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Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello everyone,

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Speaker 1: welcome to tech stuff. My name is Chris Poulett and

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Speaker 1: I'm an editor and how stuff works dot com. Sitting

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Speaker 1: in fresh for me as always a senior writer. Jonathan

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Speaker 1: Strickland Hi high above the North Pole. On the first

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Speaker 1: day of nineteen sixty nine, two professors of English literature

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Speaker 1: approached each other at a combined velocity of one thousand,

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Speaker 1: two hundred miles per hour. Hmmm did they collide? You'll

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Speaker 1: have to read the book to find out. Done. Done.

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Speaker 1: So we are today talking about an interesting subject. Definitely

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Speaker 1: something that is beyond the eyes of mirror mortals, unless,

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Speaker 1: of course, you will put the right software on your

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Speaker 1: computer or you know what you're doing. Yeah, more or less, Okay,

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Speaker 1: beyond the eyes of people like me, because I'm such

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Speaker 1: a I'm such a service level kind of guy. We're

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Speaker 1: talking about the dark web or the dark Internet, or

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Speaker 1: the deep web, or the undernet or the deep net,

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Speaker 1: or the invisible web or the hidden web. There are

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Speaker 1: a lot of different names for this. Yeah, so there

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Speaker 1: are two main definitions we need to get out of

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Speaker 1: the way. Yes, because there are people think of different

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Speaker 1: things when these terms come up, and both both things

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Speaker 1: are real and need to be addressed. So here's the

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Speaker 1: less interesting one, at least in my opinion. There are

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Speaker 1: machines that either were once connected to the Internet or

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Speaker 1: were once connected to a network that subsequently was connected

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Speaker 1: to the Internet, that are no longer reachable on the Internet. Okay,

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Speaker 1: so let's say, like their entire military networks that were

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Speaker 1: part of arpanet back when arponette was a thing, and Arpanet,

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Speaker 1: if you guys don't know, was a predecessor to the Internet.

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Speaker 1: It was where a lot of the protocols that were

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Speaker 1: developed for the Internet first were used. If only somebody

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Speaker 1: wrote an article about that for how Stuff Works dot com. Hey,

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Speaker 1: and funny, you should mention that I did write an

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Speaker 1: article about that how arpa Networks. But yeah, urpennet actually

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Speaker 1: a very interesting story. Yeah, it's and that is the

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Speaker 1: story of creating a network that can let different machines

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Speaker 1: uh communicate with one another. You know, and before networks

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Speaker 1: were mostly composed of machines that were essentially identical to

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Speaker 1: each other and they were all generally within the same space,

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Speaker 1: like same building. But Arpanet was an attempt to create

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Speaker 1: a network that would allow different machines running on different

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Speaker 1: operating systems and different locations communicate with one another. And

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Speaker 1: it grew substantially over the years that it existed, and

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Speaker 1: it started to incorporate other types of networks, including military

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Speaker 1: networks and research organizations. Well, some of those military networks

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Speaker 1: did not keep pace with the changes that were aid

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Speaker 1: when the Internet began to emerge. Now, our bonnette and

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Speaker 1: the Internet are not the same thing, not technically. The

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Speaker 1: Internet is a is a network of networks, of which

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Speaker 1: our ponnet was sort of kind of one, But our

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Speaker 1: ponett's essentially been offline. That's another example. Is that stuff

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Speaker 1: that was on our ponnet that's no longer accessible by

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Speaker 1: the Internet. Um, sometimes these machines themselves have failed and

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Speaker 1: they are no longer reachable, so that information is the

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Speaker 1: at least the original source of the information is lost.

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Speaker 1: You might be able to find bits and pieces of

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Speaker 1: information on other sites because people have have cited it

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Speaker 1: or stolen it or whatever, but the actual original source

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Speaker 1: of that information is gone. You know what occurs to me,

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Speaker 1: what's that that we should point out to that that

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Speaker 1: that information may not have ever been on the web.

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Speaker 1: Um because as as a lot of our listeners know,

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Speaker 1: but maybe not all of them, Uh, the the Worldwide

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Speaker 1: Web is a part of the Internet. It is not

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Speaker 1: the entire ternet. There's information that is available on a

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Speaker 1: computer network that can be accessed through different means, and

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Speaker 1: so calling it the deep web in that case, in

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Speaker 1: the in the definition that you were just talking about,

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Speaker 1: the sense that that you were just talking about may

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Speaker 1: not necessarily be completely accurate because it might be found

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Speaker 1: in a different form. Um. Not that I'm saying that

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Speaker 1: you're wrong, more of a clarification so that that people

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Speaker 1: understand it does a great clarification, because, yeah, the Internet

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Speaker 1: comprises so many different ways of sharing information email for example,

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Speaker 1: one way, file transfer protocol, another way using net us

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Speaker 1: net HTTP being the web based way of yea of

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Speaker 1: sharing information. And yeah, when we talk about deep webs,

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Speaker 1: some of this information is not necessarily the kind that

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Speaker 1: you would access with a normal web browser, right exactly.

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Speaker 1: So that's a good point. You might have to have

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Speaker 1: some sort of emulator, or you may have to have

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Speaker 1: a totally different kind of program in order to access

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Speaker 1: that information, and that sort of leads into the second sense.

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Speaker 1: I think, yes, yes, So, so that first sense is

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Speaker 1: stuff that is no longer accessible, either due to machine

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Speaker 1: failures or the fact that just did not keep pace

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Speaker 1: with the protocols, or it was disconnected for a reason there. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: just though it is now its own intranet, but is

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Speaker 1: no longer connected to the Internet at any rate. That's

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Speaker 1: stuff that maybe at one time was connected to the Internet,

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Speaker 1: but now no longer is, and therefore you cannot get

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Speaker 1: to it. That's why we call it dark. That's that

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Speaker 1: one definition. Now here's the more super cool, awesome, spy

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Speaker 1: scary definition. Well, and in its purest sense, I would

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Speaker 1: say it's not spy or scary at all. Um. You

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Speaker 1: think about the depth and breadth of the Internet as

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Speaker 1: you see it on a search engine. You know, you

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Speaker 1: put in a search term, you get three hundred thousand

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Speaker 1: hits plus for for a topic, and you go, wow,

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Speaker 1: there's a whole lot of information out there. Well, that's

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Speaker 1: only the information that the web browser that the search

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Speaker 1: engine knows to go to find. We call that the

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Speaker 1: surface web. Yeah, yeah, and it's overused as as a metaphor.

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Speaker 1: But the whole Iceberg thing really applies here. It is

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Speaker 1: really a very very small section of what's available on

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Speaker 1: the internet as a whole. Part of it's because that

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Speaker 1: that's what's available on the web, and there are other protocols.

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Speaker 1: It's not that Google, for example, is not searching. You know,

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Speaker 1: it's not necessarily collecting all the information that's on on

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Speaker 1: US net sites and things like that, so you may

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Speaker 1: or may not find the information that's out there. Uh

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Speaker 1: some people don't want their site indexed, and they can

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Speaker 1: choose not to just by putting in a little bit

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Speaker 1: of code at the top of their their their page.

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Speaker 1: It will It's essentially an instruction saying, hey, web crawlers,

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Speaker 1: skip the site. Yes, do not index this site that

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Speaker 1: I do not want an index and the web crawlers won't,

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Speaker 1: they'll ignore it, they'll move on. And so then you

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Speaker 1: have a website that is not indexed by any search

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Speaker 1: engine and the only way to get there or as

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Speaker 1: if there is another incoming link from somewhere else. Uh So,

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Speaker 1: so someone's build a website and they've gone outgoing link

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Speaker 1: to this other website that doesn't have any that's not

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Speaker 1: indexed by websites or web search engines rather or you

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Speaker 1: physically give out the U r L two people. Well,

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Speaker 1: and then then there's stuff that's dynamically generated, such as

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Speaker 1: the search engines results page such as, um, let's say

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Speaker 1: you go to your bank and you want to see, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, the your balance on your account. You log

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Speaker 1: in and you you know, check the balance on your account. Well,

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Speaker 1: that page that you generate by logging in checking at

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Speaker 1: you know, to fourteen pm and twenty six seconds, that

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Speaker 1: page is not indexed by anything. So that is a

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Speaker 1: dark web, if you will. That's a dark web page

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Speaker 1: that you alone are accessing and no one else really

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Speaker 1: has access. So so dark web includes all these databases

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Speaker 1: that have have terabytes and terabytes and terabytes of data

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Speaker 1: that again will only appear in very specific sets of

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Speaker 1: circumstances and otherwise doesn't. So therefore they are not indexed.

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Speaker 1: Yauto bites even mostly just because I wanted to say,

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Speaker 1: y auto bites, Yes, there is such a thing. I'd

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Speaker 1: like to grab some yauta bytes after this podcast. Um

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Speaker 1: so yeah, I mean, and and it's purest sense, the

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Speaker 1: dark web, the invisible web, the invisible net. These are

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Speaker 1: things that that just aren't. They're hard to find. They're

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Speaker 1: not something that you're going to find simply by uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, surfing around or typing in a couple of

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Speaker 1: terms in the search engine. It's not gonna come up. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So there there's a whole lot out there. I mean, um,

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Speaker 1: you know, I I use part of my website as

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Speaker 1: a sandbox just to test different technologies and play around

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Speaker 1: with it so I can learn more about it. And I,

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Speaker 1: you know, I put security access on it because I did.

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Speaker 1: I'm just fooling around, you know, I'm gonna type bladdy

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Speaker 1: bladdy bladdy blah. Who look at that. I could change

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Speaker 1: the fonts, I could, you know, And I want to

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Speaker 1: see what this under construction gift looks like on my site. Well,

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Speaker 1: you know, this looping middi is so much more awesome

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Speaker 1: than that looping middi. Wow, this browser totally still supports

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Speaker 1: that marquee tag. This is where Jonathan is clear that

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Speaker 1: Jonathan has not built a website since anyhow. Yes, that

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Speaker 1: is part of that all as part of the dark Web,

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Speaker 1: and and therefore there is nothing particularly sneaky. You have

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Speaker 1: very funny. Look. I was just I was just thinking

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Speaker 1: back to my oldest stinking back to actual websites I've

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Speaker 1: built back in. That's the problem. Alright, sorry so but

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Speaker 1: but um, you know, we did have somebody who was

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Speaker 1: asking about this, and we have not revealed your identity

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Speaker 1: dark web person. You're is safe with us deep web

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Speaker 1: anyway or her. Let's not narrow it down too much

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Speaker 1: him or her. So the thing is there is and

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Speaker 1: you think about it. Okay, I get it, but that's

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Speaker 1: not really all that interesting. It's not necessarily but people

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Speaker 1: are using the the inability to find this stuff, uh

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Speaker 1: to their advantage. They might be the hiding secret information

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Speaker 1: or you know, information that might get them in trouble

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Speaker 1: with the law, or they just don't like the idea

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Speaker 1: of companies, websites, governments being able to track all their movements. What. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: there are plenty of people this century, right Have they

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Speaker 1: talked to Mark Zuckerberg? Have they have privacy is a

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Speaker 1: thing of the path? They read George? Orwell, uh, there

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Speaker 1: it was, and look how far we've come the uh. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: The one of the concerns about using the Internet for

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Speaker 1: a lot of people is that a lot of the

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Speaker 1: stuff you do is trackable. There are records of what

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Speaker 1: you do. I mean, this has been in the news

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Speaker 1: recently because Google has changed this privacy policy where it's

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Speaker 1: going to be sharing the information that gathers across multiple

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Speaker 1: Google products in order to shape results for you personally,

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Speaker 1: which means that it's actually actively using your history of

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Speaker 1: navigating the web. Uh, and that freaks a lot of

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Speaker 1: people out. Yeah. Yeah, well, speaking of people want to

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Speaker 1: know the as of the day, we're recording this that

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Speaker 1: happened yesterday, March one, and uh, you know, people have

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Speaker 1: been making a big deal out of it ever since

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Speaker 1: Google had announced it, and plus plus they put it

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Speaker 1: on all those sites. There's a little banner at the

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Speaker 1: top seeing, uh, this stuff matters, which I thought was

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Speaker 1: kind of funny. And they actually make it easy for

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Speaker 1: you to look at what the history of your web

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Speaker 1: searching is, so that way you can choose to and

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Speaker 1: you can get rid of it. Yeah, you can choose

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Speaker 1: to delete it if you want, you can keep it.

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Speaker 1: I mean, the purpose of that, from Google's perspective is

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Speaker 1: to give you the best service possible. But there are

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Speaker 1: people who have brought up the concerns and I think

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Speaker 1: they're completely legitimate concerns that the fact that you have

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Speaker 1: this history that's personalized and visualized to a very specific user.

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Speaker 1: That's troublesome because what happens if another entity comes in

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Speaker 1: that isn't concerned about giving you a great experience, but

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Speaker 1: it's more concerned about finding out exactly what you've been

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Speaker 1: up to for you know, a nefarious purpose. And uh,

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Speaker 1: and that might be that you could be a perfectly

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Speaker 1: innocent person and still have problems arise because there there's

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Speaker 1: this information about your habits when you're out there serving

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Speaker 1: the web or using the Internet in some way. And

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Speaker 1: so there are people who have used this, this part

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Speaker 1: of the web, this kind of idea of the uh.

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Speaker 1: This this anonymous, untrackable sort of web presence to be

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Speaker 1: able to navigate through without leaving a trail. And in

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Speaker 1: some cases it is to do something that is not

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Speaker 1: necessarily ethically uh in the green right. I mean it's

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Speaker 1: some stuff. Some of the stuff is really illegal, unethical,

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Speaker 1: nasty stuff. Yeah, well it's it's like everything else. You've

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Speaker 1: got the technology to do this. It can be used

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Speaker 1: for good. Pause, Yeah, if we're for good or bad.

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Speaker 1: Like for example, Google basically says when you sign up, hey, look, Jonathan,

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Speaker 1: just between you and us we're gonna collect this information,

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Speaker 1: and as a result of us collecting this information, we're

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Speaker 1: gonna be able to tailor this for you. We're not

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Speaker 1: gonna look at your records. We don't care where you go.

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Speaker 1: This is all gonna be stored on a computer in

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Speaker 1: between you and us. You'll get a really great experience.

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Speaker 1: And Jonathan may say, well, okay, I mean, hey, just

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Speaker 1: between me and you guys, I think we're good. You know,

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Speaker 1: I don't. I don't mind that you're you're collecting this

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Speaker 1: stuff because I want a positive experience. I want to

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Speaker 1: visit a site in my password, just to go in there,

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Speaker 1: and I'm blam, I'm right there. The thing is, what

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Speaker 1: if somebody breaks into the server, or what if they're there,

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Speaker 1: there's an unethical employee or or somebody who gets ticked

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Speaker 1: off at the company and says, you know what, I'm

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Speaker 1: going to steal some customers information and make this company's

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Speaker 1: life miserable by giving him bad pr I mean, it

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Speaker 1: could be used for something like that, although the company

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Speaker 1: may not necessarily be trying to do that. On the

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Speaker 1: flip side of that, uh, people might be saying, you

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Speaker 1: know what, I'm just uncomfortable with you having that information,

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Speaker 1: and the other people might be saying, I'm uncomfortable for

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Speaker 1: you having this information because I don't want to get

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Speaker 1: thrown in jail. So you know, there's a there's a

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Speaker 1: positive and a negative for all these things. Right, So

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Speaker 1: you've got you know, you've got people who are using

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Speaker 1: it to do stuff like pirate material. Yeah. So if

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Speaker 1: you created a database online and you did not have

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Speaker 1: any pointers to this site, so no web search engines

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Speaker 1: are going to be pulling up this site, and you

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Speaker 1: distribute the information some other way to the people that

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Speaker 1: you want to visit your site, then theoretically you could

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Speaker 1: host stuff and the the likelihood that you would get

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Speaker 1: caught would be lower. Right, So there are people who

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Speaker 1: do this where you know, you hear about like the

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Speaker 1: big peer to peer network X and everything, because those

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Speaker 1: are the ones that get a lot of focus and

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Speaker 1: they are searchable. But then there are other ones that

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Speaker 1: are not searchable, and they there are plenty of them

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Speaker 1: that exist out there. It's still just as illegal to

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Speaker 1: use them, but they are they are evading detection more effectively.

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Speaker 1: I think. You know, the organizations that are concerned about

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Speaker 1: intellectual property have to make sure that they get the

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Speaker 1: services of people who are aware of the dark web

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Speaker 1: in order to be able to police that kind of stuff. Um.

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Speaker 1: But but there it's also used for things like a

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Speaker 1: journalist who might be overseas in a country that is

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Speaker 1: not so concerned about offering the press free speech as

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Speaker 1: other countries, and that journalists may want to be able

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Speaker 1: to publish reports that are unfavorable to a regime in

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Speaker 1: that country, and using something like dark web in order

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Speaker 1: to get that information out could protect the journalists or

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Speaker 1: the journalist sources. So let's say like the journalist is

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Speaker 1: overseas talking to a government official UH and trying to

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Speaker 1: communicate with this government official who does not approve of

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Speaker 1: the regime's policies. Well, that official could very potentially be

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Speaker 1: at in serious danger for sharing the information. Using some

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Speaker 1: sort of untrackable anonymous UH software or doing this over

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Speaker 1: the web in a way that's not not searchable or

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Speaker 1: trackable would be very important in that case. And so

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Speaker 1: there are tools that are out there for people to use.

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Speaker 1: And again, just like Chris said, they're the tools are

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Speaker 1: are neutral. The tools are tools. Yeah, they're just tools.

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Speaker 1: But there are tools out there like me so like

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Speaker 1: free net that that's an example. Now we've talked about

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Speaker 1: free get before. UM it was some time ago, I

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Speaker 1: think about a year ago as a matter of fact,

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Speaker 1: because we were talking about the UH using the internet

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Speaker 1: to communicate UM protests and other information in countries where

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Speaker 1: UH the government is aggressive about finding and punishing people

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Speaker 1: for UM speaking their mind in that country. UM. Of course,

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Speaker 1: we've over the last couple of years, we've had a

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Speaker 1: lot of that in many countries around the world, where

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Speaker 1: people are UM getting the word out about stuff that's

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Speaker 1: going on, people who are being jailed for being dissidents. UM.

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Speaker 1: People are trying to find ways to communicate with one another,

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Speaker 1: to establish protests. UM. The government is is watching the

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Speaker 1: law the the law enforcement authorities in that area are

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Speaker 1: are watching to see if they can crack down on

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Speaker 1: these protests to keep it from becoming worldwide, to keep

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Speaker 1: it from gathering more support. UM. So they these folks

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Speaker 1: are trying to find ways to share information without bringing

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Speaker 1: down the authorities on them, and software like free net

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Speaker 1: is is one way that they can do that. And

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Speaker 1: in fact, some people were setting up UH servers over

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Speaker 1: the past couple of years where people could speak their

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Speaker 1: mind and it wouldn't disclose their location, um, which and

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Speaker 1: a lot of people who were supporters of democracy for

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Speaker 1: these these uh governments that were not necessarily so democratic. Um,

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Speaker 1: you know, they were saying, oh, well, this is a

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Speaker 1: good thing. We're we're giving people an opportunity to speak

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Speaker 1: their mind, that we're giving them freedom of speech where

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Speaker 1: they had done before. Yeah. Another example is uh the

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Speaker 1: Onion router or tour. I've used that myself on my

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Speaker 1: own computer. As a matter of fact, you may you

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Speaker 1: may have heard of tour and tour is a part

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Speaker 1: of a project called Anonymity Online, and it's all about

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Speaker 1: being able to to access the Internet anonymously where there's

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Speaker 1: not going to be any tracking. Um. You have to

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Speaker 1: pair this with some other software sometimes depending on what

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Speaker 1: it is you're trying to do, but in general, what

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Speaker 1: it's trying what what it's its purposes is so that

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Speaker 1: you can go through and find out what you need

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Speaker 1: to find without leaving a trace of what you're doing,

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Speaker 1: which can be really important depending on what is like

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Speaker 1: maybe you're a whistleblower, Maybe you're in a huge company

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Speaker 1: and you've seen something that's truly unethical and you feel

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00:19:19,800 --> 00:19:21,920
Speaker 1: it is your responsibility since you know about it to

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00:19:22,000 --> 00:19:24,080
Speaker 1: reveal this, but you also know that if you do

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Speaker 1: this you could have some serious problems in your personal

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Speaker 1: life further down the line. Well, that's sort of the

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Speaker 1: kind of tool you might want to look into if

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Speaker 1: you were to do such a thing. Right. So, the

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Speaker 1: way Tour does it is kind of interesting. They do

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Speaker 1: it through a distributed network, So distributed networks, you know,

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Speaker 1: we talked about it again, it's kind of similar to

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Speaker 1: peer to peer networks. Well in in in a way

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Speaker 1: it's it's a lot of Uh, it has some similarity

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Speaker 1: to the people who are conducting hacker attacks because as

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Speaker 1: we again, another thing that we've talked about on on

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Speaker 1: occasion is how, um it can be difficult to trace

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Speaker 1: exactly where an attack comes from, or it can be

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Speaker 1: possible to spoof another address, say, you know, make it

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Speaker 1: appear as though an attack is coming from a country

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Speaker 1: to go you know, hey, they're the ones doing it, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: China's attacking us. And then if you were to really

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Speaker 1: look at you might realize that, uh, the attackers came

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Speaker 1: from a totally different country, but they had spoofed it,

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Speaker 1: or they had created a zombie army where they had

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Speaker 1: infected computers within China, So the attacks were coming from China,

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Speaker 1: It's just they were being masterminded from computers that were

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Speaker 1: in a totally different country. Yeah's the tricky thing about

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Speaker 1: computers is that, uh, it's it's entirely possible for you

364
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Speaker 1: to be able to cover your tracks or to off

365
00:20:44,200 --> 00:20:46,960
Speaker 1: you skate where you are working from and make it

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Speaker 1: appear that someone else, some patsy, is really the one

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Speaker 1: in charge of the actual attack. Well, tour works works

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Speaker 1: in a similar fashion to that, basically uses this array

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Speaker 1: of servers to mask your location. Right. So, so the

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Speaker 1: way the way it works normally with Internet traffic is

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Speaker 1: that if I'm sending, if I'm seeing a request to

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Speaker 1: a server for me to get let's just say a

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Speaker 1: web page back, then that request is going to go

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Speaker 1: out and pack it across the Internet with a header

375
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Speaker 1: and a footer that gives the information about where it's going.

376
00:21:20,520 --> 00:21:22,959
Speaker 1: And then once it gets to where it is, it's

377
00:21:23,480 --> 00:21:26,840
Speaker 1: the request gets received, the server response sends it back

378
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Speaker 1: my way, not necessarily in the same pathway that my

379
00:21:30,040 --> 00:21:33,000
Speaker 1: request went, uh, and then it gets to my machine.

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Speaker 1: My machine puts it all together, and then I can

381
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Speaker 1: look at the web page the Tour Each jump from

382
00:21:39,880 --> 00:21:45,040
Speaker 1: one UH server to one machine to another is is unique,

383
00:21:45,200 --> 00:21:48,240
Speaker 1: and it's it's unique to that like the the information

384
00:21:48,320 --> 00:21:50,920
Speaker 1: is unique to that jump. So that UH, when I

385
00:21:51,080 --> 00:21:53,800
Speaker 1: send my request out, it goes to a server on

386
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Speaker 1: the Tour network. Server on the Tour network doesn't know

387
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Speaker 1: that it needs to go to the specific destination. It

388
00:21:59,119 --> 00:22:01,560
Speaker 1: just knows that it has to send this request to

389
00:22:02,040 --> 00:22:06,000
Speaker 1: a second server it's that's in the Tour network. So

390
00:22:06,160 --> 00:22:08,480
Speaker 1: that request goes to that server within the Tour network.

391
00:22:08,560 --> 00:22:11,640
Speaker 1: Now that that server doesn't know where the request originated from.

392
00:22:12,240 --> 00:22:14,040
Speaker 1: It knows that it got it from server number one,

393
00:22:14,119 --> 00:22:16,240
Speaker 1: but it doesn't know who sent the request to server

394
00:22:16,400 --> 00:22:19,359
Speaker 1: number one, Right, So server number two is like, all right, well,

395
00:22:19,400 --> 00:22:21,359
Speaker 1: server number one sent this to me, I'm supposed to

396
00:22:21,359 --> 00:22:23,919
Speaker 1: send it to server number three, goes to server number three.

397
00:22:23,960 --> 00:22:26,399
Speaker 1: Server number three doesn't know about server number one. It

398
00:22:26,560 --> 00:22:28,760
Speaker 1: just knows that a request came from server number two.

399
00:22:29,240 --> 00:22:31,879
Speaker 1: It definitely doesn't know about you who sent the request

400
00:22:31,920 --> 00:22:33,520
Speaker 1: in the first place. And it does this all the

401
00:22:33,560 --> 00:22:35,359
Speaker 1: way across the network until it gets to where it's

402
00:22:35,359 --> 00:22:37,520
Speaker 1: supposed to be, and then it comes back in that

403
00:22:37,720 --> 00:22:41,560
Speaker 1: same pathway and there's no way for any individual machine

404
00:22:41,640 --> 00:22:45,320
Speaker 1: to know what the origin point or destination point was

405
00:22:45,359 --> 00:22:47,919
Speaker 1: except for the ones that were immediately adjacent to those points.

406
00:22:48,800 --> 00:22:52,840
Speaker 1: So it protects your identity because you can't track where

407
00:22:52,880 --> 00:22:55,399
Speaker 1: this this traffic is going. There's no way to figure

408
00:22:55,400 --> 00:22:58,879
Speaker 1: it out because uh, these machines are It's if you

409
00:22:58,960 --> 00:23:01,880
Speaker 1: were the only one using this network, sure, then I'd

410
00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:04,840
Speaker 1: be able to tell. But with all the information passing across,

411
00:23:04,920 --> 00:23:08,359
Speaker 1: it's impossible to say who sent what when and where

412
00:23:08,440 --> 00:23:11,399
Speaker 1: this information was going and what was inside it. Now

413
00:23:11,480 --> 00:23:15,680
Speaker 1: the tour requires that you uh install some software on

414
00:23:15,720 --> 00:23:18,600
Speaker 1: your computer, which basically you know, uses your browser. You

415
00:23:18,600 --> 00:23:21,840
Speaker 1: can turn it on and off, um, which is nice

416
00:23:21,960 --> 00:23:24,240
Speaker 1: in a way. I did test it just to play

417
00:23:24,280 --> 00:23:26,520
Speaker 1: around with a couple of years ago, UM, because I

418
00:23:26,560 --> 00:23:28,840
Speaker 1: thought it was kind of interesting and and uh, you

419
00:23:28,920 --> 00:23:31,560
Speaker 1: know how it how it masks your identity. So I

420
00:23:31,600 --> 00:23:34,240
Speaker 1: found I found out two things. One uh, you know,

421
00:23:34,320 --> 00:23:36,960
Speaker 1: I tried it, and then I went to see where

422
00:23:36,960 --> 00:23:38,840
Speaker 1: it said I was coming from, you know, I did, Uh,

423
00:23:39,240 --> 00:23:41,679
Speaker 1: I traced the route and it said I was in Sweden,

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Speaker 1: which is really great, except it made me hungry for

425
00:23:44,200 --> 00:23:47,960
Speaker 1: Lincoln berries. And then the next thing I was thinking meatballs.

426
00:23:48,200 --> 00:23:50,920
Speaker 1: Yeah I knew, and well that's you know cliche. Um.

427
00:23:51,200 --> 00:23:54,080
Speaker 1: And then, uh, the other thing is it because it

428
00:23:54,200 --> 00:23:57,959
Speaker 1: is traveling so much farther now, remember we've talked about, UM,

429
00:23:58,119 --> 00:24:00,399
Speaker 1: you make it a request of the over the internet.

430
00:24:00,720 --> 00:24:02,840
Speaker 1: The information goes from one computer to the other computer,

431
00:24:02,920 --> 00:24:05,200
Speaker 1: to the other computer until it gets to the other location,

432
00:24:05,800 --> 00:24:07,680
Speaker 1: and then it sends it, you know, back back back

433
00:24:07,760 --> 00:24:11,480
Speaker 1: back until it reaches your machine. When you go through Tour,

434
00:24:12,160 --> 00:24:14,480
Speaker 1: it does that through a whole lot more computers, and

435
00:24:14,560 --> 00:24:18,720
Speaker 1: it slows everything down. So if you want to be

436
00:24:18,800 --> 00:24:22,359
Speaker 1: private for whatever reason, you can use this software, but

437
00:24:22,840 --> 00:24:26,360
Speaker 1: it will slow things down. Yeah, just be aware. That's true.

438
00:24:26,480 --> 00:24:29,080
Speaker 1: That's pretty much true with every security system too. Anytime,

439
00:24:29,160 --> 00:24:31,119
Speaker 1: anytime you have some encryption or whatever, it's going to

440
00:24:31,240 --> 00:24:35,000
Speaker 1: affect the speed of the transmission. Um. Yeah, that's that's

441
00:24:35,040 --> 00:24:37,600
Speaker 1: one of the trade offs you have for for increased

442
00:24:37,600 --> 00:24:41,520
Speaker 1: security and tour it goes beyond just uh web browsing,

443
00:24:41,600 --> 00:24:43,360
Speaker 1: you know. I use that as my example, but it's

444
00:24:43,400 --> 00:24:47,080
Speaker 1: also used for things like instant messaging or remote logins.

445
00:24:47,680 --> 00:24:50,800
Speaker 1: You can even create an instance where you're you're creating

446
00:24:50,920 --> 00:24:55,000
Speaker 1: a rendezvous point, right let's say that you want to

447
00:24:55,080 --> 00:25:02,280
Speaker 1: create a uh discussion area for some political uh reason,

448
00:25:02,440 --> 00:25:08,560
Speaker 1: Like let' let's say you're in a potentially dangerous situation overseas,

449
00:25:09,000 --> 00:25:11,760
Speaker 1: you know, in some in some country where the regime

450
00:25:11,920 --> 00:25:17,600
Speaker 1: is is cracking down on internet access and internet communications. UM,

451
00:25:17,720 --> 00:25:19,320
Speaker 1: you might want to be able to set up a

452
00:25:19,440 --> 00:25:22,639
Speaker 1: space where you and two or three or more people

453
00:25:23,240 --> 00:25:25,879
Speaker 1: can have a discussion about something, but not have it

454
00:25:26,040 --> 00:25:30,800
Speaker 1: pop up in a very popular or publicly visible way

455
00:25:30,920 --> 00:25:34,080
Speaker 1: like on Twitter or Facebook. Because even though those tools

456
00:25:34,119 --> 00:25:37,199
Speaker 1: have been really useful, uh, it's also true that if

457
00:25:37,240 --> 00:25:39,399
Speaker 1: you use them a lot, then there's the chance that

458
00:25:39,600 --> 00:25:42,360
Speaker 1: it could either get shut down or that authorities could

459
00:25:42,400 --> 00:25:47,880
Speaker 1: track you, or that authorities could infiltrate your your communications.

460
00:25:47,960 --> 00:25:50,200
Speaker 1: So if you're using something that's below the radar, that

461
00:25:50,800 --> 00:25:54,320
Speaker 1: that's not being broadcast publicly, you have a better chance

462
00:25:54,400 --> 00:25:57,600
Speaker 1: of maintaining that security. Well. Tour would let you do

463
00:25:57,760 --> 00:26:00,960
Speaker 1: things like set up a UM essentially what it would

464
00:26:00,960 --> 00:26:03,320
Speaker 1: be like a chat room or a forum among a

465
00:26:03,400 --> 00:26:06,560
Speaker 1: bunch of people that is not visible to anyone else,

466
00:26:06,600 --> 00:26:09,320
Speaker 1: and it does it through this distributed network way where

467
00:26:09,720 --> 00:26:14,239
Speaker 1: you the person who creates the instance, lets people know Hey,

468
00:26:14,280 --> 00:26:17,040
Speaker 1: I'm I'm building this thing on blah blah blah. When

469
00:26:17,119 --> 00:26:22,120
Speaker 1: they respond, that's until someone responds, there's no rendezvous point,

470
00:26:22,760 --> 00:26:25,560
Speaker 1: it doesn't actually create anything. And when that person responds,

471
00:26:25,640 --> 00:26:29,560
Speaker 1: then one computer, one server on this system is designated

472
00:26:29,680 --> 00:26:32,760
Speaker 1: as the place where that will live for as long

473
00:26:32,840 --> 00:26:38,240
Speaker 1: as it needs to. And then uh, the different computers

474
00:26:38,280 --> 00:26:41,560
Speaker 1: will have to travel via the normal tour method to

475
00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:44,879
Speaker 1: that particular server in order to interact with it. But

476
00:26:45,040 --> 00:26:49,080
Speaker 1: this again maintains that level of anonymity that is necessary

477
00:26:49,200 --> 00:26:55,479
Speaker 1: for situations where you're talking about life and limb, you know, scenarios. So, uh,

478
00:26:55,600 --> 00:26:57,840
Speaker 1: it's interesting stuff. And like we said, you know there

479
00:26:58,480 --> 00:27:01,280
Speaker 1: military has been using this at In fact, tour the

480
00:27:01,359 --> 00:27:04,080
Speaker 1: onion router was a product of the United States Naval

481
00:27:04,440 --> 00:27:07,680
Speaker 1: UH branch of the military. It was it was a

482
00:27:07,760 --> 00:27:11,080
Speaker 1: Navy project that ends up now being used by lots

483
00:27:11,119 --> 00:27:16,000
Speaker 1: of different UM people, including civilians. But yeah, businesses use it, UH,

484
00:27:16,960 --> 00:27:21,359
Speaker 1: law enforcement uses it. It's it's been very instrumental in

485
00:27:22,000 --> 00:27:27,040
Speaker 1: lots of different UH uses other than the one that

486
00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:31,879
Speaker 1: everyone thinks about, which is to do something sneaky and criminal. Actually,

487
00:27:32,000 --> 00:27:33,760
Speaker 1: the only thing that's come out of my navel is

488
00:27:34,040 --> 00:27:38,600
Speaker 1: lent So that's that's really impressive. Um, I'll tell you

489
00:27:38,680 --> 00:27:43,920
Speaker 1: what you're gonna give up for lent um. So yeah,

490
00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:47,639
Speaker 1: But the thing is to note, um, this stuff is

491
00:27:47,720 --> 00:27:52,160
Speaker 1: on the Internet. And that's actually it's biggest flaw. UM,

492
00:27:52,320 --> 00:27:55,000
Speaker 1: when you go back to the original sense that Jonathan

493
00:27:55,040 --> 00:27:57,959
Speaker 1: mentioned earlier, when stuff is just disconnected from the Internet,

494
00:27:58,800 --> 00:28:03,640
Speaker 1: that's the easiest way to protect information on the dark web. UM,

495
00:28:04,480 --> 00:28:06,920
Speaker 1: once you make it connected to that giant network of

496
00:28:06,960 --> 00:28:11,200
Speaker 1: networks that we've come become accustomed to using. UM, that

497
00:28:11,440 --> 00:28:14,480
Speaker 1: makes it more findable. It is not a lot of

498
00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:17,920
Speaker 1: stuff is not completely unfindable. So for example, let's say

499
00:28:17,920 --> 00:28:20,280
Speaker 1: you have your robots dot text file and you say

500
00:28:20,320 --> 00:28:22,480
Speaker 1: I don't want my page to be index That doesn't

501
00:28:22,520 --> 00:28:24,880
Speaker 1: mean it's not there and it can't be accessed by people.

502
00:28:25,000 --> 00:28:28,800
Speaker 1: But it might mean that Google and Being and the

503
00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:32,119
Speaker 1: other Surgeon's is just say okay, well hey, I okay,

504
00:28:32,400 --> 00:28:34,520
Speaker 1: we'll leave you alone. You don't have to be in

505
00:28:34,560 --> 00:28:38,320
Speaker 1: our directory. But that doesn't mean it can't be found. Um.

506
00:28:39,080 --> 00:28:42,000
Speaker 1: You know, you think nothing stopping. Let's say an incredibly

507
00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:46,160
Speaker 1: popular website could post a link and that would do it.

508
00:28:46,800 --> 00:28:50,440
Speaker 1: So I mean, you know, it's uh, it would be

509
00:28:50,520 --> 00:28:53,840
Speaker 1: another step to get to where you needed to go,

510
00:28:54,400 --> 00:28:59,560
Speaker 1: but it would make that dark website very easy to

511
00:28:59,600 --> 00:29:03,240
Speaker 1: access us. Well okay, well okay, so jon and Jonathan

512
00:29:03,280 --> 00:29:06,280
Speaker 1: and I have created a file a secret file sharing thing,

513
00:29:06,360 --> 00:29:08,760
Speaker 1: and we're going to let's just make it interesting by

514
00:29:08,840 --> 00:29:12,200
Speaker 1: making it nefarious. So we're gonna share all these you know,

515
00:29:13,120 --> 00:29:15,920
Speaker 1: video files and all sorts of other stuff. But we're

516
00:29:15,960 --> 00:29:18,680
Speaker 1: sharing all the good Star Wars movies, so four or

517
00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:20,920
Speaker 1: five and six, and all the good Star Trek movies

518
00:29:21,040 --> 00:29:25,160
Speaker 1: so every other one. So, uh, the thing is Jonathan

519
00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:27,760
Speaker 1: set up this site and he's emailed me, so he

520
00:29:27,920 --> 00:29:32,400
Speaker 1: both died to bring us this site. So they both

521
00:29:32,520 --> 00:29:36,520
Speaker 1: ends send me the email and okay, so it's between

522
00:29:36,600 --> 00:29:39,560
Speaker 1: you and me, right, Nobody else knows about it except

523
00:29:39,640 --> 00:29:43,040
Speaker 1: there's a trace of that email on every server that

524
00:29:43,120 --> 00:29:46,040
Speaker 1: it touched between you and me. Plus you know, we

525
00:29:46,120 --> 00:29:48,040
Speaker 1: have I s p s and there should they have

526
00:29:48,160 --> 00:29:50,120
Speaker 1: that information somewhere and find Now, they're not gonna go

527
00:29:50,200 --> 00:29:51,920
Speaker 1: looking through all they don't have time to look through

528
00:29:51,920 --> 00:29:54,200
Speaker 1: all that stuff. There's no way. There's just so much,

529
00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:59,200
Speaker 1: but it's there. So if someone else hears about this,

530
00:29:59,400 --> 00:30:02,840
Speaker 1: like if I become Mr Flappy Gums and I walk

531
00:30:02,880 --> 00:30:06,360
Speaker 1: outside and I'm like, you should look into that gingivitis. Yeah,

532
00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:09,280
Speaker 1: I probably should and that, and I say, man, Chris

533
00:30:09,400 --> 00:30:13,160
Speaker 1: and I we shared episode four Star Wars New Hope

534
00:30:13,280 --> 00:30:16,840
Speaker 1: eighteen times between the two of us for no apparent reason. Um,

535
00:30:17,160 --> 00:30:19,600
Speaker 1: and I'm just chatting away. Well, then there's a chance

536
00:30:19,680 --> 00:30:21,440
Speaker 1: someone goes to someone else, that goes to someone else

537
00:30:21,440 --> 00:30:23,360
Speaker 1: because someone else. And next thing you know, you've got

538
00:30:23,400 --> 00:30:25,560
Speaker 1: authorities looking into it. And they say, all right, well,

539
00:30:25,640 --> 00:30:28,280
Speaker 1: if we can't find this site directly, what other routes

540
00:30:28,320 --> 00:30:30,360
Speaker 1: can we look at in order to build a case

541
00:30:30,520 --> 00:30:35,400
Speaker 1: against these two idiots and and and find out whether

542
00:30:35,480 --> 00:30:37,880
Speaker 1: or not they're really breaking the law, and if so,

543
00:30:38,040 --> 00:30:40,320
Speaker 1: how hard we can punish them. And the answer to that,

544
00:30:40,360 --> 00:30:43,600
Speaker 1: by the way, is very very hard. Yeah. The chances

545
00:30:43,640 --> 00:30:45,960
Speaker 1: are that the user agreement that Jonathan and I have

546
00:30:46,080 --> 00:30:50,360
Speaker 1: between our Internet service providers says that they're not going

547
00:30:50,440 --> 00:30:53,720
Speaker 1: to give up our information unless the law enforcement authorities

548
00:30:53,720 --> 00:30:55,680
Speaker 1: come knocking at their door with the warrant saying, hey,

549
00:30:56,200 --> 00:30:58,000
Speaker 1: we believe that these guys are up to no good

550
00:30:58,480 --> 00:31:00,920
Speaker 1: uh cough of the records, in which case they're going

551
00:31:00,960 --> 00:31:02,840
Speaker 1: to say, okay, well, if you've got a legitimate reason

552
00:31:02,880 --> 00:31:05,360
Speaker 1: to worry about it, here you go. This is why

553
00:31:05,640 --> 00:31:09,080
Speaker 1: the various pieces of legislation around the world, really but

554
00:31:09,120 --> 00:31:10,520
Speaker 1: in the United States are the ones that we were

555
00:31:10,600 --> 00:31:13,280
Speaker 1: mostly familiar with, things like d M c A, SOAPA,

556
00:31:14,080 --> 00:31:17,360
Speaker 1: uh and and PIPPA. One of these were such a

557
00:31:17,480 --> 00:31:20,000
Speaker 1: huge deal because it was one of those things that

558
00:31:20,320 --> 00:31:22,840
Speaker 1: people were worried the government would get too much authority

559
00:31:22,920 --> 00:31:25,040
Speaker 1: to be able to snoop in on what you were doing,

560
00:31:25,160 --> 00:31:27,800
Speaker 1: and whether whether you were doing something wrong or not

561
00:31:28,040 --> 00:31:29,960
Speaker 1: wasn't the point. And it was the fact that it

562
00:31:30,160 --> 00:31:33,080
Speaker 1: was almost like an unreasonable search and seizure kind of

563
00:31:33,120 --> 00:31:37,600
Speaker 1: approach to information, like it wasn't wasn't necessarily your personal

564
00:31:37,720 --> 00:31:40,320
Speaker 1: property in the sense of physical things you owned, but

565
00:31:40,520 --> 00:31:44,600
Speaker 1: it was your information, which is more and more becoming

566
00:31:44,720 --> 00:31:48,240
Speaker 1: something like property to people. So yeah, it's uh. And

567
00:31:48,400 --> 00:31:52,160
Speaker 1: also there the whole SOAPA and PIPA thing was for

568
00:31:52,240 --> 00:31:56,560
Speaker 1: a while also a concern for people who used tour

569
00:31:57,320 --> 00:32:00,480
Speaker 1: and that it looked like services like to or could

570
00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:03,680
Speaker 1: be at threat because of some of the various kinds

571
00:32:03,720 --> 00:32:05,480
Speaker 1: of laws they are being proposed around the world. Act

572
00:32:05,520 --> 00:32:08,640
Speaker 1: as another great example and that's one that's global. It's

573
00:32:08,640 --> 00:32:11,640
Speaker 1: not the United States, uh, just the United States anyway,

574
00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:14,760
Speaker 1: And there there's a lot of concern that this kind

575
00:32:14,800 --> 00:32:18,080
Speaker 1: of legislation is specifically taking aim at services that have

576
00:32:18,400 --> 00:32:25,320
Speaker 1: legitimate legal and one could argue, uh pro humanity um

577
00:32:25,840 --> 00:32:28,360
Speaker 1: reasons to use them, and yet it would those would

578
00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:31,640
Speaker 1: get wiped off just as easily as the piracy stuff.

579
00:32:31,800 --> 00:32:33,360
Speaker 1: And so the question that a lot of people have

580
00:32:33,560 --> 00:32:36,600
Speaker 1: is is the damage that's being done by piracy, which,

581
00:32:36,680 --> 00:32:40,760
Speaker 1: by the way, is completely impossible to define. We cannot

582
00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:44,320
Speaker 1: define how much damage piracy does. It's we just can't.

583
00:32:44,760 --> 00:32:46,640
Speaker 1: It does do damage, Don't get me wrong, we just

584
00:32:46,720 --> 00:32:50,160
Speaker 1: can't define how much it is. But is that indefinable

585
00:32:50,160 --> 00:32:54,880
Speaker 1: amount of damage greater than the good that a an

586
00:32:54,920 --> 00:32:59,080
Speaker 1: anonymous web gives us. And if it is greater than

587
00:32:59,240 --> 00:33:02,880
Speaker 1: maybe we have to look at wiping it all out. Personally,

588
00:33:03,280 --> 00:33:06,480
Speaker 1: this is just my own personal opinion, not representative of

589
00:33:06,600 --> 00:33:11,560
Speaker 1: anyone else. Uh. I seriously doubt that. But because I

590
00:33:11,640 --> 00:33:13,760
Speaker 1: look around in the world and how the world is changing,

591
00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:16,440
Speaker 1: like the events of the Arab Spring, and I think

592
00:33:16,800 --> 00:33:19,400
Speaker 1: if it weren't for the fact that we have these outlets,

593
00:33:19,880 --> 00:33:24,840
Speaker 1: then these social changes which in many cases look like

594
00:33:24,960 --> 00:33:28,960
Speaker 1: they are long overdue, may still not have happened. And

595
00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:32,920
Speaker 1: and that would be unfortunate for people who are living

596
00:33:33,120 --> 00:33:38,920
Speaker 1: under oppressive regimes who uh just don't have any opportunities,

597
00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:40,960
Speaker 1: like like a lot of the rest of the world does.

598
00:33:41,200 --> 00:33:45,000
Speaker 1: So now that's my again my own personal opinion. Jonathan's

599
00:33:45,000 --> 00:33:51,640
Speaker 1: getting off the soapbox. So so, in short, um, you know,

600
00:33:51,760 --> 00:33:54,880
Speaker 1: the the deep Web, the the invisible Internet. This is

601
00:33:55,000 --> 00:33:59,080
Speaker 1: this is just information that, um that the average person

602
00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:01,880
Speaker 1: is not going to be able to find easily. Um.

603
00:34:02,000 --> 00:34:04,320
Speaker 1: It could be anything from people planning a hate crime

604
00:34:04,400 --> 00:34:07,920
Speaker 1: or an act of terrorism to uh, people planning their

605
00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:10,200
Speaker 1: next big venture and they just don't want it to

606
00:34:10,360 --> 00:34:12,719
Speaker 1: become public before they can make a sensation. And and

607
00:34:12,960 --> 00:34:16,160
Speaker 1: and ruin Facebook's day by coming out with something even

608
00:34:16,239 --> 00:34:19,440
Speaker 1: better to to like fifty hard drives that are holding

609
00:34:20,040 --> 00:34:22,799
Speaker 1: databases of information that are not relevant unless you put

610
00:34:22,840 --> 00:34:26,160
Speaker 1: in a specific query. You would not want that searchable

611
00:34:26,200 --> 00:34:29,160
Speaker 1: on the Internet because it would be totally useless. Yes, yes, so,

612
00:34:29,360 --> 00:34:32,400
Speaker 1: I mean it's it's a simple definition, but you know

613
00:34:32,480 --> 00:34:34,279
Speaker 1: there's a lot of two a lot to it. And

614
00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:37,920
Speaker 1: when you start thinking about it, um, it's there's some

615
00:34:38,000 --> 00:34:41,399
Speaker 1: ethical questions involved. But your Iceberg comparison at the top

616
00:34:41,440 --> 00:34:44,080
Speaker 1: of the show was very apt because again, the stuff

617
00:34:44,120 --> 00:34:46,320
Speaker 1: that we see on the web is a fraction of

618
00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:48,360
Speaker 1: what is out there. It's from what I understand, it

619
00:34:48,440 --> 00:34:51,920
Speaker 1: is a fraction of one percent of the information that

620
00:34:52,120 --> 00:34:55,759
Speaker 1: can be accessed over the internet. Um, which when you

621
00:34:55,800 --> 00:34:58,880
Speaker 1: think about the the billions and trillions of web pages

622
00:34:58,920 --> 00:35:03,000
Speaker 1: out there, of many of which have MIDI files embedded

623
00:35:03,040 --> 00:35:06,560
Speaker 1: in them, and scrolling texts and the under construction guy, um,

624
00:35:07,239 --> 00:35:10,680
Speaker 1: you know that that's amazing to think about because there's

625
00:35:10,800 --> 00:35:13,520
Speaker 1: a vast amount of information that is accessible to us.

626
00:35:14,000 --> 00:35:16,719
Speaker 1: It's pretty phenomenal. But you know, and that's one of

627
00:35:16,840 --> 00:35:18,560
Speaker 1: just one of those things that that when you think

628
00:35:18,560 --> 00:35:20,560
Speaker 1: about you step back and you when you think about

629
00:35:20,600 --> 00:35:23,040
Speaker 1: this vast amount of information, if you just go, wow,

630
00:35:23,160 --> 00:35:26,160
Speaker 1: us really when you think it's amazing, Yeah, it is is.

631
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:28,759
Speaker 1: It's yeah, who would have thought that we have come

632
00:35:28,840 --> 00:35:31,560
Speaker 1: up with that much stuff? And I have to write

633
00:35:31,600 --> 00:35:34,320
Speaker 1: about all of it, well some of it, speaking of

634
00:35:34,360 --> 00:35:36,000
Speaker 1: which I need to get back to that. So let's

635
00:35:36,080 --> 00:35:39,239
Speaker 1: wrap up this discussion. Guys. If you have any suggestions

636
00:35:39,320 --> 00:35:42,600
Speaker 1: for future topics that we should tackle, you should email

637
00:35:42,680 --> 00:35:45,560
Speaker 1: us our addresses tech Stuff at Discovery dot com, or

638
00:35:45,640 --> 00:35:48,280
Speaker 1: send us a message via Facebook or Twitter are handled.

639
00:35:48,280 --> 00:35:50,440
Speaker 1: There is tech Stuff hs W and Chris and I

640
00:35:50,520 --> 00:35:55,400
Speaker 1: will talk to you again really soon. Be sure to

641
00:35:55,520 --> 00:35:58,280
Speaker 1: check out our new video podcast, Stuff from the Future.

642
00:35:58,600 --> 00:36:01,360
Speaker 1: Join how Stuffwork staff as we explore the most promising

643
00:36:01,480 --> 00:36:06,319
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