1 00:00:00,320 --> 00:00:02,880 Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. 2 00:00:03,200 --> 00:00:09,239 Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you didn't touch? With technology? With tech 3 00:00:09,280 --> 00:00:17,959 Speaker 1: Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello, everyone, welcome 4 00:00:18,000 --> 00:00:20,079 Speaker 1: to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Polette and I 5 00:00:20,120 --> 00:00:22,440 Speaker 1: am an editor at how stuff works dot com. Sitting 6 00:00:22,480 --> 00:00:25,800 Speaker 1: across from me as as usual as senior writer Jonathan Strickland. 7 00:00:25,920 --> 00:00:30,000 Speaker 1: It was a pleasure to burn And that was a 8 00:00:30,040 --> 00:00:34,280 Speaker 1: short quote. Yes, short and to the point. Today we're 9 00:00:34,280 --> 00:00:40,280 Speaker 1: going to talk about the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. Yes. Um, 10 00:00:40,320 --> 00:00:43,240 Speaker 1: A lot of people probably don't know that that we're 11 00:00:43,280 --> 00:00:45,600 Speaker 1: even that there is even is such a thing or 12 00:00:45,840 --> 00:00:49,239 Speaker 1: such a thing being proposed, I should say, um, but 13 00:00:49,479 --> 00:00:53,600 Speaker 1: we have talked about privacy many times on the podcast. Um, 14 00:00:53,800 --> 00:00:56,959 Speaker 1: something that a lot of people are willing to give up, 15 00:00:57,080 --> 00:01:00,760 Speaker 1: at least in part um, thanks to all the cool 16 00:01:00,800 --> 00:01:02,720 Speaker 1: stuff that you can get on the Internet if you're 17 00:01:02,760 --> 00:01:05,800 Speaker 1: willing to give people your personal information. And really, in 18 00:01:05,840 --> 00:01:08,319 Speaker 1: some cases it's not even that you get cool stuff, 19 00:01:08,360 --> 00:01:11,000 Speaker 1: it's just that there's been an avenue created where you 20 00:01:11,040 --> 00:01:15,000 Speaker 1: can share personal information, and that's what people have done. 21 00:01:15,080 --> 00:01:16,920 Speaker 1: You know, It's it's it's kind of crazy. It's a 22 00:01:17,000 --> 00:01:19,959 Speaker 1: sort of stuff where the thing the kind of information 23 00:01:19,959 --> 00:01:23,479 Speaker 1: that you wouldn't think to share in, say, necessarily a letter, 24 00:01:24,160 --> 00:01:27,280 Speaker 1: Which is interesting because the letter, there's there's some privacy 25 00:01:27,280 --> 00:01:29,640 Speaker 1: guarantees to things that are that passed through the United 26 00:01:29,680 --> 00:01:33,360 Speaker 1: States Postal Service that you do not get the same 27 00:01:33,400 --> 00:01:38,120 Speaker 1: guarantee necessarily when you publish it online. And of course 28 00:01:38,200 --> 00:01:43,040 Speaker 1: online allows for in many cases a much wider variety 29 00:01:43,040 --> 00:01:44,959 Speaker 1: of people to get a chance to get their papers 30 00:01:45,040 --> 00:01:48,480 Speaker 1: on that information. That that's true, and it's also a 31 00:01:48,520 --> 00:01:52,200 Speaker 1: good point, I think to point out that, uh, the 32 00:01:52,240 --> 00:01:54,720 Speaker 1: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights is something that is being 33 00:01:54,760 --> 00:01:58,320 Speaker 1: suggested here in the United States, and not every um, 34 00:01:58,360 --> 00:02:00,640 Speaker 1: not every country in the world has the same guarantees 35 00:02:00,760 --> 00:02:05,280 Speaker 1: on postal service privacy, and some some countries already have 36 00:02:06,560 --> 00:02:11,200 Speaker 1: legislation in place that does address privacy concerns as far 37 00:02:11,240 --> 00:02:14,000 Speaker 1: as the internet's concerned. So this is kind of a 38 00:02:15,160 --> 00:02:21,360 Speaker 1: it's sort of codifying behaviors and best practices that a 39 00:02:21,360 --> 00:02:24,080 Speaker 1: lot of people I think have assumed we're in place already. 40 00:02:24,240 --> 00:02:27,440 Speaker 1: But in this case, it's saying, let's write this down, 41 00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:31,240 Speaker 1: get in black and white, uh, potentially put it into 42 00:02:31,680 --> 00:02:36,919 Speaker 1: law and then make it an enforceable list of guidelines 43 00:02:37,080 --> 00:02:41,120 Speaker 1: so that companies that handle private information are doing so 44 00:02:41,240 --> 00:02:44,080 Speaker 1: in a responsible manner and a transparent manner, as it 45 00:02:44,080 --> 00:02:47,960 Speaker 1: turns out, right, right, Well, we've talked about many of 46 00:02:48,000 --> 00:02:52,120 Speaker 1: the companies involved in this uh in this first round 47 00:02:52,720 --> 00:02:57,400 Speaker 1: of privacy negotiations with the United States government. Um and 48 00:02:57,520 --> 00:03:00,480 Speaker 1: we've we've also handled a lot of these issues before. 49 00:03:00,600 --> 00:03:04,119 Speaker 1: We've talked about things like um uh cookies and other 50 00:03:04,160 --> 00:03:08,640 Speaker 1: information that is recorded about you when you visit places 51 00:03:08,639 --> 00:03:12,040 Speaker 1: on the internet or websites, I should say, um and 52 00:03:12,040 --> 00:03:15,160 Speaker 1: and basically the idea of being that uh, you know, 53 00:03:15,639 --> 00:03:19,760 Speaker 1: as we are moving farther into the twenty first century, 54 00:03:19,840 --> 00:03:23,120 Speaker 1: it is becoming more commonplace for us to share stuff 55 00:03:23,160 --> 00:03:25,280 Speaker 1: about us, and people are are tracking us in ways 56 00:03:25,320 --> 00:03:29,720 Speaker 1: that um that we're sort of you know, impossible really 57 00:03:30,000 --> 00:03:33,240 Speaker 1: without the the use of the internet. Yeah, and and 58 00:03:33,440 --> 00:03:36,440 Speaker 1: a lot of people are unaware of that tracking, even 59 00:03:36,440 --> 00:03:40,280 Speaker 1: though in many cases the terms for that sort of 60 00:03:40,320 --> 00:03:44,960 Speaker 1: tracking are laid out in uh somewhere yeah. Right, there's 61 00:03:45,000 --> 00:03:48,320 Speaker 1: like usually a spot somewhere on a website or service 62 00:03:48,720 --> 00:03:52,360 Speaker 1: where you can learn how the information you give to 63 00:03:52,480 --> 00:03:55,440 Speaker 1: that cider service is used and whether or not it's 64 00:03:55,440 --> 00:03:59,880 Speaker 1: shared with other entities, and uh, there's there's almost always 65 00:03:59,880 --> 00:04:01,960 Speaker 1: some sort of terms of service that spell this out, 66 00:04:02,040 --> 00:04:05,800 Speaker 1: although very few of us take the time to either 67 00:04:05,960 --> 00:04:09,440 Speaker 1: find or read that, even if it's presented right in 68 00:04:09,440 --> 00:04:11,560 Speaker 1: front of us. I mean, I know, I've been guilty 69 00:04:12,120 --> 00:04:14,560 Speaker 1: of scrolling all all the way down so I can 70 00:04:14,640 --> 00:04:18,000 Speaker 1: check I have read this and I agree yes, when 71 00:04:18,000 --> 00:04:20,400 Speaker 1: really it just means I have scrolled down and found 72 00:04:20,400 --> 00:04:24,679 Speaker 1: the checkbox. Well it Uh, it's one of those things 73 00:04:24,680 --> 00:04:27,920 Speaker 1: that a lot of us have done, especially when we've 74 00:04:27,920 --> 00:04:33,159 Speaker 1: received an invitation to a hot new social network or 75 00:04:33,200 --> 00:04:36,320 Speaker 1: something like that, where we've we've there's been some hype 76 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:39,040 Speaker 1: builds up at the beginning. Um, and then you get 77 00:04:39,080 --> 00:04:41,239 Speaker 1: your and then you get your address and it says, 78 00:04:41,320 --> 00:04:44,960 Speaker 1: you know, hey, Jonathan, please go ahead sign up for 79 00:04:45,000 --> 00:04:47,479 Speaker 1: an account. You're in the beta, And you go on 80 00:04:47,560 --> 00:04:49,000 Speaker 1: and you fill it out as fast as you can. 81 00:04:49,400 --> 00:04:51,920 Speaker 1: You get the privacy agreement, You scroll down to the bottom, 82 00:04:52,000 --> 00:04:53,600 Speaker 1: you click the agree, but and then the pop up 83 00:04:53,640 --> 00:04:57,560 Speaker 1: comes up are you sure you agree? And click and 84 00:04:57,600 --> 00:05:02,560 Speaker 1: you just scream, let me get to the print these yeah, yep, 85 00:05:02,800 --> 00:05:05,720 Speaker 1: and they can uh, you know, you think about it, 86 00:05:05,880 --> 00:05:07,680 Speaker 1: they can put the absolutely, they don't even have to 87 00:05:07,680 --> 00:05:10,359 Speaker 1: bother to lie to you because they know that you know, 88 00:05:10,400 --> 00:05:12,880 Speaker 1: you're gonna go ahead and click. Okay, they know they say, 89 00:05:13,160 --> 00:05:14,880 Speaker 1: we're going to share this stuff about you. You're okay 90 00:05:14,880 --> 00:05:18,680 Speaker 1: with that, right? All right? Then they the people aren't 91 00:05:18,680 --> 00:05:20,839 Speaker 1: going to read it, and the one person of the 92 00:05:20,839 --> 00:05:22,840 Speaker 1: people who do read it are gonna agree anyway because 93 00:05:22,839 --> 00:05:25,760 Speaker 1: they don't want to be left out. Well, you might 94 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:29,760 Speaker 1: get there, you go, you always have like that one 95 00:05:29,839 --> 00:05:32,840 Speaker 1: guy who's who's screaming out you don't want to do this, 96 00:05:33,040 --> 00:05:36,039 Speaker 1: and and that one guy might be right. You know, 97 00:05:36,120 --> 00:05:37,800 Speaker 1: it doesn't We're not saying that one guy is a 98 00:05:37,839 --> 00:05:40,800 Speaker 1: crazy person standing out screaming out that we're all you 99 00:05:40,839 --> 00:05:43,880 Speaker 1: know sheep, but that one guy may very well have 100 00:05:43,960 --> 00:05:47,800 Speaker 1: a point. And the whole reason why this has come 101 00:05:47,839 --> 00:05:54,200 Speaker 1: around is because there's more scrutiny now on companies, particularly 102 00:05:54,240 --> 00:06:00,080 Speaker 1: big internet companies that have been collecting private information, and 103 00:06:00,120 --> 00:06:03,760 Speaker 1: some of that scrutinious because we've had some pretty public 104 00:06:04,640 --> 00:06:10,640 Speaker 1: uh security breaches like information, you know, personal information being 105 00:06:10,839 --> 00:06:15,880 Speaker 1: breached by hackers and then distributed, so things like you know, 106 00:06:16,000 --> 00:06:20,039 Speaker 1: personal information with addresses, maybe even credit card information that 107 00:06:20,160 --> 00:06:23,520 Speaker 1: kind of stuff has shocked people. So that's this is 108 00:06:23,680 --> 00:06:26,000 Speaker 1: partially in response to that, but it's also in response 109 00:06:26,080 --> 00:06:31,159 Speaker 1: to trends like search engines keeping track of your search 110 00:06:31,360 --> 00:06:35,600 Speaker 1: history and then using that information to market it to advertisers, 111 00:06:35,600 --> 00:06:41,200 Speaker 1: so that these advertisers can target people who are who 112 00:06:41,240 --> 00:06:44,600 Speaker 1: have have certain behaviors because they they'll say, oh, this 113 00:06:44,640 --> 00:06:47,800 Speaker 1: person tends to search for these sort of topics. That 114 00:06:47,839 --> 00:06:50,840 Speaker 1: means that they're probably interested in these sort of products 115 00:06:50,880 --> 00:06:54,240 Speaker 1: or services. Therefore, if we serve up ads to that 116 00:06:54,320 --> 00:06:57,240 Speaker 1: person that advertise those kind of products and services, they're 117 00:06:57,240 --> 00:07:00,680 Speaker 1: more likely to go ahead and buy them. And so 118 00:07:00,800 --> 00:07:02,920 Speaker 1: it's a whole idea of the more information you have 119 00:07:02,960 --> 00:07:05,800 Speaker 1: about your target are the audience, the more effective you 120 00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:09,240 Speaker 1: can be when you are advertising to them. Uh. We've 121 00:07:09,279 --> 00:07:13,040 Speaker 1: also seen this used. There's been scrutiny from some fairly 122 00:07:13,040 --> 00:07:16,720 Speaker 1: recent stories. Did you see the story about how target 123 00:07:17,360 --> 00:07:20,000 Speaker 1: UH was able to identify Yes, okay, so there's a story. 124 00:07:20,000 --> 00:07:23,760 Speaker 1: We'll we'll give some background here. Okay, it's it's it's 125 00:07:23,760 --> 00:07:27,800 Speaker 1: a story that definitely has some controversy around it. All right, So, uh, 126 00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:34,800 Speaker 1: target had created a very effective system to identify customers. UH, 127 00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:37,840 Speaker 1: and and kind of get an idea of what that customers. 128 00:07:37,840 --> 00:07:43,480 Speaker 1: So life status was based upon their shopping habits right right. Um, specifically, 129 00:07:43,560 --> 00:07:46,720 Speaker 1: they were looking for people who were about to have 130 00:07:47,000 --> 00:07:50,560 Speaker 1: a baby. Yes, And one of the reasons why this 131 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:52,880 Speaker 1: was the case you might say, well, you know, why 132 00:07:52,920 --> 00:07:54,960 Speaker 1: not people who are getting ready by an h D 133 00:07:55,080 --> 00:07:57,760 Speaker 1: t V. Well, as it turns out, the people who 134 00:07:57,880 --> 00:08:02,520 Speaker 1: are about to have kids are um people uh tend 135 00:08:02,560 --> 00:08:06,000 Speaker 1: to get in habits, and so they buy the same 136 00:08:06,120 --> 00:08:10,120 Speaker 1: brands of laundry detergent and clothing and things like that 137 00:08:10,200 --> 00:08:13,280 Speaker 1: for years and years and years. So what advertisers want 138 00:08:13,320 --> 00:08:15,680 Speaker 1: to do is they want to find ways to get 139 00:08:15,680 --> 00:08:19,240 Speaker 1: you to switch brands over to their thing. But as 140 00:08:19,280 --> 00:08:21,520 Speaker 1: it turns out, this time when people are about to 141 00:08:21,560 --> 00:08:25,080 Speaker 1: have kids is a prime time for people to switch 142 00:08:25,280 --> 00:08:28,680 Speaker 1: because um, things are changing drastically in their life. They 143 00:08:28,680 --> 00:08:31,720 Speaker 1: start considering it's not just someone who needs a crib 144 00:08:31,760 --> 00:08:33,400 Speaker 1: and someone who needs a high chair, and someone who 145 00:08:33,480 --> 00:08:37,280 Speaker 1: needs uh you know, uh diapers and things like that 146 00:08:37,360 --> 00:08:42,040 Speaker 1: baby supplies. It's it's for everything and you have, you know, 147 00:08:42,200 --> 00:08:44,640 Speaker 1: you have another life that you have to consider. And 148 00:08:44,679 --> 00:08:46,880 Speaker 1: this is this is the needs of a baby are 149 00:08:46,880 --> 00:08:49,760 Speaker 1: different than the needs of an adult, and so you're 150 00:08:49,880 --> 00:08:52,400 Speaker 1: you start looking at things like, all right, well, is 151 00:08:52,400 --> 00:08:54,800 Speaker 1: this detergent going to be too is this is this 152 00:08:54,880 --> 00:08:56,400 Speaker 1: is not going to be good for my baby? Should 153 00:08:56,440 --> 00:08:58,240 Speaker 1: I Should I go with something that's going to be 154 00:08:58,280 --> 00:09:01,240 Speaker 1: more gentle or you know, they're lot of different considerations, 155 00:09:01,280 --> 00:09:06,080 Speaker 1: and Targets got well, gigs and gigs and gigs of 156 00:09:06,160 --> 00:09:11,440 Speaker 1: data about customer behaviors, and so there's a huge amount 157 00:09:11,440 --> 00:09:16,560 Speaker 1: of market research that has sort of indicated what behaviors 158 00:09:16,640 --> 00:09:19,680 Speaker 1: are suggests that a person is going to have a 159 00:09:19,679 --> 00:09:23,360 Speaker 1: baby that when you start seeing these changes, that's a 160 00:09:23,480 --> 00:09:26,920 Speaker 1: very good indicator that that person is planning on the 161 00:09:26,960 --> 00:09:29,400 Speaker 1: fact that they're going to have a child. So, in 162 00:09:29,440 --> 00:09:34,480 Speaker 1: this case, Targets sent some electronic coupons to a to 163 00:09:34,559 --> 00:09:39,680 Speaker 1: a young lady, a teenager, who who had exhibited some 164 00:09:39,760 --> 00:09:43,680 Speaker 1: of these new behaviors, right, and the new behavior has 165 00:09:43,720 --> 00:09:46,840 Speaker 1: triggered at the algorithm that says, hey, this person is 166 00:09:47,120 --> 00:09:49,959 Speaker 1: expecting expecting, and they're going to go ahead and automatically 167 00:09:50,000 --> 00:09:52,600 Speaker 1: send this stuff out right. And the problem here was 168 00:09:52,679 --> 00:09:56,360 Speaker 1: that this young lady had not divulged the information about 169 00:09:56,400 --> 00:10:00,200 Speaker 1: her her status to her father, and her father's saw 170 00:10:00,240 --> 00:10:04,720 Speaker 1: the coupons from Target and sent a very angry email 171 00:10:05,080 --> 00:10:09,960 Speaker 1: to a Target manager and said, uh, you know, why 172 00:10:10,000 --> 00:10:13,000 Speaker 1: are you saying this about my daughter? How dare you? 173 00:10:13,280 --> 00:10:17,760 Speaker 1: This is you know, insensitive? Um are you trying to 174 00:10:17,880 --> 00:10:20,560 Speaker 1: encourage her to have a baby? She's far too young? 175 00:10:21,000 --> 00:10:24,400 Speaker 1: And then the manager was trying to find a way 176 00:10:24,440 --> 00:10:28,760 Speaker 1: to respond to this angry father when later on another 177 00:10:28,840 --> 00:10:30,720 Speaker 1: email came in from the father who said, I had 178 00:10:30,760 --> 00:10:33,040 Speaker 1: a discussion with my daughter. It turns out there were 179 00:10:33,120 --> 00:10:36,400 Speaker 1: some things going on I didn't know about. Uh, this 180 00:10:36,559 --> 00:10:38,520 Speaker 1: was not the way I would have liked to have 181 00:10:38,559 --> 00:10:41,080 Speaker 1: found out, but I was in the wrong. But this 182 00:10:41,200 --> 00:10:44,560 Speaker 1: really brought a lot of attention towards the practice of 183 00:10:44,679 --> 00:10:49,320 Speaker 1: using customer information to react proactively, which in some cases 184 00:10:49,320 --> 00:10:52,240 Speaker 1: you would think that's that's kind of cool, you know, 185 00:10:52,240 --> 00:10:54,480 Speaker 1: It's it's a little creepy in a way that that 186 00:10:54,840 --> 00:10:57,800 Speaker 1: the retailer knows that kind of information about you just 187 00:10:57,880 --> 00:11:01,000 Speaker 1: based upon your your habits. But then you realize you 188 00:11:01,040 --> 00:11:04,240 Speaker 1: are giving the retailer information by the way you shop, 189 00:11:04,280 --> 00:11:06,480 Speaker 1: that just just by the way you shop. It's not 190 00:11:06,520 --> 00:11:09,079 Speaker 1: even your name or your address or any of that. 191 00:11:09,800 --> 00:11:12,520 Speaker 1: As long as they have some sort of customer identifier 192 00:11:12,640 --> 00:11:15,640 Speaker 1: number that is attached to you, even if they don't 193 00:11:15,640 --> 00:11:18,280 Speaker 1: know your name, if it's just, if it's just this 194 00:11:18,400 --> 00:11:22,160 Speaker 1: number designates this particular shopper, and this particular shopper has 195 00:11:22,160 --> 00:11:25,200 Speaker 1: behaved in this way, then they can start to draw 196 00:11:25,320 --> 00:11:29,320 Speaker 1: conclusions about what's going on in your life. Now, there's 197 00:11:29,360 --> 00:11:32,720 Speaker 1: a leap here really that has to be made, uh 198 00:11:32,760 --> 00:11:36,080 Speaker 1: for for Target or really any of these other retailers, 199 00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:39,160 Speaker 1: because they're far from alone and do it. Then when 200 00:11:39,160 --> 00:11:42,760 Speaker 1: when we're using this, we're simply using Target as an example, 201 00:11:42,800 --> 00:11:46,400 Speaker 1: it's not that they are unique in this at all. Yeah, 202 00:11:46,520 --> 00:11:51,319 Speaker 1: they are one of many, many retailers who do this, UM, 203 00:11:51,360 --> 00:11:53,560 Speaker 1: But there's there's a leap that needs to be made here. 204 00:11:53,559 --> 00:11:57,480 Speaker 1: Now Target is not collecting or or any of these 205 00:11:57,520 --> 00:12:00,840 Speaker 1: companies in general. We'll just say a retailer not necessarily 206 00:12:00,840 --> 00:12:05,280 Speaker 1: collecting this stuff. To identify Jonathan Strickland as being somebody 207 00:12:05,640 --> 00:12:08,720 Speaker 1: who particularly likes a specific brand of coffee, they want 208 00:12:08,720 --> 00:12:12,440 Speaker 1: to know that number, you know, whatever his customer number 209 00:12:12,559 --> 00:12:16,559 Speaker 1: is at the retailer likes these products, he's more inclined 210 00:12:16,600 --> 00:12:19,199 Speaker 1: to buy this than that UM, and they want to 211 00:12:19,360 --> 00:12:21,760 Speaker 1: give him a positive experience. So they are trying to 212 00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:26,200 Speaker 1: tailor the the customer experience as much as they can. Um. 213 00:12:26,280 --> 00:12:30,040 Speaker 1: When I go to example Target, UM, when the little 214 00:12:30,080 --> 00:12:32,640 Speaker 1: coupon prints out, when I, uh, you know, swipe my 215 00:12:32,679 --> 00:12:35,520 Speaker 1: card and we get our our stuff that we get there, UM, 216 00:12:35,600 --> 00:12:37,960 Speaker 1: the coupon printer will print out something a coupon for 217 00:12:38,040 --> 00:12:41,280 Speaker 1: something that I've bought, and not necessarily on this shopping trip. 218 00:12:41,840 --> 00:12:45,640 Speaker 1: They've gotten very good at um printing out stuff that 219 00:12:45,840 --> 00:12:49,400 Speaker 1: it's specific to what I buy with them. And so 220 00:12:49,440 --> 00:12:51,840 Speaker 1: it's not that it's not that they're trying to breach 221 00:12:51,840 --> 00:12:55,679 Speaker 1: somebody's privacy. The leap here is that it could be 222 00:12:55,800 --> 00:13:00,240 Speaker 1: used to find out information about Jonathan Strickland or Chris 223 00:13:00,280 --> 00:13:05,080 Speaker 1: poll At personally. Yes, UM, so yeah, it's it's it's 224 00:13:05,160 --> 00:13:09,160 Speaker 1: it's a delicate matter on how you handle that personal information. 225 00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:13,080 Speaker 1: Whether that means that you know, you don't want to 226 00:13:13,960 --> 00:13:17,960 Speaker 1: make your customers feel like they are being spied upon, 227 00:13:19,120 --> 00:13:22,600 Speaker 1: that that is a bad outcome, and then also you 228 00:13:22,640 --> 00:13:24,760 Speaker 1: want to make sure that whatever the information you have 229 00:13:25,240 --> 00:13:31,679 Speaker 1: is secure and and preferably in most cases not connected 230 00:13:31,880 --> 00:13:36,559 Speaker 1: to an individual by name or other personal identification, so 231 00:13:36,640 --> 00:13:40,400 Speaker 1: that there might be an a customer profile on you, 232 00:13:40,679 --> 00:13:44,880 Speaker 1: but that profile does not directly link to your identity. Well, 233 00:13:44,880 --> 00:13:49,160 Speaker 1: think about companies like Netflix or Amazon dot Com that 234 00:13:49,280 --> 00:13:53,080 Speaker 1: make recommendations based on things that you've bought before or 235 00:13:53,200 --> 00:13:55,839 Speaker 1: or consumed before and in the case of Netflix, something 236 00:13:55,880 --> 00:13:59,319 Speaker 1: you've watched um and they make recommendations. That's something that 237 00:13:59,360 --> 00:14:03,240 Speaker 1: we tend to value about those services. It makes it 238 00:14:03,800 --> 00:14:07,880 Speaker 1: them collecting that information makes it more enjoyable. Yeah, they're 239 00:14:07,920 --> 00:14:11,720 Speaker 1: curating their their collections for us so that it's less 240 00:14:11,760 --> 00:14:14,560 Speaker 1: work for us. And then it's it's the joy of 241 00:14:14,559 --> 00:14:19,160 Speaker 1: discovery seems so much more palpable because you don't have 242 00:14:19,240 --> 00:14:26,000 Speaker 1: to go through, you know, a five thousand movie titles 243 00:14:26,000 --> 00:14:28,200 Speaker 1: before you find one that actually sounds interesting to you. 244 00:14:28,760 --> 00:14:31,920 Speaker 1: So let's get back over to the actual privacy Bill 245 00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:36,400 Speaker 1: of Rights. Now, the idea of of legislating our rights 246 00:14:36,400 --> 00:14:40,200 Speaker 1: to privacy isn't new in the United States. It kind 247 00:14:40,240 --> 00:14:42,880 Speaker 1: of began in the late nineteenth century. So the eighteen 248 00:14:42,960 --> 00:14:47,120 Speaker 1: nineties is about when we really started to, uh, look 249 00:14:47,160 --> 00:14:51,160 Speaker 1: at ways of protecting privacy through US law. Apart from 250 00:14:51,320 --> 00:14:54,200 Speaker 1: the guarantees that are in the Constitution that state you know, 251 00:14:55,040 --> 00:15:00,800 Speaker 1: your your guarantee against unlawful search and seizure when it 252 00:15:00,840 --> 00:15:03,320 Speaker 1: could be an entire episode all on its own, and 253 00:15:03,360 --> 00:15:05,360 Speaker 1: in fact, I think we have talked about that on 254 00:15:05,440 --> 00:15:09,000 Speaker 1: its own. But anyway, Uh, it's that's not a new idea, 255 00:15:09,080 --> 00:15:12,880 Speaker 1: but the idea of trying to create this this uh 256 00:15:13,240 --> 00:15:17,400 Speaker 1: privacy set of guidelines for the online world is new 257 00:15:17,560 --> 00:15:21,480 Speaker 1: because it's it's a different kind of exchange of information 258 00:15:21,480 --> 00:15:24,520 Speaker 1: than we've had in the past. And so the actual 259 00:15:24,800 --> 00:15:29,400 Speaker 1: documents of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, they're their 260 00:15:29,480 --> 00:15:31,800 Speaker 1: online so you can go and read them yourselves if 261 00:15:31,800 --> 00:15:35,840 Speaker 1: you want to. The it's quite detailed. Yeah, there's it's 262 00:15:36,480 --> 00:15:40,840 Speaker 1: the actual Bill of Rights themselves. That that that's probably 263 00:15:40,880 --> 00:15:44,880 Speaker 1: about I think it's fourteen pages of text just for 264 00:15:44,920 --> 00:15:48,840 Speaker 1: the Bill of Rights. And then there's a lot more about, um, 265 00:15:48,960 --> 00:15:51,600 Speaker 1: how will that be enforced or how could it be enforced? 266 00:15:51,640 --> 00:15:54,040 Speaker 1: Because this is not this is not being enacted into 267 00:15:54,240 --> 00:15:57,840 Speaker 1: United States law yet. That's something that's being discussed. It's 268 00:15:57,880 --> 00:16:01,440 Speaker 1: a proposal, and this is a proposal coming from President 269 00:16:01,440 --> 00:16:04,560 Speaker 1: Obama's administration. It's not even it's not coming out of Congress. 270 00:16:04,600 --> 00:16:06,800 Speaker 1: So this would have to go into Congress to be 271 00:16:06,840 --> 00:16:12,920 Speaker 1: debated and tweaked and destroyed, and then rebuilt and then 272 00:16:13,560 --> 00:16:16,040 Speaker 1: either passed or not passed, and then go to the 273 00:16:16,080 --> 00:16:19,040 Speaker 1: President who would then either signed it into law or not. 274 00:16:19,560 --> 00:16:25,840 Speaker 1: So here's some of the the the language from the 275 00:16:25,880 --> 00:16:29,160 Speaker 1: bill itself and the the introduction. There's like an introduce 276 00:16:29,160 --> 00:16:32,720 Speaker 1: there's like a foreword and introduction and executive summary every 277 00:16:32,760 --> 00:16:35,160 Speaker 1: single section of this. By the way, when you read 278 00:16:35,160 --> 00:16:38,880 Speaker 1: that first paragraph, feels like the opening paragraph to a 279 00:16:38,920 --> 00:16:42,280 Speaker 1: college student's term paper. So it's like you're having to 280 00:16:42,320 --> 00:16:44,960 Speaker 1: read five different openings of a term paper before you 281 00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:47,600 Speaker 1: get to the content. But I'm gonna I'll read a 282 00:16:47,640 --> 00:16:50,840 Speaker 1: little bit here. This is This kind of explains the 283 00:16:50,880 --> 00:16:56,400 Speaker 1: reason why the administration felt like this was necessary. Citizens 284 00:16:56,400 --> 00:16:59,480 Speaker 1: who feel protected from misuse of their personal information feel 285 00:16:59,520 --> 00:17:02,840 Speaker 1: free to gauge in commerce, to participate in political process, 286 00:17:03,280 --> 00:17:05,760 Speaker 1: or to seek needed healthcare. This is why we have 287 00:17:05,840 --> 00:17:09,240 Speaker 1: laws that protect financial privacy and health privacy, and that 288 00:17:09,320 --> 00:17:12,920 Speaker 1: protect consumers against unfair and deceptive uses of their information. 289 00:17:13,240 --> 00:17:16,240 Speaker 1: This is why the Supreme Court has protected anonymous political speech, 290 00:17:16,320 --> 00:17:19,080 Speaker 1: the same right exercise by the pamphleteers of the early 291 00:17:19,119 --> 00:17:24,400 Speaker 1: Republican today's bloggers. So this was sort of there. There. 292 00:17:24,600 --> 00:17:27,280 Speaker 1: The argument by the administration saying that privacy is a 293 00:17:27,359 --> 00:17:31,400 Speaker 1: very important component in life. It's something that we need 294 00:17:31,440 --> 00:17:35,840 Speaker 1: in order to feel that we can securely pursue very 295 00:17:35,880 --> 00:17:41,040 Speaker 1: important matters in our lives without without the fear of 296 00:17:41,040 --> 00:17:43,560 Speaker 1: that information falling into the wrong hands, are being misused 297 00:17:43,560 --> 00:17:46,719 Speaker 1: in any way, or or being used to lie to us. 298 00:17:46,800 --> 00:17:49,200 Speaker 1: You know, once people find out more about us, they 299 00:17:49,400 --> 00:17:53,719 Speaker 1: start to learn what we're vulnerable to, and further on 300 00:17:53,760 --> 00:17:56,639 Speaker 1: it goes. These rights give consumers clear guidance on what 301 00:17:56,760 --> 00:17:59,400 Speaker 1: they should expect from those who handle their personal information 302 00:17:59,400 --> 00:18:02,320 Speaker 1: and set x aspectations for companies that use personal data. 303 00:18:02,520 --> 00:18:04,919 Speaker 1: I call him these companies to begin immediately working with 304 00:18:05,000 --> 00:18:08,840 Speaker 1: privacy advocates, consumer protection enforcement agencies, and others to implement 305 00:18:08,880 --> 00:18:12,960 Speaker 1: these principles in enforceable codes of conduct. My administration will 306 00:18:12,960 --> 00:18:15,679 Speaker 1: work to advance these principles and work with Congress to 307 00:18:15,680 --> 00:18:19,200 Speaker 1: put them into law. With this Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, 308 00:18:19,240 --> 00:18:22,480 Speaker 1: we offer the world a dynamic model of how to 309 00:18:22,640 --> 00:18:26,879 Speaker 1: offer strong privacy protection and enable ongoing innovation in new 310 00:18:26,960 --> 00:18:30,199 Speaker 1: information technologies. One thing should be clear. Even though we 311 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:32,480 Speaker 1: live in a world in which we share personal information 312 00:18:32,520 --> 00:18:35,520 Speaker 1: more freely than in the past, we must reject the 313 00:18:35,560 --> 00:18:39,800 Speaker 1: conclusion that privacy is an outmoded value. It has been 314 00:18:39,840 --> 00:18:41,960 Speaker 1: at the heart of our democracy from its inception, and 315 00:18:41,960 --> 00:18:44,840 Speaker 1: we need it now more than ever. I think that's 316 00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:49,160 Speaker 1: a shot across the bowl of a certain social networking founder. 317 00:18:50,600 --> 00:18:52,680 Speaker 1: Do you know who I'm talking about? Does he have 318 00:18:52,800 --> 00:18:58,080 Speaker 1: curly hair and really disagrees with a pair of twin Yes? 319 00:18:58,200 --> 00:19:02,800 Speaker 1: And he also he so can explain the excitement of 320 00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:07,400 Speaker 1: a logarithmic scale in great detail at a press conference. Yes, 321 00:19:07,400 --> 00:19:10,760 Speaker 1: we're talking about Mark Zuckerberg, who who infamously at this 322 00:19:10,840 --> 00:19:14,399 Speaker 1: point a couple of years ago, said that he felt 323 00:19:14,440 --> 00:19:17,840 Speaker 1: that he thought he thought that privacy was dying out 324 00:19:17,920 --> 00:19:20,800 Speaker 1: as a social norm. Now, what he meant by that 325 00:19:20,920 --> 00:19:25,199 Speaker 1: was that the average person no longer really seemed to 326 00:19:25,320 --> 00:19:28,399 Speaker 1: feel that privacy was that important, or rather, they didn't 327 00:19:28,520 --> 00:19:33,480 Speaker 1: feel inhibited in any way from sharing information that perhaps 328 00:19:33,560 --> 00:19:37,359 Speaker 1: a generation ago people would never have pushed out to 329 00:19:37,400 --> 00:19:43,440 Speaker 1: the public. So it's not exactly a direct contradiction, because 330 00:19:43,440 --> 00:19:46,159 Speaker 1: what Zuckerberg was saying was that we just don't feel 331 00:19:47,200 --> 00:19:50,280 Speaker 1: as as uh, we don't feel the need to keep 332 00:19:50,359 --> 00:19:52,760 Speaker 1: stuff back as much as we used to. It's not 333 00:19:52,840 --> 00:19:56,880 Speaker 1: that we should ignore privacy concerns. More, it was more 334 00:19:57,000 --> 00:20:00,560 Speaker 1: that we just don't see it as being as important 335 00:20:00,640 --> 00:20:04,879 Speaker 1: as we used to. Uh. Meanwhile, people have proven that 336 00:20:04,960 --> 00:20:09,160 Speaker 1: Zuckerberg feels very differently about his own personal privacy because 337 00:20:09,200 --> 00:20:12,520 Speaker 1: they've breached it multiple times and he has not found 338 00:20:12,520 --> 00:20:15,040 Speaker 1: it very amusing. And again I don't think that was 339 00:20:15,080 --> 00:20:17,080 Speaker 1: his point. I don't think his point was that we 340 00:20:17,119 --> 00:20:19,760 Speaker 1: shouldn't worry about privacy. It was more that people in 341 00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:23,080 Speaker 1: general just don't seem to find it as important. Well, 342 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:25,800 Speaker 1: it's one of those situations too, I think where it 343 00:20:25,920 --> 00:20:28,720 Speaker 1: sort of ended up as a SoundBite type of thing. 344 00:20:29,040 --> 00:20:31,520 Speaker 1: He said it in the public, in a public forum, 345 00:20:31,600 --> 00:20:34,080 Speaker 1: and and uh, it's you know, hey, it's a quote. 346 00:20:34,080 --> 00:20:37,520 Speaker 1: It's a direct quote, so well, not exactly what you 347 00:20:37,600 --> 00:20:40,480 Speaker 1: just said, but just to clarify in case somebody writes 348 00:20:40,520 --> 00:20:44,200 Speaker 1: in sure, but yeah, he did say those things, and 349 00:20:44,840 --> 00:20:48,680 Speaker 1: people said, hey, you know, Mark says privacy is dead, 350 00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:52,640 Speaker 1: and which was definitely an oversimplification of what he was saying. 351 00:20:52,680 --> 00:20:55,359 Speaker 1: But but also, you know, it's when you're speaking off 352 00:20:55,359 --> 00:20:57,200 Speaker 1: the cuff, it's also really easy to give a sound 353 00:20:57,200 --> 00:21:02,480 Speaker 1: bite that doesn't entirely absolute what you're thinking exactly. We've 354 00:21:02,520 --> 00:21:06,760 Speaker 1: We've had that same situation here many many times. So 355 00:21:06,840 --> 00:21:09,040 Speaker 1: let's get into the actual Bill of rights. I guess yeah, 356 00:21:09,040 --> 00:21:13,440 Speaker 1: I figure it's probably UM, although it's kind of thick 357 00:21:13,480 --> 00:21:16,280 Speaker 1: in places. We should probably get into the specific provisions. 358 00:21:16,320 --> 00:21:19,920 Speaker 1: There are seven I believe that are are UM where 359 00:21:19,960 --> 00:21:23,520 Speaker 1: they're trying to to work with people to make this happen. Yeah, 360 00:21:23,560 --> 00:21:27,760 Speaker 1: they're there. The the language refers to them as PHIPS, 361 00:21:29,119 --> 00:21:33,760 Speaker 1: f I, P P S PHIPS because they are fair 362 00:21:33,800 --> 00:21:41,280 Speaker 1: Information Practice Principles or philps. Yeah. I I actually skimmed 363 00:21:41,280 --> 00:21:44,479 Speaker 1: ahead and was reading and I started seeing references to PHIPS, 364 00:21:44,680 --> 00:21:47,000 Speaker 1: and it was before I saw what the breakout was 365 00:21:47,080 --> 00:21:51,440 Speaker 1: for the acronym. And I had many enjoyable moments trying 366 00:21:51,440 --> 00:21:54,440 Speaker 1: to come up with what PHIPS could stand for. None 367 00:21:54,480 --> 00:21:56,440 Speaker 1: of them, none of them were right, by the way, anyway. 368 00:21:56,480 --> 00:21:59,639 Speaker 1: That's that's that's tangential. Well. One of the first is uh, 369 00:22:00,119 --> 00:22:05,560 Speaker 1: the individual control of your personal information. Basically, they're saying 370 00:22:05,560 --> 00:22:08,719 Speaker 1: that you you should be the one in charge of 371 00:22:08,880 --> 00:22:10,760 Speaker 1: whether or not you give this information away and what 372 00:22:10,800 --> 00:22:13,440 Speaker 1: happens to it. So essentially, what this is saying is 373 00:22:13,480 --> 00:22:19,440 Speaker 1: that whenever you are signing up for any sort of service, 374 00:22:19,600 --> 00:22:23,280 Speaker 1: or or a site or whatever that when they the 375 00:22:23,440 --> 00:22:28,000 Speaker 1: company or organization asks for your information, you have the 376 00:22:28,080 --> 00:22:30,600 Speaker 1: right to either give the information or not give the information. 377 00:22:30,600 --> 00:22:35,640 Speaker 1: And furthermore, you can actually uh dictate how that information 378 00:22:35,680 --> 00:22:38,600 Speaker 1: will be used. So in other words, um, you know, 379 00:22:38,920 --> 00:22:40,960 Speaker 1: if you give the information to the company, if you 380 00:22:41,040 --> 00:22:44,080 Speaker 1: choose to do it, uh, you should still be able 381 00:22:44,119 --> 00:22:46,040 Speaker 1: to say, hey, you know, I want I'm giving this 382 00:22:46,080 --> 00:22:48,040 Speaker 1: information to you, but I'm doing it so that you 383 00:22:48,080 --> 00:22:51,359 Speaker 1: can do this set of things and nothing beyond that 384 00:22:51,440 --> 00:22:57,680 Speaker 1: set of things. So that's interesting. I'm wondering how how 385 00:22:57,680 --> 00:23:00,480 Speaker 1: well that will be enforced. Uh. And a lot of these, 386 00:23:00,520 --> 00:23:02,120 Speaker 1: by the way, we're going to go through them all, 387 00:23:02,200 --> 00:23:03,760 Speaker 1: but a lot of these are going to kind of 388 00:23:03,800 --> 00:23:07,600 Speaker 1: overlap each other or complement each other, so there will 389 00:23:07,640 --> 00:23:13,840 Speaker 1: be some some similarities throughout these these these uh rights, 390 00:23:13,920 --> 00:23:19,040 Speaker 1: these fips. Yes, yes, Now the second is transparency. So 391 00:23:19,040 --> 00:23:21,560 Speaker 1: so what they're saying is the company should tell you 392 00:23:21,720 --> 00:23:24,639 Speaker 1: upfront or during the entire time that you have an 393 00:23:24,640 --> 00:23:27,680 Speaker 1: account with them that exactly how your information is going 394 00:23:27,720 --> 00:23:30,720 Speaker 1: to be used. Um and and for what means? They 395 00:23:30,760 --> 00:23:34,200 Speaker 1: also privacy and security? Yes, yes, they also the security 396 00:23:34,240 --> 00:23:35,800 Speaker 1: was what I was going to address. They also have 397 00:23:35,880 --> 00:23:38,280 Speaker 1: to let you know how your data is going to 398 00:23:38,320 --> 00:23:42,560 Speaker 1: be protected, because yeah, it's Again that's one of the 399 00:23:42,640 --> 00:23:46,840 Speaker 1: reasons why this this this legislation or proposed guidelines. I 400 00:23:46,840 --> 00:23:50,640 Speaker 1: guess I shouldn't say legislation proposed guidelines. It's why they were. 401 00:23:51,160 --> 00:23:54,520 Speaker 1: Part of the reason why they exist is because people 402 00:23:55,040 --> 00:23:58,879 Speaker 1: when they are signing over information to a company, a 403 00:23:58,920 --> 00:24:00,960 Speaker 1: lot of us just kind of a him that it's 404 00:24:01,119 --> 00:24:04,040 Speaker 1: sort of sitting in a database somewhere, but that's it, 405 00:24:04,320 --> 00:24:07,040 Speaker 1: like it's not doing anything else and it's completely secure. 406 00:24:07,400 --> 00:24:09,000 Speaker 1: That's not always the case. I mean, you want to 407 00:24:09,000 --> 00:24:11,679 Speaker 1: know if if your information is can be encrypted, is 408 00:24:11,720 --> 00:24:14,000 Speaker 1: it being saved in plain text? Plain text, by the way, 409 00:24:14,040 --> 00:24:19,159 Speaker 1: is what we call a bad thing. Um, encrypted is better? Uh, 410 00:24:19,240 --> 00:24:22,800 Speaker 1: And when it's being used between companies, like if we're 411 00:24:22,800 --> 00:24:26,120 Speaker 1: talking about information that ultimately is going to be used 412 00:24:26,119 --> 00:24:29,960 Speaker 1: in order to get advertisers to send you information or 413 00:24:30,040 --> 00:24:32,640 Speaker 1: to post ads on the site that you're visiting all 414 00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:35,959 Speaker 1: the time, you want to make sure that, however they 415 00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:41,760 Speaker 1: are conveying your information to the advertiser, that it's secure. Yes, 416 00:24:41,920 --> 00:24:44,200 Speaker 1: and they need to make sure that that is easily 417 00:24:44,720 --> 00:24:48,240 Speaker 1: understood and easily available to to check out. So that's 418 00:24:48,240 --> 00:24:52,000 Speaker 1: the whole transparency issue. Then there's respect for context, and 419 00:24:52,000 --> 00:24:53,480 Speaker 1: this is one of those that sort of sounds a 420 00:24:53,560 --> 00:24:56,879 Speaker 1: little bit like in an overlap because what they're saying is, um, 421 00:24:57,920 --> 00:25:02,720 Speaker 1: let's say you've agreed to their the company's terms. Um, 422 00:25:02,840 --> 00:25:07,680 Speaker 1: the company should respect that you've agreed to those terms. So, um, 423 00:25:07,880 --> 00:25:12,240 Speaker 1: you've agreed to let your information be shared with select advertisers, 424 00:25:12,280 --> 00:25:14,720 Speaker 1: but they shouldn't go out and give it to and 425 00:25:14,760 --> 00:25:19,280 Speaker 1: sell your name to random mailing lists because within you've 426 00:25:19,880 --> 00:25:23,119 Speaker 1: had the context of I'm signing up for this, within 427 00:25:23,200 --> 00:25:27,320 Speaker 1: these boundaries, and they're saying you can't take it past that. 428 00:25:27,320 --> 00:25:30,040 Speaker 1: That's very good. And then the next is security, which 429 00:25:30,119 --> 00:25:32,119 Speaker 1: of course I've just chatted about. But this way that 430 00:25:32,240 --> 00:25:36,160 Speaker 1: you know, the transparency is letting you know how and 431 00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:40,359 Speaker 1: and uh, your data is being protected. This is actually 432 00:25:40,440 --> 00:25:44,840 Speaker 1: saying protect the data. Yeah, because it says that consumers 433 00:25:44,840 --> 00:25:48,520 Speaker 1: have a right to secure and responsible handling of personal data. 434 00:25:49,040 --> 00:25:52,240 Speaker 1: So this is this is actually putting it on those 435 00:25:52,359 --> 00:25:56,520 Speaker 1: sites and services to make sure that the information you 436 00:25:56,560 --> 00:26:01,000 Speaker 1: give them is protected reasonably from a sort of intrusion 437 00:26:01,560 --> 00:26:05,240 Speaker 1: or it could be anything from a hacker hacking their 438 00:26:05,280 --> 00:26:09,840 Speaker 1: way into the servers, to someone walking into the company 439 00:26:09,880 --> 00:26:12,960 Speaker 1: and physically taking a machine out of the company because 440 00:26:12,960 --> 00:26:15,919 Speaker 1: that has happened. You know, we we often think when 441 00:26:15,960 --> 00:26:18,919 Speaker 1: we're thinking about stealing information, we often think about the 442 00:26:18,960 --> 00:26:24,200 Speaker 1: whole Hollywood style where the cute, nerdy chick is sitting 443 00:26:24,240 --> 00:26:27,440 Speaker 1: down at a at a laptop and after about uh, 444 00:26:27,560 --> 00:26:29,480 Speaker 1: you know, I don't know, thirty seconds of typing on 445 00:26:29,520 --> 00:26:32,320 Speaker 1: a keyboard and then you just you know, you see 446 00:26:32,359 --> 00:26:34,840 Speaker 1: like the little progress bar filling up and as the 447 00:26:34,920 --> 00:26:38,520 Speaker 1: USB drive is is getting all the information. Meanwhile the 448 00:26:38,560 --> 00:26:42,360 Speaker 1: security guys are closing in. Will she get away? Well, 449 00:26:42,400 --> 00:26:46,040 Speaker 1: I'm watching, um yeah, where hels their team? You know, 450 00:26:46,240 --> 00:26:51,760 Speaker 1: Chloe Man. Anyway, So the other way you could do 451 00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:53,720 Speaker 1: it is you could have like a big guy named 452 00:26:53,720 --> 00:26:56,560 Speaker 1: Al just walks into the building, picks up a computer 453 00:26:56,640 --> 00:26:58,960 Speaker 1: and leaves, and then just all the information on the 454 00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:01,480 Speaker 1: computer is right there by the way. It does not 455 00:27:01,640 --> 00:27:03,359 Speaker 1: he does not have to be called out, nor does 456 00:27:03,400 --> 00:27:05,560 Speaker 1: he have to be a big guy. I'm here from 457 00:27:05,560 --> 00:27:08,440 Speaker 1: the computer cleaners. Okay, it's right over there. Yeah exactly. Yeah. 458 00:27:08,480 --> 00:27:11,720 Speaker 1: That's social engineering, and that happens way more frequently than 459 00:27:11,760 --> 00:27:14,960 Speaker 1: the whole. Let's breach this thing by you know, brute 460 00:27:15,000 --> 00:27:18,880 Speaker 1: forcing the password. Social engineering is much more effective if 461 00:27:18,920 --> 00:27:21,160 Speaker 1: you can walk up and talk to somebody and convince 462 00:27:21,200 --> 00:27:23,640 Speaker 1: them that you are the person who needs to do 463 00:27:23,680 --> 00:27:27,399 Speaker 1: this one particular thing. It's amazing how frequently that works. 464 00:27:28,320 --> 00:27:31,679 Speaker 1: What happened to number seventeen? Oh it's the cleaners. What 465 00:27:31,760 --> 00:27:35,520 Speaker 1: do you mean, the cleaners that had all our customer 466 00:27:35,600 --> 00:27:43,440 Speaker 1: dad on it? What one? Access and accuracy five? And basically, 467 00:27:43,600 --> 00:27:46,960 Speaker 1: people have a right to be able to get to 468 00:27:47,119 --> 00:27:49,679 Speaker 1: their personal data and make changes to it if they 469 00:27:49,680 --> 00:27:53,119 Speaker 1: need to make sure it's correct. Um, so, things like 470 00:27:53,240 --> 00:27:57,600 Speaker 1: if you have changed your address, or if you've changed 471 00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:01,239 Speaker 1: an important status in your life. You've gotten married, or 472 00:28:01,280 --> 00:28:03,920 Speaker 1: maybe you've got divorced, or maybe you've had kids or 473 00:28:04,280 --> 00:28:07,800 Speaker 1: you know, it's complicated. Yeah, yeah, it's it's the Facebook. 474 00:28:07,800 --> 00:28:10,160 Speaker 1: It's complicated, but it's where you want to be able 475 00:28:10,200 --> 00:28:13,160 Speaker 1: to go in there and make those changes so that 476 00:28:13,280 --> 00:28:17,680 Speaker 1: the information is still accurate. And um yeah, I mean 477 00:28:17,720 --> 00:28:20,119 Speaker 1: that just makes sense. And I think most companies tend 478 00:28:20,160 --> 00:28:22,360 Speaker 1: to do that, I mean, because they want to have 479 00:28:22,560 --> 00:28:24,840 Speaker 1: the most accurate information about you. It doesn't do them 480 00:28:24,840 --> 00:28:26,720 Speaker 1: any good if the information they have about you is 481 00:28:26,760 --> 00:28:29,199 Speaker 1: on a date, you know, that's not the reason they 482 00:28:29,800 --> 00:28:33,760 Speaker 1: don't care. Ultimately, I think most of these companies don't 483 00:28:33,880 --> 00:28:37,600 Speaker 1: really care about your personal information on a on a 484 00:28:37,640 --> 00:28:39,680 Speaker 1: personal level at all. It's not like they're trying to 485 00:28:39,720 --> 00:28:42,200 Speaker 1: spy on you to figure out what you are doing 486 00:28:42,320 --> 00:28:46,960 Speaker 1: in any you know, for any nefarious purposes. Uh. It's 487 00:28:47,520 --> 00:28:49,880 Speaker 1: all about profit really when it comes down to it, 488 00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:52,360 Speaker 1: or some in some cases, it's about trying to tailor 489 00:28:52,440 --> 00:28:55,720 Speaker 1: the experience so that it is the most meaningful to you, 490 00:28:56,120 --> 00:29:00,120 Speaker 1: which is feels a little more altruistic, but ultimately it 491 00:29:00,160 --> 00:29:02,160 Speaker 1: does come down to dollars and cents and not so 492 00:29:02,280 --> 00:29:07,560 Speaker 1: much of we're watching you sorry stuff they don't want 493 00:29:07,600 --> 00:29:11,640 Speaker 1: you to know shout out. And then there's um one 494 00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:16,200 Speaker 1: of my favorites, focused collection, which is basically saying we're 495 00:29:16,240 --> 00:29:19,280 Speaker 1: not going to collect or the company is not allowed 496 00:29:19,320 --> 00:29:22,000 Speaker 1: to collect anything else other than the stuff it needs 497 00:29:22,040 --> 00:29:23,920 Speaker 1: to do its job. Yeah. So in other words, if 498 00:29:23,920 --> 00:29:27,160 Speaker 1: you sign up for a coupon site, let's say a 499 00:29:27,200 --> 00:29:31,640 Speaker 1: coupon service, Yeah, that's going to deliver coupons that are 500 00:29:31,840 --> 00:29:36,120 Speaker 1: of interest to you, uh and are applicable to you 501 00:29:36,160 --> 00:29:39,360 Speaker 1: in your region. So we're talking about something like group on, right, Okay, 502 00:29:39,440 --> 00:29:41,880 Speaker 1: something like group on where you sign up, and part 503 00:29:41,920 --> 00:29:44,120 Speaker 1: of group on is that you tell it where you live, 504 00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:46,640 Speaker 1: because you know, it doesn't want to send you coupons 505 00:29:46,680 --> 00:29:48,680 Speaker 1: for a place that's a thousand miles away. It doesn't 506 00:29:48,680 --> 00:29:51,200 Speaker 1: do you any good. And you tell group on what 507 00:29:51,320 --> 00:29:55,280 Speaker 1: you're interested in, so that way it's sending you relevant coupons. 508 00:29:55,320 --> 00:29:58,520 Speaker 1: Because if you are really interested in outdoor adventures, but 509 00:29:58,640 --> 00:30:01,520 Speaker 1: you don't have a whole lot of interest in pottery, 510 00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:04,680 Speaker 1: then you don't want to keep getting you know, invites 511 00:30:04,720 --> 00:30:07,000 Speaker 1: to go take another pottery class. You know that's just 512 00:30:07,080 --> 00:30:10,880 Speaker 1: not that's not what you care about. Well, then that 513 00:30:11,080 --> 00:30:13,200 Speaker 1: information makes perfect sense for a group on to pull 514 00:30:13,280 --> 00:30:15,680 Speaker 1: from you. You know, your address or your zip code 515 00:30:15,760 --> 00:30:17,920 Speaker 1: or whatever, your the region you are in, and what 516 00:30:17,960 --> 00:30:22,120 Speaker 1: you're interested in, but other things might not matter so 517 00:30:22,200 --> 00:30:24,240 Speaker 1: much like it would, it wouldn't matter for the service 518 00:30:24,240 --> 00:30:27,040 Speaker 1: the group on is providing to you. So things like 519 00:30:27,440 --> 00:30:30,720 Speaker 1: the names of all your relatives, your social Security number, 520 00:30:30,800 --> 00:30:34,680 Speaker 1: your birth date, your driver's license number, this kind of 521 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:38,240 Speaker 1: information is not relevant to the service Groupon is providing, 522 00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:42,320 Speaker 1: and therefore, according to this bill of rights, group on 523 00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:44,880 Speaker 1: should not ask you for it, nor should you feel 524 00:30:44,880 --> 00:30:48,880 Speaker 1: compelled to share it, because why would they need that 525 00:30:49,160 --> 00:30:52,000 Speaker 1: to do what they do. You're you're never gonna let 526 00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:56,400 Speaker 1: me live down that pottery skydiving class, are you? You know? Uh? 527 00:30:56,640 --> 00:30:59,880 Speaker 1: He tells me that it was always supposed to be 528 00:30:59,880 --> 00:31:03,520 Speaker 1: an ash tray, but I am absolutely certain that originally 529 00:31:03,600 --> 00:31:07,720 Speaker 1: that wasn't going to be an urn Like, oh, let's 530 00:31:07,760 --> 00:31:12,080 Speaker 1: move on. So one of the things that they're talking 531 00:31:12,080 --> 00:31:16,040 Speaker 1: about embracing is something that UH that has been around 532 00:31:16,040 --> 00:31:18,920 Speaker 1: for a while now, the do not Track technology, which 533 00:31:19,000 --> 00:31:22,360 Speaker 1: is really less of a technology and more of an 534 00:31:22,400 --> 00:31:25,920 Speaker 1: agreement UM. In a way, it's sort of like a 535 00:31:25,920 --> 00:31:31,680 Speaker 1: gentleman's agreement between an advertiser and UH and the the 536 00:31:31,840 --> 00:31:35,920 Speaker 1: customer UM, and the technology behind it is browser based, 537 00:31:36,920 --> 00:31:40,320 Speaker 1: so UH UM Firefox, the most recent versions of Firefox 538 00:31:40,360 --> 00:31:42,960 Speaker 1: have do not Track in there, and Mozilla baked it 539 00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:45,720 Speaker 1: in there so that you could say, hey, i'm It's 540 00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:49,360 Speaker 1: basically a little information that goes along with a query 541 00:31:49,400 --> 00:31:51,480 Speaker 1: first site that says I don't want to be tracked, 542 00:31:52,000 --> 00:31:55,680 Speaker 1: and you you go to visit, you know, my wonderful 543 00:31:55,720 --> 00:31:59,360 Speaker 1: sandwich dot com, and you know, if my wonderful sandwich 544 00:31:59,440 --> 00:32:02,320 Speaker 1: dot com decides that now that lunch is over, they 545 00:32:02,360 --> 00:32:04,360 Speaker 1: want to know what else, what other kinds of foods 546 00:32:04,360 --> 00:32:08,400 Speaker 1: you like? Um, you know they don't have to participate 547 00:32:08,440 --> 00:32:11,680 Speaker 1: in the agreement at all, but you've already told them 548 00:32:11,680 --> 00:32:14,000 Speaker 1: that you don't want to. Now, if they're behaving responsibly, 549 00:32:14,040 --> 00:32:16,280 Speaker 1: they might say all right, no, no, we know, we 550 00:32:16,360 --> 00:32:19,760 Speaker 1: know you're just looking for lunch, No big deal. Um. 551 00:32:19,800 --> 00:32:21,960 Speaker 1: But now they're they're trying to uh, they're trying to 552 00:32:22,000 --> 00:32:24,120 Speaker 1: get more people to embrace that. And I know that 553 00:32:24,160 --> 00:32:27,760 Speaker 1: Google has said it will add that to Chrome um 554 00:32:27,800 --> 00:32:30,479 Speaker 1: as well. So you know this this may end up 555 00:32:30,480 --> 00:32:35,200 Speaker 1: being part of the technology that helps support this this legislation, 556 00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:38,160 Speaker 1: and it becomes legislation. And this falls into what is 557 00:32:38,200 --> 00:32:44,080 Speaker 1: the final FIP, which is accountability. Yes, and accountability is 558 00:32:44,120 --> 00:32:46,680 Speaker 1: all about the fact that the wording in the actual 559 00:32:46,720 --> 00:32:49,040 Speaker 1: document is that consumers have a right to have personal 560 00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:52,480 Speaker 1: data handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to 561 00:32:52,480 --> 00:32:54,880 Speaker 1: assure they adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. 562 00:32:55,360 --> 00:32:57,440 Speaker 1: And that's that's what we're talking about here, is that 563 00:32:57,520 --> 00:33:00,120 Speaker 1: you know, you have a right to uh, to be 564 00:33:00,160 --> 00:33:03,280 Speaker 1: able to use a browser that's not going to necessarily 565 00:33:03,800 --> 00:33:07,400 Speaker 1: collect all that information without you knowing it, or not 566 00:33:07,440 --> 00:33:10,000 Speaker 1: even a browser. But like search engines. You know, again 567 00:33:10,080 --> 00:33:14,600 Speaker 1: we're talking about Google here, mainly other search engines too, 568 00:33:15,080 --> 00:33:20,200 Speaker 1: But you know, if you're using Google and you're searching 569 00:33:20,200 --> 00:33:22,280 Speaker 1: for stuff all day long like some of us, you know, 570 00:33:22,480 --> 00:33:24,640 Speaker 1: I do it all day long. That's my job is 571 00:33:25,280 --> 00:33:30,440 Speaker 1: you know, search information and pull it together and write articles. Um. 572 00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:33,720 Speaker 1: Then you know, you'd like to have a little more 573 00:33:33,720 --> 00:33:37,040 Speaker 1: control over that so that you don't have all these 574 00:33:37,040 --> 00:33:41,320 Speaker 1: different potential companies and organizations having access to your personal 575 00:33:41,400 --> 00:33:44,760 Speaker 1: information and making decisions about you over which you have 576 00:33:44,800 --> 00:33:48,040 Speaker 1: no control. So it's nice to have that kind of 577 00:33:48,080 --> 00:33:52,440 Speaker 1: power as an individual. And but fairly recently there have 578 00:33:52,520 --> 00:33:57,400 Speaker 1: been some reports about how companies like Google have signed 579 00:33:57,440 --> 00:33:59,680 Speaker 1: on with this, saying that this is this is a 580 00:33:59,680 --> 00:34:04,240 Speaker 1: great idea, and you might think this this these guidelines 581 00:34:04,280 --> 00:34:07,360 Speaker 1: sound like they could potentially, you know, put a dent 582 00:34:07,760 --> 00:34:11,000 Speaker 1: in some business here. Well, there are a couple of 583 00:34:11,000 --> 00:34:13,319 Speaker 1: reasons why or a couple of reasons why Google and 584 00:34:13,400 --> 00:34:17,719 Speaker 1: other companies like Google might be behind the guidelines that 585 00:34:18,600 --> 00:34:22,680 Speaker 1: aren't exactly like, yes, we also believe in privacy, uh 586 00:34:23,080 --> 00:34:25,239 Speaker 1: not to say that that motivation isn't there. It may 587 00:34:25,360 --> 00:34:29,480 Speaker 1: very well be, but there are other alternative reasons why 588 00:34:29,520 --> 00:34:32,440 Speaker 1: they might be behind this, and one of those is that, well, 589 00:34:32,440 --> 00:34:35,640 Speaker 1: it's a good PR move to say customer privacy is 590 00:34:35,680 --> 00:34:37,719 Speaker 1: one of our main concerns as well, and we want 591 00:34:37,719 --> 00:34:39,440 Speaker 1: to make sure that we're doing the right thing, so 592 00:34:39,440 --> 00:34:43,560 Speaker 1: that's a good PR move. Another is this isn't legislation. 593 00:34:44,320 --> 00:34:47,120 Speaker 1: It's not baked into law, so there's no real danger 594 00:34:47,160 --> 00:34:51,160 Speaker 1: in saying sure, as opposed to opposing it, because there 595 00:34:51,200 --> 00:34:57,120 Speaker 1: was actual legislation in California for a state, uh, legislation 596 00:34:57,600 --> 00:35:01,600 Speaker 1: that would kind of approach the same sort of subject 597 00:35:01,680 --> 00:35:07,320 Speaker 1: matter as these this this bill of rights, and companies 598 00:35:07,360 --> 00:35:09,839 Speaker 1: like Google were very much non in favor of it. 599 00:35:10,480 --> 00:35:13,920 Speaker 1: So when it when it moved to the actual legislation phase, 600 00:35:14,640 --> 00:35:17,080 Speaker 1: there was a lot more opposition. Now right here where 601 00:35:17,080 --> 00:35:20,319 Speaker 1: it's not where it's a great idea, but it's not 602 00:35:20,440 --> 00:35:24,120 Speaker 1: really enforceable, not from a legal standpoint. It could be 603 00:35:24,200 --> 00:35:27,840 Speaker 1: enforceable if companies took it upon themselves to enforce it 604 00:35:28,320 --> 00:35:31,960 Speaker 1: on their own practices, but there's no teeth behind it 605 00:35:32,080 --> 00:35:36,080 Speaker 1: right now. Uh, there's nothing dangerous about saying, sure, let's 606 00:35:36,120 --> 00:35:41,400 Speaker 1: do it, So there's that as well. And you know, again, 607 00:35:41,440 --> 00:35:43,719 Speaker 1: I don't want to I don't want to say that 608 00:35:43,800 --> 00:35:47,400 Speaker 1: any company has a particular motivation. I'll just say that 609 00:35:47,480 --> 00:35:51,319 Speaker 1: the behaviors when it was in California legislation debate and 610 00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:54,920 Speaker 1: the behaviors when it's in a proposal that doesn't have 611 00:35:54,960 --> 00:36:02,120 Speaker 1: any legal backing to it are different. That's what I'm saying. Yeah, 612 00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:06,239 Speaker 1: So we were talking a little bit about about how 613 00:36:06,280 --> 00:36:09,080 Speaker 1: things will be enforced, and the Federal Trade Commission would 614 00:36:09,160 --> 00:36:12,359 Speaker 1: be the department of the United States government that would 615 00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:17,080 Speaker 1: be responsible for making sure that UH companies behave themselves 616 00:36:17,080 --> 00:36:20,920 Speaker 1: and and follow the guidelines set forth and this um 617 00:36:21,200 --> 00:36:25,800 Speaker 1: uh in this document and UH, well you know, I 618 00:36:26,080 --> 00:36:28,840 Speaker 1: don't know how much they'd be able to do that. 619 00:36:29,080 --> 00:36:32,640 Speaker 1: That's the problem. See, at this point, this document is 620 00:36:32,680 --> 00:36:36,239 Speaker 1: not as as Jonathan pointed out, it's not legislation. It's 621 00:36:36,280 --> 00:36:39,160 Speaker 1: not a proposed legislation. It's really more of a set 622 00:36:39,160 --> 00:36:42,560 Speaker 1: of guidelines. So what the legislation would be would be 623 00:36:42,600 --> 00:36:46,880 Speaker 1: actually more about how it would be enforced, and it 624 00:36:46,880 --> 00:36:50,479 Speaker 1: would it would set forth those uh instructions on how 625 00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:53,640 Speaker 1: they would move going forward. And keep in mind that 626 00:36:54,000 --> 00:36:57,920 Speaker 1: if this were to enter uh, legislation like if it 627 00:36:58,040 --> 00:37:01,680 Speaker 1: was if it would if it enters that as, then 628 00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:05,000 Speaker 1: the changes that would be made to the language would 629 00:37:05,920 --> 00:37:08,719 Speaker 1: possibly be quite drastic, and it could be that the 630 00:37:08,760 --> 00:37:13,600 Speaker 1: outcome is completely different than what this proposal is. So 631 00:37:13,920 --> 00:37:17,760 Speaker 1: that's it's pretty much a guarantee, even not completely different, 632 00:37:17,800 --> 00:37:22,040 Speaker 1: but significantly different. Yeah. Yeah, well I think uh, I 633 00:37:22,080 --> 00:37:24,920 Speaker 1: think the idea behind it is sound. There are are 634 00:37:24,960 --> 00:37:31,160 Speaker 1: several of the UM agencies that have been UM outspoken 635 00:37:31,520 --> 00:37:35,799 Speaker 1: in rights, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation. UH, they're all 636 00:37:35,840 --> 00:37:39,080 Speaker 1: about that, yes, and they basically said, hey, we like 637 00:37:39,280 --> 00:37:42,480 Speaker 1: the idea behind it, were interested to see what's going 638 00:37:42,520 --> 00:37:46,319 Speaker 1: to happen. So UM, it will be interesting to see 639 00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:49,480 Speaker 1: how it goes forward and how whether or not it 640 00:37:49,560 --> 00:37:54,320 Speaker 1: inspires others and UH and other places to create similar 641 00:37:54,400 --> 00:37:58,040 Speaker 1: legislation and maybe curtail some of this or or you know, 642 00:37:58,320 --> 00:38:01,560 Speaker 1: give people a good idea of how their information is 643 00:38:01,600 --> 00:38:04,120 Speaker 1: being used. And honestly, I think that is probably the biggest, 644 00:38:04,800 --> 00:38:08,719 Speaker 1: UM most useful thing that would come out of that too, 645 00:38:08,719 --> 00:38:12,520 Speaker 1: because people really want to use these services UM and companies, 646 00:38:12,560 --> 00:38:14,840 Speaker 1: you know, everybody's sort of an agreement, but it would 647 00:38:14,840 --> 00:38:17,279 Speaker 1: be nice to know how information is being stored and 648 00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:21,719 Speaker 1: exactly what's being collected and then not that excess information 649 00:38:21,800 --> 00:38:25,440 Speaker 1: is not being used um and and retained if it 650 00:38:25,440 --> 00:38:27,120 Speaker 1: it doesn't need to be there in the first place. 651 00:38:27,520 --> 00:38:31,719 Speaker 1: At least that's my opinion. I agree entirely. All well, 652 00:38:31,800 --> 00:38:34,160 Speaker 1: and uh yeah, it'll be you know, we'll have to 653 00:38:34,200 --> 00:38:37,400 Speaker 1: see how this turns out. I mean, the whole argument 654 00:38:37,440 --> 00:38:41,760 Speaker 1: about privacy and what people should be uh, what's reasonable 655 00:38:41,800 --> 00:38:45,080 Speaker 1: for us to expect us consumers, how much of that 656 00:38:45,200 --> 00:38:49,280 Speaker 1: responsibility falls on us versus the the entities that are 657 00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:52,839 Speaker 1: gathering our information. That debate is going to go on 658 00:38:52,920 --> 00:38:57,560 Speaker 1: for a while, probably forever. It'll it'll switch back and 659 00:38:57,600 --> 00:39:00,719 Speaker 1: forth quite a bit. But it's just to remember that 660 00:39:00,800 --> 00:39:02,840 Speaker 1: when you go and you sign up for these things, 661 00:39:03,640 --> 00:39:08,480 Speaker 1: whether it's a social networking site or an even an 662 00:39:08,480 --> 00:39:11,799 Speaker 1: app that you might put on a smartphone, keep in 663 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:14,720 Speaker 1: mind that a lot of these companies, you know, they're 664 00:39:14,760 --> 00:39:18,400 Speaker 1: they're making some serious cash off your personal information. Personal 665 00:39:18,440 --> 00:39:24,160 Speaker 1: information is the digital currency, right and so uh, you know, 666 00:39:24,360 --> 00:39:27,759 Speaker 1: just do a little thinking about that, some critical thinking 667 00:39:27,840 --> 00:39:29,960 Speaker 1: about how your information is going to be used. And 668 00:39:30,640 --> 00:39:33,680 Speaker 1: really it comes down to, right now, are you okay 669 00:39:33,680 --> 00:39:35,920 Speaker 1: with that? And if you are okay with that, if 670 00:39:35,960 --> 00:39:38,359 Speaker 1: you if you trust the source and you feel that 671 00:39:38,440 --> 00:39:41,600 Speaker 1: your information is in capable hands and you don't mind 672 00:39:41,640 --> 00:39:47,200 Speaker 1: it being used for advertising purposes or whatever, then you're fine. 673 00:39:47,760 --> 00:39:51,319 Speaker 1: If you feel that it's not the right thing for you, 674 00:39:51,360 --> 00:39:53,680 Speaker 1: then you might want to, you know, give a second 675 00:39:53,680 --> 00:39:57,240 Speaker 1: thought to actually joining that side or or engaging that service. 676 00:39:58,200 --> 00:40:00,600 Speaker 1: It's a tough you know, it's a of choice to 677 00:40:00,600 --> 00:40:03,120 Speaker 1: make sometimes because sometimes we just want something so badly 678 00:40:03,200 --> 00:40:06,920 Speaker 1: that we're willing to uh to cut some corners that 679 00:40:07,040 --> 00:40:11,120 Speaker 1: could potentially come back to haunt us and uh, you know, 680 00:40:11,160 --> 00:40:14,200 Speaker 1: and then there are cases where we have no control 681 00:40:14,200 --> 00:40:16,759 Speaker 1: over it whatsoever. Like the Epsilon hack is a good 682 00:40:16,800 --> 00:40:20,440 Speaker 1: example where you know, the consumers who had their information 683 00:40:20,480 --> 00:40:24,160 Speaker 1: stolen in the Epsilon hack weren't dealing with Epsilon directly. 684 00:40:24,719 --> 00:40:28,239 Speaker 1: They were dealing with companies that were customers of Epsilon. 685 00:40:28,880 --> 00:40:31,759 Speaker 1: And so you know that that was one of those 686 00:40:31,760 --> 00:40:34,800 Speaker 1: things that was really tough, a really tough situation because 687 00:40:35,840 --> 00:40:38,440 Speaker 1: if you you might trust the company you're doing business with, 688 00:40:38,520 --> 00:40:42,200 Speaker 1: but you don't necessarily know what companies they're doing business with, right, 689 00:40:42,280 --> 00:40:44,680 Speaker 1: and a lot of people who signed up for that 690 00:40:44,960 --> 00:40:48,759 Speaker 1: didn't realize they were signing up for that because um, 691 00:40:48,760 --> 00:40:53,440 Speaker 1: by and large, the companies that had their information stored 692 00:40:53,480 --> 00:40:57,239 Speaker 1: with Epsilon were retailers, and people had signed up for 693 00:40:57,280 --> 00:41:01,520 Speaker 1: loyalty cards not realizing that, uh or I guess probably 694 00:41:01,560 --> 00:41:04,120 Speaker 1: not thinking about the idea that hey, they're going to 695 00:41:04,160 --> 00:41:06,359 Speaker 1: put this on a computer somewhere and that computer could 696 00:41:06,360 --> 00:41:10,080 Speaker 1: be hacked and my personal information could be taken. Um 697 00:41:10,120 --> 00:41:12,640 Speaker 1: not like signing up for an account on a computer 698 00:41:12,719 --> 00:41:15,080 Speaker 1: where you're saying, I am entering this information into the 699 00:41:15,120 --> 00:41:19,399 Speaker 1: computer myself. Um. So there was a bit of an 700 00:41:19,400 --> 00:41:22,279 Speaker 1: intermediary there where you're going, oh, well, I'm giving I 701 00:41:22,640 --> 00:41:24,480 Speaker 1: filled this out by hand, and I handed it to 702 00:41:24,520 --> 00:41:26,600 Speaker 1: the guy at the service desk, and he gave me 703 00:41:26,640 --> 00:41:28,879 Speaker 1: a card that I'm going to go use and buy 704 00:41:28,880 --> 00:41:33,880 Speaker 1: some groceries. Now. Yeah. Yeah. To the average consumer, it 705 00:41:33,880 --> 00:41:38,279 Speaker 1: probably felt more like using a coupon. Yeah, and then 706 00:41:38,320 --> 00:41:40,400 Speaker 1: put clip a coupon out of a piece of paper 707 00:41:40,400 --> 00:41:42,760 Speaker 1: and you you you use it when you buy something 708 00:41:43,320 --> 00:41:46,359 Speaker 1: you know that's not attached to you at all, and 709 00:41:46,400 --> 00:41:48,840 Speaker 1: it's between you and this real retailer. Well, as it 710 00:41:48,880 --> 00:41:52,000 Speaker 1: turns out, all those retailers are working with this one company, 711 00:41:52,280 --> 00:41:56,799 Speaker 1: yeah that had massive databases and yes, yeah, so it's 712 00:41:56,840 --> 00:41:59,600 Speaker 1: it's a sticky issue and it's gonna be it's just 713 00:41:59,600 --> 00:42:02,359 Speaker 1: gonna get more and more important because again, like the 714 00:42:02,360 --> 00:42:07,000 Speaker 1: whole visibility of of security hacking has increased over the 715 00:42:07,080 --> 00:42:10,760 Speaker 1: last i'd say, like five or ten years, and uh, 716 00:42:11,000 --> 00:42:13,960 Speaker 1: it doesn't look like the hackers are giving up anytime soon. Right. 717 00:42:14,080 --> 00:42:18,200 Speaker 1: So anyway, well, that's our discussion about the Consumer Privacy 718 00:42:18,280 --> 00:42:21,839 Speaker 1: Bill of Rights. Uh it we'll see whether or not 719 00:42:21,880 --> 00:42:24,719 Speaker 1: it's ever put into law, and if it turns out 720 00:42:24,800 --> 00:42:27,439 Speaker 1: to be an effective piece of legislation, all of that's 721 00:42:27,440 --> 00:42:30,239 Speaker 1: still in question. If you guys have any ideas for 722 00:42:30,320 --> 00:42:33,280 Speaker 1: topics that we should cover here on tech Stuff, please 723 00:42:33,320 --> 00:42:35,560 Speaker 1: let us know. You can email us. Our address is 724 00:42:35,640 --> 00:42:38,799 Speaker 1: tech stuff at Discovery dot com, or you can sume 725 00:42:38,880 --> 00:42:41,640 Speaker 1: us a message via Twitter or Facebook or handle. There 726 00:42:41,719 --> 00:42:44,520 Speaker 1: is tech Stuff hs W and Chris and I will 727 00:42:44,520 --> 00:42:48,920 Speaker 1: tell you again really soon. Be sure to check out 728 00:42:48,920 --> 00:42:52,080 Speaker 1: our new video podcast, Stuff from the Future. Join how 729 00:42:52,160 --> 00:42:54,680 Speaker 1: Stuff Work staff as we explore the most promising and 730 00:42:54,719 --> 00:42:59,200 Speaker 1: perplexing possibilities of tomorrow. The house Stuff Works I find 731 00:42:59,200 --> 00:43:06,919 Speaker 1: app has a right download it today on iTunes, brought 732 00:43:06,960 --> 00:43:10,160 Speaker 1: to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. It's ready, 733 00:43:10,320 --> 00:43:10,719 Speaker 1: are you