WEBVTT - 'Inside the Mind of the White-Collar Criminal' (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Law with June Grosso on demand via our Bloomberg

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<v Speaker 1>Radio Plus app free for iPhone and Android devices. You've

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<v Speaker 1>seen the stories and the headlines and in the courts

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<v Speaker 1>over and over again. Corporate executives who already have wealth

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<v Speaker 1>and status committing financial crimes. Do they do it for

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<v Speaker 1>the money or just because their ego tells them they

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<v Speaker 1>can do they feel remorse about their victims. A new book,

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<v Speaker 1>Why They Do It Inside the Mind of the White

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<v Speaker 1>Collar Criminal explores what turns corporate executives into corporate criminals.

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<v Speaker 1>It's based on the author's interviews with close to fifty

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<v Speaker 1>well known white collar criminals, from Bernie made Off to

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<v Speaker 1>Dennis Kozlowski. The author, Eugene Saltis, is a professor at

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<v Speaker 1>Harvard Business School and joins me, now, how did you

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<v Speaker 1>get these close to fifty white collar criminals to talk

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<v Speaker 1>to you? Well, I think many of the individuals, as

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<v Speaker 1>they left their fields in finance and business, the lonely

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<v Speaker 1>and they don't have the people to engage in the

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<v Speaker 1>business community anymore. And being a financial economist, I was

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<v Speaker 1>able to develop a relationship with them by connecting by

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<v Speaker 1>talking about the world that they once loved and were

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<v Speaker 1>passionate about, but obviously have now left that community. So

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<v Speaker 1>I connected with them talking about the technical stuff that's

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<v Speaker 1>in the papers on a day to day basis. But

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<v Speaker 1>I was also fortunate being an academic, that I could

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<v Speaker 1>spend time with them, not just popping for one conversation,

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<v Speaker 1>but I committed that I would spend as long as

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<v Speaker 1>it took to really get to know them in their perspectives.

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<v Speaker 1>So some people this might be weeks, months, and in

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<v Speaker 1>some cases I actually spent years speaking with individuals over

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<v Speaker 1>the course of this project. These people were wealthy, privileged people.

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<v Speaker 1>Was it pure greed the need for more and more

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<v Speaker 1>that made them do it? I think it's a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit more complicated than that. We're all driven by incentives,

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<v Speaker 1>and to the extent that money can play some role

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<v Speaker 1>around incentence. But what I explore is trying to think

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<v Speaker 1>of why would these individuals who are really quite strategic

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<v Speaker 1>and smart, I mean it really are titans of industry.

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<v Speaker 1>To make sense, they could gain a little bit more

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<v Speaker 1>money or prestige, they wouldn't risk their freedom for that.

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<v Speaker 1>They wouldn't risk everything. And I think that's the humbling

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<v Speaker 1>question to ask, because why would someone that seems to

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<v Speaker 1>have it all seem to want to push it a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit farther, And so I explore in the book,

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<v Speaker 1>should we be thinking of this as a rational calculation

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<v Speaker 1>so many economists and regulators and prosecutors see it, or

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<v Speaker 1>should we think of this as maybe a different type

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<v Speaker 1>of failure, a different type of process that's causing these

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<v Speaker 1>executive failures? What type of failure? So, what I hypothesize

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<v Speaker 1>and argue in the book is that it doesn't look

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<v Speaker 1>so much like of a failure of that careful, analytical,

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<v Speaker 1>deliberative reasoning of comparing the expected benefits against the expected costs,

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<v Speaker 1>which is how people often type see this and and

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<v Speaker 1>think executives would make these kinds of consequential decisions. But

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<v Speaker 1>rather when one actually looks at some of the cases,

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<v Speaker 1>it looks I think it's much closer to a failure

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<v Speaker 1>of manual intuition. They don't act, we see the harm

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<v Speaker 1>associated with their actions at the time these decisions are

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<v Speaker 1>being made. So I can give an example, Sam Waxel,

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<v Speaker 1>the former CEO of m Clone Well no executive because

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<v Speaker 1>it's also the case that ended up in snaring Martha

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<v Speaker 1>Stewart and leading to her obstruction of justice charges. Sam

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<v Speaker 1>Waxel's brilliant, quite brilliant executive, but he also found out

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<v Speaker 1>about some adverse test results coming back from the FBA

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<v Speaker 1>that they weren't going to give the approval of his

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<v Speaker 1>drug as expected, and so that evening he called his

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<v Speaker 1>daughter and told her to dump her two million dollars

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<v Speaker 1>worth of shares. Now, this isn't a particularly good white

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<v Speaker 1>teller crime. I mean, this is actually about his stupid

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<v Speaker 1>as they come. I mean, this isn't hard for regulars

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<v Speaker 1>to pick up this kind of misconduct. So you're almost

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<v Speaker 1>certainly going to get caught. And so if you think

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<v Speaker 1>of well, why would Sam Waxel tell his daughter to

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<v Speaker 1>dump these shares, It's really hard to think of that

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<v Speaker 1>as a careful cost benefit calculation. You're almost certainly going

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<v Speaker 1>to get caught. But rather, at the time he was

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<v Speaker 1>thinking about calling his daughter and telling her this. I

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<v Speaker 1>see that as a failure of intuition. He didn't act.

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<v Speaker 1>We see the harm associate with that at the time.

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<v Speaker 1>So one about the victims. I remember interviewing victims of

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<v Speaker 1>the Enron scandal who were older and lost their retirements

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<v Speaker 1>and didn't know how they would cope did any of

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<v Speaker 1>these white color criminals that you spoke to think about

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<v Speaker 1>the victims and feel sorry about what they've done. One

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<v Speaker 1>of the parts that I was initially surprised but then

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<v Speaker 1>became quite used to over time is the lack of remorse,

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<v Speaker 1>and the remorse that I tend to see was around

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<v Speaker 1>the loss of their family, those privileges, they missed their

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<v Speaker 1>child's graduation, but not really for the victims. And I

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<v Speaker 1>think the reason why, going back to this notion that's

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<v Speaker 1>the failure of intuition, is that much of the harm

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<v Speaker 1>associated with white color misconduct, the victims aren't close. Their

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<v Speaker 1>psychologically distant, they're physically distant, and so it doesn't create

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<v Speaker 1>that same visceral feeling that you're actually harming someone specifically.

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<v Speaker 1>Take something like insider trading the easiest example. It's really hard,

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<v Speaker 1>if not impossible, in some circumstances, to actually identify who

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<v Speaker 1>the victims are in those cases, so it doesn't create

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<v Speaker 1>that natural, instinctive, visceral response that you're actually hurting someone specifically.

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<v Speaker 1>But even the case of financial fraud, as you point

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<v Speaker 1>out with Enron, I mean, at the time the executives

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<v Speaker 1>were actually engaged in the misconduct and the fraud that

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<v Speaker 1>would ultimately lead to the devastation for the people at

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<v Speaker 1>Enron's the time they were actually getting awards, Andy Fast

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<v Speaker 1>out one CF of the Year award, at the same

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<v Speaker 1>time he was actually engaged in and arguably the most

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<v Speaker 1>severe conduct that led to undermining the firm and leading

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<v Speaker 1>to its failure. So there isn't that connection the time

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<v Speaker 1>that you're actually hurting someone while you're actually doing it's

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<v Speaker 1>actually delayed in years away, so it doesn't have that

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<v Speaker 1>negative distance while you're actually engaged in the mouth season.

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<v Speaker 1>I've been talking to Harvard Business School professor Eugene solved

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<v Speaker 1>Us about his new book Why They Do It Inside

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<v Speaker 1>the Mind of the White Color Criminal. Bernie made Off

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<v Speaker 1>seems like one of the more unsympathetic of the people

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<v Speaker 1>that you spoke to. He stole from people he knew,

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<v Speaker 1>and he told you it's like a comedy of errors.

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<v Speaker 1>Did he have any remorse at all? Bernie made Off

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<v Speaker 1>is different than the other executives I spoke with and

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<v Speaker 1>find large different from the bath majority of people that

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<v Speaker 1>engage in white collar crime. That he knew his victims.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, intimately, these were family, these were friends, These

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<v Speaker 1>are members of the Jewish community, and he doesn't express

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<v Speaker 1>remorse for this, even to those that he knew well.

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<v Speaker 1>And I think this is what raises some interesting and

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<v Speaker 1>I think difficult questions about him as an individual, and

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<v Speaker 1>that he's just simply not empathetic even when the evidence

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<v Speaker 1>has put directly in front of him, which is one

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<v Speaker 1>of the things I described and discussed in the books,

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<v Speaker 1>putting the evidence in front of him of some of

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<v Speaker 1>the people that were harmed. He sees ways much like

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<v Speaker 1>we all do, but just in a much greater extent

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<v Speaker 1>of rationalizing. For example, the family Foundations which many of

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<v Speaker 1>us have heard that lost just extraordinary mounts when the

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<v Speaker 1>Ponte scheme collapsed, he sees it as well. Many instances

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<v Speaker 1>these foundations wouldn't have ever been set up in the

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<v Speaker 1>first place had it not been for the gains that

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<v Speaker 1>the parents had ten or twenty years ago. And so

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<v Speaker 1>to the extent that the foundations ended up collapsing when

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<v Speaker 1>the Ponte scheme ended, he sees is that well, those

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<v Speaker 1>family foundations would have never existed had it not been

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<v Speaker 1>for the artificial gains ten or twenty years earlier. So

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<v Speaker 1>it's really kind of no harm, no foul, which I

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<v Speaker 1>think we can all step back and and find a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit terrifying. One of the more surprising stories was

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<v Speaker 1>Dennis Kozlowski, the former chief executive of Tycho. He said

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<v Speaker 1>the board would have given him anything he wanted, So

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<v Speaker 1>why did he arrange for tens of millions of dollars

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<v Speaker 1>in unauthorized bonuses? It's an important question. I mean he

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<v Speaker 1>at the time when he was actually engaged in, ultimately

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<v Speaker 1>what would be the embezzment that would lead to his conviction.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, he was one of the highest paid CEOs

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<v Speaker 1>in the country and still in the last twenty years, still,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean it was over a hundred million dollars of

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<v Speaker 1>compensation per year. And I think the challenge in a

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<v Speaker 1>case like his is that whether the board, I mean

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<v Speaker 1>we talk a lot about corporate governance and independence of directors,

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<v Speaker 1>whether the board was providing the appropriate level of accountability

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<v Speaker 1>or not is almost even besides the point if an

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<v Speaker 1>executive in his position subjectively believes that they would give

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<v Speaker 1>him anything he wanted, and so to the extent that

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<v Speaker 1>there was, I mean, ultimately these loans were being forgiven

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<v Speaker 1>but not appropriately, and that's what he was convicted for. Basically,

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<v Speaker 1>forgiving himself and other executives hundreds of millions of dollars

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<v Speaker 1>and loans. Didn't feel you had to go through the

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<v Speaker 1>same checks and balances as ought have been done. And

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's that type of feeling of I'm in

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<v Speaker 1>the position of power and not going through the appropriate

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<v Speaker 1>channels that ultimately led to his failure because to the

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<v Speaker 1>extent that the board if they would have given him more,

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<v Speaker 1>which I think there's actually some evidence the board would

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<v Speaker 1>have actually given him more conversation had he actually asked

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<v Speaker 1>for it. I mean, he was a rock star CEO

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<v Speaker 1>at the time, actually doing very well, but that doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>excuse is not going through those those appropriate channels. Did

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<v Speaker 1>most of them think they would get away with it.

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<v Speaker 1>One of the things I did find really pretty extraordinary

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<v Speaker 1>is that no one thinks, even when you're doing the

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<v Speaker 1>most platent types of misconduct, that you're ever going to

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<v Speaker 1>face criminal sanctions. And I don't think this is because

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<v Speaker 1>some people have argued that regulators are not being effective

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<v Speaker 1>or not seeking to punish people. I think this is

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<v Speaker 1>just a matter of no one in a position of

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<v Speaker 1>privilege and power could ever really see themselves behind bars.

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<v Speaker 1>We all do things that are wrong, But no one

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<v Speaker 1>ever thinks that if you do something wrong like that,

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<v Speaker 1>that you ever faced criminal sanctions and be behind bars.

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<v Speaker 1>That's for other people. That's for other bad people, not

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<v Speaker 1>for me. And I think that's one of the real

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<v Speaker 1>challenges we face with regulation is that oftentimes what we're

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<v Speaker 1>doing is making the safety is harsher if you do

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<v Speaker 1>crime X, rather than giving someone a six months since

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<v Speaker 1>we're now going to give you a ten year sentence.

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<v Speaker 1>And to think people were doing a careful analytical calculation

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<v Speaker 1>doing this kind of deliver cost benefits calculation that actually

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<v Speaker 1>should have some grit because people see that the expected

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<v Speaker 1>costs are going up. The problem is that these executives

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<v Speaker 1>at the time they're actually making decisions, never think they're

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<v Speaker 1>ever going to face any sanction. It doesn't matter whether

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<v Speaker 1>it's one week in prison or ten years in prison.

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<v Speaker 1>That's just never going to happen. And I think that's

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<v Speaker 1>a deep challenge we face, both from a regulatory standpoint,

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<v Speaker 1>but also from ourselves in the executive community of actually

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<v Speaker 1>thinking about but the consequences for these types of actions.

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<v Speaker 1>So then is there any way to stop white color crime,

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<v Speaker 1>or at least to slow it down. So I think

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<v Speaker 1>this goes to back to changing norms and changing the

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<v Speaker 1>culture within instances, because I make the argument that because

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<v Speaker 1>this harm is very distant, it's very abstract, our intuitions

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<v Speaker 1>are not well designed to actually detect it. That's just

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<v Speaker 1>an evolutionary fact. We're not going to be hardwired to

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<v Speaker 1>see things that are so far away. But at the

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<v Speaker 1>same time, what we can do is layer on new

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<v Speaker 1>norms and new almost artificial intuitions, but create systems to

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<v Speaker 1>help protect us from mac really proceeding down this road.

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<v Speaker 1>One of the cases I talked about in the book

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<v Speaker 1>that's actually I think one of the more important ones.

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<v Speaker 1>Someone that wasn't actually convicted of white color crime actually

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<v Speaker 1>narrowly escaped it is Ben Horowitz, the well known venture capitalist,

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<v Speaker 1>and he actually hired a new CFO for one of

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<v Speaker 1>his firms, and the CFO came to an idea that

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<v Speaker 1>she used in her prior firm and others in Silicon

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<v Speaker 1>Valley were widely doing its option back dating. You moved

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<v Speaker 1>the option data round to make it more attractive for

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<v Speaker 1>the executive widely being practiced at the time fifteen years ago. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>Ben Horowitz is in one of these inspiring, innovative strategic minds.

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<v Speaker 1>But he's not a finance and accounting guy and actually

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<v Speaker 1>appreciates that that's where his weaknesses lie. His intuitions are

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<v Speaker 1>not well designed to figure out, well, what should you

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<v Speaker 1>do when you have a new financial accounting policy change,

0:11:47.720 --> 0:11:50.720
<v Speaker 1>And so he routinely put into places systems saying, anytime

0:11:50.720 --> 0:11:52.440
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to make one of these changes, I want

0:11:52.440 --> 0:11:56.000
<v Speaker 1>to get the insight in opinion of an outsider, someone

0:11:56.080 --> 0:11:58.960
<v Speaker 1>sitting outside by near a little bubble here. So he

0:11:59.080 --> 0:12:02.680
<v Speaker 1>called an outside attorney that he knew and respected, passed

0:12:02.679 --> 0:12:05.680
<v Speaker 1>this idea by him, and his attorney came back, there's

0:12:05.720 --> 0:12:07.640
<v Speaker 1>no way. I've looked over this six different ways and

0:12:07.679 --> 0:12:10.360
<v Speaker 1>there's no way that this is actually legal. I don't

0:12:10.360 --> 0:12:12.120
<v Speaker 1>know how the auditors signed off in the law firm

0:12:12.120 --> 0:12:14.000
<v Speaker 1>were actually comfortable with this, and all these other firms

0:12:14.040 --> 0:12:16.720
<v Speaker 1>were comfortable with this, but I advise against it. And

0:12:16.800 --> 0:12:19.840
<v Speaker 1>so because of this advice, Bend ended up turning this down.

0:12:20.280 --> 0:12:23.920
<v Speaker 1>Two years later, the government started investigating this. The CFO

0:12:24.080 --> 0:12:26.840
<v Speaker 1>actually end up going to prison for stock option backdating

0:12:26.880 --> 0:12:30.920
<v Speaker 1>the taxavation associated with that, and Ben describes it as

0:12:30.960 --> 0:12:33.240
<v Speaker 1>the only thing that kept me out of prison with

0:12:33.320 --> 0:12:36.680
<v Speaker 1>some luck and the right organizational design. This had nothing

0:12:36.720 --> 0:12:39.880
<v Speaker 1>to do with having a better moral compass, better values.

0:12:40.160 --> 0:12:43.559
<v Speaker 1>This simply had to do with understanding his weaknesses and

0:12:43.600 --> 0:12:47.600
<v Speaker 1>putting a system in place to intercede when he might

0:12:47.640 --> 0:12:51.280
<v Speaker 1>not see the consequences associated with a particular choice. Eugene,

0:12:51.480 --> 0:12:55.760
<v Speaker 1>is there one person you spoke to that stands out

0:12:55.800 --> 0:12:58.679
<v Speaker 1>in your mind for some reason? Either you felt more

0:12:58.800 --> 0:13:03.640
<v Speaker 1>sympathetic towards him, or he seemed more brilliant than the

0:13:03.720 --> 0:13:07.240
<v Speaker 1>others are more devious. I think each of those traits

0:13:07.280 --> 0:13:09.440
<v Speaker 1>I can think of an individual. I mean, one case

0:13:09.520 --> 0:13:13.000
<v Speaker 1>that did make me think and reflect upon myself a

0:13:13.040 --> 0:13:15.559
<v Speaker 1>lot more was the case of Scott Harkinnon. He was

0:13:15.600 --> 0:13:18.920
<v Speaker 1>a CEO of a biotech company and he ran a

0:13:18.960 --> 0:13:22.360
<v Speaker 1>test for a new drug for IPS, a fatal disease,

0:13:22.720 --> 0:13:25.480
<v Speaker 1>and the test actually missed its primary endpoint, its main goal.

0:13:25.880 --> 0:13:28.400
<v Speaker 1>But then in some subsequent data analysis they actually found

0:13:28.400 --> 0:13:31.160
<v Speaker 1>that maybe in this one subgroup there was actually some

0:13:31.160 --> 0:13:34.079
<v Speaker 1>promising results. So, as to be expected, you issue a

0:13:34.120 --> 0:13:36.600
<v Speaker 1>press release, and on this press release they said, after

0:13:36.640 --> 0:13:40.199
<v Speaker 1>this trial we found some results that demonstrated that there

0:13:40.200 --> 0:13:43.000
<v Speaker 1>could be some benefits associated with this treatment. And then

0:13:43.040 --> 0:13:45.079
<v Speaker 1>the rest of the press release described all the technical

0:13:45.160 --> 0:13:48.400
<v Speaker 1>nitty gritty. Couple years later, the government actually goes after

0:13:48.480 --> 0:13:52.280
<v Speaker 1>him and says that press release actually was misleading, at

0:13:52.360 --> 0:13:55.480
<v Speaker 1>was actually fraudulent because you put the word demonstrate and

0:13:55.559 --> 0:13:58.600
<v Speaker 1>ultimately this drug wasn't effective. And maybe you could have

0:13:58.640 --> 0:14:02.240
<v Speaker 1>put the word suggest, but demonstrate wasn't the appropriate word.

0:14:02.559 --> 0:14:04.960
<v Speaker 1>And when I look around and I think of the

0:14:05.040 --> 0:14:07.760
<v Speaker 1>kinds of things that we see corporate leaders often saying,

0:14:07.840 --> 0:14:11.280
<v Speaker 1>are political leaders often saying the choice between the word

0:14:11.320 --> 0:14:14.000
<v Speaker 1>demonstrate and suggest in a press release, not in the

0:14:14.040 --> 0:14:17.280
<v Speaker 1>scientific publication. We're talking about one single press release. He

0:14:17.360 --> 0:14:20.480
<v Speaker 1>faced up to ten years in prison. Ultimately quote only

0:14:20.680 --> 0:14:24.840
<v Speaker 1>received several years of probation. But it's pretty extraordinary that

0:14:25.160 --> 0:14:27.320
<v Speaker 1>an individual because of a choice of one word and

0:14:27.320 --> 0:14:29.920
<v Speaker 1>one press release, really lost everything in life. I mean,

0:14:29.960 --> 0:14:32.800
<v Speaker 1>spending millions of dollars on defense, losing his license not

0:14:32.920 --> 0:14:35.280
<v Speaker 1>able to run a publicly traded firm. And when I

0:14:35.320 --> 0:14:37.240
<v Speaker 1>think of his case, and I think of the kinds

0:14:37.240 --> 0:14:39.160
<v Speaker 1>of things that we all say in a public sphere,

0:14:39.320 --> 0:14:41.640
<v Speaker 1>in terms of how carefully we choose our words, I

0:14:41.640 --> 0:14:45.640
<v Speaker 1>think it's pretty humbling. The penalties for white collar crime

0:14:45.800 --> 0:14:48.600
<v Speaker 1>have gone up in recent years. Do you think that

0:14:48.680 --> 0:14:52.920
<v Speaker 1>they're too tough? The penalties they're they're generally around the

0:14:53.040 --> 0:14:57.840
<v Speaker 1>dollar loss, and the difference between whether your action lost

0:14:58.040 --> 0:15:02.560
<v Speaker 1>fifty million dollars or billion dollars in a fraud generally

0:15:02.600 --> 0:15:05.480
<v Speaker 1>doesn't come down to the act itself was actually different.

0:15:05.920 --> 0:15:07.680
<v Speaker 1>It comes down to that you happen to be a

0:15:07.760 --> 0:15:10.640
<v Speaker 1>larger firm, and so your action simply had a larger

0:15:10.880 --> 0:15:14.240
<v Speaker 1>market effect. And I think that's a little bit odd um,

0:15:14.280 --> 0:15:16.600
<v Speaker 1>and I think this is why some judges have started

0:15:16.640 --> 0:15:21.160
<v Speaker 1>pushing back on the sentencing guidelines, which escalate so dramatically

0:15:21.480 --> 0:15:24.720
<v Speaker 1>depending on the dollars that are perceived to have been lost.

0:15:25.400 --> 0:15:28.280
<v Speaker 1>I read that white collar crime was first defined by

0:15:28.400 --> 0:15:33.840
<v Speaker 1>sociologist Edwin Sutherland in as a crime committed by a

0:15:33.880 --> 0:15:37.640
<v Speaker 1>person of respectability and high social status in the course

0:15:37.680 --> 0:15:41.000
<v Speaker 1>of his occupation. Should we stop calling them white color

0:15:41.040 --> 0:15:44.560
<v Speaker 1>criminals and setting them apart from other criminals as if

0:15:44.600 --> 0:15:48.400
<v Speaker 1>what they're doing is not quite as bad. I think

0:15:48.400 --> 0:15:51.200
<v Speaker 1>that would go be a huge step forward. I think

0:15:51.240 --> 0:15:54.360
<v Speaker 1>the part that I find most frustrating, and certainly I

0:15:54.360 --> 0:15:57.480
<v Speaker 1>think we've seen some regulators express this, is that people

0:15:57.520 --> 0:16:00.200
<v Speaker 1>think of white color crime in many instances just not

0:16:00.360 --> 0:16:03.520
<v Speaker 1>as bad as street offenses. It doesn't seem as scary

0:16:04.000 --> 0:16:06.920
<v Speaker 1>because no one's wielding a knife in the nighttime. But

0:16:07.520 --> 0:16:10.720
<v Speaker 1>if we start thinking about the economic ramifications, the effects

0:16:10.720 --> 0:16:13.080
<v Speaker 1>that people on their livelihood. I mean, you can look

0:16:13.080 --> 0:16:16.400
<v Speaker 1>at the victims of Enron and World com Bernie made

0:16:16.440 --> 0:16:18.840
<v Speaker 1>up Ponzi scheme, and you see what this has done

0:16:18.880 --> 0:16:21.640
<v Speaker 1>to their retirement plan, to their life. This has been

0:16:21.720 --> 0:16:24.200
<v Speaker 1>in every way just has been in some sense is

0:16:24.480 --> 0:16:27.600
<v Speaker 1>much worse than many street offenses. But by setting it

0:16:27.640 --> 0:16:29.840
<v Speaker 1>apart is a white color offense that looks a little

0:16:29.840 --> 0:16:33.480
<v Speaker 1>bit more technical, it sometimes minimizes the effect. And this

0:16:33.520 --> 0:16:36.200
<v Speaker 1>is what Edwin Southerland tried to point out nineteen thirty nine,

0:16:36.600 --> 0:16:40.560
<v Speaker 1>and we've made some strides since. But in the idea

0:16:40.640 --> 0:16:44.000
<v Speaker 1>of an executive going to prison for something they did

0:16:44.040 --> 0:16:46.040
<v Speaker 1>in the course of business was really in a foreigner,

0:16:46.120 --> 0:16:49.800
<v Speaker 1>exotic concept that wasn't crime. Crime occurred only what was

0:16:49.840 --> 0:16:52.160
<v Speaker 1>on the street, not in the boardroom. And so we've

0:16:52.200 --> 0:16:54.160
<v Speaker 1>been trying to fight against that concept, I think ever

0:16:54.240 --> 0:16:56.480
<v Speaker 1>ever since, to change that notion. Thank you for being

0:16:56.480 --> 0:17:00.640
<v Speaker 1>on Bloomberg Law. That's Harvard Business School Professor Eugene Soltice.

0:17:01.080 --> 0:17:04.480
<v Speaker 1>That's it for this edition of Bloomberg Law. I'm June Graasso.

0:17:04.880 --> 0:17:06.080
<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg