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Speaker 1: Hi. This is due to the virus. I'm recording from home,

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Speaker 1: so you may notice a difference in audio quality on

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Speaker 1: this episode of News World. The US federal government and

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Speaker 1: prosecutors have ramped up scrutiny into the Chinese government's influenced

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Speaker 1: by and espionage operations on American campuses. Millions and millions

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Speaker 1: of dollars have been donated to US universities from China

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Speaker 1: and the Chinese Communist Party. Many of the Chinese contributions

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Speaker 1: who are listed as coming from quote anonymous donors, a

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Speaker 1: practice experts say is an easy tactic that allows the

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Speaker 1: Chinese to penetrate the US education system. The issue of

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Speaker 1: Chinese and investment in US universities and the lack of

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Speaker 1: transparency is alarming. I'm pleased to welcome my guests, Andrew Lelling,

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Speaker 1: US Attorney for the District of Massachusetts. Andy Lolling is

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Speaker 1: one of five US attorneys leading the initiative, which began

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Speaker 1: in November twenty eighteen. This effort was aimed to blunt

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Speaker 1: China's effort to improperly acquire cutting edge technology, has focused

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Speaker 1: on what the Department of Justice calls non traditional collaborators.

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Speaker 1: The vast majority of cases the prosecutors are temping involve

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Speaker 1: scientists working in the high tech industry or in academia.

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Speaker 1: It's a great honor to have you share with us

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Speaker 1: in real time what's actually happening as you're investigating what

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Speaker 1: has turned out to be I think a much bigger

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Speaker 1: challenge than people have thought. So could you start and

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Speaker 1: tell us about the kind of investments you're seeing China make,

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Speaker 1: for example, in Massachusetts based schools. First, thanks for having me.

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Speaker 1: It's good to be here own for years and years

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Speaker 1: that the Chinese have made a concerted effort to invest

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Speaker 1: in US universities. That investment takes on a few different forms.

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Speaker 1: There's pure dollars, which is in the tens of millions

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Speaker 1: of dollars for most major universities, and here that includes

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Speaker 1: Harvard and MIT. But you see the Chinese do this

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Speaker 1: in other ways. There's the collaboration between the Chinese and

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Speaker 1: US academics, which has become our focus at the Justice Department,

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Speaker 1: among other things. And you also see things like the

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Speaker 1: Confucious Institute, which are a very interesting phenomenon where the

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Speaker 1: Chinese set of cultural centers at major universities funnel large

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Speaker 1: amounts of money into them in an effort to broadcast

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Speaker 1: China's preferred message on US campuses and undertake other activities

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Speaker 1: that I think, as a matter of policy, we should

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Speaker 1: find questionable. This has been going on for years and years.

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Speaker 1: I used to say that China is the biggest national

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Speaker 1: security threat that no one talks about. Now we do

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Speaker 1: because of COVID and because of this administration's focus on

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Speaker 1: sort of balancing the ledger with China. But it took

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Speaker 1: a long time to catch up to that viewpoint. So

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Speaker 1: for example, as I understand, according to a student aid

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Speaker 1: dot Gov, between two and fourteen and twenty nineteen, Harbord

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Speaker 1: reported twelve contracts from China totaling over eleven million dollars

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Speaker 1: and ten gifts totaling sixty four million dollars. In addition,

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Speaker 1: Harvard created the Harbord China Fund in two thousand and six.

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Speaker 1: How do you see that affecting our relationship with China.

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Speaker 1: I think what happens is that the more money is

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Speaker 1: invested by China in these schools, the closer the relationship becomes.

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Speaker 1: And as we see every day on the prosecution side,

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Speaker 1: the more money there is, the more corrupting influence that

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Speaker 1: you can expect, meaning Harvard, for example, is a major institution,

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Speaker 1: obviously has its own interests and is a sophisticated institution.

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Speaker 1: But the more money you're receiving from one source, the

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Speaker 1: more it's going to impact how much or how little

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Speaker 1: you are willing to be critical of that source. So

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Speaker 1: I thought a great step a few months ago was

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Speaker 1: from a Department of Education, which decided to dust off

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Speaker 1: a provision of the Higher Education Act that requires universities

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Speaker 1: to report publicly annually when they receive more than two

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Speaker 1: hundred and fifty thousand dollars from a particular foreign source.

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Speaker 1: And you want to know that information. As an American,

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Speaker 1: you want to know whether enough money is pouring into

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Speaker 1: one of your schools that their policy decisions might be

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Speaker 1: influenced by a foreign power. I got a briefing recently

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Speaker 1: by the Department of Education team that's doing this. I

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Speaker 1: was amazed at the hostility of the universities and their

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Speaker 1: unwillingness to follow the law. I mean just splat out

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Speaker 1: saying that these things are all proprietary and potential, and no,

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Speaker 1: we're not going to give you the the information. We've noticed

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Speaker 1: the same thing, and in fact, I've spoken to the

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Speaker 1: Department of Education about this, because they wanted to know

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Speaker 1: what our appetite was for enforcing the Higher Education Acting

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Speaker 1: Court if it came to it, and we assured them

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Speaker 1: that we would do that. The schools do not want

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Speaker 1: to release this information. Now. What it touches on is

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Speaker 1: something I've noticed often in this area, which is that

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Speaker 1: there's a tremendous cultural gap between academia and federal law enforcement,

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Speaker 1: which sounds obvious to say, but it becomes a problem

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Speaker 1: in this context. We try and do a lot of

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Speaker 1: outreach to these major universities so that they see we're

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Speaker 1: not just a bunch of jackbooted thugs, and we actually

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Speaker 1: do take a nuanced approach to this kind of enforcement.

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Speaker 1: And you see in these meetings, which are fruitful, but

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Speaker 1: you see in these meetings that there's a tremendous amount

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Speaker 1: of suspicion on the part of academia when it comes

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Speaker 1: to dealing with the federal government, and frankly, especially when

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Speaker 1: the federal government is in the hands of a Republican administration.

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Speaker 1: One of they said that it's amazing the amount of

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Speaker 1: money these universities want to spend on very high powered

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Speaker 1: lawyers trying to block people from learning where their money's

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Speaker 1: coming from. I was just a little surprised at the

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Speaker 1: kind of hostility towards the idea of even sharing with

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Speaker 1: the public things which Congress, on a bipartisan basis, had

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Speaker 1: passed a bill requirement. I agree at all to use

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Speaker 1: the word hostility. I've encountered actual hostility. That provision in

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Speaker 1: the Higher Education Act is kind of interesting. I think

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Speaker 1: it was passed in the seventies when the concern was

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Speaker 1: OPEC money, when Middle Eastern Arab states were pouring money

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Speaker 1: into US universities. I think that's what originally prompted passing

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Speaker 1: that part of the law, But it serves the same

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Speaker 1: use today, which is it's in the public interest to

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Speaker 1: know if a foreign power is pouring a large amount

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Speaker 1: of money into your local prominent university. There's I understand.

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Speaker 1: The president of Harvard meeting was Jesuan Ping, and the

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Speaker 1: university then withdrawing an invitation to Dungbio, who's a Chinese

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Speaker 1: dissident in human rights. So in effect, I after all

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Speaker 1: this talk about academic freedom, Harvard basically count owed to

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Speaker 1: the Chinese government and agreed that in turn, from being

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Speaker 1: able to meet Wi Jijian Ping, they would block this

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Speaker 1: guy from giving a speech which is a speech ironically

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Speaker 1: on Communist Party human rights by elections. That's why I

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Speaker 1: thinks I find so clever about the approach that the

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Speaker 1: Chinese take. China is a closed society. We are in

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Speaker 1: open society, and China has found clever ways to extend

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Speaker 1: its influence here. And that's why those Confucius institutes I

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Speaker 1: mentioned earlier I think are interesting, these sort of cultural

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Speaker 1: centers based in major American universities that China uses to

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Speaker 1: extend its influence here and impact speech here in the

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Speaker 1: United States, which I think is kind of amazing that.

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Speaker 1: In fact, there's a great report by a Senator Apportment

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Speaker 1: about this phenomenon that came out a few months ago,

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Speaker 1: and it's pretty disturbing. And so this use of soft

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Speaker 1: power by the Chinese has a direct impact here. So

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Speaker 1: of In addition, though the Chinese are just straight out

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Speaker 1: bribing people to steal secrets and to provide them with

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Speaker 1: proprietary information to justice from it. Announced recently the arrest

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Speaker 1: of a Harvard University professor. I suspect this was your

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Speaker 1: office since it's in Massachusetts. This was a guy who

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Speaker 1: received over fifteen million dollars in National Steit of Health

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Speaker 1: and Department of Defense grants, who did not tell anybody

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Speaker 1: that he was very close to the associated with the

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Speaker 1: Chinese government program, which ironically is designed to recruit foreigner

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Speaker 1: scientists and reward individuals for stealing proprietary information. That's almost

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Speaker 1: surreal to imagine that you've got a tenured professor at

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Speaker 1: a place like Harvard who is signing a deal to

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Speaker 1: get money from the Chinese in a program which explicitly

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Speaker 1: is asking people to steal a proprietary information. What I

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Speaker 1: find remarkable about it is that the Chinese plan to

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Speaker 1: do this, and it is an elaborate plan. This Thousand

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Speaker 1: Talents plan is brilliant in itslicity. All the Chinese need

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Speaker 1: to do is come here and offered to engage in

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Speaker 1: research partnerships with American academics, which is entirely legal, invite

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Speaker 1: them to participate in research in China, which is entirely legal,

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Speaker 1: and then collect up the benefits. The Chinese are extremely

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Speaker 1: methodical in this context. What they do is they figure

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Speaker 1: out their own strategic technological gaps and they go find

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Speaker 1: an academic in the United States who can fill that gap.

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Speaker 1: And so it is not a coincidence that doctor Lieber,

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Speaker 1: who's the professor in the case that you're talking about,

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Speaker 1: is a world renowned scientist in the area of nanotechnology.

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Speaker 1: This is not a coincidence that he was offered a

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Speaker 1: tremendous amount of money if by the Chinese to engage

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Speaker 1: in a research partnership with them in which they can

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Speaker 1: collect up to know how and use it for Chinese purposes.

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Speaker 1: And the Chinese do this nationwide, meaning in the United States,

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Speaker 1: and they've done it for years and years, as alleged

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Speaker 1: in our charging documents with doctor Lieber. Mistake he made, ironically,

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Speaker 1: it was not necessarily collaborating with the Chinese. There are

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Speaker 1: policy problems there, but it's not on its face illegal.

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Speaker 1: He's alleged to have lied about it to federal authorities,

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Speaker 1: and we're seeing that a lot nationwide. It's changing now,

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Speaker 1: but many many academics, when confronted with the question of

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Speaker 1: are you collaborating with the Chinese, have chosen to hide

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Speaker 1: it from US authorities, which makes us question what is

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Speaker 1: going on in those relationships and how much influence is

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Speaker 1: China really having over these academics. Za Sang Sheng, who

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Speaker 1: was a Harvard affiliated cancer researcher actually was trying to

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Speaker 1: leave the country with twenty one biles themselves. It had

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Speaker 1: been stolen from a laboratory about Israel Deaconess Hospital. That's

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Speaker 1: pretty blatantly out right, it seems to me. Yes, he

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Speaker 1: is one of three cases we charged, the Harvard professor

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Speaker 1: case and this Sao chuang Jiang case and a third

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Speaker 1: one involving a woman named Young King Yee at the

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Speaker 1: same time. And one of the reasons why we did

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Speaker 1: that was to show the breadth of this conduct. The

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Speaker 1: Lieber case involves a Harvard professor collaborating with the Chinese

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Speaker 1: and being paid huge amounts of money to do so.

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Speaker 1: The Jang case, which you just mentioned, is a researcher

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Speaker 1: working at a major medical center on cancer research in

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Speaker 1: Boston who takes twenty one vials of biological material related

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Speaker 1: to his research tries to smuggle it back to Beijing.

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Speaker 1: He was caught by customs and border of the Orties.

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Speaker 1: And the third Yang King yea also a researcher here

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Speaker 1: in Boston, this time at Boston University working on polymer research.

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Speaker 1: Not a coincidence, she happens to be active military in China,

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Speaker 1: a lieutenant in the People's Liberation Army sent here tasked

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Speaker 1: with finding this kind of material, working on it, and

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Speaker 1: bringing the fruits of her research back to China. And

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Speaker 1: so we thought this sort of trifecta of cases was

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Speaker 1: a great way to try to sensitize the public to

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Speaker 1: this ongoing problem. And it's not just Boston. We obviously

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Speaker 1: have our share of major universities and defense contractors. It's

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Speaker 1: a nationwide problem, and it's taken a while to get

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Speaker 1: the public to see this really is a national security problem.

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Speaker 1: In Iowa, Pioneers a company which does very advanced research

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Speaker 1: on improving seeds and developing very specialized seeds for agriculture.

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Speaker 1: This about four or five years ago, but they ended

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Speaker 1: up noticing that these three guys from China who were

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Speaker 1: trying to find where their experimental plots were so that

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Speaker 1: they could go out at night and actually dig up

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Speaker 1: some of the brand new experimentals to take them back

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Speaker 1: to China. I remember that case. That's right. Getting the

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Speaker 1: next generation of seeds is a huge, multi billion dollar

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Speaker 1: business if you can grow them and then sell them

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Speaker 1: all over the world for agriculture, and it increases productivity

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Speaker 1: so that in a country of a billion, three hundred

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Speaker 1: million people. You'd like to have the most advanced agriculture

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Speaker 1: in the world, which they don't have. These three Chinese

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Speaker 1: guys wandering around rural Iowa, and these are folks who

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Speaker 1: have not fluent in English, and we're not blending in

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Speaker 1: very well and trying to find these plots. Sent alarm

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Speaker 1: bells all over Des Moines, and they prompably had people

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Speaker 1: out there tracking them down and I think locking them up. Yes,

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Speaker 1: they were prosecuted. I remember getting a briefing from the

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Speaker 1: FBI agent who did that case. It was exactly what

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Speaker 1: you Sho described. They stood out somewhat right, their English

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Speaker 1: was poor, and three of them just kind of wandered

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Speaker 1: around rural Iowa trying to get their hands in this

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Speaker 1: genetically modified corn. The same thing happened in Kansas, which

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Speaker 1: genetically modified rice. There was a case in Tennessee where

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Speaker 1: some Chinese nationals came to United States and wanted to

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Speaker 1: steal research on the coding for the inside of plastic

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Speaker 1: water bottles that makes them safer for drinking water. So

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Speaker 1: it's interesting that it's not just the theft of military

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Speaker 1: style technology, it's the theft of important research results that

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Speaker 1: pertain to society and food being a good one the

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Speaker 1: corn and the rice cases. But it reminds me of

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Speaker 1: something that a friend of mine in the drug development

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Speaker 1: industry was fond of saying, the first pill costs a

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Speaker 1: billion dollars to create, but the second one costs only

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Speaker 1: about five cents. And this is the tactic that the

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Speaker 1: Chinese followed. They'd rather steal the technology, replicate it at

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Speaker 1: a much cheaper cost, and then replace whatever the foreign

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Speaker 1: technology is like the US technology. So the genetically modified

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Speaker 1: corn probably cost the tremendous amount of money for Monsanto

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Speaker 1: or some other company to come up with. The Chinese

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Speaker 1: steal it, bring it home, recreate it for their own purposes.

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Speaker 1: And this has been going on for over a decade.

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Speaker 1: General Klapper, when he was the Director of National Intelligence,

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Speaker 1: I think, testified in twenty sixteen that his essment was

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Speaker 1: that the Chinese were stealing about five hundred billion dollars

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Speaker 1: a year in intellectual property, more than the total US

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Speaker 1: sales to China. And I think it's this kind of stuff.

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Speaker 1: We don't realize how really valuable some of these things

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Speaker 1: become over time, so they look small and you started,

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Speaker 1: then you look at the out years, and you're always

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Speaker 1: suddenly they just got a stream of revenue. There was

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Speaker 1: a Mason. How big a problem do you think this

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Speaker 1: is overall? I think it is a huge problem, only now,

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Speaker 1: and in part because of COVID becoming clear to a

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Speaker 1: broad swath of the American public that our primary international

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Speaker 1: rival is China. You see commentary these days finally about

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Speaker 1: how we appear to be engaged in a new Cold

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Speaker 1: War with China. I think that is true. I think

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Speaker 1: it's been true for years, but only the Chinese knew it,

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Speaker 1: and most of the US public was blissfully unaware that

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Speaker 1: we were engaged in a new Cold War with the Chinese.

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Speaker 1: Back twelve thirteen years ago, Bob Muller, when he was

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Speaker 1: the FBI director, was testifying in front of Congress about

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Speaker 1: the risk posed by Chinese front companies stealing US technology.

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Speaker 1: Then during the Obama years, if you remember, there was

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Speaker 1: a lot of press about Chinese hacking of US companies,

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Speaker 1: And now these days that has morphed somewhat into just

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Speaker 1: a wave of Chinese nationals sent here to co opt

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Speaker 1: Americans and steal American technological know how. When we talked

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Speaker 1: to the FBI about this, the FBI Director Chris Ray

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Speaker 1: speaks about it this way. The Chinese is using a

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Speaker 1: whole of society approach where it's not just traditional intelligence

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Speaker 1: agents who come over here and try and steal stuff

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Speaker 1: for co opt American. It's non traditional collectors, as we

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Speaker 1: call them. It's your everyday citizen coming over here and

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Speaker 1: either out of a feeling of loyal teach China or

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Speaker 1: under coercion, makes the effort to steal technology. We have

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Speaker 1: only done one case that I can think of in

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Speaker 1: recent memory where the defendant was literally a Chinese government agent,

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Speaker 1: and that's the AA case we just did where the

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Speaker 1: woman was a lieutenant in the PLA. All the other

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Speaker 1: ones are just private citizens and that makes it extremely

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Speaker 1: difficult to police. There's three hundred and seventy thousand Chinese

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Speaker 1: visa holders in the United States. Most of them are

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Speaker 1: here for legitimate reasons, but some of them aren't. Finding

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Speaker 1: them as a problem and it is a constant drain

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Speaker 1: on the US economy and it directly benefits our chief

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Speaker 1: global rival. So what do you think we should do

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Speaker 1: about it? Well, I think there are several tough policy

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Speaker 1: decisions to be made. One of the important things to do,

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Speaker 1: I think is sensitized the public to the problem, and

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Speaker 1: I think you're seeing that happen. Second is, it seems

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Speaker 1: to me that there needs to be greater scrutiny of

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Speaker 1: incoming Chinese immigrants, which is unfortunate to say, but I

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Speaker 1: think unavoidable. It is a bona fide national security problem.

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Speaker 1: I think that more pressure needs to be brought to

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Speaker 1: bear on the Chinese, and I think some of that

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Speaker 1: has happened. So if you look at the Phase one

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Speaker 1: trade deal the administration is struck with the Chinese in January,

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Speaker 1: there's a lot of assurances the Chinese were required to

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Speaker 1: make in that deal about policing the theft of intellectual property.

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Speaker 1: Now whether it actually happens is something else, But these

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Speaker 1: are all moves in the right direction. You need what's

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Speaker 1: called a whole of government approach, and so the State

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Speaker 1: Department needs to do its thing. The Commerce Department, when

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Speaker 1: it comes to export control, needs to do its thing.

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Speaker 1: We need to closely scrutinize foreign investment in US companies

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Speaker 1: and infrastructure. I remember at the Center for Strategic and

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Speaker 1: National Studies when we talked about the China Initiative, the

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Speaker 1: Attorney General gave a speech about Chinese investment in global

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Speaker 1: five G networks, which I think scared everybody, and appropriately so.

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Speaker 1: But it is the perfect example of how the Chinese

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Speaker 1: are relentlessly insinuating themselves into technological infrastructure that the whole

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Speaker 1: world needs. And so the US needs to wake up

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Speaker 1: to that fact. And I think we are slowly now

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Speaker 1: and begin to push back. And I think you're seeing

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Speaker 1: that begin to happen. It may not be happening fast enough,

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Speaker 1: and hopefully it's not too late. When these folks get

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Speaker 1: in trouble, does the Chinese help them at all? Over

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Speaker 1: They just wash their hands and walk off. For the

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Speaker 1: most part, we do not see directing it's from the

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Speaker 1: Chinese government in any of these cases. I have seen

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Speaker 1: one instance where we arrested someone in a case in

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Speaker 1: this context and a lawyer materialized from New York who

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Speaker 1: clearly had been either retained or solicited by Chinese authorities.

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Speaker 1: But I've only seen that one time, and so it's interesting.

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Speaker 1: I don't know if behind the scenes, the Chinese government

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Speaker 1: is just washing their hands of these people or what

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Speaker 1: is happening there. But we haven't seen any overt action

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Speaker 1: by the Chinese in these cases. So they just basically

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Speaker 1: steal what they can relax, and you know, if you

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Speaker 1: get lucky, then they take the casualties. And I think

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Speaker 1: what makes it so clever is that eighty percent of

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Speaker 1: is legal. So the Chinese can offer money to a

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Speaker 1: US academic to collaborate with a university in China. And

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Speaker 1: what your average US academic does not fully understand is

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Speaker 1: that while in the United States there is a bright

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Speaker 1: line distinction between public and private, at least in most sectors,

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Speaker 1: in China there is not. The distinction between public and

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Speaker 1: private is an illusion. So if you're collaborating with the

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Speaker 1: Wuhan University of Technology, whatever, know how you transfer to

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Speaker 1: that university is immediately available to the Chinese Communist Party.

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Speaker 1: If you collaborate with a seemingly private company in China,

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Speaker 1: and you know how you transfer to that company is

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Speaker 1: immediately available to the Chinese Communist Party, and in fact,

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Speaker 1: under Chinese law, the Communist Party can take for itself

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Speaker 1: any technology of private company cultivates for national security purposes.

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Speaker 1: And so if you said to your average US academic, look,

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Speaker 1: you understand that when you collaborate with the Chinese on

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Speaker 1: cancer research, whatever it is you're collaborating with the Communist Party.

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Speaker 1: You get that right. Most of them would be surprised

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Speaker 1: to hear it, and that's some of the outreach and

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Speaker 1: sort of sensitization we need to bring to this problem.

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Speaker 1: I think a lot of academics would be horrified to

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Speaker 1: hear it, But it is nonetheless true. So the other

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Speaker 1: side of that coin is, on the one hand, they're

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Speaker 1: trying to specific knowledge from us. On the other, how

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Speaker 1: do their Confucian institutes change the campuses? Should we be

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Speaker 1: worried about them? People differ on this. I should say

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Speaker 1: there are universities that host these Confucius institutes who insist

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Speaker 1: that they are innocuous. I do not believe that the

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Speaker 1: Confucius Institutes, in my view, and I think the view

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Speaker 1: of this Senate subcommittee, led by Senate A. Portman, are

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Speaker 1: a concerted effort by the Chinese to create basis of

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Speaker 1: operations on US campuses to influence the conversation about China.

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Speaker 1: And so these Confucius institutes were full, for example, host

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Speaker 1: or finance teaching classes, speeches, seminars about China, but every

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Speaker 1: single one of them will tow the party line about

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Speaker 1: Chinese influence in the world. You won't hear about the

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Speaker 1: need for an independent Taiwan. You're not going to hear

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Speaker 1: about Hong Kong. You're not going to hear about Tianamen Square,

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Speaker 1: and so that is an effort by the Chinese to

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Speaker 1: influence the course of the conversation. The second thing you see,

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Speaker 1: although we have not been able to at least here

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Speaker 1: successfully develop a case on this yet, is we have

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Speaker 1: indications that Chinese agents, this time literally agents operate on

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Speaker 1: US campuses in an effort to police speech by Chinese

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Speaker 1: graduate students on those campuses. And so we have seen

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Speaker 1: indications of Chinese agents intimidating Chinese graduate students here doing

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Speaker 1: work who have said something on social media or otherwise

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Speaker 1: publicly that is critical of the Chinese government. This all

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Speaker 1: happens here under our noses, because this is an open

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Speaker 1: and free society, unlike say China, and I find it

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Speaker 1: extremely concerning. It is the Chinese making use of our

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Speaker 1: own constitutional liberties for their own purposes. Lewis as who

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Speaker 1: are one specific case is not in your jurisdiction, but

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Speaker 1: it's become moderately famous. And that is the scale of

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Speaker 1: the Pennsylvania's taking money from China and not specifying what

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Speaker 1: happened to it. It obviously a part of alls Vice

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Speaker 1: President Biden, who now has an institute at penn and

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Speaker 1: the Chinese apparently gave University of Pennsylvania a pretty substantial

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Speaker 1: general grant, although because they won't release anything, we don't

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Speaker 1: actually know how much of it went to Biden's institute

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Speaker 1: and how much of a university is using elsewhere or why.

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Speaker 1: But it was apparently a huge jump between what they

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Speaker 1: had been getting and what they got once Biden showed

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Speaker 1: up there. I think the Chinese are pretty brazen and

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Speaker 1: how they make use of the influence that they can

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Speaker 1: achieve just by using sheer dollars. I think they've seen

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Speaker 1: that work here and I think they see no reason

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Speaker 1: to stop. And I think one of the best cures

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Speaker 1: for that is transparency, which is why I love that

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Speaker 1: the Department of Education has dusted off the Higher Education

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Speaker 1: Act provisions. Transparency is tremendous. You see it on a

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Speaker 1: micro level. So if this Harvard professor or other academics

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Speaker 1: we've looked at, you know, when nih ordd goes to

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Speaker 1: them and says have you received money from China? A

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Speaker 1: simple yes is all they need to give. If it's

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Speaker 1: in fact true, and then the US government now has

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Speaker 1: a better handle on the Chinese exercising influence through the

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Speaker 1: use of dollars. It's the same thing on a university

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Speaker 1: wide level. Every university should be forced to be entirely

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Speaker 1: transparent about the funds that has received from China and

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Speaker 1: where those funds are going, and then you can have

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Speaker 1: a real public policy debate about what to do about it.

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Speaker 1: Once you know the extent of the influence, then you

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Speaker 1: can make a decision about what to do. So a

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Speaker 1: good example, University of Texas, in light of our cases

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Speaker 1: in this area, polled its faculty and say, are any

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Speaker 1: of you getting money from China? They expected maybe five

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Speaker 1: or six positives, and they got over a hundred. And

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Speaker 1: the school administration itself was flabbergasted that that high percentage

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Speaker 1: of its own faculty was received dollars from China. They

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Speaker 1: didn't even know. This is the kind of information you

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Speaker 1: have to have. Once you have that information, you can

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Speaker 1: have an intelligent debate about whether the limit Chinese influence

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Speaker 1: or not. And that's for the policymakers to decide, but

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Speaker 1: it starts with transparency. Listen, I want to thank you

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Speaker 1: for serving the country and for the work you're doing

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Speaker 1: and for sharing with our listeners what I think is

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Speaker 1: going to be a steadily growing and more and more

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Speaker 1: important story, and you're doing some of the real leading

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Speaker 1: work in this area. I think people will find this

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Speaker 1: to be very informative. Thank you, thanks for having me.

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Speaker 1: Thank you to my guests. US attorney Andy Lowing. You

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Speaker 1: can read more about China's investment in US universities on

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Speaker 1: our show page at newtsworld dot com. Newts World is

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Speaker 1: produced by Gamlash three sixty and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer

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Speaker 1: is Debbie Myers and our producer is Garnsey Slum. The

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Speaker 1: artwork for the show was created by Steve Penla special

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Speaker 1: thanks to the team at Gingwich three sixty. Please email

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Speaker 1: me with your questions at Gingwish three sixty dot com

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Speaker 1: slash questions. I'll answer them in future episodes. If you've

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Speaker 1: been enjoying news World, I hope you'll go to Apple

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Speaker 1: us a review so others can learn what it's all about.

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Speaker 1: On the next episode of Newsworld, Chinese Investment in US Universities,

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Speaker 1: Part two, How many US universities receive funding from China

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Speaker 1: and the Chinese Congress Party and what influence does this

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Speaker 1: money have on our higher education system. I'm n gingwish.

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Speaker 1: This is news world