1 00:00:03,960 --> 00:00:06,560 Speaker 1: The Moscow Police Department put out a renewed call for 2 00:00:06,600 --> 00:00:09,560 Speaker 1: social media content, pictures and videos. 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:10,480 Speaker 2: From the community. 4 00:00:11,000 --> 00:00:14,280 Speaker 1: Investigators are still asking anyone with any information to contact 5 00:00:14,280 --> 00:00:17,880 Speaker 1: the Moscow tip Line. The investigation into who killed four 6 00:00:17,960 --> 00:00:22,400 Speaker 1: University of Idaho students has now received ten thousand tips. 7 00:00:28,800 --> 00:00:33,800 Speaker 3: This is the Idaho Massacre a production of KT Studios 8 00:00:33,920 --> 00:00:42,800 Speaker 3: and iHeartRadio, Episode six The Hunt Courtney Armstrong, a television 9 00:00:42,800 --> 00:00:46,960 Speaker 3: producer at KT Studios, with Stephanie Leidecker, Jeff Shane, and 10 00:00:47,040 --> 00:00:53,639 Speaker 3: Connor Powell. Weeks after four University of Idaho students were 11 00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:56,880 Speaker 3: murdered in their off campus home, investigators are on a 12 00:00:56,920 --> 00:01:02,320 Speaker 3: relentless search for the killer as the tips rolled in. 13 00:01:02,520 --> 00:01:06,319 Speaker 3: Multiple law enforcement agencies, including the Idaho's d Police and 14 00:01:06,360 --> 00:01:09,600 Speaker 3: the FBI, were working with the Moscow PD to crack 15 00:01:09,680 --> 00:01:15,120 Speaker 3: the case. They were methodically zeroing in on their main suspect, 16 00:01:15,400 --> 00:01:18,400 Speaker 3: following the evidence from the mysterious white Atlantra to the 17 00:01:18,480 --> 00:01:22,760 Speaker 3: DNA left at the scene. While observing Brian Coberger at 18 00:01:22,840 --> 00:01:25,600 Speaker 3: his family's home in Pennsylvania, the twenty eight year old 19 00:01:25,640 --> 00:01:28,720 Speaker 3: was seen wearing rubber latex gloves in public and putting 20 00:01:28,760 --> 00:01:33,240 Speaker 3: trash in neighbor's garbage cans. Coburger's family also noticed this 21 00:01:33,319 --> 00:01:37,479 Speaker 3: bizarre behavior. According to reports, one of his own sisters 22 00:01:37,520 --> 00:01:39,800 Speaker 3: began to wonder if her brother could have been involved 23 00:01:39,800 --> 00:01:43,000 Speaker 3: in the murders, at one point even saying loudly that 24 00:01:43,040 --> 00:01:45,399 Speaker 3: her brother lived near the victims and drove a white 25 00:01:45,520 --> 00:01:48,920 Speaker 3: Honda Atlantra. While some in the Coburger family may have 26 00:01:48,920 --> 00:01:52,320 Speaker 3: had their suspicions about him, unbeknownst to them, their own 27 00:01:52,400 --> 00:01:56,280 Speaker 3: family's genetic DNA would be key to linking Brian Koeberger 28 00:01:56,400 --> 00:01:57,080 Speaker 3: to the murders. 29 00:01:57,400 --> 00:02:01,120 Speaker 4: Big crack in this case came from das a specifically 30 00:02:01,320 --> 00:02:04,080 Speaker 4: genetic genealogy. 31 00:02:04,920 --> 00:02:08,079 Speaker 3: Within days of the gruesome murders, police suspected the white 32 00:02:08,160 --> 00:02:11,799 Speaker 3: Houndai Alantra seen repeatedly driving near the King Road crime 33 00:02:11,880 --> 00:02:17,000 Speaker 3: site was connected to the murders. Investigators immediately began compiling 34 00:02:17,040 --> 00:02:21,400 Speaker 3: a list of white Lantras registered in the region. Investigators 35 00:02:21,440 --> 00:02:24,880 Speaker 3: first sought cell records. They then most likely looked for 36 00:02:25,000 --> 00:02:27,960 Speaker 3: every person who panged the Moscow Tower and owned to 37 00:02:27,960 --> 00:02:32,360 Speaker 3: white Alantra, but the search of the long list of 38 00:02:32,400 --> 00:02:39,520 Speaker 3: white Alantra's didn't turn up anything conclusive for weeks. Here's 39 00:02:39,600 --> 00:02:41,040 Speaker 3: Jeff and Stephanie. 40 00:02:41,720 --> 00:02:44,160 Speaker 5: As November was coming to a close, the Moscow police 41 00:02:44,160 --> 00:02:46,120 Speaker 5: assured the public that there was no threat to the 42 00:02:46,120 --> 00:02:48,560 Speaker 5: community and that they were in fact making progress. 43 00:02:49,080 --> 00:02:52,519 Speaker 6: And at this point cops were really combing through thousands 44 00:02:52,639 --> 00:02:56,680 Speaker 6: of tips and pieces of information, most of which frankly 45 00:02:56,760 --> 00:02:57,360 Speaker 6: led nowhere. 46 00:02:57,800 --> 00:03:00,639 Speaker 5: Can you imagine the pressure. Not only are they concerned 47 00:03:00,639 --> 00:03:02,919 Speaker 5: about the safety of this college town, but they have 48 00:03:03,040 --> 00:03:04,440 Speaker 5: the whole world watching them. 49 00:03:05,080 --> 00:03:08,880 Speaker 6: I remember this time, the public really wanted information, and 50 00:03:09,200 --> 00:03:12,040 Speaker 6: every day that went by without an arrest, people were 51 00:03:12,080 --> 00:03:13,680 Speaker 6: getting angrier and angrier. 52 00:03:14,320 --> 00:03:17,680 Speaker 5: Yeah, it's a really unfair expectation, but at this point 53 00:03:17,720 --> 00:03:20,160 Speaker 5: there really was no credible suspect or murder weapon. 54 00:03:20,560 --> 00:03:24,760 Speaker 6: And then by early December, investigators had combed through the 55 00:03:24,880 --> 00:03:29,639 Speaker 6: victim's classmates, their friends, as well as any perhaps registered 56 00:03:29,639 --> 00:03:34,400 Speaker 6: sex offenders in the area, stalkers, any individuals known for 57 00:03:34,960 --> 00:03:39,680 Speaker 6: violently harassing people. They even looked into a local white supremacist, 58 00:03:40,000 --> 00:03:42,400 Speaker 6: but again, sadly, it all led to nothing. 59 00:03:42,840 --> 00:03:45,560 Speaker 5: The white Alantra was truly the best lead, but it's 60 00:03:45,560 --> 00:03:48,960 Speaker 5: an incredibly common car. In twenty twenty one, Hyundai sold 61 00:03:49,000 --> 00:03:51,960 Speaker 5: over one hundred and twenty four thousand Lantras, In fact, 62 00:03:52,080 --> 00:03:54,120 Speaker 5: the number of aluntras sold last year compared to the 63 00:03:54,200 --> 00:03:58,240 Speaker 5: year before increased forty seven percent, So it's basically like 64 00:03:58,280 --> 00:03:59,560 Speaker 5: finding a needle in a haystack. 65 00:04:01,440 --> 00:04:04,320 Speaker 3: For weeks, Brian Coberger was simply a name on an 66 00:04:04,320 --> 00:04:08,080 Speaker 3: ever growing list, one of the many white Atlanta owners, 67 00:04:08,680 --> 00:04:12,640 Speaker 3: and then he was the lone suspect and under arrest. 68 00:04:13,040 --> 00:04:16,520 Speaker 7: Suspect Brian Coburger is behind bars after investigators linked his 69 00:04:16,640 --> 00:04:19,760 Speaker 7: DNA at the crime scene two of a DNA taken 70 00:04:19,800 --> 00:04:21,520 Speaker 7: from the trash at his parents' home. 71 00:04:24,440 --> 00:04:27,359 Speaker 3: The official public story laid out in the Probable Cause 72 00:04:27,400 --> 00:04:32,200 Speaker 3: AFFI David is that investigator's positively identified Coburger by matching 73 00:04:32,279 --> 00:04:37,000 Speaker 3: DNA evidence from the knife sheath to Coburger's father's DNA. 74 00:04:39,160 --> 00:04:42,040 Speaker 3: But investigators in the Idaho Police Lab didn't have a 75 00:04:42,080 --> 00:04:45,120 Speaker 3: positive DNA match for the twenty eight year old criminology 76 00:04:45,160 --> 00:04:48,960 Speaker 3: student until at least December twenty seventh, when a surveillance 77 00:04:49,000 --> 00:04:52,240 Speaker 3: crew pulled his father's DNA from the trash. So how 78 00:04:52,240 --> 00:04:56,120 Speaker 3: did investigators know and with such confidence to start surveillance 79 00:04:56,160 --> 00:04:59,320 Speaker 3: on Coburger long before the conclusive DNA match. 80 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:04,960 Speaker 6: Investigative genetic genealogy was used to point them in his direction. 81 00:05:07,240 --> 00:05:10,720 Speaker 3: The path to positively identify in the Washington State University 82 00:05:10,760 --> 00:05:14,239 Speaker 3: PhD student, employed and new, and at the same time 83 00:05:14,360 --> 00:05:19,680 Speaker 3: one of the most controversial modern crime solving techniques. It's 84 00:05:19,720 --> 00:05:22,760 Speaker 3: a DNA method that is only reluctantly talked about by 85 00:05:22,839 --> 00:05:27,720 Speaker 3: law enforcement. Before we can explain what genetic genealogy is 86 00:05:27,839 --> 00:05:30,599 Speaker 3: and why it's so rare and controversial, we need to 87 00:05:30,640 --> 00:05:34,039 Speaker 3: explain how DNA material is normally collected and used in 88 00:05:34,040 --> 00:05:35,280 Speaker 3: a criminal investigation. 89 00:05:36,200 --> 00:05:40,560 Speaker 4: So DNA is what makes us what we are, and 90 00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:44,880 Speaker 4: every single cell of our body, with a few exceptions, 91 00:05:44,920 --> 00:05:48,600 Speaker 4: has the same DNA. I like to describe it as 92 00:05:48,640 --> 00:05:50,680 Speaker 4: an enormous encyclopedia. 93 00:05:50,800 --> 00:05:54,440 Speaker 3: That's Daniel Padini, the head of the forensic Sciences department 94 00:05:54,480 --> 00:05:57,640 Speaker 3: at George Washington University speaking with Jeff. 95 00:05:58,400 --> 00:06:02,240 Speaker 4: And every cell of our body kind of harvests or 96 00:06:02,360 --> 00:06:05,719 Speaker 4: looks at parts of that encyclopedia that it needs to 97 00:06:05,800 --> 00:06:09,279 Speaker 4: become what it needs to develop in. So the liver 98 00:06:09,400 --> 00:06:12,760 Speaker 4: cell will look at the encyclopedia chapter on how to 99 00:06:12,800 --> 00:06:16,000 Speaker 4: become a liver cell. The retina cell will do the same, 100 00:06:16,080 --> 00:06:18,240 Speaker 4: but it's going to be a different chapter. But the 101 00:06:18,400 --> 00:06:22,600 Speaker 4: entire encyclopedia is present in every single cell, so we 102 00:06:22,680 --> 00:06:27,400 Speaker 4: can look at parts of this encyclopedia that are different 103 00:06:27,520 --> 00:06:32,040 Speaker 4: among individuals, and we can generate the DNA profile that 104 00:06:32,240 --> 00:06:37,440 Speaker 4: has a very very low frequency in the population to 105 00:06:37,480 --> 00:06:42,120 Speaker 4: the point that we can essentially identify a single individual. 106 00:06:42,880 --> 00:06:47,040 Speaker 5: How has that now kind of changed the way investigators 107 00:06:47,360 --> 00:06:48,520 Speaker 5: work on criminal cases. 108 00:06:48,920 --> 00:06:55,039 Speaker 4: Yeah, it really has dramatically changed the forensic investigations in 109 00:06:55,160 --> 00:06:59,719 Speaker 4: terms of being able to identify an individual that was 110 00:06:59,720 --> 00:07:03,880 Speaker 4: a crime scene. If a biological evidence is recovered at 111 00:07:03,880 --> 00:07:07,800 Speaker 4: a crime scene, a DNA profile can be generated and 112 00:07:07,839 --> 00:07:12,960 Speaker 4: then compared either to a database everybody's heard about the 113 00:07:13,040 --> 00:07:17,240 Speaker 4: CODIS Combined DNA Index System, which is a repository of 114 00:07:17,320 --> 00:07:22,080 Speaker 4: DNA profiles from convicted defenders or directly to the DNA 115 00:07:22,400 --> 00:07:28,120 Speaker 4: of suspect in order to identify the person that left 116 00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:29,560 Speaker 4: their DNA at the crime scene. 117 00:07:29,920 --> 00:07:33,160 Speaker 5: And as we know, there was touch DNA found on it. 118 00:07:33,280 --> 00:07:35,280 Speaker 5: Can you explain to us what touch DNA is. 119 00:07:35,840 --> 00:07:39,560 Speaker 4: Touch DNA is a very general term that refers to 120 00:07:39,960 --> 00:07:44,280 Speaker 4: the DNA that is deposited on a surface through touching it. 121 00:07:45,320 --> 00:07:49,200 Speaker 4: There's a lot of different types of cells that can 122 00:07:49,240 --> 00:07:52,760 Speaker 4: be deposited when touching a surface. For example, if I 123 00:07:52,800 --> 00:07:56,080 Speaker 4: scratch my nose or I cough in my hand, they're 124 00:07:56,120 --> 00:07:59,360 Speaker 4: being me some cells that come from the mucus or 125 00:07:59,400 --> 00:08:03,640 Speaker 4: from sali. There's also epithelial cells from my skin that 126 00:08:03,720 --> 00:08:06,840 Speaker 4: I'm gonna deposit. And also there's a lot of cell 127 00:08:06,960 --> 00:08:11,760 Speaker 4: free DNA that is secreted in sweat. So there's a 128 00:08:11,800 --> 00:08:16,440 Speaker 4: bunch of different types of sources of DNA that we deposit. 129 00:08:17,000 --> 00:08:22,160 Speaker 4: So exactly what touch DNA is we don't know, but 130 00:08:22,280 --> 00:08:25,920 Speaker 4: it's a combination of all of those and so, and 131 00:08:26,160 --> 00:08:28,560 Speaker 4: you can't really see it with a naked eye, so 132 00:08:29,120 --> 00:08:32,840 Speaker 4: you have to trust or you have to make some assumptions, 133 00:08:33,559 --> 00:08:36,080 Speaker 4: and generally you're going to try and collect that from 134 00:08:36,160 --> 00:08:39,680 Speaker 4: surfaces dead will have been touched. 135 00:08:40,200 --> 00:08:42,040 Speaker 5: Is it how we see in the movies where they 136 00:08:42,120 --> 00:08:44,880 Speaker 5: like dust it and there's like a perfect thumbprint on 137 00:08:45,040 --> 00:08:46,480 Speaker 5: the ground or wherever. 138 00:08:47,320 --> 00:08:50,400 Speaker 4: No, it's not quite like that. Sometimes if there's a 139 00:08:50,400 --> 00:08:53,920 Speaker 4: blood stain or a semen stain or a saliva stain, 140 00:08:54,559 --> 00:08:58,280 Speaker 4: then yes, it's it's pretty simple. You swab that area, 141 00:08:58,440 --> 00:09:02,559 Speaker 4: you transfer the biology stain onto a swab, and then 142 00:09:02,600 --> 00:09:06,120 Speaker 4: you extract the DNA directly from the swab. At times, 143 00:09:06,120 --> 00:09:08,959 Speaker 4: though you're not able to see the DNA, you can 144 00:09:09,000 --> 00:09:12,480 Speaker 4: assume that there is DNA in that area, and so 145 00:09:12,559 --> 00:09:17,400 Speaker 4: you swab that surface. In the case that we're talking about, 146 00:09:17,880 --> 00:09:23,040 Speaker 4: they found this knife sheet and they swabbed the area. 147 00:09:23,200 --> 00:09:26,120 Speaker 4: At least that's my understanding. They swabbed the area around 148 00:09:26,120 --> 00:09:30,480 Speaker 4: the button and they extracted the DNA from that, But 149 00:09:30,559 --> 00:09:34,120 Speaker 4: you don't necessarily see it, and you don't know it's 150 00:09:34,160 --> 00:09:38,480 Speaker 4: there until you've completed the extraction process and you went 151 00:09:38,559 --> 00:09:42,400 Speaker 4: through a second process that's called DNA quantification. The DNA 152 00:09:42,480 --> 00:09:46,360 Speaker 4: quantification process allows us to determine how much DNA there 153 00:09:46,559 --> 00:09:50,200 Speaker 4: is and also the quality of that DNA in terms 154 00:09:50,240 --> 00:09:53,640 Speaker 4: of it being degraded or potentially inhibited. 155 00:09:54,880 --> 00:09:57,959 Speaker 5: So if you're an investigator, you just kind of try 156 00:09:58,000 --> 00:10:00,559 Speaker 5: to get DNA off of anything without you're kind of 157 00:10:00,559 --> 00:10:02,679 Speaker 5: blindly doing it. You're thinking, Okay, there could be DNA here, 158 00:10:02,720 --> 00:10:04,080 Speaker 5: could be DA in here, and then it's not till 159 00:10:04,120 --> 00:10:06,280 Speaker 5: you test it that you actually are are aware of 160 00:10:06,640 --> 00:10:08,120 Speaker 5: if there is DNA, and then you have to figure 161 00:10:08,120 --> 00:10:09,000 Speaker 5: out how much DNA. 162 00:10:09,480 --> 00:10:13,880 Speaker 4: Obviously, you can't swab an entire apartment. That's just not practical, 163 00:10:14,520 --> 00:10:18,920 Speaker 4: and the DNA extraction process and analysis is expensive and 164 00:10:19,000 --> 00:10:22,480 Speaker 4: it takes time, so you need to be frugal and 165 00:10:22,800 --> 00:10:27,920 Speaker 4: keep in mind the resources that are available. So you 166 00:10:28,080 --> 00:10:32,000 Speaker 4: tend to do an evaluation of the crime scene and 167 00:10:32,679 --> 00:10:39,000 Speaker 4: based on the scenario, identify pieces of evidence that have 168 00:10:39,160 --> 00:10:42,520 Speaker 4: the greatest chance of providing useful information for the case. 169 00:10:45,760 --> 00:10:48,280 Speaker 3: Here again, Stephanie and Jeff. 170 00:10:48,800 --> 00:10:52,360 Speaker 6: Since its creation in nineteen eighty seven, DNA testing has 171 00:10:52,400 --> 00:10:55,840 Speaker 6: proven to be an incredible useful tool in identifying criminals. 172 00:10:56,240 --> 00:10:58,680 Speaker 6: It completely changed the criminal justice system. 173 00:10:58,920 --> 00:11:01,280 Speaker 5: How it applies to this case is really fascinating. We 174 00:11:01,360 --> 00:11:04,280 Speaker 5: know that investigators pulled a single source mail touch DNA 175 00:11:04,360 --> 00:11:06,440 Speaker 5: off the button of the knife sheet that was left 176 00:11:06,440 --> 00:11:09,199 Speaker 5: at the murdercy. Touch DNA is DNA transferred from a 177 00:11:09,240 --> 00:11:12,120 Speaker 5: person to an object via contact with the object itself. 178 00:11:12,320 --> 00:11:15,680 Speaker 5: It's called touch DNA because it only requires very small samples, 179 00:11:15,720 --> 00:11:18,840 Speaker 5: for example, from the skin cell left on something after 180 00:11:18,920 --> 00:11:24,840 Speaker 5: it's been touched or casually handled, or from footprints. So 181 00:11:24,960 --> 00:11:27,160 Speaker 5: cops have this piece of touch DNA and they tried 182 00:11:27,200 --> 00:11:29,800 Speaker 5: to link that to criminals already in the system. Because, 183 00:11:29,800 --> 00:11:31,960 Speaker 5: as you may or may not know, when someone is arrested, 184 00:11:31,960 --> 00:11:33,880 Speaker 5: they have to give a fingerprint, which then gets put 185 00:11:33,920 --> 00:11:37,560 Speaker 5: into law enforcement's database system. So let's say whoever did 186 00:11:37,600 --> 00:11:40,440 Speaker 5: commit this massacre also had robbed a bank years ago, 187 00:11:40,880 --> 00:11:43,880 Speaker 5: cops would get a match and have all the suspects information. 188 00:11:44,440 --> 00:11:47,680 Speaker 6: But that didn't happen here because by all accounts, Brian 189 00:11:47,760 --> 00:11:51,160 Speaker 6: did not have any kind of a criminal record. Maybe 190 00:11:51,160 --> 00:11:54,719 Speaker 6: he was busted for tailgating or something, but that was 191 00:11:54,760 --> 00:11:55,640 Speaker 6: the extent of it. 192 00:11:55,960 --> 00:11:57,959 Speaker 5: I would think that since he had wanted to work 193 00:11:57,960 --> 00:12:00,400 Speaker 5: in law enforcement and applied for that internship, that he 194 00:12:00,480 --> 00:12:02,480 Speaker 5: might have had to give his fingerprint at some point. 195 00:12:02,960 --> 00:12:05,880 Speaker 6: But there was no match in the system of DNA 196 00:12:05,960 --> 00:12:09,520 Speaker 6: at the crime scene. So unfortunately this was just a 197 00:12:09,559 --> 00:12:10,000 Speaker 6: dead end. 198 00:12:13,480 --> 00:12:15,520 Speaker 3: Let's stop here for a break. We'll be back in 199 00:12:15,520 --> 00:12:26,400 Speaker 3: a moment. With pressure mounting and leads coming up empty, 200 00:12:26,559 --> 00:12:30,520 Speaker 3: investigators turned to genetic genealogy as an alternative way of 201 00:12:30,559 --> 00:12:35,280 Speaker 3: identifying DNA on the knife sheath. Here's forensic expert Joseph 202 00:12:35,320 --> 00:12:36,079 Speaker 3: Scott Morgan. 203 00:12:39,360 --> 00:12:42,360 Speaker 2: The cool thing about genetic genealogy, and it's almost as 204 00:12:42,400 --> 00:12:46,160 Speaker 2: if you've got people that have discovered this thing just 205 00:12:46,240 --> 00:12:51,200 Speaker 2: in the last few years, where it's this fascinating methodology 206 00:12:51,240 --> 00:12:54,920 Speaker 2: of tracking down things or putting an identity to things 207 00:12:55,040 --> 00:12:58,920 Speaker 2: or people more specifically, that otherwise have remained kind of 208 00:12:59,000 --> 00:13:01,959 Speaker 2: cloaked in secrecy for many, many years. 209 00:13:05,080 --> 00:13:07,720 Speaker 5: How would you say it differs or doesn't differ from 210 00:13:07,760 --> 00:13:09,080 Speaker 5: regular DNA testing. 211 00:13:09,120 --> 00:13:13,040 Speaker 2: When it comes to testing for any kind of biological element, 212 00:13:13,080 --> 00:13:16,400 Speaker 2: as it's tied back to DNA. The FEDS maintain a 213 00:13:16,559 --> 00:13:22,880 Speaker 2: database that is actually referred to it's the FBI's database 214 00:13:22,920 --> 00:13:25,920 Speaker 2: that's actually referred to as CODIS, which is combined DNA 215 00:13:26,040 --> 00:13:30,280 Speaker 2: Index System. And people hear this term thrown around quite 216 00:13:30,280 --> 00:13:32,120 Speaker 2: a bit, and I'm sure that folks have heard about, 217 00:13:32,640 --> 00:13:35,480 Speaker 2: you know, where you have sex offenders where they are 218 00:13:35,520 --> 00:13:38,839 Speaker 2: mandated by court to give up a sample and once 219 00:13:38,880 --> 00:13:42,439 Speaker 2: that sample is rendered, unto the courts and unto the system, 220 00:13:42,600 --> 00:13:45,240 Speaker 2: it's banked at that point in time. So those are 221 00:13:45,360 --> 00:13:48,760 Speaker 2: known offenders, all right. On the other side of the house, 222 00:13:49,440 --> 00:13:52,720 Speaker 2: you have what's referred to as a forensic database. Those 223 00:13:52,760 --> 00:13:57,280 Speaker 2: are these horrible crimes, just like you know, the Golden 224 00:13:57,320 --> 00:14:00,600 Speaker 2: State killer that have gone undetected from many years. Those 225 00:14:00,640 --> 00:14:04,760 Speaker 2: are forensic cases where you have a sample which is 226 00:14:05,200 --> 00:14:08,199 Speaker 2: essentially the DNA code that's built into all of us, 227 00:14:08,720 --> 00:14:12,439 Speaker 2: but yet you don't have an identity that goes specifically 228 00:14:12,480 --> 00:14:15,400 Speaker 2: to that person, and so those are the unknowns. And 229 00:14:15,679 --> 00:14:19,040 Speaker 2: when you're looking at serialized crimes, for instance, if you 230 00:14:19,120 --> 00:14:22,400 Speaker 2: can get a DNA sample from multiple cases and it 231 00:14:22,480 --> 00:14:25,320 Speaker 2: kind of funneled back into the system, what they're looking 232 00:14:25,360 --> 00:14:27,720 Speaker 2: for in the forensic side of the house is to 233 00:14:27,720 --> 00:14:31,840 Speaker 2: see if you get multiple hits from a single individual, 234 00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:34,560 Speaker 2: and that gives you an idea of that you have 235 00:14:34,640 --> 00:14:37,680 Speaker 2: a serial perpetrator, for instance, on your hands. Now here's 236 00:14:37,720 --> 00:14:41,120 Speaker 2: the thing when it comes to genetic genealogy. This throws 237 00:14:41,240 --> 00:14:44,560 Speaker 2: kind of a wrinkle into everything because for years and 238 00:14:44,640 --> 00:14:49,800 Speaker 2: years it's been all about unknown assailants. When you have 239 00:14:50,240 --> 00:14:54,840 Speaker 2: an event where you have DNA deposition at a scene, 240 00:14:55,400 --> 00:14:59,000 Speaker 2: let's say, for instance, from any kind of body fluid, 241 00:14:59,200 --> 00:15:03,040 Speaker 2: blood seam, whatever the case, saliva at the scene, or 242 00:15:03,080 --> 00:15:06,880 Speaker 2: maybe even partial DNA that we get from touch DNA, 243 00:15:07,480 --> 00:15:11,920 Speaker 2: if you can capture that bit of biological sample, you 244 00:15:11,960 --> 00:15:15,240 Speaker 2: can kind of kick it into the next level with 245 00:15:15,680 --> 00:15:20,840 Speaker 2: genetic genealogy because there is this massive database that exists 246 00:15:20,880 --> 00:15:24,000 Speaker 2: out there of people that are seeking their ancestors, or 247 00:15:24,040 --> 00:15:27,680 Speaker 2: perhaps people that are looking to find out their parentage, 248 00:15:28,040 --> 00:15:30,640 Speaker 2: people that have been put up for adoption, Who are 249 00:15:30,640 --> 00:15:34,920 Speaker 2: they related to? And so many government agencies look at 250 00:15:34,920 --> 00:15:39,440 Speaker 2: this as this kind of broad ranging spectrum that they 251 00:15:39,480 --> 00:15:43,120 Speaker 2: can dig into and utilize that to kind of connect 252 00:15:43,160 --> 00:15:46,440 Speaker 2: the dots, if you would, as to who an unknown 253 00:15:46,440 --> 00:15:50,680 Speaker 2: perpetrator might be. And you know, here's the thing. Many 254 00:15:50,760 --> 00:15:56,240 Speaker 2: of these cases are solved by identifying cousins of all things, 255 00:15:56,280 --> 00:15:58,920 Speaker 2: and we all have cousins. Many of us are related 256 00:15:59,400 --> 00:16:02,800 Speaker 2: to one another, and we have no idea, and so 257 00:16:03,080 --> 00:16:05,880 Speaker 2: you look for this connectivity and then you kind of 258 00:16:05,960 --> 00:16:10,360 Speaker 2: begin to narrow this down with genetic genealogy. 259 00:16:14,840 --> 00:16:18,640 Speaker 3: Despite having their own in state forensic laboratory, the Idaho 260 00:16:18,760 --> 00:16:22,600 Speaker 3: State Police contacted a private third party company to conduct 261 00:16:22,640 --> 00:16:26,880 Speaker 3: the genealogy testing. Athroom is a Texas based company that 262 00:16:27,040 --> 00:16:32,160 Speaker 3: specializes in forensic genetic genealogy and has helped resolve unsolved 263 00:16:32,240 --> 00:16:36,280 Speaker 3: murders and identify unknown victims. With the help of the FBI, 264 00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:39,040 Speaker 3: the firm was able to create a more extensive DNA 265 00:16:39,160 --> 00:16:42,520 Speaker 3: profile of the suspected killer, and then it was uploaded 266 00:16:42,560 --> 00:16:44,920 Speaker 3: to commercial genetic testing databases. 267 00:16:48,280 --> 00:16:51,880 Speaker 5: Jeff and Stephanie, we don't know where the data profile 268 00:16:51,960 --> 00:16:55,440 Speaker 5: was uploaded. Most likely, though it was Jebmatch or family 269 00:16:55,480 --> 00:16:58,880 Speaker 5: Tree DNA, which are both familial DNA testing services. On 270 00:16:58,920 --> 00:17:01,120 Speaker 5: these sites you can find out what your heritage is 271 00:17:01,320 --> 00:17:03,480 Speaker 5: or if you have any long lost cousins across the world. 272 00:17:04,440 --> 00:17:07,440 Speaker 5: They are also both commercial websites that allow law enforcement searches. 273 00:17:07,480 --> 00:17:09,919 Speaker 5: They differ from twenty three in me or Ancestry DNA, 274 00:17:10,160 --> 00:17:12,560 Speaker 5: which do not allow investigators to search the records. 275 00:17:13,320 --> 00:17:17,480 Speaker 6: That does make perfect sense from a consumer's standpoint. I mean, look, 276 00:17:17,480 --> 00:17:19,800 Speaker 6: if you go to a website like twenty three in 277 00:17:19,880 --> 00:17:23,800 Speaker 6: me or Ancestry DNA, you may not want your personal 278 00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:27,520 Speaker 6: data getting out to law enforcement or personal data regarding 279 00:17:27,680 --> 00:17:31,040 Speaker 6: anybody in your family. I would imagine that these companies 280 00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:34,960 Speaker 6: are frankly afraid that law enforcement has access to everyone's 281 00:17:35,040 --> 00:17:38,880 Speaker 6: DNA and then people won't upload their info, thus hurting 282 00:17:38,960 --> 00:17:42,400 Speaker 6: their ultimate bottom line. Privacy is a pretty major concern 283 00:17:42,480 --> 00:17:44,600 Speaker 6: for this industry. 284 00:17:45,480 --> 00:17:50,360 Speaker 3: Here again Jeff speaking with forensic expert just so Scott Morgan, and. 285 00:17:50,320 --> 00:17:53,320 Speaker 5: Would you say that's why it's controversial, because every Tom, 286 00:17:53,359 --> 00:17:55,400 Speaker 5: Dick and Harry can kind of help the police catch 287 00:17:55,440 --> 00:17:56,399 Speaker 5: their cousin in a crime. 288 00:17:56,960 --> 00:17:59,560 Speaker 2: Most people in the population that are submitting their DNA, 289 00:17:59,640 --> 00:18:02,800 Speaker 2: they don't have a point of reference for what their 290 00:18:02,840 --> 00:18:07,240 Speaker 2: constitutional standing is as it applies to privacy and these 291 00:18:07,280 --> 00:18:10,000 Speaker 2: sorts of things. And you know, I think that for 292 00:18:10,119 --> 00:18:13,880 Speaker 2: many folks when they render this DNA sample, and it's 293 00:18:13,920 --> 00:18:18,000 Speaker 2: generally a cheek swab or a cheek scraping. When you 294 00:18:18,040 --> 00:18:20,560 Speaker 2: go in, you take the sample, you submit it to 295 00:18:20,640 --> 00:18:23,800 Speaker 2: one of these companies and they begin to run your profile. 296 00:18:24,240 --> 00:18:27,240 Speaker 2: You don't have this expectation that this is going to 297 00:18:27,280 --> 00:18:30,359 Speaker 2: be used to solve a crime. Now, many people might 298 00:18:30,480 --> 00:18:33,160 Speaker 2: not have a problem with that, but others do. They're 299 00:18:33,200 --> 00:18:36,240 Speaker 2: not entering into this agreement with a company so that 300 00:18:36,280 --> 00:18:39,240 Speaker 2: they're going to be crime solvers. They want to determine 301 00:18:39,600 --> 00:18:43,119 Speaker 2: the mystery that surrounds their heritage and to try to 302 00:18:43,200 --> 00:18:47,160 Speaker 2: determine who they came from. The Supreme Court has ruled 303 00:18:47,240 --> 00:18:50,359 Speaker 2: in the past that you do not have like a 304 00:18:50,440 --> 00:18:56,720 Speaker 2: baked in expectation of privacy if you freely surrender something, Okay, 305 00:18:56,840 --> 00:19:00,199 Speaker 2: particularly in this case we're talking about genetic material. They've 306 00:19:00,240 --> 00:19:02,800 Speaker 2: held that there is no expectation of privacy for a 307 00:19:02,840 --> 00:19:05,000 Speaker 2: third party. And so you've got these two that go 308 00:19:05,119 --> 00:19:08,200 Speaker 2: back and forth. What it comes down to, I think 309 00:19:08,280 --> 00:19:12,320 Speaker 2: probably for many of these companies people famously like ancestry 310 00:19:12,359 --> 00:19:14,960 Speaker 2: dot com. We've got twenty three and me that have 311 00:19:15,000 --> 00:19:19,280 Speaker 2: been out there for a while. They have vigorously stated 312 00:19:19,520 --> 00:19:23,119 Speaker 2: that they are not working with any government agency and 313 00:19:23,119 --> 00:19:26,480 Speaker 2: they're not going to surrender anything unless they're being presented 314 00:19:26,520 --> 00:19:29,320 Speaker 2: with a subpoena that they are in fact being compelled 315 00:19:29,520 --> 00:19:32,440 Speaker 2: to offer up these profiles that they have. And so 316 00:19:32,520 --> 00:19:35,520 Speaker 2: that in and of itself is kind of striking when 317 00:19:35,520 --> 00:19:39,399 Speaker 2: it comes to the utility of forensic genealogy. 318 00:19:39,359 --> 00:19:41,560 Speaker 5: And is that why you think to use it or 319 00:19:41,600 --> 00:19:42,640 Speaker 5: to talk about it when they do. 320 00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:47,320 Speaker 2: Use it, I think to a great degree, police are 321 00:19:47,680 --> 00:19:52,000 Speaker 2: reticent to reveal their sources when it comes to you generally, 322 00:19:52,080 --> 00:19:55,080 Speaker 2: don't find out the veil is not lifted. If you will, 323 00:19:55,440 --> 00:19:58,879 Speaker 2: you know from their source how they went about accomplishing 324 00:19:58,920 --> 00:20:02,399 Speaker 2: this these tasks. There are companies out there that do 325 00:20:02,520 --> 00:20:06,080 Speaker 2: in fact aid in the facilitation of this. Orthum comes 326 00:20:06,080 --> 00:20:09,080 Speaker 2: to mind in particular, they've been around for a few 327 00:20:09,119 --> 00:20:12,440 Speaker 2: years now and they've certainly made a name from themselves 328 00:20:12,480 --> 00:20:15,800 Speaker 2: and are highly regarded from a scientific perspective and the 329 00:20:15,840 --> 00:20:19,240 Speaker 2: methodologies that they employ, and they've had great success. The 330 00:20:19,280 --> 00:20:22,560 Speaker 2: average person on the street they're asked this question, how 331 00:20:22,640 --> 00:20:24,880 Speaker 2: much do you value your privacy if the whole thing 332 00:20:24,960 --> 00:20:28,960 Speaker 2: turns upon your DNA? Are you willing to surrender that 333 00:20:29,040 --> 00:20:32,720 Speaker 2: bit of privacy that you have in order to solve 334 00:20:32,760 --> 00:20:36,600 Speaker 2: a crime that might facilitate someone being taken off the 335 00:20:36,600 --> 00:20:39,040 Speaker 2: street and that sort of thing. And it's not necessarily 336 00:20:39,080 --> 00:20:43,840 Speaker 2: a very simple answer. It can be very very complicated. 337 00:20:48,800 --> 00:20:51,360 Speaker 5: This case, I think is different because we hear about 338 00:20:51,400 --> 00:20:53,000 Speaker 5: it so much for cold cases, but this is an 339 00:20:53,000 --> 00:20:56,199 Speaker 5: active investigation where genetic genealogy came into place, so obviously 340 00:20:56,200 --> 00:20:58,960 Speaker 5: the question for normally in cold cases, this is a 341 00:20:58,960 --> 00:20:59,960 Speaker 5: little bit of an outlier. 342 00:21:00,720 --> 00:21:03,439 Speaker 2: Yeah, because this is in fact not a cold case. 343 00:21:03,640 --> 00:21:06,560 Speaker 2: From the very first day that this happened, you could 344 00:21:06,560 --> 00:21:10,280 Speaker 2: hear the whisperings already, I'd say probably within the first 345 00:21:10,400 --> 00:21:13,119 Speaker 2: twelve hours of me being on the air and covering 346 00:21:13,160 --> 00:21:16,120 Speaker 2: the case. From a forensic standpoint, I had questions being 347 00:21:16,119 --> 00:21:21,080 Speaker 2: thrown at me repeatedly about DNA and DNA linkage to 348 00:21:21,160 --> 00:21:25,720 Speaker 2: a potential perpetrator. How is it possible that a subject 349 00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:29,240 Speaker 2: could go into an environment which we can, I think 350 00:21:29,400 --> 00:21:33,959 Speaker 2: pretty safely state is just a blood bath and not 351 00:21:34,119 --> 00:21:38,320 Speaker 2: leave some essence of themselves behind, and you have the 352 00:21:38,440 --> 00:21:43,320 Speaker 2: genetic connection at the scene in that home where this 353 00:21:43,840 --> 00:21:49,639 Speaker 2: massacre took place, and then apparently you have genetic connectivity 354 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:53,120 Speaker 2: at Coberg's family's house. So now you're looking at two 355 00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:56,840 Speaker 2: things that are kind of coalescing here, they're coming together, 356 00:21:56,920 --> 00:22:01,160 Speaker 2: and you begin to create this picture. It's a damning 357 00:22:01,240 --> 00:22:04,520 Speaker 2: bit of evidence. I think now the courts, the attorneys 358 00:22:04,560 --> 00:22:06,560 Speaker 2: will get together and they'll begin to question things like 359 00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:11,000 Speaker 2: sourcing and procedurally, how was this done, how was the 360 00:22:11,080 --> 00:22:14,919 Speaker 2: assessment done, How can this actually be validated? How do 361 00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:17,040 Speaker 2: we know the sample may or may not have been 362 00:22:17,080 --> 00:22:20,560 Speaker 2: contaminated because it is so very fragile. Those questions will 363 00:22:20,560 --> 00:22:24,760 Speaker 2: come up. But the fact is you have this arguably 364 00:22:24,920 --> 00:22:29,560 Speaker 2: astronomical numerical mountain that the defense is going to have 365 00:22:29,600 --> 00:22:33,119 Speaker 2: to climb in this case. And I look, I don't 366 00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:36,960 Speaker 2: necessarily think that the DNA data that they gathered there 367 00:22:36,960 --> 00:22:39,520 Speaker 2: in Pennsylvania, and the DNA that we know about at 368 00:22:39,600 --> 00:22:43,159 Speaker 2: least thus far from what was collected at this quadruple 369 00:22:43,240 --> 00:22:46,200 Speaker 2: homicide is the end of the DNA. There very well 370 00:22:46,280 --> 00:22:48,119 Speaker 2: might be more, we just don't know what it is 371 00:22:48,160 --> 00:22:48,920 Speaker 2: at this point, though. 372 00:22:51,840 --> 00:22:54,760 Speaker 5: What's your opinion As an expert, do you think genetic 373 00:22:54,800 --> 00:22:57,880 Speaker 5: genealogy should be used for rest or narrowing down suspect less. 374 00:22:58,680 --> 00:23:02,199 Speaker 2: I think that there is utility for it, certainly. I 375 00:23:02,240 --> 00:23:05,760 Speaker 2: don't know that I have encountered a case where it 376 00:23:05,800 --> 00:23:09,000 Speaker 2: was turned around this quickly, you know, because look, it 377 00:23:09,040 --> 00:23:11,960 Speaker 2: seems as though we've been covering Idaho forever and ever 378 00:23:12,200 --> 00:23:14,960 Speaker 2: this point, but we haven't. It's really been a very 379 00:23:14,960 --> 00:23:18,080 Speaker 2: short period of time, and this profile was turned out 380 00:23:18,240 --> 00:23:22,639 Speaker 2: very quickly. So there is obviously provable utility relative to 381 00:23:22,680 --> 00:23:26,480 Speaker 2: the tool. I think that it can potentially be a 382 00:23:26,600 --> 00:23:30,800 Speaker 2: very slippery slope from a privacy standpoint. There are so 383 00:23:30,880 --> 00:23:34,000 Speaker 2: many cases out there that are cold, and you would 384 00:23:34,160 --> 00:23:38,680 Speaker 2: want nothing more than to have answers to these things 385 00:23:38,680 --> 00:23:40,960 Speaker 2: that have kind of lingered in our mind and actually 386 00:23:40,960 --> 00:23:45,119 Speaker 2: have become part and parcel of our history, And certainly 387 00:23:45,119 --> 00:23:48,199 Speaker 2: in the true crime community. Can you even imagine if 388 00:23:48,240 --> 00:23:51,040 Speaker 2: they were able to, say, for instance, come up with 389 00:23:51,119 --> 00:23:54,760 Speaker 2: a bit of unidentified DNA from say the Black Dalia 390 00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:58,920 Speaker 2: case or from Jack the Ripper, and they were able 391 00:23:58,960 --> 00:24:02,560 Speaker 2: to construct some kind of DNA profile based upon that. 392 00:24:02,600 --> 00:24:05,040 Speaker 2: I think a lot of us would really like to 393 00:24:05,080 --> 00:24:09,080 Speaker 2: know who those individuals might be that committed these crimes. However, 394 00:24:09,280 --> 00:24:12,720 Speaker 2: we have to keep in the forefront of our mind 395 00:24:13,000 --> 00:24:15,919 Speaker 2: what our expectations are as American citizens. Do we have 396 00:24:15,920 --> 00:24:19,919 Speaker 2: a right to privacy? And this is not just maybe 397 00:24:19,960 --> 00:24:23,480 Speaker 2: our records or our papers that you're talking about government 398 00:24:23,520 --> 00:24:27,720 Speaker 2: authorities having access to. We're talking about our base genetic code. 399 00:24:28,200 --> 00:24:30,320 Speaker 5: Do you think it's the future? Like, is there any 400 00:24:30,320 --> 00:24:32,320 Speaker 5: way to stop to you know, kind of put this 401 00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:35,199 Speaker 5: back in the box or is it like now police 402 00:24:35,240 --> 00:24:37,080 Speaker 5: have this in their tool, but they're going to use it. 403 00:24:37,560 --> 00:24:39,959 Speaker 2: No, you can't put the genie back in the bottle. 404 00:24:40,400 --> 00:24:43,280 Speaker 2: We're beyond that. Now we've crossed the rubicon. It will 405 00:24:43,280 --> 00:24:45,320 Speaker 2: be used and continue to be used. I just hope 406 00:24:45,359 --> 00:24:47,639 Speaker 2: that the people that wheel the tool have the best 407 00:24:47,680 --> 00:24:51,600 Speaker 2: interest of the citizenry at large, because no one in 408 00:24:51,640 --> 00:24:55,880 Speaker 2: our population is guilty until they are in fact proven guilty. 409 00:24:56,320 --> 00:24:59,399 Speaker 2: A quadruple homicide in a college town is stuff that 410 00:24:59,640 --> 00:25:04,160 Speaker 2: just doesn't happen every day, and it's one of these 411 00:25:04,160 --> 00:25:08,639 Speaker 2: moments in time that it has created extraordinary circumstances, and 412 00:25:08,680 --> 00:25:12,119 Speaker 2: to my way of thinking, the investigative authorities that are 413 00:25:12,160 --> 00:25:15,840 Speaker 2: involved in this case went to extraordinary measures in order 414 00:25:15,920 --> 00:25:19,080 Speaker 2: to facilitate the solving of this case, or at least 415 00:25:19,080 --> 00:25:22,320 Speaker 2: to give them an indication as to who may have 416 00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:24,560 Speaker 2: had a hand in this. And that's why they went 417 00:25:24,600 --> 00:25:28,240 Speaker 2: through these great links using genetic genealogy. 418 00:25:30,400 --> 00:25:43,080 Speaker 3: Let's stop here for another break. Once FBI investigators and 419 00:25:43,160 --> 00:25:46,679 Speaker 3: authroom genealogists had the DNA, they began to look for 420 00:25:46,760 --> 00:25:51,880 Speaker 3: full or partial matches to the suspected Idaho Killers DNA. 421 00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:56,639 Speaker 3: The first results were distant relatives. Slowly they created a 422 00:25:56,680 --> 00:25:59,920 Speaker 3: massive family tree that utilized the genetic information of the 423 00:26:00,119 --> 00:26:04,679 Speaker 3: Coburger's immediate family cousins and all of their distant relatives. 424 00:26:05,280 --> 00:26:07,840 Speaker 3: That tree would have provided a short list of potential 425 00:26:07,880 --> 00:26:15,600 Speaker 3: suspects within the Coburger family tree. Again, Stephanie and Jeff. 426 00:26:17,240 --> 00:26:20,399 Speaker 5: The most famous successful case of genetic genealogy mapping is 427 00:26:20,440 --> 00:26:23,359 Speaker 5: the Golden State Killer. In the nineteen seventies and eighties, 428 00:26:23,400 --> 00:26:27,239 Speaker 5: he terrorized California, murdering at least thirteen people. Likely he 429 00:26:27,359 --> 00:26:30,520 Speaker 5: killed and raped many more. But even with DNA evidence, 430 00:26:30,840 --> 00:26:33,199 Speaker 5: years went by with no solid leads and the cases 431 00:26:33,200 --> 00:26:37,480 Speaker 5: went cold. Why because the killer wasn't in any criminal database. 432 00:26:37,720 --> 00:26:40,560 Speaker 5: But in twenty eighteen, investigators had an idea. They used 433 00:26:40,600 --> 00:26:42,840 Speaker 5: public DNA information to see if they could locate and 434 00:26:42,880 --> 00:26:45,879 Speaker 5: identify family members of the Golden State killer using genetic 435 00:26:45,920 --> 00:26:49,840 Speaker 5: genealogy mapping. After painstakingly mapping out the killer's genetic links, 436 00:26:49,920 --> 00:26:53,639 Speaker 5: police were able to identify Joseph James DiAngelo, a retired 437 00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:56,240 Speaker 5: police officer living outside Sacramento, California. 438 00:26:56,880 --> 00:26:59,840 Speaker 6: To me, it's super interesting that he, just like co 439 00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:03,840 Speaker 6: Burger aspired to be, was also in law enforcement. 440 00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:05,000 Speaker 4: I agree. 441 00:27:05,080 --> 00:27:07,640 Speaker 5: So anyways, this technique is now being used to solve 442 00:27:07,720 --> 00:27:08,840 Speaker 5: hundreds of cold cases. 443 00:27:09,240 --> 00:27:11,760 Speaker 6: I'll say this though, it really does require a shift 444 00:27:11,760 --> 00:27:14,840 Speaker 6: in the process and the procedures that are currently in 445 00:27:14,880 --> 00:27:18,119 Speaker 6: place to catching a bad guy because labs really aren't 446 00:27:18,119 --> 00:27:21,160 Speaker 6: set up to do this type of genetic genealogy mapping. 447 00:27:21,400 --> 00:27:26,280 Speaker 6: They also don't regularly employ genealogists who map family trees. 448 00:27:26,520 --> 00:27:28,560 Speaker 5: But all that might change because of the success of 449 00:27:28,600 --> 00:27:29,639 Speaker 5: the Idaho investigation. 450 00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:36,960 Speaker 3: On the morning of December nineteenth, investigators positively identified their 451 00:27:37,000 --> 00:27:41,680 Speaker 3: loan suspect by mapping the genetic similarities of the killers' relatives. 452 00:27:41,880 --> 00:27:45,840 Speaker 3: Police were able to confirm through DNA genetic genealogy mapping 453 00:27:46,119 --> 00:27:49,520 Speaker 3: that twenty eight year old Brian Coberger was the likely killer. 454 00:27:54,920 --> 00:27:58,080 Speaker 6: Can you imagine that day for the hardworking investigators on 455 00:27:58,160 --> 00:27:58,720 Speaker 6: this case. 456 00:27:59,200 --> 00:28:02,159 Speaker 5: Yeah, was already one of their suspects. His name had 457 00:28:02,200 --> 00:28:05,359 Speaker 5: been forwarded to investigators. He drove a white Honda a Lantra, 458 00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:08,320 Speaker 5: he lived near the victims, had exhibited odd behavior, and 459 00:28:08,359 --> 00:28:10,440 Speaker 5: his cell phone had pinged in the area of the crowd. 460 00:28:10,520 --> 00:28:11,400 Speaker 5: He checked every. 461 00:28:11,240 --> 00:28:15,320 Speaker 6: Box, and yet without a murder weapon or some kind 462 00:28:15,359 --> 00:28:19,040 Speaker 6: of DNA evidence, police still don't really have any real 463 00:28:19,119 --> 00:28:21,640 Speaker 6: case against him. While it might seem like a lot 464 00:28:21,680 --> 00:28:25,159 Speaker 6: in hindsight, at the time, it was all really circumstantial 465 00:28:25,440 --> 00:28:28,480 Speaker 6: To make an arrest. Cops really needed something more. 466 00:28:28,800 --> 00:28:31,600 Speaker 5: And it's not really clear if Cooberger was quote unquote 467 00:28:31,720 --> 00:28:34,720 Speaker 5: the suspect before the genealogy ampol came back, or if 468 00:28:34,800 --> 00:28:36,840 Speaker 5: his name was just on a long list of persons 469 00:28:36,840 --> 00:28:37,400 Speaker 5: of interest. 470 00:28:39,960 --> 00:28:44,160 Speaker 3: With Coburger now identified as the prime suspect, investigators worked 471 00:28:44,160 --> 00:28:47,280 Speaker 3: to strengthen their case against him, applying for a search 472 00:28:47,360 --> 00:28:50,720 Speaker 3: warrant of Coburger's phone activity and the time period around 473 00:28:50,720 --> 00:28:53,840 Speaker 3: the murders. On the morning of the killings, the result 474 00:28:53,920 --> 00:28:57,480 Speaker 3: showed Coburger's phone hanging a tower near his home before 475 00:28:57,520 --> 00:29:00,440 Speaker 3: moving south at a rapid speed and then disco connecting 476 00:29:00,440 --> 00:29:05,080 Speaker 3: from the cellular phone system. Here's reporter Chris Spargo. 477 00:29:05,440 --> 00:29:09,000 Speaker 8: So at two forty two in the morning, Brian Coburger's 478 00:29:09,000 --> 00:29:11,680 Speaker 8: cell phone is recorded as sort of being on the 479 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:14,720 Speaker 8: network in Pullman, Washington, where his dormitory is on Washingt 480 00:29:14,720 --> 00:29:17,400 Speaker 8: State University campus. Then a few minutes later goes off 481 00:29:17,400 --> 00:29:20,880 Speaker 8: the network and is disconnected. From that point on, there's 482 00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:22,920 Speaker 8: just counts of people seeing his white han Day lantro 483 00:29:23,160 --> 00:29:25,280 Speaker 8: so is white han Day Launt scene leaving Pullman shortly 484 00:29:25,280 --> 00:29:27,320 Speaker 8: after that, and then around three point thirty ittth seen 485 00:29:27,720 --> 00:29:30,760 Speaker 8: in Moscow. Now, the direct route from Pullman to Moscow 486 00:29:30,800 --> 00:29:33,120 Speaker 8: is about fifteen minutes tops, and this is late at night, 487 00:29:33,160 --> 00:29:35,200 Speaker 8: so it's not going to be any traffic, so it's 488 00:29:35,280 --> 00:29:37,240 Speaker 8: assumed he took some sort of way that would have 489 00:29:37,240 --> 00:29:39,240 Speaker 8: gone around that sort of main road. 490 00:29:41,320 --> 00:29:44,840 Speaker 3: During the exact moments of the murders, Coburger's cell phone 491 00:29:44,920 --> 00:29:49,000 Speaker 3: was offline and wouldn't return until four forty eight am, 492 00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:53,000 Speaker 3: at least twenty minutes after investigators say the murders took place. 493 00:29:53,680 --> 00:29:57,560 Speaker 3: When Coburger's phone does reconnect, it pings off several towers 494 00:29:57,600 --> 00:30:01,040 Speaker 3: south of Moscow and maps an odd early morning travel 495 00:30:01,080 --> 00:30:04,200 Speaker 3: pattern for the next forty five minutes. The data shows 496 00:30:04,240 --> 00:30:07,400 Speaker 3: Coburger driving on back roads and taking an off the 497 00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:10,240 Speaker 3: beaten track route to his home in Pullman, Washington. 498 00:30:12,960 --> 00:30:14,960 Speaker 8: It's a difficult alibi for him because he has to 499 00:30:15,120 --> 00:30:16,920 Speaker 8: explain that phone called ping off the tower in the 500 00:30:16,920 --> 00:30:19,320 Speaker 8: middle of nowhere at four forty five am on the 501 00:30:19,400 --> 00:30:20,560 Speaker 8: night of the murders. 502 00:30:23,320 --> 00:30:26,880 Speaker 3: Police also obtained cell phone data that showed that Coburger's 503 00:30:26,920 --> 00:30:29,200 Speaker 3: phone was in the area of the house on King 504 00:30:29,320 --> 00:30:31,920 Speaker 3: Road at least a dozen times in the weeks before 505 00:30:31,960 --> 00:30:35,160 Speaker 3: the attack. By December twenty third, police were closing in 506 00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:39,480 Speaker 3: on Coburger, but investigators still need a direct genetic comparison 507 00:30:39,560 --> 00:30:42,920 Speaker 3: between Coburger and the DNA on the knife sheath before 508 00:30:42,920 --> 00:30:47,280 Speaker 3: making an arrest. Four days later, Pennsylvania State Police are 509 00:30:47,360 --> 00:30:50,959 Speaker 3: tasked with watching Brian Coburger pull trash from his parents' 510 00:30:50,960 --> 00:30:54,479 Speaker 3: home on December twenty eighth. DNA results showed that the 511 00:30:54,520 --> 00:30:57,640 Speaker 3: mail DNA pulled from the trash can was a ninety 512 00:30:57,720 --> 00:31:00,680 Speaker 3: nine point nine nine nine eight percent likely to be 513 00:31:00,760 --> 00:31:04,200 Speaker 3: the biological father of the DNA pulled from the knife 514 00:31:04,240 --> 00:31:08,240 Speaker 3: sheath left on Madison Mogan's bed. This parental link was 515 00:31:08,280 --> 00:31:10,920 Speaker 3: the last piece of evidence needed for an arrest warrant. 516 00:31:11,280 --> 00:31:15,840 Speaker 3: Coburger was arrested shortly after. When Brian Coberger was arrested 517 00:31:15,880 --> 00:31:19,000 Speaker 3: in the early hours of December thirtieth, his family didn't 518 00:31:19,040 --> 00:31:21,520 Speaker 3: know the role their own DNA played in his capture, 519 00:31:21,880 --> 00:31:24,960 Speaker 3: but they did release a statement expressing sympathy for the 520 00:31:25,040 --> 00:31:29,440 Speaker 3: four Idaho families who lost their precious children. Coberger's family 521 00:31:29,560 --> 00:31:33,240 Speaker 3: also said they had fully cooperated with law enforcement agencies 522 00:31:33,520 --> 00:31:36,440 Speaker 3: in an attempt to seek the truth. They also asked 523 00:31:36,440 --> 00:31:41,160 Speaker 3: for privacy as the case move forward through the legal process. Later, 524 00:31:41,280 --> 00:31:44,720 Speaker 3: they found out their own family's DNA led investigators to 525 00:31:44,760 --> 00:31:49,959 Speaker 3: Brian Coburger, Stephanie, and Jeff. 526 00:31:51,360 --> 00:31:54,920 Speaker 5: DNA has become increasingly important for successful prosecutions thanks to 527 00:31:54,960 --> 00:31:58,360 Speaker 5: something called the CSI effect, which shows like CSI, Cold 528 00:31:58,400 --> 00:32:01,880 Speaker 5: Case Without a Trace, Criminal Linds basically every other CBS series. 529 00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:04,920 Speaker 5: Everyone thinks they're a criminal expert, so a large portion 530 00:32:04,960 --> 00:32:08,400 Speaker 5: of jurors expect that the prosecutors will present some type 531 00:32:08,400 --> 00:32:10,000 Speaker 5: of scientific data as part of their. 532 00:32:09,880 --> 00:32:13,000 Speaker 6: Case, which in some cases is a very fair assessment, 533 00:32:13,520 --> 00:32:17,680 Speaker 6: and look things like eyewitnesses and motives are still very important, 534 00:32:17,960 --> 00:32:22,640 Speaker 6: but without any kind of scientific DNA or firearm ballistics 535 00:32:23,080 --> 00:32:25,600 Speaker 6: or fingerprints, it's really hard to get a conviction. 536 00:32:26,400 --> 00:32:29,120 Speaker 5: The CSI effect is fascinating as it may also affect 537 00:32:29,120 --> 00:32:32,240 Speaker 5: how criminals themselves act. In the year two thousand, when 538 00:32:32,320 --> 00:32:35,200 Speaker 5: CSI premiered, forty six point nine percent of all rate 539 00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:38,080 Speaker 5: cases in the United States were resolved by police. By 540 00:32:38,120 --> 00:32:40,560 Speaker 5: two thousand and five, the rate had fallen to forty 541 00:32:40,600 --> 00:32:43,720 Speaker 5: one point three percent. Some investigators attributed this to client 542 00:32:43,800 --> 00:32:47,320 Speaker 5: to the CSI effect, as crime shows often inadvertently explain 543 00:32:47,480 --> 00:32:50,200 Speaker 5: in detail how criminals can conceal or destroy evidence. 544 00:32:50,840 --> 00:32:53,440 Speaker 6: But back to how this affects this case. Look, as 545 00:32:53,440 --> 00:32:56,840 Speaker 6: we know, our legal system demands proof beyond a reasonable 546 00:32:56,920 --> 00:33:00,480 Speaker 6: doubt before we can convict, and the jurors see these 547 00:33:00,520 --> 00:33:05,320 Speaker 6: types of scientific tests as frankly undeniable proof of guilt, 548 00:33:05,520 --> 00:33:10,440 Speaker 6: whereas eyewitnesses or potential motives those can be sometimes imperfect. 549 00:33:11,040 --> 00:33:13,200 Speaker 5: There have been multiple studies that say more than seventy 550 00:33:13,240 --> 00:33:16,680 Speaker 5: percent of jurors expect scientific evidence like DNA and murder 551 00:33:16,720 --> 00:33:18,560 Speaker 5: or rape prosecutions. 552 00:33:18,600 --> 00:33:21,320 Speaker 6: And really it has done extraordinary work in terms of 553 00:33:21,480 --> 00:33:26,080 Speaker 6: people being released from prison because the DNA testing obviously 554 00:33:26,160 --> 00:33:29,400 Speaker 6: proved their innocence despite the fact that they had been convicted, 555 00:33:30,120 --> 00:33:32,440 Speaker 6: So when you think about it, it's not surprising that 556 00:33:32,600 --> 00:33:35,720 Speaker 6: Idaho prosecutors have put a ton of weight into the 557 00:33:35,800 --> 00:33:37,440 Speaker 6: DNA elements of this case. 558 00:33:37,920 --> 00:33:40,160 Speaker 5: If this does go to trial, it's safe to assume 559 00:33:40,160 --> 00:33:42,680 Speaker 5: that prosecutors will have to show that Brian Coberger was 560 00:33:42,760 --> 00:33:45,240 Speaker 5: in the house and his DNA was all over the 561 00:33:45,240 --> 00:33:48,080 Speaker 5: crime scene where Kaylee Madison, Sanna and Ethan were killed. 562 00:33:48,360 --> 00:33:50,520 Speaker 5: The question is, though, is that going to be an 563 00:33:50,520 --> 00:33:51,440 Speaker 5: impossible task? 564 00:33:56,520 --> 00:34:00,840 Speaker 3: More on that next time. For worm on the case 565 00:34:00,880 --> 00:34:05,800 Speaker 3: and relevant photos, follow us on Instagram at KAT Underscore Studios. 566 00:34:06,680 --> 00:34:10,240 Speaker 3: The Idaho Masacre is produced by Stephanie Leidecker, Jeff Shane, 567 00:34:10,360 --> 00:34:15,520 Speaker 3: Connor Powell, Chris Bargo, Gabriel Castillo, and me Courtney Armstrong. 568 00:34:16,800 --> 00:34:21,040 Speaker 3: Editing and sound designed by Jeff Toi. Music by Jared Aston. 569 00:34:22,040 --> 00:34:24,480 Speaker 3: The Idaho Masacre is a production of iHeart Radio and 570 00:34:24,560 --> 00:34:29,520 Speaker 3: KAT Studios. For more podcasts like this, visit the iHeartRadio app, 571 00:34:29,640 --> 00:34:35,680 Speaker 3: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows. 572 00:34:36,480 --> 00:34:39,279 Speaker 7: I'm Diana, You May Knows Body Movin, My Friend and 573 00:34:39,280 --> 00:34:42,520 Speaker 7: I John Green were featured in the Netflix documentary Don't 574 00:34:42,600 --> 00:34:45,400 Speaker 7: f with Cats. On our new podcast, True Crimes with 575 00:34:45,440 --> 00:34:48,560 Speaker 7: John and Deiana were turning our online investigative skills to 576 00:34:48,600 --> 00:34:52,560 Speaker 7: some of the most unexplained, unsolved, and most ignored cases. 577 00:34:54,320 --> 00:34:54,839 Speaker 2: Please say. 578 00:34:54,920 --> 00:34:57,200 Speaker 5: Thirty three year old bride Again was shot dead. 579 00:34:57,080 --> 00:34:59,320 Speaker 2: Gunned down in front of his two year old daughter. 580 00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:02,400 Speaker 8: Detectives confirmed that it was a targeted attack. 581 00:35:02,640 --> 00:35:05,480 Speaker 4: It appears to be an execution style of assassination. 582 00:35:05,760 --> 00:35:08,080 Speaker 7: This is very active, so we have to be careful. 583 00:35:08,360 --> 00:35:11,040 Speaker 6: I've heard that there's a house that has some bodies 584 00:35:11,080 --> 00:35:11,680 Speaker 6: in the basement. 585 00:35:11,880 --> 00:35:13,959 Speaker 4: I knew. I just knew something was wrong. 586 00:35:14,440 --> 00:35:17,479 Speaker 5: Maybe there's something more sinister at play than just one 587 00:35:17,600 --> 00:35:21,880 Speaker 5: young girl going missing. If you know something, heard something, 588 00:35:22,400 --> 00:35:24,920 Speaker 5: please it's never too late. 589 00:35:24,719 --> 00:35:25,520 Speaker 4: To do the right thing. 590 00:35:26,440 --> 00:35:29,200 Speaker 7: This is True Crimes with John and Deianna, the. 591 00:35:29,200 --> 00:35:32,440 Speaker 5: Production of KT Studios and iHeartRadio. 592 00:35:33,239 --> 00:35:36,880 Speaker 4: Justice is something that takes different shapes or formed