WEBVTT - Trump's Impact on SCOTUS & Facebook Arguments

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<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg Law with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>There's been a lot of speculation that in a second term,

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<v Speaker 1>Donald Trump could create a Supreme Court with a Trump

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<v Speaker 1>appointed majority that could serve for decades. After all, Trump

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<v Speaker 1>appointed three Supreme Court justices in his first term that

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<v Speaker 1>gave the Court a super conservative majority. Joining me is

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<v Speaker 1>constitutional law expert David super, a professor at Georgetown Law. David,

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<v Speaker 1>There's a lot of speculation that one or two of

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<v Speaker 1>the oldest justices, the super conservatives actually seventy six year

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<v Speaker 1>old Clarence Thomas and seventy four year old Samuel Alito,

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<v Speaker 1>could retire and give Trump a chance to put younger

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<v Speaker 1>conservatives on the court. Do you think that's likely.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm not sure that it is. They both show every

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<v Speaker 2>sign of their jobs. Progressives don't like how they're doing

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<v Speaker 2>their jobs, but their opinions remain sharp. When they choose

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<v Speaker 2>to speak from the bench, they make sense, So I

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<v Speaker 2>can certainly imagine them feeling like they want to keep

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<v Speaker 2>doing this well.

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<v Speaker 1>Thomas, The New York Times reported that he once told

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<v Speaker 1>a former clerk that he intended to stay on the

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<v Speaker 1>bench until twenty thirty four. The liberals made my life

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<v Speaker 1>miserable for forty three years, and I'm going to make

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<v Speaker 1>their lives miserable for forty three years. So we have

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<v Speaker 1>some time yet before he considers retiring, I suppose. On

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<v Speaker 1>the liberal side, there have also been renewed calls for

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<v Speaker 1>seventy year old Justice Sonya Soto Mayord to retire before

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<v Speaker 1>January so President Biden and the Democratic controlled Senate can

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<v Speaker 1>quickly confirm a successor. I don't know about quickly, but

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<v Speaker 1>that whole scenario seems unlikely to me.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I can't imagine that she would do that, and

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<v Speaker 2>I think it would be a foolish move. Try. There

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<v Speaker 2>was talk about their good Marshal retiring after Jimmy Carter

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<v Speaker 2>lost for reelection, and I think cooler heads prevailed there

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<v Speaker 2>and recognized that that couldn't be done in a snap. Now.

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<v Speaker 2>I can't imagine that Senator Mansion or Senator Cinema would

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<v Speaker 2>be okay with this sort of a process at this point,

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<v Speaker 2>and without them you can't do anything.

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<v Speaker 1>As far as future judicial appointments, there have been reports

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<v Speaker 1>that Trump complained about his first term appointees being too

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<v Speaker 1>independent and not being loyal enough to him, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>reportedly has fallen out with the Federalist Society, which basically

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<v Speaker 1>chose his judicial appointments during his first term. So what

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<v Speaker 1>do you expect from Trump as far as future judicial appointments.

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<v Speaker 2>I think he's not especially focused personally on the courts.

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<v Speaker 2>He's not a lawyer. He's never shown a lot of

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<v Speaker 2>interest in it. So my suspicion is that he will

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<v Speaker 2>go back to the federal of Society, perhaps not give

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<v Speaker 2>them as celebrated and formal a role in the process,

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<v Speaker 2>but that we will basically be getting more said sock judges.

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<v Speaker 1>And more ideologues. It seems like even the judges that

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<v Speaker 1>he did appoint were ideologues more than respected jurists.

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<v Speaker 2>He appointed arrange some of his appointments are splendid judges,

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<v Speaker 2>some of them are skilled ideologs, and some of them

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<v Speaker 2>are rather lost. I'm guessing the new round rule will

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<v Speaker 2>include some in each of those piles.

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<v Speaker 1>Now, the Biden administration has taken positions in certain cases

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<v Speaker 1>before the Supreme Court, and we can anticipate that the

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<v Speaker 1>Trump administration has opposing views and will want to back

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<v Speaker 1>out of those positions. How often does it happen that

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<v Speaker 1>new administration changes positions in cases before the Court.

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<v Speaker 2>It's become more more and more frequent over time. Once

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<v Speaker 2>upon a time, it was considered shocking enough that the

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<v Speaker 2>Supreme Court would appoint a lawyer to argue the case

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<v Speaker 2>as friend of the Court representing the position of the

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<v Speaker 2>prior administration. These days, there's less of that. I think

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<v Speaker 2>it is understood by the justices that this is what

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<v Speaker 2>happens in a society where views on law have become

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<v Speaker 2>very polarized.

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<v Speaker 1>So now some areas where there might be a change.

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<v Speaker 1>Transgender rights is probably one of them. Now the transgender

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<v Speaker 1>rights case arguments are scheduled for December fourth, so well

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<v Speaker 1>before inauguration day. I mean, what happens in a.

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<v Speaker 2>Case like that, Well, the Trump administration has a couple

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<v Speaker 2>of options. One is that they can ask the court

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<v Speaker 2>to reopen it to allow supplemental briefing. Whether the Court

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<v Speaker 2>would be inclined to slow itself down to allow that

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<v Speaker 2>is debatable. Second, they can simply declare that their allegiance

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<v Speaker 2>are on the other side and rely on the briefs

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<v Speaker 2>that we're opposing what the Biden administration advocated. They can

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<v Speaker 2>also express the intent to take executive action to reverse

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<v Speaker 2>federal regulations, but that can't be done instantly. The court

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<v Speaker 2>could decide the case and let them take their own

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<v Speaker 2>action through due course, or the court could suspend the

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<v Speaker 2>case to give them time to act. Or the court

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<v Speaker 2>could decide not to issue a ruling because it expects

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<v Speaker 2>the issue to go away.

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<v Speaker 1>The federal government already argued a case over ghost guns

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<v Speaker 1>to keep regulations for ghost guns on the books, so

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<v Speaker 1>that's already been argued, fully briefed, and argued. Now it's

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<v Speaker 1>anticipated that the Trump administration might oppose those regulations. What

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<v Speaker 1>happens there? Do they just pull their regulations or.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, you can't just pull the regulation. The Administrative Procedure

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<v Speaker 2>Act and the Supreme Court have been very clear that

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<v Speaker 2>you have to go through the same procedure to remove

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<v Speaker 2>regulations that you did to create them. So it would

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<v Speaker 2>take a certain amount of time, probably a year, even

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<v Speaker 2>if they move very quickly to get rid of those regulations.

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<v Speaker 2>This is a case where the conservative legal agenda has

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<v Speaker 2>a somewhat ironic impact in that a year ago, the

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<v Speaker 2>administration changing its views on how the statute should be

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<v Speaker 2>interpreted would be entitled a considerable weight. But today, because

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<v Speaker 2>the Supreme Court got rid of Chevron. The administration is

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<v Speaker 2>not entiled to any difference anyway. So one can well

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<v Speaker 2>imagine the Court saying, we really don't care if you've

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<v Speaker 2>changed your position, really.

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<v Speaker 1>Just ignoring Trump, the Trump administration. I mean, has the

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<v Speaker 1>Court done that before.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, we're very early in the post Chevron world. There

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<v Speaker 2>always was deference. The administration's position mattered a great deal.

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<v Speaker 2>But the Court went at great lengths last spring to

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<v Speaker 2>tell us that Congress did not intend administration views to

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<v Speaker 2>get any special weight in interpreting laws. And on that basis,

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<v Speaker 2>one could well imagine the Court simply going ahead and

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<v Speaker 2>deciding the case and saying that the administration wants to

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<v Speaker 2>go through the procedures to remove the regulations, they're free

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<v Speaker 2>to do so. But what the administration might or might

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<v Speaker 2>not try to do or succeed in doing in the

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<v Speaker 2>future doesn't stop the Court from deciding the case in

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<v Speaker 2>front of it.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I'm wondering if, as you mentioned, we saw the

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<v Speaker 1>Chevron doctrine being thrown out and the Court's conservatives have

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<v Speaker 1>been basically reining in federal agencies, do you think that

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<v Speaker 1>we'll still see that kind of aggressive attack on regulatory

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<v Speaker 1>agencies by the Court in a Trump administration which may

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<v Speaker 1>be using agencies to affect some of these broad changes.

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<v Speaker 2>I think different justices will have a different view. Chief

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<v Speaker 2>Justice Roberts has very little patients for sloppy, incompetent agency work,

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<v Speaker 2>whichever ideology the agency has, and when presented with dishonest

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<v Speaker 2>or incompetent agency actions in the first Trump administration, did

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<v Speaker 2>not hesitate to strike it down, So I would expect

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<v Speaker 2>he would be continued inclined to look closely at agencies

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<v Speaker 2>and whether they're dotting their eyes and crossing their t's.

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<v Speaker 2>Some of the other justices probably will feel that a

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<v Speaker 2>lower level of scrutiny should be applied to deregulatory actions

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<v Speaker 2>than was applied to regulatory actions.

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<v Speaker 1>Some disputes coming up involve the EPA whether fights over

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<v Speaker 1>certain clean air regulations can be heard by circuit courts.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, what happens there. Does the Trump administration just

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<v Speaker 1>pull those cases or how would they handle.

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<v Speaker 2>Those That's harder to know because that's an issue of

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<v Speaker 2>process that has implications that go far beyond the current

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<v Speaker 2>or next administrations. So one could imagine that the Trump administration,

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<v Speaker 2>although its view on the ultimate merits, may be different,

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<v Speaker 2>might not feel that that's a high priority to expend

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<v Speaker 2>its credibility with the Court by switching positions, and may

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<v Speaker 2>see some benefit to staying out of it or not

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<v Speaker 2>disrupting what the Biden administration did.

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<v Speaker 1>Have you heard any rumors about who might be the

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<v Speaker 1>solicitor General?

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<v Speaker 2>I have not.

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<v Speaker 1>I have not either, and I can't believe that because

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<v Speaker 1>I've heard rumors about many other high level positions that

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<v Speaker 1>will have to be filled.

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<v Speaker 2>I think that the new administration is going to want

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<v Speaker 2>someone competent and credible, and so what you hear, at

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<v Speaker 2>least what I hear about various other positions are people

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<v Speaker 2>who may not be especially skilled or especially respected, but

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<v Speaker 2>are very close with Trump circles and with the former president.

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<v Speaker 2>I would expect the new solicitor General would be an

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<v Speaker 2>extremely conservative lawyer, but not necessarily someone who Trump knows.

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<v Speaker 1>It's always a pleasure to talk to you, David, Thanks

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<v Speaker 1>so much for being on the show. That's Professor David

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<v Speaker 1>super of Georgetown Law. Metta's Facebook is trying to get

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<v Speaker 1>out of a shareholder lawsuit accusing it of fraud for

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<v Speaker 1>misleading investors about a known risk from the massive Cambridge

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<v Speaker 1>Analytica data breach. In twenty fifteen, the justices seemed divided

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<v Speaker 1>about how much information public companies must disclose about potential

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<v Speaker 1>investment risks, including past events. It led to hypotheticals from

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<v Speaker 1>Chief Justice John Roberts slip and fall case to Justice

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<v Speaker 1>Samuel Alito's trash from space.

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<v Speaker 3>For example, if you're leaving my house and I say

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<v Speaker 3>you might slip on the steps, you wouldn't say, well,

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<v Speaker 3>that's never happened before. Your inference would be that has happened,

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<v Speaker 3>and that's why I'm giving you the warning. And if

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<v Speaker 3>there was a fire and it was caused by the

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<v Speaker 3>fact that the factory was hit by a piece of

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<v Speaker 3>space junk that fell out of the sky, the fact

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<v Speaker 3>that that happened.

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<v Speaker 2>Doesn't really tell you much more about the probability that

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<v Speaker 2>you're going to have another fire based on objects falling

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<v Speaker 2>out of space.

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<v Speaker 1>Joining me is securities law expert James Park, a professor

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<v Speaker 1>at UCLA Law School, Jim tell Us about the shareholder's

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<v Speaker 1>lawsuit at the heart of this case.

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<v Speaker 3>It's a securities class action brought under sec Rule ten

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<v Speaker 3>B five, which typically applies to misrepresentations material misrepresentations made

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<v Speaker 3>by companies that relate to their securities. And so this

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<v Speaker 3>is a lawsuit class action brought on behalf of investors

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<v Speaker 3>of Facebook. Now it's meta course, but Facebook, as with

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<v Speaker 3>other public companies, issues periodic disclosures the form ten K

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<v Speaker 3>on a yearly basis. The ten ques, and these sec

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<v Speaker 3>disclosures typically have a lot of disclosures about risk which

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<v Speaker 3>are required by the SEC And so the idea behind

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<v Speaker 3>these risk disclosures is that your warning investors, this is

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<v Speaker 3>the risk of investing in Facebook stock. And one of

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<v Speaker 3>those risk disclosures basically said that there could be a

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<v Speaker 3>risk of unauthorized access to user data that could damage Facebook.

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<v Speaker 3>That was essentially what the risk is closure said. And

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<v Speaker 3>the reason why the planiffs are saying this is maturely

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<v Speaker 3>misleading is that at the time Facebook made this statement,

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<v Speaker 3>it knew about a fairly large breach by a political

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<v Speaker 3>consulting firm called Cambridge Analytica of user data. And so

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<v Speaker 3>what the plantiffs are arguing is that you said that

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<v Speaker 3>unauthorized access could be a risk when you knew there

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<v Speaker 3>was a very significant unauthorized access at the time you

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<v Speaker 3>issued that risk disclosure. That's essentially what the securities class

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<v Speaker 3>action is dependent on.

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<v Speaker 1>Outside of the validity of the issues here. The FTC's

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<v Speaker 1>investigation led to this record five billion dollars civil penalty

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<v Speaker 1>against Facebook, and Facebook reached a two hundred and seventy

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<v Speaker 1>five million dollar class action settlement with users over the

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<v Speaker 1>privacy breach last year. Why do you think this hasn't

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<v Speaker 1>been settled.

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<v Speaker 3>It's a good question, and I think that maybe one

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<v Speaker 3>reason is that Facebook is often facing securities class actions

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<v Speaker 3>and it does not want to be perceived as a

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<v Speaker 3>company that settled lawsuits that arise out of disclosure violations.

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<v Speaker 3>They may believe they have a strong case with respect

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<v Speaker 3>to this particular allegation. Their argument's not a material misstatement

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<v Speaker 3>because you know, there's a risk of this happening. And

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<v Speaker 3>the argument, as I understand it, is that, Okay, they

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<v Speaker 3>knew that there was a breach, they didn't know how

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<v Speaker 3>big the impact would be on a huge company like Facebook,

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<v Speaker 3>And you know, I think that's essentially the argument is that, well,

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<v Speaker 3>we knew that there had been a breach, but we

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<v Speaker 3>didn't know it was going to result in this later

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<v Speaker 3>penalty and all this reputational harm, and so our disclosure

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<v Speaker 3>that there's this risk that and unauthorized actions could affect

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<v Speaker 3>our market value was mostly accurate according to Facebook, and

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<v Speaker 3>so I think they believe they have a good case here.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's talk about the argument. And there were a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of strange hypotheticals thrown around. What were the concerns

0:15:15.840 --> 0:15:16.800
<v Speaker 1>of the justices?

0:15:17.240 --> 0:15:20.880
<v Speaker 3>I think one concern is that companies issue a lot

0:15:20.920 --> 0:15:25.360
<v Speaker 3>of risk disclosures about many different things, and some of

0:15:25.360 --> 0:15:29.200
<v Speaker 3>those things actually happen, you know, and so you might say, Okay,

0:15:29.200 --> 0:15:34.440
<v Speaker 3>there's a risk of bad publicity, just generally media coverage,

0:15:34.480 --> 0:15:36.520
<v Speaker 3>and you know, at the same time you issue this,

0:15:36.600 --> 0:15:38.960
<v Speaker 3>there may be a lot of various events that are

0:15:39.120 --> 0:15:42.400
<v Speaker 3>putting you in a bad life. And so I think,

0:15:42.720 --> 0:15:45.600
<v Speaker 3>you know, one of the concerns that the justices are

0:15:45.720 --> 0:15:50.200
<v Speaker 3>grappling with is that if we say there's liability in

0:15:50.240 --> 0:15:54.040
<v Speaker 3>this case, so that mean that for almost every type

0:15:54.040 --> 0:15:58.320
<v Speaker 3>of risk disclosure that is being issued, that a lawsuit

0:15:58.360 --> 0:16:01.720
<v Speaker 3>could come up if you phrase things in the wrong way,

0:16:01.920 --> 0:16:05.920
<v Speaker 3>if you know, there's something that happens relating to that risk,

0:16:06.120 --> 0:16:09.000
<v Speaker 3>and so there may be too much liability there, and

0:16:09.120 --> 0:16:11.320
<v Speaker 3>you know the effect of that may be that companies

0:16:11.360 --> 0:16:15.560
<v Speaker 3>will just issue very very vague risk disclosures that don't

0:16:15.560 --> 0:16:19.640
<v Speaker 3>say anything. They may not issue risk disclosures at all. Right,

0:16:19.720 --> 0:16:23.479
<v Speaker 3>if I make you liable for a misleading risk disclosure,

0:16:24.280 --> 0:16:27.400
<v Speaker 3>then maybe I won't issue that risk disclosure at all

0:16:27.480 --> 0:16:29.960
<v Speaker 3>in the future. I think that's a concern, and I

0:16:29.960 --> 0:16:32.440
<v Speaker 3>think they're also just concerned that the rule seems to

0:16:32.480 --> 0:16:37.280
<v Speaker 3>be unclear here and it's tough for companies to navigate.

0:16:37.520 --> 0:16:39.440
<v Speaker 3>You know, what you have to disclose and when you

0:16:39.480 --> 0:16:42.240
<v Speaker 3>have to disclose it. And you know, there's a concern

0:16:42.360 --> 0:16:44.840
<v Speaker 3>here that we don't want to create a general duty

0:16:44.880 --> 0:16:50.120
<v Speaker 3>to update everything in these disclosures, because there's so much

0:16:50.280 --> 0:16:54.280
<v Speaker 3>in any any SEC disclosure that it may be impossible

0:16:54.360 --> 0:17:00.160
<v Speaker 3>to you know, constantly update every single aspect of it.

0:17:00.200 --> 0:17:04.320
<v Speaker 1>Is the question how much to disclose of the past

0:17:04.920 --> 0:17:07.480
<v Speaker 1>in the present, you know, if you don't think the

0:17:07.520 --> 0:17:10.240
<v Speaker 1>past is going to affect the future. I mean, what's

0:17:10.240 --> 0:17:11.920
<v Speaker 1>the exact issue.

0:17:12.280 --> 0:17:15.400
<v Speaker 3>I think what Facebook would say is these are primarily

0:17:15.920 --> 0:17:19.479
<v Speaker 3>forward looking statements. They are predictions, and so they're not

0:17:19.520 --> 0:17:24.240
<v Speaker 3>really meant to guarantee every single thing about past event.

0:17:24.480 --> 0:17:28.719
<v Speaker 3>I think that they're saying that we're making no guarantee

0:17:28.760 --> 0:17:33.480
<v Speaker 3>that there has been no unauthorized access to user accounts.

0:17:33.520 --> 0:17:35.479
<v Speaker 3>And in fact, I think they would say, of course,

0:17:36.160 --> 0:17:40.800
<v Speaker 3>of course there have been some abuses of Facebook privacy policies,

0:17:40.880 --> 0:17:43.840
<v Speaker 3>and everyone would know that at the time the risk

0:17:43.880 --> 0:17:47.240
<v Speaker 3>disclosure had been made. And I think Facebook is making

0:17:47.280 --> 0:17:50.680
<v Speaker 3>a fairly subtle argument here, which was to say that

0:17:51.520 --> 0:17:55.359
<v Speaker 3>it's true that we knew that there was an unauthorized

0:17:55.560 --> 0:17:59.400
<v Speaker 3>access by Cambridge Analytica. What we didn't know is that

0:17:59.520 --> 0:18:03.280
<v Speaker 3>it would affect our business so much. We had no

0:18:03.400 --> 0:18:07.480
<v Speaker 3>way of knowing that, and essentially we have no way

0:18:07.480 --> 0:18:12.480
<v Speaker 3>of essentially predicting the future. And essentially this risk disclosure,

0:18:12.560 --> 0:18:16.159
<v Speaker 3>we disclosed this and we didn't know. We just didn't

0:18:16.200 --> 0:18:20.320
<v Speaker 3>know that there was an event that would eventually cause

0:18:20.320 --> 0:18:25.160
<v Speaker 3>significant economic damage to Facebook. We made no implicit representation

0:18:25.760 --> 0:18:28.560
<v Speaker 3>about the past in this particular disclosure. It's more of

0:18:28.600 --> 0:18:30.360
<v Speaker 3>a forward looking disclosure.

0:18:30.440 --> 0:18:34.400
<v Speaker 1>In this case a hypothetical from Justice Kagan. A lot

0:18:34.440 --> 0:18:37.120
<v Speaker 1>of the justices kept coming back to it, and that

0:18:37.400 --> 0:18:41.800
<v Speaker 1>is a company discloses a risk of fire but doesn't

0:18:41.840 --> 0:18:44.920
<v Speaker 1>disclose that there had recently been a fire that destroyed

0:18:44.960 --> 0:18:46.640
<v Speaker 1>fifty percent of the plant.

0:18:47.280 --> 0:18:50.400
<v Speaker 3>Yes, that's a great hypothetical, and I think it pushes

0:18:50.480 --> 0:18:54.280
<v Speaker 3>back upon sort of Facebook statement that these statements do

0:18:54.359 --> 0:19:00.400
<v Speaker 3>not make implicit representations about past events, because implicit in

0:19:00.480 --> 0:19:03.280
<v Speaker 3>the risk of a fire in a building is that

0:19:03.320 --> 0:19:06.760
<v Speaker 3>the building is still there. I think that's one implicit recognition,

0:19:06.880 --> 0:19:09.760
<v Speaker 3>and I think there's also a recognition that there's not

0:19:09.880 --> 0:19:13.320
<v Speaker 3>a known high risk of the building burning down. And

0:19:13.440 --> 0:19:16.520
<v Speaker 3>I think that investors will want to know if there's

0:19:16.560 --> 0:19:20.280
<v Speaker 3>a very very high risk that the building is so

0:19:20.440 --> 0:19:24.439
<v Speaker 3>unsafe that we know it's very likely that it would

0:19:24.760 --> 0:19:28.520
<v Speaker 3>burn down. What she's arguing here is that, you know,

0:19:28.720 --> 0:19:32.040
<v Speaker 3>we should be requiring companies when they make these risk

0:19:32.160 --> 0:19:38.040
<v Speaker 3>disclosures to also speak completely and disclose risks that they

0:19:38.119 --> 0:19:42.320
<v Speaker 3>know about that they can calculate with some reasonable assurance.

0:19:42.560 --> 0:19:46.240
<v Speaker 3>And that's where Justice Kagan may come out at the

0:19:46.320 --> 0:19:46.920
<v Speaker 3>end of the day.

0:19:47.800 --> 0:19:51.639
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned before the regulations, and well, just as Kavanaugh said,

0:19:51.920 --> 0:19:54.960
<v Speaker 1>why can't the SEC just write a rig? Why does

0:19:55.000 --> 0:19:57.399
<v Speaker 1>the judiciary have to walk the plank on this and

0:19:57.440 --> 0:20:00.439
<v Speaker 1>answer the question when the SEC could do it? And

0:20:00.520 --> 0:20:04.040
<v Speaker 1>the Chief Justice and Justice Amy Coney Barrett seem to

0:20:04.080 --> 0:20:06.840
<v Speaker 1>agree with that. I mean, why can't they SEC write

0:20:06.840 --> 0:20:07.480
<v Speaker 1>a regulation?

0:20:08.040 --> 0:20:12.439
<v Speaker 3>They could, but it's difficult to write good regulations, and

0:20:12.520 --> 0:20:16.119
<v Speaker 3>I think that the more general the regulation is, the

0:20:16.240 --> 0:20:19.440
<v Speaker 3>easier it is for the SCC. That's one reason the

0:20:19.480 --> 0:20:24.159
<v Speaker 3>SEC is not adding more specificity. It's also easier though,

0:20:24.280 --> 0:20:28.119
<v Speaker 3>I think for public companies, right, the more specific you

0:20:28.280 --> 0:20:31.720
<v Speaker 3>write the regulations, and you know the company is going

0:20:31.760 --> 0:20:34.320
<v Speaker 3>to have to dig out all of this specific information

0:20:34.440 --> 0:20:38.639
<v Speaker 3>and that could be overly burdensome. And so sometimes corporations

0:20:38.720 --> 0:20:43.880
<v Speaker 3>want fairly vague disclosure requirements that they have some discretion

0:20:44.160 --> 0:20:46.919
<v Speaker 3>to comply with. And that's the whole idea behind principles

0:20:46.920 --> 0:20:50.679
<v Speaker 3>based regulation, which a lot of you know, what you

0:20:50.760 --> 0:20:55.840
<v Speaker 3>might think of as conservative individuals, have advocated for SEC regulation.

0:20:56.600 --> 0:20:59.080
<v Speaker 3>But I think Justice Kavanaugh has a good point, which

0:20:59.119 --> 0:21:01.960
<v Speaker 3>is that you know, if you are leaving this to

0:21:02.280 --> 0:21:06.359
<v Speaker 3>lawsuits to define, then you know courts, which are not

0:21:06.480 --> 0:21:09.320
<v Speaker 3>experts in these matters, have to make these very difficult,

0:21:09.680 --> 0:21:13.880
<v Speaker 3>complicated determinations of what should be disclosed. It also give

0:21:14.240 --> 0:21:18.880
<v Speaker 3>a sense of regulation by enforcement, where lawsuits are being

0:21:19.000 --> 0:21:23.560
<v Speaker 3>used to regulate companies after the fact, and that's a

0:21:23.680 --> 0:21:28.200
<v Speaker 3>running theme about both lawsuits by private litigants as well

0:21:28.240 --> 0:21:32.840
<v Speaker 3>as lawsuits by the Securities and Exchange Commissions. So he

0:21:33.000 --> 0:21:36.320
<v Speaker 3>asked a very good question, but I think that there

0:21:36.359 --> 0:21:39.920
<v Speaker 3>are some pressures that make it difficult for the SEC

0:21:40.040 --> 0:21:45.919
<v Speaker 3>to specify completely what the disclosures does look like. And

0:21:45.960 --> 0:21:48.719
<v Speaker 3>so what we have is a very imperfect system where

0:21:49.359 --> 0:21:53.239
<v Speaker 3>you know, these issues get fleshed out in lawsuits, and

0:21:53.280 --> 0:21:56.680
<v Speaker 3>often the lawsuits are settled, so we never even actually

0:21:56.680 --> 0:22:01.040
<v Speaker 3>resolved what was required. So, you know, the requirements of

0:22:01.119 --> 0:22:05.359
<v Speaker 3>disclosure for public companies, there's not clear guidances. It's a

0:22:05.359 --> 0:22:08.840
<v Speaker 3>lot of discretion, it's a lot of judgment that is

0:22:08.880 --> 0:22:13.480
<v Speaker 3>required in order to craft good disclosures. And I think

0:22:13.520 --> 0:22:18.080
<v Speaker 3>there's you know, some resentment by public corporations that you

0:22:18.200 --> 0:22:22.440
<v Speaker 3>have private enforcers who have a monetary incentive to sue

0:22:22.480 --> 0:22:25.800
<v Speaker 3>whenever they find something wrong in a company's disclosures. And

0:22:26.119 --> 0:22:27.679
<v Speaker 3>you know, you have to pay a lot of money

0:22:27.840 --> 0:22:30.879
<v Speaker 3>sometimes to settle these lawsuits because you don't want to

0:22:30.960 --> 0:22:33.480
<v Speaker 3>risk them going to trial. Now, you know. One point

0:22:33.520 --> 0:22:35.359
<v Speaker 3>I would add, though, is that in addition to this

0:22:35.400 --> 0:22:39.359
<v Speaker 3>private class action, the SEC brought a case against Facebook

0:22:39.480 --> 0:22:44.000
<v Speaker 3>for I believe essentially it's the same disclosure, and they

0:22:44.200 --> 0:22:48.280
<v Speaker 3>alleged that they were materially misleading, and Facebook actually settled

0:22:48.280 --> 0:22:50.840
<v Speaker 3>that case for one hundred million dollars. So this is

0:22:50.880 --> 0:22:54.720
<v Speaker 3>not a lawsuit that was brought only by private planets.

0:22:54.720 --> 0:22:59.359
<v Speaker 3>The SEC also has been asserting and pushing this particular

0:22:59.440 --> 0:23:00.400
<v Speaker 3>theory as well.

0:23:00.440 --> 0:23:03.200
<v Speaker 1>Coming up next, how might the Justice is rule here?

0:23:03.440 --> 0:23:07.280
<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg. I've been talking to Professor James Park

0:23:07.359 --> 0:23:11.560
<v Speaker 1>of UCLA Law School about oral arguments before the Supreme

0:23:11.640 --> 0:23:14.920
<v Speaker 1>Court this week in Facebook's attempt to get out of

0:23:14.960 --> 0:23:19.520
<v Speaker 1>a shareholder lawsuit accusing it of fraud for misleading investors

0:23:19.840 --> 0:23:23.320
<v Speaker 1>about a known risk from the massive Cambridge Analytic data

0:23:23.320 --> 0:23:27.960
<v Speaker 1>breach in twenty fifteen. Something that Justice Gorsech said resonated

0:23:28.000 --> 0:23:32.280
<v Speaker 1>with me. He suggested that reasonable investors were well aware

0:23:32.320 --> 0:23:35.840
<v Speaker 1>of the risk of data breaches at large companies, including

0:23:35.840 --> 0:23:36.880
<v Speaker 1>by foreign governments.

0:23:37.040 --> 0:23:40.040
<v Speaker 3>I think China probably has all of our FBI files,

0:23:40.160 --> 0:23:43.520
<v Speaker 3>you know, I mean, data breaches are part of our

0:23:43.600 --> 0:23:46.960
<v Speaker 3>lives these days. There are data breaches. But I think

0:23:47.000 --> 0:23:49.840
<v Speaker 3>what the plaintiffs would say is that the Cambridge Analytical

0:23:49.960 --> 0:23:55.120
<v Speaker 3>breach was an extraordinary one. I'm involving millions of different customers,

0:23:55.320 --> 0:23:57.879
<v Speaker 3>and you know, I believe the data was used for

0:23:57.960 --> 0:24:03.159
<v Speaker 3>political purposes. And you know, not every data breach results

0:24:03.200 --> 0:24:06.440
<v Speaker 3>in a five billion dollar fine by the Federal Trade Commission.

0:24:06.840 --> 0:24:10.200
<v Speaker 3>And so, you know, certainly we're generally aware there could

0:24:10.280 --> 0:24:13.320
<v Speaker 3>be data breaches, but you could argue the investors assume

0:24:13.720 --> 0:24:17.080
<v Speaker 3>most companies are managing them pretty well and they're not

0:24:17.119 --> 0:24:21.640
<v Speaker 3>going to affect the stock price significantly, but this one did. Now,

0:24:21.840 --> 0:24:24.919
<v Speaker 3>what Facebook is saying, though, is that, you know, we

0:24:25.040 --> 0:24:27.159
<v Speaker 3>knew about the breach at the time we made this

0:24:27.320 --> 0:24:31.080
<v Speaker 3>risk disclosure, but it wasn't quite clear it was going

0:24:31.160 --> 0:24:35.720
<v Speaker 3>to have this big impact. That was still unclear, and

0:24:36.240 --> 0:24:38.840
<v Speaker 3>you know, we warned about that risk, but we didn't know.

0:24:39.119 --> 0:24:42.240
<v Speaker 3>We didn't know that the stock price would be affected

0:24:42.280 --> 0:24:45.399
<v Speaker 3>as much as it ultimately was. When the scandal broke

0:24:45.520 --> 0:24:50.679
<v Speaker 3>more widely and regulators reacted, and that, you know, it

0:24:50.720 --> 0:24:53.920
<v Speaker 3>became something that hurt Facebook's reputation. That aspect of it

0:24:54.200 --> 0:24:57.160
<v Speaker 3>we didn't know at the time the risk disclosure was issued.

0:24:57.960 --> 0:25:00.520
<v Speaker 1>Do you have any feel from the oral organ about

0:25:00.520 --> 0:25:01.440
<v Speaker 1>how they might rule.

0:25:03.119 --> 0:25:06.760
<v Speaker 3>I think it'll be a very fact specific decision. I

0:25:06.800 --> 0:25:12.520
<v Speaker 3>think that the court understands that this is a really,

0:25:12.600 --> 0:25:17.879
<v Speaker 3>really hard issue and the Supreme Court is not qualified

0:25:17.920 --> 0:25:22.520
<v Speaker 3>to write very detailed disclosure rules, and so I think

0:25:22.560 --> 0:25:26.480
<v Speaker 3>they will try to limit the case to its fact.

0:25:26.840 --> 0:25:29.240
<v Speaker 3>It's a tough one. It's really tough to predict which

0:25:29.240 --> 0:25:32.719
<v Speaker 3>way they're going to go. I suspect maybe a majority

0:25:32.840 --> 0:25:36.600
<v Speaker 3>will side with Facebook. You know that this is a

0:25:36.640 --> 0:25:40.679
<v Speaker 3>case where sure they knew there was a breach, but

0:25:40.760 --> 0:25:44.439
<v Speaker 3>they didn't know it would impact the company's business as

0:25:44.520 --> 0:25:48.359
<v Speaker 3>much as it did, and therefore the risk disclosure was

0:25:48.400 --> 0:25:51.359
<v Speaker 3>not materially misleading. Now, you know, if they had known

0:25:51.920 --> 0:25:55.440
<v Speaker 3>about the breach and they knew that it was as

0:25:55.480 --> 0:25:58.439
<v Speaker 3>impactful as it would be, then that would be a

0:25:58.480 --> 0:26:01.520
<v Speaker 3>different story. Now it's possible, though, some of the justices

0:26:01.520 --> 0:26:04.240
<v Speaker 3>will buy the plantif's response, you know, the planets. Basically

0:26:04.280 --> 0:26:07.000
<v Speaker 3>their response is that, Okay, you must have known that,

0:26:07.480 --> 0:26:10.120
<v Speaker 3>given the size of the breach, that it was going

0:26:10.160 --> 0:26:13.000
<v Speaker 3>to really affect your reputation at the time you made

0:26:13.040 --> 0:26:17.240
<v Speaker 3>that statement, and therefore the risk disclosure was misleading. What

0:26:17.320 --> 0:26:21.120
<v Speaker 3>you should have done when you wrote the disclosure was acknowledged, Hey,

0:26:21.160 --> 0:26:26.200
<v Speaker 3>we have this very very unprecedented significant reach of millions

0:26:26.200 --> 0:26:29.399
<v Speaker 3>and millions of users of data. That's the disclosure you

0:26:29.400 --> 0:26:32.359
<v Speaker 3>should have written. Now, that does seem to be kind

0:26:32.359 --> 0:26:35.600
<v Speaker 3>of second guessing from the disclosure with twenty twenty hind

0:26:35.600 --> 0:26:40.320
<v Speaker 3>sight and Facebook would say it's not fair for every

0:26:40.359 --> 0:26:45.160
<v Speaker 3>single little disclosure in one hundred page document to potentially

0:26:45.560 --> 0:26:48.040
<v Speaker 3>be second guests by a planif's attorney who has the

0:26:48.119 --> 0:26:50.919
<v Speaker 3>incentive to question it. But I think it's going to

0:26:50.920 --> 0:26:52.399
<v Speaker 3>be a close one. I think it could be a

0:26:52.440 --> 0:26:54.719
<v Speaker 3>close one, and I think there could be some disagreement.

0:26:54.760 --> 0:26:57.080
<v Speaker 3>But what I am confident of is it's going to

0:26:57.119 --> 0:27:00.280
<v Speaker 3>be a fairly backed specific decision, a.

0:27:00.280 --> 0:27:04.239
<v Speaker 1>Split between the conservatives and the liberals.

0:27:04.320 --> 0:27:08.840
<v Speaker 3>Somewhat, although some of the conservatives I wasn't quite sure

0:27:09.320 --> 0:27:12.800
<v Speaker 3>which way they were going. And you know, Justice Thomas

0:27:12.800 --> 0:27:15.920
<v Speaker 3>starts out and ask some questions that I thought were

0:27:16.000 --> 0:27:19.000
<v Speaker 3>leaning a little bit towards the plaintiffs. So it is

0:27:19.080 --> 0:27:22.280
<v Speaker 3>it is a little bit hard to say, I'm you know,

0:27:22.520 --> 0:27:26.119
<v Speaker 3>Justice Tavanaugh's question is more just about why are we

0:27:26.160 --> 0:27:28.679
<v Speaker 3>even deciding this in the first place. I don't know

0:27:28.720 --> 0:27:32.280
<v Speaker 3>what that means for how he would actually believe the

0:27:32.400 --> 0:27:35.159
<v Speaker 3>case should come out. You know, I do think the

0:27:35.240 --> 0:27:40.199
<v Speaker 3>liberal justices probably seem to be mostly sympathetic to the question.

0:27:40.480 --> 0:27:43.040
<v Speaker 3>And you know, Justice Alito has thought a lot about

0:27:43.160 --> 0:27:45.639
<v Speaker 3>these issues. He decided a few cases when he was

0:27:45.680 --> 0:27:50.879
<v Speaker 3>on the Third Circuit decision on Burlington Cope factories that

0:27:51.280 --> 0:27:55.600
<v Speaker 3>basically grappled with this duty of updating disclosures. So he's

0:27:55.600 --> 0:27:59.440
<v Speaker 3>thought about this for many years. I tend to believe Alido,

0:28:00.040 --> 0:28:03.480
<v Speaker 3>based on the Burlington Code Factory's decision, would be less

0:28:03.520 --> 0:28:07.119
<v Speaker 3>inclined to say that those disclosures were misleading. But I

0:28:07.160 --> 0:28:10.359
<v Speaker 3>could be wrong on that. It's hard for me to say,

0:28:10.880 --> 0:28:14.480
<v Speaker 3>but I think you could see some coalescing that might

0:28:14.680 --> 0:28:18.119
<v Speaker 3>break down under conservative and liberal sort of life.

0:28:18.400 --> 0:28:22.199
<v Speaker 1>But you think that whatever decision, it'll be fact specific,

0:28:22.280 --> 0:28:25.200
<v Speaker 1>so it won't have so much impact on other companies

0:28:25.280 --> 0:28:27.320
<v Speaker 1>disclosures or am I overstating that.

0:28:27.800 --> 0:28:31.560
<v Speaker 3>I think that's right, and even the defendants. Facebook's is

0:28:31.720 --> 0:28:36.000
<v Speaker 3>very careful to stay that there will be some circumstances

0:28:36.800 --> 0:28:40.920
<v Speaker 3>where a risk disclosure is misleading, like when you know

0:28:41.120 --> 0:28:45.480
<v Speaker 3>for a certainty that the risk has actualized. My understanding

0:28:45.520 --> 0:28:49.400
<v Speaker 3>of Facebook's position is that would be materially misleading, and

0:28:49.440 --> 0:28:53.520
<v Speaker 3>so I think that is a situation you find quite

0:28:53.560 --> 0:28:56.680
<v Speaker 3>often these days. That's a theory that's asserted a lot

0:28:56.720 --> 0:29:00.680
<v Speaker 3>against companies. I think that they could write an decision

0:29:00.720 --> 0:29:05.760
<v Speaker 3>where you could say in these circumstances, you knew that

0:29:05.920 --> 0:29:08.320
<v Speaker 3>part of the risk can happen, but not all of

0:29:08.360 --> 0:29:11.440
<v Speaker 3>the risks could happened. I think that might be what

0:29:11.520 --> 0:29:14.800
<v Speaker 3>the Supreme Court could could do in this case if

0:29:14.800 --> 0:29:18.480
<v Speaker 3>it wanted to rule in favor of Facebook, and that

0:29:18.600 --> 0:29:21.760
<v Speaker 3>could affect though that could affect other cases because there

0:29:21.800 --> 0:29:25.160
<v Speaker 3>may be other cases that are like that, and also

0:29:25.280 --> 0:29:27.320
<v Speaker 3>there will often be the question of well, does our

0:29:27.600 --> 0:29:31.040
<v Speaker 3>case fall into this back pattern or is it something else.

0:29:31.280 --> 0:29:35.120
<v Speaker 3>So I think it could have a substantial effect on

0:29:35.640 --> 0:29:38.880
<v Speaker 3>the way these cases are litigated, but I don't think

0:29:38.920 --> 0:29:44.240
<v Speaker 3>it will completely immunize risk disclosures from scrutiny under Rule

0:29:44.280 --> 0:29:44.960
<v Speaker 3>ten D five.

0:29:45.880 --> 0:29:48.520
<v Speaker 1>Switching topics for just a moment, I do have a

0:29:48.600 --> 0:29:54.320
<v Speaker 1>question for you about crypto and the sec The crypto industry,

0:29:54.600 --> 0:29:59.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, poured millions of dollars into presidential and congressional races,

0:29:59.360 --> 0:30:02.520
<v Speaker 1>and Donald Trump has said that on day one he's

0:30:02.560 --> 0:30:07.120
<v Speaker 1>going to fire Gary Gensler. Do you see he has

0:30:07.160 --> 0:30:09.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot of firing to do on day one. So

0:30:09.560 --> 0:30:13.000
<v Speaker 1>do you think the crypto industry is going to benefit

0:30:13.600 --> 0:30:17.200
<v Speaker 1>from Gensler's departure and Trump administration?

0:30:17.560 --> 0:30:20.480
<v Speaker 3>I think so. I'm not sure how much they will benefit.

0:30:20.640 --> 0:30:23.720
<v Speaker 3>It's not quite clear to me what the SEC will

0:30:23.760 --> 0:30:28.080
<v Speaker 3>do even under a Trump administration. I'm not sure whether

0:30:28.120 --> 0:30:34.760
<v Speaker 3>it's possible to write rules that would balance investor protection

0:30:35.040 --> 0:30:39.440
<v Speaker 3>and what the crypto industry is seeking. Is it possible

0:30:39.480 --> 0:30:41.760
<v Speaker 3>that the crypto industry could get some sort of broad

0:30:42.800 --> 0:30:47.920
<v Speaker 3>community from the requirements of the SEC. Possibly. I think

0:30:47.960 --> 0:30:52.120
<v Speaker 3>that would probably have to go through Congress, and the

0:30:52.120 --> 0:30:55.560
<v Speaker 3>crypto industry has had a good amount of influence there.

0:30:55.640 --> 0:30:59.760
<v Speaker 3>But you know, Congress is self interested, and if they

0:30:59.760 --> 0:31:05.040
<v Speaker 3>were to path that sort of broad community from registration,

0:31:06.440 --> 0:31:09.640
<v Speaker 3>if the crypto industry collapses, if a lot of investors

0:31:09.640 --> 0:31:12.240
<v Speaker 3>lose a lot of money, they know exactly who to

0:31:12.320 --> 0:31:18.440
<v Speaker 3>point it, and so I'm not sure politically that Congress

0:31:18.480 --> 0:31:22.960
<v Speaker 3>will go in that direction. Could Trump appoint somebody who

0:31:24.360 --> 0:31:28.760
<v Speaker 3>will lessen the SEC's enforcement. I think that's probably the

0:31:28.800 --> 0:31:33.240
<v Speaker 3>most likely option there. It is difficult, though, I think

0:31:33.360 --> 0:31:37.520
<v Speaker 3>for enforcement to justify completely dropping cases you know that

0:31:37.560 --> 0:31:41.120
<v Speaker 3>are being litigated and are still being litigated against companies

0:31:41.240 --> 0:31:45.600
<v Speaker 3>like coinbase, And if it takes that somewhat drastic step,

0:31:46.520 --> 0:31:50.240
<v Speaker 3>then you know, we have someone to blame if investors

0:31:50.240 --> 0:31:53.640
<v Speaker 3>lose a lot of money. So I'm not exactly sure

0:31:53.800 --> 0:31:58.360
<v Speaker 3>what's going to happen on day one or the days

0:31:58.400 --> 0:32:03.600
<v Speaker 3>afterwards with a prompt SCC, but certainly Trump will try

0:32:03.640 --> 0:32:06.520
<v Speaker 3>to do some things that at least appear to be

0:32:06.640 --> 0:32:11.080
<v Speaker 3>favorable to the crypto industry. But I also think he's

0:32:11.080 --> 0:32:16.040
<v Speaker 3>going to engage in some self interested calculus, and he

0:32:16.760 --> 0:32:21.440
<v Speaker 3>understands that he could be blamed if there are significant losses.

0:32:21.760 --> 0:32:24.320
<v Speaker 3>I think he will balance those different things, and it'll

0:32:24.360 --> 0:32:27.239
<v Speaker 3>be interesting to see what happens on day one and

0:32:27.360 --> 0:32:28.480
<v Speaker 3>the days afterwards.

0:32:28.520 --> 0:32:30.840
<v Speaker 1>There will certainly be a lot of things to watch.

0:32:31.480 --> 0:32:33.680
<v Speaker 1>It's always great to have you on this show, Jim,

0:32:33.760 --> 0:32:37.640
<v Speaker 1>thanks so much. That's Professor James Park of UCLA Law School.

0:32:38.040 --> 0:32:40.680
<v Speaker 1>And that's it for this edition of the Bloomberg Law Podcast.

0:32:41.040 --> 0:32:43.400
<v Speaker 1>Remember you can always get the latest legal news by

0:32:43.440 --> 0:32:47.280
<v Speaker 1>subscribing and listening to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify,

0:32:47.560 --> 0:32:51.400
<v Speaker 1>and at Bloomberg dot com, Slash podcast, Slash Law. I'm

0:32:51.480 --> 0:32:53.920
<v Speaker 1>June Grosso, and this is Bloomberg