1 00:00:00,120 --> 00:00:09,200 Speaker 1: This Day in History Class is a production of iHeartRadio. 2 00:00:11,600 --> 00:00:15,920 Speaker 1: Hello and Welcome to This Day in History Class, a 3 00:00:15,960 --> 00:00:19,360 Speaker 1: show that proves there's more than one way to make history. 4 00:00:20,200 --> 00:00:23,520 Speaker 1: I'm Gabe Luesier, and in this episode, we're looking at 5 00:00:23,520 --> 00:00:26,480 Speaker 1: the day when a first of its kind program wormed 6 00:00:26,520 --> 00:00:30,560 Speaker 1: its way across the early Internet, crashing systems and creating 7 00:00:30,640 --> 00:00:40,760 Speaker 1: panic along the way. The day was November two, nineteen 8 00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:45,000 Speaker 1: eighty eight, a Roague computer program was unleashed on the 9 00:00:45,040 --> 00:00:48,360 Speaker 1: Internet for the first time. The attack took place at 10 00:00:48,400 --> 00:00:52,320 Speaker 1: about eight thirty that evening, when the program's creator uploaded 11 00:00:52,320 --> 00:00:55,880 Speaker 1: it to a computer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 12 00:00:56,240 --> 00:01:01,200 Speaker 1: or MIT. This software, known as a site worm, was 13 00:01:01,280 --> 00:01:04,919 Speaker 1: designed to spread across networks and copy itself onto every 14 00:01:04,959 --> 00:01:08,680 Speaker 1: computer it touched. However, due to a flaw in the 15 00:01:08,720 --> 00:01:12,080 Speaker 1: source code, the worm didn't just send copies of itself 16 00:01:12,120 --> 00:01:16,520 Speaker 1: to other computers. It also continued replicating itself on each 17 00:01:16,640 --> 00:01:21,440 Speaker 1: system it infected, filling all available memory and eventually grinding 18 00:01:21,480 --> 00:01:24,920 Speaker 1: the computer to a halt. Within twenty four hours, the 19 00:01:24,959 --> 00:01:28,760 Speaker 1: worm had infected and estimated six thousand of the approximately 20 00:01:28,880 --> 00:01:32,080 Speaker 1: sixty thousand computers that were connected to the Internet in 21 00:01:32,160 --> 00:01:36,480 Speaker 1: nineteen eighty eight. There were two main factors facilitating the 22 00:01:36,520 --> 00:01:40,080 Speaker 1: worm spread. The first was the nature of the program. 23 00:01:40,480 --> 00:01:43,680 Speaker 1: Unlike a virus, which requires a software host in order 24 00:01:43,720 --> 00:01:47,520 Speaker 1: to propagate, a computer worm is an independent program which 25 00:01:47,560 --> 00:01:51,040 Speaker 1: can exist and replicate on its own. That means it 26 00:01:51,120 --> 00:01:53,760 Speaker 1: didn't have to be installed on each system by a 27 00:01:53,840 --> 00:01:56,960 Speaker 1: human and then spread itself from one program to the 28 00:01:57,000 --> 00:02:01,160 Speaker 1: next like a virus. Instead, the worm was the program, 29 00:02:01,360 --> 00:02:04,680 Speaker 1: and it could install itself on any machine connected to 30 00:02:04,720 --> 00:02:08,480 Speaker 1: a network. The second thing that spurred the worm's advance 31 00:02:08,840 --> 00:02:12,120 Speaker 1: was the collegial nature of the early Internet. At the 32 00:02:12,160 --> 00:02:14,920 Speaker 1: time prior to the invention of the World Wide Web, 33 00:02:15,280 --> 00:02:20,560 Speaker 1: the National Electronic Network was populated almost exclusively by academics 34 00:02:20,560 --> 00:02:25,120 Speaker 1: and engineers. To them, cybersecurity was barely even a concept, 35 00:02:25,280 --> 00:02:28,280 Speaker 1: much less a top concern, and so the early Internet 36 00:02:28,360 --> 00:02:31,760 Speaker 1: operated more or less on the honor system. That made 37 00:02:31,760 --> 00:02:34,200 Speaker 1: it all the more easy for the worm to transmit 38 00:02:34,240 --> 00:02:37,640 Speaker 1: itself from one network to the next in a matter 39 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:41,160 Speaker 1: of hours. The computers at a number of prestigious colleges, 40 00:02:41,280 --> 00:02:48,880 Speaker 1: military sites, and research centers were compromised, including those at Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Johns, Hopkins, 41 00:02:48,919 --> 00:02:53,400 Speaker 1: and NASA, among many others. The worm didn't corrupt or 42 00:02:53,440 --> 00:02:57,200 Speaker 1: destroy any files. In fact, it didn't even contain a 43 00:02:57,240 --> 00:03:01,480 Speaker 1: payload or malicious code intended to arm a system. It 44 00:03:01,520 --> 00:03:03,800 Speaker 1: still did quite a bit of damage, though, thanks to 45 00:03:03,840 --> 00:03:06,280 Speaker 1: that bug in its own code that I mentioned earlier. 46 00:03:06,880 --> 00:03:09,640 Speaker 1: Because the worm kept making copies of itself on the 47 00:03:09,680 --> 00:03:12,919 Speaker 1: same computers, it had the side effect of slowing other 48 00:03:13,040 --> 00:03:16,680 Speaker 1: functions to a crawl. Emails were delayed by hours or 49 00:03:16,760 --> 00:03:20,600 Speaker 1: even days, and as a system's resources continued to be drained, 50 00:03:20,880 --> 00:03:25,919 Speaker 1: the computer would eventually crash altogether. The online community scrambled 51 00:03:25,919 --> 00:03:30,080 Speaker 1: to find a solution. Some institutions simply wiped their systems 52 00:03:30,080 --> 00:03:34,200 Speaker 1: and started over. Others disconnected their computers from the network 53 00:03:34,280 --> 00:03:37,760 Speaker 1: and waited to see what happened. After about twelve hours, 54 00:03:37,840 --> 00:03:40,440 Speaker 1: a team of programmers at Berkeley found a way to 55 00:03:40,480 --> 00:03:43,120 Speaker 1: slow the spread of the worm. Then a team at 56 00:03:43,120 --> 00:03:46,080 Speaker 1: Purdue came up with another method to remove it completely. 57 00:03:46,800 --> 00:03:49,760 Speaker 1: The tactic was shared as widely as possible, though the 58 00:03:49,800 --> 00:03:52,320 Speaker 1: information didn't get out as quickly as it could have 59 00:03:52,640 --> 00:03:56,080 Speaker 1: since so many systems had already crashed or been disconnected. 60 00:03:56,920 --> 00:03:59,920 Speaker 1: The financial cost of the attack is hard to pin down, 61 00:04:00,320 --> 00:04:02,880 Speaker 1: but Between all the lost time and the expense of 62 00:04:02,920 --> 00:04:06,040 Speaker 1: dealing with the worm at each location, it's estimated to 63 00:04:06,080 --> 00:04:09,880 Speaker 1: have done millions of dollars in damage. What few people 64 00:04:09,960 --> 00:04:12,040 Speaker 1: knew at the time was that the creator of the 65 00:04:12,040 --> 00:04:15,760 Speaker 1: worm had actually released an apology letter along with instructions 66 00:04:15,800 --> 00:04:18,279 Speaker 1: on how to remove the worm, just a few hours 67 00:04:18,320 --> 00:04:23,120 Speaker 1: after the attack. Unfortunately, and ironically, the message didn't reach 68 00:04:23,200 --> 00:04:26,360 Speaker 1: most users in time because the program had already wrecked 69 00:04:26,360 --> 00:04:30,440 Speaker 1: the network. To be clear, the worm's programmer didn't send 70 00:04:30,440 --> 00:04:34,560 Speaker 1: the message himself. Instead, he asked two friends to relay 71 00:04:34,600 --> 00:04:39,000 Speaker 1: it anonymously on his behalf. Unbeknownst to him, however, one 72 00:04:39,040 --> 00:04:42,400 Speaker 1: of those friends also contacted The New York Times and 73 00:04:42,520 --> 00:04:46,240 Speaker 1: inadvertently revealed the initials of the worm's author. With that 74 00:04:46,360 --> 00:04:49,320 Speaker 1: as a starting point, Times reporters were soon able to 75 00:04:49,360 --> 00:04:52,800 Speaker 1: confirm and publicly report that the person behind the attack 76 00:04:53,120 --> 00:04:56,320 Speaker 1: was a twenty three year old Cornell graduate student named 77 00:04:56,440 --> 00:05:00,000 Speaker 1: Robert Morris Junior. He had spent all that summer day 78 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:03,600 Speaker 1: developing a program that could spread slowly and secretly across 79 00:05:03,640 --> 00:05:07,240 Speaker 1: the Internet. It was intended as a harmless experiment, just 80 00:05:07,279 --> 00:05:09,440 Speaker 1: to see if it was possible, and that's why the 81 00:05:09,480 --> 00:05:14,200 Speaker 1: program contained no malicious code that said Morris was still 82 00:05:14,240 --> 00:05:18,400 Speaker 1: accessing other people's systems without permission, So to cover his tracks, 83 00:05:18,600 --> 00:05:22,120 Speaker 1: he hacked into an MIT computer from Cornell and uploaded 84 00:05:22,120 --> 00:05:25,159 Speaker 1: the worm there. He may not have meant to topple 85 00:05:25,200 --> 00:05:27,640 Speaker 1: the entire network, but due to a flaw in the 86 00:05:27,640 --> 00:05:31,520 Speaker 1: program's code, that's exactly what he wound up doing. By 87 00:05:31,560 --> 00:05:35,400 Speaker 1: the time Morris's identity was revealed, the FBI had already 88 00:05:35,480 --> 00:05:40,479 Speaker 1: launched an investigation into the incident. Agents interviewed Morris, examined 89 00:05:40,520 --> 00:05:43,719 Speaker 1: his computer files, and promptly determined that he was indeed 90 00:05:43,760 --> 00:05:47,280 Speaker 1: the culprit. The only question remaining was whether he had 91 00:05:47,320 --> 00:05:50,080 Speaker 1: actually broken a law, and it turned out that he 92 00:05:50,200 --> 00:05:54,640 Speaker 1: had a rather recent one. Two years earlier, Congress had 93 00:05:54,640 --> 00:05:57,920 Speaker 1: passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, making it illegal 94 00:05:58,000 --> 00:06:02,400 Speaker 1: to access protected computers with a authorization. Morris was the 95 00:06:02,440 --> 00:06:05,120 Speaker 1: first person to violate the Act, the first to be 96 00:06:05,160 --> 00:06:08,359 Speaker 1: indicted for it, and the first to be convicted. He 97 00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:10,840 Speaker 1: didn't serve jail time, but he did have to pay 98 00:06:10,839 --> 00:06:14,240 Speaker 1: a ten thousand dollars fine and complete four hundred hours 99 00:06:14,240 --> 00:06:18,159 Speaker 1: of community service. He tried to appeal the sentence, arguing 100 00:06:18,200 --> 00:06:21,120 Speaker 1: that he hadn't released the worm with malicious intent, but 101 00:06:21,160 --> 00:06:24,160 Speaker 1: the court deemed that irrelevant as he had still accessed 102 00:06:24,200 --> 00:06:28,040 Speaker 1: other computers without permission. For all the trouble it caused, 103 00:06:28,120 --> 00:06:30,640 Speaker 1: the episode did help open the world's eyes to the 104 00:06:30,720 --> 00:06:35,480 Speaker 1: vulnerabilities of the early Internet, prompting some vital changes. For example, 105 00:06:35,800 --> 00:06:38,440 Speaker 1: just a few days after the attack, the Department of 106 00:06:38,480 --> 00:06:42,760 Speaker 1: Defense created the nation's first computer Emergency Response Team to 107 00:06:42,839 --> 00:06:47,679 Speaker 1: help combat future security breaches. Private developers also began creating 108 00:06:47,760 --> 00:06:52,000 Speaker 1: software that could detect computer intrusions, providing some much needed 109 00:06:52,080 --> 00:06:56,240 Speaker 1: cybersecurity to the general public. The flip side, of course, 110 00:06:56,480 --> 00:06:59,800 Speaker 1: is that the rogue program, now known as the Morris Worm, 111 00:07:00,279 --> 00:07:03,840 Speaker 1: gave rise to a wave of online assaults that continues 112 00:07:03,920 --> 00:07:07,400 Speaker 1: to dog our digital lives to this day. Of course, 113 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:10,760 Speaker 1: if Morris hadn't released the first worm, someone else would 114 00:07:10,800 --> 00:07:15,239 Speaker 1: have eventually, and probably not just as an intellectual exercise either. 115 00:07:15,880 --> 00:07:19,080 Speaker 1: In that light, early Internet users were lucky he was 116 00:07:19,120 --> 00:07:21,560 Speaker 1: the one to strike first, as it gave them the 117 00:07:21,640 --> 00:07:25,720 Speaker 1: chance to build their defenses before the truly malicious attacks began. 118 00:07:26,760 --> 00:07:30,000 Speaker 1: As for Morris, his conviction doesn't seem to have hurt 119 00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:34,120 Speaker 1: his career. He's currently a tenured professor of Electrical Engineering 120 00:07:34,160 --> 00:07:38,360 Speaker 1: and Computer Science at MIT, the very school to which 121 00:07:38,360 --> 00:07:42,880 Speaker 1: he first uploaded his worm all those years ago. Nice 122 00:07:42,920 --> 00:07:48,800 Speaker 1: to know there are no hard feelings. I'm gay, blues yay, 123 00:07:49,080 --> 00:07:52,160 Speaker 1: and hopefully you now know a little more about history 124 00:07:52,240 --> 00:07:55,880 Speaker 1: today than you did yesterday. If you have a second 125 00:07:55,920 --> 00:07:59,600 Speaker 1: and you're so inclined, consider keeping up with us on Twitter, Facebook, 126 00:07:59,640 --> 00:08:04,040 Speaker 1: and Instane. You can find us at TDI HC Show, 127 00:08:04,680 --> 00:08:07,480 Speaker 1: and if you have any comments or suggestions, feel free 128 00:08:07,520 --> 00:08:10,400 Speaker 1: to pass them along by writing to this day at 129 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:14,800 Speaker 1: iHeartMedia dot com. Thanks as always to Chandler Mays for 130 00:08:14,840 --> 00:08:17,840 Speaker 1: producing the show, and thank you for listening. I'll see 131 00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:21,720 Speaker 1: you back here again tomorrow for another day in history class.