WEBVTT - Luis Maizel Discusses Diversity in Finance

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<v Speaker 1>This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on Boomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>This week on the podcast, I have a special guest.

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<v Speaker 1>His name is Louise Mazel, and if you are at

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<v Speaker 1>all interested in a couple of areas of asset management

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<v Speaker 1>and allocation, you're gonna find this to be really quite intriguing.

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<v Speaker 1>He set up a firm thirty years ago to make

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<v Speaker 1>emerging market fixed income investments and LM Capital Group has

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<v Speaker 1>been doing that for the past three decades. Uh. They

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<v Speaker 1>basically do their own due diligence. They check out all

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<v Speaker 1>of the various bonds that they buy on behalf of clients, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>not relying on the traditional rating agencies, and um, they're

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<v Speaker 1>essentially owned by their employees. It's a very interesting shop.

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<v Speaker 1>And Louise does a wonderful job explaining why emerging market

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<v Speaker 1>yet has really become an asset class and to itself,

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<v Speaker 1>given how soft um actual yields are, and that half

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<v Speaker 1>of the sovereign wealth debt these days, over nine trillion dollars,

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<v Speaker 1>is actually holding a negative yield. Uh, he thinks e

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<v Speaker 1>M debt is going to be a not only a

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<v Speaker 1>distinct asset class, but it's going to attract a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of capital over the next decade, and he's very bullsh

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<v Speaker 1>So with no further ado, here's my conversation with LM

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<v Speaker 1>Capital Groups Louise Mazel. My special guest this week is

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<v Speaker 1>Louise Maizel. He is the co founder and senior managing

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<v Speaker 1>director at LM Capital Group, an emerging market fixed income

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<v Speaker 1>shop managing over four point two billion dollars in assets.

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<v Speaker 1>The firm was founded in and is privately held. It

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<v Speaker 1>is employee owned and provide It's a fixed income active

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<v Speaker 1>management approach with a global macro overlay. Louise Mazel, Welcome

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<v Speaker 1>to Bloomberg. Thank you very much. Berry, so you will

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<v Speaker 1>launched this firm in nine nine. You're pretty much in

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<v Speaker 1>the middle of a giant bullmarket. What made you decide

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<v Speaker 1>to go into bonds instead of stocks? I started a

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<v Speaker 1>second firm very actually, the first firm, Element Advisors, which

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<v Speaker 1>was managing money for high net worth individuals. Four July

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<v Speaker 1>eighteenth eighty four, the US eliminates the thirty percent withholding.

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<v Speaker 1>Up to then, foreign nationals could only invest tax free

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<v Speaker 1>in T bills or in bank CDs. All of a sudden,

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<v Speaker 1>they opened up the market. A lot of US brokers

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<v Speaker 1>fly out to Mexico City and try to grab some

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<v Speaker 1>of that money. And my friends started to call me saying,

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<v Speaker 1>you're in the States. We know you quite don't you

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<v Speaker 1>help us serve through these new way new market? So

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<v Speaker 1>we did. For five years we were managing high net

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<v Speaker 1>worth individuals, but they were being managed like pensure plants

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<v Speaker 1>because they were mostly taxed THEMPT And from there we

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<v Speaker 1>jumped into the institutional market. So that was um But

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<v Speaker 1>you bring a very different perspective to the management of assets.

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<v Speaker 1>How did growing up outside of the United States shape

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<v Speaker 1>your view of the world, be it developed or emerging markets?

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<v Speaker 1>Think of it as planets. People in the US thing

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<v Speaker 1>that they're sitting in the sun. The US is the

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<v Speaker 1>center of the universe. For US foreigners. We see the

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<v Speaker 1>US as the biggest planet, but it's part of a system.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's very interesting to see the impact of the

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<v Speaker 1>US on the other planets. But it's not the center

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<v Speaker 1>of the universe. It's just the biggest planet in the universe.

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<v Speaker 1>And now we have China becoming another very large planet.

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<v Speaker 1>How is that going to impact the way the US

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<v Speaker 1>is perceived? I think the US is still by far

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<v Speaker 1>the most important country in the world. The Chinese, just

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<v Speaker 1>because of the sheer size of population over four times

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<v Speaker 1>bigger than the US, will be very big. But in

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<v Speaker 1>the incompart capita they're still very small compared to the US,

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<v Speaker 1>and the model of growth, which was export to the

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<v Speaker 1>US makes them smaller. When you are gearing to become

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<v Speaker 1>the big one, you're far away from it. Quite quite interesting.

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<v Speaker 1>So academic studies have shown that passive management of stocks

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<v Speaker 1>has a tendency to outperform active over long periods of time.

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<v Speaker 1>But the opposite seems to be true in the fixed

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<v Speaker 1>income department. Active uh fixed income strategies outperformed passive. Why

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<v Speaker 1>is that, Well, you have a choice on what bonds

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<v Speaker 1>you buy. The bond market basically is like a landmine.

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<v Speaker 1>If you don't step on your mind, you're gonna do okay,

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<v Speaker 1>and the move along the yield curve will allow you

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<v Speaker 1>to react faster to what's happening in the economy. The

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<v Speaker 1>passive in the index does not take into account the

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<v Speaker 1>macro impact that's happening in the bond market. So how

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<v Speaker 1>do you go about creating a macro overlay for fixed

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<v Speaker 1>income investing? That has always been our approach. Verry we analyze.

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<v Speaker 1>For us, money is a commodity. When it's scarce, it's expensive.

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<v Speaker 1>When it's plentiful, it's cheap. So we analyze. We developed

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<v Speaker 1>the matrix. You know, going from a qualitative process to

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<v Speaker 1>a quantitative way of processing. It's not easy. If you

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<v Speaker 1>put three economies in the room, they're going to come

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<v Speaker 1>out with four different theories, probably all of them wrong.

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<v Speaker 1>So what we try to do is doing our macro analysis,

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<v Speaker 1>studying the growth of the company, of the country's growing,

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<v Speaker 1>understanding the inflation economic indicators. We assigned a value to

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<v Speaker 1>each of them. We created a matrix which gives us

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<v Speaker 1>a point count and we call it the trendscore, which

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<v Speaker 1>allows us then to go into the benchmark we're using,

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<v Speaker 1>which the client is requesting us to use, and the

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<v Speaker 1>trendscore will give us how long or short the benjamark

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<v Speaker 1>do we want to be. So when you say trends,

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<v Speaker 1>I tend to think of equity trends, where a market

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<v Speaker 1>or a stock is trending either higher for a long

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<v Speaker 1>period of time or trending lower for a long period

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<v Speaker 1>of time. Do you have the same meaning of the

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<v Speaker 1>word trend in fixed income or does it have a

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<v Speaker 1>slightly different. I think it's pretty similar. But what you're

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<v Speaker 1>trying to understand is the current and future needs of money.

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<v Speaker 1>If a country is growing very fast, you know there's

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<v Speaker 1>going to be competition for money. If the deficity of

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<v Speaker 1>the country is big, you know that the government is

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<v Speaker 1>going to place bonds and it's gonna cipher now money

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<v Speaker 1>from the economy. If unemployment is very high, then you

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<v Speaker 1>know that there's not gonna be a lot of need.

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<v Speaker 1>There's not gonna be a brick and mortar investment, so

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<v Speaker 1>money will be plentiful. In rates are going to come down.

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<v Speaker 1>So there is a trend on what's happened in the

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<v Speaker 1>past twelve months that will impact what will happen in

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<v Speaker 1>the next six or twelve. So when we look at

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<v Speaker 1>the great bullmarket in bonds in the US from the

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<v Speaker 1>days of Paul Vulker breaking the back of inflation in

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<v Speaker 1>the late seventies early eighties, we've enjoyed a I don't know,

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<v Speaker 1>let's call it thirty three thirty five year ballmarketing bonds.

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<v Speaker 1>Is that still in an effect? And second, how does

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<v Speaker 1>that ballmarket and bonds in the US affect the rest

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<v Speaker 1>of the UH world? We were in a secular trend

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<v Speaker 1>or slower rates. There was an enormous addition of liquidity

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<v Speaker 1>into the system, coming not only from these states, but

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<v Speaker 1>from all central banks. The European Union was placing in

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<v Speaker 1>enormous amount of money in the system, so was the

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<v Speaker 1>Bank of Japan, so was China. A couple of years

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<v Speaker 1>ago we saw a reversal in the trend. The announcement

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<v Speaker 1>of the reverse of the easing, the quantitative easing, and

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<v Speaker 1>the announcement by the fend that they were going to

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<v Speaker 1>start raising rates created a mentality that we had hit

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<v Speaker 1>bottom and we were starting to trend upwards. But now

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<v Speaker 1>we've seen that stopped. I think that the issue of

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<v Speaker 1>an upcoming recession, I don't believe it's coming. It's a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit like the wolf. You know, everybody keeps crying

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<v Speaker 1>the wolf is coming. We are not accustomed to a

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<v Speaker 1>long period without a recession. But ever since globalization started

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<v Speaker 1>in the world, the whole theory change. The formula of

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<v Speaker 1>the past is no longer appliable. So would you say

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<v Speaker 1>um tales of the death of the bundble market have

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<v Speaker 1>been greatly exaggerated. I think that we're gonna stay with

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<v Speaker 1>low interest rates, especially we have big deficits. If we

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<v Speaker 1>have an easy faith, I think we can go on

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<v Speaker 1>for several more years without a major increase in rates.

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<v Speaker 1>Quite quite fascinating. Let's go back to you have this

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<v Speaker 1>big set of tax changes. How much of a game

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<v Speaker 1>changer was that for launching affixed income firm. Actually, the

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<v Speaker 1>game changer for LM Capital was the growth of pension

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<v Speaker 1>plans wanting minority money managers. You know, the change in

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<v Speaker 1>Maxine Waters was at that time already you know, pushing

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<v Speaker 1>for it. She's still in the in the in Congress

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<v Speaker 1>and she's still doing the same the changing loss game

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<v Speaker 1>for the high networth individuals or foreigners, not for pension plans.

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<v Speaker 1>But there was this big push for hiring my minority

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<v Speaker 1>money managers. Actually, they were carving out small pieces from

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<v Speaker 1>the bigger locations, from the big rfpiece. The big funds

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<v Speaker 1>always have been very biased towards using the pimp costs

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<v Speaker 1>and one cost of the world. Sure black rocks, but

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<v Speaker 1>there was an desire to use African American Asian Hispanic companies.

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<v Speaker 1>So we saw an opportunity there being a Hispanic firm

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<v Speaker 1>to pick up some of that money. So that's the

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<v Speaker 1>way we started. Nowadays, it's emerging managers. It's no longer minority.

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<v Speaker 1>There was court case that stopped the use of minorities

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<v Speaker 1>as discriminatory, and by now we're a little bit too

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<v Speaker 1>big to be considered emerging, so we have to compete

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<v Speaker 1>on performance. So well, that's that's not the worst thing

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<v Speaker 1>in the world. So when you say ur fps by

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<v Speaker 1>big institutions, your clients and potential clients are these giant funds.

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<v Speaker 1>They put out a request for proposal and you respond

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<v Speaker 1>with a proposal, and that's the basis of either winning

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<v Speaker 1>the business or not. Is that a fair way to

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<v Speaker 1>describe it. That's correct. They will get probably thirty to

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<v Speaker 1>four responses. They will pick up five or six finalists,

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<v Speaker 1>and then you they visit you, and then they pick

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<v Speaker 1>up three or four that present to the boards, and

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<v Speaker 1>then the board decides who gets the money. So what

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<v Speaker 1>are those beauty contests as they've been called. What are

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<v Speaker 1>they like when when a firm comes in and starts

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<v Speaker 1>kicking the tires and looking around your shop, what's that

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<v Speaker 1>experience like? It's an interesting experience because you have the

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<v Speaker 1>numbers to show for performance, but they want to understand

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<v Speaker 1>the process. They want to understand the people. They want

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<v Speaker 1>to make sure you have the back office to support it.

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<v Speaker 1>Compliance has become so important. The most interesting part for

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<v Speaker 1>me has been that almost all the teams look identical.

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<v Speaker 1>Three men, one woman, everybody six one weighs two hundred

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<v Speaker 1>and three pounds, whereas Brooks brothers suits and in our

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<v Speaker 1>is where different. First, my accent doesn't well, it helps.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think it hinders anything, but I'm not the

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<v Speaker 1>typical presenter that they normally have, and I tend to

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<v Speaker 1>joke with the boards and try to be more casual.

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<v Speaker 1>Probably when you are a smaller firm and your own

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<v Speaker 1>the firm, you feel that you don't have to explain

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<v Speaker 1>to anybody who you made it or you didn't make

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<v Speaker 1>the cut, or did you win the business or not.

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<v Speaker 1>So I like to enjoy this competition. I like to

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<v Speaker 1>I enjoy to to be fighting against the big boys

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<v Speaker 1>and hopefully sometimes winning. So is that an advantage to

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<v Speaker 1>be relaxed and casual and informal and joke around with

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<v Speaker 1>these people who are used to much more formal stiff

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<v Speaker 1>The group that you described sounds like they're all manufactured

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<v Speaker 1>in the same factory, and maybe that factory is Wharton

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<v Speaker 1>or Harvard Business School. But the fact that they all

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<v Speaker 1>look so similar and so similarly, does this give you

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<v Speaker 1>a tactical advantage when you're presenting. I think that in

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<v Speaker 1>many cases he does. In others, they expect to have

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<v Speaker 1>that and they want that traditional present presenter. I'm also

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<v Speaker 1>product of the same school, you know, part results. But

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<v Speaker 1>so there, my partner in the business went to the

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<v Speaker 1>to Annapolis. So you have the square American six one

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<v Speaker 1>blah blah blah, and you have this crazy Mexican coming

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<v Speaker 1>in and joking with the board. So I think the

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<v Speaker 1>combination makes them laugh and it makes you. It makes

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<v Speaker 1>you different in their eyes, and they remember you more memorable. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>So I have a friend who's at PIMCO, and uh,

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<v Speaker 1>he always he's now retired, but he used to complain

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<v Speaker 1>that he doesn't have time to um, to do anything,

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<v Speaker 1>or go to conferences or what have you, because they're

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<v Speaker 1>so busy managing a trillion dollars in fixed income. And

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<v Speaker 1>I used to bust his chops by saying, yeah, but

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<v Speaker 1>it's not stocks, it's bond that's that stuff practically manages itself,

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<v Speaker 1>which is a joke in the middle of a giant

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<v Speaker 1>bonds bull market. But the little tiny bit of truth

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<v Speaker 1>in that is how how much was it like shooting

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<v Speaker 1>fish in a barrel during the fat part of that

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<v Speaker 1>bull market you had rates coming down from what down

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<v Speaker 1>to practically zero? How challenging was it operating during that

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<v Speaker 1>giant long term trend. There are two problems managing fixed inco.

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<v Speaker 1>One is making sure you don't step on the mind.

0:14:43.760 --> 0:14:46.640
<v Speaker 1>As I said before, that you don't buy a world

0:14:46.680 --> 0:14:49.840
<v Speaker 1>Come bond or an end run bond or a Pacific

0:14:49.840 --> 0:14:54.440
<v Speaker 1>as an electric bond. On the other side, you have

0:14:55.600 --> 0:15:00.280
<v Speaker 1>the matter of liquid it the incise. It's not easy

0:15:00.360 --> 0:15:03.000
<v Speaker 1>to be a pimcoke when you have When you decide

0:15:03.040 --> 0:15:06.840
<v Speaker 1>to move and you have to sell five million or

0:15:06.880 --> 0:15:09.840
<v Speaker 1>a billion dollars worth of a bond, you have to

0:15:09.880 --> 0:15:13.320
<v Speaker 1>find another piece, another buyer on the other side. It

0:15:13.400 --> 0:15:16.800
<v Speaker 1>takes two to tango, and for them to find the

0:15:16.840 --> 0:15:20.880
<v Speaker 1>counterparty is very hard. For a firmlike Hours that you

0:15:20.960 --> 0:15:23.560
<v Speaker 1>move with ten or twenty million dollars, you can always

0:15:23.680 --> 0:15:27.840
<v Speaker 1>find the other side in a transaction. And after the

0:15:27.960 --> 0:15:32.200
<v Speaker 1>crisis in oh nine, they allocated much less capital to

0:15:32.280 --> 0:15:35.960
<v Speaker 1>the desks, so they don't have inventory. So when you

0:15:36.000 --> 0:15:38.120
<v Speaker 1>want to do a transaction, you have to go out

0:15:38.560 --> 0:15:42.200
<v Speaker 1>and beat it in the market, and it's very hard

0:15:42.400 --> 0:15:46.360
<v Speaker 1>to find a big chunk of of the same product.

0:15:46.400 --> 0:15:49.400
<v Speaker 1>If you want to be have commonality in your portfolios,

0:15:49.440 --> 0:15:51.480
<v Speaker 1>if you if you're a buyer, what about if you're

0:15:51.480 --> 0:15:54.480
<v Speaker 1>a seller. Story Like, my assumption is if I have

0:15:54.560 --> 0:15:56.280
<v Speaker 1>a ton of bonds to sell, I pick up the

0:15:56.280 --> 0:15:59.720
<v Speaker 1>phone like called black rock, and they buy whatever whatever

0:15:59.800 --> 0:16:02.720
<v Speaker 1>is out there. They will not. The thing is, they

0:16:02.720 --> 0:16:05.600
<v Speaker 1>don't want to allocate money to bonds, they don't want

0:16:05.600 --> 0:16:09.040
<v Speaker 1>to park money in bonds, so they will only do

0:16:09.080 --> 0:16:12.640
<v Speaker 1>the transaction if they want them at that precise moment,

0:16:13.160 --> 0:16:15.560
<v Speaker 1>and the broker dealers will only do them if they

0:16:15.640 --> 0:16:19.600
<v Speaker 1>find the buyer immediately. If not, they'll just tell you

0:16:19.720 --> 0:16:22.400
<v Speaker 1>there is no market for your bonds right now, and

0:16:22.440 --> 0:16:24.280
<v Speaker 1>I will keep you in mind, and that might take

0:16:24.320 --> 0:16:27.920
<v Speaker 1>three days or three weeks. So there's a little bit

0:16:28.000 --> 0:16:31.960
<v Speaker 1>of an illusion of liquidity in bonds when it's actually

0:16:32.920 --> 0:16:35.800
<v Speaker 1>harder to sell them than we tend to think. If

0:16:35.800 --> 0:16:38.240
<v Speaker 1>I go to sell a stock, there's a bid and

0:16:38.320 --> 0:16:41.160
<v Speaker 1>an ask. I can see the spread I know other

0:16:41.200 --> 0:16:44.200
<v Speaker 1>than giant size. I can move pretty much any stock

0:16:44.240 --> 0:16:47.560
<v Speaker 1>in my portfolio. But if I have a very specific

0:16:47.640 --> 0:16:51.600
<v Speaker 1>bond from a specific whether it's a corporate or a

0:16:51.680 --> 0:16:54.920
<v Speaker 1>sovereign or a state and local bonds. You're saying it's

0:16:55.000 --> 0:16:58.080
<v Speaker 1>not quite as easy to to hit that bid as

0:16:58.120 --> 0:17:00.960
<v Speaker 1>it is with a stock. You're absolutely clear, right, I mean,

0:17:01.160 --> 0:17:03.520
<v Speaker 1>that's why there are no time in sales in bonds.

0:17:04.119 --> 0:17:07.440
<v Speaker 1>You'll never see in stocks. You can say, I put

0:17:07.480 --> 0:17:09.960
<v Speaker 1>in my order the eleven fourteen in the morning, give

0:17:10.000 --> 0:17:13.280
<v Speaker 1>me all the transactions between eleven fourteen and eleven fifteen,

0:17:13.800 --> 0:17:16.679
<v Speaker 1>and your order has to be there. No time stamping.

0:17:16.880 --> 0:17:19.760
<v Speaker 1>No time stamping bonds. You know it might be three

0:17:19.840 --> 0:17:23.359
<v Speaker 1>days or three minutes later when the transaction is done,

0:17:24.200 --> 0:17:28.439
<v Speaker 1>and you want to have basically the same price if

0:17:28.480 --> 0:17:32.960
<v Speaker 1>you're selling or buying for different clients, so you cannot

0:17:32.960 --> 0:17:36.600
<v Speaker 1>buy little pieces and added up because it becomes very

0:17:36.640 --> 0:17:42.160
<v Speaker 1>complicated to allocate in the right way the different transactions.

0:17:42.600 --> 0:17:46.480
<v Speaker 1>Quite quite interesting. So let's talk a little bit about

0:17:46.560 --> 0:17:51.320
<v Speaker 1>that lack of liquidly. I'm I'm intrigued by your description

0:17:51.520 --> 0:17:56.040
<v Speaker 1>of the bond market. Um, is this something that's relatively new?

0:17:56.280 --> 0:18:00.160
<v Speaker 1>Was there always this much lack of liquidly? How as

0:18:00.200 --> 0:18:03.040
<v Speaker 1>the market changed over the past thirty years since you

0:18:03.160 --> 0:18:07.879
<v Speaker 1>launched LM Capital. I think that up to two thousand

0:18:08.000 --> 0:18:11.240
<v Speaker 1>and nine, the market was pretty stable and there was

0:18:11.400 --> 0:18:15.360
<v Speaker 1>enough money in the different broker dealers to make a market.

0:18:16.040 --> 0:18:18.280
<v Speaker 1>You know, they would buy the bond to keep it

0:18:18.320 --> 0:18:21.440
<v Speaker 1>there and wait for somebody to come up, meaning meaning

0:18:21.480 --> 0:18:24.080
<v Speaker 1>holding an inventory, and then when a buyer comes along,

0:18:24.119 --> 0:18:29.080
<v Speaker 1>they would now so much anymore, it's gone gone, you know,

0:18:29.880 --> 0:18:34.360
<v Speaker 1>probably went from Mary Lynch went from eight or ten

0:18:34.400 --> 0:18:37.040
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars to maybe a couple of hundred million. Is

0:18:37.080 --> 0:18:40.359
<v Speaker 1>that a risk management tool or they still suffering a

0:18:40.400 --> 0:18:44.040
<v Speaker 1>little post traumatic stress disorder after the crisis. Is this

0:18:44.280 --> 0:18:46.880
<v Speaker 1>is this smart of them or is this problematic by them?

0:18:47.000 --> 0:18:49.520
<v Speaker 1>I think that they're being smarter and the way they

0:18:49.520 --> 0:18:54.240
<v Speaker 1>allocate their capital. I think that the spreads in bonds

0:18:54.280 --> 0:18:57.880
<v Speaker 1>are not that high for them to make sense to

0:18:57.960 --> 0:19:01.320
<v Speaker 1>keep them in inventory and being much tighter with the

0:19:01.320 --> 0:19:05.240
<v Speaker 1>way they handle their money. Very very interesting. What about

0:19:05.280 --> 0:19:07.760
<v Speaker 1>the rise of e t f s, which are clearly

0:19:07.800 --> 0:19:11.560
<v Speaker 1>not just stocks, they're giant bondy tfs. How is that

0:19:11.640 --> 0:19:15.560
<v Speaker 1>affecting both the way you run LM capital and and

0:19:15.760 --> 0:19:20.439
<v Speaker 1>the way liquidity for specific bonds behaves in the in

0:19:20.480 --> 0:19:23.120
<v Speaker 1>the market. I think the tfs are not the right

0:19:23.200 --> 0:19:26.280
<v Speaker 1>way to play the bond market. I think that they

0:19:26.320 --> 0:19:28.840
<v Speaker 1>are very big, but I don't think they impact the

0:19:28.920 --> 0:19:32.119
<v Speaker 1>market that much. The problem is when it becomes a

0:19:32.200 --> 0:19:37.520
<v Speaker 1>herd mentality. If everybody is selling, you magnify the problem. Again.

0:19:38.560 --> 0:19:41.320
<v Speaker 1>When there's a trend to get out of the bonds

0:19:41.720 --> 0:19:44.000
<v Speaker 1>you need, you don't find the buyers. When there's a

0:19:44.040 --> 0:19:47.679
<v Speaker 1>trend to buy the bonds, it's hard to find these sellers.

0:19:47.760 --> 0:19:51.440
<v Speaker 1>So the e t fs magnify the problem instead of

0:19:51.720 --> 0:19:55.720
<v Speaker 1>making it less problematic. So I have a couple of

0:19:55.800 --> 0:20:00.800
<v Speaker 1>questions on that. That's really really intriguing. So first, when

0:20:00.840 --> 0:20:03.760
<v Speaker 1>there's that herd mentality like we saw in O eight

0:20:03.760 --> 0:20:08.000
<v Speaker 1>oh nine, isn't everything being sold regardless when when, when,

0:20:08.720 --> 0:20:13.080
<v Speaker 1>when the herd stampedes, everything seems to get run over.

0:20:13.600 --> 0:20:16.359
<v Speaker 1>Is that any different for bond stocks or ETF No,

0:20:16.440 --> 0:20:18.879
<v Speaker 1>it works the same way, but you don't have the

0:20:18.960 --> 0:20:23.280
<v Speaker 1>dramatic cratches they do. So in stokes, the bargain hunters

0:20:23.560 --> 0:20:26.200
<v Speaker 1>are probably not going to jump in because the bond

0:20:26.280 --> 0:20:29.119
<v Speaker 1>dropped two or three points. Two or three points is

0:20:29.200 --> 0:20:32.000
<v Speaker 1>huge in bonds. In stocks, you can see moves of

0:20:32.040 --> 0:20:34.760
<v Speaker 1>ten or twenty two or three points is a Tuesday.

0:20:34.840 --> 0:20:38.000
<v Speaker 1>Nothing's exactly. Here's the question that pops into my head.

0:20:38.400 --> 0:20:41.800
<v Speaker 1>Knowing that there's no guarantee of liquidly in the future,

0:20:42.440 --> 0:20:47.440
<v Speaker 1>how does that affect your process for selecting what bonds

0:20:47.920 --> 0:20:50.800
<v Speaker 1>you want to put into your portfolio. You you obviously

0:20:50.880 --> 0:20:54.080
<v Speaker 1>have an awareness, Hey, when the time comes, there may

0:20:54.119 --> 0:20:57.560
<v Speaker 1>not be the liquidly I'm hoping for if I have

0:20:57.680 --> 0:21:02.639
<v Speaker 1>to move these in a emergency. That's a very good question.

0:21:02.720 --> 0:21:05.440
<v Speaker 1>Very What we tried to do is buy global issues,

0:21:05.720 --> 0:21:09.960
<v Speaker 1>very big issues that a lot of people holding their portfolios.

0:21:10.680 --> 0:21:12.680
<v Speaker 1>You know, at one time you would find a good

0:21:12.680 --> 0:21:15.320
<v Speaker 1>issue of a hundred a couple of hundred million dollars.

0:21:15.400 --> 0:21:18.440
<v Speaker 1>We go for the billion dollar issues at least, and

0:21:18.560 --> 0:21:21.119
<v Speaker 1>we want the names that people want to hold in

0:21:21.160 --> 0:21:24.800
<v Speaker 1>their portfolio. There are some managers that try to create

0:21:25.119 --> 0:21:29.200
<v Speaker 1>alpha from buying smaller issues because the issue is forced

0:21:29.200 --> 0:21:31.840
<v Speaker 1>to pay a bit more because of the smaller sizes

0:21:31.920 --> 0:21:34.600
<v Speaker 1>of the issue. We don't like that. We want to

0:21:34.680 --> 0:21:38.960
<v Speaker 1>have the ability to get out whenever we want. So

0:21:39.000 --> 0:21:42.400
<v Speaker 1>the liquidly premium isn't worth the risk to you. It's

0:21:42.400 --> 0:21:47.040
<v Speaker 1>not quite quite interesting. So I've had this little personal

0:21:47.119 --> 0:21:50.040
<v Speaker 1>theory for the past couple of years that part of

0:21:50.080 --> 0:21:53.080
<v Speaker 1>the reason yields or as low as they are, is

0:21:53.119 --> 0:21:58.120
<v Speaker 1>that there's a shortage of quality sovereign bonds. We haven't

0:21:58.119 --> 0:22:01.359
<v Speaker 1>been running the usual and old deficits over the past

0:22:01.400 --> 0:22:04.639
<v Speaker 1>ten years, although clearly they've started to tick up post

0:22:04.640 --> 0:22:08.120
<v Speaker 1>crisis and and most recently, And that there's so much

0:22:08.200 --> 0:22:13.440
<v Speaker 1>capital around and such a demand for quality fixed income

0:22:13.960 --> 0:22:17.359
<v Speaker 1>that it gets hoovered up by all the buyers and

0:22:17.359 --> 0:22:20.879
<v Speaker 1>that helps to keep a lid on on rates. And

0:22:21.080 --> 0:22:24.439
<v Speaker 1>am I remotely accurate or is that crackpot theory? You

0:22:24.480 --> 0:22:27.919
<v Speaker 1>are accurate even though deficits have not been shrinking on

0:22:27.960 --> 0:22:31.840
<v Speaker 1>the country that have been growing bigger. Over half of

0:22:31.920 --> 0:22:35.560
<v Speaker 1>the sovereign bonds now have negative yields. Nine point seven

0:22:35.680 --> 0:22:40.720
<v Speaker 1>trillion dollars, mostly European bonds are negative, and we see

0:22:40.800 --> 0:22:45.800
<v Speaker 1>Japan frequently dips into So by negative yield you mean here,

0:22:45.840 --> 0:22:47.720
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to give you a pile of money, and

0:22:48.000 --> 0:22:51.040
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna give me most of it back, but not

0:22:51.080 --> 0:22:54.040
<v Speaker 1>all of it, because the yield is actually I'm gonna

0:22:54.440 --> 0:22:58.119
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna pay you to hold my money, which makes

0:22:58.200 --> 0:23:00.960
<v Speaker 1>no sense. At one time, many years ago, the only

0:23:01.000 --> 0:23:05.480
<v Speaker 1>country that had This was Switzerland that showed that they

0:23:05.640 --> 0:23:09.440
<v Speaker 1>wanted to sell the concept of safety, and they said,

0:23:09.880 --> 0:23:12.400
<v Speaker 1>this is like a vault. Money that comes in here

0:23:12.480 --> 0:23:15.080
<v Speaker 1>is totally protected, So I'm going to charge you for

0:23:15.160 --> 0:23:19.760
<v Speaker 1>the use of my vault. Nowadays, it's Germany, it's Japan,

0:23:20.400 --> 0:23:25.800
<v Speaker 1>it's Northern Europe. It's nine point seven trillion dollars. So

0:23:25.880 --> 0:23:29.640
<v Speaker 1>the only play there if you're an investor, is hoping

0:23:29.680 --> 0:23:33.440
<v Speaker 1>that the currency. Because you're investing in the local currency,

0:23:34.000 --> 0:23:38.080
<v Speaker 1>it's mostly euros or yends. Your hope is that the

0:23:38.119 --> 0:23:41.280
<v Speaker 1>euro gains against the dollar, or the end gains against

0:23:41.320 --> 0:23:44.520
<v Speaker 1>the dollar. But there are much better ways to play

0:23:44.600 --> 0:23:47.680
<v Speaker 1>currencies than to buy bonds. You know, to invest a

0:23:47.760 --> 0:23:50.560
<v Speaker 1>million dollars in bonds hoping for an increase in the

0:23:50.640 --> 0:23:53.240
<v Speaker 1>value of the currency. You can do a fraction of

0:23:53.320 --> 0:23:56.760
<v Speaker 1>that investment and do futures and you're in the same game,

0:23:57.440 --> 0:24:02.560
<v Speaker 1>so with far less risk. Absolutely. Another interesting situation is

0:24:03.480 --> 0:24:07.479
<v Speaker 1>the l d I, the long duration management of pension plans.

0:24:08.800 --> 0:24:15.080
<v Speaker 1>They are buying bonds with the maturity that matches their liabilities,

0:24:16.119 --> 0:24:19.480
<v Speaker 1>but with bonds that are not growing in value, it's

0:24:19.600 --> 0:24:24.400
<v Speaker 1>incredibly expensive to match. I mean, because they're not growing

0:24:24.560 --> 0:24:28.280
<v Speaker 1>so you're going to pay a million dollars a year

0:24:28.480 --> 0:24:31.800
<v Speaker 1>thirty years from now, or a million euros. You have

0:24:31.920 --> 0:24:35.480
<v Speaker 1>to buy a million thirty thousand euros in order to

0:24:35.560 --> 0:24:39.520
<v Speaker 1>have a million back. So it's very hard to manage

0:24:39.560 --> 0:24:43.840
<v Speaker 1>money against with l d I when you have negative deals.

0:24:44.320 --> 0:24:49.600
<v Speaker 1>Quite quite fascinating. So your firm uses something called scenario

0:24:49.760 --> 0:24:55.239
<v Speaker 1>planning to mitigate against global event risk. Explain what that

0:24:55.400 --> 0:25:00.000
<v Speaker 1>is and how can you actually reduce risk about events overseas.

0:25:00.920 --> 0:25:03.600
<v Speaker 1>We think of all the weird things that could happen,

0:25:03.760 --> 0:25:06.320
<v Speaker 1>very all the weird things that could happen. I mean,

0:25:06.480 --> 0:25:09.639
<v Speaker 1>we have a scenario hopefully well it will never happen.

0:25:09.720 --> 0:25:17.000
<v Speaker 1>But for another we have a scenario for the bankruptcy

0:25:17.040 --> 0:25:19.919
<v Speaker 1>of a money center bank. We have a scenario for

0:25:20.000 --> 0:25:23.840
<v Speaker 1>oil going down to twenty or over a hundred. We

0:25:23.920 --> 0:25:29.160
<v Speaker 1>have a scenario of North Korea throwing the bomb, and

0:25:29.280 --> 0:25:32.640
<v Speaker 1>we tried to play through what our reaction would be

0:25:32.880 --> 0:25:37.800
<v Speaker 1>to that event, so we're not caught by surprise if

0:25:37.840 --> 0:25:42.520
<v Speaker 1>God forbid they happen. So we know that if X

0:25:42.600 --> 0:25:45.919
<v Speaker 1>or Y happens, we're gonna be selling or buying the

0:25:46.000 --> 0:25:49.560
<v Speaker 1>bonds or whether we're going to be shortening or lengthening

0:25:49.560 --> 0:25:56.280
<v Speaker 1>our duration, and we replay scenarios almost I mean formally

0:25:56.440 --> 0:26:01.160
<v Speaker 1>once a quarter. Informally it can be any you're driving

0:26:01.200 --> 0:26:05.520
<v Speaker 1>in and you hearing news in the radio and you say, well,

0:26:05.960 --> 0:26:10.040
<v Speaker 1>that might cause a change in the environment. What would

0:26:10.040 --> 0:26:14.160
<v Speaker 1>we do? So we go into the conference room, everybody participates,

0:26:14.480 --> 0:26:17.359
<v Speaker 1>we use the blackboard, and we try to develop a

0:26:17.480 --> 0:26:22.520
<v Speaker 1>response to the event. Mhm. So so you mentioned, um

0:26:22.600 --> 0:26:26.679
<v Speaker 1>that that's really quite interesting. So so you mentioned the

0:26:26.840 --> 0:26:32.280
<v Speaker 1>nine plus trillion dollars in negative yielding sovereign debt. Given

0:26:32.280 --> 0:26:37.000
<v Speaker 1>those liabilities that pension funds and really just retirement accounts

0:26:37.040 --> 0:26:40.560
<v Speaker 1>are going to have, where can people go to find

0:26:40.680 --> 0:26:44.840
<v Speaker 1>yields without adding leverage or adding a whole lot of

0:26:44.960 --> 0:26:49.119
<v Speaker 1>risk to their portfolios. That is something that's keeping a

0:26:49.119 --> 0:26:53.399
<v Speaker 1>lot of people awake at night. Pension plans have if

0:26:53.480 --> 0:26:57.240
<v Speaker 1>you do share responsibility, that grows at about eight percent

0:26:57.280 --> 0:27:01.240
<v Speaker 1>per year, and they're not getting those learns from their portfolios.

0:27:02.359 --> 0:27:06.359
<v Speaker 1>They need to have fixed income. It's like the retaining

0:27:06.359 --> 0:27:09.520
<v Speaker 1>world in the portfolio and the source of liquidity if needed.

0:27:10.600 --> 0:27:13.600
<v Speaker 1>But if that fixed income is yielding, say they have

0:27:14.440 --> 0:27:17.439
<v Speaker 1>in fixed income, if the yield there is two or

0:27:17.440 --> 0:27:20.320
<v Speaker 1>two and a half percent. The other eighty would have

0:27:20.400 --> 0:27:24.359
<v Speaker 1>to generate in order to make up for whether they're

0:27:24.359 --> 0:27:28.679
<v Speaker 1>not making in fixed income. So they're going more and

0:27:28.760 --> 0:27:33.480
<v Speaker 1>more to private equity, to venture capital areas that are

0:27:33.520 --> 0:27:37.320
<v Speaker 1>definitely much riskier. And we can see what happened in No.

0:27:37.560 --> 0:27:41.760
<v Speaker 1>Nine that the dropping value of individual accounts or pension

0:27:41.800 --> 0:27:47.280
<v Speaker 1>plants was dramatic. They're looking for alternatives in fixed income,

0:27:48.080 --> 0:27:51.960
<v Speaker 1>for example, bank loans, which in reality is just high yield.

0:27:51.960 --> 0:27:55.360
<v Speaker 1>With the floating rate, they're doing more and more high

0:27:55.480 --> 0:27:59.040
<v Speaker 1>yield and moving down in the rating two towards disease,

0:27:59.400 --> 0:28:03.240
<v Speaker 1>which again is very dangerous. Or an USA class that

0:28:03.280 --> 0:28:07.000
<v Speaker 1>has become much more interesting, which is emerging market debt.

0:28:07.960 --> 0:28:11.760
<v Speaker 1>At one time, these sovereign bonds in the emerging countries,

0:28:12.240 --> 0:28:18.159
<v Speaker 1>countries like Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, China, South Korea, we're paying

0:28:18.160 --> 0:28:22.119
<v Speaker 1>three to four hundred basis more than comparable risks in

0:28:22.160 --> 0:28:27.040
<v Speaker 1>the US. It has come down a lot, but you

0:28:27.080 --> 0:28:31.280
<v Speaker 1>can still find very very good corporate names in the

0:28:31.320 --> 0:28:35.480
<v Speaker 1>emerging world, both in local currency and daughter they nominated.

0:28:36.080 --> 0:28:39.840
<v Speaker 1>They can give you a very sizeable pickup and allow

0:28:39.920 --> 0:28:44.160
<v Speaker 1>your fixed income portfolio to be closer to your needs

0:28:44.200 --> 0:28:47.400
<v Speaker 1>in terms of growth than what you get out from

0:28:47.440 --> 0:28:51.880
<v Speaker 1>the traditional US based core fixed So if I'm a

0:28:52.040 --> 0:28:54.760
<v Speaker 1>US investor and I'm not happy with two and a

0:28:54.840 --> 0:29:00.960
<v Speaker 1>half percent yield on traditional treasuries, how much additional risk

0:29:01.000 --> 0:29:04.479
<v Speaker 1>am I assuming going to either emerging market bonds on

0:29:04.520 --> 0:29:07.560
<v Speaker 1>a sovereign basis or e M bonds on a corporate

0:29:07.560 --> 0:29:11.200
<v Speaker 1>basis to pick up another two D basis points? Is

0:29:11.200 --> 0:29:14.400
<v Speaker 1>that a fair amount? At least? To be honest, if

0:29:14.400 --> 0:29:17.280
<v Speaker 1>you ask me, I don't think you're picking any additional risk.

0:29:18.200 --> 0:29:21.760
<v Speaker 1>I think that if you buy a company that's solid

0:29:21.840 --> 0:29:27.720
<v Speaker 1>investment grade in their own country and that generates let's

0:29:27.720 --> 0:29:31.440
<v Speaker 1>say you bought daughter the nominated bonds and they generate

0:29:31.680 --> 0:29:37.000
<v Speaker 1>the dollars to pay you back, both interesting principle, so

0:29:37.120 --> 0:29:39.280
<v Speaker 1>they don't have to buy them in a tough time

0:29:39.400 --> 0:29:42.760
<v Speaker 1>when their currency could have the valued You are taking

0:29:42.800 --> 0:29:46.840
<v Speaker 1>no additional risk. Let me give an example. Bimbo, the

0:29:46.880 --> 0:29:52.120
<v Speaker 1>Mexican bread company. Almost sixty of their sales are abroad.

0:29:52.320 --> 0:29:55.760
<v Speaker 1>You know, they're the largest producer in fourteen countries and

0:29:55.800 --> 0:29:59.640
<v Speaker 1>they're present in about fifty five countries where they sell bread.

0:30:00.400 --> 0:30:02.520
<v Speaker 1>It's a staple, it's a company that's been in the

0:30:02.600 --> 0:30:06.680
<v Speaker 1>market for a hundred years. They are double A plus

0:30:06.720 --> 0:30:12.240
<v Speaker 1>in Mexico. Their paper is yielding almost five that if

0:30:12.280 --> 0:30:15.600
<v Speaker 1>I took away the name and showed you the financials,

0:30:15.760 --> 0:30:17.960
<v Speaker 1>you would say this is a double A company in

0:30:18.000 --> 0:30:21.400
<v Speaker 1>the US, and it would be paying maybe three ten,

0:30:21.560 --> 0:30:26.720
<v Speaker 1>three twenty. So you're picking up two hundred plus over

0:30:27.400 --> 0:30:32.200
<v Speaker 1>against a credit paper in the US and almost three

0:30:32.280 --> 0:30:36.880
<v Speaker 1>hundred over against a US equivalent from a Treasury bond.

0:30:37.360 --> 0:30:41.200
<v Speaker 1>So you really are gaining a lot in a company

0:30:41.200 --> 0:30:44.720
<v Speaker 1>that basically has no risk. So how much of this

0:30:44.840 --> 0:30:47.680
<v Speaker 1>is just the home country bias? If you live in

0:30:47.720 --> 0:30:50.000
<v Speaker 1>the US, you tend to buy US stocks and bonds,

0:30:50.040 --> 0:30:52.480
<v Speaker 1>If you live in Germany you tend to buy German

0:30:52.520 --> 0:30:54.880
<v Speaker 1>stocks and bonds, and the same as true in Australia

0:30:55.360 --> 0:31:01.080
<v Speaker 1>or wherever. How significant is that to that gap between

0:31:01.560 --> 0:31:07.120
<v Speaker 1>domestic and emerging market yields? That pride of national product

0:31:07.360 --> 0:31:09.920
<v Speaker 1>it used to be very prevalent, it's no longer there.

0:31:10.640 --> 0:31:14.280
<v Speaker 1>The markets have become so global that buyers in Singapore

0:31:14.400 --> 0:31:18.840
<v Speaker 1>or Berlin or New York are are buying from everywhere.

0:31:18.960 --> 0:31:21.720
<v Speaker 1>So so what accounts for that two hundred and fifty

0:31:21.720 --> 0:31:25.240
<v Speaker 1>basis point difference in yields. It's the perception of things

0:31:25.240 --> 0:31:27.959
<v Speaker 1>that happened in the late nineties and the beginning of

0:31:28.000 --> 0:31:31.520
<v Speaker 1>the two thousand's, where one country got in trouble and

0:31:31.520 --> 0:31:35.000
<v Speaker 1>all the other countries got in trouble. It has to

0:31:35.160 --> 0:31:40.120
<v Speaker 1>have more work done to understand what you're buying in

0:31:40.160 --> 0:31:43.120
<v Speaker 1>the US. And even the credibility of the rating agencies

0:31:43.160 --> 0:31:45.680
<v Speaker 1>in the US has dropped a lot after all. Nine

0:31:46.280 --> 0:31:48.840
<v Speaker 1>But here you see an A rated bond and you

0:31:48.920 --> 0:31:51.760
<v Speaker 1>don't get too much into analyzing whether they will pay

0:31:51.800 --> 0:31:55.479
<v Speaker 1>you back or not. You believe if standard important movies

0:31:55.480 --> 0:31:58.280
<v Speaker 1>said it's good to take it for granted, well I'm

0:31:58.360 --> 0:32:01.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm assuming or I'm saying that you don't put a

0:32:01.680 --> 0:32:04.720
<v Speaker 1>lot of stock. And with the credit rating agencies say

0:32:04.840 --> 0:32:08.040
<v Speaker 1>you guys do your own due diligence and all these absolutely,

0:32:08.160 --> 0:32:14.240
<v Speaker 1>and remember that emerging just taken back into crediting emerging countries.

0:32:14.520 --> 0:32:18.600
<v Speaker 1>Eight of the companies are still run by the founding family.

0:32:19.400 --> 0:32:22.600
<v Speaker 1>They took them public in order to create liquidity and

0:32:22.640 --> 0:32:26.000
<v Speaker 1>the state for state purposes. Go back a second. I

0:32:26.000 --> 0:32:29.320
<v Speaker 1>want to make sure I caught that statistic right. In

0:32:29.400 --> 0:32:36.600
<v Speaker 1>Emerging market nations eighty percent of the um businesses or

0:32:36.640 --> 0:32:40.080
<v Speaker 1>of the publicly traded businesses. The publicly traded businesses are

0:32:40.120 --> 0:32:44.240
<v Speaker 1>still run by the founding family. That's amazing, it's incredible.

0:32:44.400 --> 0:32:47.040
<v Speaker 1>There was a radio company that went public here in

0:32:47.120 --> 0:32:52.480
<v Speaker 1>the NYC and governance, I mean the eleven board members

0:32:52.640 --> 0:32:58.440
<v Speaker 1>last name was usually it was all brothers, nephews and nieces.

0:32:58.520 --> 0:33:01.160
<v Speaker 1>And the New York Stock Seans did not like it.

0:33:01.480 --> 0:33:03.920
<v Speaker 1>They said, you know, this is not good e s

0:33:04.000 --> 0:33:07.800
<v Speaker 1>g Y S is horrible governance when the whole families

0:33:07.840 --> 0:33:10.360
<v Speaker 1>in the board does not work. But that's pretty typical

0:33:10.400 --> 0:33:13.360
<v Speaker 1>you're saying it is. So what you have to understand

0:33:13.480 --> 0:33:18.280
<v Speaker 1>besides the financials is who those families are. So you

0:33:18.360 --> 0:33:22.080
<v Speaker 1>need to do social analysis. You have to understand whether

0:33:22.160 --> 0:33:25.200
<v Speaker 1>you're funding a new plant or you're funding a new

0:33:25.240 --> 0:33:30.640
<v Speaker 1>G five that the that the chair, you know, if

0:33:30.640 --> 0:33:33.760
<v Speaker 1>a new girls stream versus a new exact making plants.

0:33:33.920 --> 0:33:38.560
<v Speaker 1>You want to understand that they're investing your money into

0:33:38.720 --> 0:33:42.200
<v Speaker 1>something that will be productive and create more wealth for

0:33:42.400 --> 0:33:46.000
<v Speaker 1>the shareholders or the bond holders. And that's something that

0:33:46.080 --> 0:33:49.840
<v Speaker 1>will bring more satisfaction to the founding family. That that

0:33:49.960 --> 0:33:53.640
<v Speaker 1>is that is really um fascinating. I had no idea.

0:33:54.080 --> 0:33:58.640
<v Speaker 1>I'm learning a lot today. So I think people have

0:33:58.880 --> 0:34:02.480
<v Speaker 1>changed the way they view and and think about debt

0:34:02.640 --> 0:34:07.760
<v Speaker 1>over the past thirty years. Um, how do you see that? Well,

0:34:07.800 --> 0:34:09.400
<v Speaker 1>first of all, do you do you agree? Do you

0:34:09.440 --> 0:34:14.520
<v Speaker 1>see the perception of debt having changed in society? And

0:34:14.560 --> 0:34:18.839
<v Speaker 1>how does that affect building a bond portfolio. At some time,

0:34:19.120 --> 0:34:22.520
<v Speaker 1>dead was seen as a bad thing, and now some

0:34:22.600 --> 0:34:25.239
<v Speaker 1>of that's a little bit of a holdover from the

0:34:25.280 --> 0:34:30.440
<v Speaker 1>Great Depression generation who never wanted to risk having a

0:34:30.480 --> 0:34:33.879
<v Speaker 1>bank call something away from them. Exactly having debt meant

0:34:33.960 --> 0:34:39.560
<v Speaker 1>that you were at risk. Nowadays debt makes sense for corporations.

0:34:40.160 --> 0:34:45.560
<v Speaker 1>They don't delude their shareholders. Their EPs are higher and

0:34:46.400 --> 0:34:50.360
<v Speaker 1>management is basically paid by the Their bonuses are based

0:34:50.360 --> 0:34:53.160
<v Speaker 1>on the value of their stock. So if you can

0:34:53.200 --> 0:34:57.040
<v Speaker 1>borrow cheaply and buy back stock or do things without

0:34:57.080 --> 0:35:01.160
<v Speaker 1>selling more equity, the performance of your equity will probably

0:35:01.160 --> 0:35:06.759
<v Speaker 1>be better. So it's become a tool of growth without delusion.

0:35:07.800 --> 0:35:12.080
<v Speaker 1>And I so once the CFO of Mark being interviewed,

0:35:12.960 --> 0:35:16.160
<v Speaker 1>and he said they asked him why did he borrow

0:35:16.280 --> 0:35:21.960
<v Speaker 1>two billion dollars when he had in cash almost eleven billion,

0:35:22.640 --> 0:35:26.080
<v Speaker 1>And he said, you know, at two thirty for three

0:35:26.120 --> 0:35:30.080
<v Speaker 1>year paper, I couldn't and being a taxi doctor, I

0:35:30.080 --> 0:35:32.840
<v Speaker 1>could not sleep if I didn't take out that money. So,

0:35:32.840 --> 0:35:35.080
<v Speaker 1>in other words, the way the tax laws are set

0:35:35.160 --> 0:35:40.600
<v Speaker 1>up around debt versus equity, corporate management is incentivized to

0:35:40.680 --> 0:35:43.640
<v Speaker 1>borrow versus using exactly, I mean it makes a lot

0:35:43.680 --> 0:35:46.839
<v Speaker 1>of sense to borrow in them. Buy backstock dividends are

0:35:46.880 --> 0:35:51.280
<v Speaker 1>not tax deductible. Companies were borrowing or are borrowing below

0:35:51.440 --> 0:35:55.360
<v Speaker 1>when they're paying dividends, so if they retire that stock,

0:35:55.880 --> 0:35:58.840
<v Speaker 1>then they're making money in the spread that That is

0:35:58.920 --> 0:36:00.759
<v Speaker 1>quite fascinating. Can you still around a little bit? I

0:36:00.800 --> 0:36:03.720
<v Speaker 1>have some more questions for you. We have been speaking

0:36:03.719 --> 0:36:07.520
<v Speaker 1>with Louise Mazel of LM Capital Group. If you enjoy

0:36:07.560 --> 0:36:09.719
<v Speaker 1>this conversation, well be sure and come back for the

0:36:09.760 --> 0:36:13.000
<v Speaker 1>podcast extras, where we keep the tape rolling and continue

0:36:13.080 --> 0:36:17.279
<v Speaker 1>discussing all things fixed income and emerging market related. You

0:36:17.320 --> 0:36:21.640
<v Speaker 1>can find that wherever Finder podcasts are sold, Apple, iTunes,

0:36:21.719 --> 0:36:27.120
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot Com, Stitcher, Overcast, et cetera. We love your comments,

0:36:27.160 --> 0:36:31.560
<v Speaker 1>feedback and suggestions right to us at m IB podcast

0:36:31.600 --> 0:36:35.040
<v Speaker 1>at Bloomberg dot net. You can follow my daily column

0:36:35.080 --> 0:36:38.520
<v Speaker 1>at Bloomberg dot com slash Opinion, or check me out

0:36:38.560 --> 0:36:42.160
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter at rit Holts. I'm Barry Ridlts. You're listening

0:36:42.200 --> 0:36:59.000
<v Speaker 1>to Masters and Business on Bloomberg Radio. Welcome to the podcast, Louise,

0:36:59.080 --> 0:37:00.800
<v Speaker 1>Thank you so much for doing this. This is really

0:37:00.840 --> 0:37:05.520
<v Speaker 1>an interesting conversation. I sometimes will chat with people, Um,

0:37:05.560 --> 0:37:07.000
<v Speaker 1>who do you have on the show this week? Oh,

0:37:07.040 --> 0:37:10.120
<v Speaker 1>I have Louise Mozelle. He's a you know, emerging market

0:37:10.160 --> 0:37:14.040
<v Speaker 1>bond manager, and I'll get that yawn back from them,

0:37:14.040 --> 0:37:15.640
<v Speaker 1>and it's like, well, tell me when you have somebody

0:37:15.680 --> 0:37:19.239
<v Speaker 1>interesting on. But this is really fascinating stuff. There is

0:37:19.280 --> 0:37:24.160
<v Speaker 1>so much more to emerging market bond analysis than I

0:37:24.200 --> 0:37:29.640
<v Speaker 1>think the average UM stock jockey really appreciates. UM, and

0:37:29.719 --> 0:37:31.799
<v Speaker 1>you you are expressing it in a way that I

0:37:31.880 --> 0:37:35.960
<v Speaker 1>find intriguing. Um. There are a few questions I did

0:37:36.000 --> 0:37:39.000
<v Speaker 1>not get to during the broadcast portion that I have

0:37:39.120 --> 0:37:41.720
<v Speaker 1>to run through. Let me let me run through those

0:37:41.719 --> 0:37:46.919
<v Speaker 1>before we get to our favorite questions. UM. I've heard

0:37:46.920 --> 0:37:50.480
<v Speaker 1>over the years that bond investors are the smart money,

0:37:50.520 --> 0:37:54.640
<v Speaker 1>that's where the bond vigilantes come from. Why is that?

0:37:54.719 --> 0:37:59.560
<v Speaker 1>Why is bond investing considered quote unquote the smart money.

0:37:59.800 --> 0:38:02.600
<v Speaker 1>I would not say smart money. It's the safe money.

0:38:02.719 --> 0:38:07.080
<v Speaker 1>It should be the save money. Nowadays, with leverage and

0:38:07.160 --> 0:38:10.439
<v Speaker 1>with what's happening in the markets, you need to have

0:38:10.600 --> 0:38:14.399
<v Speaker 1>a portion of your portfolio ready for events that might

0:38:14.520 --> 0:38:17.640
<v Speaker 1>alter the value of the whole portfolio. I mean you

0:38:17.719 --> 0:38:21.160
<v Speaker 1>have situations like the unicorns that the more money they lose,

0:38:21.200 --> 0:38:24.239
<v Speaker 1>the more valuable they are. That's literally true. There was

0:38:24.280 --> 0:38:28.600
<v Speaker 1>a column in Bloomberg that of all the past eighteen

0:38:28.600 --> 0:38:32.520
<v Speaker 1>months of I p o s, the worst the financials

0:38:32.560 --> 0:38:35.480
<v Speaker 1>were the better the first day I p O Pop was.

0:38:36.640 --> 0:38:40.600
<v Speaker 1>What you need to see is that bonds, bonds have

0:38:40.800 --> 0:38:44.719
<v Speaker 1>much more meat in them. It's less hope and it's

0:38:44.800 --> 0:38:48.920
<v Speaker 1>more reality. So when you say smart money, it means

0:38:49.160 --> 0:38:53.040
<v Speaker 1>people have to analyze that you are lending to somebody

0:38:53.080 --> 0:38:56.600
<v Speaker 1>that will pay you back. I mean, let's take Lift

0:38:56.680 --> 0:38:59.440
<v Speaker 1>for for example. We don't know what's gonna happen with

0:38:59.560 --> 0:39:02.239
<v Speaker 1>Lift five years from now. I would not buy a

0:39:02.280 --> 0:39:05.759
<v Speaker 1>bond from leaft a five year paper because as I

0:39:05.800 --> 0:39:08.279
<v Speaker 1>didn't buy a test LA bond, you know, if I

0:39:08.320 --> 0:39:11.400
<v Speaker 1>buy a test last talk, I'm betting the electric cars

0:39:11.480 --> 0:39:13.640
<v Speaker 1>or self driving cars are going to do very well.

0:39:14.600 --> 0:39:17.640
<v Speaker 1>Their bonds did very poorly. You know, they came out

0:39:17.680 --> 0:39:20.000
<v Speaker 1>a part. They're not trading at eighty eight cents on

0:39:20.040 --> 0:39:26.200
<v Speaker 1>the dollar. So it's a situation where leverage is dangerous

0:39:26.280 --> 0:39:31.040
<v Speaker 1>when you're not making any money. Bond analysis requires much

0:39:31.080 --> 0:39:35.480
<v Speaker 1>more substance than stock and alliss. So what about m

0:39:36.080 --> 0:39:39.040
<v Speaker 1>risk mitigation? What sort of tools do you use to

0:39:39.040 --> 0:39:43.840
<v Speaker 1>to control the risk you have? Well, we stress the

0:39:43.960 --> 0:39:48.520
<v Speaker 1>portfolio based on if rates move up a hundred peers

0:39:48.600 --> 0:39:53.040
<v Speaker 1>two hundred peers. We do it in either direction. We

0:39:53.239 --> 0:39:57.719
<v Speaker 1>try not to concentrate in one industry. We personally impose

0:39:57.840 --> 0:40:01.520
<v Speaker 1>some restrictions to our portfolio. We don't do casualty insurance

0:40:01.560 --> 0:40:04.800
<v Speaker 1>for example. Why not. We don't want to read about

0:40:04.800 --> 0:40:07.879
<v Speaker 1>the tsunami and all of a sudden it turned out

0:40:07.920 --> 0:40:10.880
<v Speaker 1>that the bonds of the company we hold, we're insuring

0:40:10.920 --> 0:40:14.400
<v Speaker 1>every single house that was destroyed by the tsunami. So

0:40:14.440 --> 0:40:19.920
<v Speaker 1>that's pretty much just a straightforward geographical diversification approach. We

0:40:20.000 --> 0:40:23.560
<v Speaker 1>don't do newly deregulated industries that saved us from and

0:40:23.719 --> 0:40:27.160
<v Speaker 1>run from World com We never did the airlines, for example.

0:40:28.600 --> 0:40:33.719
<v Speaker 1>Newly deregulated industries are a higher risk bond than as

0:40:33.760 --> 0:40:38.719
<v Speaker 1>widely perceived management. Let me give you an example. Pacific

0:40:38.760 --> 0:40:43.200
<v Speaker 1>Gas and Electric, or that the Pacific companies. They were

0:40:43.320 --> 0:40:46.920
<v Speaker 1>running a utility, they were selling power, and all of

0:40:46.960 --> 0:40:50.320
<v Speaker 1>a sudden they were deregulated. They went out and bought

0:40:50.360 --> 0:40:54.040
<v Speaker 1>the thrifty chain of drug stores. Wait, so when when

0:40:54.200 --> 0:40:58.759
<v Speaker 1>was PGN and California Utilities deregulated in the nineties and

0:40:59.840 --> 0:41:02.920
<v Speaker 1>the found out that selling crests toothpaste was not the

0:41:02.960 --> 0:41:06.880
<v Speaker 1>same as selling power to Two years later they sold

0:41:06.920 --> 0:41:08.600
<v Speaker 1>the company at a loss of one and a half

0:41:08.600 --> 0:41:11.799
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars and they had their bonds downgraded because of it.

0:41:13.200 --> 0:41:16.919
<v Speaker 1>If a manager was running an airline and he had

0:41:17.000 --> 0:41:20.239
<v Speaker 1>specific routes, he could not move from them. All of

0:41:20.239 --> 0:41:23.640
<v Speaker 1>a sudden he's competing with Joe and his brother who

0:41:23.680 --> 0:41:28.120
<v Speaker 1>both three planes and are doing the small cities. It

0:41:28.239 --> 0:41:31.360
<v Speaker 1>became very dangerous to compete in that market. We saw

0:41:31.520 --> 0:41:37.279
<v Speaker 1>every major airline go through bankruptcy. Communications you had the

0:41:37.320 --> 0:41:41.240
<v Speaker 1>Big I mean Big Mabel. You knew the Big Mobil

0:41:41.520 --> 0:41:45.320
<v Speaker 1>was the safest company in the world. Stuff. So when

0:41:45.520 --> 0:41:48.920
<v Speaker 1>when they broke them up, you know, they ended up.

0:41:49.000 --> 0:41:51.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean the world comes came up in the world

0:41:51.680 --> 0:41:55.520
<v Speaker 1>and the Worlcome ended up going broke, So that's another

0:41:55.640 --> 0:41:58.680
<v Speaker 1>one of the areas we don't do. And the third

0:41:58.719 --> 0:42:04.200
<v Speaker 1>one is nuclear power, and it's not for environmental reasons.

0:42:04.320 --> 0:42:08.200
<v Speaker 1>It's if some idiot forgot to close about the plant

0:42:08.320 --> 0:42:13.200
<v Speaker 1>might end up in a different state, so whoops, the

0:42:13.280 --> 0:42:18.720
<v Speaker 1>Washington State utility had a major problem with a nuclear plant.

0:42:19.800 --> 0:42:23.400
<v Speaker 1>Three my Leland is another example. We don't want to

0:42:23.440 --> 0:42:28.120
<v Speaker 1>take the risk of an error creating a situation where

0:42:28.120 --> 0:42:31.080
<v Speaker 1>our bonds would dramatically change in races. So if I

0:42:31.120 --> 0:42:33.200
<v Speaker 1>were to go around the country and look at the

0:42:33.320 --> 0:42:38.239
<v Speaker 1>utilities that have nuclear power plants on their books, their

0:42:38.280 --> 0:42:40.480
<v Speaker 1>bonds are going to be trading at a at a

0:42:40.520 --> 0:42:44.120
<v Speaker 1>discount to what non nuclear utilities or is this just

0:42:44.200 --> 0:42:47.920
<v Speaker 1>specifically specific to l M. Does anybody else do that?

0:42:48.120 --> 0:42:51.440
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, But for us that risk mitigation is

0:42:51.520 --> 0:42:56.200
<v Speaker 1>very important, and then we overlay our scenario planning so

0:42:56.480 --> 0:43:00.680
<v Speaker 1>we try to avoid anything that we have to get

0:43:00.680 --> 0:43:04.319
<v Speaker 1>out very quickly if something happened. I don't think you're

0:43:04.360 --> 0:43:07.239
<v Speaker 1>paid enough to take a little bit of an additional risk.

0:43:08.520 --> 0:43:12.400
<v Speaker 1>If you were paying me another three d beeps, I

0:43:12.400 --> 0:43:17.719
<v Speaker 1>mean three more in interest to taking to take additional risk,

0:43:17.840 --> 0:43:21.040
<v Speaker 1>I would consider it. If you pay me five beeps

0:43:21.400 --> 0:43:24.440
<v Speaker 1>point oh five of a percent more, it's not worth it.

0:43:24.560 --> 0:43:28.120
<v Speaker 1>Not worth it. So so you had mentioned the rating agencies.

0:43:28.640 --> 0:43:32.239
<v Speaker 1>Clearly they did a terrible job during the financial crisis.

0:43:32.680 --> 0:43:36.440
<v Speaker 1>We later learned that their whole business model had shifted

0:43:36.560 --> 0:43:41.000
<v Speaker 1>from the bond buyers paying their fees to the issuers

0:43:41.040 --> 0:43:44.160
<v Speaker 1>paying their fees, and it became a payola, pay for

0:43:44.280 --> 0:43:48.759
<v Speaker 1>play sort of situation. And if I walk into one

0:43:48.760 --> 0:43:50.600
<v Speaker 1>of them, if I walk into SMP and they don't

0:43:50.640 --> 0:43:52.960
<v Speaker 1>give me the double A rating I want, I'll just

0:43:53.040 --> 0:43:55.040
<v Speaker 1>say no thanks, and I'll go across the street to

0:43:55.120 --> 0:43:58.920
<v Speaker 1>Moody's and I will be able to purchase whatever rating

0:43:59.000 --> 0:44:02.920
<v Speaker 1>I I want. So given that, do you put any

0:44:03.120 --> 0:44:07.600
<v Speaker 1>consideration and to what the rating agencies do, either either

0:44:07.640 --> 0:44:11.560
<v Speaker 1>whether they cover a bond or a country or an industry,

0:44:11.719 --> 0:44:16.040
<v Speaker 1>or a specific upgrade or downgrade. How how important is that? Well,

0:44:16.120 --> 0:44:18.960
<v Speaker 1>we do follow them, we do read what they print,

0:44:19.120 --> 0:44:22.000
<v Speaker 1>and we do take into account their rating because they

0:44:22.040 --> 0:44:27.600
<v Speaker 1>have good analysis. After on nine, they've strengthened their their analysis.

0:44:28.400 --> 0:44:31.040
<v Speaker 1>I think that in the case of the mortgages, they

0:44:31.080 --> 0:44:33.920
<v Speaker 1>just did not understand the product so it was not

0:44:34.040 --> 0:44:36.080
<v Speaker 1>only the paid to play, but it was also a

0:44:36.200 --> 0:44:39.640
<v Speaker 1>lack of understanding how the different trenches would behave in

0:44:39.680 --> 0:44:44.320
<v Speaker 1>a crisis. But first of all, the change in rating

0:44:44.680 --> 0:44:48.279
<v Speaker 1>is not that impactful anymore. Now. When you went from

0:44:48.320 --> 0:44:51.920
<v Speaker 1>a triple B to a triple B minus, the bond

0:44:52.280 --> 0:44:55.279
<v Speaker 1>at one time would drop three points. Now it might

0:44:55.360 --> 0:44:58.040
<v Speaker 1>drop a quarter of a point. How much of that

0:44:58.239 --> 0:45:00.759
<v Speaker 1>is due to the fact that they did such a

0:45:00.840 --> 0:45:04.600
<v Speaker 1>terrible job when they were needed in the last last crisis.

0:45:05.120 --> 0:45:10.320
<v Speaker 1>It does impact what's happening, but the perception of whether

0:45:10.400 --> 0:45:13.359
<v Speaker 1>you cover your needs three point two times or three

0:45:13.400 --> 0:45:17.000
<v Speaker 1>times or two point nine does not make that big

0:45:17.000 --> 0:45:20.520
<v Speaker 1>a difference, even in the case of I mean and now,

0:45:20.680 --> 0:45:24.040
<v Speaker 1>triple beasts are the vast majority of bonds, you know,

0:45:24.080 --> 0:45:28.120
<v Speaker 1>their borderline between investment grade and high yield or low

0:45:28.200 --> 0:45:32.719
<v Speaker 1>investment grade, that's the nicest way of saying junk, you know,

0:45:33.160 --> 0:45:36.280
<v Speaker 1>But they're still considered an investment grade. They're investable for

0:45:36.719 --> 0:45:43.360
<v Speaker 1>anyone who's um charter or portfolio policy statement says only

0:45:43.440 --> 0:45:48.920
<v Speaker 1>investment grade exactly. But most pension plans, for example, today,

0:45:49.560 --> 0:45:52.760
<v Speaker 1>have a bunch of non investment grade bonds in their books.

0:45:53.239 --> 0:45:58.080
<v Speaker 1>At one time, you would think that that change would

0:45:58.080 --> 0:46:02.320
<v Speaker 1>eliminate basically who could by those bonds. And ever since

0:46:02.360 --> 0:46:08.080
<v Speaker 1>Michael Milken in the eighties the he created an industry

0:46:08.400 --> 0:46:11.759
<v Speaker 1>for non investment grade bonds. I mean, he did not

0:46:11.920 --> 0:46:15.719
<v Speaker 1>invent the hi yield bonds. He just invented who could

0:46:15.719 --> 0:46:19.359
<v Speaker 1>buy them. He went to the thrifties, thrifts, he went

0:46:19.400 --> 0:46:22.840
<v Speaker 1>to the savings and loans, he went to the insurance companies,

0:46:23.360 --> 0:46:26.560
<v Speaker 1>and then the patient plan said, well, let's make that

0:46:26.640 --> 0:46:30.040
<v Speaker 1>also an asset class in which we can invest. So

0:46:30.040 --> 0:46:32.600
<v Speaker 1>so let's talk about those pension funds for a moment.

0:46:33.080 --> 0:46:38.120
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned during the broadcast portion that their allocation has

0:46:38.160 --> 0:46:43.560
<v Speaker 1>been gearing more towards alternatives like venture capital and private

0:46:43.560 --> 0:46:48.600
<v Speaker 1>equity and hedge funds because they're looking for a higher

0:46:48.840 --> 0:46:53.120
<v Speaker 1>total expected return, which they're not just they apparently you're

0:46:53.160 --> 0:46:57.280
<v Speaker 1>not getting from stocks and bonds, but they also haven't

0:46:57.280 --> 0:47:01.480
<v Speaker 1>been getting them from the alternatives they've been They're expensive.

0:47:01.719 --> 0:47:05.120
<v Speaker 1>I like to jokingly say, come, come for the high fees,

0:47:05.200 --> 0:47:09.120
<v Speaker 1>stay for the under performance. But in all seriousness, they

0:47:09.200 --> 0:47:13.880
<v Speaker 1>have built out ten thirty sometimes even of their total

0:47:13.920 --> 0:47:19.919
<v Speaker 1>portfolios with these alternatives, and they've slapped a very high

0:47:20.200 --> 0:47:25.440
<v Speaker 1>expected return six eight, ten on these. Why is that?

0:47:25.480 --> 0:47:29.120
<v Speaker 1>How can they just say, even though we have decades

0:47:29.160 --> 0:47:31.520
<v Speaker 1>of data showing that these are not going to get

0:47:32.120 --> 0:47:35.000
<v Speaker 1>eight percent, we're still going to put an expected return

0:47:35.040 --> 0:47:37.239
<v Speaker 1>of eight percent on this. What? What does that due

0:47:37.280 --> 0:47:40.879
<v Speaker 1>to the allocations? They were getting those results years ago

0:47:41.040 --> 0:47:44.319
<v Speaker 1>in the eighties and nineties because there wasn't that much competition.

0:47:45.080 --> 0:47:48.880
<v Speaker 1>There's been so much money that has gone into alternatives

0:47:49.040 --> 0:47:52.000
<v Speaker 1>that now they're competing for deals and the yields are

0:47:52.080 --> 0:47:56.000
<v Speaker 1>are lower. It's just that's just market efficiency, isn't it.

0:47:56.120 --> 0:47:58.680
<v Speaker 1>You can't you can't have these big fat margins without

0:47:59.080 --> 0:48:01.839
<v Speaker 1>attracting other people to say I'd like a little bit

0:48:01.840 --> 0:48:05.759
<v Speaker 1>of that. I tend to joke saying that hope is

0:48:05.800 --> 0:48:11.160
<v Speaker 1>not a strategy, and a lot of the buying of

0:48:11.440 --> 0:48:17.000
<v Speaker 1>private equity adventure is hoping that in the future that

0:48:17.080 --> 0:48:20.000
<v Speaker 1>will be worth much more. If you own stocks or

0:48:20.040 --> 0:48:24.400
<v Speaker 1>your own bonds, the value is there every day you know,

0:48:24.520 --> 0:48:27.040
<v Speaker 1>you run a statement, you check what the value of

0:48:27.040 --> 0:48:29.759
<v Speaker 1>your stocks are. You can find out the value of

0:48:29.760 --> 0:48:33.359
<v Speaker 1>your portfolio every day. If you have private equity, you

0:48:33.360 --> 0:48:36.600
<v Speaker 1>have no clue how much is it worth when it

0:48:36.640 --> 0:48:40.480
<v Speaker 1>goes public when there's a liquidity event, then it's when

0:48:40.520 --> 0:48:43.320
<v Speaker 1>you know what happens. But it might take five or

0:48:43.400 --> 0:48:46.040
<v Speaker 1>ten years, and you never know the real value of

0:48:46.040 --> 0:48:50.680
<v Speaker 1>your investment. And you can always put any increased value

0:48:50.719 --> 0:48:54.680
<v Speaker 1>you want and it will show us though you're doing well,

0:48:55.440 --> 0:48:58.080
<v Speaker 1>and you might or might not get that value that

0:48:58.120 --> 0:49:00.759
<v Speaker 1>you put it down in your state. So the non

0:49:00.840 --> 0:49:05.279
<v Speaker 1>publicly traded assets give people the ability to mark, to

0:49:06.040 --> 0:49:09.840
<v Speaker 1>not mark the market, but mark two what hopes and

0:49:09.920 --> 0:49:12.160
<v Speaker 1>dreams is that what you suggest that it's not that bad.

0:49:12.239 --> 0:49:15.160
<v Speaker 1>But the answer is yes, you know, it's we used

0:49:15.160 --> 0:49:17.040
<v Speaker 1>to call it mark to make believe in the middle

0:49:17.080 --> 0:49:19.520
<v Speaker 1>of the crisis, but it's not. You know, we're not

0:49:19.600 --> 0:49:22.360
<v Speaker 1>suggesting that. You're saying it gives them a little bit

0:49:22.400 --> 0:49:26.480
<v Speaker 1>of accounting flexibility, exactly. I think that things are worth

0:49:26.520 --> 0:49:29.400
<v Speaker 1>what the buyer is willing to pay. I mean, I

0:49:29.440 --> 0:49:31.760
<v Speaker 1>think that if you ask them people who their house

0:49:31.880 --> 0:49:34.839
<v Speaker 1>is worth, you're going to get tent responses that are

0:49:34.960 --> 0:49:39.360
<v Speaker 1>higher than the actual market. But that's an emotional bias

0:49:39.480 --> 0:49:42.400
<v Speaker 1>that that makes some sense. It makes It's the same

0:49:42.440 --> 0:49:46.600
<v Speaker 1>as when they're valuing companies. Endowment effect is is certainly present.

0:49:46.840 --> 0:49:52.120
<v Speaker 1>You know, you want to believe that everybody is going

0:49:52.160 --> 0:49:55.560
<v Speaker 1>to see the same that you are seeing, and the buyer,

0:49:55.800 --> 0:49:57.839
<v Speaker 1>even if they perceive that the value is the same

0:49:57.880 --> 0:49:59.800
<v Speaker 1>as you do, they're going to fight to get a

0:50:00.440 --> 0:50:03.320
<v Speaker 1>They still want a discount of absolutely. You know, nobody

0:50:03.360 --> 0:50:07.920
<v Speaker 1>likes to pay retail sure, So you are really thinking

0:50:08.360 --> 0:50:10.840
<v Speaker 1>hoping that you're going to get the values you're putting

0:50:10.880 --> 0:50:14.200
<v Speaker 1>down in this statement, and that does not necessarily going

0:50:14.239 --> 0:50:17.680
<v Speaker 1>to happen. Sometimes you're going to be very pleasantly surprised,

0:50:18.200 --> 0:50:20.520
<v Speaker 1>but most of the time you won't. So I used

0:50:20.560 --> 0:50:22.680
<v Speaker 1>to joke with a friend who is at a pension

0:50:22.719 --> 0:50:28.560
<v Speaker 1>funds about what I perceived as their absurd expected returns

0:50:28.640 --> 0:50:32.600
<v Speaker 1>on their alternatives, and the response was, we need seven

0:50:32.680 --> 0:50:36.279
<v Speaker 1>or eight percent. So I used to say, well, let's

0:50:36.280 --> 0:50:38.400
<v Speaker 1>assume you get two and a half percent from your

0:50:38.400 --> 0:50:41.799
<v Speaker 1>bond portfolio and you get five percent from your equities,

0:50:41.880 --> 0:50:44.279
<v Speaker 1>and I'm up, there's your seven a half percent. And

0:50:44.320 --> 0:50:46.920
<v Speaker 1>it took him a moment to realize, well, that's not

0:50:46.960 --> 0:50:49.759
<v Speaker 1>how you do a blended portfolio. But it's every bit

0:50:49.760 --> 0:50:53.759
<v Speaker 1>as ridiculous as expecting ten percent from asset classes that

0:50:53.840 --> 0:50:57.480
<v Speaker 1>haven't returned. That sort of number for twenty or thirty years.

0:50:58.000 --> 0:51:01.560
<v Speaker 1>You're right, but you always kicking the can a little

0:51:01.560 --> 0:51:05.240
<v Speaker 1>bit further away. So probably by the time the pension

0:51:05.400 --> 0:51:08.959
<v Speaker 1>plan runs out of money, you will not be there, right,

0:51:09.040 --> 0:51:12.000
<v Speaker 1>So I mean that you say that half jokingly, but

0:51:12.160 --> 0:51:15.600
<v Speaker 1>we know that's true. Governments, state and local governments have

0:51:15.680 --> 0:51:18.960
<v Speaker 1>done that with their police pension funds and their fire

0:51:19.000 --> 0:51:22.600
<v Speaker 1>pension funds and their teacher funds that by the time

0:51:22.840 --> 0:51:27.200
<v Speaker 1>it's really problematic, the politicians responsible for that they're long

0:51:27.200 --> 0:51:30.200
<v Speaker 1>out of office. That someone else's headache. How can we

0:51:30.280 --> 0:51:33.440
<v Speaker 1>realign the incentives so that we're not just kicking the

0:51:33.480 --> 0:51:36.480
<v Speaker 1>can down the road or is that just human nature?

0:51:36.480 --> 0:51:38.320
<v Speaker 1>And this is what's going to happen. Look at the

0:51:38.400 --> 0:51:42.000
<v Speaker 1>state of Illinois. They have excellent managers managing the money

0:51:42.000 --> 0:51:45.200
<v Speaker 1>at the pension plans, and they're underfunded by I mean,

0:51:45.239 --> 0:51:49.759
<v Speaker 1>they probably are funded for thirty five it's politicians that

0:51:49.880 --> 0:51:53.800
<v Speaker 1>have not wanted to raise the contributions that are trying

0:51:53.840 --> 0:51:57.320
<v Speaker 1>to be re elected, so they don't pressure the public

0:51:57.640 --> 0:52:01.040
<v Speaker 1>workers to give more of their salary to their pension plan.

0:52:01.760 --> 0:52:04.839
<v Speaker 1>And you know, it's now a huge problem because they're

0:52:04.880 --> 0:52:07.480
<v Speaker 1>running out of money. So there are certain states that

0:52:07.560 --> 0:52:12.960
<v Speaker 1>have high taxes and big state spending, but seem to

0:52:13.000 --> 0:52:16.840
<v Speaker 1>have their budgets and their pension plans more under control.

0:52:16.960 --> 0:52:20.080
<v Speaker 1>California comes to mind, New York comes to mind. Amongst

0:52:20.120 --> 0:52:22.600
<v Speaker 1>the states a little better or or a lot better.

0:52:23.400 --> 0:52:27.720
<v Speaker 1>Clearly Chicago and Illinois have problems. I hear about problems

0:52:27.719 --> 0:52:31.799
<v Speaker 1>in New Jersey and Connecticut both have pension issues. How

0:52:31.960 --> 0:52:35.920
<v Speaker 1>significant is this going to be for funding UM in

0:52:35.960 --> 0:52:38.840
<v Speaker 1>the next twenty to thirty years. It's a huge problem,

0:52:39.120 --> 0:52:42.560
<v Speaker 1>huge huge Look at Detroit. Detroit had to file for

0:52:42.600 --> 0:52:45.160
<v Speaker 1>bankruptcy because of the pension place. So now what happens.

0:52:45.200 --> 0:52:49.040
<v Speaker 1>So now, if you're a company and you file for bankruptcy,

0:52:50.640 --> 0:52:53.960
<v Speaker 1>judges have a tendency. Courts have a tendency to say,

0:52:55.280 --> 0:52:59.719
<v Speaker 1>before you even get to the creditors, employee compensation, salary

0:52:59.800 --> 0:53:03.760
<v Speaker 1>and pensions is sacrosanct. We don't touch that. What happened

0:53:03.800 --> 0:53:09.560
<v Speaker 1>in Detroit with the the employee pensions post bankruptcy, some

0:53:09.680 --> 0:53:12.840
<v Speaker 1>of it were cut down. Cities can go bankrupt, states

0:53:12.880 --> 0:53:16.400
<v Speaker 1>cannot by law, right, But you know, they got to

0:53:16.400 --> 0:53:19.200
<v Speaker 1>the point where they were about to sell the paintings

0:53:19.239 --> 0:53:23.280
<v Speaker 1>from the museum in Detroit in order to pay pension plans.

0:53:23.680 --> 0:53:28.640
<v Speaker 1>The city is being revitalized, and they hope that eventually

0:53:28.640 --> 0:53:32.200
<v Speaker 1>they're gonna pull out, But again I hope. To me,

0:53:32.320 --> 0:53:35.600
<v Speaker 1>hope is not a strategy. Right, So, we know that

0:53:35.840 --> 0:53:39.600
<v Speaker 1>post hurricane, Puerto Rico has had or let's let's phrase

0:53:39.640 --> 0:53:43.600
<v Speaker 1>that a little differently. Post hurricane, it was revealed the

0:53:43.640 --> 0:53:48.240
<v Speaker 1>precarious state of Puerto Rico's finances, sort of like Greece

0:53:48.360 --> 0:53:51.560
<v Speaker 1>to the EU, Puerto Rico managed to borrow it rates

0:53:51.640 --> 0:53:54.680
<v Speaker 1>that were more suitable for the US than for Puerto Rico.

0:53:56.000 --> 0:53:59.600
<v Speaker 1>They're not a state, they're not a city, They're they're

0:53:59.640 --> 0:54:03.840
<v Speaker 1>a territory. What happens with that situation? Are they going

0:54:03.880 --> 0:54:06.960
<v Speaker 1>to be able to get a refinancing? Is bankruptcy even

0:54:07.000 --> 0:54:11.719
<v Speaker 1>an option for a non state, non city territory. Well,

0:54:11.880 --> 0:54:15.200
<v Speaker 1>first they can go to bankruptcy with the state owned enterprises,

0:54:16.360 --> 0:54:19.880
<v Speaker 1>but Puerto Rico had a big problem even before the hurricane,

0:54:20.600 --> 0:54:23.440
<v Speaker 1>and you know, the electric company had been in trouble

0:54:23.960 --> 0:54:29.240
<v Speaker 1>paying back even before the hurricane. So they are still

0:54:29.280 --> 0:54:33.920
<v Speaker 1>fighting it. They're still fighting with bond holders and the pain.

0:54:34.239 --> 0:54:38.480
<v Speaker 1>The public workers are crossing their fingers that their pension

0:54:38.520 --> 0:54:40.600
<v Speaker 1>will be there when they need. They were suffering a

0:54:40.680 --> 0:54:44.240
<v Speaker 1>brain drain before the hurricane. Because if you're in Puerto

0:54:44.320 --> 0:54:48.399
<v Speaker 1>Rico and you're making X, and you could just take

0:54:48.400 --> 0:54:50.960
<v Speaker 1>a plane to Florida or Texas or wherever you want

0:54:50.960 --> 0:54:54.200
<v Speaker 1>to go, because you're a US citizen, you could get

0:54:54.200 --> 0:54:57.239
<v Speaker 1>a job with that skill and make one and half

0:54:57.320 --> 0:54:59.680
<v Speaker 1>or two X. They seem to have lost a lot

0:54:59.719 --> 0:55:02.760
<v Speaker 1>of really talented people. They have, even though they created

0:55:02.800 --> 0:55:05.400
<v Speaker 1>a lot of incentives for people to go leave in

0:55:05.440 --> 0:55:08.399
<v Speaker 1>Puerto Rica. Very low taxes, very low taxes. The first

0:55:08.440 --> 0:55:13.000
<v Speaker 1>year you pay I think three percent income taxes. That's

0:55:13.040 --> 0:55:16.759
<v Speaker 1>not too shabby. A lot of big big money managers.

0:55:16.880 --> 0:55:20.000
<v Speaker 1>That's federal income tax, not state. So instead of a

0:55:20.040 --> 0:55:23.000
<v Speaker 1>top rate of thirty seven, your top rate is three. Yeah.

0:55:23.200 --> 0:55:26.560
<v Speaker 1>H fund managers have moved to Puerto Rico. Weather is

0:55:26.600 --> 0:55:29.480
<v Speaker 1>not too bad. It's not too bad. Good beaches. Huh.

0:55:29.960 --> 0:55:33.200
<v Speaker 1>So I only have you for a limited amount of time.

0:55:34.000 --> 0:55:35.960
<v Speaker 1>Let me get to some of my favorite questions I

0:55:36.000 --> 0:55:38.960
<v Speaker 1>asked all of my guests. It adds a little bit

0:55:39.000 --> 0:55:42.200
<v Speaker 1>of a sort of cinema verity when I move off

0:55:42.280 --> 0:55:44.960
<v Speaker 1>Mike and people can tell that I'm doing that. I

0:55:45.239 --> 0:55:47.759
<v Speaker 1>kind of like that especially at the end, not during

0:55:47.760 --> 0:55:50.960
<v Speaker 1>the broadcast portion. Um, but let's jump to these questions.

0:55:51.600 --> 0:55:54.600
<v Speaker 1>We'll call this our speed round. So what was the

0:55:54.680 --> 0:56:00.359
<v Speaker 1>first car you ever owned? Year make and model six

0:56:00.440 --> 0:56:04.440
<v Speaker 1>dog Dart dodged. They were My sister had one of those.

0:56:05.160 --> 0:56:08.280
<v Speaker 1>It was a sixty six or sixty seven. Those cars

0:56:08.320 --> 0:56:11.480
<v Speaker 1>could not be killed. They were three thousand mile cars

0:56:11.480 --> 0:56:14.120
<v Speaker 1>from the sixties. I wish it had been my sisters

0:56:14.120 --> 0:56:16.440
<v Speaker 1>in that mind. So you had a problem with it.

0:56:16.640 --> 0:56:19.359
<v Speaker 1>I did not like it, but because when my father

0:56:19.440 --> 0:56:21.799
<v Speaker 1>gave me it wasn't the prettiest car, but they were

0:56:21.880 --> 0:56:25.440
<v Speaker 1>kind of indestructible for that they were, Um tell us

0:56:25.480 --> 0:56:28.120
<v Speaker 1>the most important thing that your friends and family don't

0:56:28.120 --> 0:56:33.920
<v Speaker 1>know about you. I love red wine. That's my passion,

0:56:34.000 --> 0:56:37.480
<v Speaker 1>and I'm a collector. Very interesting. Who were some of

0:56:37.520 --> 0:56:40.799
<v Speaker 1>your early mentors who helped shape your view of the

0:56:40.840 --> 0:56:46.880
<v Speaker 1>fixed income markets and investing? A Nobel Prize winner professor

0:56:46.920 --> 0:56:53.560
<v Speaker 1>at Harvard before I really got to know him, Bill Gross,

0:56:55.840 --> 0:56:58.000
<v Speaker 1>before you got to know him, not after, not after,

0:56:58.960 --> 0:57:03.400
<v Speaker 1>And I would say that the mentor was my father,

0:57:03.560 --> 0:57:06.160
<v Speaker 1>not in terms of investing, but in terms of values.

0:57:06.960 --> 0:57:09.319
<v Speaker 1>Hard work is the only thing that makes you do

0:57:09.360 --> 0:57:13.560
<v Speaker 1>well makes it makes a lot of sense. Um, tell

0:57:13.640 --> 0:57:15.880
<v Speaker 1>us about your favorite books. What are you reading? What,

0:57:15.880 --> 0:57:19.880
<v Speaker 1>what do you recommend other people read? Fiction, nonfiction, investing

0:57:19.920 --> 0:57:25.360
<v Speaker 1>related whatever. In fiction, I love the Mill Nelson, The Mill,

0:57:25.720 --> 0:57:30.040
<v Speaker 1>I love the series by ken fall It. And in

0:57:30.160 --> 0:57:34.880
<v Speaker 1>nonfiction I'm reading now a great book of the woman

0:57:34.960 --> 0:57:37.640
<v Speaker 1>that ran the Spye Network for the French in the

0:57:37.720 --> 0:57:42.080
<v Speaker 1>Second World War, Madame for God, And I love Harari's

0:57:42.240 --> 0:57:47.320
<v Speaker 1>the Israeli guy that's part historian, part philosopher. The one

0:57:47.440 --> 0:57:51.000
<v Speaker 1>Questions for the twenty one Centuries an amazing book. Really.

0:57:51.200 --> 0:57:54.200
<v Speaker 1>I read same guy who wrote Sapiens Schapions, and then

0:57:54.320 --> 0:57:58.120
<v Speaker 1>Homo which was a little darker than say, and now

0:57:58.160 --> 0:58:01.440
<v Speaker 1>The Questions in Tours a great book. I'm gonna I'm

0:58:01.440 --> 0:58:04.800
<v Speaker 1>gonna put that one on my list. The the ken

0:58:04.800 --> 0:58:07.160
<v Speaker 1>Fileted series, He's had a number of different series, which

0:58:07.160 --> 0:58:09.720
<v Speaker 1>one you were find both the Piers of the Earth

0:58:09.800 --> 0:58:11.880
<v Speaker 1>they went about the building of the Cathedral, and then

0:58:11.920 --> 0:58:15.640
<v Speaker 1>the one that takes him through the Three Wars. I mean,

0:58:15.800 --> 0:58:20.240
<v Speaker 1>his writing is amazing. I love historic novels. That's really

0:58:20.280 --> 0:58:23.600
<v Speaker 1>quite interesting. Tell us about a time you failed and

0:58:23.640 --> 0:58:26.840
<v Speaker 1>what you learned from the experience When I was living

0:58:26.840 --> 0:58:32.560
<v Speaker 1>in Mexico. I found the smoking withdrawal system from water Peak,

0:58:33.200 --> 0:58:37.160
<v Speaker 1>so I flew to Fort Collins and negotiated with them.

0:58:37.320 --> 0:58:40.400
<v Speaker 1>The representation in Mexico brought it to Mexico, and then

0:58:40.440 --> 0:58:42.960
<v Speaker 1>found out that Mexicans did not want to stop smoking,

0:58:44.280 --> 0:58:47.520
<v Speaker 1>so it was not a good business. I just thought

0:58:47.560 --> 0:58:49.640
<v Speaker 1>that I could carry over what was happening in the

0:58:49.680 --> 0:58:53.760
<v Speaker 1>US new Mexico. And you have to understand local mentality

0:58:53.760 --> 0:58:57.000
<v Speaker 1>and local desires. Is that still true or Mexicans still

0:58:57.240 --> 0:59:00.760
<v Speaker 1>big tobacco smokers relative to what it was like thirty

0:59:00.840 --> 0:59:03.600
<v Speaker 1>years ago. It's lower, but it's much bigger than in

0:59:03.640 --> 0:59:05.560
<v Speaker 1>the U. S. I mean it's fallen. I grew up

0:59:05.560 --> 0:59:08.280
<v Speaker 1>in a I've never been a smoker. My parents were smokers.

0:59:08.280 --> 0:59:12.160
<v Speaker 1>They eventually stopped. But in the United States it's fallen

0:59:12.200 --> 0:59:16.600
<v Speaker 1>off a cliff like it's like it's almost noteworthy when

0:59:16.640 --> 0:59:19.320
<v Speaker 1>you see someone in the street with a cigarette. I'm

0:59:19.360 --> 0:59:23.360
<v Speaker 1>not even talking about vaping an actual tobacco cigarette. It's

0:59:23.400 --> 0:59:26.560
<v Speaker 1>almost like, you know, a rarity. It's like spotting a

0:59:26.600 --> 0:59:30.120
<v Speaker 1>wild unicorn. In Mexico, you cannot open your restaurant without it.

0:59:30.240 --> 0:59:32.960
<v Speaker 1>Darris for smokers, but they're not allowed to smoke in

0:59:33.000 --> 0:59:35.760
<v Speaker 1>the restaurant proper. That's a smaller part of the restaurant.

0:59:36.480 --> 0:59:39.280
<v Speaker 1>That's that's amazing. Um. What do you do for fun?

0:59:39.320 --> 0:59:41.120
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned red wine? What else do you do to

0:59:41.280 --> 0:59:45.680
<v Speaker 1>stay busy out of the office, traveling, reading, watching sports

0:59:45.720 --> 0:59:48.120
<v Speaker 1>on TV, and playing some golf? What what sports do

0:59:48.160 --> 0:59:54.000
<v Speaker 1>you watch? I watch basketball and I watch golf, and

0:59:54.040 --> 0:59:57.720
<v Speaker 1>my wife says I would watch Jackson if they show

0:59:57.760 --> 1:00:02.080
<v Speaker 1>the tournament. Um, what has you most excited about the

1:00:02.120 --> 1:00:05.240
<v Speaker 1>bond market these days? What? What are you enthusiastic about.

1:00:05.560 --> 1:00:08.680
<v Speaker 1>I love the idea that emerging market that has become

1:00:08.720 --> 1:00:11.680
<v Speaker 1>an asset class, and almost everybody is not pursuing it.

1:00:12.120 --> 1:00:14.160
<v Speaker 1>We've been at it for thirty years and I think

1:00:14.200 --> 1:00:17.720
<v Speaker 1>one of the stronger firms in the country. On So,

1:00:17.920 --> 1:00:20.960
<v Speaker 1>if a young college grad or millennial came up to

1:00:20.960 --> 1:00:23.480
<v Speaker 1>you and said they were interested in a career in

1:00:23.560 --> 1:00:27.000
<v Speaker 1>fixed income, what sort of advice would you give them?

1:00:27.240 --> 1:00:30.520
<v Speaker 1>Try to go beyond what you're reading the in the financials.

1:00:30.600 --> 1:00:34.280
<v Speaker 1>I mean, reading financials is one thing. Understanding what the

1:00:34.320 --> 1:00:37.400
<v Speaker 1>company does or who runs it is probably more important

1:00:37.400 --> 1:00:41.320
<v Speaker 1>than anything. And our final question, what do you know

1:00:41.400 --> 1:00:44.840
<v Speaker 1>about the world of bond investing today that you wish

1:00:44.840 --> 1:00:49.120
<v Speaker 1>you knew thirty years ago when you first launched the firm,

1:00:49.120 --> 1:00:53.200
<v Speaker 1>that the trend torch lower rates was gonna last thirty years.

1:00:53.280 --> 1:00:55.479
<v Speaker 1>I would have made a ton of money. I would

1:00:55.760 --> 1:00:59.439
<v Speaker 1>have bought only thirty year paper. It wasn't obvious back

1:00:59.440 --> 1:01:01.400
<v Speaker 1>then that this was the start of a three decade

1:01:01.440 --> 1:01:06.800
<v Speaker 1>long bullmarket. No, we were coming out, I mean from

1:01:06.840 --> 1:01:12.200
<v Speaker 1>the Jimmy Carter days with big inflation and globalization had

1:01:12.200 --> 1:01:16.240
<v Speaker 1>not taken over yet, so boom and bust was still

1:01:16.360 --> 1:01:18.760
<v Speaker 1>part of the story of the economy in the US.

1:01:19.400 --> 1:01:21.680
<v Speaker 1>The economy in the US has changed so much, you know,

1:01:21.880 --> 1:01:26.320
<v Speaker 1>it's no longer that globalization. If there's a crisis, all

1:01:26.360 --> 1:01:30.280
<v Speaker 1>you do is called your supplier and say in China

1:01:30.400 --> 1:01:32.680
<v Speaker 1>or in Mexico, and you tell them those ship the

1:01:32.720 --> 1:01:35.760
<v Speaker 1>next six months. You don't have to shut down the plant. Huh.

1:01:35.920 --> 1:01:39.640
<v Speaker 1>Quite quite interesting. We have been speaking to Louise Mazelle

1:01:39.720 --> 1:01:43.560
<v Speaker 1>of LM Capital Group. If you enjoy this conversation, well,

1:01:43.680 --> 1:01:45.240
<v Speaker 1>be sure to look Up an Inch or down an

1:01:45.280 --> 1:01:49.240
<v Speaker 1>Inch on Apple iTunes or wherever you have access to

1:01:49.320 --> 1:01:51.920
<v Speaker 1>this podcast, and you could check out any of the

1:01:51.960 --> 1:01:56.240
<v Speaker 1>other two hundred and fifty podcasts we have broadcast over

1:01:56.240 --> 1:01:59.560
<v Speaker 1>the past five years. We love your comments, feedback and

1:01:59.560 --> 1:02:04.000
<v Speaker 1>SIGG questions right to us at m IB podcast at

1:02:04.040 --> 1:02:07.200
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot net. I would be remiss if I did

1:02:07.240 --> 1:02:10.960
<v Speaker 1>not thank the Crack staff who helps put these conversations

1:02:11.000 --> 1:02:17.200
<v Speaker 1>together each week. My producer slash audio engineer is Medina Parwanna.

1:02:17.760 --> 1:02:22.000
<v Speaker 1>Taylor Riggs and Michael Boyle are our bookers. Attica val

1:02:22.040 --> 1:02:25.720
<v Speaker 1>Brunn is our project manager. Michael Batnick is our head

1:02:25.760 --> 1:02:29.760
<v Speaker 1>of research. I'm Barry Results. You've been listening to Masters

1:02:29.800 --> 1:02:31.920
<v Speaker 1>in Business on Bloomberg Radio