00:23:22,320 --> 00:23:25,240
Speaker 1: for example, an app called eyes Up. This app was

444
00:23:25,280 --> 00:23:28,800
Speaker 1: different from ice Block. It wasn't about real time location reporting.

445
00:23:29,040 --> 00:23:31,720
Speaker 1: It was just about preserving evidence of encounters with Ice

446
00:23:31,840 --> 00:23:35,280
Speaker 1: and maintaining a public record that couldn't be hidden or censored.

447
00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:40,680
Speaker 4: And so it's like people keep posting videos to like TikTok,

448
00:23:40,760 --> 00:23:44,600
Speaker 4: to Instagram, to cts of Ice arresting people and being

449
00:23:44,680 --> 00:23:46,800
Speaker 4: violent with people, and this is just an app that

450
00:23:46,920 --> 00:23:47,480
Speaker 4: archives them.

451
00:23:47,520 --> 00:23:49,280
Speaker 5: That's it. It's a map, and.

452
00:23:49,280 --> 00:23:51,080
Speaker 4: You can browse the map, and you can click on

453
00:23:51,359 --> 00:23:53,240
Speaker 4: an area, and you click on a video and watch

454
00:23:53,280 --> 00:23:56,920
Speaker 4: the video. It's just archiving ice abuse with the goal

455
00:23:57,119 --> 00:24:00,240
Speaker 4: of preserving evidence in case the materials ever needed in court.

456
00:24:00,320 --> 00:24:03,680
Speaker 4: On the Fitch and Apple just took this down as well.

457
00:24:03,960 --> 00:24:06,160
Speaker 4: And I think that both Apple and Google they got

458
00:24:06,160 --> 00:24:09,600
Speaker 4: a bunch of pressure from Paanbandi from the Department of Justice,

459
00:24:10,080 --> 00:24:15,040
Speaker 4: and they both basically did this like absolutely mind boggling

460
00:24:15,119 --> 00:24:18,359
Speaker 4: thing where they're basically saying that, like masked ice stones

461
00:24:18,400 --> 00:24:19,520
Speaker 4: are a protected class.

462
00:24:19,560 --> 00:24:22,840
Speaker 1: Now that phrasing might sound weird, but it's not something

463
00:24:22,880 --> 00:24:25,520
Speaker 1: that Mike had just made up. Google told four or

464
00:24:25,520 --> 00:24:27,960
Speaker 1: four Media that they had, and I'm reading four or

465
00:24:27,960 --> 00:24:31,240
Speaker 1: Four's article on this, removed apps because they shared the

466
00:24:31,280 --> 00:24:34,919
Speaker 1: location of what it describes as a vulnerable group that

467
00:24:35,000 --> 00:24:37,639
Speaker 1: recently faced a violent act connected to those sorts of

468
00:24:37,680 --> 00:24:41,280
Speaker 1: ice spotting apps. I won't editorialize here, but I'll just

469
00:24:41,359 --> 00:24:44,080
Speaker 1: point out that Google calling ICE, which again is a

470
00:24:44,119 --> 00:24:49,520
Speaker 1: government agency, a vulnerable group, is unusual for a tech company.

471
00:24:49,800 --> 00:24:52,080
Speaker 1: Before this, the only people using this sort of language

472
00:24:52,320 --> 00:24:53,359
Speaker 1: was the Trump administration.

473
00:24:54,080 --> 00:24:56,960
Speaker 4: I think that the bigger picture for me is that

474
00:24:57,760 --> 00:25:01,719
Speaker 4: we have like a duopoly smartphones. We have iPhones and

475
00:25:01,720 --> 00:25:04,960
Speaker 4: we have Android phones. That's it, and both of them

476
00:25:05,160 --> 00:25:08,720
Speaker 4: are now just like arms of the US government. I

477
00:25:08,720 --> 00:25:12,119
Speaker 4: think that they've both had like various histories of removing

478
00:25:12,160 --> 00:25:14,439
Speaker 4: apps from the app stores. But I feel like this

479
00:25:14,520 --> 00:25:19,159
Speaker 4: is actually really dangerous, not just for apps that like

480
00:25:19,240 --> 00:25:21,480
Speaker 4: activists might rely on in the United States, but like

481
00:25:21,880 --> 00:25:24,320
Speaker 4: around the world, all of the phones that everyone in

482
00:25:24,320 --> 00:25:25,640
Speaker 4: the world uses.

483
00:25:25,520 --> 00:25:28,000
Speaker 5: Are essentially like what software they're allowed to run.

484
00:25:27,880 --> 00:25:30,320
Speaker 4: On those are controlled by the Trump administration, And that's

485
00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:35,000
Speaker 4: like a really bad situation to be in for the world.

486
00:25:35,640 --> 00:25:38,240
Speaker 4: This experience is showing that, like in the United States,

487
00:25:38,280 --> 00:25:41,600
Speaker 4: if you're trying to like fight ice abuses, or if

488
00:25:41,600 --> 00:25:43,600
Speaker 4: you're trying to do anything that like the trauma administration

489
00:25:43,640 --> 00:25:44,080
Speaker 4: doesn't like.

490
00:25:44,359 --> 00:25:45,240
Speaker 5: I think that we need to.

491
00:25:45,160 --> 00:25:48,600
Speaker 4: Stop relying on apps, start relying on websites, stop relying

492
00:25:48,680 --> 00:25:52,080
Speaker 4: on US companies because we can't trust them, right.

493
00:25:52,320 --> 00:25:54,639
Speaker 5: I think that this is not a good sign for

494
00:25:54,760 --> 00:25:55,320
Speaker 5: things to come.

495
00:25:57,600 --> 00:26:00,600
Speaker 1: When you say something like the what we're allowed to

496
00:26:00,640 --> 00:26:03,040
Speaker 1: put on our phones is basically controlled by the Trump

497
00:26:03,040 --> 00:26:07,680
Speaker 1: and administration sounds kind of nuts, But you know, maybe

498
00:26:07,720 --> 00:26:11,320
Speaker 1: it's not an overstatement, given that ice Block was repeatedly

499
00:26:11,440 --> 00:26:14,040
Speaker 1: called out by the Trump administration as being something that

500
00:26:14,080 --> 00:26:17,480
Speaker 1: they did not want available, and then it becomes not available,

501
00:26:17,600 --> 00:26:21,200
Speaker 1: and then a similar app becomes not available anymore on

502
00:26:21,280 --> 00:26:24,040
Speaker 1: both the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store.

503
00:26:24,240 --> 00:26:26,959
Speaker 4: Tam Bondi has given interviews being like, oh, yeah, we

504
00:26:27,000 --> 00:26:29,320
Speaker 4: went to Apple and Google. We told them to like,

505
00:26:29,680 --> 00:26:32,200
Speaker 4: you know, they need to do more to protect ice Yeah.

506
00:26:32,440 --> 00:26:35,160
Speaker 4: And in fact, actually, just like last week, tam Bondi

507
00:26:35,280 --> 00:26:38,479
Speaker 4: testified in front of Congress where she said that, like

508
00:26:38,640 --> 00:26:42,160
Speaker 4: they asked them to remove ice Block, and she said

509
00:26:42,160 --> 00:26:44,800
Speaker 4: that ice block was posting the home addresses of ice

510
00:26:44,840 --> 00:26:47,679
Speaker 4: officers and it was dosing them and that's not what

511
00:26:47,800 --> 00:26:50,119
Speaker 4: ice block was doing. But that was just just like

512
00:26:50,320 --> 00:26:53,640
Speaker 4: a little example of lying under oath that Lottie's just dead.

513
00:26:53,720 --> 00:26:54,120
Speaker 5: Last week.

514
00:26:54,680 --> 00:26:57,840
Speaker 1: Let me ask you this, the ice Block got removed

515
00:26:57,840 --> 00:26:59,600
Speaker 1: from the Apple App Store. Do you think it should

516
00:26:59,600 --> 00:27:02,040
Speaker 1: be rein stated? Do you think it should be back up? Oh?

517
00:27:02,119 --> 00:27:05,320
Speaker 4: Yeah, absolutely. I don't think it's that useful. But I

518
00:27:05,359 --> 00:27:07,600
Speaker 4: feel like this is like a bigger issue regardless of

519
00:27:07,600 --> 00:27:10,080
Speaker 4: what the problems are with this one app, Like anyone

520
00:27:10,080 --> 00:27:13,280
Speaker 4: that wants to make an app that whatever their idea is,

521
00:27:13,640 --> 00:27:15,320
Speaker 4: that they should be able to make those apps. It's

522
00:27:15,320 --> 00:27:18,320
Speaker 4: fundamentally it's like a free speech essuo. It's not very

523
00:27:18,800 --> 00:27:23,080
Speaker 4: good for democracy that these two major corporations that are

524
00:27:23,080 --> 00:27:28,640
Speaker 4: basically like just like bending the knee to authoritarianism control

525
00:27:29,320 --> 00:27:30,119
Speaker 4: the gates.

526
00:27:31,720 --> 00:27:33,879
Speaker 1: Free speech might not be something you would think applies

527
00:27:33,920 --> 00:27:37,880
Speaker 1: to computer code, but actually it does. In nineteen ninety nine,

528
00:27:38,000 --> 00:27:40,399
Speaker 1: the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the code was

529
00:27:40,440 --> 00:27:44,120
Speaker 1: considered speech. A grad student had written an encryption program

530
00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:47,720
Speaker 1: and wanted to publish the code online, but under US law,

531
00:27:47,920 --> 00:27:51,080
Speaker 1: encryption was basically treated like a weapon. If this student

532
00:27:51,119 --> 00:27:53,119
Speaker 1: wanted to share his code, he would have had to

533
00:27:53,160 --> 00:27:57,560
Speaker 1: register as an arms dealer and get government approval. The

534
00:27:57,600 --> 00:28:01,000
Speaker 1: student sued, and the court eventually ruled that those restrictions

535
00:28:01,000 --> 00:28:04,520
Speaker 1: had violated his First Amendment rights. He could publish his code,

536
00:28:04,760 --> 00:28:06,800
Speaker 1: and now if you got code, you want to publish,

537
00:28:07,160 --> 00:28:07,639
Speaker 1: so can you.

538
00:28:08,640 --> 00:28:12,040
Speaker 4: The Core ruled that, hey, this is this person's speech.

539
00:28:12,280 --> 00:28:14,399
Speaker 4: This code that they wrote is their speech. We can't

540
00:28:14,440 --> 00:28:18,080
Speaker 4: restrict their speech because of the First Amendment. That's what

541
00:28:18,119 --> 00:28:20,679
Speaker 4: made encryption legal in the United SAIDs.

542
00:28:21,240 --> 00:28:23,919
Speaker 1: But true free speech in this context becomes kind of

543
00:28:23,920 --> 00:28:26,680
Speaker 1: irrelevant when Apple has made it so that basically nothing

544
00:28:26,680 --> 00:28:28,840
Speaker 1: can be installed on their iPhone without going through the

545
00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:33,400
Speaker 1: official app store first. So what about Google. Well, Android,

546
00:28:33,480 --> 00:28:36,000
Speaker 1: historically you've basically been able to treat it like any

547
00:28:36,040 --> 00:28:39,160
Speaker 1: other computer. Most people just use the Google Play Store,

548
00:28:39,320 --> 00:28:41,840
Speaker 1: but if you wanted to, you could do something called

549
00:28:41,880 --> 00:28:45,120
Speaker 1: sideloading and pretty easily install whatever you want on your phone.

550
00:28:45,760 --> 00:28:48,800
Speaker 1: But starting next year, Google's going to require that all apps,

551
00:28:48,840 --> 00:28:51,680
Speaker 1: whether downloaded from the Google Play Store or not, be

552
00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:53,280
Speaker 1: verified by them.

553
00:28:53,480 --> 00:28:57,840
Speaker 4: The change that Google is making is basically preventing any

554
00:28:57,920 --> 00:29:01,800
Speaker 4: app that's not digitally signed by Google Key from getting

555
00:29:01,800 --> 00:29:04,720
Speaker 4: installed on your phone. It basically is like essentially getting

556
00:29:04,800 --> 00:29:07,320
Speaker 4: rid of sideloading and making it so that you can't

557
00:29:07,360 --> 00:29:10,120
Speaker 4: run anything on your phone if it's not approved by Google.

558
00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:12,800
Speaker 1: Which is kind of nuts, right because I mean, if

559
00:29:12,840 --> 00:29:15,600
Speaker 1: you told somebody you know, you're not allowed to have

560
00:29:16,200 --> 00:29:18,640
Speaker 1: certain programs on your Windows machine. I mean, first off,

561
00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:23,600
Speaker 1: Napster never would have happened. Ever, that that entire saga

562
00:29:23,640 --> 00:29:25,480
Speaker 1: never would have happened, which maybe you think it shouldn't.

563
00:29:25,920 --> 00:29:29,960
Speaker 1: But the idea that if there's an app that the

564
00:29:30,400 --> 00:29:33,400
Speaker 1: app store doesn't want you to have, or that a

565
00:29:33,400 --> 00:29:35,040
Speaker 1: certain company doesn't want you to have, and they don't

566
00:29:35,040 --> 00:29:36,880
Speaker 1: want you to have it because a government doesn't want

567
00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:38,280
Speaker 1: you to have it. I mean, these are the things

568
00:29:38,320 --> 00:29:41,120
Speaker 1: that freak people out about other countries, and this is

569
00:29:41,160 --> 00:29:43,240
Speaker 1: now something that we deal with the United States.

570
00:29:43,560 --> 00:29:45,960
Speaker 5: We in the United States have been very privileged.

571
00:29:46,080 --> 00:29:50,760
Speaker 4: It's like we're not used to getting everything like spied

572
00:29:50,840 --> 00:29:53,160
Speaker 4: on as much as we as other countries are. We're

573
00:29:53,320 --> 00:29:56,719
Speaker 4: used to being in this privileged situation where all of

574
00:29:56,720 --> 00:30:01,640
Speaker 4: this technological dystopia stuff happens to other people. I think

575
00:30:01,680 --> 00:30:03,840
Speaker 4: that's over. I think it's gonna start happening to us

576
00:30:03,960 --> 00:30:04,800
Speaker 4: now too.

577
00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:09,320
Speaker 1: For you looking at ice Block and looking that everything's

578
00:30:09,360 --> 00:30:13,000
Speaker 1: happened since it was banned and all that, what are

579
00:30:13,040 --> 00:30:14,880
Speaker 1: you thinking about now and what do you think other

580
00:30:14,880 --> 00:30:16,040
Speaker 1: people should be thinking about.

581
00:30:18,200 --> 00:30:23,280
Speaker 4: I'm thinking that we can't rely on apps anymore. Like

582
00:30:23,560 --> 00:30:26,080
Speaker 4: I rely so much on the Signal app. That's the

583
00:30:26,200 --> 00:30:29,080
Speaker 4: number one app that I use a whole lot. And

584
00:30:29,400 --> 00:30:31,680
Speaker 4: I think that for the moment, signal safe, especially because

585
00:30:31,880 --> 00:30:34,920
Speaker 4: if Trump people all use it. But I could totally

586
00:30:34,960 --> 00:30:38,920
Speaker 4: foresee a future soon where basically the Trump administration is like, no,

587
00:30:39,040 --> 00:30:40,760
Speaker 4: we want a back to around a signal because Antifa

588
00:30:40,880 --> 00:30:43,640
Speaker 4: uses it. And then I think that there might be

589
00:30:43,680 --> 00:30:46,240
Speaker 4: some sort of signal might not be allowed to be

590
00:30:46,280 --> 00:30:47,880
Speaker 4: installed on iPhones or Android phones.

591
00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:50,960
Speaker 1: So this really isn't about ice block or any app

592
00:30:51,000 --> 00:30:54,400
Speaker 1: in particular for Micah, the solution might not be in

593
00:30:54,440 --> 00:30:54,920
Speaker 1: an app.

594
00:30:55,640 --> 00:30:57,400
Speaker 4: I think that what you need to do is find

595
00:30:57,680 --> 00:31:02,280
Speaker 4: like trusted local grips. So there are people all over

596
00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:04,960
Speaker 4: the country locally that are organizing. And if you live

597
00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:07,840
Speaker 4: in a town where there are a bunch of immigrants

598
00:31:07,840 --> 00:31:10,680
Speaker 4: and there isn't like a support network that already exists,

599
00:31:10,680 --> 00:31:12,640
Speaker 4: then maybe you should start like talking to people there

600
00:31:12,640 --> 00:31:14,800
Speaker 4: and start one. If you care about this stuff and

601
00:31:14,840 --> 00:31:17,040
Speaker 4: you want to get involved, you should actually talk to

602
00:31:17,080 --> 00:31:19,080
Speaker 4: people and not just play on your phone.

603
00:31:20,880 --> 00:31:23,920
Speaker 1: As complicated as this might be, ice Block did serve

604
00:31:23,960 --> 00:31:27,080
Speaker 1: a purpose for people. It's gone now and it's only

605
00:31:27,080 --> 00:31:29,800
Speaker 1: getting harder to find out what Ice is doing. But

606
00:31:29,960 --> 00:31:33,240
Speaker 1: Ice is expanding their ability to find out what we're doing.

607
00:31:33,880 --> 00:31:36,560
Speaker 1: Ice recently signed a deal with a facial recognition company,

608
00:31:36,560 --> 00:31:39,840
Speaker 1: Clearview AI. They've bought spyware that's supposed to be able

609
00:31:39,840 --> 00:31:43,000
Speaker 1: to hack into lock smartphones and extract data. And they've

610
00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:45,680
Speaker 1: also announced that they're planning to launch a social media

611
00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:49,120
Speaker 1: monitoring team that's aimed at tracking people based on the

612
00:31:49,160 --> 00:31:53,320
Speaker 1: posts that they make online. The Department of Homeland Security

613
00:31:53,320 --> 00:31:56,080
Speaker 1: has claimed that their officials are now facing a quote

614
00:31:56,400 --> 00:31:59,840
Speaker 1: more than one thousand percent increase and assault against them,

615
00:32:00,120 --> 00:32:02,760
Speaker 1: and their families are being doxed and threatened online.

616
00:32:03,560 --> 00:32:03,840
Speaker 5: Quote.

617
00:32:04,520 --> 00:32:07,920
Speaker 1: They haven't explained where they're getting that thousand percent figure from.

618
00:32:08,120 --> 00:32:10,160
Speaker 1: And I don't think you can call an app that

619
00:32:10,240 --> 00:32:14,880
Speaker 1: reports sightings as dosing. But after those apps were taken down,

620
00:32:15,360 --> 00:32:17,600
Speaker 1: a group of hackers have posted the names and some

621
00:32:17,640 --> 00:32:21,720
Speaker 1: personal information of hundreds of government officials, including people working

622
00:32:21,760 --> 00:32:25,160
Speaker 1: for DHS and ICE. But bringing it back to ice

623
00:32:25,160 --> 00:32:28,640
Speaker 1: block for just a minute, for real computer programmers arguing

624
00:32:28,680 --> 00:32:31,360
Speaker 1: in public is very normal. I mean, there could be

625
00:32:31,400 --> 00:32:33,760
Speaker 1: a whole Netflix series of just computer beef. I mean,

626
00:32:34,200 --> 00:32:39,360
Speaker 1: episode one, WordPress versus WP Engine, Episode two, GPL versus BSD,

627
00:32:39,840 --> 00:32:42,360
Speaker 1: Episode three, whatever the hell they're doing over at Ruby

628
00:32:42,400 --> 00:32:45,040
Speaker 1: Central right now. Maybe this stuff sounds weird to you,

629
00:32:45,600 --> 00:32:48,400
Speaker 1: but just going back to how computer code was defined

630
00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:52,080
Speaker 1: legally as free speech and follow me here. If we

631
00:32:52,160 --> 00:32:56,360
Speaker 1: think of speech as expression and as art. I think

632
00:32:56,360 --> 00:32:58,520
Speaker 1: it makes sense. I mean, you pour hours of your

633
00:32:58,560 --> 00:33:02,120
Speaker 1: life into creating things, gonna care about the craft and

634
00:33:02,160 --> 00:33:06,080
Speaker 1: the product, and add on top of that the stakes.

635
00:33:07,000 --> 00:33:10,280
Speaker 1: If people can disagree over a bootloader, of course they're

636
00:33:10,280 --> 00:33:12,920
Speaker 1: going to disagree on the best way to help people

637
00:33:12,920 --> 00:33:15,840
Speaker 1: that they care about. A lot of times activist groups

638
00:33:15,880 --> 00:33:18,440
Speaker 1: agree with each other on like ninety nine percent of things.

639
00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:21,720
Speaker 1: They just disagree with each other on how something should

640
00:33:21,720 --> 00:33:33,040
Speaker 1: be done. Software is no different from that, and that

641
00:33:33,200 --> 00:33:35,200
Speaker 1: is gonna be it for this one. Thank you so

642
00:33:35,320 --> 00:33:37,719
Speaker 1: much for listening to this episode of kill Switch. If

643
00:33:37,760 --> 00:33:39,800
Speaker 1: you want to email us, we're at kill Switch at

644
00:33:39,920 --> 00:33:44,760
Speaker 1: Kaleidoscope dot NYC or on Instagram we're at kill switchpods.

645
00:33:45,120 --> 00:33:47,800
Speaker 1: And also we got some good news. Kill Switch just

646
00:33:47,840 --> 00:33:50,720
Speaker 1: won gold in the Technology category with the Signal Awards.

647
00:33:51,040 --> 00:33:53,480
Speaker 1: So shout out and thank you to everyone who's been

648
00:33:53,520 --> 00:33:55,680
Speaker 1: with us. As you know, we keep trying to figure

649
00:33:55,680 --> 00:33:58,880
Speaker 1: out how to navigate living in the future. And if

650
00:33:58,920 --> 00:34:01,120
Speaker 1: you like our show and help us win some more awards,

651
00:34:01,200 --> 00:34:03,600
Speaker 1: you know, why not leave us a review. It helps

652
00:34:03,640 --> 00:34:06,080
Speaker 1: other people find the show, which in turn helps us

653
00:34:06,200 --> 00:34:08,759
Speaker 1: keep doing our thing. And in case you didn't know,

654
00:34:09,000 --> 00:34:11,319
Speaker 1: kill Switch is on YouTube, so if you've ever been

655
00:34:11,360 --> 00:34:14,799
Speaker 1: wondering what the Fisker cars or the anime VTuber avatars

656
00:34:14,800 --> 00:34:17,360
Speaker 1: look like, there you go. The link for that and

657
00:34:17,440 --> 00:34:21,240
Speaker 1: everything else is in the show notes. Killswitch is hosted

658
00:34:21,280 --> 00:34:25,400
Speaker 1: by Me Dexter Thomas. It's produced by Sena Ozaki, Darluk Potts,

659
00:34:25,480 --> 00:34:28,360
Speaker 1: and Julia Nutter. Our theme song is by me and

660
00:34:28,440 --> 00:34:32,120
Speaker 1: Kyle Murdoch, and Kyle also mixes the show. From Kaleidoscope.

661
00:34:32,160 --> 00:34:35,480
Speaker 1: Our executive producers are Ozma lashin On, Gesh Hadi Kadur,

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00:34:35,800 --> 00:34:39,840
Speaker 1: and Kate Osborne. From iHeart, our executive producers are Katrina

663
00:34:39,880 --> 00:34:41,399
Speaker 1: Norvil and Nikki E. Tor