WEBVTT - The PSN Fiasco

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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<v Speaker 1>It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello again, everyone,

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<v Speaker 1>welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Poulette and

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<v Speaker 1>I'm an editor how stuff works dot Com. Sitting across

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<v Speaker 1>from me, as always, from Sunny South Beach senior writer

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. She had actual squirrels in her pants. We

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<v Speaker 1>got served two guys in the park. Yeah, clearly you

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<v Speaker 1>know what episode I'm up to now, Yes, and you're right,

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<v Speaker 1>it was awesome. And those of you there, there are

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<v Speaker 1>several of you out there who know exactly what we're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about and will be very excited that Jonathan has

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<v Speaker 1>jumped on the bandwagon. And you guys are also awesome.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's talk about something that's totally not awesome. Yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>this is definitely not awesome. This is um. You know.

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<v Speaker 1>From time to time in the podcast we tackle issues

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<v Speaker 1>of privacy and internet security, partially because um, they're relevant,

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<v Speaker 1>there are things that a lot of people want to

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<v Speaker 1>learn more about, and partially because I think, if I

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<v Speaker 1>may speak for you, Jonathan, I think there are issues

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<v Speaker 1>that are are important to both of us personally that

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<v Speaker 1>we're very interested and want to, uh to keep an

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<v Speaker 1>eye on there's and there's still a very casual attitude

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<v Speaker 1>among certain segments of the population that used the Internet

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<v Speaker 1>toward privacy. And I think some of it is just

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<v Speaker 1>a lack of information of the sort of things that

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<v Speaker 1>can go wrong if you do not protect your privacy.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's we'll stop dancing around this. We're specifically going

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<v Speaker 1>to talk about the breach of security within the PlayStation

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<v Speaker 1>Network and Curiosity, which is q R I O C

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<v Speaker 1>I T Y since one of Sony's online services, and

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<v Speaker 1>there was a breach that happened between April seventeenth and

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<v Speaker 1>April nineteen eleven. Uh. And I want to stress this today,

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<v Speaker 1>the day that we are recording this is April twenty nine.

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<v Speaker 1>The reason why I say that is because hopefully by

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<v Speaker 1>the time this podcast goes live, the PlayStation Network will

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<v Speaker 1>be back up and running. It has been down since

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<v Speaker 1>they um so uh, you know, ten days and counting

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<v Speaker 1>of of no support from the PlayStation network, so all

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<v Speaker 1>that online support has gone. Uh. People cannot play online games,

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<v Speaker 1>and some some games they can't play at all, even

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<v Speaker 1>a single player local games they aren't able to play

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<v Speaker 1>for for certain titles because those titles rely upon the

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<v Speaker 1>PSN network. I'm just that's redundant. But the PSN in

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<v Speaker 1>order to uh to update information on things like trophies

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<v Speaker 1>and things like that, and so games that that tie

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<v Speaker 1>into that, that rely upon that network, they do not

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<v Speaker 1>run when the networks down. So there are some single

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<v Speaker 1>player games out there that just won't work on the

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<v Speaker 1>ps So as a result, players are understandably upset, and

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<v Speaker 1>they're upset for multiple reasons. One the network's down. That

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<v Speaker 1>was the first thing that upset people because when the

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<v Speaker 1>network went down, there was very little information from Sony

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<v Speaker 1>about the reason for taking the network down. As a

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<v Speaker 1>matter of fact, I remember a story just a few

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<v Speaker 1>days ago before it came to light what was really happening,

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<v Speaker 1>um that uh one of I only read the headline,

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<v Speaker 1>I admit, Uh. They were saying basically that Sony's customers

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<v Speaker 1>were actually not quite as irritated as they might have been. Now, granted,

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<v Speaker 1>at that point, the network hasn't been down very as

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<v Speaker 1>long as it has now it's you know, still out,

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<v Speaker 1>it's going on more than a week now, so but

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<v Speaker 1>you know, Sony's fans are known to be very, very

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<v Speaker 1>loyal and outspoken, which I think is it can be

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<v Speaker 1>a good thing. Um, And I think basically it's surprised

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<v Speaker 1>some that people weren't more concerned at the time, but again,

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<v Speaker 1>I think that's probably because it had had been released

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<v Speaker 1>that hackers were involved, and they had apparently UH managed

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<v Speaker 1>to gather up some personal information. Yeah. So let's let's

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<v Speaker 1>talk about kind of what Sony said at the beginning.

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<v Speaker 1>At the very beginning, when the PlayStation network went went offline, UH,

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<v Speaker 1>Sony essentially UH issued a message that there was going

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<v Speaker 1>to be some maintenance on the network and that it

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<v Speaker 1>was going to be back up between twenty four and

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<v Speaker 1>forty eight hours. Well, part of that wasn't a lie

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<v Speaker 1>or or actually they probably didn't intend for it. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm sure they did not intend for it to be

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<v Speaker 1>down longer than so they weren't weren't outright lying. They

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<v Speaker 1>just didn't know, but it was due to maintenance. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>but they the way it was worded, it sounded like

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<v Speaker 1>it was a planned maintenance sort of issue. Well, of course,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, if you again, UM, I like to get

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<v Speaker 1>people to think from the other side of this. If

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<v Speaker 1>you're PR, corporate PR. You're one, and it's something that

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<v Speaker 1>they can sort of obfuscate about, they can sort of

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<v Speaker 1>muddy the water about. They're probably going to try to

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<v Speaker 1>do it to make themselves look as good as possible. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you don't want to say, hey, guys, our security was

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<v Speaker 1>breached and we don't know what the extent of the

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<v Speaker 1>problem is yet, UH, and our network is down as

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<v Speaker 1>a result of that. So just chill out because it

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<v Speaker 1>may have turned out that yes, security was breached, but

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<v Speaker 1>nothing went beyond that, right And if that were the case,

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<v Speaker 1>if no one had had a chance to access any

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<v Speaker 1>private information or or anything along those lines, are fiddle

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<v Speaker 1>with the network then Sony, So it would it would

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<v Speaker 1>benefit Sony to just leave that little bit out because

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<v Speaker 1>if no one managed to do anything, then there was

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<v Speaker 1>no real harm done to the end consumer apart from

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of days of the network being offline. Right

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<v Speaker 1>like the a few weeks ago, we were talking about

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<v Speaker 1>the data breach that happened here in UH the United

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<v Speaker 1>States with a number of UH loyalty marketing companies. There

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<v Speaker 1>was one provider that they used UM that that got

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<v Speaker 1>hacked into and Epsilon and all they got from Epsilon

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<v Speaker 1>really was names and addresses, although there may have been

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<v Speaker 1>there may have been some account not not like not

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<v Speaker 1>like credit card information, but loyalty account so they know

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<v Speaker 1>the kinds of things you buy right or or it

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<v Speaker 1>may or a number that identifies you for that particular system,

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<v Speaker 1>like not a not a credit card number, but say

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<v Speaker 1>you know you are like when you join a club

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<v Speaker 1>and it says you know you are member number four

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<v Speaker 1>seven eight nine three, Well at four seven eight nine

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<v Speaker 1>three is might be associated with you in that account,

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<v Speaker 1>and they may the hackers also have access to that,

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<v Speaker 1>but then has limited usability. Yeah, and that's not to

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<v Speaker 1>say that it isn't serious, because it is serious, mostly

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<v Speaker 1>because it can be used to target uh spear phishing attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>These are very directed phishing attacks where they say, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland member number four seven one eight three, Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>we need to get your information. We don't have your

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<v Speaker 1>social security number on file? Can you please just type

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<v Speaker 1>that in this little box? I mean, or visit this website.

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<v Speaker 1>And as it turns out, the website is not the

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<v Speaker 1>corporate website. It's a different web. It's just there too

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<v Speaker 1>to steal as much of your information as possible. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>at the time, Sony wasn't sure exactly what white extent

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<v Speaker 1>the attack had, uh, you know, how far did the

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<v Speaker 1>attack go? So rather than cause alarm, Sony said the

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<v Speaker 1>network was down for maintenance and that it would be

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<v Speaker 1>back up for hours while they conducted an internal investigation.

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<v Speaker 1>So you could argue that Sony made the wrong call

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<v Speaker 1>and that Sony should have said that there had been

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<v Speaker 1>a breach and that there was the possibility that there

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<v Speaker 1>was more than just a breach of security. Uh. But

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<v Speaker 1>on the flip side of it, Sony was you wasn't

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<v Speaker 1>sure how bad it was. Once Sony was sure how

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<v Speaker 1>bad it was, they did come forward and say, all right,

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<v Speaker 1>our network is down due to a security breach, and

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<v Speaker 1>it appears is that the hackers have accessed uh at

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<v Speaker 1>least the personal data tables. These are the tables within

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<v Speaker 1>the network that UH that have all the the user

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<v Speaker 1>information things like your name, your address, UH, your m uh,

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<v Speaker 1>the country of origin. It might be your email as well, UM,

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<v Speaker 1>your PlayStation network password and log in information, the handle

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<v Speaker 1>that you use on the PlayStation network. UM. It might

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<v Speaker 1>also include your purchase history and building address. If you've

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<v Speaker 1>used the PlayStation network to buy games or or content

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<v Speaker 1>within games. UM. But those tables did not include the

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<v Speaker 1>credit card information. The credit card information were stored in

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<v Speaker 1>separate tables which may or may not have also been accessed.

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<v Speaker 1>And here's the big difference between those two tables. Besides

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<v Speaker 1>the content. The credit card table was encrypted, the personal

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<v Speaker 1>data table was not. Right. So there's actually it's kind

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<v Speaker 1>of UM. It's actually a little painful to read. But

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<v Speaker 1>there's a a frequently asked questions document on PlayStation where

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<v Speaker 1>they it addresses the actual outage and and what happened. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>And there's a specific bit here. Let's see if I

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<v Speaker 1>can find the particular question about uh whether or not

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<v Speaker 1>the personal data was encrypted? UM, because they kind of

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<v Speaker 1>dance around it. Let's see here. You wanna do you

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<v Speaker 1>wanna dance while I do this? Well, UM, I could

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<v Speaker 1>tell you that I was about to talk to uh,

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<v Speaker 1>to you about the fact that UM just yesterday again

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<v Speaker 1>as of the day we recorded this on the Stephen

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<v Speaker 1>Mussel of c Net wrote that, UM, there have been

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<v Speaker 1>messages circulating that hackers have claimed that they do in

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<v Speaker 1>fact have credit card information and it is for sale,

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<v Speaker 1>that they offered it back to Sony, but Sony refused

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<v Speaker 1>to buy it. Um, And the information includes, uh, not

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<v Speaker 1>only the credit card numbers, but the expiration dates of

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<v Speaker 1>the cards and the cvvs, which are the numbers on

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<v Speaker 1>the back of most credit cards or the front. Actually

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<v Speaker 1>it's not a CBV on an AMEX American Express card,

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<v Speaker 1>but it's the same It fulfills the same purpose security.

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<v Speaker 1>Do you have the security number? And so they claim

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<v Speaker 1>to have that, but it has not been established whether

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<v Speaker 1>or not that is legitimate. I would guess I'm guessing

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<v Speaker 1>that that's not legitimate. And the reason why I say

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<v Speaker 1>that's not legitimate is because Sony does not collect the

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<v Speaker 1>security numbers that and Sony collects the expiration date and

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<v Speaker 1>the actual credit card number, but not the security number.

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<v Speaker 1>So if someone claims to have all that information, they

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<v Speaker 1>didn't get it from Sony. So where did they magically

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<v Speaker 1>get these security numbers? I call shenanigans on that claim exactly. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>you see, um, you know, if you have a couple

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<v Speaker 1>of million dollars and you want to buy this database,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm sure they'll sell it to you. Show Uh So, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I've also got a bridge that I would like to

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<v Speaker 1>interest you in. But I did find the the specific

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<v Speaker 1>section and the frequently asked questions document on at PlayStation's

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<v Speaker 1>UM supports area, and it was was my personal data encrypted?

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<v Speaker 1>Here's Sony's answer. All of the data was protected and

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<v Speaker 1>access was restricted both physically and through the perimeter and

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<v Speaker 1>security of the network. The entire credit card table was encrypted,

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<v Speaker 1>and we have no evidence that credit card data was taken.

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<v Speaker 1>The personal data table, which is a separate data set,

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<v Speaker 1>was not encrypted, but was of course behind a very

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<v Speaker 1>sophisticated security system that was breached in a malicious attack.

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<v Speaker 1>So alright, Sony, come on, guys, it doesn't help your

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<v Speaker 1>case at all to say that your security system was

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<v Speaker 1>incredibly sophisticated if once the stuff has already been stolen, right,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's like a bank coming out and saying

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<v Speaker 1>we had the best security measures imp place the burglars

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<v Speaker 1>stole everything. I mean, doesn't No one cares how sophisticated

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<v Speaker 1>your security was if in fact it was breached, because

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<v Speaker 1>clearly it was not secure enough. I mean, it's obvious

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<v Speaker 1>it wasn't secure enough, because if it were secure enough,

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<v Speaker 1>no one would have breached it. So arguing that your

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<v Speaker 1>security was really sophisticated doesn't impress anybody once the theft

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<v Speaker 1>has already happened. And also, you know, like I said,

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<v Speaker 1>it kind of danced around that question. Uh you know,

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<v Speaker 1>they didn't just come out and say no, we did

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<v Speaker 1>not encrypt your personal data until it got pretty far

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<v Speaker 1>into the answer. But yeah, so that personal data is

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<v Speaker 1>all out there and it's available. And then my opinion

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<v Speaker 1>that personal data is far more valuable than your credit

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<v Speaker 1>card number. And and here's why. So, yeah, getting your

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<v Speaker 1>credit card stolen stinks. I've had I've had my credit

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<v Speaker 1>card number stolen once before. And it's a pain because

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<v Speaker 1>it means that you you have to you have to uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, you dispute the the charges, you have to

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<v Speaker 1>change your credit card, you have to get a new card.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, they're there may be trouble disputing some charges

0:13:04.360 --> 0:13:07.640
<v Speaker 1>depending upon your credit card company and all that mess.

0:13:07.720 --> 0:13:09.840
<v Speaker 1>And this stuff can affect your credit rating and it's

0:13:09.840 --> 0:13:13.440
<v Speaker 1>a real pain in the neck. But ultimately you're talking

0:13:13.480 --> 0:13:16.640
<v Speaker 1>about probably a few hundred dollars if you're paying attention,

0:13:16.679 --> 0:13:19.360
<v Speaker 1>it may not even be that much, but you know

0:13:19.720 --> 0:13:21.440
<v Speaker 1>that's there's still a lot of money to a lot

0:13:21.480 --> 0:13:24.760
<v Speaker 1>of people, but it's not as much money as thousands

0:13:24.880 --> 0:13:28.800
<v Speaker 1>of dollars or tens of thousands of dollars, which is

0:13:28.880 --> 0:13:33.000
<v Speaker 1>what can be stolen from you or stolen within your

0:13:33.080 --> 0:13:37.400
<v Speaker 1>name should someone be able to steal your identity. And

0:13:37.840 --> 0:13:41.240
<v Speaker 1>when you think about it, these if a personal information

0:13:41.280 --> 0:13:44.800
<v Speaker 1>includes your name and your address and your birth date

0:13:45.440 --> 0:13:48.480
<v Speaker 1>and all of this sort of things, people could start

0:13:48.559 --> 0:13:52.000
<v Speaker 1>to use that to try and uh and apply for

0:13:52.080 --> 0:13:55.600
<v Speaker 1>credit cards in your name. And then that's where you

0:13:55.679 --> 0:13:58.360
<v Speaker 1>really start seeing some nasty, nasty hits. I mean, your

0:13:58.360 --> 0:14:01.679
<v Speaker 1>credit rating could plumb it as people take advantage of

0:14:01.679 --> 0:14:04.120
<v Speaker 1>that and steal your identity. Yes, and speaking of someone

0:14:04.160 --> 0:14:06.960
<v Speaker 1>who's had to do it, it's very very difficult to

0:14:08.120 --> 0:14:11.720
<v Speaker 1>uh go in and try to clean up your past

0:14:11.800 --> 0:14:15.560
<v Speaker 1>credit history, even when it's not um, you know, they're

0:14:15.640 --> 0:14:20.120
<v Speaker 1>very the credit agents are very protective of their information. Um.

0:14:20.160 --> 0:14:22.240
<v Speaker 1>And of course there are people who would love to

0:14:22.280 --> 0:14:24.440
<v Speaker 1>go up and go no, no, it was it was

0:14:24.800 --> 0:14:29.560
<v Speaker 1>it was hackers. Um. You know, so they uh, you know,

0:14:29.600 --> 0:14:32.000
<v Speaker 1>I would imagine that they are just particularly concerned that

0:14:32.040 --> 0:14:34.400
<v Speaker 1>people are allying to them. But it is very difficult

0:14:34.440 --> 0:14:37.400
<v Speaker 1>for even for those who can offer you know, more

0:14:37.400 --> 0:14:41.880
<v Speaker 1>concrete proof to go in and make changes. So um,

0:14:41.920 --> 0:14:45.600
<v Speaker 1>but even though I'm getting back to Sony specifically. UM,

0:14:45.680 --> 0:14:47.680
<v Speaker 1>I think in a way, they did some things right

0:14:47.720 --> 0:14:49.920
<v Speaker 1>and they did some things wrong. Obviously, the way they

0:14:50.000 --> 0:14:53.480
<v Speaker 1>handled it with regard to the customers, especially in the

0:14:53.480 --> 0:14:55.440
<v Speaker 1>eyes of the customers, leaves a lot to be desired.

0:14:55.440 --> 0:14:59.360
<v Speaker 1>I've seen many, uh complaints about that, and there's there

0:14:59.400 --> 0:15:01.560
<v Speaker 1>have even been law suits filed at this point. Yeah,

0:15:01.640 --> 0:15:03.560
<v Speaker 1>and we'll we'll talk. We'll need to talk a little

0:15:03.560 --> 0:15:05.920
<v Speaker 1>bit about those lawsuits because there's some there's a recent

0:15:05.960 --> 0:15:09.920
<v Speaker 1>Supreme Court ruling that might actually bear upon that. And

0:15:10.000 --> 0:15:12.920
<v Speaker 1>there's also one other element within the terms of use

0:15:12.960 --> 0:15:15.000
<v Speaker 1>that I would like to address as far as the

0:15:15.160 --> 0:15:17.760
<v Speaker 1>lawsuits are concerned. Yeah, we can, we can totally do

0:15:17.800 --> 0:15:19.400
<v Speaker 1>that in just a second. I just wanted to mention though,

0:15:19.560 --> 0:15:22.920
<v Speaker 1>that Sony did, in fact, UH call in an external

0:15:22.920 --> 0:15:26.560
<v Speaker 1>security auditor to take a look at the practices, um

0:15:26.880 --> 0:15:29.760
<v Speaker 1>and and did shut the networks down as soon as

0:15:29.800 --> 0:15:33.480
<v Speaker 1>they realized that there was a serious problem. And Uh,

0:15:33.520 --> 0:15:36.880
<v Speaker 1>the reason it's taking Song at least according to Sony,

0:15:37.120 --> 0:15:39.840
<v Speaker 1>is to get everything back up online is they're changing

0:15:40.040 --> 0:15:42.560
<v Speaker 1>the security structure of the site, which and I think

0:15:42.600 --> 0:15:45.520
<v Speaker 1>that that's an excellent thing and they're require They're going

0:15:45.600 --> 0:15:48.040
<v Speaker 1>to require everyone as soon as they reconnect to the

0:15:48.040 --> 0:15:52.240
<v Speaker 1>network to change their password. UM and that's something else

0:15:52.280 --> 0:15:54.520
<v Speaker 1>we should point out. If you are, if you're practicing

0:15:54.520 --> 0:15:59.840
<v Speaker 1>good security, first of all, you're in the most people

0:16:00.000 --> 0:16:02.040
<v Speaker 1>out I know there's some people out there who are

0:16:02.040 --> 0:16:04.480
<v Speaker 1>our listeners who claim that they do, and that's great,

0:16:04.640 --> 0:16:09.040
<v Speaker 1>I'm glad, fantastic. The rest of you are probably doing

0:16:09.040 --> 0:16:11.200
<v Speaker 1>the same thing that almost everyone is doing, which is

0:16:11.240 --> 0:16:14.800
<v Speaker 1>that you use maybe maybe a handful of passwords. Some

0:16:14.800 --> 0:16:17.280
<v Speaker 1>people just use one and they use it across everything,

0:16:17.440 --> 0:16:20.440
<v Speaker 1>and they might even use the same user name across everything,

0:16:20.880 --> 0:16:23.760
<v Speaker 1>in which case, if someone has access to your name,

0:16:24.200 --> 0:16:27.840
<v Speaker 1>your email address, your user name, and your password, and

0:16:27.840 --> 0:16:30.840
<v Speaker 1>you're using that same password across multiple platforms, all of

0:16:30.840 --> 0:16:34.360
<v Speaker 1>those platforms are now at risk. UH. That means the

0:16:34.400 --> 0:16:37.480
<v Speaker 1>hackers who stole that information could, in theory, access your

0:16:37.520 --> 0:16:41.320
<v Speaker 1>accounts across multiple platforms that might include emails, social networks,

0:16:41.800 --> 0:16:46.200
<v Speaker 1>other services. So you want to make sure that you're

0:16:46.320 --> 0:16:50.400
<v Speaker 1>using multiple passwords, make them difficult to guess. Don't just

0:16:50.440 --> 0:16:52.720
<v Speaker 1>make it a variation off a password that you're using

0:16:52.760 --> 0:16:55.440
<v Speaker 1>over and over again. Use a strong password generator. If

0:16:55.440 --> 0:16:59.360
<v Speaker 1>you need to, um, yeah, those are those are excellent.

0:16:59.400 --> 0:17:01.840
<v Speaker 1>There's there's a couple out there that you do things like,

0:17:01.920 --> 0:17:04.720
<v Speaker 1>for instance, you want to create a password, you put

0:17:04.760 --> 0:17:08.199
<v Speaker 1>in the u r L for the the website that

0:17:08.240 --> 0:17:10.320
<v Speaker 1>you're going to use. You can actually download code that

0:17:10.359 --> 0:17:12.359
<v Speaker 1>will allow you to do this, and you can even

0:17:12.400 --> 0:17:14.760
<v Speaker 1>turn your computer offline so that you know, you don't

0:17:14.800 --> 0:17:17.800
<v Speaker 1>have to worry about it broadcasting this anywhere. But you

0:17:17.840 --> 0:17:19.560
<v Speaker 1>put in the u r L for the website you

0:17:19.600 --> 0:17:22.280
<v Speaker 1>plan to visit. You put in a master password that

0:17:22.560 --> 0:17:24.119
<v Speaker 1>this is the same password you're going to use for

0:17:24.160 --> 0:17:28.520
<v Speaker 1>every single site. But using the master password and the

0:17:28.600 --> 0:17:31.040
<v Speaker 1>u r L, it creates a hash of that and

0:17:31.119 --> 0:17:34.000
<v Speaker 1>creates a strong password based on that. So then all

0:17:34.040 --> 0:17:36.000
<v Speaker 1>you do is put in different u r l's with

0:17:36.080 --> 0:17:39.000
<v Speaker 1>the same master password and it will generate its strong

0:17:39.040 --> 0:17:42.240
<v Speaker 1>password for you. You create your accounts that way using

0:17:42.240 --> 0:17:44.199
<v Speaker 1>that strong password, and if you ever forget it, all

0:17:44.240 --> 0:17:46.600
<v Speaker 1>you have to do is go back into that program.

0:17:46.640 --> 0:17:48.879
<v Speaker 1>You know, again disconnect yourself from all the networks if

0:17:48.880 --> 0:17:51.240
<v Speaker 1>you want to, but go back into that program, type

0:17:51.240 --> 0:17:53.280
<v Speaker 1>in the u r L and your master password again

0:17:53.359 --> 0:17:57.720
<v Speaker 1>and it will the same strong password will pop up again. Yeah, yeah,

0:17:57.840 --> 0:17:59.840
<v Speaker 1>and I have a I have a password wallet that

0:17:59.880 --> 0:18:03.239
<v Speaker 1>I use that will generate passwords, and uh, I have

0:18:03.400 --> 0:18:08.000
<v Speaker 1>the app on my phone and iPod and there's a

0:18:08.000 --> 0:18:10.760
<v Speaker 1>plug in for my browser. So it's that that actually

0:18:10.800 --> 0:18:13.680
<v Speaker 1>goes into the database and everything is encrypted. And if I,

0:18:13.680 --> 0:18:16.200
<v Speaker 1>if I do happen to lose my phone, the uh

0:18:16.680 --> 0:18:18.960
<v Speaker 1>uh and somebody else gets it and and breaks into it,

0:18:19.000 --> 0:18:22.879
<v Speaker 1>they have to they won't find out specifically what is

0:18:22.920 --> 0:18:25.280
<v Speaker 1>in there because they would have to actually get into

0:18:25.400 --> 0:18:27.680
<v Speaker 1>the password app two, which requires a separate and more

0:18:27.720 --> 0:18:33.000
<v Speaker 1>complex password. Um. So yeah, I mean it's uh, these

0:18:33.040 --> 0:18:36.120
<v Speaker 1>are these are good ideas, but uh, it doesn't change

0:18:36.160 --> 0:18:39.080
<v Speaker 1>the fact that that Sony customers are very upset not

0:18:39.200 --> 0:18:42.479
<v Speaker 1>only that they got that they weren't told about this,

0:18:42.520 --> 0:18:45.040
<v Speaker 1>but that they're on top of that, you know, that's

0:18:45.080 --> 0:18:48.960
<v Speaker 1>really insult to injury having their information taken. And a

0:18:48.960 --> 0:18:51.240
<v Speaker 1>lot of people are upset that they can't go back

0:18:51.280 --> 0:18:54.439
<v Speaker 1>in and change their user name and password on the

0:18:54.480 --> 0:18:57.280
<v Speaker 1>network because the network is down. Of course, if no

0:18:57.280 --> 0:18:59.520
<v Speaker 1>one else can get in, I would argue that that's

0:19:00.040 --> 0:19:02.480
<v Speaker 1>not quite as big as at this point, you should

0:19:02.520 --> 0:19:06.040
<v Speaker 1>really be concentrating on changing your password everywhere else. Yes,

0:19:06.280 --> 0:19:09.320
<v Speaker 1>like all the different emails and and social networks and

0:19:09.359 --> 0:19:11.639
<v Speaker 1>all the other services you use. If you use that

0:19:11.680 --> 0:19:14.040
<v Speaker 1>same password, you need to change it. Um, I want

0:19:14.080 --> 0:19:16.440
<v Speaker 1>to put a fraud alert on your credit report? Yeah. Yeah,

0:19:16.520 --> 0:19:19.280
<v Speaker 1>those can be a real pain too, just because if

0:19:19.280 --> 0:19:22.040
<v Speaker 1>you start using your credit card and you're you know,

0:19:22.080 --> 0:19:25.320
<v Speaker 1>you're out of town, then you may end up getting

0:19:25.320 --> 0:19:27.880
<v Speaker 1>a call from your your bank or credit union every

0:19:27.920 --> 0:19:31.880
<v Speaker 1>time you Yeah. Compared that compared to yeah, that it's

0:19:31.920 --> 0:19:33.800
<v Speaker 1>it's inconvenient, and it's a pain in the butt, but

0:19:33.840 --> 0:19:35.760
<v Speaker 1>it's less of a pain in the butt than dealing

0:19:35.800 --> 0:19:38.040
<v Speaker 1>with the fact that someone has stolen your information and

0:19:38.200 --> 0:19:43.080
<v Speaker 1>is using your card without your approval. Just as an aside, Yeah,

0:19:43.080 --> 0:19:45.919
<v Speaker 1>I've I've heard recently, very recently that the people who

0:19:46.040 --> 0:19:50.199
<v Speaker 1>steal credit card numbers now are not And you know,

0:19:50.240 --> 0:19:53.040
<v Speaker 1>if I were stealing credit card numbers, I would think

0:19:53.080 --> 0:19:55.080
<v Speaker 1>that I would want to do things as quickly as

0:19:55.160 --> 0:19:58.680
<v Speaker 1>possible to avoid, uh, you know, the person I stole

0:19:58.680 --> 0:20:01.880
<v Speaker 1>it from. Changing, Yeah, to call in and say, hey,

0:20:01.920 --> 0:20:04.640
<v Speaker 1>my credit card, my credit card has been stolen. Um.

0:20:04.680 --> 0:20:07.880
<v Speaker 1>But in a lot of cases, when when, apparently, when

0:20:07.880 --> 0:20:10.080
<v Speaker 1>this kind of thing happens. They don't run out and

0:20:10.240 --> 0:20:13.280
<v Speaker 1>buy lots of big screen TVs and designer genes and

0:20:13.320 --> 0:20:16.719
<v Speaker 1>all sorts of other cool fun stuff computers, video games.

0:20:16.760 --> 0:20:20.359
<v Speaker 1>They go and they buy stuff for twenty dollars or

0:20:20.560 --> 0:20:23.840
<v Speaker 1>thirty dollars because it doesn't go noticed. People let that

0:20:23.920 --> 0:20:26.040
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing slide on their card. They go, wait

0:20:26.080 --> 0:20:28.520
<v Speaker 1>a minute, I don't remember going to Best Buy and

0:20:28.600 --> 0:20:32.480
<v Speaker 1>spending twenty five times. I probably bought a movie or something. Oh, well,

0:20:32.560 --> 0:20:34.359
<v Speaker 1>you know, I'm sure it's it's just twenty bucks. It's

0:20:34.400 --> 0:20:36.480
<v Speaker 1>no big deal. That's the thing that they've started to do.

0:20:36.560 --> 0:20:39.960
<v Speaker 1>And that's very insidious because they could continue to do

0:20:40.000 --> 0:20:42.480
<v Speaker 1>that and continue to hold on your information and take

0:20:42.520 --> 0:20:44.960
<v Speaker 1>money from you for years. Well, like we said, though,

0:20:45.000 --> 0:20:49.000
<v Speaker 1>credit cards, that's cheap. In the long run, the long game,

0:20:49.200 --> 0:20:51.640
<v Speaker 1>credit card is nothing. In fact, we had a security

0:20:51.640 --> 0:20:54.200
<v Speaker 1>expert come and talk to the editorial department at House

0:20:54.200 --> 0:20:56.000
<v Speaker 1>Stuff Works just as part of our we have this

0:20:56.080 --> 0:20:59.119
<v Speaker 1>ongoing lecture series where we get to listen to various

0:20:59.119 --> 0:21:02.120
<v Speaker 1>experts in different fields. And the security expert was talking

0:21:02.119 --> 0:21:05.000
<v Speaker 1>about how credit card information is cheap. It's it's you know,

0:21:05.119 --> 0:21:07.359
<v Speaker 1>it's like fifteen cents for a credit card number, and

0:21:07.359 --> 0:21:10.280
<v Speaker 1>it's because it's because there is no guarantee that credit

0:21:10.320 --> 0:21:13.240
<v Speaker 1>card number is going to be good for very much longer. Um.

0:21:13.359 --> 0:21:16.439
<v Speaker 1>What's valuable is the personal information, because that's where you

0:21:16.440 --> 0:21:19.520
<v Speaker 1>can start to you know, you you create your own

0:21:19.560 --> 0:21:22.880
<v Speaker 1>credit card based upon this person's identity, on that person's

0:21:22.920 --> 0:21:25.119
<v Speaker 1>credit rating, and you have all the billing go to

0:21:25.440 --> 0:21:27.119
<v Speaker 1>information go to a different place. You don't have to

0:21:27.119 --> 0:21:29.439
<v Speaker 1>worry about paying for it. You're just gonna run that

0:21:29.520 --> 0:21:31.320
<v Speaker 1>up as much as you can, and that's where you

0:21:31.359 --> 0:21:35.239
<v Speaker 1>make the big purchases, right So, and and ultimately the

0:21:35.280 --> 0:21:38.680
<v Speaker 1>person whose name is attached to that number that's their

0:21:38.720 --> 0:21:41.359
<v Speaker 1>credit rating, is going to suffer as a result, and

0:21:41.800 --> 0:21:44.640
<v Speaker 1>that's where you really have to worry. So again, even

0:21:44.680 --> 0:21:47.600
<v Speaker 1>if the credit card information wasn't touched, that personal data

0:21:47.640 --> 0:21:52.320
<v Speaker 1>is very important now they the hackers would lack certain

0:21:52.320 --> 0:21:55.359
<v Speaker 1>information that would really make it useful, like your Social

0:21:55.359 --> 0:21:59.440
<v Speaker 1>Security number. That part is not in your ps N profile,

0:21:59.720 --> 0:22:03.720
<v Speaker 1>So he does not ask for that. So for that reason,

0:22:03.760 --> 0:22:06.600
<v Speaker 1>Sony has alerted users that they should be on the

0:22:06.640 --> 0:22:12.040
<v Speaker 1>lookout for any spear phishing attempts. Sony has said it

0:22:12.080 --> 0:22:15.640
<v Speaker 1>will not ask for personal information through email. Just like

0:22:16.080 --> 0:22:19.439
<v Speaker 1>most retailers and organizations will say the same thing. They

0:22:19.480 --> 0:22:22.679
<v Speaker 1>will never ask for your personal identifiable information to be

0:22:22.760 --> 0:22:25.600
<v Speaker 1>sent over email. So if you get an email from

0:22:25.640 --> 0:22:29.359
<v Speaker 1>apparently Sony that says, all right, we're ready to reinstate

0:22:29.400 --> 0:22:32.520
<v Speaker 1>your ps N profile, but we need your Social Security

0:22:32.560 --> 0:22:34.919
<v Speaker 1>number in order to do it, that's a red flag.

0:22:35.440 --> 0:22:37.879
<v Speaker 1>That's a that's a sign of spear fishing, and that

0:22:37.920 --> 0:22:40.239
<v Speaker 1>the person who sent that is probably just trying to

0:22:40.280 --> 0:22:42.760
<v Speaker 1>gather as much user information as possible to sell it

0:22:42.800 --> 0:22:46.480
<v Speaker 1>off to whomever. So um we we said this a

0:22:46.520 --> 0:22:50.959
<v Speaker 1>few weeks ago, but basically, any reputable company who values

0:22:51.000 --> 0:22:53.639
<v Speaker 1>your business and and may actually need some of this

0:22:53.760 --> 0:22:59.600
<v Speaker 1>information for legitimate purposes, legitimate real world companies are not

0:22:59.760 --> 0:23:01.919
<v Speaker 1>going to ask for you to mail that in or

0:23:02.000 --> 0:23:07.119
<v Speaker 1>to send it in over um A network because basically,

0:23:07.160 --> 0:23:09.600
<v Speaker 1>at this point they all know that these kinds of

0:23:09.640 --> 0:23:12.119
<v Speaker 1>things are going on. It's always better if you have

0:23:12.200 --> 0:23:15.040
<v Speaker 1>any questions to give the company a call at the

0:23:15.119 --> 0:23:18.359
<v Speaker 1>number listed on its legitimate website. Go to the website yourself,

0:23:18.400 --> 0:23:22.399
<v Speaker 1>don't click on any links and those emails, and h

0:23:22.680 --> 0:23:24.720
<v Speaker 1>get the phone number, use the one on your bill

0:23:25.400 --> 0:23:28.159
<v Speaker 1>or whatever to I to call and say, hey, did

0:23:28.240 --> 0:23:31.000
<v Speaker 1>you do you actually need this information? Talk to a

0:23:31.000 --> 0:23:33.440
<v Speaker 1>customer service representative and say, you know, I'm happy to

0:23:33.560 --> 0:23:36.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, hopefully I'm happy to give you the information

0:23:36.119 --> 0:23:38.280
<v Speaker 1>you need if you need it. But I believe this

0:23:38.359 --> 0:23:41.480
<v Speaker 1>might be an attempt to get my information. And if so,

0:23:42.200 --> 0:23:44.040
<v Speaker 1>you guys need to be aware of it so that

0:23:44.240 --> 0:23:46.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, you can maybe message out to people that

0:23:46.880 --> 0:23:51.280
<v Speaker 1>there are these kinds of attacks. Um and yeah, I've

0:23:51.320 --> 0:23:53.840
<v Speaker 1>I've actually had my information soul and wasn't actually related

0:23:53.880 --> 0:23:56.640
<v Speaker 1>to a tech thing. Somebody else that I did business with,

0:23:56.960 --> 0:24:01.000
<v Speaker 1>um had a person on the inside who was uh

0:24:01.080 --> 0:24:04.959
<v Speaker 1>selling information. Yeah, yeah, that can happen. That's essentially you know,

0:24:05.040 --> 0:24:07.760
<v Speaker 1>sabotage is really what that comes down to. Yeah. Yeah.

0:24:07.800 --> 0:24:09.800
<v Speaker 1>And so you know, if you were if you were

0:24:09.800 --> 0:24:13.280
<v Speaker 1>in a situation like this, either through the PlayStation network

0:24:13.440 --> 0:24:15.800
<v Speaker 1>or some other company, you want to make sure you

0:24:15.880 --> 0:24:18.439
<v Speaker 1>keep an eye in your your credit reports. And in

0:24:18.480 --> 0:24:20.520
<v Speaker 1>the United States you can do that. Um. You know,

0:24:20.560 --> 0:24:23.240
<v Speaker 1>I believe there's there's a law and effect now for

0:24:23.320 --> 0:24:26.119
<v Speaker 1>everybody that you can get one reporter year free, one

0:24:26.440 --> 0:24:31.520
<v Speaker 1>free credit report from each of the credit Yeah and um,

0:24:31.520 --> 0:24:35.200
<v Speaker 1>and those would be Equifax, trans Union, and Experience UM

0:24:35.280 --> 0:24:37.200
<v Speaker 1>and you you would definitely want to keep an eye

0:24:37.200 --> 0:24:40.240
<v Speaker 1>on that. UM. Some states like the one we live

0:24:40.280 --> 0:24:42.919
<v Speaker 1>and allow you, I believe, to reports per year. You

0:24:42.920 --> 0:24:45.720
<v Speaker 1>can sign up for services that will allow you to

0:24:45.920 --> 0:24:47.760
<v Speaker 1>check it as many times as you want to. I

0:24:47.960 --> 0:24:52.040
<v Speaker 1>I you know, there's usually a pretty decent fee associated

0:24:52.080 --> 0:24:55.880
<v Speaker 1>with that. UM. And I've talked, I've I've heard information

0:24:55.960 --> 0:25:01.560
<v Speaker 1>from some of the UH consumer protect your folks. I

0:25:01.680 --> 0:25:04.080
<v Speaker 1>can't think of what you call them, like consumer watchdogs

0:25:04.080 --> 0:25:05.760
<v Speaker 1>and say, yeah, you know, you do need to keep

0:25:05.760 --> 0:25:07.159
<v Speaker 1>an eye on your credit, but you might not need

0:25:07.200 --> 0:25:09.399
<v Speaker 1>to spend twenty dollars a month to keep an eye

0:25:09.400 --> 0:25:14.000
<v Speaker 1>on your credit every day. UM. So you know, just

0:25:14.000 --> 0:25:16.760
<v Speaker 1>just be wary of that. Certainly, UH, if I were

0:25:16.800 --> 0:25:21.080
<v Speaker 1>affected by the PlayStation network fiasco, I would I would

0:25:21.080 --> 0:25:24.800
<v Speaker 1>certainly change that credit card number immediately if you haven't

0:25:24.800 --> 0:25:28.760
<v Speaker 1>already hopefully you already have. Yeah, and um I changing

0:25:28.800 --> 0:25:30.919
<v Speaker 1>credit card numbers today is even a bigger pain than

0:25:30.960 --> 0:25:33.160
<v Speaker 1>it used to be. The reason for that is things

0:25:33.160 --> 0:25:36.720
<v Speaker 1>like when you set up recurring payments for stuff. Yes,

0:25:36.960 --> 0:25:39.879
<v Speaker 1>I mean, as we make these systems simpler to do

0:25:39.920 --> 0:25:43.520
<v Speaker 1>all your your payments online. Then we have to remember, oh,

0:25:43.600 --> 0:25:45.440
<v Speaker 1>I changed my credit card number. I have to go

0:25:45.640 --> 0:25:49.919
<v Speaker 1>through every single building service I use and change my

0:25:50.040 --> 0:25:53.840
<v Speaker 1>information there or else I'm going to default on a bill. Yeah. Yeah,

0:25:54.000 --> 0:25:56.640
<v Speaker 1>pain in the butt, but still still better than having

0:25:56.640 --> 0:25:59.320
<v Speaker 1>your identity still in For Sony, though, this is gonna

0:25:59.320 --> 0:26:02.399
<v Speaker 1>be a real headache for sometime. Sony has got This

0:26:02.440 --> 0:26:04.600
<v Speaker 1>is gonna be costs Sony big time. And it's gonna

0:26:04.640 --> 0:26:08.080
<v Speaker 1>cost it because there are between seventy and seventy seven

0:26:08.320 --> 0:26:14.040
<v Speaker 1>million users of PSN. That's a lot of people. And

0:26:14.119 --> 0:26:18.440
<v Speaker 1>to UH to update the security information is it's this

0:26:18.480 --> 0:26:22.400
<v Speaker 1>is a major investment to to fix this problem. It's

0:26:22.400 --> 0:26:25.760
<v Speaker 1>almost like creating the network over from scratch. And they

0:26:25.800 --> 0:26:30.720
<v Speaker 1>have a huge blow to their reputation because not all

0:26:30.760 --> 0:26:33.159
<v Speaker 1>of those users are necessarily going to be willing to

0:26:33.200 --> 0:26:37.240
<v Speaker 1>come back after having their information stolen like this. They aren't,

0:26:37.440 --> 0:26:42.080
<v Speaker 1>and new users might rethink joining because of this breach,

0:26:42.560 --> 0:26:45.080
<v Speaker 1>and so they may say, I don't want to put

0:26:45.080 --> 0:26:47.840
<v Speaker 1>my information in the hands of a company that has

0:26:47.880 --> 0:26:51.560
<v Speaker 1>shown itself incapable of keeping it protected. Well, I would, uh,

0:26:52.119 --> 0:26:54.200
<v Speaker 1>I would go out on a limb. We It's a

0:26:54.280 --> 0:26:56.440
<v Speaker 1>long ways away now from our prediction episode, I would

0:26:56.440 --> 0:26:58.199
<v Speaker 1>go out on a limb and say that's Sony. The

0:26:58.240 --> 0:27:00.680
<v Speaker 1>thing that saves Sony in this case, if anything does,

0:27:00.880 --> 0:27:06.520
<v Speaker 1>is that amazing loyalty that PlayStation customers have. But I

0:27:07.000 --> 0:27:09.200
<v Speaker 1>still think a lot of people are going to be

0:27:09.920 --> 0:27:13.480
<v Speaker 1>extremely upset and quite a few will probably drop out. Yeah,

0:27:13.520 --> 0:27:16.359
<v Speaker 1>and this is again, by the time this podcast goes live,

0:27:16.480 --> 0:27:20.359
<v Speaker 1>there may very well be many more developments. Maybe you

0:27:20.400 --> 0:27:24.000
<v Speaker 1>will know exactly who was responsible for these attacks. As

0:27:24.000 --> 0:27:27.240
<v Speaker 1>of this moment, we don't. We can't say Sony may

0:27:27.240 --> 0:27:29.640
<v Speaker 1>have an idea, but Sony's not letting everyone know, which

0:27:29.840 --> 0:27:33.880
<v Speaker 1>makes sense, rightification Right, So by the time this goes live,

0:27:33.960 --> 0:27:35.639
<v Speaker 1>we may have more information. I might have to come

0:27:35.720 --> 0:27:38.359
<v Speaker 1>in with a breaking news segment at the end and

0:27:38.520 --> 0:27:41.560
<v Speaker 1>kind of update. But but as of the twenty ninth

0:27:41.600 --> 0:27:44.640
<v Speaker 1>of April, we should also mention you you talked about

0:27:44.680 --> 0:27:47.439
<v Speaker 1>the fact that there's a class action suit or some

0:27:47.600 --> 0:27:52.480
<v Speaker 1>lawsuits being levied against Sony. Have seen one right so far?

0:27:53.000 --> 0:27:56.359
<v Speaker 1>There was an interesting news report I saw that said

0:27:56.480 --> 0:28:00.359
<v Speaker 1>that um, because of a different UH suit that was

0:28:00.400 --> 0:28:03.639
<v Speaker 1>brought forth to the Supreme Court. UM, there was a

0:28:05.280 --> 0:28:09.520
<v Speaker 1>class action lawsuit that was brought against a phone company UM.

0:28:09.800 --> 0:28:14.520
<v Speaker 1>A Southern California couple uh levied a lawsuit, began a

0:28:14.520 --> 0:28:17.560
<v Speaker 1>class action lawsuit against the phone company because they were

0:28:18.119 --> 0:28:21.320
<v Speaker 1>they had a fee of around thirty dollars tacked onto

0:28:21.480 --> 0:28:25.919
<v Speaker 1>their cell phone UM bill or cell phone purchase, and

0:28:26.000 --> 0:28:30.479
<v Speaker 1>they said that that that was an unfair bill and

0:28:30.480 --> 0:28:33.240
<v Speaker 1>that it wasn't communicated to them, and that they were

0:28:33.840 --> 0:28:35.920
<v Speaker 1>essentially that the company had stolen that money from them.

0:28:35.960 --> 0:28:39.240
<v Speaker 1>So I started a class action lawsuit. A class action lawsuit,

0:28:40.080 --> 0:28:42.600
<v Speaker 1>it's like a when you get a whole bunch of

0:28:42.600 --> 0:28:46.080
<v Speaker 1>people who all have been affected by the same well

0:28:46.120 --> 0:28:48.240
<v Speaker 1>if the if the court decides at the same crime,

0:28:49.200 --> 0:28:52.880
<v Speaker 1>and they all are seeking damages against a company for

0:28:52.960 --> 0:28:56.200
<v Speaker 1>that crime. Now, normally the money in a class action

0:28:56.280 --> 0:28:59.800
<v Speaker 1>lawsuit for each individual consumer is pretty low, uh. And

0:28:59.800 --> 0:29:01.920
<v Speaker 1>that that's why you want a class action lawsuit. You

0:29:01.920 --> 0:29:04.560
<v Speaker 1>want a lot of people banded together for this because

0:29:05.320 --> 0:29:08.600
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't make any financial sense to pursue this in

0:29:08.840 --> 0:29:11.360
<v Speaker 1>a small claims court because you're gonna spend way more

0:29:11.440 --> 0:29:14.600
<v Speaker 1>money in court than you would reclaiming whatever it was

0:29:14.640 --> 0:29:17.000
<v Speaker 1>was stolen from you. Right, But together you can pull

0:29:17.040 --> 0:29:21.560
<v Speaker 1>the costs and and actually bring a suit and and

0:29:21.640 --> 0:29:25.120
<v Speaker 1>lawyers love them because they get a little bit off

0:29:25.160 --> 0:29:28.040
<v Speaker 1>of each and every transaction. And if there are if

0:29:28.040 --> 0:29:30.560
<v Speaker 1>there are millions of people in the in the lawsuit,

0:29:30.680 --> 0:29:34.240
<v Speaker 1>that that's big bucks. It's It's very weird though, when

0:29:34.280 --> 0:29:36.440
<v Speaker 1>you're somebody who didn't actually bring the suit and you

0:29:36.480 --> 0:29:38.720
<v Speaker 1>get the letter in the mail and says, hey, you're

0:29:39.160 --> 0:29:41.479
<v Speaker 1>so sure, so and so customer, you're part of this

0:29:41.600 --> 0:29:45.320
<v Speaker 1>class action lawsuit. Here's your five dollars, yeah, dollar forty nine.

0:29:45.320 --> 0:29:47.800
<v Speaker 1>Here you um And they're like, hey, I won five

0:29:47.840 --> 0:29:49.800
<v Speaker 1>dollars and you don't even think. You don't even think

0:29:49.880 --> 0:29:52.240
<v Speaker 1>of whatever it was that was the purpose of the

0:29:52.240 --> 0:29:56.000
<v Speaker 1>suit in the first place. But the in this case,

0:29:56.320 --> 0:30:00.280
<v Speaker 1>the cell phone company or they said that they ad

0:30:00.280 --> 0:30:04.240
<v Speaker 1>within their terms of use a a statement that prevented

0:30:04.280 --> 0:30:07.479
<v Speaker 1>people from bringing a class action lawsuit against them. And

0:30:07.560 --> 0:30:09.560
<v Speaker 1>that's what was being taken to court, the challenge of

0:30:09.680 --> 0:30:13.520
<v Speaker 1>can you have something in your terms of service that

0:30:13.520 --> 0:30:17.560
<v Speaker 1>that will prevent the the ability of class action lawsuit

0:30:17.600 --> 0:30:20.320
<v Speaker 1>being levied against you? And the Supreme Court upheld that

0:30:20.560 --> 0:30:24.080
<v Speaker 1>five to four. So if you are a company and

0:30:24.120 --> 0:30:26.200
<v Speaker 1>you put in your terms of service that you do

0:30:26.360 --> 0:30:30.479
<v Speaker 1>not allow class action lawsuits to be levied against you

0:30:30.520 --> 0:30:36.400
<v Speaker 1>for whatever reason. Apparently that can be Um, that's upheld

0:30:36.440 --> 0:30:38.520
<v Speaker 1>by the Supreme Court. That doesn't mean that that's permanent.

0:30:38.560 --> 0:30:41.200
<v Speaker 1>And of course that's just the United States. Not every

0:30:41.920 --> 0:30:45.760
<v Speaker 1>uh country does this. Not every country allows class action lawsuits. Actually,

0:30:45.760 --> 0:30:49.200
<v Speaker 1>so UM, it's not it's not a done deal. But

0:30:49.320 --> 0:30:53.120
<v Speaker 1>also there was I saw someone mentioned that Sony has

0:30:53.200 --> 0:30:57.880
<v Speaker 1>a statement called the limitation of liability and uh, if

0:30:57.880 --> 0:31:00.720
<v Speaker 1>you read that paragraph in their terms of use, uh,

0:31:00.800 --> 0:31:03.440
<v Speaker 1>it says, I'll just read the part that pertains to this.

0:31:04.520 --> 0:31:06.600
<v Speaker 1>We have to throw in some more legal language. We

0:31:06.680 --> 0:31:08.560
<v Speaker 1>need to protect us so that we can provide you

0:31:08.600 --> 0:31:11.800
<v Speaker 1>the benefits of the sites. In no event will s

0:31:11.840 --> 0:31:16.800
<v Speaker 1>c e A, Its officers, directors, employees, shareholders, representatives, or

0:31:16.840 --> 0:31:23.080
<v Speaker 1>agents be liable to you for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive,

0:31:23.240 --> 0:31:27.680
<v Speaker 1>or consequential damages whatsoever resulting from any and then there's

0:31:27.680 --> 0:31:30.120
<v Speaker 1>a list of of criteria, but the one that pertains

0:31:30.120 --> 0:31:34.720
<v Speaker 1>to our discussion is c any unauthorized access to or

0:31:34.920 --> 0:31:38.640
<v Speaker 1>use of our secure servers or any and all non

0:31:38.680 --> 0:31:42.640
<v Speaker 1>secured personal information. I saw someone suggest that maybe that

0:31:42.640 --> 0:31:45.480
<v Speaker 1>would give Sony an out in this case. I don't

0:31:45.480 --> 0:31:47.600
<v Speaker 1>think so. And the reason why I don't think so, now,

0:31:47.600 --> 0:31:50.880
<v Speaker 1>granted I am not a lawyer, so this is just

0:31:50.960 --> 0:31:55.400
<v Speaker 1>basically this is based upon my understanding of the English language. Right, So,

0:31:55.760 --> 0:32:02.240
<v Speaker 1>they said all non secured personal information, but this is secured, Yes,

0:32:02.280 --> 0:32:06.360
<v Speaker 1>this information was, well, the credit card is encrypted, but

0:32:06.360 --> 0:32:08.680
<v Speaker 1>the personal data they don't know that the credit card

0:32:08.720 --> 0:32:10.680
<v Speaker 1>information was taken in the first place, but the personal

0:32:10.760 --> 0:32:14.240
<v Speaker 1>data they do know that someone that was that was

0:32:14.280 --> 0:32:16.920
<v Speaker 1>one of the targets of the attack. The argument might

0:32:16.960 --> 0:32:20.240
<v Speaker 1>be that it wasn't secured, right, So, well, they would

0:32:20.320 --> 0:32:23.280
<v Speaker 1>argue that maybe they might argue that they're that information,

0:32:23.520 --> 0:32:26.120
<v Speaker 1>that the liability means that they're free to go. But

0:32:26.480 --> 0:32:30.520
<v Speaker 1>because it says non secured personal data, you know, they

0:32:30.640 --> 0:32:34.280
<v Speaker 1>specifically said in uh in that in that fact that

0:32:34.360 --> 0:32:39.640
<v Speaker 1>I mentioned that the the that it was restricted both

0:32:39.640 --> 0:32:42.640
<v Speaker 1>physically and through the perimeter and security of the network.

0:32:43.040 --> 0:32:46.160
<v Speaker 1>They were very specific to say that this information was

0:32:46.200 --> 0:32:51.080
<v Speaker 1>behind state of the art, sophisticated security system. So I

0:32:51.120 --> 0:32:53.440
<v Speaker 1>don't think they could argue that it was non secured

0:32:53.520 --> 0:32:57.240
<v Speaker 1>personal data. No, probably not, because in their own statements

0:32:57.240 --> 0:32:58.920
<v Speaker 1>out to the customer they said no, no, no, no,

0:32:58.920 --> 0:33:01.120
<v Speaker 1>no, no no, this information was cure. It's just these people

0:33:01.120 --> 0:33:03.920
<v Speaker 1>were really good and they managed to breach the system.

0:33:04.000 --> 0:33:07.720
<v Speaker 1>So I don't think Sony can avoid a lawsuit based

0:33:07.760 --> 0:33:11.080
<v Speaker 1>upon that criteria. Now there may be that there's other

0:33:11.200 --> 0:33:13.800
<v Speaker 1>information buried within the terms of use that would would

0:33:14.120 --> 0:33:17.000
<v Speaker 1>protect Sony from that, but in that particular paragraph, I

0:33:17.040 --> 0:33:19.880
<v Speaker 1>don't think it applies. Yeah, it sounds like it, but

0:33:19.920 --> 0:33:23.400
<v Speaker 1>I don't. It's certainly going to uh too. This is

0:33:23.400 --> 0:33:26.040
<v Speaker 1>going to dog them for some time, I belive, especially

0:33:26.040 --> 0:33:28.760
<v Speaker 1>on the heels of other missteps they've made over the

0:33:28.800 --> 0:33:31.040
<v Speaker 1>past few years well, and and that, and the fact

0:33:31.080 --> 0:33:34.200
<v Speaker 1>that it came on the heels of the Epsilon breach,

0:33:34.840 --> 0:33:39.840
<v Speaker 1>so people's attention to security online security has already been heightened,

0:33:40.320 --> 0:33:43.120
<v Speaker 1>and to see this happened shortly after that that breach

0:33:43.200 --> 0:33:46.480
<v Speaker 1>became public was really bad news for Sony. And also

0:33:46.600 --> 0:33:49.800
<v Speaker 1>I have to say, you know, Sony's strategy of not

0:33:49.920 --> 0:33:51.880
<v Speaker 1>coming forward and saying that there was a breach early

0:33:51.920 --> 0:33:54.920
<v Speaker 1>on that probably has hurt them quite a bit as well.

0:33:54.960 --> 0:33:56.560
<v Speaker 1>But there was no way of knowing at the time

0:33:56.600 --> 0:33:58.400
<v Speaker 1>that it was going to hurt them. It's just that

0:33:58.480 --> 0:34:00.720
<v Speaker 1>in retrospect, you sit there and you you come forward

0:34:00.720 --> 0:34:02.440
<v Speaker 1>and say, oh, it's just down for maintenance, and then

0:34:02.480 --> 0:34:03.880
<v Speaker 1>a couple of days literally say all right, there was

0:34:03.880 --> 0:34:07.320
<v Speaker 1>a breach. Then people say, well, we how how can

0:34:07.360 --> 0:34:10.600
<v Speaker 1>we trust you as a company if you're going to um,

0:34:11.080 --> 0:34:13.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, lie to your users. Now, you could argue

0:34:13.840 --> 0:34:16.280
<v Speaker 1>that Sony had to do that in order to conduct

0:34:16.360 --> 0:34:20.600
<v Speaker 1>its investigation and as uh effective a way as possible,

0:34:20.640 --> 0:34:23.440
<v Speaker 1>because all the more information Sony gives out, the more

0:34:23.640 --> 0:34:27.439
<v Speaker 1>firepower they give to the attackers. So there's there's a

0:34:27.480 --> 0:34:30.880
<v Speaker 1>scale there. When I meant miss when I was saying missteps,

0:34:30.920 --> 0:34:34.359
<v Speaker 1>I was specifically thinking of the root kit situation from

0:34:34.400 --> 0:34:36.680
<v Speaker 1>a few years ago, which we mentioned on an podcast,

0:34:36.680 --> 0:34:39.480
<v Speaker 1>and they were very um, oh no, nothing's wrong. Okay,

0:34:39.520 --> 0:34:41.960
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, there was this root Kit. Sorry, Yeah, I've

0:34:41.960 --> 0:34:44.839
<v Speaker 1>seen I've seen kind of the same thing. I've seen

0:34:44.920 --> 0:34:48.200
<v Speaker 1>some journalists out there say that Sony should at least

0:34:48.239 --> 0:34:52.359
<v Speaker 1>actually offer an apology to users. Uh, there's a lot

0:34:52.400 --> 0:34:55.480
<v Speaker 1>of we regret that this information was stolen, but not

0:34:55.520 --> 0:34:58.839
<v Speaker 1>an outright we're sorry, right, and that we're sorry might

0:34:58.880 --> 0:35:02.279
<v Speaker 1>go a long way. I'm not or what Sony's thought,

0:35:02.400 --> 0:35:04.800
<v Speaker 1>what the the executives at Sonny, what their thought processes.

0:35:04.840 --> 0:35:07.040
<v Speaker 1>I know that if I were an executive at Sony,

0:35:07.280 --> 0:35:10.560
<v Speaker 1>I would probably if I were not issuing an apology,

0:35:10.600 --> 0:35:14.160
<v Speaker 1>it would probably be because in my mind, that would

0:35:14.200 --> 0:35:18.480
<v Speaker 1>be accepting even more responsibility for the breach, and there

0:35:18.640 --> 0:35:22.480
<v Speaker 1>that might in turn look bad to shareholders because we

0:35:22.480 --> 0:35:25.600
<v Speaker 1>have to remember that for companies, they have multiple kinds

0:35:25.600 --> 0:35:29.840
<v Speaker 1>of customers. Right, there's the customer like I mean myself,

0:35:29.880 --> 0:35:34.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, or Chris there. We're customers of various companies

0:35:34.200 --> 0:35:37.799
<v Speaker 1>where you know, we're purchasing goods or services. But then

0:35:37.880 --> 0:35:40.920
<v Speaker 1>there are customers like the shareholders who own a stake

0:35:41.000 --> 0:35:44.360
<v Speaker 1>within that company and to serve them, you know, you

0:35:44.400 --> 0:35:48.400
<v Speaker 1>have this delicate balancing act. There's only so much responsibility

0:35:48.440 --> 0:35:51.040
<v Speaker 1>you're going to be able to lay claim to without

0:35:51.440 --> 0:35:54.200
<v Speaker 1>making the shareholders say, you know, maybe this isn't the

0:35:54.280 --> 0:35:59.120
<v Speaker 1>right company for me to invest in. So yeah, it's um,

0:35:59.120 --> 0:36:02.240
<v Speaker 1>it's a dirty world there. It's a dirty, dirty world

0:36:02.280 --> 0:36:05.840
<v Speaker 1>out there in the in the financial sector. So uh, guys,

0:36:06.160 --> 0:36:09.279
<v Speaker 1>be careful with your personal information. You may need to

0:36:09.360 --> 0:36:12.359
<v Speaker 1>keep an eye on your accounts. Like we said, change

0:36:12.360 --> 0:36:15.040
<v Speaker 1>your password if you're using the same password everywhere. Really

0:36:15.360 --> 0:36:17.759
<v Speaker 1>try to consider using multiple passwords. I know it's a

0:36:17.760 --> 0:36:20.839
<v Speaker 1>pain in the butt, but it it it death does

0:36:20.880 --> 0:36:23.720
<v Speaker 1>pay off. I mean, it's it's much better than finding

0:36:23.760 --> 0:36:27.040
<v Speaker 1>out that all of your accounts have been compromised. Um,

0:36:27.080 --> 0:36:29.360
<v Speaker 1>and yeah, just be careful and we hope that the

0:36:29.400 --> 0:36:33.200
<v Speaker 1>PSN system is back running by the time this podcast

0:36:33.200 --> 0:36:35.560
<v Speaker 1>goes live and that everyone's having fun with Portal Too.

0:36:36.760 --> 0:36:38.960
<v Speaker 1>That was a big bummer. Portal Too launched, has this

0:36:39.080 --> 0:36:44.960
<v Speaker 1>awesome online gaming component and then the network goes down. Yikes.

0:36:45.920 --> 0:36:49.920
<v Speaker 1>So I'm just gonna go and plan my xbox alright, guys, Well,

0:36:49.960 --> 0:36:53.560
<v Speaker 1>if you want to know about other news stories within

0:36:53.600 --> 0:36:55.400
<v Speaker 1>the tech world, you'd kind of like to hear some

0:36:55.400 --> 0:36:58.080
<v Speaker 1>more context around it, or you just have a particular

0:36:58.120 --> 0:37:00.120
<v Speaker 1>subject do you think that we should tackle Let us know. Oh,

0:37:00.560 --> 0:37:03.520
<v Speaker 1>you can contact us on Facebook and Twitter. That handle

0:37:03.640 --> 0:37:06.439
<v Speaker 1>is tech Stuff h s W. Or you can send

0:37:06.480 --> 0:37:09.520
<v Speaker 1>us an email that addresses tech stuff at how stuff

0:37:09.520 --> 0:37:11.279
<v Speaker 1>worth dot com and Chris and I will talk to

0:37:11.280 --> 0:37:20.840
<v Speaker 1>you again really soon. Breaking news everyone, So this is

0:37:20.880 --> 0:37:23.920
<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland, just coming back with some stuff that's developed

0:37:23.920 --> 0:37:28.680
<v Speaker 1>since we recorded this podcast. Actually lots happened. First of all,

0:37:28.719 --> 0:37:30.759
<v Speaker 1>the problem was bigger than anyone thought it was at

0:37:30.800 --> 0:37:34.440
<v Speaker 1>the time. The Sony online entertainment accounts were also compromised,

0:37:34.440 --> 0:37:37.960
<v Speaker 1>which added another million or so accounts to the seventy

0:37:38.040 --> 0:37:40.840
<v Speaker 1>to seventy seven million accounts that have been compromised, So

0:37:40.920 --> 0:37:43.600
<v Speaker 1>that makes about a hundred million accounts total. Of course,

0:37:43.600 --> 0:37:46.680
<v Speaker 1>there's probably some overlap there, so that was a big problem.

0:37:47.280 --> 0:37:50.759
<v Speaker 1>Then around the beginning of May, Sony said that they

0:37:50.800 --> 0:37:54.200
<v Speaker 1>were going to roll out an identity theft protection program

0:37:54.239 --> 0:37:58.240
<v Speaker 1>to all ps N and Curiosity customers, which would involve

0:37:59.080 --> 0:38:03.200
<v Speaker 1>having a a year long program that would allow this

0:38:03.440 --> 0:38:07.040
<v Speaker 1>company called all Clear i D Actually that's a program

0:38:07.120 --> 0:38:11.680
<v Speaker 1>name to cyber monitor your information and if your information

0:38:11.719 --> 0:38:14.279
<v Speaker 1>was being used for nefarious purposes, they would alert you

0:38:14.320 --> 0:38:18.239
<v Speaker 1>to it. You could also have some ready access to

0:38:18.480 --> 0:38:23.000
<v Speaker 1>private investigators as well as some identity restoration specialists to

0:38:23.080 --> 0:38:25.640
<v Speaker 1>try and fix things once they go wrong, and there

0:38:25.640 --> 0:38:28.920
<v Speaker 1>would be a one million dollar identity theft insurance policy

0:38:29.360 --> 0:38:34.240
<v Speaker 1>on all accounts and this was complimentary. Uh PSN players

0:38:34.280 --> 0:38:36.759
<v Speaker 1>would have to enroll in the program, but it was

0:38:36.800 --> 0:38:41.759
<v Speaker 1>completely free. Then a little later in May, Sony announced

0:38:41.760 --> 0:38:46.040
<v Speaker 1>that the new ps N rollout was going to take place.

0:38:46.040 --> 0:38:49.840
<v Speaker 1>This around May fourteen, and that at this point you

0:38:49.840 --> 0:38:55.080
<v Speaker 1>would start to see restored services in online play, online video,

0:38:55.120 --> 0:38:58.040
<v Speaker 1>online music. All of these services were starting to come back,

0:38:58.080 --> 0:39:01.400
<v Speaker 1>not everything under the PSN network. Sony said that that

0:39:01.480 --> 0:39:04.560
<v Speaker 1>stuff would be rolled out by the end of May,

0:39:04.600 --> 0:39:07.360
<v Speaker 1>but we'd at least start to see some of the

0:39:07.360 --> 0:39:10.160
<v Speaker 1>the service return, and sure enough, it started to get

0:39:10.239 --> 0:39:14.880
<v Speaker 1>rolled out across North America. So then Sony announced a

0:39:14.880 --> 0:39:18.560
<v Speaker 1>welcome back program for North American customers. Uh P S

0:39:18.600 --> 0:39:21.399
<v Speaker 1>three owners would be allowed to select two titles from

0:39:21.400 --> 0:39:26.319
<v Speaker 1>the following Dead Nation, Infamous, Little Big Planet, Superstar, Dust

0:39:26.440 --> 0:39:29.480
<v Speaker 1>h D and wipe Out the HD plus Fury. Now

0:39:29.520 --> 0:39:32.879
<v Speaker 1>PSP owners would be able to select two titles from

0:39:32.880 --> 0:39:37.839
<v Speaker 1>the following Little Big Planet, moder Nation, Racers, Pursuit, Force Kill,

0:39:37.960 --> 0:39:42.480
<v Speaker 1>Zone Liberation, and that this offer would last for thirty days.

0:39:42.600 --> 0:39:47.759
<v Speaker 1>UH since the PSN UH service was restored and it

0:39:47.800 --> 0:39:49.800
<v Speaker 1>was completely free and you get to keep the games

0:39:49.840 --> 0:39:54.160
<v Speaker 1>forever UH the you would also get a thirty day

0:39:54.280 --> 0:39:58.040
<v Speaker 1>ps N Plus membership if you were not a PSN

0:39:58.080 --> 0:40:01.560
<v Speaker 1>Plus member before. If you were a ps N Plus member,

0:40:01.880 --> 0:40:05.160
<v Speaker 1>you got an extra sixty days free of that service.

0:40:05.560 --> 0:40:07.760
<v Speaker 1>So Sony was really trying to do a lot to

0:40:07.800 --> 0:40:11.680
<v Speaker 1>apologize and make up for the lost service during the

0:40:11.719 --> 0:40:19.719
<v Speaker 1>whole hacking incident. However, on May seventeen, Nilivia website reported

0:40:19.760 --> 0:40:23.080
<v Speaker 1>that there's a possible problem with sony solution. Now. Part

0:40:23.080 --> 0:40:25.480
<v Speaker 1>of that solution was that Sony wanted everyone to go

0:40:25.560 --> 0:40:28.719
<v Speaker 1>in and reset their passwords for their accounts to make

0:40:28.760 --> 0:40:32.760
<v Speaker 1>them safe. But Nilivia reported that there was a nasty

0:40:32.840 --> 0:40:36.280
<v Speaker 1>hack going around that would allow hackers who had access

0:40:36.320 --> 0:40:39.440
<v Speaker 1>to your email and your date of birth to reset

0:40:39.480 --> 0:40:44.000
<v Speaker 1>your password for you, thus effectively stealing your PSN account,

0:40:44.640 --> 0:40:48.040
<v Speaker 1>and they they had some detailed information about this that

0:40:48.080 --> 0:40:51.279
<v Speaker 1>they later went back and removed and dumbed down so

0:40:51.320 --> 0:40:55.560
<v Speaker 1>that to to help cut back on actual stiff thefts.

0:40:56.360 --> 0:40:58.279
<v Speaker 1>They did point out that if the hackers did not

0:40:58.440 --> 0:41:00.920
<v Speaker 1>have your email or date of birth, could not perform

0:41:01.040 --> 0:41:03.160
<v Speaker 1>this hack, but since that information was hacked in the

0:41:03.280 --> 0:41:06.920
<v Speaker 1>initial attack on Sony, there's a good bet that a

0:41:07.000 --> 0:41:09.280
<v Speaker 1>lot of hackers out there had access to that information.

0:41:09.840 --> 0:41:13.960
<v Speaker 1>So what Nilvia suggests is that people who are PSN

0:41:14.760 --> 0:41:17.960
<v Speaker 1>users go in and change their email address, create a

0:41:18.040 --> 0:41:22.040
<v Speaker 1>new email address just for the PSN network, and use

0:41:22.120 --> 0:41:26.280
<v Speaker 1>that update their information through PSN so that the hackers

0:41:26.400 --> 0:41:28.719
<v Speaker 1>would not have the right email address and could not

0:41:29.000 --> 0:41:32.640
<v Speaker 1>steal your account. Meanwhile, Sony actually took down the web

0:41:32.760 --> 0:41:37.279
<v Speaker 1>based service to change your password so that hackers could

0:41:37.320 --> 0:41:40.920
<v Speaker 1>not access that and and and change it for you.

0:41:41.719 --> 0:41:45.240
<v Speaker 1>So it's still a big mess. Even at the recording

0:41:45.320 --> 0:41:49.359
<v Speaker 1>of this update, Sony has not yet returned that web

0:41:49.440 --> 0:41:53.960
<v Speaker 1>based system to reset your password to full service, so

0:41:54.920 --> 0:41:57.359
<v Speaker 1>we'll keep an eye on it see if things develop further.

0:41:58.160 --> 0:42:00.879
<v Speaker 1>This has just been an enormous headache for Sony. They've

0:42:00.880 --> 0:42:03.080
<v Speaker 1>been trying to do the right thing, trying to to

0:42:03.239 --> 0:42:06.920
<v Speaker 1>make it up to users, but it's definitely a blow

0:42:07.160 --> 0:42:12.600
<v Speaker 1>against online security in general, identity, theft fears, all of

0:42:12.719 --> 0:42:15.760
<v Speaker 1>that has really taken a big hit as a result

0:42:15.800 --> 0:42:17.920
<v Speaker 1>of this hacking program. We'll keep an eye on it,

0:42:18.040 --> 0:42:22.480
<v Speaker 1>will update anything that happens from this point forward. Well,

0:42:22.600 --> 0:42:24.319
<v Speaker 1>you can check it out on the blogs, you can

0:42:24.400 --> 0:42:26.520
<v Speaker 1>check it out on our Facebook and Twitter feeds, and

0:42:26.640 --> 0:42:29.520
<v Speaker 1>we may even do another podcast about a similar topic

0:42:29.600 --> 0:42:31.640
<v Speaker 1>in the future, just because this has become such a

0:42:31.800 --> 0:42:34.960
<v Speaker 1>huge story. So thanks a lot, guys, and we'll talk

0:42:34.960 --> 0:42:38.960
<v Speaker 1>to you again soon for more on this and thousands

0:42:39.040 --> 0:42:41.239
<v Speaker 1>of other topics. Is it how stuff works dot com.

0:42:41.480 --> 0:42:44.120
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0:42:44.320 --> 0:42:47.840
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0:42:47.920 --> 0:42:50.880
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