Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio news.
Speaker 2: Dodor Myron, you are now recognized.
Speaker 3: My view is that reindustriizing America is imperative, not only
Speaker 3: for economic reasons, but for national security. Economists must accept
Speaker 3: that we are a nation with an economy, not merely
Speaker 3: an economy with a nation to reindustrialize. Policy must focus
Speaker 3: on making the United States the best place on Earth
Speaker 3: to do business.
Speaker 4: I'm Stephanie Flanders, head of Government and Economics at Bloomberg,
Speaker 4: and welcome to Trump Economics, the podcast that looks at
Speaker 4: the economic world of Donald Trump, how he's already shaped
Speaker 4: the global economy, and what on earth is going to
Speaker 4: happen next. Well, this week we're asking just how exactly
Speaker 4: Donald Trump would like global trade and finance to operate,
Speaker 4: and how likely is he to get there. In just
Speaker 4: a few weeks, Donald Trump has turned one of the
Speaker 4: world's oldest security relationships, the Western Alliance, on its head.
Speaker 4: He's also unleashed a slew of tariff threats on China, Canada,
Speaker 4: and Mexico, with more to come. And at the same time,
Speaker 4: talk has intensified over a so called Mara Lago accord
Speaker 4: to deliberately weaken the dollar through a grand international bargain. Well,
Speaker 4: at Trumpnomics, we think all three of these things might
Speaker 4: be connected. And we think that because we've read a
Speaker 4: paper written in November by Stephen Myron which first came
Speaker 4: up with the idea of that Mara Lago accord. Now,
Speaker 4: back then Myron was a former US Treasury advisor working
Speaker 4: as a strategist in the private sector, but now he's
Speaker 4: poised to be the head of President Trump's Council of
Speaker 4: Economic Advisors. And the currency piece of that paper has
Speaker 4: been much discussed since then, especially the last couple of weeks,
Speaker 4: but not so much the grander reordering of the world
Speaker 4: trade and financial system, which is actually what the paper's
Speaker 4: mainly about, and I would have thought could be pretty
Speaker 4: appealing to Donald Trump too. So what is that new
Speaker 4: world order for trade and finance sketched out in that paper?
Speaker 4: Does it make any sense intellectually or practically? And how
Speaker 4: might it change the world If any or all of
Speaker 4: that were actually attempted To help understand Stephen Moron's worldview
Speaker 4: and what it could mean for currencies for the global
Speaker 4: economic order, we've got two brilliant voices, as you'd expect.
Speaker 4: Welcome back to Sean Donnan, senior writer for Economics with Bloomberg. Shan,
Speaker 4: thanks again for joining us.
Speaker 5: Wonderful to be here.
Speaker 4: And Mark Sobel, the US chairman of OMFIF, which is
Speaker 4: the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. He's also a
Speaker 4: former colleague of mine at the US Treasury who always
Speaker 4: answered the toughest questions I had, and an International Monetary
Speaker 4: Fund official. He's been, i think it's fair to say,
Speaker 4: at the forefront or certainly in the room for international
Speaker 4: financial diplomacy for twenty years or more. Thanks very much
Speaker 4: for joining US, Mark Pleasure concent So Sean briefly, how
Speaker 4: is security and economics interlinked in Myron and potentially Donald
Speaker 4: Trump's view of the world.
Speaker 5: Stephen Myron's paper, which came out in November and which
Speaker 5: reads now, is a kind of very good piece of
Speaker 5: job interviewing for the job he has now. The title
Speaker 5: was you know, how to rebalance the Global Trading System?
Speaker 5: And it laid out this kind of sequence of events
Speaker 5: that they wanted to go through. And the first was
Speaker 5: based on a recognition that in their mind, the dollar
Speaker 5: is overvalued and that that's a problem for the United
Speaker 5: States and its competitiveness around the world, and they wanted
Speaker 5: to tackle that in two ways. One was to use
Speaker 5: tariffs to kind of rebalance trade, to draw more investment
Speaker 5: to the United States, to rebuild the industrial capacity here
Speaker 5: in the United States, and it's kind of hard industrial
Speaker 5: power in the world. But they also recognize that when
Speaker 5: you increase tariffs, you are going to inevitably cause the
Speaker 5: dollar to appreciate. That's kind of the laws of economics.
Speaker 5: Mark can walk you through that and much more than
Speaker 5: I can. But they're gonna end up with a stronger dollar,
Speaker 5: and as a result of that, they needed to come
Speaker 5: up with a plan to then weaken the dollar afterwards.
Speaker 5: And that's where this mari A Lago accord comes through.
Speaker 5: Everyone's focused on this mari A Lago accord. Very few
Speaker 5: people have focused on how Stephen Myron is talking about
Speaker 5: really erasing the boundary between America and how it uses
Speaker 5: the economic power and how it uses its national security
Speaker 5: power and to get what it wants. And this is
Speaker 5: what we're seeing now. We're seeing Donald Trump use tariffs,
Speaker 5: use the threat of withdrawing security guarantees. We're seeing that
Speaker 5: play out in Ukraine, We're seeing that play out in
Speaker 5: the Transatlantic relationship. There's big questions about what it might
Speaker 5: mean for the future of Taiwan.
Speaker 2: And things like that.
Speaker 5: But that's the new model, and it's all about how
Speaker 5: do you get what Donald Trump wants? How do you
Speaker 5: get to his vision of the global economy.
Speaker 4: That is definitely the question that a lot of people
Speaker 4: in Washington are asking themselves. Mark just on this piece,
Speaker 4: if you read the paper, what comes across very strongly
Speaker 4: is in effect this idea that America has been hugely
Speaker 4: disadvantaged by being the world's most important country. You know
Speaker 4: that having this reserve dollar status and being the sort
Speaker 4: of lynchpin also of the security system, but specifically the
Speaker 4: currency and the US financial system being at the heart
Speaker 4: of everything has ended up forcing the currency to be
Speaker 4: overvalued and made US manufacturing less competitive cost ordinary Americans jobs.
Speaker 4: The basic idea that the US dollar is overvalued and
Speaker 4: it has something to do with America's status in the
Speaker 4: global financial system. Is that true? Would you say that
Speaker 4: adds up?
Speaker 1: The dollar is the world's global reserve and financing currency.
Speaker 1: It is so because of the properties of the US economy.
Speaker 1: We're the largest economy in the world, we have good
Speaker 1: rule of law, we've had respect for institutions, We've had
Speaker 1: kind of decent macro policies. We've got the deepest, most
Speaker 1: open liquid capital markets in the world, et cetera. So
Speaker 1: that brings capital into the United States, and in that sense,
Speaker 1: it pushes up the dollar. So I do think that
Speaker 1: there is something to the idea that says that because
Speaker 1: of the attractiveness of the United States and receiving capital,
Speaker 1: that the dollar is overvalued. Whatever that means.
Speaker 4: I guess some people would have seen like the Big
Speaker 4: mac Index and things like that, which you know, but
Speaker 4: just basically, it means that you're when you compare prices
Speaker 4: across countries, the US looks out of whag.
Speaker 1: Yes, of course, there's no precise way to measure that,
Speaker 1: but and I do believe that you could argue, and
Speaker 1: I think the advance has made this point that.
Speaker 2: It's a subsidied.
Speaker 1: Consumer and attacks on manufacturers and whatnot, and you know,
Speaker 1: historically it has given rise or further impetist to protectionist
Speaker 1: tendencies in the United States, which is something that we
Speaker 1: were always dealing with at Treasury. My big problem, however,
Speaker 1: with going where you are is there's no reason why
Speaker 1: all countries should have current account bounces or whatnot. Some
Speaker 1: countries are going to have deficits, some countries are going
Speaker 1: to have surpluses. And when you think about it, some
Speaker 1: countries with deficits, well, it's going to reflect demographics, energy endowments,
Speaker 1: strengths of institutions, economic policies, et cetera. So the IMF
Speaker 1: has this calculation. It does, and it says the current
Speaker 1: account norm of the US should be a minus two
Speaker 1: percent of GDP deficit. But in fact, if you look
Speaker 1: at our deficit right now, it's pushing four percent. So
Speaker 1: four percent isn't two percent? And why is it for
Speaker 1: or not two? And that gets back down to questions
Speaker 1: of just bad fiscal policy. For example, and Myron and others,
Speaker 1: they're all talking about the reserve currency or the financing
Speaker 1: currency rule the dollar causing problems. They don't talk about
Speaker 1: fiscal deficits. We have massive, irresponsible fiscal deficits these days.
Speaker 1: As far as I'm concerned, we should focus on implementing
Speaker 1: decent policies at home.
Speaker 4: To go back a little bit on that reserve currency piece,
Speaker 4: Donald Trump has made clear he wants to keep the
Speaker 4: dollar's global reserve currency status. He's even talked about punishing
Speaker 4: countries that start talking about moving away from the dollar,
Speaker 4: but he also wants to make it weaker. Is there
Speaker 4: a sort of straightforward contradiction there? Could you force people
Speaker 4: to keep treating the dollar as a reserve currency while
Speaker 4: still making it weaker and maybe us using lots of
Speaker 4: measures to support that.
Speaker 1: Doesn't it depend on kind of how you weakend. I mean,
Speaker 1: currency markets. Currencies go up and down. They go up
Speaker 1: and down all the time, but that's a different issue.
Speaker 1: Let us say than calling for devaluation, which to me
Speaker 1: implies official action to conscientiously lower the dollar. And as
Speaker 1: you mentioned, this idea of one hundred percent tax on
Speaker 1: those who would shun the dollar. To me, I don't
Speaker 1: really understand how you can call for devaluation and one
Speaker 1: hundred percent taxes and say that that is consistent with
Speaker 1: preserving the reserve currency role of the dollar. So I
Speaker 1: don't think that it's inconsistent to say we're going to
Speaker 1: run a decent fiscal policy which may have the result
Speaker 1: of lowering the dollars value. But I do think that
Speaker 1: calling for devaluation and taxes on others, and some of
Speaker 1: Myron's ideas like one hundred years zero coupon bonds or
Speaker 1: taxes and fees on users. I think those are fundamentally
Speaker 1: inconsistent with the reserve currency preserving the preserve currency role of.
Speaker 2: The dour Sean.
Speaker 4: And say this, having already talked about it for fifty minutes,
Speaker 4: we just want to get too obsessed with the details
Speaker 4: of this document. But I think it is interesting to
Speaker 4: sort of think about how Donald Trump's first few weeks
Speaker 4: has chimed with what was in that paper. There's quite
Speaker 4: a lot of areas where Myron's kind of assuming that
Speaker 4: the things that cause a lot of volatility or uncertainty,
Speaker 4: like the tariffs will be done gradually. Well, seems to
Speaker 4: be a greater appetite for volatility and uncertainty from the
Speaker 4: administration so far in the way it's addressed that. Arguably,
Speaker 4: you could say the same on the security front. How
Speaker 4: much do you think is following the script suggested by Myron?
Speaker 5: I think you can definitely see bits of the script
Speaker 5: in there, right. I mean, you can definitely see this
Speaker 5: broad idea of we're going to break down the barrier
Speaker 5: between national security policy and economic policy, and we're going
Speaker 5: to use one to reinforce the other, and vice versa.
Speaker 2: At the same time.
Speaker 5: What we've seen is the same thing we saw there
Speaker 5: in the first Trump administration, and that is a pretty
Speaker 5: chaotic policy making a lot of differing internal voices. We
Speaker 5: are seeing again, whether it's on tariffs, this kind of
Speaker 5: the rolling out of really aggressive tariffs on Canada and Mexico,
Speaker 5: and then within forty eight hours they're kind of rolling
Speaker 5: back in a big way. And with Ukraine, a live
Speaker 5: debate playing out via leaks and Oval Office comments on
Speaker 5: what a peace deal might look like, what a minerals
Speaker 5: agreement with Ukraine might look like. I would say there
Speaker 5: is one kind of overarching aim above it all, and
Speaker 5: that is that Donald Trump wants America to be feared again.
Speaker 5: And that's his vision of power, and that applies to tariffs,
Speaker 5: that applies to national security. It's not that he wants
Speaker 5: America to be this kind of beacon on the hill
Speaker 5: of democracy and free markets and that the world kind
Speaker 5: of flocks towards. He wants to be able to dictate
Speaker 5: how the world runs, and he believes that fear is
Speaker 5: the most powerful thing to see and we're seeing elements
Speaker 5: of that clearly in all sorts of policies that have
Speaker 5: rolled out. But Beneath that kind of broad goal, it
Speaker 5: all looks pretty messy, and it's not clear that these
Speaker 5: goals kind of operate or can operate together.
Speaker 1: Can I come back to the mirone article a little
Speaker 1: bit and Sean, it's obviously not a zero some world
Speaker 1: we live in.
Speaker 4: But to be more granular, I think it's a zero
Speaker 4: some world that Donald Trump lives in. Genuinely.
Speaker 1: Well, yes, But the point I wanted to make I
Speaker 1: want to go back to being somewhat of a point.
Speaker 1: He had economics type, unlike you guys in this discussion,
Speaker 1: I wanted to talk more about some things I don't
Speaker 1: like about the Myron article. Sure, the implication is that
Speaker 1: the dollar's global role as bad for America. The French
Speaker 1: always talked about the exorbitant privilege. I believe the dollar's
Speaker 1: role is a net plus, not exorbitant. You know, we
Speaker 1: get some maybe interest rates are lower, we're shielded from
Speaker 1: foreign exchange risk, we can use the dollar for geopolitical
Speaker 1: leverage via sanctions. The dollars are valued, but on balance
Speaker 1: net plus, if we're trying to disrupt alliances and everything,
Speaker 1: I just don't know what is the end goal, the
Speaker 1: end vision.
Speaker 4: Donald Trump famously approaches pretty much everything as a bargain
Speaker 4: is about a deal, and it's about the relative strength
Speaker 4: of each side in a deal. And by definition, you
Speaker 4: have most leverage in doing a deal with your strongest
Speaker 4: partners because they're the ones who are already most have
Speaker 4: most to lose by damaging the relationship with you. So
Speaker 4: you could say it may be counterintuitive, but you could
Speaker 4: say it is a natural place to start if you
Speaker 4: have the deeply transactional view that Donald Trump has, and
Speaker 4: if you feel kind of fundamentally that the US shouldn't
Speaker 4: pay any price for being the strongest economy. Yes, it
Speaker 4: gets to be the reserve currency, but it should be
Speaker 4: paid for by other people. If America is the strongest,
Speaker 4: and they've been clever enough to be the strongest, and
Speaker 4: by the way, also willing to put loads of American
Speaker 4: troops at risk that other countries are not willing to
Speaker 4: put at risk in defending the free world, then why
Speaker 4: not have everyone else pay for that. It's like America's
Speaker 4: performing a service and you make your allies who are
Speaker 4: getting the most value out of you pay the most.
Speaker 4: I mean mark. It may not be an attractive vision,
Speaker 4: but it's perfectly rational.
Speaker 1: First of all, I have to say I've always thought it,
Speaker 1: certainly in recent decades, that Europe needed to step up more,
Speaker 1: step up more on defense.
Speaker 2: So I have no problem with that.
Speaker 4: He's only one who's got them to do it, though,
Speaker 4: combination of him and.
Speaker 1: Putin, well, I guess the more Putin than him. I
Speaker 1: think the magnitudes the way of getting it done are
Speaker 1: very questionable. But again, if you're going to tell me
Speaker 1: that the Trump vision is to get others to pay
Speaker 1: for the US security guarantee, maybe that's a vision. Of course,
Speaker 1: it seems now that they're all going their own way
Speaker 1: and rejecting the US, and this is going to have
Speaker 1: really harmful of consequences I think for global relations and economics,
Speaker 1: and it's not going to make us more secure, and
Speaker 1: it's not going to make us more prosperous.
Speaker 4: Okay, but take the reserve currency thing. The world benefits
Speaker 4: from there being a reserve currency. You know, we can
Speaker 4: denominate the cost of oil in a single currency. Everyone
Speaker 4: knows what they're talking about when they talk about ten dollars.
Speaker 4: Why shouldn't the world pay for that? Why does America
Speaker 4: have to pay the negative of you know, being overvalued
Speaker 4: or whatever one might identify.
Speaker 2: The United States benefits from that.
Speaker 1: The last decades have been remarkable for the history of
Speaker 1: mankind and prosperity, and so the eighty years of the
Speaker 1: postwar US hegemony has been nothing to sneeze at.
Speaker 5: It depends where you're sitting in the US economy right
Speaker 5: as to how you benefit from the US being or
Speaker 5: are hurt by the US being a reserve currency. If
Speaker 5: you're a manufacturer, you can make an argument that you
Speaker 5: are hurt because your export's are less competitive as a
Speaker 5: result of a strong dollar, although other people will point
Speaker 5: out that actually you can buy imported components in intermediate
Speaker 5: goods for cheaper as a result of a strong dollar,
Speaker 5: and that doesn't matter as much in terms of competitives.
Speaker 5: If you're a homeowner or you're looking to buy a
Speaker 5: home in the United States, you probably benefit from lower
Speaker 5: interest rates than you would otherwise as a result of
Speaker 5: demand for US assets from overseas. Likewise, if you're an
Speaker 5: entrepreneur like Elon Musk, chances are your cost of capital
Speaker 5: growing up was lower than it might be in other
Speaker 5: places as a result of the US's reserve currency status.
Speaker 5: So the issue that we have here now is that
Speaker 5: it's the manufacturers and the protectionists who are driving the
Speaker 5: view of the dollar, and and and it's a downside
Speaker 5: as a reserve currency. And you know, at some point
Speaker 5: that might shift again. And this gets to a bigger
Speaker 5: issue which I think we was gonna last beyond Donald Trump,
Speaker 5: and that is America's power in the world and the
Speaker 5: place of the dollar in the world is based on
Speaker 5: decades of trust, right of building trust, It's based on
Speaker 5: legal certainty. It's based on this idea of America as
Speaker 5: a kind of having a coherent vision of the world
Speaker 5: that's changed over the last decade. Right, We've kind of
Speaker 5: flipped back and forth. We go from a big government
Speaker 5: paradigm under Joe Biden to now a small government paradigm
Speaker 5: under Donald Trump. We've gone from a kind of gentle
Speaker 5: giant view of a superpower under Joe Biden and Barack
Speaker 5: Obama to one of you know, the big gorilla kind
Speaker 5: of rampage through the world under Donald Trump. And I
Speaker 5: think that issue of trust, that issue of certainty, and
Speaker 5: what America is and what America wants and what America
Speaker 5: offers that going away is perhaps more damaging to American
Speaker 5: power than any of these kind of little bits of
Speaker 5: policy that people like Stephen Meyron lay out in this paper.
Speaker 4: Okay, so there's a final chunk of things that I
Speaker 4: just want to get to because all of this sounds
Speaker 4: a bit ephemeral and sort of we're talking about this
Speaker 4: paper and is it or is it not relevant for
Speaker 4: Donald Trump, and we've probably gone as far as we
Speaker 4: can go on that. What I'm thinking about as a
Speaker 4: result of this conversation is, Okay, what we have learned
Speaker 4: about Donald Trump in the last few weeks is when
Speaker 4: he decides that he really wants something, or he wants
Speaker 4: to be known for something like finding peace in Ukraine,
Speaker 4: he will go further than anyone expected to make that happen,
Speaker 4: including being very tough on very close allies in a
Speaker 4: way that we wouldn't expect. If he decides that the
Speaker 4: next big thing he wants is a weeker dollar, then
Speaker 4: we will probably all be talking a lot more about
Speaker 4: a mar Lago Accord or some version of that mark.
Speaker 4: If Donald Trump woke up one morning and decided he
Speaker 4: wanted a week a dollar as much as he wants
Speaker 4: to be known for a piece deal in Ukraine, how
Speaker 4: could it go about that? I mean how much, what
Speaker 4: might that look like and wouldn't have any chance of success.
Speaker 1: So this week he's managed to get the dollar down
Speaker 1: by creating growth fears and undermining our long standing relationships.
Speaker 1: I've already mentioned undermining the underpinnings of the dollars status
Speaker 1: would be one way to do it. And more to
Speaker 1: the point of what I think you're asking, Obviously he
Speaker 1: can job own the dollar down. He's probably already done that.
Speaker 1: That's not going to be very effective. The Treasury could
Speaker 1: sell dollars and buy foreign currency. Treasury doesn't have that
Speaker 1: many dollars, but they could mobilize the Exchange Stabilization Fund
Speaker 1: balance sheet in different ways. The Fed can print unlimited dollars.
Speaker 1: It wouldn't likely play ball, but it could be done.
Speaker 4: Theoretically, does network When one country does it by themselves.
Speaker 2: It's certainly less effective.
Speaker 1: I don't think that central banks and financial authorities and
Speaker 1: the G three really think that intervention is all that
Speaker 1: effective absent fundamental policy shifts. Maybe there could be some
Speaker 1: concerted type of intervention operation these days, but again, central
Speaker 1: bank's target inflation, not exchange rates.
Speaker 4: We've already seen in the Ukraine context that he's sort
Speaker 4: of crossed a lot of lines that people didn't expect
Speaker 4: to be crossed. And it has to be said, the
Speaker 4: Ukraine invasion has caused everyone to do that. We've done
Speaker 4: things like seizing sovereign central bank reserves that we've never
Speaker 4: done before. We did that to the Russian Central Bank,
Speaker 4: So I'm sure at the IMF that caused a bit
Speaker 4: of headaches and head scratching whether or not we should
Speaker 4: go there. What are the kind of out of the
Speaker 4: box tools he could use to pressure other countries to collaborate,
Speaker 4: even if they didn't particularly want a week a dollar.
Speaker 1: I recently had to speak on this topic, and what
Speaker 1: I started focusing on is not so much currency action
Speaker 1: per se, but how to associate currency issues with trade measures.
Speaker 1: So under Obama and Trump, there were currency chapters as
Speaker 1: part of trade deals or discussions.
Speaker 4: I didn't even know that.
Speaker 1: So TPP made tackling currency manipulation a principal negotiating objective,
Speaker 1: and there was a kind of a side understanding and
Speaker 1: TPP before it's derailed that the finance ministers would meet
Speaker 1: and discuss these issues.
Speaker 4: That was a trade deal that was negotiated under the
Speaker 4: Biden of Minnesota. That's right, yes, with Asian economies.
Speaker 1: But now under USMCA, there was a currency chapter inside
Speaker 1: the deal. If you remember the Phase one deal with China,
Speaker 1: there was a currency chapter. Chinese just committed to doing
Speaker 1: what they were doing, but but whatnot?
Speaker 2: So there's that. Then there was under.
Speaker 1: The Trump administration at the very end, there were currency
Speaker 1: undervaluation countervailing duties a terrible idea as far as I'm concerned,
Speaker 1: but they did assess currency evaluation.
Speaker 4: Could you make it harder for countries to access the
Speaker 4: central Bank the FEDS swap facilities, I don't know. There
Speaker 4: must be a range of things that the US has
Speaker 4: within its gift that are beneficial for other countries financially.
Speaker 5: Look in my senses, he cares about the reputation of
Speaker 5: the dollar and the kind of branding of the dollar
Speaker 5: as a reserve currency. And he cares about having a
Speaker 5: vote of confidence from financial markets, whether that's currency markets
Speaker 5: or whether that's equity markets or bond markets. There's a
Speaker 5: kind of branding concern around the dollar. I think what
Speaker 5: he cares about in terms of the level of the
Speaker 5: dollar depends a little bit on who the last person
Speaker 5: he was talking to cares about the easiest way, and
Speaker 5: Mark pointed to this, the easiest way to bring down
Speaker 5: the value of the dollar, and also by the way
Speaker 5: the trade deficit is to have a recession in the
Speaker 5: United States.
Speaker 2: And one of the.
Speaker 5: Things that you've seen creep into markets in recent days
Speaker 5: is this question of whether the Trump administration is somehow
Speaker 5: intentionally trying to tank the economy through some of its policies,
Speaker 5: whether it's tariffs, whether it's immigration, whether it's the kind
Speaker 5: of austerity campaign that Elon Musk and Doze or are
Speaker 5: waging on the federal government, but in terms of workforce
Speaker 5: and spending, and that that somehow is all about bringing
Speaker 5: the dollar and the ten year yields down to a
Speaker 5: level that somehow is of more advantage to the US
Speaker 5: economy in the long term. That seems like a pretty
Speaker 5: destructive way to go about it. I have no evidence
Speaker 5: that this is actually what the Trump administration is thinking,
Speaker 5: but it gets to the point of.
Speaker 2: The surest way to do some of the.
Speaker 5: Things that Stephen Myron lays out, other people around Donald
Speaker 5: Trump lays out is to kind of attack America's place
Speaker 5: in the world and its growth at home. And it's
Speaker 5: broader exceptionalism.
Speaker 4: Well One thing I did learn from spending a few
Speaker 4: years looking at things from the other side of the
Speaker 4: journalistic divide as an official US Treasury is people don't
Speaker 4: even in this administration. I suspect people are not sitting
Speaker 4: plotting to try and force a US recession. But we
Speaker 4: shall see. Mark Soble, Sean Donnan, thank you so much.
Speaker 4: I am struck by the quote actually at the end
Speaker 4: of that paper by Stephen Myra, and he says there
Speaker 4: is a path by which the Trump administration can reconfigure
Speaker 4: the global trading and financial system to America's benefit, but
Speaker 4: it is narrow and will require careful planning, precise execution,
Speaker 4: and attention to steps to minimize adverse consequences. Well, we'll
Speaker 4: wait and see all of that then.
Speaker 2: Thank you very much, Thank you, thanks so much for
Speaker 2: having me.
Speaker 4: Thanks for listening to Trumpnomics from Bloomberg. It was hosted
Speaker 4: by me, Stephanie Flanders, and I was joined this week
Speaker 4: by Sean Donnan and Mark Sobel. Trump Andomics is produced
Speaker 4: by Summer, Sadi and Moss and with help from Chris
Speaker 4: Martlu and sound design by Blake Maple's Brendan Francis Newnham
Speaker 4: is our executive producer, and to help others find the show.
Speaker 4: Please rate it highly and review it wherever you listen
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