WEBVTT - TechStuff Recites the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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<v Speaker 1>It's ready. Are you didn't touch? With technology? With tech

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<v Speaker 1>Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello, everyone, welcome

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<v Speaker 1>to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Polette and I

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<v Speaker 1>am an editor at how stuff works dot com. Sitting

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<v Speaker 1>across from me as as usual as senior writer Jonathan Strickland.

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<v Speaker 1>It was a pleasure to burn And that was a

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<v Speaker 1>short quote. Yes, short and to the point. Today we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to talk about the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. Yes. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>A lot of people probably don't know that that we're

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<v Speaker 1>even that there is even is such a thing or

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<v Speaker 1>such a thing being proposed, I should say, um, but

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<v Speaker 1>we have talked about privacy many times on the podcast. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>something that a lot of people are willing to give up,

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<v Speaker 1>at least in part um, thanks to all the cool

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<v Speaker 1>stuff that you can get on the Internet if you're

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<v Speaker 1>willing to give people your personal information. And really, in

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<v Speaker 1>some cases it's not even that you get cool stuff,

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<v Speaker 1>it's just that there's been an avenue created where you

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<v Speaker 1>can share personal information, and that's what people have done.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, It's it's it's kind of crazy. It's a

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<v Speaker 1>sort of stuff where the thing the kind of information

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<v Speaker 1>that you wouldn't think to share in, say, necessarily a letter,

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<v Speaker 1>Which is interesting because the letter, there's there's some privacy

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<v Speaker 1>guarantees to things that are that passed through the United

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<v Speaker 1>States Postal Service that you do not get the same

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<v Speaker 1>guarantee necessarily when you publish it online. And of course

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<v Speaker 1>online allows for in many cases a much wider variety

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<v Speaker 1>of people to get a chance to get their papers

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<v Speaker 1>on that information. That that's true, and it's also a

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<v Speaker 1>good point, I think to point out that, uh, the

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<v Speaker 1>Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights is something that is being

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<v Speaker 1>suggested here in the United States, and not every um,

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<v Speaker 1>not every country in the world has the same guarantees

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<v Speaker 1>on postal service privacy, and some some countries already have

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<v Speaker 1>legislation in place that does address privacy concerns as far

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<v Speaker 1>as the internet's concerned. So this is kind of a

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<v Speaker 1>it's sort of codifying behaviors and best practices that a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of people I think have assumed we're in place already.

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<v Speaker 1>But in this case, it's saying, let's write this down,

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<v Speaker 1>get in black and white, uh, potentially put it into

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<v Speaker 1>law and then make it an enforceable list of guidelines

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<v Speaker 1>so that companies that handle private information are doing so

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<v Speaker 1>in a responsible manner and a transparent manner, as it

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<v Speaker 1>turns out, right, right, Well, we've talked about many of

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<v Speaker 1>the companies involved in this uh in this first round

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<v Speaker 1>of privacy negotiations with the United States government. Um and

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<v Speaker 1>we've we've also handled a lot of these issues before.

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<v Speaker 1>We've talked about things like um uh cookies and other

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<v Speaker 1>information that is recorded about you when you visit places

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<v Speaker 1>on the internet or websites, I should say, um and

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<v Speaker 1>and basically the idea of being that uh, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>as we are moving farther into the twenty first century,

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<v Speaker 1>it is becoming more commonplace for us to share stuff

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<v Speaker 1>about us, and people are are tracking us in ways

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<v Speaker 1>that um that we're sort of you know, impossible really

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<v Speaker 1>without the the use of the internet. Yeah, and and

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of people are unaware of that tracking, even

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<v Speaker 1>though in many cases the terms for that sort of

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<v Speaker 1>tracking are laid out in uh somewhere yeah. Right, there's

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<v Speaker 1>like usually a spot somewhere on a website or service

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<v Speaker 1>where you can learn how the information you give to

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<v Speaker 1>that cider service is used and whether or not it's

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<v Speaker 1>shared with other entities, and uh, there's there's almost always

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<v Speaker 1>some sort of terms of service that spell this out,

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<v Speaker 1>although very few of us take the time to either

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<v Speaker 1>find or read that, even if it's presented right in

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<v Speaker 1>front of us. I mean, I know, I've been guilty

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<v Speaker 1>of scrolling all all the way down so I can

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<v Speaker 1>check I have read this and I agree yes, when

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<v Speaker 1>really it just means I have scrolled down and found

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<v Speaker 1>the checkbox. Well it Uh, it's one of those things

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<v Speaker 1>that a lot of us have done, especially when we've

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<v Speaker 1>received an invitation to a hot new social network or

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<v Speaker 1>something like that, where we've we've there's been some hype

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<v Speaker 1>builds up at the beginning. Um, and then you get

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<v Speaker 1>your and then you get your address and it says,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, hey, Jonathan, please go ahead sign up for

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<v Speaker 1>an account. You're in the beta, And you go on

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<v Speaker 1>and you fill it out as fast as you can.

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<v Speaker 1>You get the privacy agreement, You scroll down to the bottom,

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<v Speaker 1>you click the agree, but and then the pop up

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<v Speaker 1>comes up are you sure you agree? And click and

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<v Speaker 1>you just scream, let me get to the print these yeah, yep,

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<v Speaker 1>and they can uh, you know, you think about it,

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<v Speaker 1>they can put the absolutely, they don't even have to

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<v Speaker 1>bother to lie to you because they know that you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you're gonna go ahead and click. Okay, they know they say,

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to share this stuff about you. You're okay

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<v Speaker 1>with that, right? All right? Then they the people aren't

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<v Speaker 1>going to read it, and the one person of the

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<v Speaker 1>people who do read it are gonna agree anyway because

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<v Speaker 1>they don't want to be left out. Well, you might

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<v Speaker 1>get there, you go, you always have like that one

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<v Speaker 1>guy who's who's screaming out you don't want to do this,

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<v Speaker 1>and and that one guy might be right. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't We're not saying that one guy is a

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<v Speaker 1>crazy person standing out screaming out that we're all you

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<v Speaker 1>know sheep, but that one guy may very well have

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<v Speaker 1>a point. And the whole reason why this has come

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<v Speaker 1>around is because there's more scrutiny now on companies, particularly

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<v Speaker 1>big internet companies that have been collecting private information, and

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<v Speaker 1>some of that scrutinious because we've had some pretty public

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<v Speaker 1>uh security breaches like information, you know, personal information being

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<v Speaker 1>breached by hackers and then distributed, so things like you know,

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<v Speaker 1>personal information with addresses, maybe even credit card information that

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<v Speaker 1>kind of stuff has shocked people. So that's this is

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<v Speaker 1>partially in response to that, but it's also in response

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<v Speaker 1>to trends like search engines keeping track of your search

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<v Speaker 1>history and then using that information to market it to advertisers,

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<v Speaker 1>so that these advertisers can target people who are who

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<v Speaker 1>have have certain behaviors because they they'll say, oh, this

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<v Speaker 1>person tends to search for these sort of topics. That

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<v Speaker 1>means that they're probably interested in these sort of products

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<v Speaker 1>or services. Therefore, if we serve up ads to that

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<v Speaker 1>person that advertise those kind of products and services, they're

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<v Speaker 1>more likely to go ahead and buy them. And so

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<v Speaker 1>it's a whole idea of the more information you have

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<v Speaker 1>about your target are the audience, the more effective you

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<v Speaker 1>can be when you are advertising to them. Uh. We've

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<v Speaker 1>also seen this used. There's been scrutiny from some fairly

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<v Speaker 1>recent stories. Did you see the story about how target

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<v Speaker 1>UH was able to identify Yes, okay, so there's a story.

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<v Speaker 1>We'll we'll give some background here. Okay, it's it's it's

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<v Speaker 1>a story that definitely has some controversy around it. All right, So, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>target had created a very effective system to identify customers. UH,

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<v Speaker 1>and and kind of get an idea of what that customers.

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<v Speaker 1>So life status was based upon their shopping habits right right. Um, specifically,

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<v Speaker 1>they were looking for people who were about to have

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<v Speaker 1>a baby. Yes, And one of the reasons why this

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<v Speaker 1>was the case you might say, well, you know, why

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<v Speaker 1>not people who are getting ready by an h D

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<v Speaker 1>t V. Well, as it turns out, the people who

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<v Speaker 1>are about to have kids are um people uh tend

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<v Speaker 1>to get in habits, and so they buy the same

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<v Speaker 1>brands of laundry detergent and clothing and things like that

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<v Speaker 1>for years and years and years. So what advertisers want

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<v Speaker 1>to do is they want to find ways to get

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<v Speaker 1>you to switch brands over to their thing. But as

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<v Speaker 1>it turns out, this time when people are about to

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<v Speaker 1>have kids is a prime time for people to switch

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<v Speaker 1>because um, things are changing drastically in their life. They

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<v Speaker 1>start considering it's not just someone who needs a crib

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<v Speaker 1>and someone who needs a high chair, and someone who

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<v Speaker 1>needs uh you know, uh diapers and things like that

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<v Speaker 1>baby supplies. It's it's for everything and you have, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you have another life that you have to consider. And

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<v Speaker 1>this is this is the needs of a baby are

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<v Speaker 1>different than the needs of an adult, and so you're

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<v Speaker 1>you start looking at things like, all right, well, is

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<v Speaker 1>this detergent going to be too is this is this

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<v Speaker 1>is not going to be good for my baby? Should

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<v Speaker 1>I Should I go with something that's going to be

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<v Speaker 1>more gentle or you know, they're lot of different considerations,

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<v Speaker 1>and Targets got well, gigs and gigs and gigs of

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<v Speaker 1>data about customer behaviors, and so there's a huge amount

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<v Speaker 1>of market research that has sort of indicated what behaviors

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<v Speaker 1>are suggests that a person is going to have a

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<v Speaker 1>baby that when you start seeing these changes, that's a

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<v Speaker 1>very good indicator that that person is planning on the

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<v Speaker 1>fact that they're going to have a child. So, in

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<v Speaker 1>this case, Targets sent some electronic coupons to a to

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<v Speaker 1>a young lady, a teenager, who who had exhibited some

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<v Speaker 1>of these new behaviors, right, and the new behavior has

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<v Speaker 1>triggered at the algorithm that says, hey, this person is

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<v Speaker 1>expecting expecting, and they're going to go ahead and automatically

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<v Speaker 1>send this stuff out right. And the problem here was

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<v Speaker 1>that this young lady had not divulged the information about

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<v Speaker 1>her her status to her father, and her father's saw

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<v Speaker 1>the coupons from Target and sent a very angry email

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<v Speaker 1>to a Target manager and said, uh, you know, why

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<v Speaker 1>are you saying this about my daughter? How dare you?

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<v Speaker 1>This is you know, insensitive? Um are you trying to

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<v Speaker 1>encourage her to have a baby? She's far too young?

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<v Speaker 1>And then the manager was trying to find a way

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<v Speaker 1>to respond to this angry father when later on another

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<v Speaker 1>email came in from the father who said, I had

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<v Speaker 1>a discussion with my daughter. It turns out there were

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<v Speaker 1>some things going on I didn't know about. Uh, this

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<v Speaker 1>was not the way I would have liked to have

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<v Speaker 1>found out, but I was in the wrong. But this

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<v Speaker 1>really brought a lot of attention towards the practice of

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<v Speaker 1>using customer information to react proactively, which in some cases

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<v Speaker 1>you would think that's that's kind of cool, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>It's it's a little creepy in a way that that

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<v Speaker 1>the retailer knows that kind of information about you just

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<v Speaker 1>based upon your your habits. But then you realize you

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<v Speaker 1>are giving the retailer information by the way you shop,

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<v Speaker 1>that just just by the way you shop. It's not

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<v Speaker 1>even your name or your address or any of that.

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<v Speaker 1>As long as they have some sort of customer identifier

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<v Speaker 1>number that is attached to you, even if they don't

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<v Speaker 1>know your name, if it's just, if it's just this

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<v Speaker 1>number designates this particular shopper, and this particular shopper has

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<v Speaker 1>behaved in this way, then they can start to draw

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<v Speaker 1>conclusions about what's going on in your life. Now, there's

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<v Speaker 1>a leap here really that has to be made, uh

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<v Speaker 1>for for Target or really any of these other retailers,

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<v Speaker 1>because they're far from alone and do it. Then when

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<v Speaker 1>when we're using this, we're simply using Target as an example,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not that they are unique in this at all. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>they are one of many, many retailers who do this, UM,

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<v Speaker 1>But there's there's a leap that needs to be made here.

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<v Speaker 1>Now Target is not collecting or or any of these

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<v Speaker 1>companies in general. We'll just say a retailer not necessarily

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<v Speaker 1>collecting this stuff. To identify Jonathan Strickland as being somebody

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<v Speaker 1>who particularly likes a specific brand of coffee, they want

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<v Speaker 1>to know that number, you know, whatever his customer number

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<v Speaker 1>is at the retailer likes these products, he's more inclined

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<v Speaker 1>to buy this than that UM, and they want to

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<v Speaker 1>give him a positive experience. So they are trying to

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<v Speaker 1>tailor the the customer experience as much as they can. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>When I go to example Target, UM, when the little

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<v Speaker 1>coupon prints out, when I, uh, you know, swipe my

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<v Speaker 1>card and we get our our stuff that we get there, UM,

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<v Speaker 1>the coupon printer will print out something a coupon for

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<v Speaker 1>something that I've bought, and not necessarily on this shopping trip.

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<v Speaker 1>They've gotten very good at um printing out stuff that

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<v Speaker 1>it's specific to what I buy with them. And so

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<v Speaker 1>it's not that it's not that they're trying to breach

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<v Speaker 1>somebody's privacy. The leap here is that it could be

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<v Speaker 1>used to find out information about Jonathan Strickland or Chris

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<v Speaker 1>poll At personally. Yes, UM, so yeah, it's it's it's

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<v Speaker 1>it's a delicate matter on how you handle that personal information.

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<v Speaker 1>Whether that means that you know, you don't want to

0:13:13.960 --> 0:13:17.960
<v Speaker 1>make your customers feel like they are being spied upon,

0:13:19.120 --> 0:13:22.600
<v Speaker 1>that that is a bad outcome, and then also you

0:13:22.640 --> 0:13:24.760
<v Speaker 1>want to make sure that whatever the information you have

0:13:25.240 --> 0:13:31.679
<v Speaker 1>is secure and and preferably in most cases not connected

0:13:31.880 --> 0:13:36.559
<v Speaker 1>to an individual by name or other personal identification, so

0:13:36.640 --> 0:13:40.400
<v Speaker 1>that there might be an a customer profile on you,

0:13:40.679 --> 0:13:44.880
<v Speaker 1>but that profile does not directly link to your identity. Well,

0:13:44.880 --> 0:13:49.160
<v Speaker 1>think about companies like Netflix or Amazon dot Com that

0:13:49.280 --> 0:13:53.080
<v Speaker 1>make recommendations based on things that you've bought before or

0:13:53.200 --> 0:13:55.839
<v Speaker 1>or consumed before and in the case of Netflix, something

0:13:55.880 --> 0:13:59.319
<v Speaker 1>you've watched um and they make recommendations. That's something that

0:13:59.360 --> 0:14:03.240
<v Speaker 1>we tend to value about those services. It makes it

0:14:03.800 --> 0:14:07.880
<v Speaker 1>them collecting that information makes it more enjoyable. Yeah, they're

0:14:07.920 --> 0:14:11.720
<v Speaker 1>curating their their collections for us so that it's less

0:14:11.760 --> 0:14:14.560
<v Speaker 1>work for us. And then it's it's the joy of

0:14:14.559 --> 0:14:19.160
<v Speaker 1>discovery seems so much more palpable because you don't have

0:14:19.240 --> 0:14:26.000
<v Speaker 1>to go through, you know, a five thousand movie titles

0:14:26.000 --> 0:14:28.200
<v Speaker 1>before you find one that actually sounds interesting to you.

0:14:28.760 --> 0:14:31.920
<v Speaker 1>So let's get back over to the actual privacy Bill

0:14:31.960 --> 0:14:36.400
<v Speaker 1>of Rights. Now, the idea of of legislating our rights

0:14:36.400 --> 0:14:40.200
<v Speaker 1>to privacy isn't new in the United States. It kind

0:14:40.240 --> 0:14:42.880
<v Speaker 1>of began in the late nineteenth century. So the eighteen

0:14:42.960 --> 0:14:47.120
<v Speaker 1>nineties is about when we really started to, uh, look

0:14:47.160 --> 0:14:51.160
<v Speaker 1>at ways of protecting privacy through US law. Apart from

0:14:51.320 --> 0:14:54.200
<v Speaker 1>the guarantees that are in the Constitution that state you know,

0:14:55.040 --> 0:15:00.800
<v Speaker 1>your your guarantee against unlawful search and seizure when it

0:15:00.840 --> 0:15:03.320
<v Speaker 1>could be an entire episode all on its own, and

0:15:03.360 --> 0:15:05.360
<v Speaker 1>in fact, I think we have talked about that on

0:15:05.440 --> 0:15:09.000
<v Speaker 1>its own. But anyway, Uh, it's that's not a new idea,

0:15:09.080 --> 0:15:12.880
<v Speaker 1>but the idea of trying to create this this uh

0:15:13.240 --> 0:15:17.400
<v Speaker 1>privacy set of guidelines for the online world is new

0:15:17.560 --> 0:15:21.480
<v Speaker 1>because it's it's a different kind of exchange of information

0:15:21.480 --> 0:15:24.520
<v Speaker 1>than we've had in the past. And so the actual

0:15:24.800 --> 0:15:29.400
<v Speaker 1>documents of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, they're their

0:15:29.480 --> 0:15:31.800
<v Speaker 1>online so you can go and read them yourselves if

0:15:31.800 --> 0:15:35.840
<v Speaker 1>you want to. The it's quite detailed. Yeah, there's it's

0:15:36.480 --> 0:15:40.840
<v Speaker 1>the actual Bill of Rights themselves. That that that's probably

0:15:40.880 --> 0:15:44.880
<v Speaker 1>about I think it's fourteen pages of text just for

0:15:44.920 --> 0:15:48.840
<v Speaker 1>the Bill of Rights. And then there's a lot more about, um,

0:15:48.960 --> 0:15:51.600
<v Speaker 1>how will that be enforced or how could it be enforced?

0:15:51.640 --> 0:15:54.040
<v Speaker 1>Because this is not this is not being enacted into

0:15:54.240 --> 0:15:57.840
<v Speaker 1>United States law yet. That's something that's being discussed. It's

0:15:57.880 --> 0:16:01.440
<v Speaker 1>a proposal, and this is a proposal coming from President

0:16:01.440 --> 0:16:04.560
<v Speaker 1>Obama's administration. It's not even it's not coming out of Congress.

0:16:04.600 --> 0:16:06.800
<v Speaker 1>So this would have to go into Congress to be

0:16:06.840 --> 0:16:12.920
<v Speaker 1>debated and tweaked and destroyed, and then rebuilt and then

0:16:13.560 --> 0:16:16.040
<v Speaker 1>either passed or not passed, and then go to the

0:16:16.080 --> 0:16:19.040
<v Speaker 1>President who would then either signed it into law or not.

0:16:19.560 --> 0:16:25.840
<v Speaker 1>So here's some of the the the language from the

0:16:25.880 --> 0:16:29.160
<v Speaker 1>bill itself and the the introduction. There's like an introduce

0:16:29.160 --> 0:16:32.720
<v Speaker 1>there's like a foreword and introduction and executive summary every

0:16:32.760 --> 0:16:35.160
<v Speaker 1>single section of this. By the way, when you read

0:16:35.160 --> 0:16:38.880
<v Speaker 1>that first paragraph, feels like the opening paragraph to a

0:16:38.920 --> 0:16:42.280
<v Speaker 1>college student's term paper. So it's like you're having to

0:16:42.320 --> 0:16:44.960
<v Speaker 1>read five different openings of a term paper before you

0:16:45.000 --> 0:16:47.600
<v Speaker 1>get to the content. But I'm gonna I'll read a

0:16:47.640 --> 0:16:50.840
<v Speaker 1>little bit here. This is This kind of explains the

0:16:50.880 --> 0:16:56.400
<v Speaker 1>reason why the administration felt like this was necessary. Citizens

0:16:56.400 --> 0:16:59.480
<v Speaker 1>who feel protected from misuse of their personal information feel

0:16:59.520 --> 0:17:02.840
<v Speaker 1>free to gauge in commerce, to participate in political process,

0:17:03.280 --> 0:17:05.760
<v Speaker 1>or to seek needed healthcare. This is why we have

0:17:05.840 --> 0:17:09.240
<v Speaker 1>laws that protect financial privacy and health privacy, and that

0:17:09.320 --> 0:17:12.920
<v Speaker 1>protect consumers against unfair and deceptive uses of their information.

0:17:13.240 --> 0:17:16.240
<v Speaker 1>This is why the Supreme Court has protected anonymous political speech,

0:17:16.320 --> 0:17:19.080
<v Speaker 1>the same right exercise by the pamphleteers of the early

0:17:19.119 --> 0:17:24.400
<v Speaker 1>Republican today's bloggers. So this was sort of there. There.

0:17:24.600 --> 0:17:27.280
<v Speaker 1>The argument by the administration saying that privacy is a

0:17:27.359 --> 0:17:31.400
<v Speaker 1>very important component in life. It's something that we need

0:17:31.440 --> 0:17:35.840
<v Speaker 1>in order to feel that we can securely pursue very

0:17:35.880 --> 0:17:41.040
<v Speaker 1>important matters in our lives without without the fear of

0:17:41.040 --> 0:17:43.560
<v Speaker 1>that information falling into the wrong hands, are being misused

0:17:43.560 --> 0:17:46.719
<v Speaker 1>in any way, or or being used to lie to us.

0:17:46.800 --> 0:17:49.200
<v Speaker 1>You know, once people find out more about us, they

0:17:49.400 --> 0:17:53.719
<v Speaker 1>start to learn what we're vulnerable to, and further on

0:17:53.760 --> 0:17:56.639
<v Speaker 1>it goes. These rights give consumers clear guidance on what

0:17:56.760 --> 0:17:59.400
<v Speaker 1>they should expect from those who handle their personal information

0:17:59.400 --> 0:18:02.320
<v Speaker 1>and set x aspectations for companies that use personal data.

0:18:02.520 --> 0:18:04.919
<v Speaker 1>I call him these companies to begin immediately working with

0:18:05.000 --> 0:18:08.840
<v Speaker 1>privacy advocates, consumer protection enforcement agencies, and others to implement

0:18:08.880 --> 0:18:12.960
<v Speaker 1>these principles in enforceable codes of conduct. My administration will

0:18:12.960 --> 0:18:15.679
<v Speaker 1>work to advance these principles and work with Congress to

0:18:15.680 --> 0:18:19.200
<v Speaker 1>put them into law. With this Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights,

0:18:19.240 --> 0:18:22.480
<v Speaker 1>we offer the world a dynamic model of how to

0:18:22.640 --> 0:18:26.879
<v Speaker 1>offer strong privacy protection and enable ongoing innovation in new

0:18:26.960 --> 0:18:30.199
<v Speaker 1>information technologies. One thing should be clear. Even though we

0:18:30.240 --> 0:18:32.480
<v Speaker 1>live in a world in which we share personal information

0:18:32.520 --> 0:18:35.520
<v Speaker 1>more freely than in the past, we must reject the

0:18:35.560 --> 0:18:39.800
<v Speaker 1>conclusion that privacy is an outmoded value. It has been

0:18:39.840 --> 0:18:41.960
<v Speaker 1>at the heart of our democracy from its inception, and

0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:44.840
<v Speaker 1>we need it now more than ever. I think that's

0:18:44.840 --> 0:18:49.160
<v Speaker 1>a shot across the bowl of a certain social networking founder.

0:18:50.600 --> 0:18:52.680
<v Speaker 1>Do you know who I'm talking about? Does he have

0:18:52.800 --> 0:18:58.080
<v Speaker 1>curly hair and really disagrees with a pair of twin Yes?

0:18:58.200 --> 0:19:02.800
<v Speaker 1>And he also he so can explain the excitement of

0:19:02.800 --> 0:19:07.400
<v Speaker 1>a logarithmic scale in great detail at a press conference. Yes,

0:19:07.400 --> 0:19:10.760
<v Speaker 1>we're talking about Mark Zuckerberg, who who infamously at this

0:19:10.840 --> 0:19:14.399
<v Speaker 1>point a couple of years ago, said that he felt

0:19:14.440 --> 0:19:17.840
<v Speaker 1>that he thought he thought that privacy was dying out

0:19:17.920 --> 0:19:20.800
<v Speaker 1>as a social norm. Now, what he meant by that

0:19:20.920 --> 0:19:25.199
<v Speaker 1>was that the average person no longer really seemed to

0:19:25.320 --> 0:19:28.399
<v Speaker 1>feel that privacy was that important, or rather, they didn't

0:19:28.520 --> 0:19:33.480
<v Speaker 1>feel inhibited in any way from sharing information that perhaps

0:19:33.560 --> 0:19:37.359
<v Speaker 1>a generation ago people would never have pushed out to

0:19:37.400 --> 0:19:43.440
<v Speaker 1>the public. So it's not exactly a direct contradiction, because

0:19:43.440 --> 0:19:46.159
<v Speaker 1>what Zuckerberg was saying was that we just don't feel

0:19:47.200 --> 0:19:50.280
<v Speaker 1>as as uh, we don't feel the need to keep

0:19:50.359 --> 0:19:52.760
<v Speaker 1>stuff back as much as we used to. It's not

0:19:52.840 --> 0:19:56.880
<v Speaker 1>that we should ignore privacy concerns. More, it was more

0:19:57.000 --> 0:20:00.560
<v Speaker 1>that we just don't see it as being as important

0:20:00.640 --> 0:20:04.879
<v Speaker 1>as we used to. Uh. Meanwhile, people have proven that

0:20:04.960 --> 0:20:09.160
<v Speaker 1>Zuckerberg feels very differently about his own personal privacy because

0:20:09.200 --> 0:20:12.520
<v Speaker 1>they've breached it multiple times and he has not found

0:20:12.520 --> 0:20:15.040
<v Speaker 1>it very amusing. And again I don't think that was

0:20:15.080 --> 0:20:17.080
<v Speaker 1>his point. I don't think his point was that we

0:20:17.119 --> 0:20:19.760
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't worry about privacy. It was more that people in

0:20:19.800 --> 0:20:23.080
<v Speaker 1>general just don't seem to find it as important. Well,

0:20:23.440 --> 0:20:25.800
<v Speaker 1>it's one of those situations too, I think where it

0:20:25.920 --> 0:20:28.720
<v Speaker 1>sort of ended up as a SoundBite type of thing.

0:20:29.040 --> 0:20:31.520
<v Speaker 1>He said it in the public, in a public forum,

0:20:31.600 --> 0:20:34.080
<v Speaker 1>and and uh, it's you know, hey, it's a quote.

0:20:34.080 --> 0:20:37.520
<v Speaker 1>It's a direct quote, so well, not exactly what you

0:20:37.600 --> 0:20:40.480
<v Speaker 1>just said, but just to clarify in case somebody writes

0:20:40.520 --> 0:20:44.200
<v Speaker 1>in sure, but yeah, he did say those things, and

0:20:44.840 --> 0:20:48.680
<v Speaker 1>people said, hey, you know, Mark says privacy is dead,

0:20:49.600 --> 0:20:52.640
<v Speaker 1>and which was definitely an oversimplification of what he was saying.

0:20:52.680 --> 0:20:55.359
<v Speaker 1>But but also, you know, it's when you're speaking off

0:20:55.359 --> 0:20:57.200
<v Speaker 1>the cuff, it's also really easy to give a sound

0:20:57.200 --> 0:21:02.480
<v Speaker 1>bite that doesn't entirely absolute what you're thinking exactly. We've

0:21:02.520 --> 0:21:06.760
<v Speaker 1>We've had that same situation here many many times. So

0:21:06.840 --> 0:21:09.040
<v Speaker 1>let's get into the actual Bill of rights. I guess yeah,

0:21:09.040 --> 0:21:13.440
<v Speaker 1>I figure it's probably UM, although it's kind of thick

0:21:13.480 --> 0:21:16.280
<v Speaker 1>in places. We should probably get into the specific provisions.

0:21:16.320 --> 0:21:19.920
<v Speaker 1>There are seven I believe that are are UM where

0:21:19.960 --> 0:21:23.520
<v Speaker 1>they're trying to to work with people to make this happen. Yeah,

0:21:23.560 --> 0:21:27.760
<v Speaker 1>they're there. The the language refers to them as PHIPS,

0:21:29.119 --> 0:21:33.760
<v Speaker 1>f I, P P S PHIPS because they are fair

0:21:33.800 --> 0:21:41.280
<v Speaker 1>Information Practice Principles or philps. Yeah. I I actually skimmed

0:21:41.280 --> 0:21:44.479
<v Speaker 1>ahead and was reading and I started seeing references to PHIPS,

0:21:44.680 --> 0:21:47.000
<v Speaker 1>and it was before I saw what the breakout was

0:21:47.080 --> 0:21:51.440
<v Speaker 1>for the acronym. And I had many enjoyable moments trying

0:21:51.440 --> 0:21:54.440
<v Speaker 1>to come up with what PHIPS could stand for. None

0:21:54.480 --> 0:21:56.440
<v Speaker 1>of them, none of them were right, by the way, anyway.

0:21:56.480 --> 0:21:59.639
<v Speaker 1>That's that's that's tangential. Well. One of the first is uh,

0:22:00.119 --> 0:22:05.560
<v Speaker 1>the individual control of your personal information. Basically, they're saying

0:22:05.560 --> 0:22:08.719
<v Speaker 1>that you you should be the one in charge of

0:22:08.880 --> 0:22:10.760
<v Speaker 1>whether or not you give this information away and what

0:22:10.800 --> 0:22:13.440
<v Speaker 1>happens to it. So essentially, what this is saying is

0:22:13.480 --> 0:22:19.440
<v Speaker 1>that whenever you are signing up for any sort of service,

0:22:19.600 --> 0:22:23.280
<v Speaker 1>or or a site or whatever that when they the

0:22:23.440 --> 0:22:28.000
<v Speaker 1>company or organization asks for your information, you have the

0:22:28.080 --> 0:22:30.600
<v Speaker 1>right to either give the information or not give the information.

0:22:30.600 --> 0:22:35.640
<v Speaker 1>And furthermore, you can actually uh dictate how that information

0:22:35.680 --> 0:22:38.600
<v Speaker 1>will be used. So in other words, um, you know,

0:22:38.920 --> 0:22:40.960
<v Speaker 1>if you give the information to the company, if you

0:22:41.040 --> 0:22:44.080
<v Speaker 1>choose to do it, uh, you should still be able

0:22:44.119 --> 0:22:46.040
<v Speaker 1>to say, hey, you know, I want I'm giving this

0:22:46.080 --> 0:22:48.040
<v Speaker 1>information to you, but I'm doing it so that you

0:22:48.080 --> 0:22:51.359
<v Speaker 1>can do this set of things and nothing beyond that

0:22:51.440 --> 0:22:57.680
<v Speaker 1>set of things. So that's interesting. I'm wondering how how

0:22:57.680 --> 0:23:00.480
<v Speaker 1>well that will be enforced. Uh. And a lot of these,

0:23:00.520 --> 0:23:02.120
<v Speaker 1>by the way, we're going to go through them all,

0:23:02.200 --> 0:23:03.760
<v Speaker 1>but a lot of these are going to kind of

0:23:03.800 --> 0:23:07.600
<v Speaker 1>overlap each other or complement each other, so there will

0:23:07.640 --> 0:23:13.840
<v Speaker 1>be some some similarities throughout these these these uh rights,

0:23:13.920 --> 0:23:19.040
<v Speaker 1>these fips. Yes, yes, Now the second is transparency. So

0:23:19.040 --> 0:23:21.560
<v Speaker 1>so what they're saying is the company should tell you

0:23:21.720 --> 0:23:24.639
<v Speaker 1>upfront or during the entire time that you have an

0:23:24.640 --> 0:23:27.680
<v Speaker 1>account with them that exactly how your information is going

0:23:27.720 --> 0:23:30.720
<v Speaker 1>to be used. Um and and for what means? They

0:23:30.760 --> 0:23:34.200
<v Speaker 1>also privacy and security? Yes, yes, they also the security

0:23:34.240 --> 0:23:35.800
<v Speaker 1>was what I was going to address. They also have

0:23:35.880 --> 0:23:38.280
<v Speaker 1>to let you know how your data is going to

0:23:38.320 --> 0:23:42.560
<v Speaker 1>be protected, because yeah, it's Again that's one of the

0:23:42.640 --> 0:23:46.840
<v Speaker 1>reasons why this this this legislation or proposed guidelines. I

0:23:46.840 --> 0:23:50.640
<v Speaker 1>guess I shouldn't say legislation proposed guidelines. It's why they were.

0:23:51.160 --> 0:23:54.520
<v Speaker 1>Part of the reason why they exist is because people

0:23:55.040 --> 0:23:58.879
<v Speaker 1>when they are signing over information to a company, a

0:23:58.920 --> 0:24:00.960
<v Speaker 1>lot of us just kind of a him that it's

0:24:01.119 --> 0:24:04.040
<v Speaker 1>sort of sitting in a database somewhere, but that's it,

0:24:04.320 --> 0:24:07.040
<v Speaker 1>like it's not doing anything else and it's completely secure.

0:24:07.400 --> 0:24:09.000
<v Speaker 1>That's not always the case. I mean, you want to

0:24:09.000 --> 0:24:11.679
<v Speaker 1>know if if your information is can be encrypted, is

0:24:11.720 --> 0:24:14.000
<v Speaker 1>it being saved in plain text? Plain text, by the way,

0:24:14.040 --> 0:24:19.159
<v Speaker 1>is what we call a bad thing. Um, encrypted is better? Uh,

0:24:19.240 --> 0:24:22.800
<v Speaker 1>And when it's being used between companies, like if we're

0:24:22.800 --> 0:24:26.120
<v Speaker 1>talking about information that ultimately is going to be used

0:24:26.119 --> 0:24:29.960
<v Speaker 1>in order to get advertisers to send you information or

0:24:30.040 --> 0:24:32.640
<v Speaker 1>to post ads on the site that you're visiting all

0:24:32.640 --> 0:24:35.959
<v Speaker 1>the time, you want to make sure that, however they

0:24:36.000 --> 0:24:41.760
<v Speaker 1>are conveying your information to the advertiser, that it's secure. Yes,

0:24:41.920 --> 0:24:44.200
<v Speaker 1>and they need to make sure that that is easily

0:24:44.720 --> 0:24:48.240
<v Speaker 1>understood and easily available to to check out. So that's

0:24:48.240 --> 0:24:52.000
<v Speaker 1>the whole transparency issue. Then there's respect for context, and

0:24:52.000 --> 0:24:53.480
<v Speaker 1>this is one of those that sort of sounds a

0:24:53.560 --> 0:24:56.879
<v Speaker 1>little bit like in an overlap because what they're saying is, um,

0:24:57.920 --> 0:25:02.720
<v Speaker 1>let's say you've agreed to their the company's terms. Um,

0:25:02.840 --> 0:25:07.680
<v Speaker 1>the company should respect that you've agreed to those terms. So, um,

0:25:07.880 --> 0:25:12.240
<v Speaker 1>you've agreed to let your information be shared with select advertisers,

0:25:12.280 --> 0:25:14.720
<v Speaker 1>but they shouldn't go out and give it to and

0:25:14.760 --> 0:25:19.280
<v Speaker 1>sell your name to random mailing lists because within you've

0:25:19.880 --> 0:25:23.119
<v Speaker 1>had the context of I'm signing up for this, within

0:25:23.200 --> 0:25:27.320
<v Speaker 1>these boundaries, and they're saying you can't take it past that.

0:25:27.320 --> 0:25:30.040
<v Speaker 1>That's very good. And then the next is security, which

0:25:30.119 --> 0:25:32.119
<v Speaker 1>of course I've just chatted about. But this way that

0:25:32.240 --> 0:25:36.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, the transparency is letting you know how and

0:25:36.160 --> 0:25:40.359
<v Speaker 1>and uh, your data is being protected. This is actually

0:25:40.440 --> 0:25:44.840
<v Speaker 1>saying protect the data. Yeah, because it says that consumers

0:25:44.840 --> 0:25:48.520
<v Speaker 1>have a right to secure and responsible handling of personal data.

0:25:49.040 --> 0:25:52.240
<v Speaker 1>So this is this is actually putting it on those

0:25:52.359 --> 0:25:56.520
<v Speaker 1>sites and services to make sure that the information you

0:25:56.560 --> 0:26:01.000
<v Speaker 1>give them is protected reasonably from a sort of intrusion

0:26:01.560 --> 0:26:05.240
<v Speaker 1>or it could be anything from a hacker hacking their

0:26:05.280 --> 0:26:09.840
<v Speaker 1>way into the servers, to someone walking into the company

0:26:09.880 --> 0:26:12.960
<v Speaker 1>and physically taking a machine out of the company because

0:26:12.960 --> 0:26:15.919
<v Speaker 1>that has happened. You know, we we often think when

0:26:15.960 --> 0:26:18.919
<v Speaker 1>we're thinking about stealing information, we often think about the

0:26:18.960 --> 0:26:24.200
<v Speaker 1>whole Hollywood style where the cute, nerdy chick is sitting

0:26:24.240 --> 0:26:27.440
<v Speaker 1>down at a at a laptop and after about uh,

0:26:27.560 --> 0:26:29.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, I don't know, thirty seconds of typing on

0:26:29.520 --> 0:26:32.320
<v Speaker 1>a keyboard and then you just you know, you see

0:26:32.359 --> 0:26:34.840
<v Speaker 1>like the little progress bar filling up and as the

0:26:34.920 --> 0:26:38.520
<v Speaker 1>USB drive is is getting all the information. Meanwhile the

0:26:38.560 --> 0:26:42.360
<v Speaker 1>security guys are closing in. Will she get away? Well,

0:26:42.400 --> 0:26:46.040
<v Speaker 1>I'm watching, um yeah, where hels their team? You know,

0:26:46.240 --> 0:26:51.760
<v Speaker 1>Chloe Man. Anyway, So the other way you could do

0:26:51.800 --> 0:26:53.720
<v Speaker 1>it is you could have like a big guy named

0:26:53.720 --> 0:26:56.560
<v Speaker 1>Al just walks into the building, picks up a computer

0:26:56.640 --> 0:26:58.960
<v Speaker 1>and leaves, and then just all the information on the

0:26:59.000 --> 0:27:01.480
<v Speaker 1>computer is right there by the way. It does not

0:27:01.640 --> 0:27:03.359
<v Speaker 1>he does not have to be called out, nor does

0:27:03.400 --> 0:27:05.560
<v Speaker 1>he have to be a big guy. I'm here from

0:27:05.560 --> 0:27:08.440
<v Speaker 1>the computer cleaners. Okay, it's right over there. Yeah exactly. Yeah.

0:27:08.480 --> 0:27:11.720
<v Speaker 1>That's social engineering, and that happens way more frequently than

0:27:11.760 --> 0:27:14.960
<v Speaker 1>the whole. Let's breach this thing by you know, brute

0:27:15.000 --> 0:27:18.880
<v Speaker 1>forcing the password. Social engineering is much more effective if

0:27:18.920 --> 0:27:21.160
<v Speaker 1>you can walk up and talk to somebody and convince

0:27:21.200 --> 0:27:23.640
<v Speaker 1>them that you are the person who needs to do

0:27:23.680 --> 0:27:27.399
<v Speaker 1>this one particular thing. It's amazing how frequently that works.

0:27:28.320 --> 0:27:31.679
<v Speaker 1>What happened to number seventeen? Oh it's the cleaners. What

0:27:31.760 --> 0:27:35.520
<v Speaker 1>do you mean, the cleaners that had all our customer

0:27:35.600 --> 0:27:43.440
<v Speaker 1>dad on it? What one? Access and accuracy five? And basically,

0:27:43.600 --> 0:27:46.960
<v Speaker 1>people have a right to be able to get to

0:27:47.119 --> 0:27:49.679
<v Speaker 1>their personal data and make changes to it if they

0:27:49.680 --> 0:27:53.119
<v Speaker 1>need to make sure it's correct. Um, so, things like

0:27:53.240 --> 0:27:57.600
<v Speaker 1>if you have changed your address, or if you've changed

0:27:58.200 --> 0:28:01.239
<v Speaker 1>an important status in your life. You've gotten married, or

0:28:01.280 --> 0:28:03.920
<v Speaker 1>maybe you've got divorced, or maybe you've had kids or

0:28:04.280 --> 0:28:07.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, it's complicated. Yeah, yeah, it's it's the Facebook.

0:28:07.800 --> 0:28:10.160
<v Speaker 1>It's complicated, but it's where you want to be able

0:28:10.200 --> 0:28:13.160
<v Speaker 1>to go in there and make those changes so that

0:28:13.280 --> 0:28:17.680
<v Speaker 1>the information is still accurate. And um yeah, I mean

0:28:17.720 --> 0:28:20.119
<v Speaker 1>that just makes sense. And I think most companies tend

0:28:20.160 --> 0:28:22.360
<v Speaker 1>to do that, I mean, because they want to have

0:28:22.560 --> 0:28:24.840
<v Speaker 1>the most accurate information about you. It doesn't do them

0:28:24.840 --> 0:28:26.720
<v Speaker 1>any good if the information they have about you is

0:28:26.760 --> 0:28:29.199
<v Speaker 1>on a date, you know, that's not the reason they

0:28:29.800 --> 0:28:33.760
<v Speaker 1>don't care. Ultimately, I think most of these companies don't

0:28:33.880 --> 0:28:37.600
<v Speaker 1>really care about your personal information on a on a

0:28:37.640 --> 0:28:39.680
<v Speaker 1>personal level at all. It's not like they're trying to

0:28:39.720 --> 0:28:42.200
<v Speaker 1>spy on you to figure out what you are doing

0:28:42.320 --> 0:28:46.960
<v Speaker 1>in any you know, for any nefarious purposes. Uh. It's

0:28:47.520 --> 0:28:49.880
<v Speaker 1>all about profit really when it comes down to it,

0:28:50.040 --> 0:28:52.360
<v Speaker 1>or some in some cases, it's about trying to tailor

0:28:52.440 --> 0:28:55.720
<v Speaker 1>the experience so that it is the most meaningful to you,

0:28:56.120 --> 0:29:00.120
<v Speaker 1>which is feels a little more altruistic, but ultimately it

0:29:00.160 --> 0:29:02.160
<v Speaker 1>does come down to dollars and cents and not so

0:29:02.280 --> 0:29:07.560
<v Speaker 1>much of we're watching you sorry stuff they don't want

0:29:07.600 --> 0:29:11.640
<v Speaker 1>you to know shout out. And then there's um one

0:29:11.640 --> 0:29:16.200
<v Speaker 1>of my favorites, focused collection, which is basically saying we're

0:29:16.240 --> 0:29:19.280
<v Speaker 1>not going to collect or the company is not allowed

0:29:19.320 --> 0:29:22.000
<v Speaker 1>to collect anything else other than the stuff it needs

0:29:22.040 --> 0:29:23.920
<v Speaker 1>to do its job. Yeah. So in other words, if

0:29:23.920 --> 0:29:27.160
<v Speaker 1>you sign up for a coupon site, let's say a

0:29:27.200 --> 0:29:31.640
<v Speaker 1>coupon service, Yeah, that's going to deliver coupons that are

0:29:31.840 --> 0:29:36.120
<v Speaker 1>of interest to you, uh and are applicable to you

0:29:36.160 --> 0:29:39.360
<v Speaker 1>in your region. So we're talking about something like group on, right, Okay,

0:29:39.440 --> 0:29:41.880
<v Speaker 1>something like group on where you sign up, and part

0:29:41.920 --> 0:29:44.120
<v Speaker 1>of group on is that you tell it where you live,

0:29:44.520 --> 0:29:46.640
<v Speaker 1>because you know, it doesn't want to send you coupons

0:29:46.680 --> 0:29:48.680
<v Speaker 1>for a place that's a thousand miles away. It doesn't

0:29:48.680 --> 0:29:51.200
<v Speaker 1>do you any good. And you tell group on what

0:29:51.320 --> 0:29:55.280
<v Speaker 1>you're interested in, so that way it's sending you relevant coupons.

0:29:55.320 --> 0:29:58.520
<v Speaker 1>Because if you are really interested in outdoor adventures, but

0:29:58.640 --> 0:30:01.520
<v Speaker 1>you don't have a whole lot of interest in pottery,

0:30:01.600 --> 0:30:04.680
<v Speaker 1>then you don't want to keep getting you know, invites

0:30:04.720 --> 0:30:07.000
<v Speaker 1>to go take another pottery class. You know that's just

0:30:07.080 --> 0:30:10.880
<v Speaker 1>not that's not what you care about. Well, then that

0:30:11.080 --> 0:30:13.200
<v Speaker 1>information makes perfect sense for a group on to pull

0:30:13.280 --> 0:30:15.680
<v Speaker 1>from you. You know, your address or your zip code

0:30:15.760 --> 0:30:17.920
<v Speaker 1>or whatever, your the region you are in, and what

0:30:17.960 --> 0:30:22.120
<v Speaker 1>you're interested in, but other things might not matter so

0:30:22.200 --> 0:30:24.240
<v Speaker 1>much like it would, it wouldn't matter for the service

0:30:24.240 --> 0:30:27.040
<v Speaker 1>the group on is providing to you. So things like

0:30:27.440 --> 0:30:30.720
<v Speaker 1>the names of all your relatives, your social Security number,

0:30:30.800 --> 0:30:34.680
<v Speaker 1>your birth date, your driver's license number, this kind of

0:30:34.720 --> 0:30:38.240
<v Speaker 1>information is not relevant to the service Groupon is providing,

0:30:38.520 --> 0:30:42.320
<v Speaker 1>and therefore, according to this bill of rights, group on

0:30:42.400 --> 0:30:44.880
<v Speaker 1>should not ask you for it, nor should you feel

0:30:44.880 --> 0:30:48.880
<v Speaker 1>compelled to share it, because why would they need that

0:30:49.160 --> 0:30:52.000
<v Speaker 1>to do what they do. You're you're never gonna let

0:30:52.000 --> 0:30:56.400
<v Speaker 1>me live down that pottery skydiving class, are you? You know? Uh?

0:30:56.640 --> 0:30:59.880
<v Speaker 1>He tells me that it was always supposed to be

0:30:59.880 --> 0:31:03.520
<v Speaker 1>an ash tray, but I am absolutely certain that originally

0:31:03.600 --> 0:31:07.720
<v Speaker 1>that wasn't going to be an urn Like, oh, let's

0:31:07.760 --> 0:31:12.080
<v Speaker 1>move on. So one of the things that they're talking

0:31:12.080 --> 0:31:16.040
<v Speaker 1>about embracing is something that UH that has been around

0:31:16.040 --> 0:31:18.920
<v Speaker 1>for a while now, the do not Track technology, which

0:31:19.000 --> 0:31:22.360
<v Speaker 1>is really less of a technology and more of an

0:31:22.400 --> 0:31:25.920
<v Speaker 1>agreement UM. In a way, it's sort of like a

0:31:25.920 --> 0:31:31.680
<v Speaker 1>gentleman's agreement between an advertiser and UH and the the

0:31:31.840 --> 0:31:35.920
<v Speaker 1>customer UM, and the technology behind it is browser based,

0:31:36.920 --> 0:31:40.320
<v Speaker 1>so UH UM Firefox, the most recent versions of Firefox

0:31:40.360 --> 0:31:42.960
<v Speaker 1>have do not Track in there, and Mozilla baked it

0:31:43.000 --> 0:31:45.720
<v Speaker 1>in there so that you could say, hey, i'm It's

0:31:45.800 --> 0:31:49.360
<v Speaker 1>basically a little information that goes along with a query

0:31:49.400 --> 0:31:51.480
<v Speaker 1>first site that says I don't want to be tracked,

0:31:52.000 --> 0:31:55.680
<v Speaker 1>and you you go to visit, you know, my wonderful

0:31:55.720 --> 0:31:59.360
<v Speaker 1>sandwich dot com, and you know, if my wonderful sandwich

0:31:59.440 --> 0:32:02.320
<v Speaker 1>dot com decides that now that lunch is over, they

0:32:02.360 --> 0:32:04.360
<v Speaker 1>want to know what else, what other kinds of foods

0:32:04.360 --> 0:32:08.400
<v Speaker 1>you like? Um, you know they don't have to participate

0:32:08.440 --> 0:32:11.680
<v Speaker 1>in the agreement at all, but you've already told them

0:32:11.680 --> 0:32:14.000
<v Speaker 1>that you don't want to. Now, if they're behaving responsibly,

0:32:14.040 --> 0:32:16.280
<v Speaker 1>they might say all right, no, no, we know, we

0:32:16.360 --> 0:32:19.760
<v Speaker 1>know you're just looking for lunch, No big deal. Um.

0:32:19.800 --> 0:32:21.960
<v Speaker 1>But now they're they're trying to uh, they're trying to

0:32:22.000 --> 0:32:24.120
<v Speaker 1>get more people to embrace that. And I know that

0:32:24.160 --> 0:32:27.760
<v Speaker 1>Google has said it will add that to Chrome um

0:32:27.800 --> 0:32:30.479
<v Speaker 1>as well. So you know this this may end up

0:32:30.480 --> 0:32:35.200
<v Speaker 1>being part of the technology that helps support this this legislation,

0:32:35.280 --> 0:32:38.160
<v Speaker 1>and it becomes legislation. And this falls into what is

0:32:38.200 --> 0:32:44.080
<v Speaker 1>the final FIP, which is accountability. Yes, and accountability is

0:32:44.120 --> 0:32:46.680
<v Speaker 1>all about the fact that the wording in the actual

0:32:46.720 --> 0:32:49.040
<v Speaker 1>document is that consumers have a right to have personal

0:32:49.120 --> 0:32:52.480
<v Speaker 1>data handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to

0:32:52.480 --> 0:32:54.880
<v Speaker 1>assure they adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.

0:32:55.360 --> 0:32:57.440
<v Speaker 1>And that's that's what we're talking about here, is that

0:32:57.520 --> 0:33:00.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, you have a right to uh, to be

0:33:00.160 --> 0:33:03.280
<v Speaker 1>able to use a browser that's not going to necessarily

0:33:03.800 --> 0:33:07.400
<v Speaker 1>collect all that information without you knowing it, or not

0:33:07.440 --> 0:33:10.000
<v Speaker 1>even a browser. But like search engines. You know, again

0:33:10.080 --> 0:33:14.600
<v Speaker 1>we're talking about Google here, mainly other search engines too,

0:33:15.080 --> 0:33:20.200
<v Speaker 1>But you know, if you're using Google and you're searching

0:33:20.200 --> 0:33:22.280
<v Speaker 1>for stuff all day long like some of us, you know,

0:33:22.480 --> 0:33:24.640
<v Speaker 1>I do it all day long. That's my job is

0:33:25.280 --> 0:33:30.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, search information and pull it together and write articles. Um.

0:33:30.560 --> 0:33:33.720
<v Speaker 1>Then you know, you'd like to have a little more

0:33:33.720 --> 0:33:37.040
<v Speaker 1>control over that so that you don't have all these

0:33:37.040 --> 0:33:41.320
<v Speaker 1>different potential companies and organizations having access to your personal

0:33:41.400 --> 0:33:44.760
<v Speaker 1>information and making decisions about you over which you have

0:33:44.800 --> 0:33:48.040
<v Speaker 1>no control. So it's nice to have that kind of

0:33:48.080 --> 0:33:52.440
<v Speaker 1>power as an individual. And but fairly recently there have

0:33:52.520 --> 0:33:57.400
<v Speaker 1>been some reports about how companies like Google have signed

0:33:57.440 --> 0:33:59.680
<v Speaker 1>on with this, saying that this is this is a

0:33:59.680 --> 0:34:04.240
<v Speaker 1>great idea, and you might think this this these guidelines

0:34:04.280 --> 0:34:07.360
<v Speaker 1>sound like they could potentially, you know, put a dent

0:34:07.760 --> 0:34:11.000
<v Speaker 1>in some business here. Well, there are a couple of

0:34:11.000 --> 0:34:13.319
<v Speaker 1>reasons why or a couple of reasons why Google and

0:34:13.400 --> 0:34:17.719
<v Speaker 1>other companies like Google might be behind the guidelines that

0:34:18.600 --> 0:34:22.680
<v Speaker 1>aren't exactly like, yes, we also believe in privacy, uh

0:34:23.080 --> 0:34:25.239
<v Speaker 1>not to say that that motivation isn't there. It may

0:34:25.360 --> 0:34:29.480
<v Speaker 1>very well be, but there are other alternative reasons why

0:34:29.520 --> 0:34:32.440
<v Speaker 1>they might be behind this, and one of those is that, well,

0:34:32.440 --> 0:34:35.640
<v Speaker 1>it's a good PR move to say customer privacy is

0:34:35.680 --> 0:34:37.719
<v Speaker 1>one of our main concerns as well, and we want

0:34:37.719 --> 0:34:39.440
<v Speaker 1>to make sure that we're doing the right thing, so

0:34:39.440 --> 0:34:43.560
<v Speaker 1>that's a good PR move. Another is this isn't legislation.

0:34:44.320 --> 0:34:47.120
<v Speaker 1>It's not baked into law, so there's no real danger

0:34:47.160 --> 0:34:51.160
<v Speaker 1>in saying sure, as opposed to opposing it, because there

0:34:51.200 --> 0:34:57.120
<v Speaker 1>was actual legislation in California for a state, uh, legislation

0:34:57.600 --> 0:35:01.600
<v Speaker 1>that would kind of approach the same sort of subject

0:35:01.680 --> 0:35:07.320
<v Speaker 1>matter as these this this bill of rights, and companies

0:35:07.360 --> 0:35:09.839
<v Speaker 1>like Google were very much non in favor of it.

0:35:10.480 --> 0:35:13.920
<v Speaker 1>So when it when it moved to the actual legislation phase,

0:35:14.640 --> 0:35:17.080
<v Speaker 1>there was a lot more opposition. Now right here where

0:35:17.080 --> 0:35:20.319
<v Speaker 1>it's not where it's a great idea, but it's not

0:35:20.440 --> 0:35:24.120
<v Speaker 1>really enforceable, not from a legal standpoint. It could be

0:35:24.200 --> 0:35:27.840
<v Speaker 1>enforceable if companies took it upon themselves to enforce it

0:35:28.320 --> 0:35:31.960
<v Speaker 1>on their own practices, but there's no teeth behind it

0:35:32.080 --> 0:35:36.080
<v Speaker 1>right now. Uh, there's nothing dangerous about saying, sure, let's

0:35:36.120 --> 0:35:41.400
<v Speaker 1>do it, So there's that as well. And you know, again,

0:35:41.440 --> 0:35:43.719
<v Speaker 1>I don't want to I don't want to say that

0:35:43.800 --> 0:35:47.400
<v Speaker 1>any company has a particular motivation. I'll just say that

0:35:47.480 --> 0:35:51.319
<v Speaker 1>the behaviors when it was in California legislation debate and

0:35:51.400 --> 0:35:54.920
<v Speaker 1>the behaviors when it's in a proposal that doesn't have

0:35:54.960 --> 0:36:02.120
<v Speaker 1>any legal backing to it are different. That's what I'm saying. Yeah,

0:36:02.320 --> 0:36:06.239
<v Speaker 1>So we were talking a little bit about about how

0:36:06.280 --> 0:36:09.080
<v Speaker 1>things will be enforced, and the Federal Trade Commission would

0:36:09.160 --> 0:36:12.359
<v Speaker 1>be the department of the United States government that would

0:36:12.400 --> 0:36:17.080
<v Speaker 1>be responsible for making sure that UH companies behave themselves

0:36:17.080 --> 0:36:20.920
<v Speaker 1>and and follow the guidelines set forth and this um

0:36:21.200 --> 0:36:25.800
<v Speaker 1>uh in this document and UH, well you know, I

0:36:26.080 --> 0:36:28.840
<v Speaker 1>don't know how much they'd be able to do that.

0:36:29.080 --> 0:36:32.640
<v Speaker 1>That's the problem. See, at this point, this document is

0:36:32.680 --> 0:36:36.239
<v Speaker 1>not as as Jonathan pointed out, it's not legislation. It's

0:36:36.280 --> 0:36:39.160
<v Speaker 1>not a proposed legislation. It's really more of a set

0:36:39.160 --> 0:36:42.560
<v Speaker 1>of guidelines. So what the legislation would be would be

0:36:42.600 --> 0:36:46.880
<v Speaker 1>actually more about how it would be enforced, and it

0:36:46.880 --> 0:36:50.479
<v Speaker 1>would it would set forth those uh instructions on how

0:36:50.640 --> 0:36:53.640
<v Speaker 1>they would move going forward. And keep in mind that

0:36:54.000 --> 0:36:57.920
<v Speaker 1>if this were to enter uh, legislation like if it

0:36:58.040 --> 0:37:01.680
<v Speaker 1>was if it would if it enters that as, then

0:37:02.640 --> 0:37:05.000
<v Speaker 1>the changes that would be made to the language would

0:37:05.920 --> 0:37:08.719
<v Speaker 1>possibly be quite drastic, and it could be that the

0:37:08.760 --> 0:37:13.600
<v Speaker 1>outcome is completely different than what this proposal is. So

0:37:13.920 --> 0:37:17.760
<v Speaker 1>that's it's pretty much a guarantee, even not completely different,

0:37:17.800 --> 0:37:22.040
<v Speaker 1>but significantly different. Yeah. Yeah, well I think uh, I

0:37:22.080 --> 0:37:24.920
<v Speaker 1>think the idea behind it is sound. There are are

0:37:24.960 --> 0:37:31.160
<v Speaker 1>several of the UM agencies that have been UM outspoken

0:37:31.520 --> 0:37:35.799
<v Speaker 1>in rights, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation. UH, they're all

0:37:35.840 --> 0:37:39.080
<v Speaker 1>about that, yes, and they basically said, hey, we like

0:37:39.280 --> 0:37:42.480
<v Speaker 1>the idea behind it, were interested to see what's going

0:37:42.520 --> 0:37:46.319
<v Speaker 1>to happen. So UM, it will be interesting to see

0:37:46.320 --> 0:37:49.480
<v Speaker 1>how it goes forward and how whether or not it

0:37:49.560 --> 0:37:54.320
<v Speaker 1>inspires others and UH and other places to create similar

0:37:54.400 --> 0:37:58.040
<v Speaker 1>legislation and maybe curtail some of this or or you know,

0:37:58.320 --> 0:38:01.560
<v Speaker 1>give people a good idea of how their information is

0:38:01.600 --> 0:38:04.120
<v Speaker 1>being used. And honestly, I think that is probably the biggest,

0:38:04.800 --> 0:38:08.719
<v Speaker 1>UM most useful thing that would come out of that too,

0:38:08.719 --> 0:38:12.520
<v Speaker 1>because people really want to use these services UM and companies,

0:38:12.560 --> 0:38:14.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, everybody's sort of an agreement, but it would

0:38:14.840 --> 0:38:17.279
<v Speaker 1>be nice to know how information is being stored and

0:38:17.360 --> 0:38:21.719
<v Speaker 1>exactly what's being collected and then not that excess information

0:38:21.800 --> 0:38:25.440
<v Speaker 1>is not being used um and and retained if it

0:38:25.440 --> 0:38:27.120
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't need to be there in the first place.

0:38:27.520 --> 0:38:31.719
<v Speaker 1>At least that's my opinion. I agree entirely. All well,

0:38:31.800 --> 0:38:34.160
<v Speaker 1>and uh yeah, it'll be you know, we'll have to

0:38:34.200 --> 0:38:37.400
<v Speaker 1>see how this turns out. I mean, the whole argument

0:38:37.440 --> 0:38:41.760
<v Speaker 1>about privacy and what people should be uh, what's reasonable

0:38:41.800 --> 0:38:45.080
<v Speaker 1>for us to expect us consumers, how much of that

0:38:45.200 --> 0:38:49.280
<v Speaker 1>responsibility falls on us versus the the entities that are

0:38:50.000 --> 0:38:52.839
<v Speaker 1>gathering our information. That debate is going to go on

0:38:52.920 --> 0:38:57.560
<v Speaker 1>for a while, probably forever. It'll it'll switch back and

0:38:57.600 --> 0:39:00.719
<v Speaker 1>forth quite a bit. But it's just to remember that

0:39:00.800 --> 0:39:02.840
<v Speaker 1>when you go and you sign up for these things,

0:39:03.640 --> 0:39:08.480
<v Speaker 1>whether it's a social networking site or an even an

0:39:08.480 --> 0:39:11.799
<v Speaker 1>app that you might put on a smartphone, keep in

0:39:11.840 --> 0:39:14.720
<v Speaker 1>mind that a lot of these companies, you know, they're

0:39:14.760 --> 0:39:18.400
<v Speaker 1>they're making some serious cash off your personal information. Personal

0:39:18.440 --> 0:39:24.160
<v Speaker 1>information is the digital currency, right and so uh, you know,

0:39:24.360 --> 0:39:27.759
<v Speaker 1>just do a little thinking about that, some critical thinking

0:39:27.840 --> 0:39:29.960
<v Speaker 1>about how your information is going to be used. And

0:39:30.640 --> 0:39:33.680
<v Speaker 1>really it comes down to, right now, are you okay

0:39:33.680 --> 0:39:35.920
<v Speaker 1>with that? And if you are okay with that, if

0:39:35.960 --> 0:39:38.359
<v Speaker 1>you if you trust the source and you feel that

0:39:38.440 --> 0:39:41.600
<v Speaker 1>your information is in capable hands and you don't mind

0:39:41.640 --> 0:39:47.200
<v Speaker 1>it being used for advertising purposes or whatever, then you're fine.

0:39:47.760 --> 0:39:51.319
<v Speaker 1>If you feel that it's not the right thing for you,

0:39:51.360 --> 0:39:53.680
<v Speaker 1>then you might want to, you know, give a second

0:39:53.680 --> 0:39:57.240
<v Speaker 1>thought to actually joining that side or or engaging that service.

0:39:58.200 --> 0:40:00.600
<v Speaker 1>It's a tough you know, it's a of choice to

0:40:00.600 --> 0:40:03.120
<v Speaker 1>make sometimes because sometimes we just want something so badly

0:40:03.200 --> 0:40:06.920
<v Speaker 1>that we're willing to uh to cut some corners that

0:40:07.040 --> 0:40:11.120
<v Speaker 1>could potentially come back to haunt us and uh, you know,

0:40:11.160 --> 0:40:14.200
<v Speaker 1>and then there are cases where we have no control

0:40:14.200 --> 0:40:16.759
<v Speaker 1>over it whatsoever. Like the Epsilon hack is a good

0:40:16.800 --> 0:40:20.440
<v Speaker 1>example where you know, the consumers who had their information

0:40:20.480 --> 0:40:24.160
<v Speaker 1>stolen in the Epsilon hack weren't dealing with Epsilon directly.

0:40:24.719 --> 0:40:28.239
<v Speaker 1>They were dealing with companies that were customers of Epsilon.

0:40:28.880 --> 0:40:31.759
<v Speaker 1>And so you know that that was one of those

0:40:31.760 --> 0:40:34.800
<v Speaker 1>things that was really tough, a really tough situation because

0:40:35.840 --> 0:40:38.440
<v Speaker 1>if you you might trust the company you're doing business with,

0:40:38.520 --> 0:40:42.200
<v Speaker 1>but you don't necessarily know what companies they're doing business with, right,

0:40:42.280 --> 0:40:44.680
<v Speaker 1>and a lot of people who signed up for that

0:40:44.960 --> 0:40:48.759
<v Speaker 1>didn't realize they were signing up for that because um,

0:40:48.760 --> 0:40:53.440
<v Speaker 1>by and large, the companies that had their information stored

0:40:53.480 --> 0:40:57.239
<v Speaker 1>with Epsilon were retailers, and people had signed up for

0:40:57.280 --> 0:41:01.520
<v Speaker 1>loyalty cards not realizing that, uh or I guess probably

0:41:01.560 --> 0:41:04.120
<v Speaker 1>not thinking about the idea that hey, they're going to

0:41:04.160 --> 0:41:06.359
<v Speaker 1>put this on a computer somewhere and that computer could

0:41:06.360 --> 0:41:10.080
<v Speaker 1>be hacked and my personal information could be taken. Um

0:41:10.120 --> 0:41:12.640
<v Speaker 1>not like signing up for an account on a computer

0:41:12.719 --> 0:41:15.080
<v Speaker 1>where you're saying, I am entering this information into the

0:41:15.120 --> 0:41:19.399
<v Speaker 1>computer myself. Um. So there was a bit of an

0:41:19.400 --> 0:41:22.279
<v Speaker 1>intermediary there where you're going, oh, well, I'm giving I

0:41:22.640 --> 0:41:24.480
<v Speaker 1>filled this out by hand, and I handed it to

0:41:24.520 --> 0:41:26.600
<v Speaker 1>the guy at the service desk, and he gave me

0:41:26.640 --> 0:41:28.879
<v Speaker 1>a card that I'm going to go use and buy

0:41:28.880 --> 0:41:33.880
<v Speaker 1>some groceries. Now. Yeah. Yeah. To the average consumer, it

0:41:33.880 --> 0:41:38.279
<v Speaker 1>probably felt more like using a coupon. Yeah, and then

0:41:38.320 --> 0:41:40.400
<v Speaker 1>put clip a coupon out of a piece of paper

0:41:40.400 --> 0:41:42.760
<v Speaker 1>and you you you use it when you buy something

0:41:43.320 --> 0:41:46.359
<v Speaker 1>you know that's not attached to you at all, and

0:41:46.400 --> 0:41:48.840
<v Speaker 1>it's between you and this real retailer. Well, as it

0:41:48.880 --> 0:41:52.000
<v Speaker 1>turns out, all those retailers are working with this one company,

0:41:52.280 --> 0:41:56.799
<v Speaker 1>yeah that had massive databases and yes, yeah, so it's

0:41:56.840 --> 0:41:59.600
<v Speaker 1>it's a sticky issue and it's gonna be it's just

0:41:59.600 --> 0:42:02.359
<v Speaker 1>gonna get more and more important because again, like the

0:42:02.360 --> 0:42:07.000
<v Speaker 1>whole visibility of of security hacking has increased over the

0:42:07.080 --> 0:42:10.760
<v Speaker 1>last i'd say, like five or ten years, and uh,

0:42:11.000 --> 0:42:13.960
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't look like the hackers are giving up anytime soon. Right.

0:42:14.080 --> 0:42:18.200
<v Speaker 1>So anyway, well, that's our discussion about the Consumer Privacy

0:42:18.280 --> 0:42:21.839
<v Speaker 1>Bill of Rights. Uh it we'll see whether or not

0:42:21.880 --> 0:42:24.719
<v Speaker 1>it's ever put into law, and if it turns out

0:42:24.800 --> 0:42:27.439
<v Speaker 1>to be an effective piece of legislation, all of that's

0:42:27.440 --> 0:42:30.239
<v Speaker 1>still in question. If you guys have any ideas for

0:42:30.320 --> 0:42:33.280
<v Speaker 1>topics that we should cover here on tech Stuff, please

0:42:33.320 --> 0:42:35.560
<v Speaker 1>let us know. You can email us. Our address is

0:42:35.640 --> 0:42:38.799
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0:42:38.880 --> 0:42:41.640
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0:42:41.719 --> 0:42:44.520
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0:42:44.520 --> 0:42:48.920
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