Speaker 1: All the media.
Speaker 2: Hello, and welcome to it could happen here. I'm here
Speaker 2: once again.
Speaker 3: With it's James again.
Speaker 2: Free to talk to you again, James.
Speaker 3: Yeah, likewise glad to be here.
Speaker 2: You know, I spend a lot of time thinking about
Speaker 2: the world and how it works and all that jazz,
Speaker 2: and I assume you do as well.
Speaker 4: I do, yeah, yeah, increasingly worrying about the word.
Speaker 2: Yeah, this place, this home is quite the puzzle. And
Speaker 2: much like a puzzle, it has been carved up and
Speaker 2: divided in so many different ways, sliced, labeled, ranked, and
Speaker 2: measured from all kinds of different angles. And that's really
Speaker 2: what I'm interested in talking about today, the different ways
Speaker 2: that we try to explain the differences we see on
Speaker 2: the global stage. So going from the concept of civilized
Speaker 2: and primitive, to the East and West binary, to the
Speaker 2: imagined communities called nations, the clash of quote unquoteizations, to
Speaker 2: the concept of first, second, and third worlds, to the
Speaker 2: development spectrum, to the global North and global cell, then
Speaker 2: finally to the core and the periphery. So we have
Speaker 2: a lot of ground to cover in this episode.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I really like this stuff, like as a historian,
Speaker 4: like we're always kind of forced into certain divisions, right,
Speaker 4: Like even when you apply to you with your funding, right,
Speaker 4: like you're normally in like a geographical area, or like
Speaker 4: you're trying to shoehorn something that's just interesting into one
Speaker 4: of these boxes that gets funding. And I think like
Speaker 4: often that impacts like how we see the world, So
Speaker 4: we have to write with that goal.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, absolutely, I find the way that we approach the
Speaker 2: telling of history so fascinating And in another life maybe
Speaker 2: I would have been a historian.
Speaker 4: I never I can recommend it. Yeah, yeah, it's I
Speaker 4: enjoy the doing of history. It's the doing of academia
Speaker 4: that I don't enjoy so much.
Speaker 2: So I suppose as historian, I'm going to ask you
Speaker 2: a discomforting question. Great, would you consider yourself civilized or primitive?
Speaker 1: Oh?
Speaker 3: That's a fun one.
Speaker 4: I don't know, Like, I don't like that binary because
Speaker 4: I think it's it's a value statement, right, And I think,
Speaker 4: like James Scott talks about this, Actually, this is a
Speaker 4: really interesting I've had this. James Scott right talks about
Speaker 4: the idea of people who exist outside of the state
Speaker 4: being labeled as primitive by the state. It's in the
Speaker 4: art of not being governed, and that that's the sort
Speaker 4: of the narrative there. The inherent message is that the
Speaker 4: state is the final and superior form of human organizing
Speaker 4: and people who have chosen to exist outside it are
Speaker 4: not because they chose to, but because they haven't made
Speaker 4: it there yet. And of course Scott problematized that suggests
Speaker 4: it maybe it's a choice, not a failure to accede
Speaker 4: to that civilization. And it's a concept that like young
Speaker 4: Burmese fighters have goed.
Speaker 3: Back to me. I don't think they're aware of James C.
Speaker 4: Scott if I'm being honest, but they they will say
Speaker 4: to me, like when, because when they left the cities
Speaker 4: to live with the ethnic revolutionary organizations there, they had
Speaker 4: always been told that the reason those people lived outside
Speaker 4: of the Burmese state was because they were primitive, violent.
Speaker 4: But then they came to live and fight alongside them,
Speaker 4: and they were like, no, these are a family. They
Speaker 4: were brothers and sisters and siblings, and like they want
Speaker 4: the same thing as us, Like they're not primitive, they
Speaker 4: just don't want the state. So I guess in that sense,
Speaker 4: I would want to be labeled as primitive too. I
Speaker 4: think the primitive people are doing cool shit and then
Speaker 4: the civilized people are not.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, I mean that's one of I think one
Speaker 2: of the one during global binaries, one of the oldest.
Speaker 2: You know, you'd hear that sign, that kind of juxtaposition
Speaker 2: or civilized and primitive or civilized and barbarians. Yeah, you know,
Speaker 2: in ancient role you see that distinction between the civilized
Speaker 2: Roman citizens and the barberia and other.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 2: And in that instance, and in a lot of instances
Speaker 2: as used as this ideological tool just a superiority, definitely.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 4: Like I think we have to be really careful as
Speaker 4: his story about these assumptions that we make. It'says we'll
Speaker 4: have to make a lot of assumptions about revolutions too,
Speaker 4: And I would wager that I've attended more revolutions and
Speaker 4: many of my academic colleagues, and I think many of
Speaker 4: those are grounded in the truths that people accept as
Speaker 4: truths without ever testing them. And like, I think this
Speaker 4: sort of civilized barbarian one, it's kind of the same
Speaker 4: like that.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a classic one. I mean, do you know
Speaker 2: where the word barbaria and even comes from?
Speaker 3: Isn't it the language?
Speaker 4: Thing?
Speaker 3: Like, because I didn't speak is it Latin? They were
Speaker 3: just going like bar Ba, is that right?
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's because of what you know, Rome did did
Speaker 2: this all the time, where they just borrowed whole sale
Speaker 2: from what the Greeks were doing. Yeah, so in Greek
Speaker 2: Barbaros meant anyone who did not speak Greek. Okay, that's
Speaker 2: the rum, and just kind of took that and expanded
Speaker 2: as he to talk about anybody who wasn't on their
Speaker 2: whole wave of urban planning and you know, coudified legal systems,
Speaker 2: the philosophy, the education they are to all of that stuff.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the Barbarians didn't have those those refinements, right, Yeah,
Speaker 2: you know, but of course the relationship between the tours
Speaker 2: is not so simple, right because the later on in
Speaker 2: Roman history, as you'd know, Barbarians quote unquote, were incorporated
Speaker 2: slowly into the state and became very useful armies and
Speaker 2: a reserve full of labor and all these different things
Speaker 2: for what Roman was trying to do with the expartnership.
Speaker 4: Yeah, and luckily contemporary American right has been very normal
Speaker 4: about that and it isn't using that for like it's
Speaker 4: sort of eugenic eugenic agenda right.
Speaker 2: Now, yeah, very very much eugenics vibes these days.
Speaker 4: Yeah, where my father lives is right on the border
Speaker 4: between England and Scotland and you can visit Hadrian's Wall.
Speaker 3: I rode my bike all along it a couple of
Speaker 3: years ago.
Speaker 2: Oh ask.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 4: It's like a fun edge of empire kind of thought experiment,
Speaker 4: like you beyond this line of the barbarians or uncivilized
Speaker 4: people today, it's like unremarkable, you know, like like it's
Speaker 4: literally it.
Speaker 3: It keeps some people sheep in their fields at points
Speaker 3: along like.
Speaker 4: A yeah, yeah, exactly, Yeah, like some stones kind of
Speaker 4: piled on top of each other and it's kind of
Speaker 4: an unremarkable novelty. But it's funny to think that at
Speaker 4: one point there was this binary world, right, and they
Speaker 4: felt that they the outside was so dangerous to them
Speaker 4: that they had to provide a physical barrier, something we're
Speaker 4: still doing.
Speaker 2: Indeed, and as we're speaking of walls, by the way,
Speaker 2: this reminds me of another major empire where this sort
Speaker 2: of dichotomy was a curtain. You know, it wasn't just
Speaker 2: taking place in the Mediterranean build you had and of
Speaker 2: course ancient China, this whole identity constructed around these moral
Speaker 2: and cultural and political ideals. Had the whole Confucianism Taoism
Speaker 2: a legalist thought or shape and what it meant to be,
Speaker 2: you know, conducting yourself properly and in a civilized manner.
Speaker 2: And so those who did not ascribe to those ideals
Speaker 2: would have been people who were labeled barbarians.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 2: Often the people on the other side of the Great Wall.
Speaker 4: Yeah we are the United States is literally doing the
Speaker 4: exact same thing, right, Like it's we're building a giant
Speaker 4: wall and labeling other ring the people on the other
Speaker 4: side of it.
Speaker 2: Yeah, you definitely see the genealogy there. Yeah, but I
Speaker 2: think there's a closer genealogy we could draw upon for
Speaker 2: that particular reference though, which is how later European empires
Speaker 2: would appropriate the Roman civilized barbarian binary to justify their assimilation,
Speaker 2: extermination and colonialism.
Speaker 4: Definitely one of the things I like to do, even
Speaker 4: with you know, the United States and it's in formal empire, right,
Speaker 4: Like I love to show my students cartoons, like political cartoons,
Speaker 4: like there's one of the White Man's Burden, which like
Speaker 4: distill you know, sometimes the patriots worth a thousand words,
Speaker 4: but it distills that whole binary so well in a
Speaker 4: way that seems like repugnant to most of my students today.
Speaker 4: I guess, I don't know, maybe maybe folks are moving
Speaker 4: back that way, but like the imagery and the distinction
Speaker 4: between the way or even like Lewis and Clark when
Speaker 4: they're addressing the indigenous people they meet and calling them children,
Speaker 4: right like like this this binary distinction is so it's
Speaker 4: so apparent, and like, I don't know, it seems so outlandish,
Speaker 4: I think to most folks today maybe, But then we
Speaker 4: do similar things, I guess in uh, you know it
Speaker 4: just in a slightly more subtle way sometimes.
Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly. I mean when you look at what was
Speaker 2: taking place with the Enlightenment and that whole developments of
Speaker 2: this particular order, it steeped in these particular values with
Speaker 2: the European culture was the ideal standard, and everything that
Speaker 2: did not measure up to that standard was barbarical, primative.
Speaker 2: It's just that has never really gone away, you know,
Speaker 2: and it continues to be used to justify the domination
Speaker 2: of Western powers, particularly in the way that they've instilled
Speaker 2: these European norms and practices across the world. When it
Speaker 2: comes to things like relation to the land when it
Speaker 2: comes to things like the divisions between people, between genders,
Speaker 2: all these things, all these attitudes that are now so widespread,
Speaker 2: originated from in part, this elevation of one above the other.
Speaker 2: And speaking of I mentioned the word western there, and
Speaker 2: that's really another way that we've sort of maintained this
Speaker 2: binary in a different court of paint. It's not quite
Speaker 2: the same. So there's this sort of lingering framework of
Speaker 2: the notion of the East and the West. Right in
Speaker 2: the ancient times, it was China versus Rome. These days
Speaker 2: it's probably China versus America. Yeah, China really is that old?
Speaker 3: Yeah?
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, And okay, this is probably a very probably
Speaker 2: very gen z reference for me to make. But I
Speaker 2: don't know if you've seen these edits circulated on social
Speaker 2: media of the Chinese president Chi chen Ping going like
Speaker 2: buzzer Beijing, and there's like a whole bunch of like
Speaker 2: skyscrapers and like like hardcore like electronic music edited to
Speaker 2: show like all these advanced ones, and people in the
Speaker 2: comments are saying things like be China do nothing win.
Speaker 3: I I have not seen those.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, that's definitely dating me a little bit in
Speaker 2: terms of my social media diet. But yeah, just seeing
Speaker 2: the dynamic between China, or between the East and the West,
Speaker 2: the Orient and the occident, to use an older term,
Speaker 2: it's just another way that we've created this sort of
Speaker 2: boundary between people that either on one side or the other,
Speaker 2: there's a necessary tension between the two. You know. This
Speaker 2: concept of the orient and Orientalism is something that it
Speaker 2: would side identified famously as something that was constructed by
Speaker 2: the West as an exotic, irrational, decadent, and dangerous place.
Speaker 2: And so that whole dualistic narrative was then put into
Speaker 2: the imperial project to Legitimizeie domination and to position the
Speaker 2: East as a passive subject without a voice of their
Speaker 2: own and constant need of Western intervention and guidance. So
Speaker 2: this West becomes this sort of stage for modernity and
Speaker 2: science and region and progress, this whole idea of the
Speaker 2: protagonist of history and the orients the East. They're the primitive,
Speaker 2: I guess side of that binary. Although unlike the civilized
Speaker 2: primitive binary or civilized barbarian binary of old I think
Speaker 2: while there could have been racial components to it in
Speaker 2: the past, this one is more explicitly racial and geographic
Speaker 2: in its division, because I mean in ancient room, anybody
Speaker 2: could essentially become a Roman citizen. You know, it wasn't
Speaker 2: necessarily racially, you know, pure area and sense that a
Speaker 2: lot of new Nazis and stuff today like to look
Speaker 2: back at that period as you had a quieter diversity
Speaker 2: of phenotypes in the Roman Empire. Yeah, but you know,
Speaker 2: when you come to this orient and occident dichotomy, it's
Speaker 2: very much racialized. You know, a lot of times when
Speaker 2: people talk about the Western world, it really tends to
Speaker 2: be I guess a more politically correct way of saying
Speaker 2: the white wood. Yes, at least in my observation.
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, definitely, that's often the subtext.
Speaker 2: Because I mean that's something I've always struggled with pinning
Speaker 2: down right, because why isn't Brazil considered part of the West?
Speaker 2: You know, why isn't Mexico considered part of the West?
Speaker 3: Right? What are we west of? Like?
Speaker 4: Like what it's not even it's not the western hemisphere
Speaker 4: like as you say.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean Western say is more straightforward, but is
Speaker 2: it because there are too many colored people? Yeah, in
Speaker 2: Mexico and in Brazil.
Speaker 4: It seems to be right, Like it's not even countries
Speaker 4: strongly either from Western Europe was strongly impacted by settler
Speaker 4: colonialism from Western Europe, because the entirety of Latin America
Speaker 4: is impact.
Speaker 2: And they should be included, but they're not.
Speaker 3: That they're not.
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, and it yeah, it's I've always struggled with
Speaker 4: that one, other than get neoliberal capitalists white countries, it's
Speaker 4: it's what people don't want to say.
Speaker 2: And Japan sometimes yeah, yeah, Japan, strangely enough, yeah, yeah,
Speaker 2: an member of the club.
Speaker 4: Yeah, or like sometimes also not Spain. This is a
Speaker 4: particular like bug Bury guess of Spanish history.
Speaker 2: Really, I don't think I've seen that one.
Speaker 4: Yeah, for years, like literally you would be excluded from
Speaker 4: European history, like like Africa starts at the Pyrenees.
Speaker 3: It's a sort of phrase that that's hilarious.
Speaker 4: Yeah, Like I guess it compounded because Spain was so
Speaker 4: isolated under Franco. Right, but like yeah, this they called
Speaker 4: it the black legend that like Spain does not belong
Speaker 4: to Europe and and it's not again it's racialized, right,
Speaker 4: it's because Spain had this exchange with the Muslim world, right,
Speaker 4: and like that that culture deeply impacted Spanish culture, and
Speaker 4: even after the Conquista, it's like it's like, you know,
Speaker 4: the French historians were just like, nah, you guys are tainted,
Speaker 4: like you you don't get to come back.
Speaker 2: It's kind of a similar sitribution with the territories the
Speaker 2: former Artsman Empire as well, technically part to Europe and
Speaker 2: yet you know, maligned in some way. Yeah, yeah, a
Speaker 2: little less than Still, it's like y'all have too much,
Speaker 2: too much Turkish to watch Muslim influence.
Speaker 4: You'all got a Yeah, you need like a thousand years
Speaker 4: to decompress before we let you back in.
Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean, honestly, if the Pope wasn't based in Italy,
Speaker 2: I'm sure Italy would have a similar dynamic. I mean,
Speaker 2: Italy is a recent construction right in terms of as
Speaker 2: a country. Ye, but only look at the two Sicilies,
Speaker 2: for example, that was under North African rule for a
Speaker 2: significant period of its history. But let me not get
Speaker 2: too far off track. One day. One more tangent, and
Speaker 2: that is I'm far from being a dentist by any means,
Speaker 2: or a maurist or anything of that show. But there
Speaker 2: is something to be said for the way that the
Speaker 2: East of the Orient has been sidelined, marginalized to treat
Speaker 2: it us lesser than for so long, and now they're
Speaker 2: at a point where their geopolitical sway has to be respected. Yeah,
Speaker 2: I'm not a rooting for them by any means. I'm
Speaker 2: not one of those people is like, yeah, multipolar world.
Speaker 2: I would rather we have no poles, you know, as
Speaker 2: an anarchist.
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I do know what you mean.
Speaker 2: But it's like it's a bit of shodding for it,
Speaker 2: I guess.
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, yeah, it is, you know, ironic in a
Speaker 4: but yeah, not necessarily in a good way. Like I've
Speaker 4: just seen Jijienping meeting with Minan Plang, the dictator of
Speaker 4: me and mar today, and I'm like, I'm not excited
Speaker 4: for that pole of the world.
Speaker 2: Not at all, not at all. Yeah. I feel the
Speaker 2: same way about the way that the Sahel Federation has
Speaker 2: kind of kicked out France. I'm like, yeah, stickets of France,
Speaker 2: but also military hunters, you.
Speaker 3: Know, yeah, yeah, like the rebranded Wagner Core now.
Speaker 2: Like yeah, and the collaboration close collaborations Russia. But you know,
Speaker 2: a lot of this thing is really a lot of
Speaker 2: these relationships, these geopidical relationships are so opportunistic. It's all
Speaker 2: opportunists on yeah, end of the day, they don't really
Speaker 2: they're not really necessarily guided by principles.
Speaker 4: Yeah, Like the difference I guess between like, for instance,
Speaker 4: I you know, I've been thinking a lot about anarchist
Speaker 4: at war, right, and people go and fight in other
Speaker 4: people's to depend other people, right, like like the people
Speaker 4: who went to Rajava to fight, people who went to
Speaker 4: Miama to fight. Like there's a difference between doing something
Speaker 4: out of a sense of solidarity and doing something out
Speaker 4: of root opportunism, and like that always shows itself in
Speaker 4: the end.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean the work groups of involvement in Africa
Speaker 2: is the most blatant capitalist tra vun opportunism.
Speaker 4: These people are not there for the anti colonials that
Speaker 4: are like standing with the oppressed peoples of the world. Yeah, yeah,
Speaker 4: like watching the Battle of Algiers and setting off to
Speaker 4: immediately liberate the people of.
Speaker 2: Africa literal mercenaries, right yeah. Yeah, But getting back onto
Speaker 2: the main topic, talking about all these ways we divvy
Speaker 2: up the world. Out of the linguistic and cultural and
Speaker 2: geographical differences that we observe around us, came this concept
Speaker 2: of nations, right, nation as an idea also came out
Speaker 2: of the European imagine nation. It's commonly defined and it's
Speaker 2: USA worldwide today, But it's commonly defined as a large
Speaker 2: community of people who share common identity, often through language, culture, history,
Speaker 2: and sometimes ethnicity, then who usually inhabit a specific geographic
Speaker 2: territory with its own political organization. The comminations without states
Speaker 2: as simply a culturalmmunity force. People feel a collective long
Speaker 2: and then share that snee. But nations are as we know,
Speaker 2: mostly tied up with states today, hence nation being used
Speaker 2: as a synonym for country.
Speaker 3: Yeah, this is one of my bug bears.
Speaker 4: I guess is an academic like I tried to develop
Speaker 4: this concept of Catalan nationalism that like at the time
Speaker 4: was inherently anti fascist. I think I was trying to
Speaker 4: be like, it ain't now like this it's a very
Speaker 4: Catalan right now. And yeah, I do still find it
Speaker 4: hard when people say nation is the the state, especially Americans, Like,
Speaker 4: it's very hard, right because state is like a subset
Speaker 4: of the state here, like the sort of military division
Speaker 4: of the federal state. So it can be hard to
Speaker 4: explain those differences.
Speaker 2: And as you mentioned, this sort of way that that
Speaker 2: Catalan nationalism has shifted. Really, I think gets to the
Speaker 2: whole weakness of the nation idea. So Benick Anderson famously
Speaker 2: called nations imaginedmmunities because the community exists as a collective fantasy.
Speaker 2: You know, they imagine a deep comradeship with people who
Speaker 2: they've never met. Yeah, and this fantasy has boundaries not
Speaker 2: just about who is included, but also famously who is excluded.
Speaker 2: And this fantasy is not necessarily something that is automatic
Speaker 2: or natural as we tend to see it today. But
Speaker 2: it's really the rise of things like print capitalism, with
Speaker 2: the mass production of books and newspapers, and that's what
Speaker 2: really shaped the standardization and formalization of these imagined communities,
Speaker 2: through the creation of like common cultural reference and a
Speaker 2: shared sense of history. Yeah. And then of course you
Speaker 2: had the nation idea of further being developed by liberal
Speaker 2: revolutions and through the shared experience of colonial rule. You know,
Speaker 2: we're subject populations with mobilized nationalism to claim self determination.
Speaker 3: Yeah, definitely like it.
Speaker 4: I'm sure I'm trying to remember borrowed this from someone,
Speaker 4: but the idea of like identity entrepreneurs is what I like.
Speaker 4: Like it's when religion loses its claim on universal truth,
Speaker 4: specifically in Europe. That's like a market for identity that
Speaker 4: is open. And the creation of nations is like, to
Speaker 4: my mind, like a bourgeois project, right Like, it's an
Speaker 4: entrepreneurial endeavor that they seek to create something, a benefit
Speaker 4: from it and like it. Yet to a degree that
Speaker 4: turned against them, it's still an entrepreneurial endeavor, right Like. Still,
Speaker 4: you could be creating a nation which wants to kick
Speaker 4: France out of Morocco, right that that nation may not
Speaker 4: have space for everyone who inhabits that territory of Morocco.
Speaker 3: Like, it's still it's a sort of for some people.
Speaker 2: Construct absolutely absolutely, I think the elite intellectual current of
Speaker 2: a nationalist movements can go under stated. You know, oftentimes
Speaker 2: what stirs up the masses toward that specific direction, because
Speaker 2: I mean, the masses will revolt against their conditions, but
Speaker 2: what sort of directs it in that national independence direction?
Speaker 2: And this concept of nation is tends to be that
Speaker 2: sort of you lead into actual current. I often look
Speaker 2: at the history of and Tobago as a reference point.
Speaker 2: See that's where I come from. The whole process of
Speaker 2: nation building is always ongoing, and we are in a
Speaker 2: position where there's an effort, there's a very strong efforts
Speaker 2: to both push for a nation building but also recognize
Speaker 2: our divergent pasts, you know, because we have this sort
Speaker 2: of almost equal in population Indo Trinadian and Afro Trianadian populations,
Speaker 2: and then a mixed population as well, and then you
Speaker 2: have some Chinese and Syria and Lebanese and Venezuela and
Speaker 2: and Filipino and all these different groups come into Trinidad,
Speaker 2: and because of that colonial past, their tensions is between
Speaker 2: those groups and things are still play out to this day.
Speaker 2: But while tensions are played out, there's also an effort
Speaker 2: to construct a unity through an allegiance to the nation
Speaker 2: of Trinan Tobago to create a sense of national identity,
Speaker 2: and as a very young country, it's still quite difficult
Speaker 2: to do. I can imagine, especially in the United States,
Speaker 2: it might have been a similar situation where you have
Speaker 2: all these different European populations and different populations from around
Speaker 2: the world who are in the US and there hasn't
Speaker 2: quite yet been a fully built up American identity yet,
Speaker 2: and so a lot of those tensions are still kind
Speaker 2: of playing out, and so it takes a couple of
Speaker 2: generations for there to be a sense of American identity
Speaker 2: that arises out of that. Yeah, definitely turnedad being one
Speaker 2: a younger colony and two only recently becoming independent in
Speaker 2: nineteen sixty two, it hasn't had enough time yet to,
Speaker 2: I suppose, develop that patriotism that America is so known for.
Speaker 2: And so you still see a lot of people who
Speaker 2: continue to have allegiance to the ancestry, to the heritage,
Speaker 2: even before they have any sort of sense of connection
Speaker 2: to the country. Concept of truingad.
Speaker 4: Yeah, the American would have interesting because the people who
Speaker 4: did the American Revolution might often call themselves English right like.
Speaker 4: And it's this kind of post hoc nationalism that has applied,
Speaker 4: right like, they did begin constructing a nation, but after
Speaker 4: they after they gained the apparatus of the state, right like.
Speaker 4: And sometimes they'll talk about their freedoms in terms of
Speaker 4: English freedoms, which they themselves are not granted, right that
Speaker 4: they don't have the same freedoms as English people in
Speaker 4: England when they are a British colony. This concept of
Speaker 4: freedom they will elucidate like it, and like so much
Speaker 4: of it is based on like English common law, right,
Speaker 4: they didn't necessarily see themselves as distinct. That comes later.
Speaker 4: And like the US one is interesting because they have
Speaker 4: to develop this kind of civic nationalism much. I guess
Speaker 4: France does that two of course, but like France, probably
Speaker 4: the og there. But like this idea, like you've subscribed
Speaker 4: to these ideas. Therefore you're an American because they're like this,
Speaker 4: this nation constructed by people from all over Europe. For
Speaker 4: the most part, the phrasing is universal, but the implementation
Speaker 4: is not. Right, it's also a country where people own
Speaker 4: other people.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, I think I mean, like I was saying earlier,
Speaker 2: it does help in our struggle for autonomy and independence
Speaker 2: from cluding on rule to have this construct the nation, right,
Speaker 2: but it also obscures a lot of the real material
Speaker 2: divisions in society, you know between the with in class
Speaker 2: and the elites. And so you have this national identity
Speaker 2: that is constructed by intellectual and you know, economic elites,
Speaker 2: and it's overlaid onto a population that does not really
Speaker 2: have us see in that construction. And so these nationalist
Speaker 2: projects will try to downplay or suppress differences in conflicts
Speaker 2: and as part of why nationalism so often lends itself
Speaker 2: to fascist well, because fascism is an outgrowth of this
Speaker 2: idea of nation where they promote this vision of national
Speaker 2: unity and stifle class conflict and create a collusion of
Speaker 2: classes that push us aside of people who don't fit
Speaker 2: within their concept of the nation.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I often think, like when I'm talking to my
Speaker 4: undergrads about nation, like the most distinct where I can say,
Speaker 4: is like the salient we through both space and time, right,
Speaker 4: Like it's the people you identify with, it's the us,
Speaker 4: And fascism weaponizes us against the rest of humanity or
Speaker 4: against us mostly like against escapegoat group who become them, right,
Speaker 4: and then like the nation is for us, the state
Speaker 4: is for us, it's not for them. Thus they must
Speaker 4: be exterminated exactly. Is an obvious outgrowth of nationalism.
Speaker 2: Hence xenophobia, hence anti semitism, anti blackness, anti indigeneity, all
Speaker 2: these prejudices. I mean, And that's the thing about nationalism.
Speaker 2: It's not necessarily consistent because you'll say, all people from
Speaker 2: this land, you know, we should desay to be united,
Speaker 2: except for those people who are also from this land.
Speaker 2: They don't get to come, you know, they are perpetual outsiders.
Speaker 2: They don't share the true culture. They'ren't part of our destiny.
Speaker 2: So even if they're legally citizens or legally a long
Speaker 2: term residents, or they haven't residents there for a long
Speaker 2: time the entire lives generations, or if the case may be,
Speaker 2: they don't count. They're outside forever.
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, they can never assent to like a sort
Speaker 4: of higher status of being one of us. British people
Speaker 4: like to mobilize this one a lot, right, Like you
Speaker 4: can be British.
Speaker 2: But you can never be English.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 4: I forget who coined that coined the phrase cricket nationalism,
Speaker 4: but it's just particularly kind of ridiculous, Like, oh, if
Speaker 4: if there's a Test match between Britain and Pakistan and
Speaker 4: Britain and Trinidad Tobago, who do you support? Like is that,
Speaker 4: like are you really going to make that the core
Speaker 4: of your national identity? Like the cene qua non of
Speaker 4: being British is like which flag you take to the
Speaker 4: cricket match, Like it's particularly ridiculous and if it doesn't
Speaker 4: reflect exclusion, right, people aren't taking their flags to the
Speaker 4: cricket match because like that's the core of the entity.
Speaker 4: They're just like, yeah, well kind of I get treated
Speaker 4: differently because of my ethnic boundary, like makeup right ethnic presentation.
Speaker 4: So I guess you guys don't like me, so like
Speaker 4: they'll be funny when we kick your ass cricket, like
Speaker 4: it's the cause of arrow points in the wrong direction.
Speaker 2: I guess I can imagine I will not be bringing
Speaker 2: any flags to any cricket match because I don't attend
Speaker 2: cricket matches. I'm not too big of a fan of cricket.
Speaker 3: I can't be doing it.
Speaker 2: Stick to my football, and I say football in the
Speaker 2: international sense.
Speaker 4: Good, yeah, yeah, I can't stand around long enough to
Speaker 4: play cricket, to be honest.
Speaker 2: As we're talking about national liberation, these struggles often took
Speaker 2: place in the context of the Cold War, right, which
Speaker 2: is where we get this other sense of this other
Speaker 2: framework for divving up the world now. Growing up, I
Speaker 2: was always told that, you know, tran Tobago is a
Speaker 2: third World country. I had a social studies textbook, and
Speaker 2: I taught first world, second world, third world. But I
Speaker 2: didn't teach first world, second world, third world in the
Speaker 2: context of the Cold War, because I grew up in
Speaker 2: a post Cold War world, and these terms came from
Speaker 2: the Cool War but persisted after the Cold War. So
Speaker 2: what happened, I was taught we are third world because
Speaker 2: we are still developing. We're not at that intermediate stage
Speaker 2: development where we could say that the second world, and
Speaker 2: we're not at that first world level of development like America, right,
Speaker 2: And that's a smaller side for me. But I've always
Speaker 2: found it mildly irritating when I see people use this
Speaker 2: famous social media catchphrase or America is a third World
Speaker 2: country in a Gucci belt.
Speaker 3: I haven't seen now on the yet. That's annoying.
Speaker 2: I'm sure you've seen similar sentiments, this idea, Oh, America's
Speaker 2: third world, American slid world.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I have.
Speaker 2: Like, it's just annoying to me yet. So one, it
Speaker 2: completely divorces the concert of the third world from its
Speaker 2: actual origins and to it. Also, I think reflects that
Speaker 2: kind of a blindness to what's happened in the rest
Speaker 2: of the world, in the countries that are actually considered
Speaker 2: the third world, and the difference is between them, you know,
Speaker 2: for everything that we can express frustrations about in the US,
Speaker 2: anybody in the third world, I think, and I've when
Speaker 2: I when I've visited the US. I've seen it from
Speaker 2: my own eyes. You know, there's still things there that
Speaker 2: Americans might take for granted that are just not that
Speaker 2: would never be taken for granted in other contexts. And
Speaker 2: I see, of course the division see in America's version
Speaker 2: of the First World versus you know, some of the
Speaker 2: European Social Democracy's version of the First World. So I
Speaker 2: get that frustration, you know, the lack of free health
Speaker 2: care and that kind of thing, investment in infrastructure and
Speaker 2: all that. But let me just get into the background
Speaker 2: behind the tomb. Right as we step into the Cool War,
Speaker 2: you have this concept of the three world model that
Speaker 2: came after World War Two. The pre war status cool
Speaker 2: was over and you had new conflicts on the horizon.
Speaker 2: And so the film First World originally described the capitalist
Speaker 2: block led by the United States and Western Europe, where
Speaker 2: capitalist markets, liberal democracy, and economic progress was celebrated. And
Speaker 2: then you had the Second World block, which referred to
Speaker 2: the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union, where what
Speaker 2: I would consider state and centrally planned economies shape their societies.
Speaker 2: So in the First World they had countries like the US, Australia,
Speaker 2: Africa today might be shocking you know, Iran was even
Speaker 2: considered part of the First World Block during the Cool War.
Speaker 2: That might be shockinged now because when we think of
Speaker 2: some of these countries like, oh, those are Third World countries.
Speaker 2: Those are undeveloped countries. They aren't at the developed level
Speaker 2: of the West yet. But in the context in which
Speaker 2: the three World model originated, these were countries that explicitly
Speaker 2: aligned themselves with the policies of the United States and
Speaker 2: its allies as capitalist nations against the Soviet Bloc. And
Speaker 2: the Soviet Bloc you had, of course, countries like China
Speaker 2: and Vietnam, Laos, Ethiopia, Yemen, Huba, all these different countries
Speaker 2: align themselves explicitly with the Soviet Union. Then the Third
Speaker 2: World and where the third will concept came in was
Speaker 2: with all the countries that stood against picking aside. Yeah,
Speaker 2: a lot of these were former colonies and nations that
Speaker 2: chose not to side completely with either and to this
Speaker 2: whole concept, this whole idea of the non aligned movement.
Speaker 2: It really kicked off thanks to the joining of the
Speaker 2: Indian Prime Minister, the Kenaian President, the Indonesian President, and
Speaker 2: the President of the United Arab Republic alongside Yugoslavia, and
Speaker 2: so all these countries who all had very different economic
Speaker 2: arrange ones. Yugoslavia famously was kind of doing its own thing,
Speaker 2: compared to a lot of the other countries associated with socialism,
Speaker 2: India and Ghana, they were also kind of doing their
Speaker 2: own thing, kind of a mix Trancebagos also considered part
Speaker 2: of the non aligned movement. And so these classifications at
Speaker 2: the time, these were geopolitical and all political ideologies, not
Speaker 2: necessarily economic development. So technically speaking, the term shouldn't even
Speaker 2: be relevant US today. I mean, the Cold War of
Speaker 2: the twentieth century is over. But over time the narrative
Speaker 2: began to twist. You know, so because you didn't pick
Speaker 2: a side, you didn't pick the red team or the
Speaker 2: blue team, you didn't pick the first will of the
Speaker 2: Second World, this narrative developed where or you didn't pick
Speaker 2: a side, you're politically independent, so you're poor, you're chaotic,
Speaker 2: you're a failed state, all these different things. And of
Speaker 2: course there were incidents in part influenced of course by
Speaker 2: state actors in the US and state actors in the
Speaker 2: Soviet client block would have contributed to this outcome. But
Speaker 2: over time you get this sense of or the third
Speaker 2: world is failure. All these states were trying different paths
Speaker 2: of development, different approaches to governance from either of the
Speaker 2: two camps, mixed hybrid approaches, but in the end this
Speaker 2: just got them stuck with the label of underdevelopment and
Speaker 2: at having them being seen as last. Now today people
Speaker 2: don't use food world as much as they use developing,
Speaker 2: at least in you know, the more above board discourse.
Speaker 2: But that division also has its own implications, right, the
Speaker 2: developed countries versus the developing countries. It's kind of a
Speaker 2: softer sorts of version of the same thing.
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's kind of gentler, Yeah, the same shit.
Speaker 2: What those terms do implicitly, it's like, you know what,
Speaker 2: you're fish in water, so you can't recognize water. It's
Speaker 2: hard to recognize these things, these ideological impulses when we're
Speaker 2: submerged in them. If you take a step back, you realize, oh,
Speaker 2: these terms developed and developing they have very heavy implications.
Speaker 2: And the implication is that there's a single linear path
Speaker 2: to progress modeled after Western capitalism, that all societies are
Speaker 2: progressing towards through industrialization, through consumerism, through the ALMIGHTYGP growth
Speaker 2: and so development of your your underdevelopment becomes a tool
Speaker 2: of intervention. It becomes a way to mask imperial interests
Speaker 2: with the sort of the nair of oh, we're just
Speaker 2: kind of helping you out.
Speaker 1: You know.
Speaker 2: It's like we move from your savage you're a primitive,
Speaker 2: so you're just not developed yet. But theory will help
Speaker 2: you out. And that's how you get the whole sort
Speaker 2: of IMF and World Bank introductions of models of debts
Speaker 2: and policy conditions and metrics and all these different things
Speaker 2: to sort of shape these countries into client states, states
Speaker 2: that can be used to further Western development. The Cold
Speaker 2: War is technically over now, as I said, so I
Speaker 2: suppose we've reached the end of history, as the famous
Speaker 2: saying goes, but not exactly. In the early nineteen nineties,
Speaker 2: Samuel Huntington came up with a thesis to explain the
Speaker 2: conflicts that we define the post Cold War world and
Speaker 2: as we entered into the twenty fifth century, and so
Speaker 2: he argued that the future of global conflict would not
Speaker 2: be defined by competing ideologies or economic systems, but by
Speaker 2: cultural fault lines. In his nineteen ninety three article in
Speaker 2: Foreign Affairs, which Lates expanded into his nineteen ninety six
Speaker 2: book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the
Speaker 2: World Order, Huntington predicted that the primary source of conflict
Speaker 2: in a new era would be between distinct civilizations. His
Speaker 2: model would have pointed to clashes between the West and
Speaker 2: other groups Islamic nations, the Confucian East, and of course
Speaker 2: set up this sense that the West is this pinnacle
Speaker 2: of rationality and modernity, and all these others are in
Speaker 2: competition with the fantastic, amazing West. And I always like
Speaker 2: to call out some of these strange ways that he
Speaker 2: has divided the world. Right, So sub Saharan Africa is
Speaker 2: all grouped up into the African camp, all of North Africa,
Speaker 2: the Middle East, into West Asia, all of that is
Speaker 2: considered part of the Islamic civilization. Forget all the different
Speaker 2: between any of them. By the way, Indonesia it's also
Speaker 2: part of the Islamic block. You have the Sinic or
Speaker 2: the Confucian block that includes China, both Koreas, Taiwan, and Vietnam,
Speaker 2: except for the parts of China that are under the
Speaker 2: Buddhist camp, such as Tibet. So Tibet is kind of
Speaker 2: carved up on its own as its own camp. Mongolia
Speaker 2: is also under the Buddhist camp. Thailand and all these
Speaker 2: others in Southeast Asia considered part of the Buddhist camp.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 2: And then you have the Latin American block, which is
Speaker 2: everybody part of Latin America and even people who are
Speaker 2: not technically Latin America and are kind of swept in there.
Speaker 2: And I'm going to be a by the base of
Speaker 2: the map that I saw on the Wikipedia article on
Speaker 2: this subject.
Speaker 3: Ye, I found that map.
Speaker 2: Now, it's some very bizarre divisions and ways to cut
Speaker 2: up this world. They have the Western world versus the
Speaker 2: Orthodox world, which includes Kazakhstan and Greece and Ukraine and
Speaker 2: Russia all under that civilizational banner. Yeah. The Philippines is
Speaker 2: somehow part Islamic, part Western, and part Sinic. It's a
Speaker 2: very unusual blend.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 4: And then he's just got like Japan it's just hanging
Speaker 4: out there by itself.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, I forgot to mention, especially pan It's kind
Speaker 2: of it's a one thing. Yeah.
Speaker 4: It just literally says Japanese. I've forgotten about that. And
Speaker 4: then he goes on to freak out about like the
Speaker 4: like Latin world as he sees it, like fucking dividing
Speaker 4: the United States, right, Like in his his is it
Speaker 4: called like who we are or where we are or something?
Speaker 4: His book about migration in the United States. M it
Speaker 4: was after clash of civilizations he wrote this book about
Speaker 4: like how the like I think I don't quite remember
Speaker 4: how he terms it, Like does he use Latino or
Speaker 4: Hispanic or something else, but like that that that population
Speaker 4: increasing in the United States will like divide the to
Speaker 4: day too, too fundamentally opposed civilizations.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, he has some interesting compulsions. Yeah, and unfortunately
Speaker 2: his thesis found its voice following the events of nine
Speaker 2: to eleven partitions and media. These people were taking his
Speaker 2: ideas to kind of justify the war and terror that
Speaker 2: would unfold. It also creates sort of cultural device that
Speaker 2: settle into place at home will not create, but shape
Speaker 2: those cultural divides as you create the sense of oh,
Speaker 2: if there's if we're experiencing a clash of civilizations right now,
Speaker 2: then this flood couldn't quote of people from another civilization
Speaker 2: is a threat to the invasion. It's something that needs
Speaker 2: to be targeted and fought against. And so in a sense,
Speaker 2: his class civilizations is kind of a repackaging of a
Speaker 2: lot of the binaries and divisions we've spoken about before.
Speaker 2: You have elements of nationalism, you have elements of civilized
Speaker 2: versus warber, the evelements of East and West, the Cold
Speaker 2: War dichotomies. All of that kind of comes together in
Speaker 2: this neat package. Finally, we enter the twenty first century,
Speaker 2: and they are two very popular ways that we now
Speaker 2: categorize the world. People tend to use the phrases Global
Speaker 2: North and Global South as a softer or more politically
Speaker 2: correct alternative to develop developing or foods in third world.
Speaker 2: It's considered less loaded, more neutral sounding, and it's originally
Speaker 2: popularized via UN frameworks and the brand line, which is
Speaker 2: done in nineteen eighty, which drew a literal line across
Speaker 2: the globe, separating the wealthier North from the poorer South.
Speaker 2: To be clear, though, despite the geographical language, it's not
Speaker 2: literally about hemispheres. Australia is considered part of the Global
Speaker 2: North and Mongolia is considered part of the Global South.
Speaker 2: But generally speak in the global salth refus to the
Speaker 2: post Coulnar regions and the global North refus the wealthy,
Speaker 2: industrialized trees of the world. To me, again, it's not
Speaker 2: really a flawless framework. It has all the same binaries
Speaker 2: and smoothing over of complexities of internal class divides between
Speaker 2: for example, ritually it's in the global South and poor
Speaker 2: communities in the North. It gives impression that entire countries
Speaker 2: share unified class experience, I think. I think it also
Speaker 2: has the potential to obscure inequality between South South relations.
Speaker 2: So yes, two countries may both be a part of
Speaker 2: the Global South, but there could be a massive power
Speaker 2: differential between them that you know, sets them up for
Speaker 2: interventions and equal treaties and also sort of different sorts
Speaker 2: of medline. For example, Saudi Arabia, at least in one
Speaker 2: map that I saw, is considered part of the Global South.
Speaker 2: But as we know, Saudi Arabia is famous first medland
Speaker 2: across Africa and the Middle East. It's interventions, it's financing
Speaker 2: of the conflicts across the region. Now I get why
Speaker 2: the term is used. It creates a sense of shared struggle,
Speaker 2: especially in anti imperialist and climate justice spaces. But I
Speaker 2: think it has weaknesses, you know, and how we constructlidarity.
Speaker 3: On that basis, yeah, very much too.
Speaker 2: Yeah. And the other and final system that I wanted
Speaker 2: to mention that has gained popularity these days. Is world
Speaker 2: systems theory, which is actually older than class civilizations. It
Speaker 2: came out of Immanuel Wallastein's work during the Cold War,
Speaker 2: and he kind of stood out and said that he
Speaker 2: was rejecting the three world system and the simplistic country
Speaker 2: by country development models. Instead he created this world systems
Speaker 2: theory that saw capitalism as a single global system, not
Speaker 2: a patchwork of individual national economies. So the focuses on
Speaker 2: labor roles, on commodity flows, and on power concentration. And
Speaker 2: I think in an even more globalized world it makes
Speaker 2: the most sense to the wallaceteine. They have three differ
Speaker 2: and zones of the global economy. You have the core,
Speaker 2: which as you know, have strong states, financial capital, tech
Speaker 2: heavy industries controlled with global institutions, and they tend to
Speaker 2: exploit the labor and resources of the periphery, while exports
Speaker 2: and high value goods and debt structures, and the periphery
Speaker 2: of the countries that tend to have weaker institutions, extractive
Speaker 2: or career economies, reliance and export and raw materials, debt
Speaker 2: defendency and structural adjustment policies, and they often dump in
Speaker 2: grounds for pollution waste and arms from the global North.
Speaker 2: The semi periphery are then considered under his model, the
Speaker 2: countries that mediates between the core and the periphery. These
Speaker 2: are industrializing economies with mixed labor and capital exports. They
Speaker 2: sometimes exploit others while being exploited themselves, and these include
Speaker 2: countries like Brazil, India, Mexico, Turkey, and South Africa. And
Speaker 2: they tend to save as the buffers as stabilize the
Speaker 2: system while chasing core status. I think this model is
Speaker 2: very dynamic. It could be more dynamic, but it does
Speaker 2: have the capacity to highlight the systemic interdependence of this
Speaker 2: glocal system, that one region's wealth is contingent on another's dispossession.
Speaker 2: It makes it very useful for understanding that, you know,
Speaker 2: poverty is not something that just happens, it's nan is
Speaker 2: very clearly structured and developed by the wealth of the North.
Speaker 2: And I think also with the corporate free model, you
Speaker 2: see the sense of a one way flow where value
Speaker 2: and labor goes from the periphery to the core. But
Speaker 2: there is another direction that flow goes right because the
Speaker 2: migrants from the periphree they go to the core. They
Speaker 2: fill precurious rules and core economy is like care work
Speaker 2: and agriculture and logistics, and so they almost become an
Speaker 2: important periphery within the core, and their absence from the
Speaker 2: periphree also deprives the periphree. Hence the phenomenon of brain drain,
Speaker 2: where people are sipher the way as label and the
Speaker 2: and the educated population tends to leave, you know, their
Speaker 2: countries of origin. But I'm saying it's not just a
Speaker 2: one way flow, because you also have that sense of
Speaker 2: diaspora and diasporic networks that kind of reverse the flow.
Speaker 2: Remittances for some countries can be a significant chunk of
Speaker 2: their national income. I think the Philippines is a classic
Speaker 2: example of this. Some of the Caribbean countries, either historically
Speaker 2: or presently, we're very dependent on remittances from their diasporic
Speaker 2: populations sending money back home. Lebanon is another example of
Speaker 2: Salvador is another example. They become a key part of
Speaker 2: the national GDP. That sort of relationship of my creatia. Yeah,
Speaker 2: but I think what I want to do with this
Speaker 2: corporate free model or this corefree SEMIPI free model is
Speaker 2: expanded and one of the ways that I found very
Speaker 2: useful to do so comes from fellow podcaster shout out
Speaker 2: to Elia j Ayube. Yeah, I read it. Article of
Speaker 2: is that was on the anarchist libraries called the periphery
Speaker 2: has no time for binaries. This very crucial point, and
Speaker 2: I quote, we are as peripheral to the global soult
Speaker 2: regimes crushing us as they are perceived to be by
Speaker 2: the Western think tanks and foreign ministers who view their
Speaker 2: imagined space as the center of the world. China and
Speaker 2: Russia and Iran are peripheral to the West, and any
Speaker 2: and all activists in China and Russia and Iran are
Speaker 2: peripheral to their governments. So I kind of like this
Speaker 2: sense of not just looking on the country level, but
Speaker 2: looking at particular populations, populations within countries the relationships between them,
Speaker 2: bringing in that class dynamic Yeah, routine populations more prominently.
Speaker 4: Yeah, Like if you look at the like the example
Speaker 4: I'm familiar with, relate like the Cold We could look
Speaker 4: at Kurdistan or Mienma, right, there are ethnic groups within
Speaker 4: that country that are subject to colonialism by the core
Speaker 4: groups within that country, right, like asad Arab belt for
Speaker 4: the Bama majority, using classic colonial divide and rule tactics
Speaker 4: right now against the hinder in the MMR. And like,
Speaker 4: I think it doesn't make sense to see that whole
Speaker 4: country is peripheral, right, Like that binary doesn't function when
Speaker 4: like the salient colonial violence happening, especially in the MMA,
Speaker 4: is happening within the ANMA, but it doesn't make any
Speaker 4: less salient. And like the experience in colonialism is still violent.
Speaker 4: And if we only use this state level binary, we
Speaker 4: will totally miss.
Speaker 2: That exactly exactly, And I think it's important to be clear.
Speaker 2: Obviously I've rejected a lot of these frameworks in covering them.
Speaker 2: You won't see me using the civilized primitive binary anytime soon.
Speaker 2: But some of these concepts can be useful. You know.
Speaker 2: They do shape the way that we view the world,
Speaker 2: how we see ourselves the imperfect, of course, but because
Speaker 2: they're trying to map on reality and reality is a
Speaker 2: shifting beast. But I think it's good to have some
Speaker 2: sense of or some language to understand the inequality and
Speaker 2: podynamics present in the world. So we can reclaim these
Speaker 2: free mooks, so we can reject them. You know, we
Speaker 2: could use them for solidarity or for division. But the
Speaker 2: question I want to leave us with the wrap of
Speaker 2: this episode is how do we build a world where
Speaker 2: these divisions are no longer descriptive or relevant? And that's
Speaker 2: all I have for today? Or power to all the people. Peace.
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