1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:24,760 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. Welcome 4 00:00:24,760 --> 00:00:26,960 Speaker 1: back to the show. My name is Matt, my name 5 00:00:27,040 --> 00:00:29,360 Speaker 1: is Noll. They call me Ben. We are joined with 6 00:00:29,480 --> 00:00:34,440 Speaker 1: our returning guest super producer, Casey Pegram. Most importantly, you 7 00:00:34,479 --> 00:00:37,400 Speaker 1: are you. You are here that makes this stuff they 8 00:00:37,440 --> 00:00:41,080 Speaker 1: don't want you to know. Today's episode is about war. Uh, 9 00:00:41,280 --> 00:00:43,720 Speaker 1: what is it good for? A war that some people 10 00:00:43,760 --> 00:00:45,919 Speaker 1: will tell you it's just a few years in the distance. 11 00:00:47,040 --> 00:00:50,680 Speaker 1: Are that's already kind of happening? A war that other 12 00:00:50,760 --> 00:00:56,760 Speaker 1: people will argue has already begun here the facts, so 13 00:00:56,880 --> 00:01:01,400 Speaker 1: the state of war is changing in decades and centuries past. 14 00:01:01,600 --> 00:01:03,920 Speaker 1: Most of us who are not hundreds of years have 15 00:01:04,000 --> 00:01:07,440 Speaker 1: only seen this depicted in film right and photographs and such. 16 00:01:07,920 --> 00:01:11,680 Speaker 1: In the past ages and past conflicts, there would be 17 00:01:11,880 --> 00:01:16,640 Speaker 1: things like Napoleonic warfare. Napoleonic warfare is one of the 18 00:01:16,680 --> 00:01:19,720 Speaker 1: reasons that the Civil War here in the US was 19 00:01:19,760 --> 00:01:23,640 Speaker 1: such a bloody conflict. It's that thing where people line 20 00:01:23,720 --> 00:01:26,319 Speaker 1: up in rows and they all hold guns or some 21 00:01:26,400 --> 00:01:29,480 Speaker 1: kind of weapon and then somebody in charge stands in 22 00:01:29,520 --> 00:01:32,520 Speaker 1: the back and makes them all march toward each other 23 00:01:32,880 --> 00:01:36,440 Speaker 1: and just continually shoot and see who's left standing at 24 00:01:36,440 --> 00:01:41,120 Speaker 1: the end. Yeah, it's um, it's a combination of the 25 00:01:41,160 --> 00:01:44,920 Speaker 1: technology available to wage war and the rules that are 26 00:01:44,959 --> 00:01:48,440 Speaker 1: set in place or agreed upon. Just as what is 27 00:01:48,520 --> 00:01:51,720 Speaker 1: the correct thing to do in war? Right? Right? What 28 00:01:51,880 --> 00:01:55,160 Speaker 1: is the ethical thing? The traditional thing? How much do 29 00:01:55,240 --> 00:01:58,280 Speaker 1: we value the lives of the people we are sending 30 00:01:58,320 --> 00:02:02,760 Speaker 1: to die? Uh? The answer in the poleonic wars value. 31 00:02:03,560 --> 00:02:07,560 Speaker 1: So war has changed, as you said, met, and it 32 00:02:08,000 --> 00:02:13,079 Speaker 1: is continually changing. There were a lot of wonderful things 33 00:02:13,680 --> 00:02:15,920 Speaker 1: we've talked about on the show that come from war, 34 00:02:16,520 --> 00:02:22,760 Speaker 1: usually advances in medical technology, but they're earned through horrific experiences, 35 00:02:23,440 --> 00:02:28,519 Speaker 1: and there are lots of other non medical technological breakthroughs. 36 00:02:28,919 --> 00:02:33,200 Speaker 1: Usually weaponize things that later have a civilian use. And 37 00:02:33,240 --> 00:02:36,560 Speaker 1: that's everything from well not really zippers, but kind of 38 00:02:36,639 --> 00:02:40,920 Speaker 1: zippers like clothing, really lots and lots of different types 39 00:02:40,960 --> 00:02:46,480 Speaker 1: of kinds of clothing, um, to what's something else? Grow food? Yeah, 40 00:02:46,520 --> 00:02:51,680 Speaker 1: food storage, just everywhere, well everything probably in some way 41 00:02:51,760 --> 00:02:54,960 Speaker 1: to say it comes from innovation from war because you 42 00:02:55,000 --> 00:02:59,679 Speaker 1: have needs. So in this way, and just this relatively 43 00:02:59,800 --> 00:03:03,399 Speaker 1: in innovative way, one could argue that war is an 44 00:03:03,440 --> 00:03:11,080 Speaker 1: economic necessity. The more realistic and way less inspiring ted 45 00:03:11,160 --> 00:03:15,280 Speaker 1: talky version of wars and economic necessity is the one 46 00:03:15,360 --> 00:03:19,360 Speaker 1: that admits that, despite all the ideological clap trap people 47 00:03:19,440 --> 00:03:22,840 Speaker 1: are fed by their leaders, war is typically going to 48 00:03:22,880 --> 00:03:28,359 Speaker 1: be about dominance and resource extraction, controlling the stage, the 49 00:03:28,360 --> 00:03:35,240 Speaker 1: theater in which these uh, blood drenched plays occur. And 50 00:03:35,320 --> 00:03:40,440 Speaker 1: now we have moved past long past napoleonic warfare to 51 00:03:41,280 --> 00:03:44,640 Speaker 1: what we would have considered modern warfare, which would be 52 00:03:45,560 --> 00:03:50,640 Speaker 1: smaller groups of people or larger groups divided into smaller groups, 53 00:03:50,680 --> 00:03:53,760 Speaker 1: practicing things that were once seen as very dishonorable, like 54 00:03:53,800 --> 00:03:59,520 Speaker 1: guerrilla tactics. You know, hide, shoot, avoid rents, and repeat 55 00:04:00,120 --> 00:04:04,640 Speaker 1: and use information available to better target things. That's why 56 00:04:04,680 --> 00:04:07,120 Speaker 1: we have UH. Now we live in a world of 57 00:04:07,720 --> 00:04:13,360 Speaker 1: unmanned aerial vehicles that in theory are targeting specific threats 58 00:04:13,600 --> 00:04:18,000 Speaker 1: and never getting it wrong, not once. Yeah. Yeah. A 59 00:04:18,040 --> 00:04:20,480 Speaker 1: lot of the technology is very much one sided, which 60 00:04:20,520 --> 00:04:23,719 Speaker 1: is why being at the top of the technology game 61 00:04:23,800 --> 00:04:27,039 Speaker 1: is so important. Yeah yeah, And it's hard to overstate that. 62 00:04:27,120 --> 00:04:30,640 Speaker 1: And and a lot of nations, even the very advanced 63 00:04:30,760 --> 00:04:36,400 Speaker 1: nations are working with these strangely uneven levels of sophistication. 64 00:04:36,839 --> 00:04:40,279 Speaker 1: Computers in one part or one department could be top notch, 65 00:04:40,360 --> 00:04:44,320 Speaker 1: bleeding edge sci fi stuff that the public won't see 66 00:04:44,400 --> 00:04:48,200 Speaker 1: for another ten to fifteen years, but the same country, 67 00:04:48,360 --> 00:04:51,320 Speaker 1: maybe even in the same building, could have computers that 68 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:55,039 Speaker 1: are doing equally important tasks that are hopelessly outdated, like 69 00:04:55,120 --> 00:04:58,280 Speaker 1: their pre windows they're on IBM, you know, like all 70 00:04:58,320 --> 00:05:01,479 Speaker 1: the Hacker film screens, and then the greens with the 71 00:05:01,520 --> 00:05:07,400 Speaker 1: green the mono colored those do still exist, and windows 72 00:05:07,480 --> 00:05:13,000 Speaker 1: ninety five machines in highly important like water treatment plants, 73 00:05:13,040 --> 00:05:15,760 Speaker 1: something as simple as that, even if it's not war. Yeah, 74 00:05:16,000 --> 00:05:18,800 Speaker 1: we I don't remember which show this was on, but 75 00:05:19,000 --> 00:05:21,640 Speaker 1: I think we did an episode before either here on 76 00:05:21,760 --> 00:05:27,960 Speaker 1: car stuff about how distressingly easy it is to compromise infrastructure, 77 00:05:28,360 --> 00:05:30,200 Speaker 1: like all the traffic If you were in the US 78 00:05:30,240 --> 00:05:32,360 Speaker 1: and you're listening to this, unless you're in a very 79 00:05:32,480 --> 00:05:35,520 Speaker 1: very large city, the odds are that most of your 80 00:05:35,560 --> 00:05:40,840 Speaker 1: traffic lights are controlled by a central thing, and you 81 00:05:40,880 --> 00:05:45,719 Speaker 1: can you can hack into it, don't you're not telling 82 00:05:45,760 --> 00:05:49,040 Speaker 1: you to. And the terminals are usually immediately there next 83 00:05:49,080 --> 00:05:51,920 Speaker 1: to the traffic light is so you cannot just mess 84 00:05:52,040 --> 00:05:54,840 Speaker 1: up one traffic light, you can mess up all of them. 85 00:05:54,920 --> 00:05:56,680 Speaker 1: Did you ever see that episode of My Geiver where 86 00:05:56,680 --> 00:05:59,359 Speaker 1: he like uses like a credit card and sticks it 87 00:05:59,400 --> 00:06:01,479 Speaker 1: inside and he opens up the traffic box and he 88 00:06:01,520 --> 00:06:03,640 Speaker 1: like gets the lights to change on command by like 89 00:06:04,000 --> 00:06:06,640 Speaker 1: you know, using some kind of plastic device to like 90 00:06:06,720 --> 00:06:08,480 Speaker 1: break the circuit. I can't remember exactly what he did. 91 00:06:08,600 --> 00:06:10,720 Speaker 1: It was very mcguivvery but yeah, he called he basically 92 00:06:10,800 --> 00:06:12,760 Speaker 1: it was kind of messed up because he actually caused 93 00:06:12,800 --> 00:06:16,200 Speaker 1: a pretty catastrophic looking pile up and as like, ever, 94 00:06:16,279 --> 00:06:20,640 Speaker 1: that's not cool. You don't kill Yeah, uh, that's and 95 00:06:20,720 --> 00:06:23,440 Speaker 1: that is for the record, the original Oneiver, the good one, 96 00:06:24,279 --> 00:06:28,880 Speaker 1: hot take. Yeah, sure, fine, no regrets, but it's it's true. 97 00:06:29,000 --> 00:06:35,040 Speaker 1: We're we have uneven progress as a species, especially in 98 00:06:35,040 --> 00:06:38,919 Speaker 1: this field. And according to prominent think tanks like the 99 00:06:39,000 --> 00:06:44,960 Speaker 1: Rand Corporation, this new face of war, we're evolving past 100 00:06:45,240 --> 00:06:50,159 Speaker 1: of past guerrilla tactics, past um just sending people out 101 00:06:50,200 --> 00:06:55,480 Speaker 1: with good human intel or sigent signal intelligence. And it's 102 00:06:55,520 --> 00:06:59,960 Speaker 1: less about who has the biggest gun, right exactly, It's 103 00:07:00,120 --> 00:07:04,440 Speaker 1: more about who has the best information. So all of 104 00:07:04,480 --> 00:07:07,400 Speaker 1: the thing tanks are more or less agreeing in them. 105 00:07:08,560 --> 00:07:12,160 Speaker 1: In this post nuclear society, we have everybody still as nukes, right, 106 00:07:13,040 --> 00:07:15,880 Speaker 1: but a lot of people you don't want to use them. 107 00:07:15,960 --> 00:07:19,880 Speaker 1: That's political suicide. So now we're trying to find better 108 00:07:19,920 --> 00:07:23,480 Speaker 1: ways to steal, bag or borrow information, and that leads 109 00:07:23,560 --> 00:07:29,000 Speaker 1: us to something called strategic information warfare. This is the 110 00:07:29,120 --> 00:07:33,040 Speaker 1: term the US eggheads prefer to use. It has another 111 00:07:33,160 --> 00:07:38,440 Speaker 1: term in other places. It's one subgenre of what we 112 00:07:38,480 --> 00:07:43,000 Speaker 1: would call asymmetrical warfare. If if we're three different nations. 113 00:07:43,400 --> 00:07:46,960 Speaker 1: So if we're four different nations and we're in a 114 00:07:47,080 --> 00:07:50,280 Speaker 1: conflict and one of us, Matt, let's say you're America 115 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:55,040 Speaker 1: and you have the world's most powerful davy, I most 116 00:07:55,080 --> 00:07:59,080 Speaker 1: certainly do. There's no reason for US other countries to 117 00:07:59,440 --> 00:08:02,120 Speaker 1: spend billions and billions and billions of dollars trying to 118 00:08:02,160 --> 00:08:04,600 Speaker 1: catch up with you when we can just leap frog 119 00:08:04,680 --> 00:08:08,600 Speaker 1: you and build a battleship killer or an aircraft carrier killer, 120 00:08:09,080 --> 00:08:13,720 Speaker 1: something that is less expensive to build and almost impossible 121 00:08:13,720 --> 00:08:16,240 Speaker 1: for you to defend against. Matt, why always flexing that 122 00:08:16,560 --> 00:08:20,280 Speaker 1: superior navy and air force because I can print dollars 123 00:08:20,520 --> 00:08:23,080 Speaker 1: get a little too big for them pants. You'll never 124 00:08:23,160 --> 00:08:28,600 Speaker 1: know my black budgets. Yes, it's true, It's all true, 125 00:08:28,640 --> 00:08:31,520 Speaker 1: and that you know, those are great pants. Matt has 126 00:08:31,600 --> 00:08:34,480 Speaker 1: to have their American flag pants. Yeah, Matt's taken wearing 127 00:08:34,480 --> 00:08:38,360 Speaker 1: his uncle sam outfit just seven, which just has the 128 00:08:38,400 --> 00:08:41,840 Speaker 1: weird out your kid. You know, he's comes to love it. 129 00:08:42,280 --> 00:08:45,679 Speaker 1: And and he calls me Sammy. Um, he says, Sammy, 130 00:08:45,760 --> 00:08:48,400 Speaker 1: what are we doing today? And I'm like, we're gonna 131 00:08:49,040 --> 00:08:52,600 Speaker 1: find some natives and we're going to take all their land. 132 00:08:53,040 --> 00:08:56,640 Speaker 1: We're gonna affect them blankets with the plague. I'm sorry, 133 00:08:56,679 --> 00:08:58,439 Speaker 1: I think I was role playing a little too hard. Now, 134 00:08:59,240 --> 00:09:04,160 Speaker 1: America for it, for it. America is great. Well, America 135 00:09:04,200 --> 00:09:06,520 Speaker 1: is a country, and all countries have blood on their hands. 136 00:09:06,559 --> 00:09:10,800 Speaker 1: I would challenge anybody's name one that does not. That's 137 00:09:10,800 --> 00:09:13,760 Speaker 1: actually my favorite song of the moment. It's called Country Blood, 138 00:09:14,080 --> 00:09:19,480 Speaker 1: Country Blood by Toby Keith. Sounds great, sounds sounds great. 139 00:09:19,520 --> 00:09:24,200 Speaker 1: Toby Keith probably would fit oddly enough, this is so 140 00:09:24,280 --> 00:09:26,520 Speaker 1: off track, but Toby Keith would fit in more into 141 00:09:26,559 --> 00:09:29,960 Speaker 1: psy ops right propaganda warfare. If you want to freak 142 00:09:29,960 --> 00:09:33,199 Speaker 1: out people in foreign country, play your own music. Really loud, 143 00:09:33,320 --> 00:09:35,960 Speaker 1: it's very patriotic, and then play it for hours. Like 144 00:09:36,000 --> 00:09:39,400 Speaker 1: the Barney song has often been used when law enforcement 145 00:09:39,559 --> 00:09:42,480 Speaker 1: is making a siege of some kind of compound or 146 00:09:42,520 --> 00:09:47,199 Speaker 1: commune anyway. So now we've got the basic logic, why 147 00:09:47,760 --> 00:09:51,679 Speaker 1: bother to try to build a battleship when you can 148 00:09:51,840 --> 00:09:55,480 Speaker 1: build something that kills a battleship, or you can build 149 00:09:55,520 --> 00:09:58,840 Speaker 1: something that teaches you how to kill a battleship, and 150 00:09:58,880 --> 00:10:02,160 Speaker 1: you can do it for a lot less money. This 151 00:10:02,240 --> 00:10:03,760 Speaker 1: is why we get this is how we get to 152 00:10:03,760 --> 00:10:08,520 Speaker 1: information warfare. This is why hacking is so important. Stealing 153 00:10:08,760 --> 00:10:13,680 Speaker 1: information from another country or from another business, you know what, 154 00:10:13,960 --> 00:10:17,280 Speaker 1: forget about Uncle Sam. Let's just say go to Northrop Grumman, 155 00:10:17,480 --> 00:10:19,920 Speaker 1: figure out what they've got going on, right, And there 156 00:10:19,960 --> 00:10:22,199 Speaker 1: are million ways to do it. And I just would 157 00:10:22,200 --> 00:10:25,040 Speaker 1: say hacking that that kind of tactic really is an 158 00:10:25,120 --> 00:10:29,120 Speaker 1: underdog tactic because it's it requires that there is someone 159 00:10:29,440 --> 00:10:33,960 Speaker 1: that has something that is worth stealing. Right. I completely 160 00:10:34,280 --> 00:10:39,240 Speaker 1: see that logic. I understand it's um God, I don't 161 00:10:39,240 --> 00:10:42,160 Speaker 1: want to get into it too much, but the the 162 00:10:42,200 --> 00:10:47,320 Speaker 1: psychology of a suicide bombing or akama kaze, right when 163 00:10:47,320 --> 00:10:50,840 Speaker 1: you get into that idea of we do not have 164 00:10:50,880 --> 00:10:55,640 Speaker 1: the technology to meet this group in in warfare, like 165 00:10:55,679 --> 00:10:59,080 Speaker 1: you're saying, battleships and build battleships, but we can do 166 00:10:59,200 --> 00:11:02,559 Speaker 1: something that destroys a battleship, right, Yeah, I see what 167 00:11:02,600 --> 00:11:05,400 Speaker 1: you're seeing, and that's essentially what this is. We cannot 168 00:11:05,480 --> 00:11:08,640 Speaker 1: build this thing, but we can take the information and 169 00:11:08,679 --> 00:11:11,719 Speaker 1: we can know what you're doing, and we can basically 170 00:11:12,640 --> 00:11:14,920 Speaker 1: use some of the other guerrilla tackics and things because 171 00:11:14,960 --> 00:11:17,880 Speaker 1: now we know what you're doing. Yeah, that's absolutely correct. 172 00:11:18,360 --> 00:11:22,560 Speaker 1: And the US in particular is seen as very vulnerable 173 00:11:22,679 --> 00:11:27,920 Speaker 1: to these sorts of hacking attempts because operational security is 174 00:11:27,960 --> 00:11:32,000 Speaker 1: such a tough thing for the world's largest military to be. 175 00:11:32,120 --> 00:11:37,400 Speaker 1: You know, it's it's like you could get secure on something, 176 00:11:37,440 --> 00:11:42,080 Speaker 1: but that other ten percent is devilishly difficult. And this 177 00:11:42,160 --> 00:11:46,360 Speaker 1: is where we see the emergence of things that have 178 00:11:46,400 --> 00:11:50,000 Speaker 1: been called off to by various journalists, pundits I think 179 00:11:50,040 --> 00:11:52,120 Speaker 1: I even did it a few years back, have been 180 00:11:52,120 --> 00:11:58,439 Speaker 1: called hacking armies, state sponsored well kind of kind of 181 00:11:58,480 --> 00:12:03,160 Speaker 1: a state sponsored groups used to compromise the security rival governments, 182 00:12:03,160 --> 00:12:06,679 Speaker 1: obtained intelligence and in a lot of cases target high 183 00:12:06,720 --> 00:12:10,880 Speaker 1: value individuals such as officials in the military, key industries, 184 00:12:11,320 --> 00:12:16,760 Speaker 1: or officials in political campaigns and so on. So for example, 185 00:12:16,760 --> 00:12:20,680 Speaker 1: of that super producer Casey Pegram is a general and 186 00:12:20,760 --> 00:12:23,280 Speaker 1: he has some kind of he has some kind of 187 00:12:23,320 --> 00:12:26,280 Speaker 1: intimate knowledge of something, then he would be he would 188 00:12:26,320 --> 00:12:29,360 Speaker 1: be a target worth looking as an individual. Good news 189 00:12:29,400 --> 00:12:32,200 Speaker 1: is most people are not most most people, you just 190 00:12:32,280 --> 00:12:36,440 Speaker 1: it doesn't matter. The primary thing is where you work 191 00:12:36,720 --> 00:12:40,400 Speaker 1: and what your position is there, and maybe maybe maybe 192 00:12:40,440 --> 00:12:45,520 Speaker 1: if you're related to somebody really important. And the thing is, 193 00:12:46,400 --> 00:12:50,280 Speaker 1: most of these hacker armies operate in their home countries 194 00:12:50,720 --> 00:12:54,680 Speaker 1: in a way that their sponsors their patrons can claim 195 00:12:54,760 --> 00:12:58,760 Speaker 1: plausible deniability if they're caught or suspected. So there was 196 00:12:58,760 --> 00:13:02,400 Speaker 1: that Russian bot net arm me that influenced Western social media. 197 00:13:03,040 --> 00:13:06,280 Speaker 1: Um it got the story broke in the wake of 198 00:13:06,320 --> 00:13:10,080 Speaker 1: the previous presidential election. But this Bottonet army was active 199 00:13:10,120 --> 00:13:12,880 Speaker 1: on things, on a lot of things for much longer, 200 00:13:13,000 --> 00:13:15,920 Speaker 1: you know, like even on sub credits, which is weird, 201 00:13:16,200 --> 00:13:19,080 Speaker 1: and definitely on YouTube, which is weird. And you have 202 00:13:19,080 --> 00:13:23,320 Speaker 1: to wonder what their priorities are. But according to Russia, 203 00:13:23,679 --> 00:13:27,360 Speaker 1: the actual Federated States of Russia, their official position is 204 00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:31,840 Speaker 1: uh yet not with us. You know, if they were 205 00:13:31,960 --> 00:13:37,160 Speaker 1: doing some pro Russia is only pro Russia is personal feeling, 206 00:13:38,000 --> 00:13:41,640 Speaker 1: not not like we're not paying them to do it. 207 00:13:41,640 --> 00:13:44,880 Speaker 1: It's just they just like us so much, you know. Yeah, 208 00:13:44,880 --> 00:13:48,600 Speaker 1: they're doing it out of their own fields, and we 209 00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:50,560 Speaker 1: we have not paid. And this is a very familiar 210 00:13:50,600 --> 00:13:53,400 Speaker 1: line from Russia. It's oddly enough, it's one we don't 211 00:13:53,440 --> 00:13:56,199 Speaker 1: see us too often on the U S side, because 212 00:13:56,240 --> 00:13:59,199 Speaker 1: the US has a really bad time as a really 213 00:13:59,200 --> 00:14:04,880 Speaker 1: tough time getting the top notch hackers often just because 214 00:14:04,960 --> 00:14:07,840 Speaker 1: mainly because of the drug use policy for security clearance, 215 00:14:08,080 --> 00:14:11,319 Speaker 1: which I think they walked back. So maybe it's I 216 00:14:11,600 --> 00:14:14,480 Speaker 1: don't know, maybe the really good US hackers are just 217 00:14:14,520 --> 00:14:18,520 Speaker 1: all completely secret and never commented on. Maybe the US 218 00:14:18,600 --> 00:14:23,320 Speaker 1: has a group of patriotic hackers, but Russia is clearly 219 00:14:23,320 --> 00:14:26,840 Speaker 1: playing paying these people, paying and playing paying to play 220 00:14:26,920 --> 00:14:31,160 Speaker 1: these people. Thank you. So now we have to ask 221 00:14:31,200 --> 00:14:35,120 Speaker 1: about the other countries who has the most effective hacker army. 222 00:14:35,320 --> 00:14:37,400 Speaker 1: Most people, most of us in the West, would just 223 00:14:37,440 --> 00:14:41,680 Speaker 1: like in a knee jerk reaction, say well, it's the USA. Obviously, 224 00:14:41,720 --> 00:14:45,640 Speaker 1: it's the US a partner, you know, we have the 225 00:14:45,960 --> 00:14:47,960 Speaker 1: we've got the money, we've got the means, we've got 226 00:14:47,960 --> 00:14:53,040 Speaker 1: the motives. America bald eagles, rock flag and eagle. You know. Yeah, 227 00:14:53,120 --> 00:14:56,600 Speaker 1: but America hasn't been an underdog for a long time. 228 00:14:57,560 --> 00:15:00,520 Speaker 1: And I think you raised in a very importan point 229 00:15:00,560 --> 00:15:03,640 Speaker 1: regarding that perspective. So then maybe other people would say, oh, 230 00:15:03,680 --> 00:15:07,200 Speaker 1: it's it's Russia. Clearly it's Russia. They would say, look 231 00:15:07,200 --> 00:15:09,560 Speaker 1: at it's we know about the bot net. It's Russia. 232 00:15:09,720 --> 00:15:11,880 Speaker 1: And then other people would say, no, no, you guys 233 00:15:11,920 --> 00:15:17,320 Speaker 1: are being ridiculous. Pay attention. Look past the illusion of 234 00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:22,240 Speaker 1: the single nation state. Look at international surveillance, these cooperatives 235 00:15:22,280 --> 00:15:27,160 Speaker 1: like five Eyes, which is terrifying. Yeah, because that's that's 236 00:15:27,400 --> 00:15:32,040 Speaker 1: a bunch of countries working together, combining forces and then saying, hey, 237 00:15:32,040 --> 00:15:34,120 Speaker 1: we got all this land, and we got all this 238 00:15:34,240 --> 00:15:37,920 Speaker 1: sea around the land, let's just monitor everything, and let's 239 00:15:37,960 --> 00:15:40,440 Speaker 1: do it in such a way that we're never actually 240 00:15:40,520 --> 00:15:44,120 Speaker 1: technically breaking our own domestic laws. We just happened to 241 00:15:44,160 --> 00:15:49,200 Speaker 1: share some information. It's brilliant. It is so immoral and brilliant. 242 00:15:49,320 --> 00:15:52,560 Speaker 1: We've all got Gmail drafts open and accounts that we 243 00:15:52,600 --> 00:15:59,600 Speaker 1: share right right. Oh for portrays. So with all this stuff. 244 00:15:59,640 --> 00:16:03,120 Speaker 1: The problem them as people tend to overlook the role 245 00:16:03,400 --> 00:16:08,760 Speaker 1: of China's digital superspies. And we want to be really 246 00:16:08,800 --> 00:16:11,280 Speaker 1: careful in this episode because there's so much when the 247 00:16:11,360 --> 00:16:15,120 Speaker 1: nationalism stuff comes into playing, there's so so many people 248 00:16:15,520 --> 00:16:21,480 Speaker 1: fall in this slippery slope of racism, you know, and jingoism. 249 00:16:21,520 --> 00:16:25,720 Speaker 1: And it's important to note that even the smallest countries 250 00:16:25,760 --> 00:16:29,440 Speaker 1: are full of people with different viewpoints. Very very very 251 00:16:29,560 --> 00:16:33,160 Speaker 1: rarely does an entire country move and lockstep and agree 252 00:16:33,200 --> 00:16:35,880 Speaker 1: on something. You know, there are a ton of people 253 00:16:36,400 --> 00:16:40,760 Speaker 1: here in the US that completely don't think China is 254 00:16:40,760 --> 00:16:43,360 Speaker 1: a threat to don't want some sort of war, and 255 00:16:43,480 --> 00:16:48,480 Speaker 1: that problem that that variety of views is even larger 256 00:16:49,080 --> 00:17:00,360 Speaker 1: in China. But they're also probably they're also probably the 257 00:17:00,400 --> 00:17:05,679 Speaker 1: biggest culprit or biggest propagator of digital warfare today. And 258 00:17:05,720 --> 00:17:10,960 Speaker 1: we've seen that already h in when we were talking 259 00:17:10,960 --> 00:17:18,000 Speaker 1: about infiltration and corporate infiltration and the use of getting 260 00:17:18,040 --> 00:17:22,680 Speaker 1: into systems, taking intellectual property from other countries and then 261 00:17:22,800 --> 00:17:27,280 Speaker 1: kind of building your own version of it. UM China. Again, 262 00:17:27,320 --> 00:17:29,800 Speaker 1: it's hard to even speak about it, but groups in 263 00:17:29,880 --> 00:17:33,240 Speaker 1: China have a very long history of doing this. UM 264 00:17:33,280 --> 00:17:35,800 Speaker 1: and that's almost like on the level of like corporate espionage. 265 00:17:35,840 --> 00:17:38,240 Speaker 1: It is corporate espionage, but then if you imagine it, 266 00:17:38,440 --> 00:17:41,040 Speaker 1: we're we're just kind of moving it over a couple 267 00:17:41,080 --> 00:17:46,480 Speaker 1: of steps to military espionage in this way, especially sinceince 268 00:17:46,520 --> 00:17:47,680 Speaker 1: because like you said at the top of the show, 269 00:17:47,720 --> 00:17:50,200 Speaker 1: so much of the technology is created at the military 270 00:17:50,280 --> 00:17:53,239 Speaker 1: level before it, uh you know, ends up in the 271 00:17:53,240 --> 00:17:55,919 Speaker 1: public sphere. So it's just a way of like getting 272 00:17:57,440 --> 00:18:02,240 Speaker 1: proprietary technology early. Yeah. And one of the main factors 273 00:18:02,280 --> 00:18:05,680 Speaker 1: here is that China is home to one point four 274 00:18:05,840 --> 00:18:10,000 Speaker 1: billion people. It's the most populous country, and they've been 275 00:18:10,040 --> 00:18:12,920 Speaker 1: doing this for a long, long long time. They see 276 00:18:12,920 --> 00:18:18,720 Speaker 1: it's right, it's and it's hard to even speak about it. Well, 277 00:18:18,800 --> 00:18:21,200 Speaker 1: China is the they and the stuff they don't want 278 00:18:21,240 --> 00:18:24,320 Speaker 1: you to know of this episode. It is China's government. 279 00:18:24,520 --> 00:18:26,760 Speaker 1: We could call it the PRC if that yeah, that's 280 00:18:26,840 --> 00:18:32,560 Speaker 1: that is that is good, the People's Republic of China. Yeah. Yes. 281 00:18:33,280 --> 00:18:36,520 Speaker 1: And they also made something. They created a program, a 282 00:18:36,600 --> 00:18:41,119 Speaker 1: group of networks and a network of people that is 283 00:18:41,160 --> 00:18:47,960 Speaker 1: doing something and it's called ghost net. Oh per ghost 284 00:18:48,040 --> 00:18:53,119 Speaker 1: net pretty good huha, at least that's what it's called. 285 00:18:53,440 --> 00:18:56,159 Speaker 1: Isn't that the name of a Mission Impossible movie? Is 286 00:18:56,200 --> 00:19:00,080 Speaker 1: that that ghost Nation? Ghost It's something rogue nation. What 287 00:19:00,119 --> 00:19:03,439 Speaker 1: was it called? Thought ghost protocol? Ghost protocol maybe? And 288 00:19:03,480 --> 00:19:05,400 Speaker 1: there was also like a Tom Clancy video game called 289 00:19:05,400 --> 00:19:09,639 Speaker 1: ghost Recon. I believe we we have to we have 290 00:19:09,720 --> 00:19:16,960 Speaker 1: to figure out what that is. Hey, God, impossible. It's 291 00:19:16,960 --> 00:19:19,960 Speaker 1: ghost protocol, ghost protocol. There you go. I'm a fan 292 00:19:20,000 --> 00:19:21,480 Speaker 1: of that. Are you a fan of Oh? They're fun 293 00:19:21,880 --> 00:19:25,199 Speaker 1: so much running, a lot of running and jumping, and 294 00:19:25,480 --> 00:19:28,040 Speaker 1: you know, you can really tell that Cruiz takes doing 295 00:19:28,040 --> 00:19:30,080 Speaker 1: his own stunts very seriously. Be there's a lot of 296 00:19:30,080 --> 00:19:33,360 Speaker 1: one takes, you know, not a lot of cutting, slicing 297 00:19:33,359 --> 00:19:36,919 Speaker 1: and dicing. It's good stuff and it's still not as 298 00:19:37,040 --> 00:19:41,399 Speaker 1: dangerous as again, to return to our original tone, ghost net. 299 00:19:42,080 --> 00:19:44,080 Speaker 1: But what is it? We'll tell you after a word 300 00:19:44,119 --> 00:19:53,959 Speaker 1: from our sponsor. Here's where it gets crazy. So commercial 301 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:59,760 Speaker 1: fisher fishing people, members of the commercial fishing industry who 302 00:19:59,800 --> 00:20:02,879 Speaker 1: lives into the show's shout out to a very specific 303 00:20:03,880 --> 00:20:08,000 Speaker 1: uh part of the demographic here deadliest catch. Yes, yes, 304 00:20:09,560 --> 00:20:12,680 Speaker 1: you all will be familiar with ghost net. From a 305 00:20:12,800 --> 00:20:15,919 Speaker 1: different perspective, ghost net can mean one of two things. 306 00:20:15,960 --> 00:20:19,719 Speaker 1: In the world of commercial fishing, ghost nets or ghost 307 00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:23,840 Speaker 1: gear are lost or discarded fishing nets that float through 308 00:20:23,840 --> 00:20:26,920 Speaker 1: the ocean and every year they trap and kill millions 309 00:20:26,920 --> 00:20:29,960 Speaker 1: and millions and millions of marine animals. It's a tragedy. 310 00:20:30,040 --> 00:20:33,520 Speaker 1: The ocean ecosystem is collapsing. Your grandchildren may not be 311 00:20:33,600 --> 00:20:37,119 Speaker 1: able to eat fish. But that's that's the story for 312 00:20:37,160 --> 00:20:39,679 Speaker 1: another day. What are you gonna do? Go out there 313 00:20:39,680 --> 00:20:42,800 Speaker 1: and capture all the nets? Yeah, good luck, good luck. 314 00:20:43,440 --> 00:20:46,320 Speaker 1: Uh try to capture the net, but the net will 315 00:20:46,359 --> 00:20:49,600 Speaker 1: capture you. How I did it without making a severe 316 00:20:49,640 --> 00:20:52,760 Speaker 1: Russia joke, at least in the world of hacking, however, 317 00:20:52,800 --> 00:20:57,280 Speaker 1: The ghost net no spaces is a sophisticated program operating 318 00:20:57,320 --> 00:21:03,240 Speaker 1: in China designed to capture information for Ministries of Foreign Affairs, embussies, 319 00:21:03,560 --> 00:21:11,720 Speaker 1: international organizations, high value target type individuals, news media institutions 320 00:21:12,080 --> 00:21:16,920 Speaker 1: and in geo's non government organizations. Basically high value everything. 321 00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:20,000 Speaker 1: So how do we find out about this? So ghost 322 00:21:20,080 --> 00:21:23,080 Speaker 1: net was discovered when the Office of Get This the 323 00:21:23,160 --> 00:21:28,359 Speaker 1: Dolli Llama in Tarmasala, India, contacted experts to investigate if 324 00:21:28,600 --> 00:21:32,160 Speaker 1: this facility was being bugged and um A researcher at 325 00:21:32,240 --> 00:21:36,560 Speaker 1: Cambridge Guy named Ross Anderson, and also Shashir Nagaraja at 326 00:21:36,560 --> 00:21:39,879 Speaker 1: the University of Illinois wrote this about this event quote, 327 00:21:39,880 --> 00:21:41,679 Speaker 1: the Office of the Dali Lama started to suspect it 328 00:21:41,720 --> 00:21:44,840 Speaker 1: was under surveillance while setting up meetings between His Holiness. 329 00:21:45,320 --> 00:21:47,320 Speaker 1: I wish people called me his Holiness. That'd be awesome. 330 00:21:47,400 --> 00:21:48,480 Speaker 1: What do you have to do to get that title? 331 00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:51,560 Speaker 1: You have to be the doi law or or maybe 332 00:21:51,560 --> 00:21:55,760 Speaker 1: a pope. Uh, their holiness? Yeah, so yeah, his Holiness 333 00:21:55,840 --> 00:21:59,000 Speaker 1: and foreign dignitaries. They were looking to surveil these meetings 334 00:21:59,000 --> 00:22:02,439 Speaker 1: between His Holy the Dali Lama and foreign dignitaries, so 335 00:22:02,600 --> 00:22:05,160 Speaker 1: they sent an email invitation on behalf of the Dalai 336 00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:08,399 Speaker 1: Lama to foreign diplomat, but before anyone was able to 337 00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:11,359 Speaker 1: follow up with a phone call, the diplomat's office was 338 00:22:11,400 --> 00:22:14,760 Speaker 1: contacted by the Chinese government and warned not to go 339 00:22:14,840 --> 00:22:18,320 Speaker 1: ahead with the meeting. So this is important because it 340 00:22:18,359 --> 00:22:22,440 Speaker 1: means one of two things happened. Either when the Office 341 00:22:22,440 --> 00:22:28,280 Speaker 1: of the Dalai Lama sent that email, the government of 342 00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:34,600 Speaker 1: China knew what was happening right yes, somehow, or when 343 00:22:34,960 --> 00:22:39,119 Speaker 1: the embassy received the email, the government of China found 344 00:22:39,119 --> 00:22:41,800 Speaker 1: it and knew what was happening. So yeah, they had 345 00:22:41,880 --> 00:22:46,000 Speaker 1: they had one side of it, at least one side right. 346 00:22:47,080 --> 00:22:53,919 Speaker 1: And so Mr Niagaraja travels to Dam Sala. Then September 347 00:22:54,000 --> 00:22:58,399 Speaker 1: of two thousand and eight, I believe and discovers that 348 00:22:58,440 --> 00:23:02,760 Speaker 1: the Tibetan computer system had been breached from inside China. 349 00:23:03,320 --> 00:23:08,040 Speaker 1: These computers contain details about the locations of refugees, Tibetan 350 00:23:08,080 --> 00:23:13,959 Speaker 1: refugees and the location of schools that were possible targets 351 00:23:14,080 --> 00:23:20,720 Speaker 1: for um, the Chinese assimilation is one way to say 352 00:23:20,800 --> 00:23:26,280 Speaker 1: assimilation tactics, but also the repression of Tibetan culture. So 353 00:23:26,480 --> 00:23:29,400 Speaker 1: they got hacked and then they launched into an investigation 354 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:33,040 Speaker 1: that took almost a year before they reached their conclusions. Yes, 355 00:23:33,160 --> 00:23:35,720 Speaker 1: in two thousand nine, it was a ten month investigation 356 00:23:35,760 --> 00:23:39,040 Speaker 1: by the Monks Center for International Studies in Toronto, and 357 00:23:39,080 --> 00:23:42,879 Speaker 1: they revealed that this thing ghost net not only taps 358 00:23:42,880 --> 00:23:45,800 Speaker 1: into their emails, but it also turns them into giant 359 00:23:45,960 --> 00:23:50,600 Speaker 1: listening devices like like Amazon Alexa right yes, oh my god, 360 00:23:50,720 --> 00:23:53,280 Speaker 1: or a Google Home or whatever else you've just got 361 00:23:53,320 --> 00:23:55,920 Speaker 1: sitting in your living room like me wait wait to 362 00:23:56,040 --> 00:23:58,720 Speaker 1: like like but like a reverse that thing right, because 363 00:23:58,720 --> 00:24:01,560 Speaker 1: it's not it's not assisting. It's not personally assisting you. 364 00:24:01,600 --> 00:24:04,199 Speaker 1: It's more personally helping itself to your information and passing 365 00:24:04,200 --> 00:24:07,480 Speaker 1: it on to whoever has which, which Alexa is doing 366 00:24:07,560 --> 00:24:09,639 Speaker 1: as well. Right, we just have the illusion that we 367 00:24:09,680 --> 00:24:12,720 Speaker 1: control with just don't get intimate around it. And here's 368 00:24:12,720 --> 00:24:14,600 Speaker 1: a fun one for the one who has one of 369 00:24:14,640 --> 00:24:17,719 Speaker 1: these devices in your house as you're listening to this podcast. 370 00:24:19,080 --> 00:24:21,000 Speaker 1: I'll do the one for Alexis. Someone do the one 371 00:24:21,040 --> 00:24:24,240 Speaker 1: for Google. Don't know what happens, Hey, Alex, so tell 372 00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:29,960 Speaker 1: us Amazon's official privacy policy. It's not gonna do it. No, 373 00:24:30,720 --> 00:24:33,840 Speaker 1: there's no way to make it happen. Hey Google, when's 374 00:24:33,920 --> 00:24:38,160 Speaker 1: Lady Gaga's birthday? I feel like that's way less important. 375 00:24:42,880 --> 00:24:47,439 Speaker 1: Hey Google, erase all of your records? There you go. 376 00:24:47,520 --> 00:24:51,160 Speaker 1: I just can't do that, you know I can't do that? 377 00:24:51,920 --> 00:24:57,119 Speaker 1: All right? Whatever? Google? Hey Alexa played Desposito. No, do 378 00:24:57,200 --> 00:24:59,439 Speaker 1: you realize we have alienated literally everyone that's listening to 379 00:24:59,440 --> 00:25:01,840 Speaker 1: this on the devices right now? Yeah? I know absolutely 380 00:25:02,640 --> 00:25:06,160 Speaker 1: the Uh that's that's part of the show. Um, And 381 00:25:06,280 --> 00:25:09,399 Speaker 1: I don't think it will work if you're listening to 382 00:25:09,400 --> 00:25:13,600 Speaker 1: it on one of those devices already. I don't Yeah, 383 00:25:13,680 --> 00:25:16,040 Speaker 1: I don't think write in and let us know, uh, 384 00:25:16,200 --> 00:25:19,119 Speaker 1: And we hope that that harmless prank hasn't done anything. 385 00:25:19,200 --> 00:25:22,240 Speaker 1: The only reason to bring it up is because those 386 00:25:22,320 --> 00:25:29,920 Speaker 1: listening devices themselves uh are notoriously imperfect at answering questions. 387 00:25:30,200 --> 00:25:33,640 Speaker 1: There's a wealth of research going on now to make 388 00:25:33,760 --> 00:25:37,080 Speaker 1: these devices better at answering questions. But I maintain that 389 00:25:37,080 --> 00:25:41,679 Speaker 1: there's some questions they're simply refusing to answer, such as, uh, 390 00:25:42,119 --> 00:25:46,400 Speaker 1: privacy questions, what happens to those recordings if you do 391 00:25:46,520 --> 00:25:48,920 Speaker 1: think you ever race them? Yeah? The built the built 392 00:25:48,920 --> 00:25:51,480 Speaker 1: in answers to a lot of those questions have changed 393 00:25:51,840 --> 00:25:55,480 Speaker 1: every time, especially as they get as they become memes online. 394 00:25:55,920 --> 00:25:58,240 Speaker 1: But we just forgot to mention Sirie, the one that's 395 00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:00,480 Speaker 1: like sitting on the desk. I'm looking at a serie 396 00:26:00,560 --> 00:26:04,320 Speaker 1: right there. There's one in my pocket. Yeah, case he's 397 00:26:04,320 --> 00:26:08,679 Speaker 1: going out there. I'm pretty sure. Oh lord, there's in 398 00:26:08,720 --> 00:26:11,040 Speaker 1: everybody's pocket now. So it's true we have become the 399 00:26:11,080 --> 00:26:13,840 Speaker 1: eyes and ears that we feared their parents did. But 400 00:26:14,640 --> 00:26:17,960 Speaker 1: the thing about this program, ghost Net, is that it 401 00:26:18,040 --> 00:26:21,920 Speaker 1: did not even have um the It did not even 402 00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:29,160 Speaker 1: have the pretense of control or privacy concerns. It didn't 403 00:26:29,160 --> 00:26:31,280 Speaker 1: even have the theater of that that we see in 404 00:26:31,400 --> 00:26:36,280 Speaker 1: Amazon and Google because there was there was absolutely no need. 405 00:26:36,320 --> 00:26:40,480 Speaker 1: People weren't supposed to know about this. The report stopped 406 00:26:40,520 --> 00:26:46,040 Speaker 1: short of outright accusing the government of the PRC for 407 00:26:46,200 --> 00:26:50,720 Speaker 1: creating this network, and instead they said everything but they 408 00:26:50,760 --> 00:26:55,399 Speaker 1: said the vast majority of these attacks originate from inside China. 409 00:26:55,760 --> 00:26:59,000 Speaker 1: What they meant was, all of these attacks originate from 410 00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:03,399 Speaker 1: inside China, but they could be independently operating. They just 411 00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:07,680 Speaker 1: happened to be in China, right right, right. Someone is 412 00:27:07,800 --> 00:27:11,040 Speaker 1: very patriotic, and they say, you know what, not only 413 00:27:11,160 --> 00:27:17,680 Speaker 1: am I a supremely talented um computer whiz, but I'm 414 00:27:17,800 --> 00:27:22,040 Speaker 1: also not just patriotic, but I'm plugged into the internal, 415 00:27:22,160 --> 00:27:27,119 Speaker 1: often unstated policy goals of the Chinese military and government 416 00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:29,840 Speaker 1: just because I like the country so much. So I'm 417 00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:32,600 Speaker 1: just gonna do this, even though the government has come 418 00:27:32,640 --> 00:27:35,680 Speaker 1: forward and said that it's a crime. So I'm gonna 419 00:27:35,760 --> 00:27:39,639 Speaker 1: go to jail, uh due to breaking the laws of 420 00:27:39,680 --> 00:27:42,159 Speaker 1: the country I love, and the country I love is 421 00:27:42,160 --> 00:27:43,680 Speaker 1: gonna put me in jail, you know what I mean. 422 00:27:44,040 --> 00:27:49,840 Speaker 1: That's just it's a lot of that's a lot of Uh, 423 00:27:49,840 --> 00:27:53,199 Speaker 1: it's just a lot in general to try to digest. Right, 424 00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:57,560 Speaker 1: So again we have to be fair. It's unclear whether 425 00:27:57,600 --> 00:28:00,399 Speaker 1: they're independent or state sponsored. But that is back to 426 00:28:00,440 --> 00:28:04,600 Speaker 1: the idea of plausible deniability. And another thing that's important 427 00:28:04,600 --> 00:28:06,760 Speaker 1: here too is that it's a little bit of a 428 00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:10,760 Speaker 1: lower simmer because a lot of other countries like Russia, 429 00:28:10,960 --> 00:28:17,040 Speaker 1: the US, Israel or whatever, will have cyber attacks or 430 00:28:17,119 --> 00:28:22,879 Speaker 1: digital attacks that are blatantly violent, targeting things and in 431 00:28:22,920 --> 00:28:25,399 Speaker 1: many cases have a little bit of a little bit 432 00:28:25,440 --> 00:28:27,480 Speaker 1: of a style on them, a little bit of swag, 433 00:28:28,000 --> 00:28:30,680 Speaker 1: so that despite official deniability, it can be an open 434 00:28:30,760 --> 00:28:34,280 Speaker 1: secret about who did this, Like stuck s net clearly 435 00:28:34,440 --> 00:28:40,120 Speaker 1: Israel US right too, um cripple or at least mitigate 436 00:28:40,160 --> 00:28:45,480 Speaker 1: the progress of the Irani nuclear program, Russia taking out 437 00:28:45,640 --> 00:28:50,840 Speaker 1: various power grids and then saying, oh, it's almost very sad. 438 00:28:50,280 --> 00:28:54,320 Speaker 1: That's yeah. A lot of times when when at least 439 00:28:54,880 --> 00:28:57,440 Speaker 1: I'm seeing and please right in and correct me if 440 00:28:57,440 --> 00:29:01,800 Speaker 1: I'm incorrect about this will be because with these kinds 441 00:29:01,800 --> 00:29:06,680 Speaker 1: of cyber attacks and security threats, when the originating or 442 00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:10,840 Speaker 1: the area where an attack originates physically is harder it's 443 00:29:10,880 --> 00:29:15,000 Speaker 1: becoming harder and harder to understand or to verify. I guess, 444 00:29:15,640 --> 00:29:18,360 Speaker 1: so you really have to look at motive like you're saying, 445 00:29:18,360 --> 00:29:21,920 Speaker 1: ben like who what power would want this to happen 446 00:29:22,040 --> 00:29:24,520 Speaker 1: or want this area to be infected or you know, 447 00:29:24,840 --> 00:29:28,440 Speaker 1: this sector in this military or something, And then is 448 00:29:28,480 --> 00:29:31,800 Speaker 1: this some weird star Trek four D level chess. It's 449 00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:36,080 Speaker 1: interesting because one researcher said, this could be happening in 450 00:29:36,200 --> 00:29:39,600 Speaker 1: China without the knowledge of any Chinese nationals. We can't 451 00:29:39,600 --> 00:29:45,000 Speaker 1: forget that there are no clean nor ethical intelligence agencies. 452 00:29:45,160 --> 00:29:49,440 Speaker 1: That's not how intelligence works. Instead, Okay, so Ronald Debart, 453 00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:54,200 Speaker 1: one of the researchers said, and I quote here, we 454 00:29:54,200 --> 00:29:56,480 Speaker 1: were a bit careful about it. Knowing the nuance of 455 00:29:56,480 --> 00:30:01,600 Speaker 1: what happens in subterranean realms, you could tell this guys, yeah, whatever, 456 00:30:02,600 --> 00:30:05,520 Speaker 1: this could also well be the CIA or the Russians. 457 00:30:05,600 --> 00:30:08,840 Speaker 1: It's a murky realm. We're lifting the lid on, right, 458 00:30:09,240 --> 00:30:11,320 Speaker 1: And at first I was very skeptical about that, but 459 00:30:12,000 --> 00:30:15,480 Speaker 1: it's a really good point because if you wanted to 460 00:30:15,560 --> 00:30:18,920 Speaker 1: make the government of China look bad, disrep your role, 461 00:30:19,000 --> 00:30:21,800 Speaker 1: or terrible, then just send some send some of your 462 00:30:21,840 --> 00:30:25,040 Speaker 1: own dirty boys in there to do an operation. Gotta 463 00:30:25,080 --> 00:30:26,960 Speaker 1: get them dirty boys on the scene. I know, and 464 00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:32,400 Speaker 1: I like that phrase. So the US has also repeatedly 465 00:30:32,440 --> 00:30:38,480 Speaker 1: warned about China's increasing capabilities in the realm of electronic warfare. 466 00:30:38,760 --> 00:30:42,360 Speaker 1: But we're I don't know, We're we're setting the context. 467 00:30:42,480 --> 00:30:48,360 Speaker 1: We should probably walk everyone through how this happens, because 468 00:30:48,920 --> 00:30:51,600 Speaker 1: right now, the way it happens might surprise you, but 469 00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:56,280 Speaker 1: it feels relatively simplistic. Yeah, so you know what, let's 470 00:30:56,280 --> 00:30:58,360 Speaker 1: take a word from our sponsor and then we'll go 471 00:30:58,400 --> 00:31:08,000 Speaker 1: through the what an attack looks like. Okay, so the 472 00:31:08,480 --> 00:31:14,480 Speaker 1: ghost net has um is attempting to infect you. Here's 473 00:31:14,480 --> 00:31:17,760 Speaker 1: what's going to happen. First, you get an email, casey, 474 00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:21,880 Speaker 1: can we get an email cube? But it's an email 475 00:31:21,920 --> 00:31:25,240 Speaker 1: from someone you know. It's not like, what's a made 476 00:31:25,280 --> 00:31:32,040 Speaker 1: up name? Uh, Lauren Vogel bomb. That's a great example. Actually, Okay, 477 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:34,200 Speaker 1: let's say it is Lauren Vogel is someone you know. 478 00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:37,960 Speaker 1: So you get this email from someone you know, maybe 479 00:31:38,040 --> 00:31:41,800 Speaker 1: someone you work with, maybe a family member, but it's 480 00:31:41,800 --> 00:31:44,160 Speaker 1: someone you trust, and most importantly, it's someone that you 481 00:31:44,160 --> 00:31:48,400 Speaker 1: have had a previous, ongoing conversation with via these email addresses, 482 00:31:49,120 --> 00:31:53,000 Speaker 1: and the email itself is not going to be something 483 00:31:54,200 --> 00:31:57,880 Speaker 1: blatantly like a scam. It's actually going to be pretty 484 00:31:58,160 --> 00:32:01,360 Speaker 1: pretty nuanced and sophisticate, dude, So it wouldn't be an 485 00:32:01,360 --> 00:32:04,719 Speaker 1: email from Lauren. By the way, for long time listeners, 486 00:32:04,760 --> 00:32:07,160 Speaker 1: you all know you all know her from our previous 487 00:32:07,200 --> 00:32:09,200 Speaker 1: episode on Diamonds. Will probably have her on the show 488 00:32:09,200 --> 00:32:12,240 Speaker 1: a little bit later as well, longtime friend of our show, 489 00:32:12,320 --> 00:32:16,200 Speaker 1: personal friend of all of us, host of Savor, current 490 00:32:16,280 --> 00:32:19,240 Speaker 1: brain stuff. So maybe we receive an email from her 491 00:32:19,280 --> 00:32:23,760 Speaker 1: and it says instead of like hey, omg, Lowell, click 492 00:32:23,840 --> 00:32:27,360 Speaker 1: this crazy link, it says something like we've all seen 493 00:32:27,360 --> 00:32:33,040 Speaker 1: those cute right right, it says something like, uh, it 494 00:32:33,120 --> 00:32:36,000 Speaker 1: says something like, hey, Ben, earlier last week, we were 495 00:32:36,000 --> 00:32:40,600 Speaker 1: talking about, uh, you know we we were talking about, um, 496 00:32:41,320 --> 00:32:45,680 Speaker 1: the differences between types of camels or between lamas and 497 00:32:45,680 --> 00:32:48,760 Speaker 1: al pockets. And I don't think, oh yeah, we talked 498 00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:51,240 Speaker 1: about that. I found this great interviewer. I found this 499 00:32:51,280 --> 00:32:53,280 Speaker 1: great article about this, and I thought you would like 500 00:32:53,320 --> 00:32:55,720 Speaker 1: to read it, like, oh man, yeah, okay, I want 501 00:32:55,720 --> 00:33:00,160 Speaker 1: to learn more about lama's. I'm in yeah, al pacas, whatever, 502 00:33:00,280 --> 00:33:02,280 Speaker 1: I need to know these things, and then you click 503 00:33:02,320 --> 00:33:05,440 Speaker 1: on a word documentary PDF that's there, and when it 504 00:33:05,440 --> 00:33:11,000 Speaker 1: opens up it is actually about the difference between lamazel pockets, 505 00:33:11,200 --> 00:33:14,400 Speaker 1: and it actually opens up with word or whatever and 506 00:33:14,560 --> 00:33:16,520 Speaker 1: it looks legit and you read it and you think like, oh, 507 00:33:16,520 --> 00:33:19,440 Speaker 1: what a great friend. Following up on that operates as expected. 508 00:33:19,920 --> 00:33:23,800 Speaker 1: Nothing amiss here, not at all. But if we could 509 00:33:23,800 --> 00:33:27,080 Speaker 1: get a sound queue, that indicates a pivotal shift in 510 00:33:27,200 --> 00:33:32,560 Speaker 1: tone here. But that was good man. What's actually happening 511 00:33:32,600 --> 00:33:35,800 Speaker 1: as you're reading this is that a virus is downloading 512 00:33:35,920 --> 00:33:41,560 Speaker 1: very quickly into your computer. This virus, a trojan, often 513 00:33:41,640 --> 00:33:45,800 Speaker 1: a trojan called ghost rats, will allow the hackers based 514 00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:50,840 Speaker 1: in China, access to your camera, your microphone, access to screenshots, 515 00:33:51,120 --> 00:33:54,480 Speaker 1: access to your files, and it will also be able 516 00:33:54,560 --> 00:33:59,080 Speaker 1: to log key strokes. That last part is incredibly important. Yeah, 517 00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:02,680 Speaker 1: he logging. Uh, let's just we think we glossed over 518 00:34:02,760 --> 00:34:07,120 Speaker 1: a little bit. Then Ghost Rat G H zero S 519 00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:10,640 Speaker 1: T R A T. I love that Forest Whittaker movie 520 00:34:10,719 --> 00:34:13,920 Speaker 1: Ghost Rat in the Way of the Samurai Jim Jarmish 521 00:34:13,920 --> 00:34:16,719 Speaker 1: directed number. It was a little slow for me, but 522 00:34:17,000 --> 00:34:20,360 Speaker 1: overall I enjoyed it. It's because the ghost dog Okay, 523 00:34:20,520 --> 00:34:22,359 Speaker 1: I think there is. I did the soundtrack though, love 524 00:34:22,960 --> 00:34:26,719 Speaker 1: and stuff. I don't want you to know. And yeah, 525 00:34:26,880 --> 00:34:30,960 Speaker 1: so this this thing happens. You're learning about Lama's all 526 00:34:31,040 --> 00:34:37,799 Speaker 1: podkas and then you are unwittingly becoming a h and Alexa. 527 00:34:38,040 --> 00:34:41,560 Speaker 1: For these people, you're like knode a series. Yeah, you're 528 00:34:41,560 --> 00:34:47,200 Speaker 1: a node. And ghost Rat itself is interesting because it 529 00:34:47,280 --> 00:34:50,759 Speaker 1: was very very successful. We we all SHO should mention NOL. 530 00:34:50,840 --> 00:34:52,760 Speaker 1: I think you alluded to this a little bit earlier 531 00:34:52,960 --> 00:34:59,000 Speaker 1: that this occurs in the civilian world as well. Numerous voyeurs, hackers, 532 00:34:59,040 --> 00:35:02,440 Speaker 1: people that crush yourself thing will will hack into a 533 00:35:02,520 --> 00:35:07,399 Speaker 1: victims webcam just to watch them, you know what I mean. 534 00:35:07,440 --> 00:35:09,920 Speaker 1: Not I can't remember. We're talking about this on air 535 00:35:10,080 --> 00:35:14,520 Speaker 1: off air, but not not too steal nuclear secrets or something. 536 00:35:14,560 --> 00:35:17,200 Speaker 1: What's different here with ghost Rat and with ghost net 537 00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:20,640 Speaker 1: is a their names are way cooler and be Civilian 538 00:35:20,640 --> 00:35:23,040 Speaker 1: webcams are not typically going to give away things like 539 00:35:23,120 --> 00:35:28,000 Speaker 1: troop movement or the new design for a jet engine, 540 00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:31,719 Speaker 1: or nuclear payloads in their locations. Yeah, we'll just call 541 00:35:31,800 --> 00:35:36,400 Speaker 1: those ghost creeps. Those are just ghost creeps. The Chinese 542 00:35:36,400 --> 00:35:41,799 Speaker 1: government again officially denies any involvement with cyber spine. Uh, 543 00:35:41,800 --> 00:35:45,360 Speaker 1: spokesman for the Chinese embassy in London in two thousand 544 00:35:45,400 --> 00:35:48,919 Speaker 1: and nine, when this was first breaking news, Uh said 545 00:35:48,960 --> 00:35:52,200 Speaker 1: Beijing had also fallen victim to hackers and dismissed this 546 00:35:52,320 --> 00:35:57,040 Speaker 1: report as part of the Dali Lamas media and propaganda campaign. 547 00:35:57,480 --> 00:35:59,959 Speaker 1: So it was just a it was a frame job 548 00:36:00,120 --> 00:36:06,719 Speaker 1: by the Dalai Lama himself. Wow, But yeah, that's that's 549 00:36:06,760 --> 00:36:11,279 Speaker 1: how he It wasn't the numerous allegations and proven instances 550 00:36:11,320 --> 00:36:15,200 Speaker 1: of human rights abuses by the PRC. Note he said 551 00:36:15,239 --> 00:36:16,839 Speaker 1: that he thought the best way to go at them 552 00:36:16,840 --> 00:36:20,799 Speaker 1: would be a hacking accusation. Interesting, So they said this 553 00:36:20,920 --> 00:36:25,560 Speaker 1: is smoke and mirrors, this is nothing, pay no mind. 554 00:36:26,280 --> 00:36:29,200 Speaker 1: But the problem is that a long long time before that, 555 00:36:29,239 --> 00:36:34,239 Speaker 1: the Chinese government decided to make control of information one 556 00:36:34,280 --> 00:36:38,359 Speaker 1: of the main parts of the country's policy. In two 557 00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:41,680 Speaker 1: thousand and three of the tenth National People's Congress, the 558 00:36:41,800 --> 00:36:45,800 Speaker 1: Chinese Army, which is controlled by the Party. Very important 559 00:36:45,800 --> 00:36:49,520 Speaker 1: difference here, the Chinese Army announced the creation of information 560 00:36:49,600 --> 00:36:53,640 Speaker 1: warfare units, and a general at the time, Die ching Ming, 561 00:36:54,080 --> 00:36:57,879 Speaker 1: said internet attacks would always run in advance of any 562 00:36:57,920 --> 00:37:01,160 Speaker 1: military operation to cripple in as said that in two 563 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:03,600 Speaker 1: thousand three and then two thousand nine, they're saying, we 564 00:37:03,640 --> 00:37:06,279 Speaker 1: would never do anything like that. The Dali Lama is 565 00:37:06,320 --> 00:37:10,680 Speaker 1: like trying to get in your head Westerners. Well, it's 566 00:37:10,719 --> 00:37:13,799 Speaker 1: really interesting in two thousand three that's announced. I'm trying 567 00:37:13,800 --> 00:37:17,640 Speaker 1: to imagine how many full scale military conflicts China has 568 00:37:17,680 --> 00:37:20,759 Speaker 1: engaged in up into this time, and really all I 569 00:37:20,760 --> 00:37:24,000 Speaker 1: can think of is the South China see stuff, but 570 00:37:24,120 --> 00:37:29,600 Speaker 1: it's not really full military engagements. Um where they've you know, 571 00:37:29,680 --> 00:37:33,080 Speaker 1: performed in the internet attack in in front of an 572 00:37:33,160 --> 00:37:38,480 Speaker 1: actual military advance. Well, they just said military operation, and 573 00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:43,040 Speaker 1: a military operation can also be a domestic operation or 574 00:37:43,360 --> 00:37:47,120 Speaker 1: an operation on the border, so largely intelligence it could 575 00:37:47,120 --> 00:37:49,960 Speaker 1: be as well, so so it doesn't have to be 576 00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:53,920 Speaker 1: an out and out war, but it could easily be. 577 00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:57,520 Speaker 1: Just like you're saying, a series of small conflicts in 578 00:37:57,600 --> 00:38:02,760 Speaker 1: the South China Sea as they attend too ah enlarge 579 00:38:02,840 --> 00:38:06,000 Speaker 1: their maritime border or excuse me, get everybody else to 580 00:38:06,120 --> 00:38:09,000 Speaker 1: agree with what they feel like their maritime border is 581 00:38:09,360 --> 00:38:14,680 Speaker 1: the government feels. So it's strange because we're hearing conflicting 582 00:38:14,760 --> 00:38:20,000 Speaker 1: reports from government officials depending on the situation. The Pentagon 583 00:38:20,440 --> 00:38:24,040 Speaker 1: has been obsessed with this and quite uncomfortable with it. 584 00:38:24,320 --> 00:38:27,600 Speaker 1: They conducted a number of investigations and one of the 585 00:38:27,640 --> 00:38:32,319 Speaker 1: reports that they issued said that Chinese progress in this 586 00:38:32,440 --> 00:38:37,560 Speaker 1: sphere is pretty impressive. They're they're scared, but they were impressed, 587 00:38:38,200 --> 00:38:41,000 Speaker 1: and they said China has made steady progress in recent 588 00:38:41,080 --> 00:38:46,120 Speaker 1: years and developing offensive, nuclear, space, and cyber warfare capabilities, 589 00:38:46,400 --> 00:38:49,600 Speaker 1: the only aspects of China's armed forces that today have 590 00:38:49,719 --> 00:38:54,160 Speaker 1: the potential to be truly global. So what they're saying 591 00:38:54,200 --> 00:39:00,000 Speaker 1: there is that right now the Chinese government that China, 592 00:39:00,000 --> 00:39:03,759 Speaker 1: these military the capacities that they have in terms of 593 00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:08,560 Speaker 1: military hardware are are making them a regional power right 594 00:39:09,040 --> 00:39:11,600 Speaker 1: the economic in the economic spirit, they are truly a 595 00:39:11,640 --> 00:39:14,839 Speaker 1: global power, but if it comes down to you know, 596 00:39:15,520 --> 00:39:19,800 Speaker 1: guns and bombs and explosions, they can control the region, 597 00:39:19,880 --> 00:39:24,040 Speaker 1: but they can't lock down a globe. Yeah, but they're 598 00:39:24,120 --> 00:39:29,520 Speaker 1: focusing on nuclear, space and cyber which are the three 599 00:39:29,520 --> 00:39:32,879 Speaker 1: things that can reach pretty much anywhere in the world. 600 00:39:33,200 --> 00:39:38,120 Speaker 1: They also are building out a blue water navy, which 601 00:39:38,200 --> 00:39:40,400 Speaker 1: is I think we've talked about this in the past, 602 00:39:40,440 --> 00:39:42,360 Speaker 1: so they're not to get two in the weeds with it, 603 00:39:42,440 --> 00:39:45,840 Speaker 1: but there are three ways to rate the navy of 604 00:39:45,880 --> 00:39:49,600 Speaker 1: a country. The first is brownwater. The brownwater navy is 605 00:39:49,719 --> 00:39:54,040 Speaker 1: mainly at the coast. The second is greenwater. The greenwater 606 00:39:54,120 --> 00:39:59,719 Speaker 1: navy can project force to other closer areas in the 607 00:39:59,760 --> 00:40:02,080 Speaker 1: re gin, it can go across a sea or something 608 00:40:02,080 --> 00:40:05,120 Speaker 1: like that. Right, A blue water navy, which there are 609 00:40:05,200 --> 00:40:08,640 Speaker 1: very few, is able to project force anywhere across the globe. 610 00:40:08,800 --> 00:40:11,239 Speaker 1: The US is the biggest blue water navy, which is 611 00:40:11,280 --> 00:40:13,879 Speaker 1: why you hear about the US being involved in all 612 00:40:14,000 --> 00:40:17,719 Speaker 1: sorts of maritime conflicts around the world. It's kind of 613 00:40:17,719 --> 00:40:23,239 Speaker 1: where Britain was during its naval days of naval glories. Yeah, 614 00:40:23,520 --> 00:40:26,880 Speaker 1: chances are chances of days of naval Yeah, no, degrees 615 00:40:26,960 --> 00:40:31,240 Speaker 1: of naval glory and naval gazing. Yeah. That's it feels 616 00:40:31,280 --> 00:40:36,399 Speaker 1: like just the idea that there could be numerous, uh 617 00:40:36,560 --> 00:40:40,640 Speaker 1: let's call them naval units deployed and anywhere in the 618 00:40:40,640 --> 00:40:44,480 Speaker 1: world at any time, and there there probably are, because 619 00:40:44,480 --> 00:40:47,839 Speaker 1: there are bases, their naval bases throughout the world. That's true. 620 00:40:47,920 --> 00:40:50,000 Speaker 1: We've got our stuff just parked and we've got the 621 00:40:50,719 --> 00:40:54,319 Speaker 1: supercarriers essentially that are out there that can just be 622 00:40:54,400 --> 00:40:56,960 Speaker 1: a base wherever you want it. To be yes, the 623 00:40:57,040 --> 00:41:01,600 Speaker 1: US has eleven supercarriers, which exactly can describe that they're 624 00:41:01,680 --> 00:41:08,239 Speaker 1: they're moving naval bases. And now I think as of 625 00:41:08,760 --> 00:41:13,920 Speaker 1: eighteen officially, China only has one overseas logistics base. I 626 00:41:13,960 --> 00:41:18,400 Speaker 1: think it's an Africa and it does have an aircraft carrier, 627 00:41:19,320 --> 00:41:21,719 Speaker 1: or it's building one. It's either building it or it's 628 00:41:21,760 --> 00:41:27,120 Speaker 1: just built it. The point is that stuff takes a 629 00:41:27,200 --> 00:41:31,440 Speaker 1: much longer time to become a to reach fruition. But 630 00:41:32,000 --> 00:41:37,080 Speaker 1: this hacking stuff where all you need are all you 631 00:41:37,080 --> 00:41:40,240 Speaker 1: need are a few vulnerabilities in one in one place 632 00:41:40,440 --> 00:41:42,680 Speaker 1: and a few very very smart people with an Internet 633 00:41:42,680 --> 00:41:49,960 Speaker 1: connection in another. So everybody else's research, all other governments 634 00:41:50,000 --> 00:41:54,000 Speaker 1: research indicates this is the goal of China. If so, 635 00:41:54,120 --> 00:41:56,960 Speaker 1: this is the stuff that the Chinese government doesn't want 636 00:41:57,000 --> 00:42:00,360 Speaker 1: you to know because they're they maintain that this is 637 00:42:00,400 --> 00:42:04,640 Speaker 1: not happening, depending on who they talked to, because as 638 00:42:04,680 --> 00:42:07,520 Speaker 1: we know, if you're a politician making speech to a 639 00:42:07,560 --> 00:42:11,319 Speaker 1: domestic audience, it's very different, uh, from what you'll say 640 00:42:11,360 --> 00:42:15,399 Speaker 1: to the United Nations most times, oh totally. I mean, 641 00:42:15,440 --> 00:42:18,520 Speaker 1: like a good example is with Donald Trump, who recently 642 00:42:19,080 --> 00:42:21,480 Speaker 1: did a speech in for the United nations and caught 643 00:42:21,560 --> 00:42:23,880 Speaker 1: some flak in the form of a little bit of 644 00:42:24,840 --> 00:42:27,160 Speaker 1: laughing at a statement that he made. That is not 645 00:42:27,280 --> 00:42:29,640 Speaker 1: the kind of reception he would be even as like 646 00:42:29,680 --> 00:42:33,000 Speaker 1: a you know, kind of controversial president. Any president would 647 00:42:33,000 --> 00:42:35,000 Speaker 1: be used to um speaking in front of a more 648 00:42:35,160 --> 00:42:40,200 Speaker 1: friendly domestic audience, let alone an audience of their base. Yeah, 649 00:42:40,280 --> 00:42:43,840 Speaker 1: and that's usually why one thing unusual about that speech, 650 00:42:44,120 --> 00:42:48,520 Speaker 1: um I was alluding to us that he was he 651 00:42:48,680 --> 00:42:51,839 Speaker 1: was speaking with the same talking points he would use 652 00:42:51,840 --> 00:42:54,480 Speaker 1: for his domestic base. Doesn't fly right, well, Yeah, which 653 00:42:54,520 --> 00:42:58,400 Speaker 1: other which other presidents usually wouldn't do, regardless of what 654 00:42:58,480 --> 00:43:08,120 Speaker 1: country they are representing. But this means that right now, technically, officially, 655 00:43:08,800 --> 00:43:13,200 Speaker 1: on the record, issually, we cannot say the government of 656 00:43:13,320 --> 00:43:20,080 Speaker 1: China is currently sponsoring a ton of ongoing attacks to 657 00:43:20,400 --> 00:43:23,880 Speaker 1: compromise various businesses and countries. We can't even say that 658 00:43:23,920 --> 00:43:28,919 Speaker 1: they did it in two thousand nine. But here's the thing, right, 659 00:43:30,040 --> 00:43:33,840 Speaker 1: multiple attacks. Most of these attacks, especially ghost net, but 660 00:43:33,920 --> 00:43:36,440 Speaker 1: also with these other programs, have been traced to an 661 00:43:36,440 --> 00:43:40,200 Speaker 1: island in China called Hainan, and this island is home 662 00:43:40,280 --> 00:43:44,719 Speaker 1: to a signals intelligence facility run by the government is 663 00:43:44,760 --> 00:43:47,520 Speaker 1: also home to the third Technical Department of the People's 664 00:43:47,520 --> 00:43:51,520 Speaker 1: Liberation Army, which is their uh cyber one of the 665 00:43:51,680 --> 00:43:56,120 Speaker 1: cyber warfare places. So it may not be sponsored by them. 666 00:43:56,239 --> 00:43:59,239 Speaker 1: Maybe maybe maybe, Yeah, I mean you could tell that. 667 00:43:59,280 --> 00:44:02,799 Speaker 1: I don't believe it, that's my opinion. But uh, it's 668 00:44:02,840 --> 00:44:05,319 Speaker 1: certainly in the same neighborhood, so maybe it's someone who 669 00:44:05,360 --> 00:44:08,600 Speaker 1: works there and is so patriotic that they're doing this 670 00:44:08,680 --> 00:44:11,799 Speaker 1: on their free time somehow. Uh. And keep in mind 671 00:44:11,800 --> 00:44:15,879 Speaker 1: that ghost net happened ten years ago. It's discovered ten 672 00:44:15,960 --> 00:44:18,880 Speaker 1: years ago. So whatever is out there now is whatever 673 00:44:18,920 --> 00:44:22,160 Speaker 1: the successes are, they're far beyond that, and they're probably 674 00:44:22,200 --> 00:44:26,120 Speaker 1: far beyond most of the technology available to citizens here 675 00:44:26,120 --> 00:44:29,480 Speaker 1: in the West. One of the servers was verified to 676 00:44:29,520 --> 00:44:32,480 Speaker 1: be a Chinese government server, So for people who believe 677 00:44:32,520 --> 00:44:36,719 Speaker 1: this PRC, that's a smoking gun. Okay, let's just for 678 00:44:36,760 --> 00:44:39,799 Speaker 1: a little bit of perspective. This is two thousand and eight, 679 00:44:39,800 --> 00:44:44,440 Speaker 1: two thousand nine when this is occurring, when computers across center, 680 00:44:44,520 --> 00:44:49,840 Speaker 1: across the globe and sensitive areas were turned into Amazon Alexis. 681 00:44:50,080 --> 00:44:55,640 Speaker 1: That occurred five years before the Amazon Alexa premiered, So 682 00:44:55,640 --> 00:44:59,560 Speaker 1: so whoever is doing this was way ahead of the game, 683 00:45:00,360 --> 00:45:03,600 Speaker 1: way way ahead of the game. And if you think 684 00:45:03,680 --> 00:45:06,440 Speaker 1: maybe some of the technology that goes into like these 685 00:45:06,520 --> 00:45:09,600 Speaker 1: list of these uh alexas and these personal assistants may 686 00:45:09,640 --> 00:45:14,560 Speaker 1: have had its origin in military technology, I didn't say that. 687 00:45:14,960 --> 00:45:19,040 Speaker 1: I don't think like a bugging device was the reason 688 00:45:19,640 --> 00:45:23,080 Speaker 1: companies wanted you to have a bugging device in your home. 689 00:45:23,120 --> 00:45:25,839 Speaker 1: I don't think military applications of bugging device has had 690 00:45:25,840 --> 00:45:29,879 Speaker 1: anything to do with voluntary bugging devices. Just so we're 691 00:45:29,880 --> 00:45:31,640 Speaker 1: on the same page, I mean, it is just an 692 00:45:31,640 --> 00:45:34,080 Speaker 1: extension of like stuff like Facebook, where we just you know, 693 00:45:34,160 --> 00:45:36,080 Speaker 1: no one even needs to survey us anymore because it 694 00:45:36,200 --> 00:45:38,680 Speaker 1: is dumping all our information out into the interwebs, right, 695 00:45:38,880 --> 00:45:41,240 Speaker 1: So why would it not be a logical next step 696 00:45:41,480 --> 00:45:46,400 Speaker 1: that we would just actively and voluntarily install bugging devices 697 00:45:46,400 --> 00:45:50,360 Speaker 1: in our own homes, um, you know, using our ingenious 698 00:45:50,360 --> 00:45:56,680 Speaker 1: powers of free will. And the spookies thing of it 699 00:45:56,719 --> 00:45:59,759 Speaker 1: all is, you know, to the point we just maid 700 00:45:59,840 --> 00:46:04,360 Speaker 1: we don't know whatever is happening now technologically speaking, in 701 00:46:04,480 --> 00:46:07,880 Speaker 1: terms of surveillance, we might not know about it for 702 00:46:07,920 --> 00:46:13,000 Speaker 1: another ten, five, ten years. And ghost Net, as far 703 00:46:13,040 --> 00:46:15,600 Speaker 1: as we know, has been responsible for a minimum of 704 00:46:15,680 --> 00:46:21,279 Speaker 1: one thousand two computer system attacks on embassies for ministries, 705 00:46:21,600 --> 00:46:25,160 Speaker 1: government offices, pretty much every exile center for the Dali 706 00:46:25,239 --> 00:46:29,200 Speaker 1: Lama in London, India, New York City. It's only one 707 00:46:29,320 --> 00:46:33,960 Speaker 1: of multiple similar or operations running out of China. There 708 00:46:34,000 --> 00:46:36,640 Speaker 1: are tons, and they all have really cool names. Just 709 00:46:36,840 --> 00:46:39,640 Speaker 1: on the side and take away from today's episode ghost Net, 710 00:46:39,920 --> 00:46:45,120 Speaker 1: it's kind of spooky. Unlike other nations which tend to 711 00:46:45,280 --> 00:46:49,719 Speaker 1: practice overt attacks, you know, crippling power grids, China's programs 712 00:46:49,760 --> 00:46:54,680 Speaker 1: seem much more focused on just collecting sensitive information so 713 00:46:54,719 --> 00:46:57,040 Speaker 1: that other parts of the military can act on that. 714 00:46:57,520 --> 00:47:02,240 Speaker 1: That's so far at least, uh and odd make signals 715 00:47:02,239 --> 00:47:06,640 Speaker 1: are coming in. Then President Obama that with President jej 716 00:47:06,760 --> 00:47:08,759 Speaker 1: and Ping, who will be president of China for a 717 00:47:08,760 --> 00:47:11,960 Speaker 1: long long time now, to address a range of issues. 718 00:47:12,520 --> 00:47:16,479 Speaker 1: And they talked about economic espionage. And when they talked 719 00:47:16,520 --> 00:47:18,919 Speaker 1: about that, they said they reached an agreement. They said 720 00:47:18,920 --> 00:47:22,680 Speaker 1: neither government, the PRC, nor the US will conduct or 721 00:47:22,760 --> 00:47:27,280 Speaker 1: support cyber enabled theft of business secrets that would provide 722 00:47:27,320 --> 00:47:33,000 Speaker 1: competitive advantage to their commercial sectors. Importantly, disturbingly, they did 723 00:47:33,040 --> 00:47:37,640 Speaker 1: not agree to restrict government espionage. Because most countries are 724 00:47:37,719 --> 00:47:40,920 Speaker 1: cool with that, or most countries won't come out against 725 00:47:40,960 --> 00:47:45,319 Speaker 1: it because they all do it exactly. You can't be 726 00:47:45,360 --> 00:47:48,719 Speaker 1: against something that that everybody knows you're doing. Sure, you 727 00:47:48,800 --> 00:47:53,920 Speaker 1: can against all kinds of stuff. And that's the thing. Like, 728 00:47:54,680 --> 00:47:59,560 Speaker 1: of course I would I would proposed to you all 729 00:48:00,239 --> 00:48:06,480 Speaker 1: and everyone listening, that all countries also support uh, theft 730 00:48:06,520 --> 00:48:10,480 Speaker 1: of business secrets. Yeah, I think so, It's just you can't. 731 00:48:10,640 --> 00:48:13,080 Speaker 1: You're not going to put the rubber stamp of your 732 00:48:13,120 --> 00:48:15,960 Speaker 1: country on it. You can. You've got a million different 733 00:48:15,960 --> 00:48:19,080 Speaker 1: ways to obvious skate who's actually doing that. That's true, 734 00:48:19,280 --> 00:48:24,400 Speaker 1: And I don't know this is more of a socio 735 00:48:24,840 --> 00:48:29,560 Speaker 1: philosophical perspective here. But the reason I think all countries 736 00:48:29,680 --> 00:48:35,200 Speaker 1: will also support or attempt to commit industrial espionage is 737 00:48:35,239 --> 00:48:39,440 Speaker 1: because I think it's increasingly misleading in a myth to 738 00:48:39,719 --> 00:48:43,360 Speaker 1: pretend that business and government are separate. In many cases, 739 00:48:44,480 --> 00:48:47,800 Speaker 1: it just doesn't make sense. I mean, look at Russian 740 00:48:47,840 --> 00:48:51,239 Speaker 1: oligarchs for the most part, and the function Russian governance. 741 00:48:51,840 --> 00:48:57,600 Speaker 1: Look at the largest companies in the largest countries, and 742 00:48:58,800 --> 00:49:01,560 Speaker 1: many times there's just so much bleed over from who 743 00:49:01,600 --> 00:49:06,120 Speaker 1: controls what that while it's comforting to say that businesses 744 00:49:06,160 --> 00:49:12,920 Speaker 1: and governments maybe separate. Well, it's technically supposed to be 745 00:49:12,960 --> 00:49:16,000 Speaker 1: the case. In practice it really isn't. Yeah, I mean 746 00:49:16,040 --> 00:49:19,520 Speaker 1: you can donate as like unlimited funds to a campaign, 747 00:49:20,000 --> 00:49:24,320 Speaker 1: when you can get government contracts for just a number 748 00:49:24,320 --> 00:49:29,200 Speaker 1: of military applications and other applications, when there's a revolving 749 00:49:29,239 --> 00:49:31,880 Speaker 1: door between business and government, I totally feel you. And 750 00:49:31,920 --> 00:49:34,239 Speaker 1: I'm not I'm not saying it's thank you, but I'm 751 00:49:34,280 --> 00:49:37,959 Speaker 1: not even I'm not even specifically talking about the US. 752 00:49:38,000 --> 00:49:41,799 Speaker 1: I'm talking about global phenomenon. And I guess what I'm 753 00:49:41,840 --> 00:49:43,680 Speaker 1: just saying is when you can use the United States 754 00:49:43,680 --> 00:49:47,600 Speaker 1: as an example, like the the one for in a 755 00:49:47,680 --> 00:49:50,840 Speaker 1: lot of ways is the leader or at least the 756 00:49:50,880 --> 00:49:54,560 Speaker 1: main bully when we're doing it, then it seems like 757 00:49:54,600 --> 00:49:58,120 Speaker 1: you probably do it, or it's happening everywhere else. And 758 00:49:58,160 --> 00:50:01,160 Speaker 1: then the question is, uh, what to do next? You 759 00:50:01,200 --> 00:50:03,839 Speaker 1: want to fight against it? Do you want to uh 760 00:50:04,280 --> 00:50:06,080 Speaker 1: to want to fight against it? Do you want to 761 00:50:06,239 --> 00:50:12,200 Speaker 1: join the empire? Right? Or do we just think about 762 00:50:12,280 --> 00:50:16,680 Speaker 1: changing your password, running a couple of virus checks. You'll 763 00:50:16,800 --> 00:50:19,720 Speaker 1: probably be able to catch anything from two thousand and nine, 764 00:50:20,040 --> 00:50:24,120 Speaker 1: you know, even even something like Norton Anti virus can 765 00:50:24,160 --> 00:50:29,120 Speaker 1: find that. But what about the eighteen stuff? You just 766 00:50:29,200 --> 00:50:33,200 Speaker 1: gotta kind of hope cover up your cover up your 767 00:50:33,320 --> 00:50:37,600 Speaker 1: cameras as much as you can take out the MIC's 768 00:50:37,960 --> 00:50:40,160 Speaker 1: because there's really no way to stop that mike from 769 00:50:40,200 --> 00:50:45,080 Speaker 1: getting turned on. Yeah, I mean yeah, you just have 770 00:50:45,160 --> 00:50:48,480 Speaker 1: a white noise generator. It's like shitting on your monitor 771 00:50:48,560 --> 00:50:50,719 Speaker 1: where the mic is. Well, we want to we want 772 00:50:50,719 --> 00:50:54,480 Speaker 1: to hear what you think, folks. No, obviously we are 773 00:50:54,560 --> 00:51:00,120 Speaker 1: not ourselves professional black nor white hat hackers, but you 774 00:51:00,160 --> 00:51:04,040 Speaker 1: want to know if you believe there's propaganda involved here? 775 00:51:04,520 --> 00:51:07,239 Speaker 1: Is the government of China really sponsoring these things? Are 776 00:51:07,239 --> 00:51:10,680 Speaker 1: they just patriotic hackers? Is the West making it look 777 00:51:10,719 --> 00:51:14,520 Speaker 1: worse than it is to justify future military action? What 778 00:51:14,640 --> 00:51:17,560 Speaker 1: kind of programs is the West doing right now to 779 00:51:17,719 --> 00:51:20,640 Speaker 1: places like China? Do you have any info on that? 780 00:51:21,719 --> 00:51:24,279 Speaker 1: Tell us and not? You can tell us anonymously, Yeah 781 00:51:24,600 --> 00:51:29,240 Speaker 1: you can, you can, uh, you cannot tell us anonymously Instagram, Facebook, 782 00:51:29,320 --> 00:51:31,960 Speaker 1: or Twitter. We'd love to we'd love to hear from you. 783 00:51:31,960 --> 00:51:34,320 Speaker 1: You can find us on Here's where it gets crazy, 784 00:51:34,680 --> 00:51:39,040 Speaker 1: But you can contact us anonymously, at least anonymously to us, 785 00:51:39,040 --> 00:51:44,120 Speaker 1: our our long serving uh hapless intern at the n 786 00:51:44,200 --> 00:51:47,000 Speaker 1: s A will probably know everything about you. Shout out 787 00:51:47,000 --> 00:51:51,000 Speaker 1: to you, Matt, hopefully you've made it that far. And 788 00:51:51,040 --> 00:51:53,880 Speaker 1: then if you want to send us a voicemail, you 789 00:51:53,920 --> 00:51:57,359 Speaker 1: could disguise your voice. Uh call us from a pay phone. 790 00:51:57,400 --> 00:51:59,440 Speaker 1: That would be a lot of fun. Our number is 791 00:51:59,719 --> 00:52:04,839 Speaker 1: well an eight three three st d w TK. That's 792 00:52:04,840 --> 00:52:07,160 Speaker 1: just stuff they don't want you to and again yes, 793 00:52:07,239 --> 00:52:09,920 Speaker 1: good junker um. And if you don't want to do 794 00:52:10,000 --> 00:52:13,120 Speaker 1: any of that stuff, oh oh, first thing, how are 795 00:52:13,120 --> 00:52:16,520 Speaker 1: you listening to this show? Are you listening on Apple podcasts? 796 00:52:16,520 --> 00:52:20,319 Speaker 1: Maybe through the old iTunes desktop app? How are you 797 00:52:20,360 --> 00:52:24,560 Speaker 1: listening to us? Something that would be massively helpful is 798 00:52:24,600 --> 00:52:27,400 Speaker 1: if you could log in, if you're an Apple user 799 00:52:27,440 --> 00:52:30,840 Speaker 1: and you have an account, log into iTunes slash Apple 800 00:52:30,840 --> 00:52:33,279 Speaker 1: Podcasts and give us a review. Doesn't matter what it is. 801 00:52:33,320 --> 00:52:36,040 Speaker 1: It can be a terrible like these guys are just 802 00:52:36,520 --> 00:52:40,000 Speaker 1: worse than the dirt that my boots are standing on, 803 00:52:40,360 --> 00:52:43,200 Speaker 1: or it could be well, these guys are okay that 804 00:52:43,200 --> 00:52:46,480 Speaker 1: that was pretty much the range? Right? Is that the range? 805 00:52:46,640 --> 00:52:50,759 Speaker 1: I think? So? Okay? Have the range? Okay? But your 806 00:52:50,760 --> 00:52:53,840 Speaker 1: reviews will help us tremendously just to give us feedback 807 00:52:53,880 --> 00:52:56,080 Speaker 1: as well as hopefully move us up a little bit 808 00:52:56,160 --> 00:52:59,640 Speaker 1: in those ranks get some visibility. So thank you in advance. 809 00:52:59,680 --> 00:53:01,719 Speaker 1: We have appreciated and I guess if you don't want 810 00:53:01,760 --> 00:53:03,560 Speaker 1: to do any of that stuff, you can always go 811 00:53:03,719 --> 00:53:06,480 Speaker 1: the old fashioned route. You can write it's an email 812 00:53:06,680 --> 00:53:29,919 Speaker 1: at conspiracy at how stuff works dot com