1 00:00:00,320 --> 00:00:02,880 Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. 2 00:00:03,200 --> 00:00:09,000 Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With 3 00:00:09,080 --> 00:00:17,840 Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello again, everyone, 4 00:00:17,880 --> 00:00:20,040 Speaker 1: welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Poulette and 5 00:00:20,040 --> 00:00:22,560 Speaker 1: I'm an editor how stuff works dot Com. Sitting across 6 00:00:22,560 --> 00:00:27,280 Speaker 1: from me, as always, from Sunny South Beach senior writer 7 00:00:27,360 --> 00:00:32,120 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. She had actual squirrels in her pants. We 8 00:00:32,320 --> 00:00:37,800 Speaker 1: got served two guys in the park. Yeah, clearly you 9 00:00:37,840 --> 00:00:40,600 Speaker 1: know what episode I'm up to now, Yes, and you're right, 10 00:00:41,080 --> 00:00:44,000 Speaker 1: it was awesome. And those of you there, there are 11 00:00:44,040 --> 00:00:46,279 Speaker 1: several of you out there who know exactly what we're 12 00:00:46,320 --> 00:00:48,479 Speaker 1: talking about and will be very excited that Jonathan has 13 00:00:48,560 --> 00:00:51,199 Speaker 1: jumped on the bandwagon. And you guys are also awesome. 14 00:00:52,960 --> 00:00:57,200 Speaker 1: So let's talk about something that's totally not awesome. Yeah, yeah, 15 00:00:57,280 --> 00:01:00,120 Speaker 1: this is definitely not awesome. This is um. You know. 16 00:01:00,160 --> 00:01:03,120 Speaker 1: From time to time in the podcast we tackle issues 17 00:01:03,280 --> 00:01:08,160 Speaker 1: of privacy and internet security, partially because um, they're relevant, 18 00:01:08,240 --> 00:01:10,280 Speaker 1: there are things that a lot of people want to 19 00:01:10,400 --> 00:01:13,600 Speaker 1: learn more about, and partially because I think, if I 20 00:01:13,640 --> 00:01:15,560 Speaker 1: may speak for you, Jonathan, I think there are issues 21 00:01:15,600 --> 00:01:18,520 Speaker 1: that are are important to both of us personally that 22 00:01:18,680 --> 00:01:21,320 Speaker 1: we're very interested and want to, uh to keep an 23 00:01:21,319 --> 00:01:24,280 Speaker 1: eye on there's and there's still a very casual attitude 24 00:01:24,400 --> 00:01:28,560 Speaker 1: among certain segments of the population that used the Internet 25 00:01:28,920 --> 00:01:32,840 Speaker 1: toward privacy. And I think some of it is just 26 00:01:32,880 --> 00:01:34,800 Speaker 1: a lack of information of the sort of things that 27 00:01:34,840 --> 00:01:37,319 Speaker 1: can go wrong if you do not protect your privacy. 28 00:01:37,319 --> 00:01:39,840 Speaker 1: So let's we'll stop dancing around this. We're specifically going 29 00:01:39,880 --> 00:01:43,760 Speaker 1: to talk about the breach of security within the PlayStation 30 00:01:43,800 --> 00:01:48,240 Speaker 1: Network and Curiosity, which is q R I O C 31 00:01:48,560 --> 00:01:53,800 Speaker 1: I T Y since one of Sony's online services, and 32 00:01:53,840 --> 00:01:57,880 Speaker 1: there was a breach that happened between April seventeenth and 33 00:01:57,920 --> 00:02:02,400 Speaker 1: April nineteen eleven. Uh. And I want to stress this today, 34 00:02:02,560 --> 00:02:05,240 Speaker 1: the day that we are recording this is April twenty nine. 35 00:02:06,600 --> 00:02:09,080 Speaker 1: The reason why I say that is because hopefully by 36 00:02:09,120 --> 00:02:13,480 Speaker 1: the time this podcast goes live, the PlayStation Network will 37 00:02:13,480 --> 00:02:16,640 Speaker 1: be back up and running. It has been down since 38 00:02:16,800 --> 00:02:21,400 Speaker 1: they um so uh, you know, ten days and counting 39 00:02:21,520 --> 00:02:25,440 Speaker 1: of of no support from the PlayStation network, so all 40 00:02:25,440 --> 00:02:29,640 Speaker 1: that online support has gone. Uh. People cannot play online games, 41 00:02:29,880 --> 00:02:32,880 Speaker 1: and some some games they can't play at all, even 42 00:02:32,960 --> 00:02:35,680 Speaker 1: a single player local games they aren't able to play 43 00:02:35,840 --> 00:02:39,680 Speaker 1: for for certain titles because those titles rely upon the 44 00:02:39,680 --> 00:02:43,760 Speaker 1: PSN network. I'm just that's redundant. But the PSN in 45 00:02:43,840 --> 00:02:48,040 Speaker 1: order to uh to update information on things like trophies 46 00:02:48,440 --> 00:02:50,880 Speaker 1: and things like that, and so games that that tie 47 00:02:50,919 --> 00:02:53,880 Speaker 1: into that, that rely upon that network, they do not 48 00:02:54,120 --> 00:02:57,400 Speaker 1: run when the networks down. So there are some single 49 00:02:57,400 --> 00:02:59,560 Speaker 1: player games out there that just won't work on the 50 00:02:59,600 --> 00:03:04,640 Speaker 1: ps So as a result, players are understandably upset, and 51 00:03:04,639 --> 00:03:07,760 Speaker 1: they're upset for multiple reasons. One the network's down. That 52 00:03:07,840 --> 00:03:09,600 Speaker 1: was the first thing that upset people because when the 53 00:03:09,600 --> 00:03:12,560 Speaker 1: network went down, there was very little information from Sony 54 00:03:12,600 --> 00:03:15,480 Speaker 1: about the reason for taking the network down. As a 55 00:03:15,560 --> 00:03:18,919 Speaker 1: matter of fact, I remember a story just a few 56 00:03:19,000 --> 00:03:22,639 Speaker 1: days ago before it came to light what was really happening, 57 00:03:23,320 --> 00:03:27,120 Speaker 1: um that uh one of I only read the headline, 58 00:03:27,120 --> 00:03:30,960 Speaker 1: I admit, Uh. They were saying basically that Sony's customers 59 00:03:31,000 --> 00:03:34,680 Speaker 1: were actually not quite as irritated as they might have been. Now, granted, 60 00:03:34,680 --> 00:03:37,520 Speaker 1: at that point, the network hasn't been down very as 61 00:03:37,600 --> 00:03:39,920 Speaker 1: long as it has now it's you know, still out, 62 00:03:40,120 --> 00:03:42,400 Speaker 1: it's going on more than a week now, so but 63 00:03:42,520 --> 00:03:46,600 Speaker 1: you know, Sony's fans are known to be very, very 64 00:03:46,640 --> 00:03:49,640 Speaker 1: loyal and outspoken, which I think is it can be 65 00:03:49,680 --> 00:03:52,880 Speaker 1: a good thing. Um, And I think basically it's surprised 66 00:03:53,080 --> 00:03:57,280 Speaker 1: some that people weren't more concerned at the time, but again, 67 00:03:57,640 --> 00:04:01,560 Speaker 1: I think that's probably because it had had been released 68 00:04:01,680 --> 00:04:06,560 Speaker 1: that hackers were involved, and they had apparently UH managed 69 00:04:06,600 --> 00:04:09,440 Speaker 1: to gather up some personal information. Yeah. So let's let's 70 00:04:09,480 --> 00:04:13,400 Speaker 1: talk about kind of what Sony said at the beginning. 71 00:04:13,880 --> 00:04:19,560 Speaker 1: At the very beginning, when the PlayStation network went went offline, UH, 72 00:04:19,640 --> 00:04:23,040 Speaker 1: Sony essentially UH issued a message that there was going 73 00:04:23,080 --> 00:04:26,919 Speaker 1: to be some maintenance on the network and that it 74 00:04:27,080 --> 00:04:29,400 Speaker 1: was going to be back up between twenty four and 75 00:04:29,440 --> 00:04:33,200 Speaker 1: forty eight hours. Well, part of that wasn't a lie 76 00:04:33,400 --> 00:04:35,720 Speaker 1: or or actually they probably didn't intend for it. Well, 77 00:04:35,760 --> 00:04:37,640 Speaker 1: I'm sure they did not intend for it to be 78 00:04:38,360 --> 00:04:42,480 Speaker 1: down longer than so they weren't weren't outright lying. They 79 00:04:42,640 --> 00:04:46,000 Speaker 1: just didn't know, but it was due to maintenance. Yeah, 80 00:04:46,040 --> 00:04:48,520 Speaker 1: but they the way it was worded, it sounded like 81 00:04:48,560 --> 00:04:51,720 Speaker 1: it was a planned maintenance sort of issue. Well, of course, 82 00:04:51,880 --> 00:04:54,520 Speaker 1: I mean, if you again, UM, I like to get 83 00:04:54,560 --> 00:04:56,680 Speaker 1: people to think from the other side of this. If 84 00:04:56,680 --> 00:05:01,359 Speaker 1: you're PR, corporate PR. You're one, and it's something that 85 00:05:01,400 --> 00:05:05,680 Speaker 1: they can sort of obfuscate about, they can sort of 86 00:05:05,720 --> 00:05:08,000 Speaker 1: muddy the water about. They're probably going to try to 87 00:05:08,040 --> 00:05:10,920 Speaker 1: do it to make themselves look as good as possible. Yeah, 88 00:05:10,960 --> 00:05:13,599 Speaker 1: you don't want to say, hey, guys, our security was 89 00:05:13,640 --> 00:05:16,160 Speaker 1: breached and we don't know what the extent of the 90 00:05:16,160 --> 00:05:18,840 Speaker 1: problem is yet, UH, and our network is down as 91 00:05:18,839 --> 00:05:21,800 Speaker 1: a result of that. So just chill out because it 92 00:05:21,920 --> 00:05:24,760 Speaker 1: may have turned out that yes, security was breached, but 93 00:05:24,880 --> 00:05:28,679 Speaker 1: nothing went beyond that, right And if that were the case, 94 00:05:28,760 --> 00:05:32,240 Speaker 1: if no one had had a chance to access any 95 00:05:32,360 --> 00:05:35,560 Speaker 1: private information or or anything along those lines, are fiddle 96 00:05:35,640 --> 00:05:40,000 Speaker 1: with the network then Sony, So it would it would 97 00:05:40,080 --> 00:05:42,799 Speaker 1: benefit Sony to just leave that little bit out because 98 00:05:42,800 --> 00:05:44,960 Speaker 1: if no one managed to do anything, then there was 99 00:05:45,000 --> 00:05:47,919 Speaker 1: no real harm done to the end consumer apart from 100 00:05:47,960 --> 00:05:51,840 Speaker 1: a couple of days of the network being offline. Right 101 00:05:51,960 --> 00:05:54,800 Speaker 1: like the a few weeks ago, we were talking about 102 00:05:54,880 --> 00:05:58,040 Speaker 1: the data breach that happened here in UH the United 103 00:05:58,080 --> 00:06:02,520 Speaker 1: States with a number of UH loyalty marketing companies. There 104 00:06:02,560 --> 00:06:05,720 Speaker 1: was one provider that they used UM that that got 105 00:06:05,760 --> 00:06:08,880 Speaker 1: hacked into and Epsilon and all they got from Epsilon 106 00:06:08,960 --> 00:06:13,520 Speaker 1: really was names and addresses, although there may have been 107 00:06:14,320 --> 00:06:17,520 Speaker 1: there may have been some account not not like not 108 00:06:17,560 --> 00:06:20,720 Speaker 1: like credit card information, but loyalty account so they know 109 00:06:20,880 --> 00:06:22,919 Speaker 1: the kinds of things you buy right or or it 110 00:06:22,960 --> 00:06:26,640 Speaker 1: may or a number that identifies you for that particular system, 111 00:06:26,880 --> 00:06:28,920 Speaker 1: like not a not a credit card number, but say 112 00:06:29,000 --> 00:06:31,920 Speaker 1: you know you are like when you join a club 113 00:06:31,960 --> 00:06:33,920 Speaker 1: and it says you know you are member number four 114 00:06:34,080 --> 00:06:36,839 Speaker 1: seven eight nine three, Well at four seven eight nine 115 00:06:36,839 --> 00:06:39,279 Speaker 1: three is might be associated with you in that account, 116 00:06:39,279 --> 00:06:41,520 Speaker 1: and they may the hackers also have access to that, 117 00:06:41,600 --> 00:06:45,560 Speaker 1: but then has limited usability. Yeah, and that's not to 118 00:06:45,600 --> 00:06:48,080 Speaker 1: say that it isn't serious, because it is serious, mostly 119 00:06:48,120 --> 00:06:52,279 Speaker 1: because it can be used to target uh spear phishing attacks. 120 00:06:52,320 --> 00:06:55,240 Speaker 1: These are very directed phishing attacks where they say, hey, 121 00:06:55,400 --> 00:06:59,640 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland member number four seven one eight three, Uh, 122 00:06:59,720 --> 00:07:01,960 Speaker 1: we need to get your information. We don't have your 123 00:07:01,960 --> 00:07:04,839 Speaker 1: social security number on file? Can you please just type 124 00:07:04,839 --> 00:07:08,560 Speaker 1: that in this little box? I mean, or visit this website. 125 00:07:08,560 --> 00:07:11,120 Speaker 1: And as it turns out, the website is not the 126 00:07:11,240 --> 00:07:13,640 Speaker 1: corporate website. It's a different web. It's just there too 127 00:07:13,840 --> 00:07:16,120 Speaker 1: to steal as much of your information as possible. Well, 128 00:07:16,360 --> 00:07:20,119 Speaker 1: at the time, Sony wasn't sure exactly what white extent 129 00:07:20,200 --> 00:07:22,640 Speaker 1: the attack had, uh, you know, how far did the 130 00:07:22,680 --> 00:07:27,280 Speaker 1: attack go? So rather than cause alarm, Sony said the 131 00:07:27,560 --> 00:07:29,520 Speaker 1: network was down for maintenance and that it would be 132 00:07:29,600 --> 00:07:33,640 Speaker 1: back up for hours while they conducted an internal investigation. 133 00:07:34,280 --> 00:07:37,600 Speaker 1: So you could argue that Sony made the wrong call 134 00:07:37,920 --> 00:07:40,400 Speaker 1: and that Sony should have said that there had been 135 00:07:40,400 --> 00:07:43,240 Speaker 1: a breach and that there was the possibility that there 136 00:07:43,320 --> 00:07:46,840 Speaker 1: was more than just a breach of security. Uh. But 137 00:07:47,040 --> 00:07:49,400 Speaker 1: on the flip side of it, Sony was you wasn't 138 00:07:49,440 --> 00:07:52,440 Speaker 1: sure how bad it was. Once Sony was sure how 139 00:07:52,480 --> 00:07:55,360 Speaker 1: bad it was, they did come forward and say, all right, 140 00:07:55,960 --> 00:07:59,360 Speaker 1: our network is down due to a security breach, and 141 00:07:59,440 --> 00:08:03,080 Speaker 1: it appears is that the hackers have accessed uh at 142 00:08:03,160 --> 00:08:07,560 Speaker 1: least the personal data tables. These are the tables within 143 00:08:07,880 --> 00:08:11,640 Speaker 1: the network that UH that have all the the user 144 00:08:11,720 --> 00:08:18,160 Speaker 1: information things like your name, your address, UH, your m uh, 145 00:08:19,720 --> 00:08:24,400 Speaker 1: the country of origin. It might be your email as well, UM, 146 00:08:24,440 --> 00:08:30,040 Speaker 1: your PlayStation network password and log in information, the handle 147 00:08:30,120 --> 00:08:32,920 Speaker 1: that you use on the PlayStation network. UM. It might 148 00:08:33,000 --> 00:08:36,360 Speaker 1: also include your purchase history and building address. If you've 149 00:08:36,480 --> 00:08:40,160 Speaker 1: used the PlayStation network to buy games or or content 150 00:08:40,240 --> 00:08:45,520 Speaker 1: within games. UM. But those tables did not include the 151 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:48,280 Speaker 1: credit card information. The credit card information were stored in 152 00:08:48,400 --> 00:08:51,840 Speaker 1: separate tables which may or may not have also been accessed. 153 00:08:52,160 --> 00:08:54,600 Speaker 1: And here's the big difference between those two tables. Besides 154 00:08:54,679 --> 00:09:00,319 Speaker 1: the content. The credit card table was encrypted, the personal 155 00:09:00,360 --> 00:09:04,719 Speaker 1: data table was not. Right. So there's actually it's kind 156 00:09:04,720 --> 00:09:08,320 Speaker 1: of UM. It's actually a little painful to read. But 157 00:09:08,360 --> 00:09:13,440 Speaker 1: there's a a frequently asked questions document on PlayStation where 158 00:09:13,480 --> 00:09:18,000 Speaker 1: they it addresses the actual outage and and what happened. UM. 159 00:09:18,160 --> 00:09:20,480 Speaker 1: And there's a specific bit here. Let's see if I 160 00:09:20,480 --> 00:09:25,160 Speaker 1: can find the particular question about uh whether or not 161 00:09:25,200 --> 00:09:28,920 Speaker 1: the personal data was encrypted? UM, because they kind of 162 00:09:29,040 --> 00:09:33,640 Speaker 1: dance around it. Let's see here. You wanna do you 163 00:09:33,640 --> 00:09:36,720 Speaker 1: wanna dance while I do this? Well, UM, I could 164 00:09:36,720 --> 00:09:39,400 Speaker 1: tell you that I was about to talk to uh, 165 00:09:39,520 --> 00:09:43,000 Speaker 1: to you about the fact that UM just yesterday again 166 00:09:43,080 --> 00:09:46,560 Speaker 1: as of the day we recorded this on the Stephen 167 00:09:46,640 --> 00:09:51,840 Speaker 1: Mussel of c Net wrote that, UM, there have been 168 00:09:51,960 --> 00:09:56,840 Speaker 1: messages circulating that hackers have claimed that they do in 169 00:09:56,960 --> 00:10:00,000 Speaker 1: fact have credit card information and it is for sale, 170 00:10:00,480 --> 00:10:02,880 Speaker 1: that they offered it back to Sony, but Sony refused 171 00:10:02,920 --> 00:10:07,280 Speaker 1: to buy it. Um, And the information includes, uh, not 172 00:10:07,360 --> 00:10:11,400 Speaker 1: only the credit card numbers, but the expiration dates of 173 00:10:11,440 --> 00:10:14,320 Speaker 1: the cards and the cvvs, which are the numbers on 174 00:10:14,360 --> 00:10:17,920 Speaker 1: the back of most credit cards or the front. Actually 175 00:10:17,960 --> 00:10:20,520 Speaker 1: it's not a CBV on an AMEX American Express card, 176 00:10:20,520 --> 00:10:23,520 Speaker 1: but it's the same It fulfills the same purpose security. 177 00:10:23,640 --> 00:10:26,840 Speaker 1: Do you have the security number? And so they claim 178 00:10:26,960 --> 00:10:29,480 Speaker 1: to have that, but it has not been established whether 179 00:10:29,559 --> 00:10:32,520 Speaker 1: or not that is legitimate. I would guess I'm guessing 180 00:10:32,520 --> 00:10:35,160 Speaker 1: that that's not legitimate. And the reason why I say 181 00:10:35,200 --> 00:10:38,040 Speaker 1: that's not legitimate is because Sony does not collect the 182 00:10:38,080 --> 00:10:43,120 Speaker 1: security numbers that and Sony collects the expiration date and 183 00:10:43,160 --> 00:10:45,440 Speaker 1: the actual credit card number, but not the security number. 184 00:10:45,480 --> 00:10:47,800 Speaker 1: So if someone claims to have all that information, they 185 00:10:47,840 --> 00:10:50,600 Speaker 1: didn't get it from Sony. So where did they magically 186 00:10:50,600 --> 00:10:54,880 Speaker 1: get these security numbers? I call shenanigans on that claim exactly. Well, 187 00:10:54,960 --> 00:10:57,280 Speaker 1: you see, um, you know, if you have a couple 188 00:10:57,280 --> 00:10:59,040 Speaker 1: of million dollars and you want to buy this database, 189 00:10:59,080 --> 00:11:02,280 Speaker 1: I'm sure they'll sell it to you. Show Uh So, yeah, 190 00:11:02,320 --> 00:11:04,079 Speaker 1: I've also got a bridge that I would like to 191 00:11:04,160 --> 00:11:07,079 Speaker 1: interest you in. But I did find the the specific 192 00:11:07,240 --> 00:11:10,920 Speaker 1: section and the frequently asked questions document on at PlayStation's 193 00:11:11,080 --> 00:11:15,600 Speaker 1: UM supports area, and it was was my personal data encrypted? 194 00:11:15,800 --> 00:11:19,920 Speaker 1: Here's Sony's answer. All of the data was protected and 195 00:11:20,120 --> 00:11:23,840 Speaker 1: access was restricted both physically and through the perimeter and 196 00:11:23,880 --> 00:11:27,960 Speaker 1: security of the network. The entire credit card table was encrypted, 197 00:11:28,160 --> 00:11:30,880 Speaker 1: and we have no evidence that credit card data was taken. 198 00:11:31,360 --> 00:11:34,240 Speaker 1: The personal data table, which is a separate data set, 199 00:11:34,320 --> 00:11:37,680 Speaker 1: was not encrypted, but was of course behind a very 200 00:11:37,720 --> 00:11:41,400 Speaker 1: sophisticated security system that was breached in a malicious attack. 201 00:11:41,800 --> 00:11:47,280 Speaker 1: So alright, Sony, come on, guys, it doesn't help your 202 00:11:47,400 --> 00:11:49,439 Speaker 1: case at all to say that your security system was 203 00:11:49,480 --> 00:11:54,720 Speaker 1: incredibly sophisticated if once the stuff has already been stolen, right, 204 00:11:55,040 --> 00:11:57,800 Speaker 1: I mean, that's like a bank coming out and saying 205 00:11:58,160 --> 00:12:01,640 Speaker 1: we had the best security measures imp place the burglars 206 00:12:01,640 --> 00:12:05,120 Speaker 1: stole everything. I mean, doesn't No one cares how sophisticated 207 00:12:05,120 --> 00:12:07,600 Speaker 1: your security was if in fact it was breached, because 208 00:12:07,600 --> 00:12:10,840 Speaker 1: clearly it was not secure enough. I mean, it's obvious 209 00:12:10,880 --> 00:12:13,160 Speaker 1: it wasn't secure enough, because if it were secure enough, 210 00:12:13,280 --> 00:12:16,520 Speaker 1: no one would have breached it. So arguing that your 211 00:12:16,559 --> 00:12:20,520 Speaker 1: security was really sophisticated doesn't impress anybody once the theft 212 00:12:20,559 --> 00:12:23,000 Speaker 1: has already happened. And also, you know, like I said, 213 00:12:23,040 --> 00:12:25,520 Speaker 1: it kind of danced around that question. Uh you know, 214 00:12:25,600 --> 00:12:27,439 Speaker 1: they didn't just come out and say no, we did 215 00:12:27,440 --> 00:12:30,959 Speaker 1: not encrypt your personal data until it got pretty far 216 00:12:31,000 --> 00:12:33,520 Speaker 1: into the answer. But yeah, so that personal data is 217 00:12:33,559 --> 00:12:37,200 Speaker 1: all out there and it's available. And then my opinion 218 00:12:37,920 --> 00:12:41,160 Speaker 1: that personal data is far more valuable than your credit 219 00:12:41,160 --> 00:12:45,080 Speaker 1: card number. And and here's why. So, yeah, getting your 220 00:12:45,080 --> 00:12:48,720 Speaker 1: credit card stolen stinks. I've had I've had my credit 221 00:12:48,760 --> 00:12:52,640 Speaker 1: card number stolen once before. And it's a pain because 222 00:12:52,679 --> 00:12:55,679 Speaker 1: it means that you you have to you have to uh, 223 00:12:56,000 --> 00:12:58,600 Speaker 1: you know, you dispute the the charges, you have to 224 00:12:58,679 --> 00:13:00,520 Speaker 1: change your credit card, you have to get a new card. 225 00:13:00,960 --> 00:13:04,320 Speaker 1: You know, they're there may be trouble disputing some charges 226 00:13:04,360 --> 00:13:07,640 Speaker 1: depending upon your credit card company and all that mess. 227 00:13:07,720 --> 00:13:09,840 Speaker 1: And this stuff can affect your credit rating and it's 228 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:13,440 Speaker 1: a real pain in the neck. But ultimately you're talking 229 00:13:13,480 --> 00:13:16,640 Speaker 1: about probably a few hundred dollars if you're paying attention, 230 00:13:16,679 --> 00:13:19,360 Speaker 1: it may not even be that much, but you know 231 00:13:19,720 --> 00:13:21,440 Speaker 1: that's there's still a lot of money to a lot 232 00:13:21,480 --> 00:13:24,760 Speaker 1: of people, but it's not as much money as thousands 233 00:13:24,880 --> 00:13:28,800 Speaker 1: of dollars or tens of thousands of dollars, which is 234 00:13:28,880 --> 00:13:33,000 Speaker 1: what can be stolen from you or stolen within your 235 00:13:33,080 --> 00:13:37,400 Speaker 1: name should someone be able to steal your identity. And 236 00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:41,240 Speaker 1: when you think about it, these if a personal information 237 00:13:41,280 --> 00:13:44,800 Speaker 1: includes your name and your address and your birth date 238 00:13:45,440 --> 00:13:48,480 Speaker 1: and all of this sort of things, people could start 239 00:13:48,559 --> 00:13:52,000 Speaker 1: to use that to try and uh and apply for 240 00:13:52,080 --> 00:13:55,600 Speaker 1: credit cards in your name. And then that's where you 241 00:13:55,679 --> 00:13:58,360 Speaker 1: really start seeing some nasty, nasty hits. I mean, your 242 00:13:58,360 --> 00:14:01,679 Speaker 1: credit rating could plumb it as people take advantage of 243 00:14:01,679 --> 00:14:04,120 Speaker 1: that and steal your identity. Yes, and speaking of someone 244 00:14:04,160 --> 00:14:06,960 Speaker 1: who's had to do it, it's very very difficult to 245 00:14:08,120 --> 00:14:11,720 Speaker 1: uh go in and try to clean up your past 246 00:14:11,800 --> 00:14:15,560 Speaker 1: credit history, even when it's not um, you know, they're 247 00:14:15,640 --> 00:14:20,120 Speaker 1: very the credit agents are very protective of their information. Um. 248 00:14:20,160 --> 00:14:22,240 Speaker 1: And of course there are people who would love to 249 00:14:22,280 --> 00:14:24,440 Speaker 1: go up and go no, no, it was it was 250 00:14:24,800 --> 00:14:29,560 Speaker 1: it was hackers. Um. You know, so they uh, you know, 251 00:14:29,600 --> 00:14:32,000 Speaker 1: I would imagine that they are just particularly concerned that 252 00:14:32,040 --> 00:14:34,400 Speaker 1: people are allying to them. But it is very difficult 253 00:14:34,440 --> 00:14:37,400 Speaker 1: for even for those who can offer you know, more 254 00:14:37,400 --> 00:14:41,880 Speaker 1: concrete proof to go in and make changes. So um, 255 00:14:41,920 --> 00:14:45,600 Speaker 1: but even though I'm getting back to Sony specifically. UM, 256 00:14:45,680 --> 00:14:47,680 Speaker 1: I think in a way, they did some things right 257 00:14:47,720 --> 00:14:49,920 Speaker 1: and they did some things wrong. Obviously, the way they 258 00:14:50,000 --> 00:14:53,480 Speaker 1: handled it with regard to the customers, especially in the 259 00:14:53,480 --> 00:14:55,440 Speaker 1: eyes of the customers, leaves a lot to be desired. 260 00:14:55,440 --> 00:14:59,360 Speaker 1: I've seen many, uh complaints about that, and there's there 261 00:14:59,400 --> 00:15:01,560 Speaker 1: have even been law suits filed at this point. Yeah, 262 00:15:01,640 --> 00:15:03,560 Speaker 1: and we'll we'll talk. We'll need to talk a little 263 00:15:03,560 --> 00:15:05,920 Speaker 1: bit about those lawsuits because there's some there's a recent 264 00:15:05,960 --> 00:15:09,920 Speaker 1: Supreme Court ruling that might actually bear upon that. And 265 00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:12,920 Speaker 1: there's also one other element within the terms of use 266 00:15:12,960 --> 00:15:15,000 Speaker 1: that I would like to address as far as the 267 00:15:15,160 --> 00:15:17,760 Speaker 1: lawsuits are concerned. Yeah, we can, we can totally do 268 00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:19,400 Speaker 1: that in just a second. I just wanted to mention though, 269 00:15:19,560 --> 00:15:22,920 Speaker 1: that Sony did, in fact, UH call in an external 270 00:15:22,920 --> 00:15:26,560 Speaker 1: security auditor to take a look at the practices, um 271 00:15:26,880 --> 00:15:29,760 Speaker 1: and and did shut the networks down as soon as 272 00:15:29,800 --> 00:15:33,480 Speaker 1: they realized that there was a serious problem. And Uh, 273 00:15:33,520 --> 00:15:36,880 Speaker 1: the reason it's taking Song at least according to Sony, 274 00:15:37,120 --> 00:15:39,840 Speaker 1: is to get everything back up online is they're changing 275 00:15:40,040 --> 00:15:42,560 Speaker 1: the security structure of the site, which and I think 276 00:15:42,600 --> 00:15:45,520 Speaker 1: that that's an excellent thing and they're require They're going 277 00:15:45,600 --> 00:15:48,040 Speaker 1: to require everyone as soon as they reconnect to the 278 00:15:48,040 --> 00:15:52,240 Speaker 1: network to change their password. UM and that's something else 279 00:15:52,280 --> 00:15:54,520 Speaker 1: we should point out. If you are, if you're practicing 280 00:15:54,520 --> 00:15:59,840 Speaker 1: good security, first of all, you're in the most people 281 00:16:00,000 --> 00:16:02,040 Speaker 1: out I know there's some people out there who are 282 00:16:02,040 --> 00:16:04,480 Speaker 1: our listeners who claim that they do, and that's great, 283 00:16:04,640 --> 00:16:09,040 Speaker 1: I'm glad, fantastic. The rest of you are probably doing 284 00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:11,200 Speaker 1: the same thing that almost everyone is doing, which is 285 00:16:11,240 --> 00:16:14,800 Speaker 1: that you use maybe maybe a handful of passwords. Some 286 00:16:14,800 --> 00:16:17,280 Speaker 1: people just use one and they use it across everything, 287 00:16:17,440 --> 00:16:20,440 Speaker 1: and they might even use the same user name across everything, 288 00:16:20,880 --> 00:16:23,760 Speaker 1: in which case, if someone has access to your name, 289 00:16:24,200 --> 00:16:27,840 Speaker 1: your email address, your user name, and your password, and 290 00:16:27,840 --> 00:16:30,840 Speaker 1: you're using that same password across multiple platforms, all of 291 00:16:30,840 --> 00:16:34,360 Speaker 1: those platforms are now at risk. UH. That means the 292 00:16:34,400 --> 00:16:37,480 Speaker 1: hackers who stole that information could, in theory, access your 293 00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:41,320 Speaker 1: accounts across multiple platforms that might include emails, social networks, 294 00:16:41,800 --> 00:16:46,200 Speaker 1: other services. So you want to make sure that you're 295 00:16:46,320 --> 00:16:50,400 Speaker 1: using multiple passwords, make them difficult to guess. Don't just 296 00:16:50,440 --> 00:16:52,720 Speaker 1: make it a variation off a password that you're using 297 00:16:52,760 --> 00:16:55,440 Speaker 1: over and over again. Use a strong password generator. If 298 00:16:55,440 --> 00:16:59,360 Speaker 1: you need to, um, yeah, those are those are excellent. 299 00:16:59,400 --> 00:17:01,840 Speaker 1: There's there's a couple out there that you do things like, 300 00:17:01,920 --> 00:17:04,720 Speaker 1: for instance, you want to create a password, you put 301 00:17:04,760 --> 00:17:08,199 Speaker 1: in the u r L for the the website that 302 00:17:08,240 --> 00:17:10,320 Speaker 1: you're going to use. You can actually download code that 303 00:17:10,359 --> 00:17:12,359 Speaker 1: will allow you to do this, and you can even 304 00:17:12,400 --> 00:17:14,760 Speaker 1: turn your computer offline so that you know, you don't 305 00:17:14,800 --> 00:17:17,800 Speaker 1: have to worry about it broadcasting this anywhere. But you 306 00:17:17,840 --> 00:17:19,560 Speaker 1: put in the u r L for the website you 307 00:17:19,600 --> 00:17:22,280 Speaker 1: plan to visit. You put in a master password that 308 00:17:22,560 --> 00:17:24,119 Speaker 1: this is the same password you're going to use for 309 00:17:24,160 --> 00:17:28,520 Speaker 1: every single site. But using the master password and the 310 00:17:28,600 --> 00:17:31,040 Speaker 1: u r L, it creates a hash of that and 311 00:17:31,119 --> 00:17:34,000 Speaker 1: creates a strong password based on that. So then all 312 00:17:34,040 --> 00:17:36,000 Speaker 1: you do is put in different u r l's with 313 00:17:36,080 --> 00:17:39,000 Speaker 1: the same master password and it will generate its strong 314 00:17:39,040 --> 00:17:42,240 Speaker 1: password for you. You create your accounts that way using 315 00:17:42,240 --> 00:17:44,199 Speaker 1: that strong password, and if you ever forget it, all 316 00:17:44,240 --> 00:17:46,600 Speaker 1: you have to do is go back into that program. 317 00:17:46,640 --> 00:17:48,879 Speaker 1: You know, again disconnect yourself from all the networks if 318 00:17:48,880 --> 00:17:51,240 Speaker 1: you want to, but go back into that program, type 319 00:17:51,240 --> 00:17:53,280 Speaker 1: in the u r L and your master password again 320 00:17:53,359 --> 00:17:57,720 Speaker 1: and it will the same strong password will pop up again. Yeah, yeah, 321 00:17:57,840 --> 00:17:59,840 Speaker 1: and I have a I have a password wallet that 322 00:17:59,880 --> 00:18:03,239 Speaker 1: I use that will generate passwords, and uh, I have 323 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:08,000 Speaker 1: the app on my phone and iPod and there's a 324 00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:10,760 Speaker 1: plug in for my browser. So it's that that actually 325 00:18:10,800 --> 00:18:13,680 Speaker 1: goes into the database and everything is encrypted. And if I, 326 00:18:13,680 --> 00:18:16,200 Speaker 1: if I do happen to lose my phone, the uh 327 00:18:16,680 --> 00:18:18,960 Speaker 1: uh and somebody else gets it and and breaks into it, 328 00:18:19,000 --> 00:18:22,879 Speaker 1: they have to they won't find out specifically what is 329 00:18:22,920 --> 00:18:25,280 Speaker 1: in there because they would have to actually get into 330 00:18:25,400 --> 00:18:27,680 Speaker 1: the password app two, which requires a separate and more 331 00:18:27,720 --> 00:18:33,000 Speaker 1: complex password. Um. So yeah, I mean it's uh, these 332 00:18:33,040 --> 00:18:36,120 Speaker 1: are these are good ideas, but uh, it doesn't change 333 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:39,080 Speaker 1: the fact that that Sony customers are very upset not 334 00:18:39,200 --> 00:18:42,479 Speaker 1: only that they got that they weren't told about this, 335 00:18:42,520 --> 00:18:45,040 Speaker 1: but that they're on top of that, you know, that's 336 00:18:45,080 --> 00:18:48,960 Speaker 1: really insult to injury having their information taken. And a 337 00:18:48,960 --> 00:18:51,240 Speaker 1: lot of people are upset that they can't go back 338 00:18:51,280 --> 00:18:54,439 Speaker 1: in and change their user name and password on the 339 00:18:54,480 --> 00:18:57,280 Speaker 1: network because the network is down. Of course, if no 340 00:18:57,280 --> 00:18:59,520 Speaker 1: one else can get in, I would argue that that's 341 00:19:00,040 --> 00:19:02,480 Speaker 1: not quite as big as at this point, you should 342 00:19:02,520 --> 00:19:06,040 Speaker 1: really be concentrating on changing your password everywhere else. Yes, 343 00:19:06,280 --> 00:19:09,320 Speaker 1: like all the different emails and and social networks and 344 00:19:09,359 --> 00:19:11,639 Speaker 1: all the other services you use. If you use that 345 00:19:11,680 --> 00:19:14,040 Speaker 1: same password, you need to change it. Um, I want 346 00:19:14,080 --> 00:19:16,440 Speaker 1: to put a fraud alert on your credit report? Yeah. Yeah, 347 00:19:16,520 --> 00:19:19,280 Speaker 1: those can be a real pain too, just because if 348 00:19:19,280 --> 00:19:22,040 Speaker 1: you start using your credit card and you're you know, 349 00:19:22,080 --> 00:19:25,320 Speaker 1: you're out of town, then you may end up getting 350 00:19:25,320 --> 00:19:27,880 Speaker 1: a call from your your bank or credit union every 351 00:19:27,920 --> 00:19:31,880 Speaker 1: time you Yeah. Compared that compared to yeah, that it's 352 00:19:31,920 --> 00:19:33,800 Speaker 1: it's inconvenient, and it's a pain in the butt, but 353 00:19:33,840 --> 00:19:35,760 Speaker 1: it's less of a pain in the butt than dealing 354 00:19:35,800 --> 00:19:38,040 Speaker 1: with the fact that someone has stolen your information and 355 00:19:38,200 --> 00:19:43,080 Speaker 1: is using your card without your approval. Just as an aside, Yeah, 356 00:19:43,080 --> 00:19:45,919 Speaker 1: I've I've heard recently, very recently that the people who 357 00:19:46,040 --> 00:19:50,199 Speaker 1: steal credit card numbers now are not And you know, 358 00:19:50,240 --> 00:19:53,040 Speaker 1: if I were stealing credit card numbers, I would think 359 00:19:53,080 --> 00:19:55,080 Speaker 1: that I would want to do things as quickly as 360 00:19:55,160 --> 00:19:58,680 Speaker 1: possible to avoid, uh, you know, the person I stole 361 00:19:58,680 --> 00:20:01,880 Speaker 1: it from. Changing, Yeah, to call in and say, hey, 362 00:20:01,920 --> 00:20:04,640 Speaker 1: my credit card, my credit card has been stolen. Um. 363 00:20:04,680 --> 00:20:07,880 Speaker 1: But in a lot of cases, when when, apparently, when 364 00:20:07,880 --> 00:20:10,080 Speaker 1: this kind of thing happens. They don't run out and 365 00:20:10,240 --> 00:20:13,280 Speaker 1: buy lots of big screen TVs and designer genes and 366 00:20:13,320 --> 00:20:16,719 Speaker 1: all sorts of other cool fun stuff computers, video games. 367 00:20:16,760 --> 00:20:20,359 Speaker 1: They go and they buy stuff for twenty dollars or 368 00:20:20,560 --> 00:20:23,840 Speaker 1: thirty dollars because it doesn't go noticed. People let that 369 00:20:23,920 --> 00:20:26,040 Speaker 1: kind of thing slide on their card. They go, wait 370 00:20:26,080 --> 00:20:28,520 Speaker 1: a minute, I don't remember going to Best Buy and 371 00:20:28,600 --> 00:20:32,480 Speaker 1: spending twenty five times. I probably bought a movie or something. Oh, well, 372 00:20:32,560 --> 00:20:34,359 Speaker 1: you know, I'm sure it's it's just twenty bucks. It's 373 00:20:34,400 --> 00:20:36,480 Speaker 1: no big deal. That's the thing that they've started to do. 374 00:20:36,560 --> 00:20:39,960 Speaker 1: And that's very insidious because they could continue to do 375 00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:42,480 Speaker 1: that and continue to hold on your information and take 376 00:20:42,520 --> 00:20:44,960 Speaker 1: money from you for years. Well, like we said, though, 377 00:20:45,000 --> 00:20:49,000 Speaker 1: credit cards, that's cheap. In the long run, the long game, 378 00:20:49,200 --> 00:20:51,640 Speaker 1: credit card is nothing. In fact, we had a security 379 00:20:51,640 --> 00:20:54,200 Speaker 1: expert come and talk to the editorial department at House 380 00:20:54,200 --> 00:20:56,000 Speaker 1: Stuff Works just as part of our we have this 381 00:20:56,080 --> 00:20:59,119 Speaker 1: ongoing lecture series where we get to listen to various 382 00:20:59,119 --> 00:21:02,120 Speaker 1: experts in different fields. And the security expert was talking 383 00:21:02,119 --> 00:21:05,000 Speaker 1: about how credit card information is cheap. It's it's you know, 384 00:21:05,119 --> 00:21:07,359 Speaker 1: it's like fifteen cents for a credit card number, and 385 00:21:07,359 --> 00:21:10,280 Speaker 1: it's because it's because there is no guarantee that credit 386 00:21:10,320 --> 00:21:13,240 Speaker 1: card number is going to be good for very much longer. Um. 387 00:21:13,359 --> 00:21:16,439 Speaker 1: What's valuable is the personal information, because that's where you 388 00:21:16,440 --> 00:21:19,520 Speaker 1: can start to you know, you you create your own 389 00:21:19,560 --> 00:21:22,880 Speaker 1: credit card based upon this person's identity, on that person's 390 00:21:22,920 --> 00:21:25,119 Speaker 1: credit rating, and you have all the billing go to 391 00:21:25,440 --> 00:21:27,119 Speaker 1: information go to a different place. You don't have to 392 00:21:27,119 --> 00:21:29,439 Speaker 1: worry about paying for it. You're just gonna run that 393 00:21:29,520 --> 00:21:31,320 Speaker 1: up as much as you can, and that's where you 394 00:21:31,359 --> 00:21:35,239 Speaker 1: make the big purchases, right So, and and ultimately the 395 00:21:35,280 --> 00:21:38,680 Speaker 1: person whose name is attached to that number that's their 396 00:21:38,720 --> 00:21:41,359 Speaker 1: credit rating, is going to suffer as a result, and 397 00:21:41,800 --> 00:21:44,640 Speaker 1: that's where you really have to worry. So again, even 398 00:21:44,680 --> 00:21:47,600 Speaker 1: if the credit card information wasn't touched, that personal data 399 00:21:47,640 --> 00:21:52,320 Speaker 1: is very important now they the hackers would lack certain 400 00:21:52,320 --> 00:21:55,359 Speaker 1: information that would really make it useful, like your Social 401 00:21:55,359 --> 00:21:59,440 Speaker 1: Security number. That part is not in your ps N profile, 402 00:21:59,720 --> 00:22:03,720 Speaker 1: So he does not ask for that. So for that reason, 403 00:22:03,760 --> 00:22:06,600 Speaker 1: Sony has alerted users that they should be on the 404 00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:12,040 Speaker 1: lookout for any spear phishing attempts. Sony has said it 405 00:22:12,080 --> 00:22:15,640 Speaker 1: will not ask for personal information through email. Just like 406 00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:19,439 Speaker 1: most retailers and organizations will say the same thing. They 407 00:22:19,480 --> 00:22:22,679 Speaker 1: will never ask for your personal identifiable information to be 408 00:22:22,760 --> 00:22:25,600 Speaker 1: sent over email. So if you get an email from 409 00:22:25,640 --> 00:22:29,359 Speaker 1: apparently Sony that says, all right, we're ready to reinstate 410 00:22:29,400 --> 00:22:32,520 Speaker 1: your ps N profile, but we need your Social Security 411 00:22:32,560 --> 00:22:34,919 Speaker 1: number in order to do it, that's a red flag. 412 00:22:35,440 --> 00:22:37,879 Speaker 1: That's a that's a sign of spear fishing, and that 413 00:22:37,920 --> 00:22:40,239 Speaker 1: the person who sent that is probably just trying to 414 00:22:40,280 --> 00:22:42,760 Speaker 1: gather as much user information as possible to sell it 415 00:22:42,800 --> 00:22:46,480 Speaker 1: off to whomever. So um we we said this a 416 00:22:46,520 --> 00:22:50,959 Speaker 1: few weeks ago, but basically, any reputable company who values 417 00:22:51,000 --> 00:22:53,639 Speaker 1: your business and and may actually need some of this 418 00:22:53,760 --> 00:22:59,600 Speaker 1: information for legitimate purposes, legitimate real world companies are not 419 00:22:59,760 --> 00:23:01,919 Speaker 1: going to ask for you to mail that in or 420 00:23:02,000 --> 00:23:07,119 Speaker 1: to send it in over um A network because basically, 421 00:23:07,160 --> 00:23:09,600 Speaker 1: at this point they all know that these kinds of 422 00:23:09,640 --> 00:23:12,119 Speaker 1: things are going on. It's always better if you have 423 00:23:12,200 --> 00:23:15,040 Speaker 1: any questions to give the company a call at the 424 00:23:15,119 --> 00:23:18,359 Speaker 1: number listed on its legitimate website. Go to the website yourself, 425 00:23:18,400 --> 00:23:22,399 Speaker 1: don't click on any links and those emails, and h 426 00:23:22,680 --> 00:23:24,720 Speaker 1: get the phone number, use the one on your bill 427 00:23:25,400 --> 00:23:28,159 Speaker 1: or whatever to I to call and say, hey, did 428 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:31,000 Speaker 1: you do you actually need this information? Talk to a 429 00:23:31,000 --> 00:23:33,440 Speaker 1: customer service representative and say, you know, I'm happy to 430 00:23:33,560 --> 00:23:36,080 Speaker 1: you know, hopefully I'm happy to give you the information 431 00:23:36,119 --> 00:23:38,280 Speaker 1: you need if you need it. But I believe this 432 00:23:38,359 --> 00:23:41,480 Speaker 1: might be an attempt to get my information. And if so, 433 00:23:42,200 --> 00:23:44,040 Speaker 1: you guys need to be aware of it so that 434 00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:46,840 Speaker 1: you know, you can maybe message out to people that 435 00:23:46,880 --> 00:23:51,280 Speaker 1: there are these kinds of attacks. Um and yeah, I've 436 00:23:51,320 --> 00:23:53,840 Speaker 1: I've actually had my information soul and wasn't actually related 437 00:23:53,880 --> 00:23:56,640 Speaker 1: to a tech thing. Somebody else that I did business with, 438 00:23:56,960 --> 00:24:01,000 Speaker 1: um had a person on the inside who was uh 439 00:24:01,080 --> 00:24:04,959 Speaker 1: selling information. Yeah, yeah, that can happen. That's essentially you know, 440 00:24:05,040 --> 00:24:07,760 Speaker 1: sabotage is really what that comes down to. Yeah. Yeah. 441 00:24:07,800 --> 00:24:09,800 Speaker 1: And so you know, if you were if you were 442 00:24:09,800 --> 00:24:13,280 Speaker 1: in a situation like this, either through the PlayStation network 443 00:24:13,440 --> 00:24:15,800 Speaker 1: or some other company, you want to make sure you 444 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:18,439 Speaker 1: keep an eye in your your credit reports. And in 445 00:24:18,480 --> 00:24:20,520 Speaker 1: the United States you can do that. Um. You know, 446 00:24:20,560 --> 00:24:23,240 Speaker 1: I believe there's there's a law and effect now for 447 00:24:23,320 --> 00:24:26,119 Speaker 1: everybody that you can get one reporter year free, one 448 00:24:26,440 --> 00:24:31,520 Speaker 1: free credit report from each of the credit Yeah and um, 449 00:24:31,520 --> 00:24:35,200 Speaker 1: and those would be Equifax, trans Union, and Experience UM 450 00:24:35,280 --> 00:24:37,200 Speaker 1: and you you would definitely want to keep an eye 451 00:24:37,200 --> 00:24:40,240 Speaker 1: on that. UM. Some states like the one we live 452 00:24:40,280 --> 00:24:42,919 Speaker 1: and allow you, I believe, to reports per year. You 453 00:24:42,920 --> 00:24:45,720 Speaker 1: can sign up for services that will allow you to 454 00:24:45,920 --> 00:24:47,760 Speaker 1: check it as many times as you want to. I 455 00:24:47,960 --> 00:24:52,040 Speaker 1: I you know, there's usually a pretty decent fee associated 456 00:24:52,080 --> 00:24:55,880 Speaker 1: with that. UM. And I've talked, I've I've heard information 457 00:24:55,960 --> 00:25:01,560 Speaker 1: from some of the UH consumer protect your folks. I 458 00:25:01,680 --> 00:25:04,080 Speaker 1: can't think of what you call them, like consumer watchdogs 459 00:25:04,080 --> 00:25:05,760 Speaker 1: and say, yeah, you know, you do need to keep 460 00:25:05,760 --> 00:25:07,159 Speaker 1: an eye on your credit, but you might not need 461 00:25:07,200 --> 00:25:09,399 Speaker 1: to spend twenty dollars a month to keep an eye 462 00:25:09,400 --> 00:25:14,000 Speaker 1: on your credit every day. UM. So you know, just 463 00:25:14,000 --> 00:25:16,760 Speaker 1: just be wary of that. Certainly, UH, if I were 464 00:25:16,800 --> 00:25:21,080 Speaker 1: affected by the PlayStation network fiasco, I would I would 465 00:25:21,080 --> 00:25:24,800 Speaker 1: certainly change that credit card number immediately if you haven't 466 00:25:24,800 --> 00:25:28,760 Speaker 1: already hopefully you already have. Yeah, and um I changing 467 00:25:28,800 --> 00:25:30,919 Speaker 1: credit card numbers today is even a bigger pain than 468 00:25:30,960 --> 00:25:33,160 Speaker 1: it used to be. The reason for that is things 469 00:25:33,160 --> 00:25:36,720 Speaker 1: like when you set up recurring payments for stuff. Yes, 470 00:25:36,960 --> 00:25:39,879 Speaker 1: I mean, as we make these systems simpler to do 471 00:25:39,920 --> 00:25:43,520 Speaker 1: all your your payments online. Then we have to remember, oh, 472 00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:45,440 Speaker 1: I changed my credit card number. I have to go 473 00:25:45,640 --> 00:25:49,919 Speaker 1: through every single building service I use and change my 474 00:25:50,040 --> 00:25:53,840 Speaker 1: information there or else I'm going to default on a bill. Yeah. Yeah, 475 00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:56,640 Speaker 1: pain in the butt, but still still better than having 476 00:25:56,640 --> 00:25:59,320 Speaker 1: your identity still in For Sony, though, this is gonna 477 00:25:59,320 --> 00:26:02,399 Speaker 1: be a real headache for sometime. Sony has got This 478 00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:04,600 Speaker 1: is gonna be costs Sony big time. And it's gonna 479 00:26:04,640 --> 00:26:08,080 Speaker 1: cost it because there are between seventy and seventy seven 480 00:26:08,320 --> 00:26:14,040 Speaker 1: million users of PSN. That's a lot of people. And 481 00:26:14,119 --> 00:26:18,440 Speaker 1: to UH to update the security information is it's this 482 00:26:18,480 --> 00:26:22,400 Speaker 1: is a major investment to to fix this problem. It's 483 00:26:22,400 --> 00:26:25,760 Speaker 1: almost like creating the network over from scratch. And they 484 00:26:25,800 --> 00:26:30,720 Speaker 1: have a huge blow to their reputation because not all 485 00:26:30,760 --> 00:26:33,159 Speaker 1: of those users are necessarily going to be willing to 486 00:26:33,200 --> 00:26:37,240 Speaker 1: come back after having their information stolen like this. They aren't, 487 00:26:37,440 --> 00:26:42,080 Speaker 1: and new users might rethink joining because of this breach, 488 00:26:42,560 --> 00:26:45,080 Speaker 1: and so they may say, I don't want to put 489 00:26:45,080 --> 00:26:47,840 Speaker 1: my information in the hands of a company that has 490 00:26:47,880 --> 00:26:51,560 Speaker 1: shown itself incapable of keeping it protected. Well, I would, uh, 491 00:26:52,119 --> 00:26:54,200 Speaker 1: I would go out on a limb. We It's a 492 00:26:54,280 --> 00:26:56,440 Speaker 1: long ways away now from our prediction episode, I would 493 00:26:56,440 --> 00:26:58,199 Speaker 1: go out on a limb and say that's Sony. The 494 00:26:58,240 --> 00:27:00,680 Speaker 1: thing that saves Sony in this case, if anything does, 495 00:27:00,880 --> 00:27:06,520 Speaker 1: is that amazing loyalty that PlayStation customers have. But I 496 00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:09,200 Speaker 1: still think a lot of people are going to be 497 00:27:09,920 --> 00:27:13,480 Speaker 1: extremely upset and quite a few will probably drop out. Yeah, 498 00:27:13,520 --> 00:27:16,359 Speaker 1: and this is again, by the time this podcast goes live, 499 00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:20,359 Speaker 1: there may very well be many more developments. Maybe you 500 00:27:20,400 --> 00:27:24,000 Speaker 1: will know exactly who was responsible for these attacks. As 501 00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:27,240 Speaker 1: of this moment, we don't. We can't say Sony may 502 00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:29,640 Speaker 1: have an idea, but Sony's not letting everyone know, which 503 00:27:29,840 --> 00:27:33,880 Speaker 1: makes sense, rightification Right, So by the time this goes live, 504 00:27:33,960 --> 00:27:35,639 Speaker 1: we may have more information. I might have to come 505 00:27:35,720 --> 00:27:38,359 Speaker 1: in with a breaking news segment at the end and 506 00:27:38,520 --> 00:27:41,560 Speaker 1: kind of update. But but as of the twenty ninth 507 00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:44,640 Speaker 1: of April, we should also mention you you talked about 508 00:27:44,680 --> 00:27:47,439 Speaker 1: the fact that there's a class action suit or some 509 00:27:47,600 --> 00:27:52,480 Speaker 1: lawsuits being levied against Sony. Have seen one right so far? 510 00:27:53,000 --> 00:27:56,359 Speaker 1: There was an interesting news report I saw that said 511 00:27:56,480 --> 00:28:00,359 Speaker 1: that um, because of a different UH suit that was 512 00:28:00,400 --> 00:28:03,639 Speaker 1: brought forth to the Supreme Court. UM, there was a 513 00:28:05,280 --> 00:28:09,520 Speaker 1: class action lawsuit that was brought against a phone company UM. 514 00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:14,520 Speaker 1: A Southern California couple uh levied a lawsuit, began a 515 00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:17,560 Speaker 1: class action lawsuit against the phone company because they were 516 00:28:18,119 --> 00:28:21,320 Speaker 1: they had a fee of around thirty dollars tacked onto 517 00:28:21,480 --> 00:28:25,919 Speaker 1: their cell phone UM bill or cell phone purchase, and 518 00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:30,479 Speaker 1: they said that that that was an unfair bill and 519 00:28:30,480 --> 00:28:33,240 Speaker 1: that it wasn't communicated to them, and that they were 520 00:28:33,840 --> 00:28:35,920 Speaker 1: essentially that the company had stolen that money from them. 521 00:28:35,960 --> 00:28:39,240 Speaker 1: So I started a class action lawsuit. A class action lawsuit, 522 00:28:40,080 --> 00:28:42,600 Speaker 1: it's like a when you get a whole bunch of 523 00:28:42,600 --> 00:28:46,080 Speaker 1: people who all have been affected by the same well 524 00:28:46,120 --> 00:28:48,240 Speaker 1: if the if the court decides at the same crime, 525 00:28:49,200 --> 00:28:52,880 Speaker 1: and they all are seeking damages against a company for 526 00:28:52,960 --> 00:28:56,200 Speaker 1: that crime. Now, normally the money in a class action 527 00:28:56,280 --> 00:28:59,800 Speaker 1: lawsuit for each individual consumer is pretty low, uh. And 528 00:28:59,800 --> 00:29:01,920 Speaker 1: that that's why you want a class action lawsuit. You 529 00:29:01,920 --> 00:29:04,560 Speaker 1: want a lot of people banded together for this because 530 00:29:05,320 --> 00:29:08,600 Speaker 1: it doesn't make any financial sense to pursue this in 531 00:29:08,840 --> 00:29:11,360 Speaker 1: a small claims court because you're gonna spend way more 532 00:29:11,440 --> 00:29:14,600 Speaker 1: money in court than you would reclaiming whatever it was 533 00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:17,000 Speaker 1: was stolen from you. Right, But together you can pull 534 00:29:17,040 --> 00:29:21,560 Speaker 1: the costs and and actually bring a suit and and 535 00:29:21,640 --> 00:29:25,120 Speaker 1: lawyers love them because they get a little bit off 536 00:29:25,160 --> 00:29:28,040 Speaker 1: of each and every transaction. And if there are if 537 00:29:28,040 --> 00:29:30,560 Speaker 1: there are millions of people in the in the lawsuit, 538 00:29:30,680 --> 00:29:34,240 Speaker 1: that that's big bucks. It's It's very weird though, when 539 00:29:34,280 --> 00:29:36,440 Speaker 1: you're somebody who didn't actually bring the suit and you 540 00:29:36,480 --> 00:29:38,720 Speaker 1: get the letter in the mail and says, hey, you're 541 00:29:39,160 --> 00:29:41,479 Speaker 1: so sure, so and so customer, you're part of this 542 00:29:41,600 --> 00:29:45,320 Speaker 1: class action lawsuit. Here's your five dollars, yeah, dollar forty nine. 543 00:29:45,320 --> 00:29:47,800 Speaker 1: Here you um And they're like, hey, I won five 544 00:29:47,840 --> 00:29:49,800 Speaker 1: dollars and you don't even think. You don't even think 545 00:29:49,880 --> 00:29:52,240 Speaker 1: of whatever it was that was the purpose of the 546 00:29:52,240 --> 00:29:56,000 Speaker 1: suit in the first place. But the in this case, 547 00:29:56,320 --> 00:30:00,280 Speaker 1: the cell phone company or they said that they ad 548 00:30:00,280 --> 00:30:04,240 Speaker 1: within their terms of use a a statement that prevented 549 00:30:04,280 --> 00:30:07,479 Speaker 1: people from bringing a class action lawsuit against them. And 550 00:30:07,560 --> 00:30:09,560 Speaker 1: that's what was being taken to court, the challenge of 551 00:30:09,680 --> 00:30:13,520 Speaker 1: can you have something in your terms of service that 552 00:30:13,520 --> 00:30:17,560 Speaker 1: that will prevent the the ability of class action lawsuit 553 00:30:17,600 --> 00:30:20,320 Speaker 1: being levied against you? And the Supreme Court upheld that 554 00:30:20,560 --> 00:30:24,080 Speaker 1: five to four. So if you are a company and 555 00:30:24,120 --> 00:30:26,200 Speaker 1: you put in your terms of service that you do 556 00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:30,479 Speaker 1: not allow class action lawsuits to be levied against you 557 00:30:30,520 --> 00:30:36,400 Speaker 1: for whatever reason. Apparently that can be Um, that's upheld 558 00:30:36,440 --> 00:30:38,520 Speaker 1: by the Supreme Court. That doesn't mean that that's permanent. 559 00:30:38,560 --> 00:30:41,200 Speaker 1: And of course that's just the United States. Not every 560 00:30:41,920 --> 00:30:45,760 Speaker 1: uh country does this. Not every country allows class action lawsuits. Actually, 561 00:30:45,760 --> 00:30:49,200 Speaker 1: so UM, it's not it's not a done deal. But 562 00:30:49,320 --> 00:30:53,120 Speaker 1: also there was I saw someone mentioned that Sony has 563 00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:57,880 Speaker 1: a statement called the limitation of liability and uh, if 564 00:30:57,880 --> 00:31:00,720 Speaker 1: you read that paragraph in their terms of use, uh, 565 00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:03,440 Speaker 1: it says, I'll just read the part that pertains to this. 566 00:31:04,520 --> 00:31:06,600 Speaker 1: We have to throw in some more legal language. We 567 00:31:06,680 --> 00:31:08,560 Speaker 1: need to protect us so that we can provide you 568 00:31:08,600 --> 00:31:11,800 Speaker 1: the benefits of the sites. In no event will s 569 00:31:11,840 --> 00:31:16,800 Speaker 1: c e A, Its officers, directors, employees, shareholders, representatives, or 570 00:31:16,840 --> 00:31:23,080 Speaker 1: agents be liable to you for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive, 571 00:31:23,240 --> 00:31:27,680 Speaker 1: or consequential damages whatsoever resulting from any and then there's 572 00:31:27,680 --> 00:31:30,120 Speaker 1: a list of of criteria, but the one that pertains 573 00:31:30,120 --> 00:31:34,720 Speaker 1: to our discussion is c any unauthorized access to or 574 00:31:34,920 --> 00:31:38,640 Speaker 1: use of our secure servers or any and all non 575 00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:42,640 Speaker 1: secured personal information. I saw someone suggest that maybe that 576 00:31:42,640 --> 00:31:45,480 Speaker 1: would give Sony an out in this case. I don't 577 00:31:45,480 --> 00:31:47,600 Speaker 1: think so. And the reason why I don't think so, now, 578 00:31:47,600 --> 00:31:50,880 Speaker 1: granted I am not a lawyer, so this is just 579 00:31:50,960 --> 00:31:55,400 Speaker 1: basically this is based upon my understanding of the English language. Right, So, 580 00:31:55,760 --> 00:32:02,240 Speaker 1: they said all non secured personal information, but this is secured, Yes, 581 00:32:02,280 --> 00:32:06,360 Speaker 1: this information was, well, the credit card is encrypted, but 582 00:32:06,360 --> 00:32:08,680 Speaker 1: the personal data they don't know that the credit card 583 00:32:08,720 --> 00:32:10,680 Speaker 1: information was taken in the first place, but the personal 584 00:32:10,760 --> 00:32:14,240 Speaker 1: data they do know that someone that was that was 585 00:32:14,280 --> 00:32:16,920 Speaker 1: one of the targets of the attack. The argument might 586 00:32:16,960 --> 00:32:20,240 Speaker 1: be that it wasn't secured, right, So, well, they would 587 00:32:20,320 --> 00:32:23,280 Speaker 1: argue that maybe they might argue that they're that information, 588 00:32:23,520 --> 00:32:26,120 Speaker 1: that the liability means that they're free to go. But 589 00:32:26,480 --> 00:32:30,520 Speaker 1: because it says non secured personal data, you know, they 590 00:32:30,640 --> 00:32:34,280 Speaker 1: specifically said in uh in that in that fact that 591 00:32:34,360 --> 00:32:39,640 Speaker 1: I mentioned that the the that it was restricted both 592 00:32:39,640 --> 00:32:42,640 Speaker 1: physically and through the perimeter and security of the network. 593 00:32:43,040 --> 00:32:46,160 Speaker 1: They were very specific to say that this information was 594 00:32:46,200 --> 00:32:51,080 Speaker 1: behind state of the art, sophisticated security system. So I 595 00:32:51,120 --> 00:32:53,440 Speaker 1: don't think they could argue that it was non secured 596 00:32:53,520 --> 00:32:57,240 Speaker 1: personal data. No, probably not, because in their own statements 597 00:32:57,240 --> 00:32:58,920 Speaker 1: out to the customer they said no, no, no, no, 598 00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:01,120 Speaker 1: no, no no, this information was cure. It's just these people 599 00:33:01,120 --> 00:33:03,920 Speaker 1: were really good and they managed to breach the system. 600 00:33:04,000 --> 00:33:07,720 Speaker 1: So I don't think Sony can avoid a lawsuit based 601 00:33:07,760 --> 00:33:11,080 Speaker 1: upon that criteria. Now there may be that there's other 602 00:33:11,200 --> 00:33:13,800 Speaker 1: information buried within the terms of use that would would 603 00:33:14,120 --> 00:33:17,000 Speaker 1: protect Sony from that, but in that particular paragraph, I 604 00:33:17,040 --> 00:33:19,880 Speaker 1: don't think it applies. Yeah, it sounds like it, but 605 00:33:19,920 --> 00:33:23,400 Speaker 1: I don't. It's certainly going to uh too. This is 606 00:33:23,400 --> 00:33:26,040 Speaker 1: going to dog them for some time, I belive, especially 607 00:33:26,040 --> 00:33:28,760 Speaker 1: on the heels of other missteps they've made over the 608 00:33:28,800 --> 00:33:31,040 Speaker 1: past few years well, and and that, and the fact 609 00:33:31,080 --> 00:33:34,200 Speaker 1: that it came on the heels of the Epsilon breach, 610 00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:39,840 Speaker 1: so people's attention to security online security has already been heightened, 611 00:33:40,320 --> 00:33:43,120 Speaker 1: and to see this happened shortly after that that breach 612 00:33:43,200 --> 00:33:46,480 Speaker 1: became public was really bad news for Sony. And also 613 00:33:46,600 --> 00:33:49,800 Speaker 1: I have to say, you know, Sony's strategy of not 614 00:33:49,920 --> 00:33:51,880 Speaker 1: coming forward and saying that there was a breach early 615 00:33:51,920 --> 00:33:54,920 Speaker 1: on that probably has hurt them quite a bit as well. 616 00:33:54,960 --> 00:33:56,560 Speaker 1: But there was no way of knowing at the time 617 00:33:56,600 --> 00:33:58,400 Speaker 1: that it was going to hurt them. It's just that 618 00:33:58,480 --> 00:34:00,720 Speaker 1: in retrospect, you sit there and you you come forward 619 00:34:00,720 --> 00:34:02,440 Speaker 1: and say, oh, it's just down for maintenance, and then 620 00:34:02,480 --> 00:34:03,880 Speaker 1: a couple of days literally say all right, there was 621 00:34:03,880 --> 00:34:07,320 Speaker 1: a breach. Then people say, well, we how how can 622 00:34:07,360 --> 00:34:10,600 Speaker 1: we trust you as a company if you're going to um, 623 00:34:11,080 --> 00:34:13,800 Speaker 1: you know, lie to your users. Now, you could argue 624 00:34:13,840 --> 00:34:16,280 Speaker 1: that Sony had to do that in order to conduct 625 00:34:16,360 --> 00:34:20,600 Speaker 1: its investigation and as uh effective a way as possible, 626 00:34:20,640 --> 00:34:23,440 Speaker 1: because all the more information Sony gives out, the more 627 00:34:23,640 --> 00:34:27,439 Speaker 1: firepower they give to the attackers. So there's there's a 628 00:34:27,480 --> 00:34:30,880 Speaker 1: scale there. When I meant miss when I was saying missteps, 629 00:34:30,920 --> 00:34:34,359 Speaker 1: I was specifically thinking of the root kit situation from 630 00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:36,680 Speaker 1: a few years ago, which we mentioned on an podcast, 631 00:34:36,680 --> 00:34:39,480 Speaker 1: and they were very um, oh no, nothing's wrong. Okay, 632 00:34:39,520 --> 00:34:41,960 Speaker 1: So yeah, there was this root Kit. Sorry, Yeah, I've 633 00:34:41,960 --> 00:34:44,839 Speaker 1: seen I've seen kind of the same thing. I've seen 634 00:34:44,920 --> 00:34:48,200 Speaker 1: some journalists out there say that Sony should at least 635 00:34:48,239 --> 00:34:52,359 Speaker 1: actually offer an apology to users. Uh, there's a lot 636 00:34:52,400 --> 00:34:55,480 Speaker 1: of we regret that this information was stolen, but not 637 00:34:55,520 --> 00:34:58,839 Speaker 1: an outright we're sorry, right, and that we're sorry might 638 00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:02,279 Speaker 1: go a long way. I'm not or what Sony's thought, 639 00:35:02,400 --> 00:35:04,800 Speaker 1: what the the executives at Sonny, what their thought processes. 640 00:35:04,840 --> 00:35:07,040 Speaker 1: I know that if I were an executive at Sony, 641 00:35:07,280 --> 00:35:10,560 Speaker 1: I would probably if I were not issuing an apology, 642 00:35:10,600 --> 00:35:14,160 Speaker 1: it would probably be because in my mind, that would 643 00:35:14,200 --> 00:35:18,480 Speaker 1: be accepting even more responsibility for the breach, and there 644 00:35:18,640 --> 00:35:22,480 Speaker 1: that might in turn look bad to shareholders because we 645 00:35:22,480 --> 00:35:25,600 Speaker 1: have to remember that for companies, they have multiple kinds 646 00:35:25,600 --> 00:35:29,840 Speaker 1: of customers. Right, there's the customer like I mean myself, 647 00:35:29,880 --> 00:35:34,080 Speaker 1: you know, or Chris there. We're customers of various companies 648 00:35:34,200 --> 00:35:37,799 Speaker 1: where you know, we're purchasing goods or services. But then 649 00:35:37,880 --> 00:35:40,920 Speaker 1: there are customers like the shareholders who own a stake 650 00:35:41,000 --> 00:35:44,360 Speaker 1: within that company and to serve them, you know, you 651 00:35:44,400 --> 00:35:48,400 Speaker 1: have this delicate balancing act. There's only so much responsibility 652 00:35:48,440 --> 00:35:51,040 Speaker 1: you're going to be able to lay claim to without 653 00:35:51,440 --> 00:35:54,200 Speaker 1: making the shareholders say, you know, maybe this isn't the 654 00:35:54,280 --> 00:35:59,120 Speaker 1: right company for me to invest in. So yeah, it's um, 655 00:35:59,120 --> 00:36:02,240 Speaker 1: it's a dirty world there. It's a dirty, dirty world 656 00:36:02,280 --> 00:36:05,840 Speaker 1: out there in the in the financial sector. So uh, guys, 657 00:36:06,160 --> 00:36:09,279 Speaker 1: be careful with your personal information. You may need to 658 00:36:09,360 --> 00:36:12,359 Speaker 1: keep an eye on your accounts. Like we said, change 659 00:36:12,360 --> 00:36:15,040 Speaker 1: your password if you're using the same password everywhere. Really 660 00:36:15,360 --> 00:36:17,759 Speaker 1: try to consider using multiple passwords. I know it's a 661 00:36:17,760 --> 00:36:20,839 Speaker 1: pain in the butt, but it it it death does 662 00:36:20,880 --> 00:36:23,720 Speaker 1: pay off. I mean, it's it's much better than finding 663 00:36:23,760 --> 00:36:27,040 Speaker 1: out that all of your accounts have been compromised. Um, 664 00:36:27,080 --> 00:36:29,360 Speaker 1: and yeah, just be careful and we hope that the 665 00:36:29,400 --> 00:36:33,200 Speaker 1: PSN system is back running by the time this podcast 666 00:36:33,200 --> 00:36:35,560 Speaker 1: goes live and that everyone's having fun with Portal Too. 667 00:36:36,760 --> 00:36:38,960 Speaker 1: That was a big bummer. Portal Too launched, has this 668 00:36:39,080 --> 00:36:44,960 Speaker 1: awesome online gaming component and then the network goes down. Yikes. 669 00:36:45,920 --> 00:36:49,920 Speaker 1: So I'm just gonna go and plan my xbox alright, guys, Well, 670 00:36:49,960 --> 00:36:53,560 Speaker 1: if you want to know about other news stories within 671 00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:55,400 Speaker 1: the tech world, you'd kind of like to hear some 672 00:36:55,400 --> 00:36:58,080 Speaker 1: more context around it, or you just have a particular 673 00:36:58,120 --> 00:37:00,120 Speaker 1: subject do you think that we should tackle Let us know. Oh, 674 00:37:00,560 --> 00:37:03,520 Speaker 1: you can contact us on Facebook and Twitter. That handle 675 00:37:03,640 --> 00:37:06,439 Speaker 1: is tech Stuff h s W. Or you can send 676 00:37:06,480 --> 00:37:09,520 Speaker 1: us an email that addresses tech stuff at how stuff 677 00:37:09,520 --> 00:37:11,279 Speaker 1: worth dot com and Chris and I will talk to 678 00:37:11,280 --> 00:37:20,840 Speaker 1: you again really soon. Breaking news everyone, So this is 679 00:37:20,880 --> 00:37:23,920 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland, just coming back with some stuff that's developed 680 00:37:23,920 --> 00:37:28,680 Speaker 1: since we recorded this podcast. Actually lots happened. First of all, 681 00:37:28,719 --> 00:37:30,759 Speaker 1: the problem was bigger than anyone thought it was at 682 00:37:30,800 --> 00:37:34,440 Speaker 1: the time. The Sony online entertainment accounts were also compromised, 683 00:37:34,440 --> 00:37:37,960 Speaker 1: which added another million or so accounts to the seventy 684 00:37:38,040 --> 00:37:40,840 Speaker 1: to seventy seven million accounts that have been compromised, So 685 00:37:40,920 --> 00:37:43,600 Speaker 1: that makes about a hundred million accounts total. Of course, 686 00:37:43,600 --> 00:37:46,680 Speaker 1: there's probably some overlap there, so that was a big problem. 687 00:37:47,280 --> 00:37:50,759 Speaker 1: Then around the beginning of May, Sony said that they 688 00:37:50,800 --> 00:37:54,200 Speaker 1: were going to roll out an identity theft protection program 689 00:37:54,239 --> 00:37:58,240 Speaker 1: to all ps N and Curiosity customers, which would involve 690 00:37:59,080 --> 00:38:03,200 Speaker 1: having a a year long program that would allow this 691 00:38:03,440 --> 00:38:07,040 Speaker 1: company called all Clear i D Actually that's a program 692 00:38:07,120 --> 00:38:11,680 Speaker 1: name to cyber monitor your information and if your information 693 00:38:11,719 --> 00:38:14,279 Speaker 1: was being used for nefarious purposes, they would alert you 694 00:38:14,320 --> 00:38:18,239 Speaker 1: to it. You could also have some ready access to 695 00:38:18,480 --> 00:38:23,000 Speaker 1: private investigators as well as some identity restoration specialists to 696 00:38:23,080 --> 00:38:25,640 Speaker 1: try and fix things once they go wrong, and there 697 00:38:25,640 --> 00:38:28,920 Speaker 1: would be a one million dollar identity theft insurance policy 698 00:38:29,360 --> 00:38:34,240 Speaker 1: on all accounts and this was complimentary. Uh PSN players 699 00:38:34,280 --> 00:38:36,759 Speaker 1: would have to enroll in the program, but it was 700 00:38:36,800 --> 00:38:41,759 Speaker 1: completely free. Then a little later in May, Sony announced 701 00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:46,040 Speaker 1: that the new ps N rollout was going to take place. 702 00:38:46,040 --> 00:38:49,840 Speaker 1: This around May fourteen, and that at this point you 703 00:38:49,840 --> 00:38:55,080 Speaker 1: would start to see restored services in online play, online video, 704 00:38:55,120 --> 00:38:58,040 Speaker 1: online music. All of these services were starting to come back, 705 00:38:58,080 --> 00:39:01,400 Speaker 1: not everything under the PSN network. Sony said that that 706 00:39:01,480 --> 00:39:04,560 Speaker 1: stuff would be rolled out by the end of May, 707 00:39:04,600 --> 00:39:07,360 Speaker 1: but we'd at least start to see some of the 708 00:39:07,360 --> 00:39:10,160 Speaker 1: the service return, and sure enough, it started to get 709 00:39:10,239 --> 00:39:14,880 Speaker 1: rolled out across North America. So then Sony announced a 710 00:39:14,880 --> 00:39:18,560 Speaker 1: welcome back program for North American customers. Uh P S 711 00:39:18,600 --> 00:39:21,399 Speaker 1: three owners would be allowed to select two titles from 712 00:39:21,400 --> 00:39:26,319 Speaker 1: the following Dead Nation, Infamous, Little Big Planet, Superstar, Dust 713 00:39:26,440 --> 00:39:29,480 Speaker 1: h D and wipe Out the HD plus Fury. Now 714 00:39:29,520 --> 00:39:32,879 Speaker 1: PSP owners would be able to select two titles from 715 00:39:32,880 --> 00:39:37,839 Speaker 1: the following Little Big Planet, moder Nation, Racers, Pursuit, Force Kill, 716 00:39:37,960 --> 00:39:42,480 Speaker 1: Zone Liberation, and that this offer would last for thirty days. 717 00:39:42,600 --> 00:39:47,759 Speaker 1: UH since the PSN UH service was restored and it 718 00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:49,800 Speaker 1: was completely free and you get to keep the games 719 00:39:49,840 --> 00:39:54,160 Speaker 1: forever UH the you would also get a thirty day 720 00:39:54,280 --> 00:39:58,040 Speaker 1: ps N Plus membership if you were not a PSN 721 00:39:58,080 --> 00:40:01,560 Speaker 1: Plus member before. If you were a ps N Plus member, 722 00:40:01,880 --> 00:40:05,160 Speaker 1: you got an extra sixty days free of that service. 723 00:40:05,560 --> 00:40:07,760 Speaker 1: So Sony was really trying to do a lot to 724 00:40:07,800 --> 00:40:11,680 Speaker 1: apologize and make up for the lost service during the 725 00:40:11,719 --> 00:40:19,719 Speaker 1: whole hacking incident. However, on May seventeen, Nilivia website reported 726 00:40:19,760 --> 00:40:23,080 Speaker 1: that there's a possible problem with sony solution. Now. Part 727 00:40:23,080 --> 00:40:25,480 Speaker 1: of that solution was that Sony wanted everyone to go 728 00:40:25,560 --> 00:40:28,719 Speaker 1: in and reset their passwords for their accounts to make 729 00:40:28,760 --> 00:40:32,760 Speaker 1: them safe. But Nilivia reported that there was a nasty 730 00:40:32,840 --> 00:40:36,280 Speaker 1: hack going around that would allow hackers who had access 731 00:40:36,320 --> 00:40:39,440 Speaker 1: to your email and your date of birth to reset 732 00:40:39,480 --> 00:40:44,000 Speaker 1: your password for you, thus effectively stealing your PSN account, 733 00:40:44,640 --> 00:40:48,040 Speaker 1: and they they had some detailed information about this that 734 00:40:48,080 --> 00:40:51,279 Speaker 1: they later went back and removed and dumbed down so 735 00:40:51,320 --> 00:40:55,560 Speaker 1: that to to help cut back on actual stiff thefts. 736 00:40:56,360 --> 00:40:58,279 Speaker 1: They did point out that if the hackers did not 737 00:40:58,440 --> 00:41:00,920 Speaker 1: have your email or date of birth, could not perform 738 00:41:01,040 --> 00:41:03,160 Speaker 1: this hack, but since that information was hacked in the 739 00:41:03,280 --> 00:41:06,920 Speaker 1: initial attack on Sony, there's a good bet that a 740 00:41:07,000 --> 00:41:09,280 Speaker 1: lot of hackers out there had access to that information. 741 00:41:09,840 --> 00:41:13,960 Speaker 1: So what Nilvia suggests is that people who are PSN 742 00:41:14,760 --> 00:41:17,960 Speaker 1: users go in and change their email address, create a 743 00:41:18,040 --> 00:41:22,040 Speaker 1: new email address just for the PSN network, and use 744 00:41:22,120 --> 00:41:26,280 Speaker 1: that update their information through PSN so that the hackers 745 00:41:26,400 --> 00:41:28,719 Speaker 1: would not have the right email address and could not 746 00:41:29,000 --> 00:41:32,640 Speaker 1: steal your account. Meanwhile, Sony actually took down the web 747 00:41:32,760 --> 00:41:37,279 Speaker 1: based service to change your password so that hackers could 748 00:41:37,320 --> 00:41:40,920 Speaker 1: not access that and and and change it for you. 749 00:41:41,719 --> 00:41:45,240 Speaker 1: So it's still a big mess. Even at the recording 750 00:41:45,320 --> 00:41:49,359 Speaker 1: of this update, Sony has not yet returned that web 751 00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:53,960 Speaker 1: based system to reset your password to full service, so 752 00:41:54,920 --> 00:41:57,359 Speaker 1: we'll keep an eye on it see if things develop further. 753 00:41:58,160 --> 00:42:00,879 Speaker 1: This has just been an enormous headache for Sony. They've 754 00:42:00,880 --> 00:42:03,080 Speaker 1: been trying to do the right thing, trying to to 755 00:42:03,239 --> 00:42:06,920 Speaker 1: make it up to users, but it's definitely a blow 756 00:42:07,160 --> 00:42:12,600 Speaker 1: against online security in general, identity, theft fears, all of 757 00:42:12,719 --> 00:42:15,760 Speaker 1: that has really taken a big hit as a result 758 00:42:15,800 --> 00:42:17,920 Speaker 1: of this hacking program. We'll keep an eye on it, 759 00:42:18,040 --> 00:42:22,480 Speaker 1: will update anything that happens from this point forward. Well, 760 00:42:22,600 --> 00:42:24,319 Speaker 1: you can check it out on the blogs, you can 761 00:42:24,400 --> 00:42:26,520 Speaker 1: check it out on our Facebook and Twitter feeds, and 762 00:42:26,640 --> 00:42:29,520 Speaker 1: we may even do another podcast about a similar topic 763 00:42:29,600 --> 00:42:31,640 Speaker 1: in the future, just because this has become such a 764 00:42:31,800 --> 00:42:34,960 Speaker 1: huge story. So thanks a lot, guys, and we'll talk 765 00:42:34,960 --> 00:42:38,960 Speaker 1: to you again soon for more on this and thousands 766 00:42:39,040 --> 00:42:41,239 Speaker 1: of other topics. Is it how stuff works dot com. 767 00:42:41,480 --> 00:42:44,120 Speaker 1: So learn more about the podcast, click on the podcast 768 00:42:44,320 --> 00:42:47,840 Speaker 1: icon in the upper right corner of our homepage. The 769 00:42:47,920 --> 00:42:50,880 Speaker 1: House Stuff Works iPhone app has arrived. Download it today 770 00:42:51,160 --> 00:42:58,400 Speaker 1: on iTunes. Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand 771 00:42:58,440 --> 00:43:00,440 Speaker 1: twelve camera. It's ready, are you