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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is noelh.

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Speaker 3: They called me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 3: super producer Dylan the Tennessee pal Faga. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 3: are you. You are here. That makes this the stuff

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Speaker 3: they don't want you to know. It is the return

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Speaker 3: of our weekly listener mail segment, and folks, we couldn't

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Speaker 3: be more pleased to answer a lot of the emails

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Speaker 3: that came through over the break. You reached out to

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Speaker 3: us on voicemail, reached out to us on social meds, Tennessee.

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Speaker 3: We love the Knoxville OUTI Yo. You've just got to

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Speaker 3: do it for the people. Can you give us that

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Speaker 3: route of Bega?

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Speaker 4: This is considering all the things. I'm your host, Pepper

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Speaker 4: Pelican Schmidt. Our guest today is jan Warmouth, Professor of

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Speaker 4: fastrophysics at Granston State. Professor Warmouth has shocked the world

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Speaker 4: with this discovery that not only is an asteroid going

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Speaker 4: to at our planet, but it is actually a route

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Speaker 4: to bega. Thank you for being here, professor.

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Speaker 2: Thank you.

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Speaker 4: It's a breath of fresh air to be taken. Seriously, Now,

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Speaker 4: is there anything we can do about this? This is

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Speaker 4: a large and complex issue, but the steaks have never

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Speaker 4: been higher for humanity. We have our brightest minds at

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Speaker 4: work day and night trying.

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Speaker 2: To find a solution.

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Speaker 4: Does that include driller aj Frost? I'm sorry, I'm unfamiliar. Well,

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Speaker 4: aj encountered something similar in nineteen ninety eight. It was

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Speaker 4: an asteroid the size of Texas. Along with this mentor

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Speaker 4: Harry Stamper, and a man only known as Rockhound, they

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Speaker 4: were able to set off a nucle bomb inside of

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Speaker 4: the asteroid. Are you recounting the plot of the movie Armageddon?

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Speaker 4: Was that not a documentary?

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Speaker 2: Man?

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Speaker 4: I had my assistant Rudy compiled these notes. Sorry, let

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Speaker 4: me dig through these again.

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Speaker 2: Oh God, you got to dick through those. Rudy begas.

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Speaker 3: The man, the legend, the Tennessee pal, Dylan Fagan. Uh, Dylan,

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Speaker 3: can you give yourself an applausecue right here? Because I

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Speaker 3: know you don't.

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Speaker 2: Come on, don't give yourself applause.

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Speaker 3: Don't let that never never do that.

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Speaker 5: No, I can't help but remember the DVD commentary that

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Speaker 5: Ben Affleck did on the DVD release of Armageddon where

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Speaker 5: he kind of poo poosed the plot of the whole movie. Uh,

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Speaker 5: and I recently saw a Deadline article where he is

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Speaker 5: shocked that they let him do that. He says, I

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Speaker 5: asked Michael why it was easier to train oil drillers

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Speaker 5: to become astronauts than was to train astronauts to become

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Speaker 5: and he told me to shut the cup.

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Speaker 2: That's what we're doing here, Matt the program, which whichever

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Speaker 2: one you are.

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Speaker 3: Thanks for the uh, thanks for the beef there till it,

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Speaker 3: because we are so excited and so thankful to be

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Speaker 3: hanging out with all of you this evening. Now, we've

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Speaker 3: got a lot of what Loupole family time coming up

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Speaker 3: in tonight's listener mail program. Uh, We've got some folks

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Speaker 3: who want to talk about water. We've got some folks

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Speaker 3: who want to talk about pizza, one of our favorite subjects.

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Speaker 3: It's pizza is like just on the cusp of becoming

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Speaker 3: a Casadia. Yeah.

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Speaker 5: It also I feel like it should be one of

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Speaker 5: the elements that are spoken for in Captain Planet.

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Speaker 3: Right and Captive planet, Yeah, Earth, fire, air, water, Heart,

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Speaker 3: and then you should have pizza.

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Speaker 2: You should have don't forget wind.

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Speaker 5: Well there's wind. There was something. Yeah, what's going on, Matt,

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Speaker 5: You're having some So there was some cell phone anomalies.

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Speaker 2: Oh no, it's still happening right now. I'm sure there

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Speaker 2: are a lot of people who went through this on

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Speaker 2: Well today it is Wednesday, January fourteenth at to thirty

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Speaker 2: pm ET, and my cell phone has been down at

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Speaker 2: least for the service that is supposed to get oh

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Speaker 2: several hours now.

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Speaker 3: Not down in a cool way, not like I want

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Speaker 3: to be down down to clown, but.

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Speaker 2: Oh man, it is down with o PS other people's

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Speaker 2: services and SOS. Yeah it is SOS instead of bars.

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Speaker 2: So and then if you go on down detector, it

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Speaker 2: shows that I.

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Speaker 5: Was not familiar with this website until you sent it

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Speaker 5: in the group tex So if anyone out there doesn't

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Speaker 5: know what he's talking about. This is a site that

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Speaker 5: tracks outages in various web services and cell providers all

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Speaker 5: over the.

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Speaker 3: World, right meta analysis.

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Speaker 2: Yes, it's powered by Club, the same people that if

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Speaker 2: you ever just type into Google the speed test, you

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Speaker 2: will find their speed test. It's usually sponsored. But yeah,

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Speaker 2: it was Verizon, T Mobile AT and T Infinity, Google

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Speaker 2: AWS and Apple Support. We're all down kind of at

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Speaker 2: the same time with the same spike, and it made

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Speaker 2: us all just go, huh happening.

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Speaker 5: We postponed recording fifteen whole minutes just to make sure

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Speaker 5: the world listening.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, here we are, dude, and here we are. And

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Speaker 3: it is January fourteenth. It is now two thirty one

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Speaker 3: pm local ET, and we're going to talk about tankers.

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Speaker 3: We appreciate the correspondence there. We're going to have a

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Speaker 3: lot of like several cool letters from home. We're going

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Speaker 3: to talk about institutional conspiracies. This is one for all

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Speaker 3: our college students in the crowd, former, current and future.

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Speaker 3: Before we get to any of that, we're gonna we're

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Speaker 3: gonna take a break for a word from our sponsors

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Speaker 3: and Nolat. I have to tell you, man, I'm very

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Speaker 3: excited about this. When we were talking off air, I

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Speaker 3: use some inappropriate language walk a room, talk about how

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Speaker 3: I need our pal Jack O'Brien from Daily's Guys to

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Speaker 3: hear this piece of news.

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Speaker 5: Hopefully he's tuned in.

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Speaker 3: Oh yeah, I bet he is.

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Speaker 5: And we're back and uh yeah, let's take a little

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Speaker 5: trip courtesy of our listener. Sc not going to drop

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Speaker 5: real names because they did not give permission to use

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Speaker 5: their name or give themselves a cool nickname tisk, but

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Speaker 5: basically just dropped us a link to a very interesting

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Speaker 5: piece over on CNN, and they summed it up thusly.

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Speaker 5: DHS Department of Homeland Security purportedly bought the device that

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Speaker 5: is thought to be the source of Havana syndrome. And

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Speaker 5: I think we all clocked some version of this piece.

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Speaker 5: But the CNN piece that was updated as of yesterday,

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Speaker 5: written jointly by Katie bo Lilis, Natasha Bertrand, Priscilla Alvarez,

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Speaker 5: Jim Scluto, and Zachary Cohen headline Pentagon bought device through

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Speaker 5: undercover operation some investigators suspect is linked to Havana syndrome.

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Speaker 5: I feel like this might be worth further exploration and

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Speaker 5: update because I also have another bit of correspondence regarding

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Speaker 5: an unusual syndrome. But essentially, let's just kind of give

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Speaker 5: get into the gist of the article here. The Defense

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Speaker 5: Department has been testing a device that they purchased in

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Speaker 5: an undercover operation that other outside investigators seem to think

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Speaker 5: might have been the cause of these mysterious ailments impacting

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Speaker 5: US spies and diplomats and ground troops that have collectively

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Speaker 5: been referred to as Havana syndrome or colloquially as the

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Speaker 5: word they use there. But it is kind of a

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Speaker 5: that was the problem, and when we've talked about this,

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Speaker 5: we talked about it with Jack. It's really hard to

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Speaker 5: pin down something that doesn't have a through line or

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Speaker 5: like common symptoms, and there were a lot of varying

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Speaker 5: symptoms that were associated with this history, this time and

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Speaker 5: history and this place, which is of course Havannah, and

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Speaker 5: so we kind of catch all terms of Havana syndrome

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Speaker 5: has been the one that's been thrown around. A division

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Speaker 5: of the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Investigations is

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Speaker 5: the agency that bought the device for believe, eight figures

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Speaker 5: is the term that they use. Declining inside sources speaking

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Speaker 5: to this UH, these reporters declined to give further details

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Speaker 5: about the number. Is what we have. It's right, that's right,

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Speaker 5: I mean, you believe it. It's apparently still being studied,

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Speaker 5: and there is ongoing debate in certain areas of the

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Speaker 5: government as well as skepticism over the potential link to

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Speaker 5: these dozens of again amlus health incidents that to this

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Speaker 5: day remain officially unexplained and yet lumped in to this

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Speaker 5: concept of Havana syndrome. CNN spoke to the Pentagon, HSI

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Speaker 5: and DHS for comment. The CIA did not return. That's

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Speaker 5: another lack of surprise. So the device acquired by Homeland

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Speaker 5: Security investigations matches some of the theories that we've seen

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Speaker 5: thrown around about Savannah syndrome, Havana syndrome, this idea of

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Speaker 5: radio waves, this idea of like the kinds of a

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Speaker 5: a an escalation of weapons of used for crowd control

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Speaker 5: that we're all aware that exists, This idea of sonic

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Speaker 5: weapons that can cause people to drop to their knees

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Speaker 5: and not be able to think straight. It's these like weaponized,

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Speaker 5: very very focused beams of sound or radio waves. In

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Speaker 5: this case, there are some officials, as CNN says, and

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Speaker 5: academics that have speculated this this kind of thing could

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Speaker 5: well have been the cause of these incidents. And this device,

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Speaker 5: while not entirely originating from Russia, does contain many Russian components,

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Speaker 5: according to one of the sources for this piece. So

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Speaker 5: we have talked about guys, and I'll throw to the

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Speaker 5: group here the idea of based on what we know

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Speaker 5: about these types of sonic weapons or radio weaponized with

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Speaker 5: radio ways, the big issue was how could it affect

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Speaker 5: people from such distances?

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Speaker 2: Is a big.

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Speaker 5: Crux of the arguments or the question around how could

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Speaker 5: a thing like this that we don't currently have evidence

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Speaker 5: is technologically possible? How could that exist? And how could

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Speaker 5: this have caused that? It would seem that this is

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Speaker 5: the kind of stuff they don't want you to know

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Speaker 5: in terms of government weaponry that maybe is being tested

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Speaker 5: but that has not made its way out into the

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Speaker 5: public sphere yet. A lot of theories behind various upas

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Speaker 5: and such, often you know, linked to testing of vehicles

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Speaker 5: that maybe again the public is not entirely aware of.

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Speaker 5: This tracks for me, guys, what do you think?

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Speaker 1: Uh?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think the two biggest takeaways for me about

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Speaker 2: this are that one, they've been testing it for over

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Speaker 2: a year, right, so these officials have been they first

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Speaker 2: of all, they learned about it well over a year,

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Speaker 2: right because they ran some whole undercover operation to even

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Speaker 2: acquire the thing, which takes time. Then they've had it

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Speaker 2: for over a year. They've been testing it for that

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Speaker 2: year's long time. They've realized that it uses pulse radio

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Speaker 2: signals to deliver some of the same sensations it looks

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Speaker 2: like or feelings or you know, stuff that would be

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Speaker 2: audible and also not audible that's affecting a human body

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Speaker 2: with directed energy of some sort in this case post

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Speaker 2: radio waves, and.

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Speaker 5: Some of the symptoms, including things like vertigo and headaches

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Speaker 5: and nausea, and then some things that even you know

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Speaker 5: held on much longer, not just in the immediate aftermath

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Speaker 5: of being hit by something like this exactly.

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Speaker 2: The thing number two is that this device is portable.

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Speaker 2: It fits in a backpack, right, which means anybody could

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Speaker 2: strap on their backpack and walk around wherever they're going

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Speaker 2: to be. They could go into a car with the

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Speaker 2: backpack with them, they could be in a crowded space.

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Speaker 2: It would be very difficult to identify someone who is

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Speaker 2: taking this device somewhere to place it somewhere, right, and

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Speaker 2: then even looking for a device, you we heard for

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Speaker 2: a while it was officials looking on rooftops for a

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Speaker 2: device large enough that would be powerful enough to have

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Speaker 2: these directed energy weapon effects right right.

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Speaker 3: In this case too to be diplomatic sc This goes

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Speaker 3: to Knowle's earlier points from our conversation or our episodes

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Speaker 3: about have that a syndrome. The idea of dispersing verse

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Speaker 3: is concentrating over over space.

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Speaker 5: Right, It's quite difficult, and I think maybe the version

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Speaker 5: of things that we pictured and that was being discussed

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Speaker 5: was almost like a sniper kind of situation, someone like

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Speaker 5: pointing this and focusing it. Whether as this is more

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Speaker 5: like a device that might disrupt you know what do

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Speaker 5: you call it an EMP or whatever? You know what

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Speaker 5: I mean, like some sort of device that you place

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Speaker 5: and then it just does its thing and you leave it.

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Speaker 5: That seems a little more like what this is like AoE.

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Speaker 2: But we don't have enough information because we don't know

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Speaker 2: if it is directed or if it is AoE. We

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Speaker 2: just don't know, right, they're not. It does seem like

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Speaker 2: something that would have if it is the device responsible

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Speaker 2: for Havana syndrome reports, it would have to be somewhat directed.

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Speaker 2: I guess that's true because it was specific, like building

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Speaker 2: where people were reporting a specific.

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Speaker 3: Right, right, this is I forgot about them. Yeah. This

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Speaker 3: is also loosely called internally anomalist health incidents or Ahi's

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Speaker 3: in Havana syndrome is great for a headline, right because

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Speaker 3: it accuses or villainizes Cuba, And as we discussed in

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Speaker 3: our previous episodes or previous Strange News listener mail programs.

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Speaker 6: Sc.

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Speaker 3: Look, the science is still not out there. But to

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Speaker 3: your point, and thank you again for writing, it is curious, right,

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Speaker 3: It's a little bit curious that Uncle Sam would capture

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Speaker 3: a device publicize the capture after experimenting with it a

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Speaker 3: little bit.

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Speaker 5: It's is this not a leak or did they actually

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Speaker 5: release information about this or is this not like something

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Speaker 5: that maybe they didn't mean to get out quite yet.

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Speaker 3: I think the leaks are controlled. I think sometimes they

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Speaker 3: think they want people to know the calls are coming

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Speaker 3: from inside the house. Yeah.

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Speaker 5: So the big takeaway here is that we do know

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Speaker 5: is that based on the way HSI purchased this device,

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Speaker 5: it would seem as though could have been purchased by

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Speaker 5: any other numerous other countries and potential bad actors. So

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Speaker 5: you know, this thing, whatever it is, is probably out

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Speaker 5: in the wind and has the potential to be weaponized

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Speaker 5: to inflict what the CNN piece refers to as career

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Speaker 5: ending injuries on high level individuals within government, within military,

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Speaker 5: you know, within the echelons of power.

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Speaker 2: Interestingly enough, guys Homely Security Investigations HSI. They if you

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Speaker 2: go to their website, they are that group that is

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Speaker 2: Department of Homeland Security that is highly involved with immigration

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Speaker 2: enforcement in the United States and directly tied to ICE,

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Speaker 2: which is just a fun thing to remember.

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Speaker 3: It's cool to remember stuff. For sure, you got you

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Speaker 3: got her.

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Speaker 5: Yeah. Remember. I'll wrap this this segment because I do

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Speaker 5: think we can we can look deeper into this, uh

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Speaker 5: as maybe more information comes out, and I don't it's

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Speaker 5: not quite clear from this piece as to whether this

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Speaker 5: was like a public.

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Speaker 3: Like a press release. I don't.

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Speaker 5: I feel like it's it's it's it's kind of like

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Speaker 5: fo yeah, okay, there you go. Thank you very much. Man,

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Speaker 5: appreciate that miss that detail. But again to your point, Ben,

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Speaker 5: one person's leak is another person's press release. If you

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Speaker 5: do it right, you know, if you're if you're in

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Speaker 5: control of it. But the big takeaway here is comes

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Speaker 5: from a quote from an individual that was afflicted by

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Speaker 5: the Havana sentdrome. One of the first CIA officers to

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Speaker 5: go public with his injuries, Mark Paul Mayrapolis, who I

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Speaker 5: believe we've discussed in the story in the past. He says,

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Speaker 5: if the US government has indeed uncovered such devices, and

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Speaker 5: the CIA owes all the victims of major and public apology,

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Speaker 5: apology for how we have been treated as pariahs, and that,

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Speaker 5: my friends, I think we can all agree with. This

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Speaker 5: next piece that was linked from another listener, going by

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Speaker 5: the Babel Effect, is so very in depth. It was

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Speaker 5: almost like a thirty minute read from the BBC that

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Speaker 5: I think I'm just going to do a little summation

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Speaker 5: of it, mention what this is and how it relates

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Speaker 5: as an update to a story we talked about in

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Speaker 5: Strange News in the past, and then we'll save this,

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Speaker 5: I think for a deeper dive episode. But this is

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Speaker 5: from the Babel Effect. Hi, guys, I remember you covered

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Speaker 5: this story in Strange News sometime in the past year

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Speaker 5: or so. Story referring to a mysterious brain disease found

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Speaker 5: in a pretty rural part of Canada. Interesting new twist

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Speaker 5: what if the brain disease didn't exist at all? And

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Speaker 5: this reporting comes from the BBC In the headline from

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Speaker 5: a piece by Joel Gunter and Nadine Yusef Joel Gunter

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Speaker 5: being the senior international reporter for New Brunswick there in

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Speaker 5: Canada and naden Usef, senior Canada reporter also in New Brunswick.

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Speaker 5: The answer cannot be nothing the battle over Canada's mystery

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Speaker 5: brain disease. So just you know, for a little bit

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Speaker 5: of a backstory catch up refresher. In the early in

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Speaker 5: early twenty nineteen, officials at a hospital in the small

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Speaker 5: Canadian province of New Brunswick saw two patients that had

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Speaker 5: contracted this incredibly rare brain disease known as Kreutzfeld Jacob

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Speaker 5: disease or c JD, which is can be fatal or

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Speaker 5: is fatal and also potentially contagious. So this leads to

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Speaker 5: a task force called Task Force being assembled and you know,

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Speaker 5: looking into this and fortunately, as a result of this

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Speaker 5: the or you know, reportedly the disease did not spread.

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Speaker 5: But this actually was just the beginning of the story.

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Speaker 5: One of these experts, Alier Morrero, a Cuban born neurologist

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Speaker 5: who'd been working in the area for around six years,

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Speaker 5: shared a fact that was quite troubling with other members

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Speaker 5: of this group or this task force. He'd been seeing

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Speaker 5: patients with unexplained CJD like symptoms for years, he said,

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Speaker 5: and that included young people who showed signs of a

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Speaker 5: rapidly progressing form of dementia. And the number of cases

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Speaker 5: or the cluster as they refer to it, and the

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Speaker 5: piece had already reached more than twenty and several of

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Speaker 5: these patients had already died, And then you start to

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Speaker 5: see these incredibly an amorphis is maybe the wrong word,

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Speaker 5: but just unconnected, not particularly contiguous arrays they refer to

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Speaker 5: it of symptoms among the patients dementia, weight loss, unsteadiness,

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Speaker 5: facial twitches, muscle spasms, blurred vision, limb pain, atrophying muscles,

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Speaker 5: dry skin, hair loss.

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Speaker 3: This really connect to have an syndrome.

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Speaker 5: There's so many various symptoms that don't seem to be

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Speaker 5: directly connected. That's when you start calling things a syndrome,

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Speaker 5: and it starts to feel like, you know, we don't

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Speaker 5: really know what this is, and yet there is geographical

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Speaker 5: reason to believe that they are in some way, shape

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Speaker 5: or form connected bable effect.

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Speaker 3: Thank you so much for writing.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, for sure.

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Speaker 5: No, it's a big deal to have this update, and

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Speaker 5: I really want to dig deeper into it. But like

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Speaker 5: I said, this is incredibly important and in depth reporting,

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Speaker 5: and I really really would love for us to all

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Speaker 5: take a look and dig a little deeper. And perhaps

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Speaker 5: since we only just mentioned the condition in the first

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Speaker 5: place via Strange News, there's more than enough here and

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Speaker 5: other sources cited to do a deep dive on it.

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Speaker 5: But Matt, I think you had some thoughts on this

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Speaker 5: as well.

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Speaker 3: Well.

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Speaker 2: I just remember this really well. It's almost exactly four

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Speaker 2: years ago to the day January eighteenth, twenty twenty two,

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Speaker 2: when we made that Strange News episode, or when it

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Speaker 2: came out rather, and it was very much a mystery

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Speaker 2: then in Cruxfield Yakub disease. And I'm only saying it

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Speaker 2: that way because I literally last night watched X File

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Speaker 2: season two Our Town, and I don't want to spoil

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Speaker 2: too much here, but it has to do with a

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Speaker 2: preon prion disease that is past like.

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Speaker 5: A brain parasite.

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Speaker 2: Right, It's cool, it's eating cannibal It involves cannibalism and

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Speaker 2: a brain disease where you eat the brain of somebody

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Speaker 2: who has this thing. Theoretically it could transfer on. That's

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Speaker 2: what the X Files episode is about. But it is

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Speaker 2: all about CJD, which is really interesting that it's coming

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Speaker 2: back up right now all of a sudden, and that's

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Speaker 2: just me doing the whole no coincidences thing. But go

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Speaker 2: back and listen to episode for sure if you haven't

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Speaker 2: heard it, or just check this out, because guys, you're right, Noel,

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Speaker 2: this deserves an entire deep dive.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, this deserves an actual episode. And one of the

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Speaker 3: best things about our Strange News listener mail segments is

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Speaker 3: that they they create for us the episodes in the future,

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Speaker 3: and Nol, I've got to thank you for bringing this

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Speaker 3: here and Babbel Effect. This is something that has been

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Speaker 3: on our minds or in our brains for some time

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Speaker 3: and it is more than worth the more than worth

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Speaker 3: the attention to look into a novelist health incidents as

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Speaker 3: they are so euphemistically deemed, And the.

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Speaker 5: Name of this thing or this mystery disease is pretty wild.

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Speaker 5: They are referring to it as New Brunswick neurological Syndrome

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Speaker 5: of unknown cause.

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Speaker 3: Sounds like an album name, it really does.

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Speaker 5: And a lot of the details of this sound like

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Speaker 5: a movie like Outbreak or something like that. But the again,

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Speaker 5: way too much to get into here. But I did

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Speaker 5: just want to broach this in the hopes that you

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Speaker 5: guys were into and I'm glad you are looking into

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Speaker 5: this a little bit deeper. The question then becomes again

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Speaker 5: something that we can also transfer to our conversation around

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Speaker 5: Havana syndrome. Is this just a cluster of different diseases

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Speaker 5: that seem to have a connection or is there an

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Speaker 5: actual connection? And I think that's what these researchers are

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Speaker 5: hoping to prove the patients are real. A quote says,

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Speaker 5: but the clustering as a mystery disease is not right.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. Is there now a powerful term or word that

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Speaker 3: functions like a coat rack where you can hang any

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Speaker 3: fabric of malaise upon it right and say this is

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Speaker 3: the thing that's good.

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Speaker 2: Now, you guys. The the BBC here is reporting that

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Speaker 2: several patients have reported that the doctor, doctor Morrero, I

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Speaker 2: think is the guy who's noted in here, has at

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Speaker 2: times put his hand up when he's having a conversation

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Speaker 2: with a patient, say to say stop talking, and then

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Speaker 2: he'll go look outside a door and say, I believe

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Speaker 2: we're being recorded, and like not like be conspiratorial about

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Speaker 2: this stuff.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, it's got those kind of undertones to it, So

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Speaker 5: I think we'll definitely pick this one back up at

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Speaker 5: a later date, but I just want to want to

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Speaker 5: bring it up and give props to Babel Syndrome for

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Speaker 5: hitping us to this update. So that's it for me, y'all.

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Speaker 5: Let's take a break, hear a word from our sponsor,

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Speaker 5: and then we'll be back with more messages from you.

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Speaker 2: All right, we are back, and we're gonna jump to guys.

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Speaker 2: I think one of the best voicemails you've gotten in

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Speaker 2: a long time. You ready for this?

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Speaker 3: Yes?

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Speaker 2: No, no, setup know anything. We're just gonna hear this

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Speaker 2: and then we're gonna get into it. Here we go.

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Speaker 6: Just a second. You gotta stop the tankers Trojan Horse.

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Speaker 6: Why would they have that Russian tanker and turn it

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Speaker 6: back over to us so easily, and it's been five

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Speaker 6: days since we took over. How would they just be

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Speaker 6: trying to sneak another tanker out? Now it's the Trojan Horse,

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Speaker 6: one of those tankers we're going to take home to

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Speaker 6: our port, and it's going to blow up or it's

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Speaker 6: got guys on it. We're getting these ships too easy.

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Speaker 6: You've got to tell somebody. I don't know who to call.

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00:25:48,640 --> 00:25:53,800
Speaker 6: I've tried to call everybody, Tell somebody blow up the bankers. Yes,

436
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Speaker 6: call me don Quixote.

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00:25:56,400 --> 00:26:00,159
Speaker 2: And there we have it. Wow, thank you DoD is

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00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:04,600
Speaker 2: in that an interesting message. It's some don Quixote was

439
00:26:04,880 --> 00:26:07,280
Speaker 2: watching the news. I suppose it sounded like you could

440
00:26:07,280 --> 00:26:11,120
Speaker 2: hear it in that clip and just had just that

441
00:26:11,200 --> 00:26:13,679
Speaker 2: moment realization, right, I think we've all had about a

442
00:26:13,680 --> 00:26:16,680
Speaker 2: great number of things, and then said, oh, I got

443
00:26:16,720 --> 00:26:19,200
Speaker 2: a call. I'm gonna call anybody, and he called us.

444
00:26:19,760 --> 00:26:22,400
Speaker 2: So thank you don Quixote for putting the call into us.

445
00:26:23,080 --> 00:26:28,480
Speaker 2: And Uh, I gotta say I I see his logic there,

446
00:26:28,560 --> 00:26:33,080
Speaker 2: at least in that that nervousness that perhaps he's feeling

447
00:26:33,280 --> 00:26:37,840
Speaker 2: that some of these tankers are being let go, even

448
00:26:37,920 --> 00:26:41,040
Speaker 2: though we know it's a delicate situation right geopolitically to

449
00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:44,560
Speaker 2: make any big moves there. The US is certainly not

450
00:26:44,720 --> 00:26:47,760
Speaker 2: having a problem making some big moves with regards to

451
00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:53,840
Speaker 2: the tankers. Uh, it seems seems a little weird, like

452
00:26:53,840 --> 00:26:56,919
Speaker 2: like could you can't you can you guys foresee or

453
00:26:57,000 --> 00:26:59,800
Speaker 2: like can you imagine that picture where there ends up

454
00:26:59,840 --> 00:27:01,760
Speaker 2: being a dirty bomb on one of these or even

455
00:27:01,840 --> 00:27:04,560
Speaker 2: perhaps a full fledged nuke on one of them.

456
00:27:04,600 --> 00:27:07,639
Speaker 5: Sounds like the plot of a nineties Steven Sagal movie.

457
00:27:07,960 --> 00:27:12,320
Speaker 3: Right, Dodd, I'm with you. Beat me here, Dylan Dodd,

458
00:27:12,400 --> 00:27:16,480
Speaker 3: I'm with you. Win Mills swing at them, always shout

459
00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:19,600
Speaker 3: out to nerds like don Quiohote.

460
00:27:19,480 --> 00:27:21,200
Speaker 5: Mills and tankers of the mind.

461
00:27:21,280 --> 00:27:22,560
Speaker 2: But what do you guys think about this?

462
00:27:22,600 --> 00:27:22,880
Speaker 3: For real?

463
00:27:23,080 --> 00:27:24,600
Speaker 5: I'm serious. It sounds like the kind of thing that

464
00:27:24,600 --> 00:27:26,640
Speaker 5: would be dramatized in like a Steven Sagall thing. It's

465
00:27:26,680 --> 00:27:28,159
Speaker 5: like a plot of like, how would you do this?

466
00:27:29,119 --> 00:27:31,960
Speaker 5: I'm I'd love some more contexts, but I do think

467
00:27:32,000 --> 00:27:32,560
Speaker 5: it makes sense.

468
00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:37,680
Speaker 3: Yeah, don again, just to finish this out, addressing directly

469
00:27:37,760 --> 00:27:40,919
Speaker 3: your concern and thank you for sending us the the

470
00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:46,800
Speaker 3: voicemails here. The trojan horse argument, uh decays a little

471
00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:52,120
Speaker 3: bit when we consider the amount of security applied in

472
00:27:52,200 --> 00:27:58,240
Speaker 3: the acquisition of a tanker. So look, is it good

473
00:27:58,280 --> 00:28:03,040
Speaker 3: news that piracy is back in vogue? Probably not. Is

474
00:28:03,119 --> 00:28:08,440
Speaker 3: it bad news that the people or the forces acquiring

475
00:28:09,160 --> 00:28:13,720
Speaker 3: these tankers illegally in violation of international law? Is it

476
00:28:13,800 --> 00:28:17,679
Speaker 3: bad news that they check everything? It is not. It

477
00:28:17,760 --> 00:28:24,679
Speaker 3: is not out of the realm of possibility that some

478
00:28:24,800 --> 00:28:30,000
Speaker 3: sort of bad variable could sneak past that kind of

479
00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:35,040
Speaker 3: security check, but it is highly implausible at this point.

480
00:28:35,080 --> 00:28:38,800
Speaker 3: I will say, what interests us here don is the

481
00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:44,160
Speaker 3: idea that it wasn't just oil, right. So in a

482
00:28:44,200 --> 00:28:48,240
Speaker 3: couple of the tankers situations from Russia's shadow fleet, the

483
00:28:48,360 --> 00:28:53,920
Speaker 3: question is the cargo right, which has not been largely publicized.

484
00:28:53,960 --> 00:28:59,760
Speaker 3: To be quite honest, that's the opinion from publicly available information.

485
00:29:00,120 --> 00:29:02,520
Speaker 3: But again, Matt, I love that you brought this to us,

486
00:29:02,640 --> 00:29:06,360
Speaker 3: because it does it does beg the question about the

487
00:29:06,360 --> 00:29:10,120
Speaker 3: Trojan horse maneuver, which is you know it's old because

488
00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:10,600
Speaker 3: it works.

489
00:29:10,920 --> 00:29:13,640
Speaker 5: I guess I'm just I'm sorry I keep harping on this,

490
00:29:13,720 --> 00:29:16,560
Speaker 5: but it just really seems like I'm surprised we haven't

491
00:29:16,600 --> 00:29:22,479
Speaker 5: seen this in like a political thriller, like espionage type movie,

492
00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:25,720
Speaker 5: like some plot surrounding this kind of thing.

493
00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:32,040
Speaker 2: And interestingly enough, guys, according to g Captain, I don't

494
00:29:32,040 --> 00:29:34,080
Speaker 2: know anything about the website and I couldn't find it

495
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:38,200
Speaker 2: reported anywhere else. But the tanker that we discussed on

496
00:29:38,240 --> 00:29:40,600
Speaker 2: this show, known as the Bill of One or the

497
00:29:40,600 --> 00:29:46,600
Speaker 2: Marinara Marinaro is today again on Wednesday, January fourteenth. Currently

498
00:29:46,680 --> 00:29:51,560
Speaker 2: it is two fifty nine pm. It is in UK

499
00:29:51,720 --> 00:29:55,880
Speaker 2: territorial waters and it is going into port there. If

500
00:29:55,880 --> 00:29:59,200
Speaker 2: there was going to be a situation, now would be

501
00:29:59,240 --> 00:30:01,480
Speaker 2: the time right today as we're recording. So I guess

502
00:30:01,520 --> 00:30:02,880
Speaker 2: we'll have to wait and find out.

503
00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:06,800
Speaker 3: Also what's going on, what's going on with what are

504
00:30:06,880 --> 00:30:10,920
Speaker 3: the four creepiest boeings in the US arsenal or in

505
00:30:10,920 --> 00:30:14,680
Speaker 3: the US fleet stopping by California a few days back.

506
00:30:14,560 --> 00:30:16,840
Speaker 5: And y'all just on a cursory google of like trojan

507
00:30:16,880 --> 00:30:19,680
Speaker 5: Horse terrorism and things like that, there is you know,

508
00:30:19,920 --> 00:30:22,840
Speaker 5: this is something that's discussed and debated, this idea of

509
00:30:22,880 --> 00:30:27,560
Speaker 5: cargo containers being used to smuggle nuclear weapons into the

510
00:30:27,600 --> 00:30:33,360
Speaker 5: countries using commercial shipping vessels in a modern day Trojan

511
00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:34,720
Speaker 5: Horse esque maneuver.

512
00:30:35,120 --> 00:30:38,120
Speaker 2: Well, yeah, imagine if you got one of these into

513
00:30:38,560 --> 00:30:41,520
Speaker 2: you know, a major port that also has a major

514
00:30:41,680 --> 00:30:43,600
Speaker 2: US city or a major UK city.

515
00:30:44,920 --> 00:30:45,080
Speaker 3: Yeah.

516
00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:46,800
Speaker 5: I remember when we were at the port in there

517
00:30:46,800 --> 00:30:48,680
Speaker 5: in Florida. I had never been to a port like

518
00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:50,800
Speaker 5: that before. And the security is very similar to like

519
00:30:50,880 --> 00:30:54,640
Speaker 5: the airport, you know. I mean it's because of how

520
00:30:55,680 --> 00:30:56,560
Speaker 5: vulnerable it is.

521
00:30:56,840 --> 00:31:01,000
Speaker 3: It makes I suggest. I liked when Noel called it

522
00:31:01,440 --> 00:31:08,040
Speaker 3: Savannah syndrome. Right yeah, oh yeah.

523
00:31:07,800 --> 00:31:10,960
Speaker 2: So guys, I think we will switch to one more

524
00:31:11,160 --> 00:31:15,200
Speaker 2: listener mail. This one comes to us from Chef Ben.

525
00:31:15,440 --> 00:31:20,320
Speaker 2: Chef Ben, constant caller of the show and uh beloved

526
00:31:20,640 --> 00:31:22,960
Speaker 2: by us here, I think, right, I think it's unanimous,

527
00:31:23,040 --> 00:31:23,920
Speaker 2: oh big time.

528
00:31:23,760 --> 00:31:27,479
Speaker 3: A lot of I'm super biased, Chef. Uh, you know

529
00:31:27,520 --> 00:31:28,440
Speaker 3: why I can't comment.

530
00:31:28,680 --> 00:31:31,200
Speaker 5: He comes by it honestly though. The admiration, I think

531
00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:33,920
Speaker 5: it's not just it's not just nominative.

532
00:31:36,240 --> 00:31:37,800
Speaker 2: Always has something interesting to say.

533
00:31:38,080 --> 00:31:38,640
Speaker 3: Interesting.

534
00:31:39,000 --> 00:31:42,360
Speaker 2: There's something about a lot of experience in the hospitality

535
00:31:42,360 --> 00:31:46,440
Speaker 2: industry that lends itself to either an understanding specifically of

536
00:31:46,480 --> 00:31:50,080
Speaker 2: stuff that we talk about in that industry or tangentially

537
00:31:50,520 --> 00:31:54,040
Speaker 2: to other industries, and then understanding how they function and work.

538
00:31:54,040 --> 00:31:55,600
Speaker 5: And we'll not to mention that if you're in the

539
00:31:55,600 --> 00:31:58,520
Speaker 5: hospitality industry, you're often privy to a lot of comings

540
00:31:58,520 --> 00:32:01,600
Speaker 5: and goings of like powerful people and you know, events

541
00:32:01,640 --> 00:32:03,560
Speaker 5: and things like I mean, you're you're kind of got

542
00:32:03,760 --> 00:32:05,400
Speaker 5: like the inside scoop on a lot of things because

543
00:32:05,400 --> 00:32:09,440
Speaker 5: people often don't they don't notice that you're paring potential.

544
00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:13,080
Speaker 3: Some of the some of the most dangerous people I've

545
00:32:13,120 --> 00:32:15,680
Speaker 3: met actually work in hospitality, you know what I mean?

546
00:32:15,680 --> 00:32:18,760
Speaker 5: Though, like you're you're you're kind of situations, your sort

547
00:32:18,800 --> 00:32:22,480
Speaker 5: of background, and oftentimes you you will steal witness things,

548
00:32:22,680 --> 00:32:25,080
Speaker 5: not to mention people that work at like events in Washington,

549
00:32:25,120 --> 00:32:26,960
Speaker 5: d C. In various places like that.

550
00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:32,840
Speaker 2: Just out of curiosity without outing anybody. What type of

551
00:32:32,880 --> 00:32:34,880
Speaker 2: hospitality jobs are we talking about?

552
00:32:35,040 --> 00:32:36,959
Speaker 5: I think it's hotels largely.

553
00:32:37,480 --> 00:32:40,600
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's going to be it's going to be hospitality.

554
00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:44,440
Speaker 3: It's going to be catering. Know is uh to on

555
00:32:44,520 --> 00:32:46,200
Speaker 3: that one? Hing?

556
00:32:46,600 --> 00:32:50,240
Speaker 5: Catering for big old of diplomatic type of events.

557
00:32:50,280 --> 00:32:52,520
Speaker 3: What are you talking about? Talk about a trojan horse,

558
00:32:52,920 --> 00:32:55,600
Speaker 3: forget the tank, get a waiter.

559
00:32:57,400 --> 00:32:59,840
Speaker 2: The days back in the days of Kings, you'd have

560
00:32:59,840 --> 00:33:00,600
Speaker 2: a food taster.

561
00:33:01,840 --> 00:33:09,120
Speaker 3: A lot of a lot of people play assassin as well, right,

562
00:33:09,200 --> 00:33:13,480
Speaker 3: hit man, whatever, But it's less of forty seven. It's

563
00:33:13,520 --> 00:33:19,360
Speaker 3: more about gathering information. Always gush. We're introducing one of

564
00:33:19,400 --> 00:33:23,520
Speaker 3: our favorite chefs and we still haven't gotten to his voicemail.

565
00:33:23,760 --> 00:33:26,880
Speaker 2: Hey, well let's do that right now. Here's Chef Ben.

566
00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:29,680
Speaker 7: Hello, good morning, Chef Ben in Chicago. Call him back.

567
00:33:29,720 --> 00:33:32,240
Speaker 7: I know I just called yesterday. I listened to you

568
00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:36,120
Speaker 7: a lot, not sorry, So you're talking about tracking pizza

569
00:33:36,320 --> 00:33:40,640
Speaker 7: deliveries to depenagon if they are using a pizza delivery

570
00:33:40,680 --> 00:33:42,720
Speaker 7: service and they're not sending staffers out to go to

571
00:33:42,760 --> 00:33:45,360
Speaker 7: the pizza restaurant itself. I do know that there are

572
00:33:45,400 --> 00:33:48,720
Speaker 7: a number of different pieces of software in hospitality that

573
00:33:48,760 --> 00:33:51,880
Speaker 7: are integrated in such a way that it's like your

574
00:33:52,240 --> 00:33:55,600
Speaker 7: point of sale ordering system, it's your credit card processor,

575
00:33:55,680 --> 00:34:01,480
Speaker 7: it's your inventory system, it's your delivery mapping and schedule device,

576
00:34:01,920 --> 00:34:06,680
Speaker 7: right so that your deliveries are as efficient as possible. Now,

577
00:34:06,960 --> 00:34:10,360
Speaker 7: having said that, I'm no hacker, which I'm aware is

578
00:34:10,360 --> 00:34:13,720
Speaker 7: a very dated nineties kind of a term, but I imagine

579
00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:18,560
Speaker 7: that it's possible to gain access to that software surreptitiously

580
00:34:18,640 --> 00:34:23,600
Speaker 7: or otherwise and know how pizza restaurants are scheduling their

581
00:34:23,640 --> 00:34:27,080
Speaker 7: deliveries within a radius just based on getting into that

582
00:34:27,120 --> 00:34:30,080
Speaker 7: whatever that software is. There's a number of different softwares,

583
00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:33,080
Speaker 7: and they're generally run out of like a square system,

584
00:34:33,239 --> 00:34:35,960
Speaker 7: right like out of their pos point of sale system.

585
00:34:36,239 --> 00:34:40,720
Speaker 7: So that could be your ticket to real time where

586
00:34:40,760 --> 00:34:44,080
Speaker 7: are pieces being delivered right now? And is this an uptick?

587
00:34:44,080 --> 00:34:47,000
Speaker 7: Because I'm sure there's historical data built into that system.

588
00:34:47,040 --> 00:34:49,440
Speaker 7: Is this an uptick over yesterday? Is this an uptick

589
00:34:49,440 --> 00:34:51,799
Speaker 7: because things in hospitality go up and down so much.

590
00:34:52,200 --> 00:34:55,080
Speaker 7: Is this an uptick over a comparable day last week?

591
00:34:55,200 --> 00:34:55,359
Speaker 3: Right?

592
00:34:55,400 --> 00:34:56,880
Speaker 7: You sell more pizza on a Friday than you do

593
00:34:56,920 --> 00:35:02,040
Speaker 7: on a Tuesday. That's just pizza. Pizza economics are not complicated.

594
00:35:02,680 --> 00:35:04,080
Speaker 7: So yeah, you don't want to look at the day before.

595
00:35:04,120 --> 00:35:05,200
Speaker 7: You want to look at the same day of the

596
00:35:05,200 --> 00:35:07,520
Speaker 7: week before, the same day of the year before, that

597
00:35:07,600 --> 00:35:12,120
Speaker 7: kind of thing. So yeah, that software, if it is hackable,

598
00:35:12,520 --> 00:35:15,640
Speaker 7: is probably the key to having real time data on

599
00:35:15,680 --> 00:35:17,960
Speaker 7: that kind of stuff. As always, feel free to use

600
00:35:17,960 --> 00:35:20,160
Speaker 7: this on your show. Thank you so much and glad

601
00:35:20,160 --> 00:35:20,799
Speaker 7: to have you as back.

602
00:35:21,360 --> 00:35:23,080
Speaker 5: That's so cool, man, because I was just couldn't wrap

603
00:35:23,080 --> 00:35:25,480
Speaker 5: my head around, like how are they finding this information?

604
00:35:25,760 --> 00:35:30,360
Speaker 5: And like it It ultimately boiled down to observational calling

605
00:35:30,400 --> 00:35:33,720
Speaker 5: the place, going there in person, maybe looking at Google

606
00:35:33,760 --> 00:35:37,400
Speaker 5: mappee type results like like peak business times and like

607
00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:39,960
Speaker 5: foot traffic and stuff like that. But this is ultimately

608
00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:40,800
Speaker 5: what you'd want.

609
00:35:41,000 --> 00:35:45,439
Speaker 2: I think. So the only problem is in Chef Man.

610
00:35:45,719 --> 00:35:51,040
Speaker 2: In all of the reporting about attacks on POS systems,

611
00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:55,479
Speaker 2: I've only really seen them used to gather credit card

612
00:35:55,560 --> 00:35:59,400
Speaker 2: data or personal information of individuals who let's say, swipe

613
00:35:59,400 --> 00:36:01,880
Speaker 2: their card or af their card on a POS system.

614
00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:08,319
Speaker 2: It recently happened with Jimmy John's beloved Jimmy Johns, the

615
00:36:08,360 --> 00:36:15,000
Speaker 2: sandwich maker Hunter. Well, I really loved it. Maybe I'm wrong.

616
00:36:15,120 --> 00:36:16,320
Speaker 2: Is they're bad? Did they get canceled?

617
00:36:16,440 --> 00:36:18,359
Speaker 5: Jimmy Johns is a great sandwich. But I believe that dude,

618
00:36:18,440 --> 00:36:22,359
Speaker 5: Jimmy john is like a notorious, like big game type hunter.

619
00:36:22,480 --> 00:36:22,719
Speaker 8: Dude.

620
00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:25,520
Speaker 3: Also, I just like a hot sandwich. You know, if

621
00:36:25,520 --> 00:36:28,920
Speaker 3: we're paying for it, throw it, throw it in the microwave.

622
00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:35,560
Speaker 3: That's heard and background, folks, So everybody knows. For years

623
00:36:35,640 --> 00:36:42,000
Speaker 3: upon years, belough, these many evenings, our office was located

624
00:36:42,400 --> 00:36:46,959
Speaker 3: very close to a Jimmy Johns. So we were sandwich rich.

625
00:36:47,280 --> 00:36:51,880
Speaker 3: We were not financially rich. Smell yeah, we got free smells.

626
00:36:52,320 --> 00:36:54,400
Speaker 5: Yeah. There were some images of him, like posing with

627
00:36:54,680 --> 00:36:57,960
Speaker 5: dead elephants and rhinos and leopards and stuff that not.

628
00:36:58,000 --> 00:37:00,920
Speaker 5: We're not a particularly good look back in twenty fifteen. Well,

629
00:37:01,040 --> 00:37:04,440
Speaker 5: dang it, whatever, you can still enjoy the sandwich.

630
00:37:04,719 --> 00:37:07,040
Speaker 2: But as you were saying that, this story actually isn't

631
00:37:07,080 --> 00:37:09,080
Speaker 2: recent and I'm sorry you guys. I took the two

632
00:37:09,239 --> 00:37:11,520
Speaker 2: zero one four for a two zero two four when

633
00:37:11,520 --> 00:37:13,440
Speaker 2: I glanced at it as I'm going through. That actually

634
00:37:13,480 --> 00:37:15,719
Speaker 2: happened in twenty fourteen, so that was a long time ago,

635
00:37:15,960 --> 00:37:19,399
Speaker 2: just before the elephant rhino pictures. Maybe that's why those

636
00:37:19,400 --> 00:37:19,880
Speaker 2: were leaked.

637
00:37:20,320 --> 00:37:26,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, pos is are are not hardened devices necessarily. And

638
00:37:26,280 --> 00:37:31,319
Speaker 3: to your point about like hacking or what you call it,

639
00:37:31,440 --> 00:37:37,640
Speaker 3: chef hackability, hackable stuff, I love that phrase. In scraping

640
00:37:37,719 --> 00:37:43,840
Speaker 3: that information, that credit card information, one could potentially also

641
00:37:44,080 --> 00:37:46,480
Speaker 3: gather metadata absolutely well.

642
00:37:46,560 --> 00:37:49,439
Speaker 2: Yeah, and you can get logins for folks who are

643
00:37:49,440 --> 00:37:52,200
Speaker 2: in charge of the pos right, those people who are

644
00:37:52,239 --> 00:37:54,760
Speaker 2: logging in to actually run it during the day, somebody

645
00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:58,279
Speaker 2: who's got a shift there. And if you got that,

646
00:37:58,400 --> 00:38:02,200
Speaker 2: then potentially you could get in to the inner workings

647
00:38:02,200 --> 00:38:04,239
Speaker 2: of that software and actually look at as you're talking

648
00:38:04,280 --> 00:38:06,960
Speaker 2: about year of a year statistics and things like that.

649
00:38:07,520 --> 00:38:10,560
Speaker 2: I just haven't seen I haven't seen that be the thing,

650
00:38:11,480 --> 00:38:14,319
Speaker 2: at least as nobody's reported on that being the thing.

651
00:38:14,360 --> 00:38:16,760
Speaker 2: But it's a really it's really smart thinking there, Chef Ben.

652
00:38:17,120 --> 00:38:22,160
Speaker 3: Yeah, Chef. My question from our earlier conversations remains, and

653
00:38:22,239 --> 00:38:24,600
Speaker 3: you address that a little bit in the voicemail here,

654
00:38:25,040 --> 00:38:29,880
Speaker 3: what is the baseline, right, three hundred percent increase from

655
00:38:30,960 --> 00:38:33,759
Speaker 3: you know, if someone's selling one pizza and then they

656
00:38:33,800 --> 00:38:40,120
Speaker 3: sell thirty, right, is that magnificent indicative increase? How many

657
00:38:40,680 --> 00:38:45,360
Speaker 3: basil leaves are we reading here? Also, I'm going to

658
00:38:45,440 --> 00:38:48,719
Speaker 3: go back on record, I do think it's I do

659
00:38:48,800 --> 00:38:52,319
Speaker 3: think it's a bit of theater obviously, Like if you

660
00:38:52,760 --> 00:38:56,160
Speaker 3: have the one of the biggest office buildings in the world,

661
00:38:56,480 --> 00:38:59,520
Speaker 3: or you have some of the most dangerous office buildings

662
00:38:59,600 --> 00:39:01,960
Speaker 3: in the world world, and you have a food court,

663
00:39:02,400 --> 00:39:06,640
Speaker 3: why are you ordering outside? Also check out the Friday

664
00:39:06,719 --> 00:39:10,759
Speaker 3: traffic before you know, sometimes people just get home for

665
00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:13,759
Speaker 3: the holidays and they don't want to cook. I just

666
00:39:14,000 --> 00:39:20,640
Speaker 3: I would caution us from putting too much credulity into

667
00:39:21,120 --> 00:39:25,319
Speaker 3: the idea that the world's most dangerous military can be

668
00:39:25,400 --> 00:39:32,880
Speaker 3: prognosticated without its knowledge based on pizza deliveries. A fun story, though.

669
00:39:33,920 --> 00:39:38,040
Speaker 2: Wholeheartedly agreed, and it reminds me a lot of our

670
00:39:38,160 --> 00:39:41,800
Speaker 2: little exploration of down detector earlier in the episode. Remember

671
00:39:41,840 --> 00:39:43,480
Speaker 2: we were talking about that. If you go to down

672
00:39:43,520 --> 00:39:47,160
Speaker 2: Detector right now at three ten pm on January fourteenth.

673
00:39:47,400 --> 00:39:51,560
Speaker 2: It's showing that the spike has subsided substantially, But there

674
00:39:51,680 --> 00:39:54,200
Speaker 2: was one, and it felt weird, right, and we're just

675
00:39:54,239 --> 00:39:56,800
Speaker 2: putting pieces together or taking a look and thinking about

676
00:39:56,880 --> 00:39:59,480
Speaker 2: what could that mean? That seems odd that that would

677
00:39:59,480 --> 00:40:02,040
Speaker 2: happen in t and them, But ultimately it looks like

678
00:40:02,080 --> 00:40:06,759
Speaker 2: it was nothing or at least an unsuccessful something, right.

679
00:40:09,600 --> 00:40:12,360
Speaker 5: Anyway, I mean, think about how many times unsuccessful something's

680
00:40:12,400 --> 00:40:16,440
Speaker 5: happened every day that either get thwarted by the powers

681
00:40:16,480 --> 00:40:18,479
Speaker 5: that be, you know, who were supposed to thwart things

682
00:40:18,480 --> 00:40:19,720
Speaker 5: like that, and we just never.

683
00:40:19,760 --> 00:40:22,720
Speaker 3: I had an ex girlfriend who called me an unsuccessful something.

684
00:40:22,840 --> 00:40:25,040
Speaker 5: There you go. Well, I'm just saying, you know, there's

685
00:40:25,400 --> 00:40:28,400
Speaker 5: plenty of attempts of this nature, like you know, And

686
00:40:28,440 --> 00:40:31,239
Speaker 5: to your point, Matt about not having heard anything about

687
00:40:31,280 --> 00:40:34,880
Speaker 5: any hacking attempts into point of sales software like this,

688
00:40:34,960 --> 00:40:36,799
Speaker 5: maybe they just did a good job and we haven't

689
00:40:36,800 --> 00:40:37,839
Speaker 5: heard about it, ye, because they haven't.

690
00:40:38,640 --> 00:40:41,120
Speaker 2: There were lots of Again, there were lots of lots

691
00:40:41,120 --> 00:40:45,040
Speaker 2: and lots and lots for god, the past fifteen years

692
00:40:45,440 --> 00:40:50,120
Speaker 2: successful attacks on POS systems for these purposes. Yes, well, anyway,

693
00:40:50,160 --> 00:40:52,840
Speaker 2: that's all I've got for you today. Let's jump to

694
00:40:52,920 --> 00:41:04,000
Speaker 2: our next break, and then our next message is from you.

695
00:41:01,960 --> 00:41:05,960
Speaker 3: And we have returned. Folks. We don't have a ton

696
00:41:06,080 --> 00:41:08,520
Speaker 3: of time right now, but we've got to share with

697
00:41:08,600 --> 00:41:12,920
Speaker 3: you a pretty awesome story that will be an episode

698
00:41:12,960 --> 00:41:13,640
Speaker 3: in the future.

699
00:41:13,840 --> 00:41:14,719
Speaker 5: I hope.

700
00:41:15,920 --> 00:41:19,240
Speaker 3: Let's pitch it to each other. This comes from Grady.

701
00:41:19,360 --> 00:41:23,480
Speaker 3: Grady says, hello, I'm a fellow conspiracy realist. I only

702
00:41:23,560 --> 00:41:26,839
Speaker 3: recently started listening to the show, but have found much

703
00:41:26,840 --> 00:41:30,200
Speaker 3: of what you all talk about to be incredible. I

704
00:41:30,239 --> 00:41:34,920
Speaker 3: am curious if you have done any shows on shady nonprofits.

705
00:41:35,080 --> 00:41:36,160
Speaker 3: Let's pause there.

706
00:41:37,200 --> 00:41:39,600
Speaker 5: Incredible isn't really cool or not credible?

707
00:41:40,120 --> 00:41:45,239
Speaker 3: Ah? The levels do it, right, Joel, and we have

708
00:41:45,440 --> 00:41:50,600
Speaker 3: talked about nonprofits in the past, right for sure. Oh

709
00:41:50,640 --> 00:41:54,640
Speaker 3: many a time and check out our episodes Grady on

710
00:41:54,920 --> 00:41:57,759
Speaker 3: some of those conversations, as well as strange news and

711
00:41:57,880 --> 00:42:02,080
Speaker 3: listener mail programs. You continue, you say, I am a

712
00:42:02,160 --> 00:42:07,600
Speaker 3: student applying to American universities and recently did some digging

713
00:42:07,800 --> 00:42:12,799
Speaker 3: into the college Board nonprofit. Now that's college board all

714
00:42:12,840 --> 00:42:16,839
Speaker 3: one word. I was thinking about them, says Grady. As

715
00:42:16,960 --> 00:42:21,120
Speaker 3: lots of colleges are going back to requiring tests, which

716
00:42:21,160 --> 00:42:25,360
Speaker 3: will greatly benefit the College Board again all one word.

717
00:42:25,760 --> 00:42:29,000
Speaker 3: The conspiracy side of me began to wonder if College

718
00:42:29,000 --> 00:42:33,839
Speaker 3: Board could potentially be donating to universities and colleges as

719
00:42:33,880 --> 00:42:38,640
Speaker 3: an active bribery. However, it's also entirely possible that schools

720
00:42:38,680 --> 00:42:43,320
Speaker 3: simply aren't able to gauge students as well without these metrics.

721
00:42:43,840 --> 00:42:47,640
Speaker 3: Lots of top universities have seen the number of applicants

722
00:42:47,760 --> 00:42:51,160
Speaker 3: more than double in the past ten years, and these

723
00:42:51,239 --> 00:42:57,120
Speaker 3: metrics could be essential. So pause there, We all had

724
00:42:57,160 --> 00:43:00,759
Speaker 3: to take something like an SAT or an ace, right,

725
00:43:01,800 --> 00:43:05,640
Speaker 3: barrenel Sat? How did you guys feel about it?

726
00:43:06,280 --> 00:43:08,640
Speaker 5: I always I did a couple of times, and I

727
00:43:08,640 --> 00:43:11,439
Speaker 5: did way better on verbal than on math. But that's

728
00:43:11,480 --> 00:43:13,759
Speaker 5: how I couldn't tell you what my score was. To

729
00:43:13,760 --> 00:43:15,759
Speaker 5: be honest, I think it was like thirteen hundred or

730
00:43:15,800 --> 00:43:16,400
Speaker 5: something like that.

731
00:43:16,600 --> 00:43:19,319
Speaker 3: Nice, Yeah, nice.

732
00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:23,399
Speaker 2: I got into Georgia State University. That's all you need

733
00:43:23,440 --> 00:43:26,560
Speaker 2: to know. What are you talking about? You can learn

734
00:43:26,600 --> 00:43:30,320
Speaker 2: about it just means I did fine.

735
00:43:30,880 --> 00:43:34,680
Speaker 3: And if you need any more information from our brother Matthew,

736
00:43:35,560 --> 00:43:37,960
Speaker 3: you will have to come with a warrant and a Supeda.

737
00:43:39,800 --> 00:43:41,360
Speaker 2: My bachelor's is on the wall over there, if you

738
00:43:41,360 --> 00:43:42,000
Speaker 2: want more info.

739
00:43:42,280 --> 00:43:43,839
Speaker 5: Oh, you got a frame, it's up on the wall

740
00:43:44,080 --> 00:43:44,919
Speaker 5: of that Yeah.

741
00:43:45,200 --> 00:43:51,040
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, well I think we matriculated into similar institutions. Okay,

742
00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:54,720
Speaker 3: so college Board, this really bugs me, you guys. Before

743
00:43:54,760 --> 00:43:58,600
Speaker 3: we return to the conversation with you, Grady, we got

744
00:43:58,680 --> 00:44:05,040
Speaker 3: to say, like, regardless of the institutionalized testing regimes, which

745
00:44:05,080 --> 00:44:11,040
Speaker 3: are weirdly quasi public quasi private, everybody who goes to

746
00:44:11,360 --> 00:44:18,320
Speaker 3: any higher education institution is going to get absolutely reamed

747
00:44:18,440 --> 00:44:22,480
Speaker 3: on textbook prices. That's a grip. Do you guys remember

748
00:44:22,880 --> 00:44:24,040
Speaker 3: having to buy textbooks?

749
00:44:24,200 --> 00:44:27,040
Speaker 5: Of course, and then the resell valued plummets.

750
00:44:27,640 --> 00:44:29,319
Speaker 2: Now you gotta keep them. You got to keep them,

751
00:44:29,400 --> 00:44:31,799
Speaker 2: and then they're they're they're gonna be worth something. One

752
00:44:31,840 --> 00:44:35,000
Speaker 2: day you can sell them to the Atlanta Vintage Books.

753
00:44:35,160 --> 00:44:37,359
Speaker 2: It'll be like, oh, look at this one from two

754
00:44:37,400 --> 00:44:40,160
Speaker 2: thousand and six. Oh it's meant.

755
00:44:40,480 --> 00:44:45,680
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, here, let me find one Theories of Personalities,

756
00:44:46,239 --> 00:44:51,160
Speaker 3: third edition worthless. Now I'm sure because the appendix changed.

757
00:44:52,480 --> 00:44:59,040
Speaker 3: This idea of college Board is interesting because there may

758
00:44:59,080 --> 00:45:03,880
Speaker 3: be an institute utional conspiracy at play the College Board.

759
00:45:04,719 --> 00:45:07,920
Speaker 3: What do we say about innocuous names they develop and

760
00:45:08,000 --> 00:45:13,120
Speaker 3: administer the standardized test not just used in higher education,

761
00:45:14,160 --> 00:45:19,080
Speaker 3: but in the curricula used from kindergarten to twelfth grade

762
00:45:19,120 --> 00:45:22,520
Speaker 3: to senior year of high school. These folks are making money.

763
00:45:22,640 --> 00:45:27,120
Speaker 3: Handover fist, Yeah, baby, I do. I still have a

764
00:45:27,120 --> 00:45:29,080
Speaker 3: stack of mine upstairs. I was looking at him the other.

765
00:45:29,000 --> 00:45:32,920
Speaker 2: Day, and it does feel like the ones that I've

766
00:45:33,000 --> 00:45:36,000
Speaker 2: kept around could be useful or have some kind of use,

767
00:45:36,080 --> 00:45:40,719
Speaker 2: you know. But I do remember, I think, did you

768
00:45:40,719 --> 00:45:43,920
Speaker 2: guys ever have to get an updated version while you

769
00:45:44,000 --> 00:45:46,560
Speaker 2: were in the class? So like you had a version

770
00:45:46,640 --> 00:45:47,560
Speaker 2: three or something.

771
00:45:47,480 --> 00:45:48,439
Speaker 3: Addition for whatever?

772
00:45:48,600 --> 00:45:49,640
Speaker 5: Ye yah, yeah, I think so.

773
00:45:50,000 --> 00:45:52,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, And that was like an extra sixty five seventy

774
00:45:52,400 --> 00:45:55,400
Speaker 2: five hundreds of dollars, Like it just depended on what

775
00:45:55,440 --> 00:45:55,799
Speaker 2: it was.

776
00:45:55,920 --> 00:45:56,720
Speaker 5: Holton Nifflin.

777
00:45:57,680 --> 00:46:04,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, big textbook. That's the name of the episode.

778
00:46:04,680 --> 00:46:09,640
Speaker 3: It's got to be so. So, Grady is asking us

779
00:46:10,040 --> 00:46:15,800
Speaker 3: a question that a lot of people have probably thought

780
00:46:15,840 --> 00:46:21,279
Speaker 3: about lightly in the past. Grady, We're gonna paraphrase a

781
00:46:21,320 --> 00:46:25,120
Speaker 3: little bit of this for time, But you ask us,

782
00:46:25,480 --> 00:46:30,839
Speaker 3: why is a US public serving nonprofit keeping so much

783
00:46:30,880 --> 00:46:35,720
Speaker 3: of its profits outside of the United States. You point

784
00:46:35,760 --> 00:46:40,279
Speaker 3: to this particular issue, You say, I did find some

785
00:46:40,440 --> 00:46:45,000
Speaker 3: interesting articles talking about how the College Board apparently has

786
00:46:45,080 --> 00:46:49,200
Speaker 3: anywhere from get this, guys, two hundred and fifty million

787
00:46:49,360 --> 00:46:54,880
Speaker 3: to one point five six billion US dollars under management

788
00:46:55,440 --> 00:47:03,080
Speaker 3: in the Caribbean. So the US nonprofit that is in

789
00:47:03,280 --> 00:47:09,319
Speaker 3: charge of so many standardized tests, you know, they get

790
00:47:09,360 --> 00:47:11,640
Speaker 3: a little bolt hole out in the islands.

791
00:47:13,000 --> 00:47:15,640
Speaker 2: Is it Panama specifically down there somewhere?

792
00:47:16,160 --> 00:47:19,839
Speaker 3: We'd have to look at the papers.

793
00:47:20,640 --> 00:47:22,879
Speaker 2: They have some really nice banks down there.

794
00:47:23,680 --> 00:47:26,479
Speaker 3: They've got some great banks, you know. I always think,

795
00:47:27,400 --> 00:47:30,000
Speaker 3: because we're all in love with the Caribbean now like

796
00:47:31,120 --> 00:47:35,320
Speaker 3: all of us, uh, Tennessee has been the most recently returned.

797
00:47:35,400 --> 00:47:38,239
Speaker 3: But uh, I think we could agree. You know, we

798
00:47:38,239 --> 00:47:41,399
Speaker 3: were sitting out there on a boat and we all

799
00:47:41,440 --> 00:47:45,040
Speaker 3: had that cool Ghostbusters look at the license plate moment,

800
00:47:45,280 --> 00:47:47,839
Speaker 3: and we said we should start a bank if podcasting

801
00:47:47,960 --> 00:47:48,680
Speaker 3: doesn't work.

802
00:47:48,480 --> 00:47:50,719
Speaker 5: Out going down old Dimny Road.

803
00:47:52,880 --> 00:47:57,080
Speaker 3: That's a reference. I love. We have more to say

804
00:47:57,080 --> 00:47:59,600
Speaker 3: about this. Grady has more to say about this. Grady

805
00:47:59,680 --> 00:48:02,880
Speaker 3: is giving this background. Gray do you say? College Board

806
00:48:03,000 --> 00:48:06,600
Speaker 3: underwent a regime change in twenty twelve when a new

807
00:48:06,719 --> 00:48:11,320
Speaker 3: CEO named David Coleman stepped in and many board members

808
00:48:11,440 --> 00:48:16,000
Speaker 3: left Coleman made over two million dollars last year, which

809
00:48:16,000 --> 00:48:19,200
Speaker 3: would be twenty twenty five, and most of the chief

810
00:48:19,239 --> 00:48:25,560
Speaker 3: executives made upward of five hundred thousand US dollars. A

811
00:48:25,600 --> 00:48:29,480
Speaker 3: little bit odd for a nonprofit. Yeah, jents tell me.

812
00:48:29,600 --> 00:48:35,000
Speaker 5: A lot of profit to me, right, And I know

813
00:48:35,160 --> 00:48:37,800
Speaker 5: nonprofit it doesn't involve like making zero money.

814
00:48:37,800 --> 00:48:41,880
Speaker 3: But that's just out of step with the stated goals.

815
00:48:41,560 --> 00:48:44,120
Speaker 5: Of what a nonprofit typically should represent.

816
00:48:44,640 --> 00:48:48,840
Speaker 3: Yeah, I agree with you. On another note to Dovetail

817
00:48:48,920 --> 00:48:52,640
Speaker 3: that it's why we have a separate thing called not

818
00:48:52,920 --> 00:48:55,240
Speaker 3: for profit. Yeah.

819
00:48:55,280 --> 00:48:56,880
Speaker 2: Wait a second, those two things are different.

820
00:48:56,920 --> 00:48:59,680
Speaker 5: I think there's some slight differences in their bylaws or

821
00:48:59,719 --> 00:49:02,560
Speaker 5: in their Yeah, what's the word I'm looking for. You know,

822
00:49:02,719 --> 00:49:05,839
Speaker 5: they're they're charters.

823
00:49:06,360 --> 00:49:09,360
Speaker 3: It's a ven diagram. Oh my gosh. We got to

824
00:49:09,360 --> 00:49:14,600
Speaker 3: get back to our accountains and say, oh, whoops, sorry, guys,

825
00:49:14,760 --> 00:49:17,560
Speaker 3: we were on a boat. It was crazy. We kind

826
00:49:17,560 --> 00:49:22,200
Speaker 3: of started a thing we meant not for profit. Oh god,

827
00:49:23,719 --> 00:49:24,880
Speaker 3: all right, we'll text.

828
00:49:24,680 --> 00:49:28,879
Speaker 2: The Powell's coming for me. That's a different thing.

829
00:49:29,360 --> 00:49:32,959
Speaker 3: Oh boy, They're all related, you know. At the top.

830
00:49:33,520 --> 00:49:37,120
Speaker 5: Not for profits can be things like like professional groups,

831
00:49:37,600 --> 00:49:41,120
Speaker 5: you know, business leagues and social clubs and stuff like that,

832
00:49:41,160 --> 00:49:45,640
Speaker 5: whereas nonprofits typically have more abilities for tax deductions, and

833
00:49:45,880 --> 00:49:48,160
Speaker 5: they are meant to have a bit of a like

834
00:49:49,640 --> 00:49:52,840
Speaker 5: mission that benefits, you know, the greater good in the pubble,

835
00:49:53,280 --> 00:49:54,680
Speaker 5: which ones for cults.

836
00:49:55,080 --> 00:49:58,520
Speaker 3: That's us. Let's just do the religion thing, guys, let's

837
00:49:58,520 --> 00:50:02,960
Speaker 3: cross that rube find. We've been dancing around it. I

838
00:50:02,960 --> 00:50:06,759
Speaker 3: think it's time, you know, I'll shave the mustache.

839
00:50:09,080 --> 00:50:12,960
Speaker 2: I'm gonna say keep it. I mean, it's at this point.

840
00:50:13,000 --> 00:50:15,480
Speaker 5: It'll be like when Alex Trebek shaved his mustache and

841
00:50:15,520 --> 00:50:17,680
Speaker 5: I lost all trust in the man. Now, I would

842
00:50:17,719 --> 00:50:19,840
Speaker 5: never lose trust in You've been but it would be jarring.

843
00:50:19,880 --> 00:50:21,520
Speaker 5: I've grown to really love that little guy.

844
00:50:21,680 --> 00:50:23,800
Speaker 2: Yeh man, he is kind of perfect.

845
00:50:23,840 --> 00:50:24,040
Speaker 7: Man.

846
00:50:24,160 --> 00:50:24,640
Speaker 5: It's great.

847
00:50:25,320 --> 00:50:28,440
Speaker 3: I got a weird chin. It works out, but we'll

848
00:50:29,280 --> 00:50:32,720
Speaker 3: will table that one. We want to go back to you, Grady,

849
00:50:32,760 --> 00:50:36,799
Speaker 3: because you point out that the ap exam has gone

850
00:50:36,880 --> 00:50:40,920
Speaker 3: up in price every year since twenty twenty to almost

851
00:50:41,080 --> 00:50:45,239
Speaker 3: one hundred dollars per test. Okay, so this is a

852
00:50:45,320 --> 00:50:49,000
Speaker 3: nonprofit with a ton of money in the Caribbean, and

853
00:50:49,719 --> 00:50:54,360
Speaker 3: the test remained largely the same. Right, the concept of

854
00:50:54,719 --> 00:50:57,319
Speaker 3: how they score and what they're looking for, but the

855
00:50:57,520 --> 00:51:02,400
Speaker 3: cost to the student and the students parents keeps increasing.

856
00:51:03,000 --> 00:51:07,239
Speaker 3: Did you guys ever take okay? Uh, thank you for

857
00:51:07,320 --> 00:51:10,800
Speaker 3: the subtitles there, Matt, Wait, is that you, Dylan?

858
00:51:13,080 --> 00:51:14,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm.

859
00:51:15,880 --> 00:51:23,080
Speaker 3: Okay, okay, well, I but I appeal for a different subtitle.

860
00:51:23,360 --> 00:51:28,040
Speaker 3: That'll be a joke for us. But but Noel, just

861
00:51:28,080 --> 00:51:30,040
Speaker 3: so you can see in the subtitle there you are

862
00:51:30,080 --> 00:51:33,400
Speaker 3: the chill cult leader, and Matt, you are the charismatic

863
00:51:33,520 --> 00:51:39,800
Speaker 3: cult leader. Yeah. Yeah, and I am currently in negotiations

864
00:51:40,000 --> 00:51:41,040
Speaker 3: with tennessee about that.

865
00:51:41,640 --> 00:51:44,040
Speaker 5: Okay, forward to seeing how now that shakes out.

866
00:51:44,520 --> 00:51:48,920
Speaker 3: Yeah, so say we all, Uh, this is a pretty

867
00:51:49,200 --> 00:51:54,719
Speaker 3: crazy question about about where the money goes because it

868
00:51:54,920 --> 00:51:59,160
Speaker 3: may be indeed, uh, I don't know, guys, it may

869
00:51:59,160 --> 00:52:03,919
Speaker 3: be a choke for opportunity of education. Like imagine you've

870
00:52:03,960 --> 00:52:08,480
Speaker 3: got brilliant kids, but you can't pay one hundred dollars

871
00:52:08,520 --> 00:52:12,520
Speaker 3: a pop for your kid to get the tests they need.

872
00:52:12,719 --> 00:52:13,720
Speaker 3: That's pretty crooked.

873
00:52:14,360 --> 00:52:17,040
Speaker 2: Well, that's not that's going to be the first and

874
00:52:17,320 --> 00:52:21,000
Speaker 2: no offense, but the tiniest hurdle that they'll face right

875
00:52:21,040 --> 00:52:24,080
Speaker 2: when you get into the secondary schools and like higher education, and.

876
00:52:24,080 --> 00:52:28,000
Speaker 5: Are they're not scholarships that also cover maybe the cost

877
00:52:28,040 --> 00:52:30,160
Speaker 5: of some of those tests. But I guess that's the deal, right,

878
00:52:30,160 --> 00:52:31,920
Speaker 5: You're not necessarily going to get the scholarship unless you're

879
00:52:31,920 --> 00:52:32,560
Speaker 5: taking the tests.

880
00:52:32,719 --> 00:52:35,120
Speaker 3: Yeah, that's the Yeah.

881
00:52:35,200 --> 00:52:37,480
Speaker 5: But maybe let us know anybody out there in higher education.

882
00:52:37,840 --> 00:52:41,880
Speaker 5: Surely there must be organizations out there that will help,

883
00:52:42,680 --> 00:52:46,320
Speaker 5: you know, qualified students, you know, who have excellent grades

884
00:52:46,320 --> 00:52:48,680
Speaker 5: in school get what they need in terms of the

885
00:52:48,719 --> 00:52:50,680
Speaker 5: testing that will get them to the place where they will,

886
00:52:50,719 --> 00:52:54,040
Speaker 5: you know, get get a full ride if they're the

887
00:52:54,120 --> 00:52:55,719
Speaker 5: kind of student that would get one of those.

888
00:52:56,239 --> 00:52:59,160
Speaker 2: Is there a college book assistance program the way there

889
00:52:59,160 --> 00:52:59,800
Speaker 2: is fratuition?

890
00:53:00,200 --> 00:53:02,880
Speaker 5: Yeah, it can be built into it will be a

891
00:53:02,880 --> 00:53:05,799
Speaker 5: stipend that will be built into certain types of scholarships.

892
00:53:05,960 --> 00:53:09,440
Speaker 3: When we're going to write to you in full, Grady

893
00:53:09,560 --> 00:53:13,839
Speaker 3: at Conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com, because you you've brought

894
00:53:13,920 --> 00:53:17,560
Speaker 3: up some fascinating statistics and one point we want to

895
00:53:17,640 --> 00:53:23,239
Speaker 3: leave you with here, folks, is the idea of endowments. Right.

896
00:53:23,360 --> 00:53:27,600
Speaker 3: Why has Why have endowments for a lot of storied

897
00:53:27,719 --> 00:53:33,440
Speaker 3: universities increased massively over time in step with the pay

898
00:53:33,640 --> 00:53:37,480
Speaker 3: for say the Dean or the president. And why have

899
00:53:37,640 --> 00:53:42,600
Speaker 3: the students not seen the advantages of those massive amounts

900
00:53:42,680 --> 00:53:46,160
Speaker 3: of money. Not to be all black Monday murders about it,

901
00:53:46,200 --> 00:53:49,400
Speaker 3: but something is happening with higher education.

902
00:53:49,800 --> 00:53:53,600
Speaker 2: I guess it is good that we compensate the publishers

903
00:53:54,200 --> 00:53:59,520
Speaker 2: of the books that the learned folks sure create. Wait,

904
00:54:00,600 --> 00:54:06,040
Speaker 2: as long as the authors slash, you know, teachers, researchers, professors,

905
00:54:06,880 --> 00:54:08,960
Speaker 2: people who actually write the books. As long as they're

906
00:54:09,000 --> 00:54:12,480
Speaker 2: getting a nice bit of that money, I'm actually okay

907
00:54:12,480 --> 00:54:15,799
Speaker 2: with it. But if it's just the publisher doing their

908
00:54:15,800 --> 00:54:18,880
Speaker 2: thing in the Caribbean, like, man, this my tie is

909
00:54:18,960 --> 00:54:21,839
Speaker 2: so good? Aren't you glad we rose? We raised their

910
00:54:21,840 --> 00:54:23,600
Speaker 2: prises by twenty percent year every year.

911
00:54:25,880 --> 00:54:28,960
Speaker 3: Cheers to all those young chumps in high school.

912
00:54:29,760 --> 00:54:34,120
Speaker 2: Yeah, all right, professors out there writing giant tomes.

913
00:54:35,120 --> 00:54:39,399
Speaker 3: Okay. McGraw hill says, we'll just change this one appendix

914
00:54:39,719 --> 00:54:43,799
Speaker 3: and then we'll we'll we'll get these folks for one

915
00:54:43,880 --> 00:54:46,880
Speaker 3: hundred and twenty five dollars that they don't have.

916
00:54:47,160 --> 00:54:50,359
Speaker 2: Oh crap, the Cabana Fund is getting low, guys. Oh

917
00:54:50,400 --> 00:54:51,640
Speaker 2: my god, I don't know.

918
00:54:51,719 --> 00:54:53,480
Speaker 5: It's just me, guys, but I just can't imagine that

919
00:54:53,719 --> 00:54:59,560
Speaker 5: being a textbook writer is like nearly as lucrative occupation

920
00:54:59,640 --> 00:55:04,839
Speaker 5: is being textbook publisher. I just don't know that kickdowns, kickbacks, whatever.

921
00:55:05,160 --> 00:55:10,840
Speaker 2: But theoretically wouldn't a textbook creator be incredibly lucrative just

922
00:55:10,880 --> 00:55:15,000
Speaker 2: because it's required purchasing, right, it's built into the system.

923
00:55:15,120 --> 00:55:17,479
Speaker 5: I just think they're getting paid a fee to write

924
00:55:17,560 --> 00:55:21,399
Speaker 5: the thing, and then the actual per unit that I mean,

925
00:55:21,520 --> 00:55:23,280
Speaker 5: I just don't know that they would have the leverage

926
00:55:23,320 --> 00:55:26,680
Speaker 5: unless it's like an incredibly niche that only one type

927
00:55:26,680 --> 00:55:29,480
Speaker 5: of individual could write, Like, if it's more broad, they're

928
00:55:29,480 --> 00:55:31,279
Speaker 5: going to find that they're not going to be paying

929
00:55:31,320 --> 00:55:31,880
Speaker 5: top dollars.

930
00:55:32,280 --> 00:55:34,600
Speaker 2: West thunder Mifflin was around, so we could consult them

931
00:55:34,640 --> 00:55:35,399
Speaker 2: about paper press.

932
00:55:39,880 --> 00:55:44,000
Speaker 3: That is what you guys. Oh I can I can

933
00:55:44,360 --> 00:55:47,480
Speaker 3: help us, just sus out a little bit of this.

934
00:55:47,640 --> 00:55:53,120
Speaker 3: We need your help, fellow academics. There is a dividing

935
00:55:53,200 --> 00:55:57,520
Speaker 3: line between professors. There are professors who will make you

936
00:55:57,640 --> 00:56:03,160
Speaker 3: buy the most recently updated textbook even if very little

937
00:56:03,239 --> 00:56:07,440
Speaker 3: is changed. The cool professors.

938
00:56:06,960 --> 00:56:08,120
Speaker 2: Make you buy their own book.

939
00:56:09,560 --> 00:56:12,880
Speaker 3: The cool professor. Okay, a couple of them did, and

940
00:56:12,960 --> 00:56:15,719
Speaker 3: they were cool, but they were kind of militant. I'm

941
00:56:15,760 --> 00:56:18,080
Speaker 3: just gonna be awesome. I'm gonna be honest about that.

942
00:56:18,239 --> 00:56:21,000
Speaker 5: It doesn't appear that there are certain situations where if

943
00:56:21,040 --> 00:56:23,760
Speaker 5: you can command it, you might get a royalty.

944
00:56:24,360 --> 00:56:24,600
Speaker 3: Right.

945
00:56:24,920 --> 00:56:28,000
Speaker 5: Maybe, but typically it seems like these Reddit posts, it's

946
00:56:28,040 --> 00:56:34,640
Speaker 5: individuals that are getting paid salary or a per project. Yeah,

947
00:56:34,760 --> 00:56:40,000
Speaker 5: paper collected, referenced, bibliography and so on. But the really

948
00:56:40,080 --> 00:56:43,440
Speaker 5: cool professors, and I'm sure we can all agree with this,

949
00:56:43,640 --> 00:56:46,960
Speaker 5: the really cool professors are the ones who rock up

950
00:56:47,000 --> 00:56:51,680
Speaker 5: to your class and they say the publishing is a

951
00:56:51,719 --> 00:56:58,000
Speaker 5: grift in a conspiracy. I can't tell you officially that

952
00:56:58,040 --> 00:57:02,279
Speaker 5: this book is free at the library. I can't tell

953
00:57:02,320 --> 00:57:06,960
Speaker 5: you officially that the printer costs this much for page.

954
00:57:07,800 --> 00:57:12,959
Speaker 5: I can't tell you officially that we can hang out later.

955
00:57:14,000 --> 00:57:15,560
Speaker 2: Don't do that. Don't do that.

956
00:57:15,840 --> 00:57:20,160
Speaker 3: No, no professor, after hours. Oh my gosh. Come on,

957
00:57:21,120 --> 00:57:24,720
Speaker 3: all right, guys, we have just enough time for a

958
00:57:24,880 --> 00:57:29,120
Speaker 3: couple of letters from home. If it's okay, we got

959
00:57:29,160 --> 00:57:31,680
Speaker 3: to shout out Netflix. Are we all right with that?

960
00:57:32,120 --> 00:57:33,320
Speaker 5: Yeah? We love Netflix.

961
00:57:34,360 --> 00:57:39,280
Speaker 3: We sure do this. Coming Monday, January twenty sixth, you

962
00:57:39,440 --> 00:57:43,280
Speaker 3: will be able to hang out with us on Netflix.

963
00:57:43,360 --> 00:57:46,120
Speaker 3: Now if you want to give us a little attaboy,

964
00:57:46,960 --> 00:57:50,040
Speaker 3: we would love it if you hit the little look

965
00:57:50,120 --> 00:57:52,720
Speaker 3: us up on Netflix. Stuff they don't want you to know,

966
00:57:52,920 --> 00:57:57,880
Speaker 3: hit the little bell reminder, and then on Monday, January

967
00:57:57,920 --> 00:58:00,800
Speaker 3: twenty sixth, wherever it is is in your neck of

968
00:58:00,840 --> 00:58:05,400
Speaker 3: the woods, you're going to see us live and direct

969
00:58:05,760 --> 00:58:09,120
Speaker 3: with our two episodes a week. We also got to

970
00:58:09,160 --> 00:58:13,680
Speaker 3: shout out our hometown boy, the comedian Dedrick Flynn, who

971
00:58:13,800 --> 00:58:18,840
Speaker 3: recently got on Netflix himself and did a great job

972
00:58:19,000 --> 00:58:23,080
Speaker 3: on a on a thing called Kill Tony.

973
00:58:22,560 --> 00:58:26,800
Speaker 2: Kill Today, a really quick actionable thing you could do

974
00:58:26,880 --> 00:58:29,960
Speaker 2: if you do open up your Netflix on whatever device

975
00:58:30,000 --> 00:58:33,520
Speaker 2: you've got. In the search bar, just type stuff. You'll

976
00:58:33,520 --> 00:58:36,040
Speaker 2: see us, stuff to blow the mind, stuff.

977
00:58:35,800 --> 00:58:37,120
Speaker 3: Stuff, history class lass.

978
00:58:37,200 --> 00:58:39,240
Speaker 2: You can hit the little bell that'll give you a

979
00:58:39,280 --> 00:58:43,720
Speaker 2: reminder when we launch on January twenty sixth, And I mean,

980
00:58:43,720 --> 00:58:46,120
Speaker 2: that's the best way to at least make sure you

981
00:58:46,120 --> 00:58:46,840
Speaker 2: don't miss it.

982
00:58:46,840 --> 00:58:49,440
Speaker 5: Ring that bell as they ring that bell on another

983
00:58:49,440 --> 00:58:51,800
Speaker 5: platform which we shall not name.

984
00:58:52,920 --> 00:58:55,280
Speaker 2: No, I mean, I don't know.

985
00:58:55,280 --> 00:58:57,280
Speaker 5: We've got we've got some cool new cameras and lightning

986
00:58:57,320 --> 00:58:58,880
Speaker 5: stuff and you can be able to see our faces

987
00:58:58,920 --> 00:59:01,720
Speaker 5: and our you guys, little set pieces. It's a lot

988
00:59:01,720 --> 00:59:04,600
Speaker 5: of fun, and it's been a nice injection of new

989
00:59:04,760 --> 00:59:06,919
Speaker 5: energy into the show for the new year. So I'm

990
00:59:06,920 --> 00:59:11,920
Speaker 5: personally super loving and excited to bring these two full

991
00:59:11,920 --> 00:59:14,840
Speaker 5: episodes to y'all in video form every single week.

992
00:59:15,760 --> 00:59:20,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, and I know we love that. We're returning to

993
00:59:20,400 --> 00:59:24,760
Speaker 3: our video roots where we got away with a lot

994
00:59:25,000 --> 00:59:28,840
Speaker 3: of cool, off color stuff. In the spirit of that,

995
00:59:29,080 --> 00:59:33,280
Speaker 3: we've got two quick things letters from home that we

996
00:59:33,520 --> 00:59:37,640
Speaker 3: just had to share. The following may not be appropriate

997
00:59:37,960 --> 00:59:42,720
Speaker 3: for all audiences. Being very biased, I gotta bring Chef

998
00:59:42,800 --> 00:59:47,400
Speaker 3: Ben back because he did a really cool joke, and

999
00:59:47,440 --> 00:59:50,920
Speaker 3: then we'll end with a really nice thing as well.

1000
00:59:51,160 --> 00:59:51,840
Speaker 3: Are we ready?

1001
00:59:52,200 --> 00:59:52,480
Speaker 5: Yes?

1002
00:59:52,640 --> 00:59:56,480
Speaker 7: Oh yeah, Good morning fellows. This is Chef Ben in Chicago,

1003
00:59:56,720 --> 00:59:58,760
Speaker 7: just listening to the Shrunken Head episode, and I'm proud

1004
00:59:58,760 --> 01:00:00,560
Speaker 7: of you, guys. Took you a long long time to

1005
01:00:00,560 --> 01:00:02,680
Speaker 7: get to a head joke, but Ben, you did it,

1006
01:00:02,760 --> 01:00:04,320
Speaker 7: so really, this is for you. This isn't even for

1007
01:00:04,320 --> 01:00:07,000
Speaker 7: the show because this is probably too off color for you, guys,

1008
01:00:07,040 --> 01:00:11,400
Speaker 7: but you did make a reference to nobody likes bad head.

1009
01:00:11,560 --> 01:00:16,160
Speaker 7: Head of course being the oral a gesture of love

1010
01:00:16,200 --> 01:00:19,200
Speaker 7: between consenting adults. So here's the joke. I've got a

1011
01:00:19,280 --> 01:00:22,080
Speaker 7: joke for you, guys. It goes like this, Hey, did

1012
01:00:22,120 --> 01:00:24,240
Speaker 7: I ever tell you about the worst job I ever got?

1013
01:00:24,800 --> 01:00:25,760
Speaker 3: It was awesome.

1014
01:00:26,840 --> 01:00:29,160
Speaker 7: That's the whole joke. It's best told in a bar,

1015
01:00:29,760 --> 01:00:32,720
Speaker 7: several beers deep. Have a good one, fellows. It's snow

1016
01:00:32,720 --> 01:00:36,320
Speaker 7: in at Chicago and I'm driving really slow, so kind.

1017
01:00:36,160 --> 01:00:39,880
Speaker 5: Of board Chef Ben saucy boy?

1018
01:00:41,400 --> 01:00:42,600
Speaker 3: Can I get away with that?

1019
01:00:42,840 --> 01:00:50,160
Speaker 2: I like how he said it's probably not for the show.

1020
01:00:50,800 --> 01:00:57,360
Speaker 3: So no joke left behind, Thank you, chef, And yeah,

1021
01:00:57,480 --> 01:01:01,680
Speaker 3: that is on the show now. So we're gonna end

1022
01:01:01,720 --> 01:01:06,560
Speaker 3: this week's Strange News segment with a surprise for our

1023
01:01:06,680 --> 01:01:12,600
Speaker 3: pal Tennessee Dylan Fagan. Man, We've we've got something for you.

1024
01:01:12,680 --> 01:01:16,600
Speaker 3: We gotta we got a crazy route to bega pitch man,

1025
01:01:17,240 --> 01:01:20,400
Speaker 3: and uh, we're just gonna play it, and if you

1026
01:01:20,520 --> 01:01:24,280
Speaker 3: would be so kind, we would like to hear your, uh,

1027
01:01:24,560 --> 01:01:28,120
Speaker 3: your honest reaction. Okay, so don't give us any guff, Dylan,

1028
01:01:28,240 --> 01:01:31,520
Speaker 3: are you ready? I am ready give us the straight

1029
01:01:31,560 --> 01:01:32,560
Speaker 3: bega on this. All right?

1030
01:01:33,480 --> 01:01:35,360
Speaker 2: Okay, Hey, what's up, guys.

1031
01:01:35,360 --> 01:01:37,040
Speaker 7: It's spurring lane right here.

1032
01:01:37,560 --> 01:01:38,640
Speaker 6: You can use it if you want.

1033
01:01:39,280 --> 01:01:42,480
Speaker 9: It's not really something that I figured you want you

1034
01:01:42,560 --> 01:01:46,240
Speaker 9: use on UH on the show. But so I'm like

1035
01:01:46,320 --> 01:01:49,120
Speaker 9: catching up a little bit. I'm like seven months backlogs,

1036
01:01:49,400 --> 01:01:52,200
Speaker 9: and UH just recently got into that thing where we

1037
01:01:52,280 --> 01:01:54,920
Speaker 9: all do this like the Rude Bega thing, and one

1038
01:01:54,960 --> 01:01:56,640
Speaker 9: of the episodes said, if you have any ideas for

1039
01:01:56,680 --> 01:01:57,720
Speaker 9: the Rubega, just.

1040
01:01:58,040 --> 01:01:58,880
Speaker 7: Call in and give it.

1041
01:01:59,360 --> 01:02:03,160
Speaker 9: You know that song by Blue Swade, I think it's

1042
01:02:03,160 --> 01:02:05,440
Speaker 9: called Hooked on Feeling. I think it's a cover, but

1043
01:02:05,600 --> 01:02:07,200
Speaker 9: in the beginning they start off.

1044
01:02:07,120 --> 01:02:09,400
Speaker 7: Like Uga Choka Uga Choka.

1045
01:02:09,760 --> 01:02:11,960
Speaker 9: You could do you could have your boy do something

1046
01:02:12,040 --> 01:02:14,720
Speaker 9: like rude of Big Rude of Vega and then have

1047
01:02:14,880 --> 01:02:17,800
Speaker 9: then have like the Blue Swave music in the background

1048
01:02:17,920 --> 01:02:18,080
Speaker 9: or like.

1049
01:02:18,120 --> 01:02:19,280
Speaker 7: Kick into it or something.

1050
01:02:19,640 --> 01:02:22,600
Speaker 9: But yeah, I just I just thought y'all might like that.

1051
01:02:22,600 --> 01:02:24,440
Speaker 9: That kind of popped into my head, and I just

1052
01:02:24,440 --> 01:02:26,360
Speaker 9: wanted to let you know I love what you guys do.

1053
01:02:26,400 --> 01:02:27,560
Speaker 6: I'll listen to you all the time.

1054
01:02:27,960 --> 01:02:30,120
Speaker 9: It's not a bad thing that I'm seven months back log.

1055
01:02:30,360 --> 01:02:32,680
Speaker 9: I think I'm I'm up to like May twenty five

1056
01:02:32,760 --> 01:02:36,400
Speaker 9: right now, and here it is December. So I just

1057
01:02:36,480 --> 01:02:38,560
Speaker 9: listened to it all the time when I'm driving.

1058
01:02:38,280 --> 01:02:39,200
Speaker 7: From work and everything.

1059
01:02:39,360 --> 01:02:42,560
Speaker 9: But I appreciate what y'all do and take care of

1060
01:02:42,640 --> 01:02:45,480
Speaker 9: if y'all have a very very merry Christmas, a happy

1061
01:02:45,520 --> 01:02:48,240
Speaker 9: holiday and uh yeah.

1062
01:02:47,560 --> 01:02:50,320
Speaker 5: And a fine rude bega tu as well, what do

1063
01:02:50,360 --> 01:02:54,040
Speaker 5: you think, Dylan, a weird dancing cgi.

1064
01:02:53,960 --> 01:02:54,760
Speaker 2: A dancing baby.

1065
01:02:54,920 --> 01:02:56,240
Speaker 5: Yeah, if you made it, we had, we'd have to

1066
01:02:56,280 --> 01:02:58,800
Speaker 5: do an animation where he's a dancing rude of baby.

1067
01:02:59,360 --> 01:02:59,840
Speaker 2: I love it.

1068
01:03:00,440 --> 01:03:03,360
Speaker 8: So here here's the thing, like I want crowdsource rude

1069
01:03:03,400 --> 01:03:06,520
Speaker 8: Vegas and I love this idea like we did a

1070
01:03:06,600 --> 01:03:10,160
Speaker 8: rudebago a little while ago, and that was a suggestion

1071
01:03:10,280 --> 01:03:12,400
Speaker 8: from I think listeners zvus Rex.

1072
01:03:12,640 --> 01:03:17,560
Speaker 2: So yeah, man, thank you, Thank you everybody, and thank

1073
01:03:17,600 --> 01:03:22,280
Speaker 2: you Dylan for your yes, incredible skills in the rudebega field.

1074
01:03:22,800 --> 01:03:23,160
Speaker 2: Thank you.

1075
01:03:23,240 --> 01:03:24,640
Speaker 8: I can't believe you all let me do this, but

1076
01:03:24,640 --> 01:03:25,680
Speaker 8: it makes me very happy.

1077
01:03:25,880 --> 01:03:29,920
Speaker 3: So you're just the best man. Uga Chaka to you.

1078
01:03:30,320 --> 01:03:34,840
Speaker 3: Happy rude bega, Mary, rude bega to everyone. Big thanks

1079
01:03:34,880 --> 01:03:38,800
Speaker 3: to Grady, Big thanks of course, the Chef, Ben Spurvying,

1080
01:03:38,920 --> 01:03:44,000
Speaker 3: Wayne Wright, Dedrick Flynn, Don Quixote, sc and the Babble Effect.

1081
01:03:44,360 --> 01:03:48,280
Speaker 3: Most importantly, big thanks to you folks. We can't wait

1082
01:03:48,320 --> 01:03:52,680
Speaker 3: to hear your uga chakas, your ruda begas. We can't

1083
01:03:52,720 --> 01:03:55,800
Speaker 3: wait to hear your thoughts. Find us on the lines,

1084
01:03:56,120 --> 01:03:57,960
Speaker 3: give us a call, send us an email.

1085
01:03:58,360 --> 01:03:59,840
Speaker 5: That's right. You can find us on all the social

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01:03:59,840 --> 01:04:04,280
Speaker 5: medi platforms of note at either Conspiracy Stuff or Conspiracy

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01:04:04,360 --> 01:04:08,680
Speaker 5: Stuff show New Era new CTA. That means cooling action.

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01:04:08,760 --> 01:04:11,000
Speaker 5: We're tightening that one up a little bit. You can

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01:04:11,000 --> 01:04:12,680
Speaker 5: also find us in other places.

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01:04:13,720 --> 01:04:16,680
Speaker 2: Use your phone, pick it up. Go ahead, pick up

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01:04:16,680 --> 01:04:21,400
Speaker 2: the phone dial one eight three three st d wytk.

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01:04:22,000 --> 01:04:25,480
Speaker 2: It will be a voicemail. Just you can figure it out.

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01:04:25,600 --> 01:04:27,080
Speaker 2: You could do that if you want to send us

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01:04:27,080 --> 01:04:27,480
Speaker 2: an email.

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01:04:27,560 --> 01:04:31,400
Speaker 3: We are the entities. Read each piece of correspondence we receive.

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01:04:31,560 --> 01:04:35,400
Speaker 3: Be well aware, yet out afraid. Sometimes the void writes back,

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01:04:35,840 --> 01:04:40,240
Speaker 3: uga chaka, uga chaka, uga chaka as for random fact,

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01:04:40,480 --> 01:04:43,000
Speaker 3: and you shall receive. Join us out here in the

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01:04:43,080 --> 01:05:04,160
Speaker 3: dark conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

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01:05:04,640 --> 01:05:06,680
Speaker 2: Stuff they Don't Want you to Know is a production

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01:05:06,800 --> 01:05:11,320
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

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01:05:11,400 --> 01:05:14,560
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.