WEBVTT - How Tech Spies On Us

0:00:04.400 --> 0:00:07.800
<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

0:00:12.080 --> 0:00:14.960
<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

0:00:15.080 --> 0:00:18.520
<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio

0:00:18.600 --> 0:00:20.920
<v Speaker 1>and a love of all things tech, and I figured

0:00:20.960 --> 0:00:26.120
<v Speaker 1>i'd do UH an episode or two about tech and privacy.

0:00:26.239 --> 0:00:29.639
<v Speaker 1>I've titled this episode how Tech Spies on Us, But

0:00:29.880 --> 0:00:32.560
<v Speaker 1>right from the get go, I have to admit that

0:00:32.720 --> 0:00:37.479
<v Speaker 1>that is a little disingenuous because in many cases, not all,

0:00:37.680 --> 0:00:42.600
<v Speaker 1>but in many cases, we're essentially giving tech permission to

0:00:42.760 --> 0:00:45.760
<v Speaker 1>just harvest information about us, which is a little different

0:00:46.000 --> 0:00:49.480
<v Speaker 1>than spying. It's kind of like saying, no, I'm cool

0:00:49.600 --> 0:00:53.360
<v Speaker 1>with there being a live camera on me all the time,

0:00:53.760 --> 0:00:57.880
<v Speaker 1>just broadcasting to some other location. You can't really call

0:00:57.960 --> 0:01:00.360
<v Speaker 1>that spying if you were in on it at the top.

0:01:00.440 --> 0:01:05.279
<v Speaker 1>But the way tech tends to go about this UH

0:01:05.600 --> 0:01:10.760
<v Speaker 1>usually follows a pathway that isn't transparent, and it's not

0:01:10.840 --> 0:01:15.920
<v Speaker 1>always obvious, and sometimes it relies on people not really

0:01:15.959 --> 0:01:19.320
<v Speaker 1>being aware of what they've agreed to. So I really

0:01:19.360 --> 0:01:21.200
<v Speaker 1>wanted to go into that so that we can all

0:01:21.240 --> 0:01:27.120
<v Speaker 1>have a deeper understanding of how tech gathers information and

0:01:27.120 --> 0:01:31.600
<v Speaker 1>then how companies leverage that and exploit our information, and

0:01:31.680 --> 0:01:34.600
<v Speaker 1>furthermore to kind of, you know, think about whether or

0:01:34.600 --> 0:01:36.800
<v Speaker 1>not we're okay with this. Some of you might be,

0:01:37.000 --> 0:01:39.759
<v Speaker 1>and there's I'm not casting any shade, I'm not making

0:01:39.800 --> 0:01:43.240
<v Speaker 1>any judgments, but others might not be. And that's why

0:01:43.280 --> 0:01:45.200
<v Speaker 1>I wanted to kind of go through this and really

0:01:45.240 --> 0:01:49.000
<v Speaker 1>get down to why it seems like our tech has

0:01:49.040 --> 0:01:53.040
<v Speaker 1>almost a preternatural ability to know things about us. So

0:01:53.160 --> 0:01:57.320
<v Speaker 1>let me paint for you a hypothetical situation. You are

0:01:57.440 --> 0:02:00.240
<v Speaker 1>hanging out with a friend and you're both chatting a out,

0:02:00.480 --> 0:02:03.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, all sorts of stuff, and the two of

0:02:03.040 --> 0:02:05.520
<v Speaker 1>you decided to go to a nice restaurant with an

0:02:05.520 --> 0:02:08.040
<v Speaker 1>outdoor seating area because you know, we're still kind of

0:02:08.520 --> 0:02:11.960
<v Speaker 1>post pandemic type stuff, and you know you're being super

0:02:11.960 --> 0:02:15.280
<v Speaker 1>responsible with regard to health concerns and all of that. Anyway,

0:02:15.600 --> 0:02:18.120
<v Speaker 1>you have a conversation with your friend who is telling

0:02:18.120 --> 0:02:21.520
<v Speaker 1>you all about this movie they just watched. And after

0:02:21.600 --> 0:02:23.960
<v Speaker 1>your meal, you say goodbye to your friend and you

0:02:24.000 --> 0:02:27.799
<v Speaker 1>head on home. Later that same day or evening or

0:02:27.919 --> 0:02:30.560
<v Speaker 1>night whatever, you're on the internet and you see something

0:02:30.639 --> 0:02:33.639
<v Speaker 1>kind of weird. You actually start seeing ads for that

0:02:33.680 --> 0:02:37.240
<v Speaker 1>film your friend was talking about popping up on different

0:02:37.280 --> 0:02:40.760
<v Speaker 1>sites and services, and you don't remember seeing ads for

0:02:40.880 --> 0:02:46.720
<v Speaker 1>this particular movie before, So maybe it's cherry picking. Maybe

0:02:46.800 --> 0:02:49.519
<v Speaker 1>it's the whole van as always by the corner thing

0:02:49.520 --> 0:02:52.000
<v Speaker 1>where you only notice something after it's been brought to

0:02:52.040 --> 0:02:54.520
<v Speaker 1>your attention. But maybe it's not. So what the heck

0:02:54.560 --> 0:02:57.800
<v Speaker 1>is going on? Was your phone spying on you? Was

0:02:57.840 --> 0:03:01.000
<v Speaker 1>it listening in on your conversationation that you had with

0:03:01.000 --> 0:03:04.320
<v Speaker 1>your friend at dinner and then sent that information off

0:03:04.600 --> 0:03:09.520
<v Speaker 1>somewhere to be processed and analyzed, then sold to advertisers,

0:03:09.560 --> 0:03:13.040
<v Speaker 1>And then when you get back and now you have

0:03:13.120 --> 0:03:17.320
<v Speaker 1>targeted ads aimed at you because your phone was eavesdropping

0:03:17.360 --> 0:03:20.680
<v Speaker 1>on you. Now, I mentioned this sort of thing in

0:03:20.720 --> 0:03:24.000
<v Speaker 1>a recent tech News episode, and I'm not gonna make

0:03:24.080 --> 0:03:27.800
<v Speaker 1>you wait through this whole episode to answer that hypothetical question.

0:03:28.280 --> 0:03:33.919
<v Speaker 1>Your tech is most likely not listening in on your conversations,

0:03:34.480 --> 0:03:37.040
<v Speaker 1>not because that would be hard to do it. It

0:03:37.120 --> 0:03:40.440
<v Speaker 1>actually wouldn't be hard to do that, but because there's

0:03:40.520 --> 0:03:43.040
<v Speaker 1>really no need to do it. There's no need to

0:03:43.040 --> 0:03:47.680
<v Speaker 1>go that far. Also, if tech were actually actively listening

0:03:47.680 --> 0:03:50.560
<v Speaker 1>in on you all the time, governments around the world

0:03:50.640 --> 0:03:54.440
<v Speaker 1>would be extremely interested in that, either to use it

0:03:55.040 --> 0:03:58.440
<v Speaker 1>for their themselves as a kind of surveillance of their

0:03:58.480 --> 0:04:01.880
<v Speaker 1>own citizens and people who are within the country, or

0:04:02.160 --> 0:04:05.120
<v Speaker 1>they would want to go after tech companies for violating

0:04:05.200 --> 0:04:09.880
<v Speaker 1>various privacy and security laws. Now, the point is that

0:04:10.040 --> 0:04:14.280
<v Speaker 1>the way our modern tech works, and the way companies collect, share,

0:04:14.440 --> 0:04:18.400
<v Speaker 1>and barter our data, means there's no need to listen

0:04:18.480 --> 0:04:21.479
<v Speaker 1>in to what we're saying. Our tech knows who we are,

0:04:22.080 --> 0:04:25.480
<v Speaker 1>it knows where we go, it knows what we're doing,

0:04:26.080 --> 0:04:29.240
<v Speaker 1>and because the people around us also carry similar tech,

0:04:29.520 --> 0:04:32.800
<v Speaker 1>it knows who we're with, and by cross referencing data,

0:04:33.080 --> 0:04:36.960
<v Speaker 1>it knows what sort of connections exist between us. So

0:04:37.040 --> 0:04:39.840
<v Speaker 1>today I thought I talk a bit more about how

0:04:39.880 --> 0:04:43.000
<v Speaker 1>our tech collects data and the history of that, from

0:04:43.000 --> 0:04:45.919
<v Speaker 1>the stuff that we willingly surrender to the stuff that

0:04:45.960 --> 0:04:49.000
<v Speaker 1>we might not even realize was being shared. We'll talk

0:04:49.040 --> 0:04:52.400
<v Speaker 1>about how this has evolved and how geolocation has played

0:04:52.440 --> 0:04:54.920
<v Speaker 1>a really big part in this, and this will lead

0:04:55.000 --> 0:04:57.159
<v Speaker 1>us to some recent events in which we've seen big

0:04:57.200 --> 0:05:00.880
<v Speaker 1>companies like Facebook and Google try to skirt around attempts

0:05:00.960 --> 0:05:03.800
<v Speaker 1>to give users the option to opt out of some

0:05:03.880 --> 0:05:08.839
<v Speaker 1>forms of data collection now, as always in tech stuff,

0:05:08.839 --> 0:05:11.440
<v Speaker 1>anyone who's listened to a textuff episode knows I love

0:05:12.120 --> 0:05:15.840
<v Speaker 1>going through history because it's not like there was just

0:05:16.000 --> 0:05:18.799
<v Speaker 1>a switch that was flipped one day and then suddenly

0:05:18.839 --> 0:05:22.920
<v Speaker 1>all of our personal information got hoovered up by the Internet. Also,

0:05:22.920 --> 0:05:24.480
<v Speaker 1>we should keep in mind that there are a lot

0:05:24.520 --> 0:05:28.239
<v Speaker 1>of different privacy laws around the world that can restrict

0:05:28.320 --> 0:05:31.719
<v Speaker 1>this kind of you know, data collection and how data

0:05:31.720 --> 0:05:36.160
<v Speaker 1>companies can use that information. So, for example, the European

0:05:36.279 --> 0:05:40.160
<v Speaker 1>Union has laws that provide a decent amount of protection

0:05:40.240 --> 0:05:44.799
<v Speaker 1>for citizens. But as I am located in the United States,

0:05:45.000 --> 0:05:47.839
<v Speaker 1>where the Internet first got its start, and thus where

0:05:47.920 --> 0:05:51.920
<v Speaker 1>the attitudes and practices regarding private information on the Internet

0:05:52.440 --> 0:05:55.080
<v Speaker 1>got their start, at least with regard to you know,

0:05:55.320 --> 0:05:58.279
<v Speaker 1>the web and the Internet in general, I'm mostly going

0:05:58.320 --> 0:06:00.279
<v Speaker 1>to be focusing on the good old us of a

0:06:01.400 --> 0:06:05.239
<v Speaker 1>which isn't really that old, and frequently isn't that good either.

0:06:06.720 --> 0:06:09.800
<v Speaker 1>So here in the United States, a right to privacy

0:06:10.120 --> 0:06:13.880
<v Speaker 1>was not one of the guarantees laid out in the Constitution,

0:06:14.000 --> 0:06:18.680
<v Speaker 1>at least not explicitly. However, the various forms of government,

0:06:18.680 --> 0:06:22.160
<v Speaker 1>including the Supreme Court, over the course of decades and

0:06:22.240 --> 0:06:26.080
<v Speaker 1>several court cases has essentially found that four of the

0:06:26.120 --> 0:06:31.479
<v Speaker 1>first five amendments to the Constitution extend over towards a

0:06:31.600 --> 0:06:34.480
<v Speaker 1>right to privacy. So those would be the first Amendment.

0:06:34.839 --> 0:06:38.159
<v Speaker 1>That's the one that guarantees the right to assembly, uh,

0:06:38.200 --> 0:06:41.520
<v Speaker 1>the freedom of religion, the freedom of speech, and the

0:06:41.560 --> 0:06:45.240
<v Speaker 1>freedom of expression. Then we skip over the second Amendment

0:06:45.440 --> 0:06:48.320
<v Speaker 1>and we head over to Amendment number three, which prevents

0:06:48.320 --> 0:06:51.200
<v Speaker 1>the government from being able to station soldiers in private

0:06:51.240 --> 0:06:55.600
<v Speaker 1>homes of citizens. Then there's the Fourth Amendment, which protects

0:06:55.640 --> 0:06:59.120
<v Speaker 1>citizens from unreasonable search and seizure. That's a big part

0:06:59.160 --> 0:07:02.760
<v Speaker 1>of privacy obviously. And then we've got Amendment number five,

0:07:03.040 --> 0:07:06.360
<v Speaker 1>which has a little bit of Monica in my life. Wait, no,

0:07:06.440 --> 0:07:10.760
<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry, that's mambo number five. Amendment number five says

0:07:10.840 --> 0:07:15.240
<v Speaker 1>that US citizens enjoy certain legal protections. For example, you

0:07:15.480 --> 0:07:19.000
<v Speaker 1>can't be tried for the same crime twice, right, that's

0:07:19.000 --> 0:07:23.360
<v Speaker 1>double jeopardy. That obviously doesn't include stuff like the appeals process,

0:07:23.400 --> 0:07:27.720
<v Speaker 1>but that's separate. Also, citizens can take the Fifth Amendment

0:07:27.800 --> 0:07:31.520
<v Speaker 1>to avoid self incrimination during a trial, so they cannot

0:07:31.560 --> 0:07:35.840
<v Speaker 1>be compelled to confess to a crime. Uh. That again

0:07:35.920 --> 0:07:39.440
<v Speaker 1>relates to privacy. Now, none of those four amendments provide

0:07:39.520 --> 0:07:42.880
<v Speaker 1>explicit rights to privacy, but they all extend towards that

0:07:42.920 --> 0:07:46.440
<v Speaker 1>direction in different ways. So that was back in seventeen

0:07:46.600 --> 0:07:49.200
<v Speaker 1>eighty nine, which means it was like two centuries before

0:07:49.200 --> 0:07:52.280
<v Speaker 1>we had to worry about the Internet, but a century

0:07:52.320 --> 0:07:56.480
<v Speaker 1>after the Constitution was ratified. That being an eight ninety

0:07:57.040 --> 0:08:01.640
<v Speaker 1>an article written by Justice Louis Brandy and Samuel Warren

0:08:02.080 --> 0:08:05.680
<v Speaker 1>argued for a more explicit right to privacy. It was

0:08:05.720 --> 0:08:09.360
<v Speaker 1>the early days of photography in the eighteen nineties, and

0:08:09.480 --> 0:08:12.240
<v Speaker 1>already the two saw the potential for people to have

0:08:12.320 --> 0:08:15.960
<v Speaker 1>their privacy violated due to the fact that now it

0:08:16.040 --> 0:08:19.880
<v Speaker 1>was easier to capture a moment forever and then potentially

0:08:19.960 --> 0:08:24.600
<v Speaker 1>distribute it widely through the press. In nineteen fourteen, we

0:08:24.720 --> 0:08:29.040
<v Speaker 1>got the founding of the Federal Trade Commission, or FTC. Now,

0:08:29.040 --> 0:08:32.600
<v Speaker 1>the primary responsibility of the FTC is to ensure that

0:08:32.640 --> 0:08:36.880
<v Speaker 1>companies within the United States are playing fair. The FTC

0:08:36.960 --> 0:08:40.880
<v Speaker 1>can go after companies that use deceptive commercial practices, but

0:08:41.080 --> 0:08:45.240
<v Speaker 1>later on, really like starting around the nineteen seventies, the

0:08:45.320 --> 0:08:50.000
<v Speaker 1>FTC would also focus on companies that violated citizen privacy,

0:08:50.280 --> 0:08:53.680
<v Speaker 1>going global. For a moment in nineteen forty eight, the

0:08:53.760 --> 0:08:58.280
<v Speaker 1>United Nations drafted the Declaration of Human Rights, which included

0:08:58.320 --> 0:09:01.920
<v Speaker 1>within it article number twelve, of which states, quote no

0:09:01.960 --> 0:09:07.160
<v Speaker 1>one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home,

0:09:07.360 --> 0:09:11.599
<v Speaker 1>or correspondence, nor two attacks upon his honor and reputation.

0:09:12.000 --> 0:09:14.680
<v Speaker 1>Everyone has the right to the protection of the law

0:09:14.800 --> 0:09:19.040
<v Speaker 1>against such interference or attacks. End quote. Now, apart from

0:09:19.080 --> 0:09:22.760
<v Speaker 1>the non inclusive pronoun usage there, this was a really

0:09:22.800 --> 0:09:26.480
<v Speaker 1>big step toward positioning privacy as a basic human right.

0:09:27.280 --> 0:09:31.720
<v Speaker 1>In nineteen sixty a legal scholar named William Prosser published

0:09:31.760 --> 0:09:36.040
<v Speaker 1>an article titled Fittingly Enough Privacy, and in that article

0:09:36.160 --> 0:09:40.559
<v Speaker 1>processor outlined four cases in which infringing on privacy should

0:09:40.600 --> 0:09:44.720
<v Speaker 1>allow for the victim to pursue a civil lawsuit against

0:09:44.760 --> 0:09:50.320
<v Speaker 1>the perpetrator. Those four cases were intrusion upon seclusion or solitude,

0:09:50.600 --> 0:09:53.559
<v Speaker 1>so in other words, someone's barging in on you when

0:09:53.559 --> 0:09:58.520
<v Speaker 1>you're just trying to be alone, or intrusion into private affairs. Similarly,

0:09:59.280 --> 0:10:03.680
<v Speaker 1>public disco cosure of embarrassing private facts, which when you

0:10:03.720 --> 0:10:07.680
<v Speaker 1>think about that, the Internet and the way it works

0:10:08.000 --> 0:10:11.199
<v Speaker 1>would just catch on fire if people were really holding

0:10:11.240 --> 0:10:15.080
<v Speaker 1>that seriously. Today publicity which places a person in a

0:10:15.120 --> 0:10:18.520
<v Speaker 1>false light in the public eye was another case. And

0:10:18.679 --> 0:10:22.559
<v Speaker 1>appropriation of one's name or likeness. So if someone were

0:10:22.600 --> 0:10:26.640
<v Speaker 1>to go about posing as Jonathan Strickland and it's not me,

0:10:27.240 --> 0:10:29.360
<v Speaker 1>it's not someone else who's actually named Jonathan Strickland like

0:10:29.400 --> 0:10:32.080
<v Speaker 1>they were trying to pose as me, I should be

0:10:32.160 --> 0:10:38.480
<v Speaker 1>allowed to sue that person based on that that criteria. Now,

0:10:38.520 --> 0:10:41.920
<v Speaker 1>obviously in these cases, uh, there's a lot of leeway

0:10:41.960 --> 0:10:45.840
<v Speaker 1>because there also are issues where it kind of starts

0:10:45.840 --> 0:10:49.160
<v Speaker 1>to track a little bit toward issues with the First Amendment. Right,

0:10:49.240 --> 0:10:52.800
<v Speaker 1>So in case of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts,

0:10:53.840 --> 0:10:56.319
<v Speaker 1>if you're talking about a public figure, there's a lot

0:10:56.360 --> 0:10:59.680
<v Speaker 1>more leeway there because it may be that that public

0:10:59.760 --> 0:11:04.760
<v Speaker 1>fig years private facts have a public bearing, like if

0:11:04.840 --> 0:11:07.920
<v Speaker 1>it's a politician or something. So it does get a

0:11:07.960 --> 0:11:12.079
<v Speaker 1>little dicey, but these matters always do. We'll skip ahead

0:11:12.120 --> 0:11:14.400
<v Speaker 1>to nineteen seventy four, though I should say that there

0:11:14.400 --> 0:11:17.400
<v Speaker 1>were some court cases and some scholarly articles that further

0:11:17.559 --> 0:11:21.240
<v Speaker 1>the framing of privacy. By nineteen seventy four, the US

0:11:21.320 --> 0:11:25.280
<v Speaker 1>passed the Privacy Act, which placed limits on how federal

0:11:25.400 --> 0:11:30.360
<v Speaker 1>agencies can collect and use personally identifiable information not granted.

0:11:30.720 --> 0:11:34.959
<v Speaker 1>These restrictions were all about government use, federal government use,

0:11:35.080 --> 0:11:39.240
<v Speaker 1>not state government, and not corporate use, so it's not

0:11:39.320 --> 0:11:43.040
<v Speaker 1>like this applied across the board. In nineteen six, the

0:11:43.120 --> 0:11:46.840
<v Speaker 1>US government passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and established

0:11:46.880 --> 0:11:49.840
<v Speaker 1>they Do Not Call Registry, and these were meant to

0:11:49.880 --> 0:11:52.920
<v Speaker 1>reduce the number of solicitation calls that citizens would get,

0:11:52.960 --> 0:11:55.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, the spam calls we would call them today,

0:11:55.640 --> 0:11:58.600
<v Speaker 1>and it would give people the opportunity to opt out

0:11:58.960 --> 0:12:01.640
<v Speaker 1>of being on that regis streets, so that in theory,

0:12:01.720 --> 0:12:04.640
<v Speaker 1>you wouldn't get those cold calls. Now, this is one

0:12:04.640 --> 0:12:07.200
<v Speaker 1>of those things that in recent years has become an

0:12:07.240 --> 0:12:11.199
<v Speaker 1>area of focus because stuff like robo calls and spoofing

0:12:11.280 --> 0:12:14.920
<v Speaker 1>have really sidestepped the protections that were in place all

0:12:14.960 --> 0:12:19.520
<v Speaker 1>the way back in six rendering them almost meaningless. And

0:12:19.559 --> 0:12:22.240
<v Speaker 1>you've heard a lot of calls even in you know,

0:12:22.360 --> 0:12:27.079
<v Speaker 1>high areas of Congress to have a new version of

0:12:27.120 --> 0:12:32.679
<v Speaker 1>this too address things like companies that use spoofing and

0:12:32.800 --> 0:12:37.800
<v Speaker 1>robo calls to do a widespread targeting of spam. Over

0:12:37.880 --> 0:12:41.440
<v Speaker 1>in Europe, the EU adopted the Data Protection Directive in

0:12:41.559 --> 0:12:47.360
<v Speaker 1>nine and then in the EU replaced that with the

0:12:47.400 --> 0:12:51.559
<v Speaker 1>General Data Protection Regulation or g d p R. This

0:12:51.640 --> 0:12:54.280
<v Speaker 1>is the set of rules and restrictions that really prevents

0:12:54.840 --> 0:12:58.160
<v Speaker 1>largely like big tech companies from following the same source

0:12:58.200 --> 0:13:01.400
<v Speaker 1>of strategies in the EU that they follow here over

0:13:01.440 --> 0:13:04.120
<v Speaker 1>in the United States. So you'll hear a lot about

0:13:04.120 --> 0:13:08.040
<v Speaker 1>companies having to readjust how they work in the EU,

0:13:09.120 --> 0:13:12.679
<v Speaker 1>because if they were to continue to operate as they

0:13:12.720 --> 0:13:15.520
<v Speaker 1>do in the United States, they could be held legally

0:13:15.920 --> 0:13:20.200
<v Speaker 1>liable for lots of violations. There are other rules that

0:13:20.240 --> 0:13:25.160
<v Speaker 1>are important. There's KAPPA. That's the Children's Online Privacy Protection

0:13:25.200 --> 0:13:27.920
<v Speaker 1>Act here in the United States. That act places much

0:13:27.920 --> 0:13:31.439
<v Speaker 1>tighter restrictions on companies when it comes to the collection

0:13:31.480 --> 0:13:34.720
<v Speaker 1>and use of data about people who are younger than thirteen.

0:13:35.320 --> 0:13:37.840
<v Speaker 1>That law and the enforcement of it have created some

0:13:38.080 --> 0:13:41.720
<v Speaker 1>fairly tricky situations for companies and for others, like notably

0:13:41.880 --> 0:13:45.760
<v Speaker 1>content creators on platforms like YouTube. But I'm pretty sure

0:13:45.800 --> 0:13:47.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna have to do just a full episode on

0:13:47.679 --> 0:13:52.800
<v Speaker 1>KAPPA and its consequences in the future, because those consequences

0:13:52.840 --> 0:13:57.000
<v Speaker 1>include stuff that I think are valuable and stuff that

0:13:57.320 --> 0:14:01.240
<v Speaker 1>because of the interpretation of the law and the implementation

0:14:01.280 --> 0:14:05.679
<v Speaker 1>of policies on platforms like YouTube can also be harmful.

0:14:06.640 --> 0:14:11.240
<v Speaker 1>It's complicated, so that's why it would require its own episode.

0:14:10.160 --> 0:14:15.439
<v Speaker 1>In the US past, the Graham Leach Blightly Act, which

0:14:15.640 --> 0:14:19.640
<v Speaker 1>requires financial institutions to explain how they use and share

0:14:19.720 --> 0:14:22.880
<v Speaker 1>private consumer data. So this was for things like credit

0:14:23.000 --> 0:14:26.280
<v Speaker 1>organizations banks. That kind of thing also requires that those

0:14:26.280 --> 0:14:30.000
<v Speaker 1>companies provide a means for customers to opt out of

0:14:30.120 --> 0:14:34.000
<v Speaker 1>having their information shared, which is a pretty good point

0:14:34.000 --> 0:14:36.600
<v Speaker 1>to focus on for a second. In the United States,

0:14:37.200 --> 0:14:40.760
<v Speaker 1>the general approach the default is to require companies to

0:14:40.800 --> 0:14:44.240
<v Speaker 1>provide an opt out option, but a lot of companies

0:14:44.920 --> 0:14:49.200
<v Speaker 1>bury these sorts of settings or features so that they're

0:14:49.200 --> 0:14:53.000
<v Speaker 1>not easy to find or activate, and often any disclosure

0:14:53.200 --> 0:14:57.440
<v Speaker 1>of there being an opt out feature can be buried

0:14:57.480 --> 0:15:01.680
<v Speaker 1>inside a long terms of service end user agreement page

0:15:01.840 --> 0:15:04.600
<v Speaker 1>which most people don't take the time to read. And

0:15:04.840 --> 0:15:07.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm just as guilty of this as other people. I

0:15:07.640 --> 0:15:10.880
<v Speaker 1>don't I'm not you know, I'm not throwing shade here, folks,

0:15:11.040 --> 0:15:14.720
<v Speaker 1>I am. I've done this, and some people argue that

0:15:14.800 --> 0:15:17.520
<v Speaker 1>it would be better to have an opt in approach,

0:15:17.760 --> 0:15:21.360
<v Speaker 1>so this would be where you would sign up for

0:15:21.400 --> 0:15:24.400
<v Speaker 1>a service. You would be told, hey, do you mind

0:15:24.880 --> 0:15:27.400
<v Speaker 1>if we use your information to do X, Y and

0:15:27.480 --> 0:15:31.040
<v Speaker 1>Z in a very clear and transparent way, not buried

0:15:31.080 --> 0:15:35.200
<v Speaker 1>in like pages and pages of terms of service, and

0:15:35.320 --> 0:15:37.440
<v Speaker 1>you would then click a box to allow it to happen.

0:15:37.880 --> 0:15:41.600
<v Speaker 1>But since so much revenue depends intrinsically on the ability

0:15:41.600 --> 0:15:44.880
<v Speaker 1>of companies to collect and share data, there's an extreme

0:15:44.920 --> 0:15:49.800
<v Speaker 1>financial incentive to go the opt out route. More on

0:15:49.880 --> 0:15:53.960
<v Speaker 1>that later. On the state level, presently, two states in

0:15:54.000 --> 0:15:56.760
<v Speaker 1>the US have passed privacy laws meant to protect the

0:15:56.800 --> 0:16:01.440
<v Speaker 1>private information of citizens of those states, and they are California,

0:16:01.680 --> 0:16:05.560
<v Speaker 1>which passed the California Consumer Privacy Act in which went

0:16:05.600 --> 0:16:09.920
<v Speaker 1>into effect in twenty twenty, and then Virginia, which very

0:16:10.000 --> 0:16:14.040
<v Speaker 1>recently passed the Consumer Data Protection Act just this past

0:16:14.120 --> 0:16:19.880
<v Speaker 1>March in but that law won't go into effect until January.

0:16:20.080 --> 0:16:22.640
<v Speaker 1>The other forty eight states of the US pretty much

0:16:22.680 --> 0:16:26.840
<v Speaker 1>just followed the general federal rules to some extent. So

0:16:26.880 --> 0:16:30.480
<v Speaker 1>that's the legal background on privacy in the United States

0:16:30.520 --> 0:16:33.600
<v Speaker 1>and to a lesser extent, the EU without going into

0:16:33.800 --> 0:16:38.040
<v Speaker 1>like super detailed analysis. The idea being privacy is clearly

0:16:38.080 --> 0:16:43.680
<v Speaker 1>a thing, but it's not as heavily protected from a

0:16:43.800 --> 0:16:47.800
<v Speaker 1>legal standpoint in the United States as it could be. Meanwhile,

0:16:48.480 --> 0:16:54.080
<v Speaker 1>obviously technology advances at an incredible pace and frequently leaves

0:16:54.240 --> 0:16:57.840
<v Speaker 1>the legal system in the dust. But what about the

0:16:57.880 --> 0:17:01.360
<v Speaker 1>actual collection of personal information in the tech age. Well,

0:17:01.400 --> 0:17:04.359
<v Speaker 1>again we need to think back historically. Now, in the

0:17:04.440 --> 0:17:08.960
<v Speaker 1>old old days, you know, pre digital age, businesses essentially

0:17:09.040 --> 0:17:13.560
<v Speaker 1>kept an eye on customers, particularly repeat customers, and kept

0:17:13.600 --> 0:17:17.240
<v Speaker 1>an eye on what they were buying. This was necessary

0:17:17.280 --> 0:17:19.560
<v Speaker 1>in order to just keep stores stocked with the stuff

0:17:19.560 --> 0:17:23.320
<v Speaker 1>people actually needed. And I think this kind of tracking,

0:17:23.600 --> 0:17:26.920
<v Speaker 1>which is being really generous, uh, it was much more

0:17:26.920 --> 0:17:30.040
<v Speaker 1>general approach. It's pretty easy to understand and to forgive.

0:17:30.280 --> 0:17:33.600
<v Speaker 1>So imagine that you are a store owner and you

0:17:33.640 --> 0:17:36.879
<v Speaker 1>notice that every two months farmer Betty comes in and

0:17:36.960 --> 0:17:40.040
<v Speaker 1>she buys two bags of grain. You would learn pretty

0:17:40.080 --> 0:17:42.439
<v Speaker 1>quickly that you need to make sure you have grain

0:17:42.560 --> 0:17:46.920
<v Speaker 1>stocked every two months because typically that's when she would

0:17:46.920 --> 0:17:48.320
<v Speaker 1>come in and buy them. So you want to make

0:17:48.359 --> 0:17:50.960
<v Speaker 1>sure you had that on hand. And you would do

0:17:51.000 --> 0:17:53.119
<v Speaker 1>this with all your customers, whatever it was that they

0:17:53.119 --> 0:17:55.199
<v Speaker 1>were buying. You would make sure that you were stocked

0:17:55.280 --> 0:17:58.679
<v Speaker 1>up on and you might also try and experiment and

0:17:58.760 --> 0:18:01.960
<v Speaker 1>stock some stuff was related to the products that your

0:18:01.960 --> 0:18:06.320
<v Speaker 1>regulars were buying, and assuming that you speculate correctly, everyone

0:18:06.440 --> 0:18:10.119
<v Speaker 1>benefits from that. You make more sales and your customers

0:18:10.359 --> 0:18:12.880
<v Speaker 1>end up getting stuff that they need, even if they

0:18:12.880 --> 0:18:16.240
<v Speaker 1>didn't know they needed it at the time. Fast forward

0:18:16.680 --> 0:18:19.679
<v Speaker 1>a whole lot to the point where we had electronic

0:18:19.800 --> 0:18:23.440
<v Speaker 1>means of keeping inventory. The invention of stuff like computer

0:18:23.520 --> 0:18:27.119
<v Speaker 1>systems and the bar code in the nineteen seventies that

0:18:27.200 --> 0:18:29.199
<v Speaker 1>made it possible for us to keep an up to

0:18:29.359 --> 0:18:33.960
<v Speaker 1>date electronic record of inventory and sales, and these weren't

0:18:34.000 --> 0:18:37.640
<v Speaker 1>directly tied to customers just yet. That would still largely

0:18:37.680 --> 0:18:41.400
<v Speaker 1>depend heavily on observation, but now it was much easier

0:18:41.400 --> 0:18:45.439
<v Speaker 1>to spot buying trends and respond to them in close

0:18:45.480 --> 0:18:49.679
<v Speaker 1>to real time. That particular branch would lead to data

0:18:49.760 --> 0:18:54.120
<v Speaker 1>driven marketing, in which experts and marketing would look at

0:18:54.240 --> 0:18:57.680
<v Speaker 1>various goods and services and use data to determine which

0:18:57.720 --> 0:19:00.840
<v Speaker 1>regions they should focus on and which one's might prove

0:19:00.840 --> 0:19:05.119
<v Speaker 1>to be less profitable. So let's say you are uh,

0:19:05.160 --> 0:19:08.120
<v Speaker 1>the owner of a chain of grocery stores in the Southeast.

0:19:08.600 --> 0:19:12.600
<v Speaker 1>You might notice that grocery stores in Atlanta are selling

0:19:12.760 --> 0:19:15.800
<v Speaker 1>a lot of a particular type of product, and then meanwhile,

0:19:16.200 --> 0:19:21.280
<v Speaker 1>a store in you know, Charlotte isn't selling that so much,

0:19:21.320 --> 0:19:24.359
<v Speaker 1>but it is selling a different product at very high volume.

0:19:24.880 --> 0:19:26.520
<v Speaker 1>These are the sort of dad trends you would want

0:19:26.560 --> 0:19:27.960
<v Speaker 1>to know so that you could make sure you had

0:19:27.960 --> 0:19:31.120
<v Speaker 1>the right stock on hand, you could do advertising campaigns,

0:19:31.640 --> 0:19:35.440
<v Speaker 1>and you can maximize your sales and minimize your waste.

0:19:35.840 --> 0:19:41.080
<v Speaker 1>It was incredibly valuable data that was undeniable. Information was

0:19:41.119 --> 0:19:46.120
<v Speaker 1>the key to maximizing profit and reducing costs as much

0:19:46.160 --> 0:19:49.280
<v Speaker 1>as possible. In the nineteen eighties we saw the rise

0:19:49.400 --> 0:19:53.920
<v Speaker 1>of direct marketing, in which marketers would customize and personalized

0:19:53.920 --> 0:19:58.080
<v Speaker 1>efforts and aim them at specific shoppers. Now we're no

0:19:58.160 --> 0:20:02.400
<v Speaker 1>longer looking at regions, we're looking at individuals. And typically

0:20:02.400 --> 0:20:05.800
<v Speaker 1>they did this through direct mail sales. And this was

0:20:05.840 --> 0:20:08.960
<v Speaker 1>a pretty primitive approach and based solely on the customer's

0:20:08.960 --> 0:20:11.280
<v Speaker 1>past purchases. So I can give you an example of this.

0:20:11.480 --> 0:20:14.000
<v Speaker 1>I grew up in the eighties. I was one of

0:20:14.040 --> 0:20:17.919
<v Speaker 1>those kids who occasionally would buy comic books, and of

0:20:17.960 --> 0:20:20.880
<v Speaker 1>course stuff on the backs of comic books would sometimes

0:20:20.880 --> 0:20:24.159
<v Speaker 1>be really tempting, Like man I really would like that

0:20:24.320 --> 0:20:27.400
<v Speaker 1>hand buzzer. That seems like that will be a real hit,

0:20:28.200 --> 0:20:31.400
<v Speaker 1>And you go and you send your like dollar seventy

0:20:31.400 --> 0:20:33.679
<v Speaker 1>five or the mail and you buy one. And then

0:20:33.720 --> 0:20:36.000
<v Speaker 1>next thing you know, you start getting catalogs for all

0:20:36.040 --> 0:20:39.040
<v Speaker 1>these sort of novelty gifts. And that's how I ended

0:20:39.119 --> 0:20:41.960
<v Speaker 1>up on a billion mailing lists that were all aiming

0:20:41.960 --> 0:20:44.600
<v Speaker 1>at me in different ways for different types of weird

0:20:44.760 --> 0:20:48.000
<v Speaker 1>or novelty type stuff. That was kind of the approach.

0:20:48.040 --> 0:20:52.520
<v Speaker 1>It was pretty primitive. It was not, you know, super sophisticated,

0:20:52.960 --> 0:20:58.160
<v Speaker 1>but it did set a foundation that particular branch would

0:20:58.400 --> 0:21:02.280
<v Speaker 1>later extend further into st like loyalty programs in which

0:21:02.400 --> 0:21:06.320
<v Speaker 1>stores would issue cards or tokens, often using a bar

0:21:06.400 --> 0:21:09.480
<v Speaker 1>code right that they would scan, and that would link

0:21:09.560 --> 0:21:13.240
<v Speaker 1>purchases to specific customers. Now you actually know who it

0:21:13.400 --> 0:21:16.160
<v Speaker 1>is that's buying stuff and how frequently they're buying it,

0:21:16.760 --> 0:21:19.880
<v Speaker 1>and when linked to other information such as a person's

0:21:19.920 --> 0:21:23.680
<v Speaker 1>email address or their snail mail address, that can allow

0:21:23.800 --> 0:21:27.080
<v Speaker 1>stores to proactively reach out to a customer and alert

0:21:27.119 --> 0:21:30.199
<v Speaker 1>them of sales, maybe offer up coupons, all in an

0:21:30.240 --> 0:21:33.040
<v Speaker 1>effort to sell more stuff. And it gave the stores

0:21:33.320 --> 0:21:37.240
<v Speaker 1>way more information about the preferences of their customers on

0:21:37.320 --> 0:21:41.040
<v Speaker 1>that individual basis. That's sort of a microcosm of what

0:21:41.080 --> 0:21:43.880
<v Speaker 1>we're looking at with personal data on the Internet. I'll

0:21:43.920 --> 0:21:56.200
<v Speaker 1>explain more after this short break. Okay, we have gotten

0:21:56.280 --> 0:21:59.359
<v Speaker 1>up to the ninety nineties and the birth of the

0:21:59.400 --> 0:22:02.440
<v Speaker 1>World Wide Web. Now, the original purpose of the web

0:22:02.560 --> 0:22:05.800
<v Speaker 1>was to create a collection of documents that could be

0:22:05.840 --> 0:22:09.919
<v Speaker 1>linked to one another using hypertext links. So it was

0:22:09.960 --> 0:22:13.640
<v Speaker 1>just a means of sharing information and linking information together

0:22:14.080 --> 0:22:17.080
<v Speaker 1>which could allow you to create a type of contextualization.

0:22:17.640 --> 0:22:19.720
<v Speaker 1>So think of the average experience you might have on

0:22:19.760 --> 0:22:23.480
<v Speaker 1>a site like Wikipedia. Sure you might start off reading

0:22:23.520 --> 0:22:26.919
<v Speaker 1>about sloths, but then through a series of clicking on

0:22:27.040 --> 0:22:30.200
<v Speaker 1>various links in different articles, you ultimately end up reading

0:22:30.240 --> 0:22:34.359
<v Speaker 1>about the communist revolution in Cuba. It didn't take too

0:22:34.440 --> 0:22:37.760
<v Speaker 1>long after the initial launch of the earliest web pages

0:22:38.200 --> 0:22:43.720
<v Speaker 1>for commerce to follow onto the web. In the digital

0:22:43.800 --> 0:22:49.680
<v Speaker 1>magazine hot Wired introduced something new, the banner ad. Hot

0:22:49.720 --> 0:22:53.760
<v Speaker 1>Wired was an online branch of the print magazine Wired.

0:22:54.119 --> 0:22:57.840
<v Speaker 1>Now hot Wired doesn't exist anymore, but Wired now occupies

0:22:57.880 --> 0:23:01.639
<v Speaker 1>both print and digital formats. However, the banner ad became

0:23:01.760 --> 0:23:05.600
<v Speaker 1>a really important stepping stone in our story. The first

0:23:05.640 --> 0:23:08.560
<v Speaker 1>banner ad was for a T and T, which reportedly

0:23:08.560 --> 0:23:12.840
<v Speaker 1>paid hot Wire a fee of thirty dollars so that

0:23:12.960 --> 0:23:15.159
<v Speaker 1>the banner ad would be placed at the top of

0:23:15.240 --> 0:23:19.639
<v Speaker 1>hot Wired pages for the duration of three months during

0:23:19.680 --> 0:23:22.960
<v Speaker 1>that time, according to one source, at least I could

0:23:22.960 --> 0:23:26.000
<v Speaker 1>not verify this. It's widely reported, but I feel like

0:23:26.000 --> 0:23:28.320
<v Speaker 1>they're all pulling it from the same source, So take

0:23:28.359 --> 0:23:32.879
<v Speaker 1>this with a grain of salt. But apparently that banner

0:23:32.920 --> 0:23:38.240
<v Speaker 1>ad enjoyed a click through rate of forty so quick aside,

0:23:38.359 --> 0:23:41.159
<v Speaker 1>just in case you're not familiar with online ad terms,

0:23:41.680 --> 0:23:44.480
<v Speaker 1>click through is what it sounds like. It's how many

0:23:44.480 --> 0:23:48.960
<v Speaker 1>people actively clicked on an ad, which would then link

0:23:49.080 --> 0:23:51.160
<v Speaker 1>the person to some other page. It would send them

0:23:51.160 --> 0:23:53.919
<v Speaker 1>to a page that might have a little more information

0:23:54.080 --> 0:23:57.720
<v Speaker 1>about a specific service or product, and frequently it would

0:23:57.720 --> 0:24:01.360
<v Speaker 1>also include some means of signing up or purchasing that

0:24:01.440 --> 0:24:04.560
<v Speaker 1>service or product. So if you're an advertiser, you want

0:24:04.640 --> 0:24:08.200
<v Speaker 1>a pretty decent click through rate because one, it shows

0:24:08.240 --> 0:24:11.200
<v Speaker 1>your ad was effective, and too, it makes your client

0:24:11.240 --> 0:24:14.800
<v Speaker 1>happy because presumably they're going to get more sales, and

0:24:16.000 --> 0:24:22.600
<v Speaker 1>click through is indescribably effective. It is it's insane when

0:24:22.640 --> 0:24:26.240
<v Speaker 1>nearly half of all the people visiting a web page

0:24:26.280 --> 0:24:30.440
<v Speaker 1>are clicking on an AD that's on that page. That's incredible.

0:24:31.400 --> 0:24:35.399
<v Speaker 1>These days, the average click through on display ads is

0:24:35.520 --> 0:24:39.240
<v Speaker 1>somewhere in the neighborhood of point three five per cent,

0:24:39.440 --> 0:24:43.840
<v Speaker 1>so less than half a percentage point. Banner ads, by

0:24:43.840 --> 0:24:46.480
<v Speaker 1>the way, get even less, sometimes as low as point

0:24:46.760 --> 0:24:52.679
<v Speaker 1>zero five percent click through. So yeah, was unthinkably successful.

0:24:52.680 --> 0:24:56.080
<v Speaker 1>It probably said a lot of very unrealistic expectations, if

0:24:56.080 --> 0:24:59.760
<v Speaker 1>I'm being honest. But it was also a brand new thing.

0:25:00.280 --> 0:25:03.760
<v Speaker 1>People had yet to develop ad blindness to banner ads, right.

0:25:03.840 --> 0:25:07.040
<v Speaker 1>They They hadn't sort of trained themselves to just ignore

0:25:07.119 --> 0:25:09.080
<v Speaker 1>everything that's at the top or the right of the

0:25:09.080 --> 0:25:12.680
<v Speaker 1>page or sometimes the bottom. They were looking at everything.

0:25:13.320 --> 0:25:16.920
<v Speaker 1>And also ad blockers were not yet a thing, so

0:25:17.160 --> 0:25:21.600
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't like people were using means to prevent ads

0:25:21.640 --> 0:25:24.520
<v Speaker 1>from showing up in the first place. Now, in those

0:25:24.560 --> 0:25:28.720
<v Speaker 1>early days, the general thought was that a conversion, that is,

0:25:28.760 --> 0:25:32.840
<v Speaker 1>converting someone from viewing an AD to acting on it,

0:25:32.920 --> 0:25:35.840
<v Speaker 1>was pretty much limited to sales. So, in other words,

0:25:36.040 --> 0:25:39.359
<v Speaker 1>people thought of ads as only being successful if someone

0:25:39.600 --> 0:25:44.199
<v Speaker 1>was actively buying stuff through interacting with that ad. But

0:25:44.280 --> 0:25:47.280
<v Speaker 1>pretty early on that attitude began to change because there

0:25:47.280 --> 0:25:51.479
<v Speaker 1>were other aspects of conversion to consider. Clicking on the

0:25:51.520 --> 0:25:55.480
<v Speaker 1>ad showed interest, and interest alone could be a conversion.

0:25:55.560 --> 0:25:59.080
<v Speaker 1>It might mean that the company that was in charge

0:25:59.160 --> 0:26:02.439
<v Speaker 1>of of uh, whatever projects our service the ad was

0:26:02.480 --> 0:26:05.480
<v Speaker 1>linked to, might have to do some extra work, but

0:26:06.080 --> 0:26:10.480
<v Speaker 1>you have at least identified a a prospect. Downloading a

0:26:10.520 --> 0:26:14.800
<v Speaker 1>coupon was another type of conversion, and companies began to

0:26:15.119 --> 0:26:18.879
<v Speaker 1>have a way to track data trends through online interactions,

0:26:18.920 --> 0:26:21.840
<v Speaker 1>at least to how well their ads were kind of doing.

0:26:22.200 --> 0:26:26.160
<v Speaker 1>At the same time, a developer named Lou Montoli created

0:26:26.240 --> 0:26:29.439
<v Speaker 1>a new type of computer file that would transform the

0:26:29.480 --> 0:26:33.879
<v Speaker 1>experience of using the World Wide Web. These files, called cookies,

0:26:34.119 --> 0:26:37.800
<v Speaker 1>are integral to how we experience the web. The cookies

0:26:37.920 --> 0:26:42.119
<v Speaker 1>keep track of which websites we visit, how frequently we

0:26:42.280 --> 0:26:45.240
<v Speaker 1>visit them, and what we do on those sites, including

0:26:45.240 --> 0:26:47.919
<v Speaker 1>stuff like if we make a purchase or if we

0:26:48.040 --> 0:26:50.720
<v Speaker 1>click through an ad. They allow us to do stuff

0:26:50.760 --> 0:26:53.640
<v Speaker 1>like log into a service online, like you know, put

0:26:53.680 --> 0:26:56.160
<v Speaker 1>in your user name and password, and then you can

0:26:56.200 --> 0:26:58.800
<v Speaker 1>stay logged in even if you navigate away from the

0:26:58.840 --> 0:27:00.720
<v Speaker 1>site and you come back to it later, you're still

0:27:00.760 --> 0:27:03.480
<v Speaker 1>lugged in. Well, that's thanks to cookies. That way, when

0:27:03.480 --> 0:27:05.359
<v Speaker 1>we come back, we're already lugged in. We don't have

0:27:05.400 --> 0:27:08.399
<v Speaker 1>to go through that process again unless you're using something

0:27:08.400 --> 0:27:11.800
<v Speaker 1>that has really high security, in which case you would

0:27:11.800 --> 0:27:14.400
<v Speaker 1>have to do it because the security is the most

0:27:14.400 --> 0:27:18.919
<v Speaker 1>important part. Similarly, if you're using a site that allows

0:27:18.920 --> 0:27:22.119
<v Speaker 1>you to set certain preferences, the cookie file on your

0:27:22.160 --> 0:27:25.320
<v Speaker 1>computer tells that site what those preferences are, so that

0:27:25.359 --> 0:27:28.280
<v Speaker 1>when you return, those preferences are already in place for

0:27:28.320 --> 0:27:31.760
<v Speaker 1>you automatically. It creates a level of convenience that makes

0:27:31.760 --> 0:27:34.800
<v Speaker 1>the web more usable. Now, when you visit a site,

0:27:34.880 --> 0:27:38.359
<v Speaker 1>the site can request the information stored in that cookie file.

0:27:38.400 --> 0:27:41.640
<v Speaker 1>It has to because if the site needs to adjust

0:27:41.720 --> 0:27:44.440
<v Speaker 1>things for you, it has to know what to do right.

0:27:44.960 --> 0:27:46.399
<v Speaker 1>And this is where we start to get to a

0:27:46.400 --> 0:27:51.600
<v Speaker 1>point where personal information becomes a hot commodity online. The cookie,

0:27:51.800 --> 0:27:54.960
<v Speaker 1>which had clear benefits for users, would have even more

0:27:55.040 --> 0:27:59.760
<v Speaker 1>significant benefits for businesses online. So let's switch back to

0:27:59.800 --> 0:28:02.960
<v Speaker 1>the ads side of the story. At first, companies would

0:28:02.960 --> 0:28:05.720
<v Speaker 1>follow a T and T S lead and purchase banner

0:28:05.800 --> 0:28:09.399
<v Speaker 1>space or right rail space on a website for a

0:28:09.480 --> 0:28:11.560
<v Speaker 1>set amount of money for a set amount of time.

0:28:12.040 --> 0:28:14.520
<v Speaker 1>But it didn't take long for that to change. In

0:28:16.160 --> 0:28:20.560
<v Speaker 1>Netscape and info seek migrated to a new pricing model.

0:28:21.200 --> 0:28:25.400
<v Speaker 1>Instead of creating a one size fits a few approach

0:28:25.560 --> 0:28:28.840
<v Speaker 1>to selling web page landscape, which meant companies would have

0:28:28.880 --> 0:28:31.760
<v Speaker 1>to pay the same amount whether their ads were working

0:28:31.760 --> 0:28:34.560
<v Speaker 1>on that page or not, and for you know, whatever

0:28:34.640 --> 0:28:37.280
<v Speaker 1>duration they had picked. The new approach was the good

0:28:37.320 --> 0:28:43.280
<v Speaker 1>old CPM. CPM stands for cost per milay, with milla

0:28:43.400 --> 0:28:46.719
<v Speaker 1>being the Roman word for thousand. So it sounds at

0:28:46.760 --> 0:28:48.640
<v Speaker 1>first like you're saying cost per million, but you're really

0:28:48.640 --> 0:28:51.760
<v Speaker 1>saying cost per thousand. So the thousand in this case

0:28:52.080 --> 0:28:56.360
<v Speaker 1>tends to mean impressions. That is the number of times

0:28:56.400 --> 0:29:01.320
<v Speaker 1>the ad is presumably seen by visitors to that particular website.

0:29:01.840 --> 0:29:04.360
<v Speaker 1>So what this really breaks down to is that web

0:29:04.400 --> 0:29:07.680
<v Speaker 1>pages that are really popular and they get lots of

0:29:07.760 --> 0:29:12.600
<v Speaker 1>visitors can demand a higher CPM because more folks go there,

0:29:12.960 --> 0:29:15.080
<v Speaker 1>So ads that are placed there are going to have

0:29:15.160 --> 0:29:19.160
<v Speaker 1>higher visibility than an ad placed on you know, old

0:29:19.240 --> 0:29:23.360
<v Speaker 1>Joe Bob's Duct Tape Museum website. A site that gets

0:29:23.400 --> 0:29:26.400
<v Speaker 1>a lot of traffic can demand more money per thousand impressions,

0:29:26.680 --> 0:29:29.200
<v Speaker 1>kind of like how in the United States, if you

0:29:29.280 --> 0:29:31.440
<v Speaker 1>want to have a commercial played during the Super Bowl,

0:29:31.480 --> 0:29:35.080
<v Speaker 1>it's gonna cost you millions of dollars compared to, you know,

0:29:35.200 --> 0:29:38.680
<v Speaker 1>putting an ad on some niche television channel for late

0:29:38.760 --> 0:29:43.080
<v Speaker 1>night TV. On the flip side, for advertisers, they can

0:29:43.080 --> 0:29:47.120
<v Speaker 1>negotiate a rate with websites for a certain number of impressions,

0:29:47.160 --> 0:29:50.240
<v Speaker 1>which effectively replaced the duration limit for an ad. So

0:29:50.280 --> 0:29:53.240
<v Speaker 1>instead of saying I want an ad running on this

0:29:53.320 --> 0:29:57.200
<v Speaker 1>page for three months, you would say, all right, the

0:29:57.280 --> 0:30:01.040
<v Speaker 1>web page has a CPM rate of ten dollars, meaning

0:30:01.080 --> 0:30:03.200
<v Speaker 1>that you have to pay ten dollars for every one

0:30:03.320 --> 0:30:08.600
<v Speaker 1>thousand views, and you might negotiate for a million impressions,

0:30:09.000 --> 0:30:11.920
<v Speaker 1>which would mean that the advertiser would have to pay

0:30:11.920 --> 0:30:15.680
<v Speaker 1>the website ten thousand dollars to carry that ad in

0:30:15.760 --> 0:30:18.520
<v Speaker 1>order to generate a million impressions. And if the page

0:30:18.560 --> 0:30:20.720
<v Speaker 1>got a million impressions in a couple of days, boom,

0:30:20.800 --> 0:30:24.400
<v Speaker 1>that ad campaign was done. If it takes weeks, well,

0:30:24.480 --> 0:30:28.560
<v Speaker 1>then the campaign would last longer. And obviously that CPM

0:30:28.720 --> 0:30:32.120
<v Speaker 1>was different depending on the popularity of the website. Website

0:30:32.120 --> 0:30:34.120
<v Speaker 1>that's not that popular would have a low CPM, and

0:30:34.120 --> 0:30:37.719
<v Speaker 1>it would also take a longer time to reach whatever

0:30:37.800 --> 0:30:41.080
<v Speaker 1>the agreed upon number of impressions was. By the way,

0:30:41.120 --> 0:30:44.400
<v Speaker 1>this is also why there are a lot of websites

0:30:44.440 --> 0:30:47.400
<v Speaker 1>that have things like quizzes and galleries where you have

0:30:47.520 --> 0:30:52.240
<v Speaker 1>to scroll through each item. Like any website where it's

0:30:52.520 --> 0:30:57.720
<v Speaker 1>top ten movies that feature ghosts that have hair in

0:30:57.760 --> 0:31:00.720
<v Speaker 1>front of their face, and every single tree is its

0:31:00.760 --> 0:31:04.360
<v Speaker 1>own web page. That's because every one of those web

0:31:04.400 --> 0:31:08.360
<v Speaker 1>pages you go to, that's another impression. So it's a

0:31:08.400 --> 0:31:11.520
<v Speaker 1>way of expanding the number of impressions and AD would

0:31:11.600 --> 0:31:15.280
<v Speaker 1>get by making you have to reload the page over

0:31:15.320 --> 0:31:17.920
<v Speaker 1>and over and over again. If all ten of those

0:31:17.920 --> 0:31:21.040
<v Speaker 1>things were on one page, you would get one impression

0:31:21.160 --> 0:31:23.720
<v Speaker 1>for that article. These things, by the way, also have

0:31:23.880 --> 0:31:26.880
<v Speaker 1>massive drop off rates, like if they're not really compelling,

0:31:26.920 --> 0:31:30.479
<v Speaker 1>people will bail on them within like two or three entries,

0:31:31.480 --> 0:31:35.320
<v Speaker 1>so there's a diminishing returns thing going on with them.

0:31:35.400 --> 0:31:39.040
<v Speaker 1>That's just some insight into how web pages generate revenue.

0:31:39.320 --> 0:31:42.600
<v Speaker 1>I've been on that side, and it is not always

0:31:42.640 --> 0:31:47.160
<v Speaker 1>fun anyway. A big part of all this is that

0:31:47.400 --> 0:31:51.880
<v Speaker 1>the ad campaign wasn't tied to other performance metrics, right,

0:31:51.920 --> 0:31:54.240
<v Speaker 1>So it wasn't whether or not people click through the

0:31:54.280 --> 0:31:57.680
<v Speaker 1>ad or whether they actually made a purchase through the ad.

0:31:57.720 --> 0:32:01.000
<v Speaker 1>This was just about how many people actually were exposed

0:32:01.120 --> 0:32:03.800
<v Speaker 1>to the ad itself. The ad had to do the

0:32:03.840 --> 0:32:07.680
<v Speaker 1>rest of the work. Then you had the emergence of

0:32:08.000 --> 0:32:11.640
<v Speaker 1>double Click, that company which is now owned by Google.

0:32:11.800 --> 0:32:15.440
<v Speaker 1>It was actually the focus of a big antitrust lawsuit

0:32:15.560 --> 0:32:18.040
<v Speaker 1>that I'm not going to get into, but it was

0:32:18.080 --> 0:32:21.080
<v Speaker 1>a big deal anyway, and let companies know which of

0:32:21.120 --> 0:32:24.360
<v Speaker 1>their ads were most effective. So double click would give

0:32:24.440 --> 0:32:27.720
<v Speaker 1>feedback to companies about which ads got the most impressions

0:32:27.760 --> 0:32:30.320
<v Speaker 1>and click throughs, and those companies could then get a

0:32:30.360 --> 0:32:33.000
<v Speaker 1>better idea of where they needed to spend their digital

0:32:33.040 --> 0:32:37.720
<v Speaker 1>marketing dollars. Double clicks relationship with advertisers meant that there

0:32:37.760 --> 0:32:40.200
<v Speaker 1>was a lot of rapid innovation in the web marketing

0:32:40.200 --> 0:32:44.200
<v Speaker 1>space as companies began to hone in on what strategies

0:32:44.240 --> 0:32:49.000
<v Speaker 1>worked and which ones didn't work. From there, you add

0:32:49.040 --> 0:32:52.520
<v Speaker 1>all sorts of changes in the space. Some ads moved

0:32:52.560 --> 0:32:55.640
<v Speaker 1>to pay per click models, so that was kind of

0:32:55.640 --> 0:32:59.080
<v Speaker 1>going back to that conversion approach, where in this model

0:32:59.160 --> 0:33:02.520
<v Speaker 1>and advertiser would only pay a website for the number

0:33:02.560 --> 0:33:06.280
<v Speaker 1>of clicks that an ad received. That created an incentive

0:33:06.480 --> 0:33:09.360
<v Speaker 1>for the website operators to try and make sure they

0:33:09.360 --> 0:33:12.880
<v Speaker 1>were pairing ads with pages that would potentially drive the

0:33:12.960 --> 0:33:16.160
<v Speaker 1>most traffic. So if you had a web page about

0:33:16.560 --> 0:33:20.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, chainsaws, you probably wouldn't try and pair

0:33:20.920 --> 0:33:24.560
<v Speaker 1>that page with an ad for perfume. Now I'm not

0:33:24.640 --> 0:33:28.360
<v Speaker 1>saying there's no crossover between people who are interested in

0:33:28.440 --> 0:33:31.880
<v Speaker 1>chainsaws and those who are interested in perfume, but from

0:33:31.880 --> 0:33:35.120
<v Speaker 1>a marketing standpoint, you're probably not going to get the

0:33:35.280 --> 0:33:40.440
<v Speaker 1>view that is the best use of your resources. And

0:33:40.520 --> 0:33:43.680
<v Speaker 1>another big change around this time was to how people

0:33:43.720 --> 0:33:46.640
<v Speaker 1>were accessing information on the web in general. While it

0:33:46.720 --> 0:33:50.400
<v Speaker 1>might be theoretically possible to navigate the webs simply by

0:33:50.440 --> 0:33:53.680
<v Speaker 1>following various hypertext links to get from point A to

0:33:53.760 --> 0:33:58.160
<v Speaker 1>point B, to actually do it would be monumentally inefficient.

0:33:58.240 --> 0:34:00.680
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you might have to pass through hundreds or

0:34:00.840 --> 0:34:03.720
<v Speaker 1>thousands of sites to get from A to B. If

0:34:03.760 --> 0:34:07.400
<v Speaker 1>you're limiting yourself to just following links that are on

0:34:07.520 --> 0:34:09.719
<v Speaker 1>the page of A and trying to get to be

0:34:09.840 --> 0:34:12.120
<v Speaker 1>that way, this can be a fun game by the way,

0:34:12.120 --> 0:34:14.520
<v Speaker 1>a kind of seven degrees of separation kind of game,

0:34:15.040 --> 0:34:17.160
<v Speaker 1>but it's not an efficient way to navigate the web.

0:34:17.480 --> 0:34:20.839
<v Speaker 1>So Internet search engines were way more useful. You would

0:34:20.880 --> 0:34:23.760
<v Speaker 1>put in your query in the search bar and boom,

0:34:24.040 --> 0:34:26.880
<v Speaker 1>you got results that and, in theory at least best

0:34:26.920 --> 0:34:30.520
<v Speaker 1>match whatever it was you're looking for. But this meant

0:34:31.000 --> 0:34:36.000
<v Speaker 1>that search engines were incredible aggregators for user behavior. Not

0:34:36.200 --> 0:34:39.919
<v Speaker 1>only could search engines keep itally on which search terms

0:34:39.920 --> 0:34:42.799
<v Speaker 1>were the most popular at any given time, they could

0:34:42.840 --> 0:34:46.839
<v Speaker 1>also consult those cookie files on users computers and see

0:34:46.880 --> 0:34:50.000
<v Speaker 1>what other sites users have been visiting, and search engines

0:34:50.040 --> 0:34:53.440
<v Speaker 1>could sell ads to. In fact, search engines made a

0:34:53.480 --> 0:34:57.719
<v Speaker 1>subtle shift from being all about indexing the web and

0:34:57.800 --> 0:35:01.320
<v Speaker 1>became more about monetizing search and getting into the data

0:35:01.360 --> 0:35:05.799
<v Speaker 1>collection and advertising businesses. That's what happened to Google. I

0:35:05.800 --> 0:35:08.560
<v Speaker 1>mean years ago you might call a you know, Google,

0:35:08.560 --> 0:35:11.840
<v Speaker 1>a search company. Uh this was before the days of

0:35:11.920 --> 0:35:15.279
<v Speaker 1>tons of other Google products emerged, like Google Cloud and

0:35:15.280 --> 0:35:18.560
<v Speaker 1>Android and all that stuff. But at its heart, what

0:35:18.680 --> 0:35:21.640
<v Speaker 1>Google really was wasn't a search engine. It was an

0:35:21.680 --> 0:35:25.400
<v Speaker 1>advertising company. Companies could pay Google to have their sites

0:35:25.440 --> 0:35:28.799
<v Speaker 1>pop up in searches as you know, results in a

0:35:28.840 --> 0:35:31.840
<v Speaker 1>search result, they would be ads, they would be clearly

0:35:31.880 --> 0:35:35.319
<v Speaker 1>marked his ads, but they would be advertised spots. And

0:35:35.360 --> 0:35:38.680
<v Speaker 1>it gave those companies way more visibility than they might

0:35:38.719 --> 0:35:43.280
<v Speaker 1>otherwise have. And Google can target specific users with ads

0:35:43.320 --> 0:35:47.520
<v Speaker 1>that might appeal to them through a collection and analysis

0:35:47.560 --> 0:35:50.600
<v Speaker 1>of all that personal data, both from the users cookies

0:35:50.640 --> 0:35:53.880
<v Speaker 1>and their own searches history, and and if that person

0:35:53.920 --> 0:35:56.440
<v Speaker 1>happens to be using Chrome or an Android device, well

0:35:56.440 --> 0:36:00.600
<v Speaker 1>that's another kettle of fish entirely. So things took a

0:36:00.840 --> 0:36:06.000
<v Speaker 1>massive downturn shortly after search engines began to dominate the

0:36:06.120 --> 0:36:09.160
<v Speaker 1>data collection space, and that's because of the dot com

0:36:09.200 --> 0:36:12.600
<v Speaker 1>bubble bursting in two thousand, two thousand one, and the

0:36:12.640 --> 0:36:16.520
<v Speaker 1>world slid into an economic recession in general that particularly

0:36:16.600 --> 0:36:20.080
<v Speaker 1>hit the online world hard. That was further exacerbated by

0:36:20.080 --> 0:36:22.880
<v Speaker 1>the terrorist attacks on the United States on September eleven,

0:36:23.000 --> 0:36:27.359
<v Speaker 1>two thousand one. But the industry did continue. There were

0:36:27.400 --> 0:36:30.160
<v Speaker 1>just fewer players. Some of the bigger companies were able

0:36:30.200 --> 0:36:32.880
<v Speaker 1>to survive all that turmoil, and the fact that the

0:36:33.040 --> 0:36:37.680
<v Speaker 1>smaller competitors were largely wiped out meant that these companies.

0:36:37.840 --> 0:36:42.040
<v Speaker 1>So companies like Google and Amazon now had an even

0:36:42.040 --> 0:36:45.520
<v Speaker 1>more dominant position in the online world, so it would

0:36:45.560 --> 0:36:48.560
<v Speaker 1>be very hard to overtake those companies, and both Google

0:36:48.600 --> 0:36:52.279
<v Speaker 1>and Amazon are famous for jealously guarding their dominant positions.

0:36:53.280 --> 0:36:55.239
<v Speaker 1>Move forward a few more years and you get the

0:36:55.320 --> 0:36:58.520
<v Speaker 1>rise of social network platforms. My Space was one of

0:36:58.560 --> 0:37:02.000
<v Speaker 1>the first really big social networks. It launched in two

0:37:02.040 --> 0:37:05.359
<v Speaker 1>thousand three, but Facebook soon followed in two thousand four.

0:37:06.280 --> 0:37:08.680
<v Speaker 1>My Space would be the most popular social network until

0:37:08.680 --> 0:37:12.360
<v Speaker 1>about two thousand eight. That's when Facebook overtook it. But

0:37:12.440 --> 0:37:17.160
<v Speaker 1>Facebook also introduced Facebook Ads in two thousand seven. Facebook

0:37:17.200 --> 0:37:21.280
<v Speaker 1>offered even more data points about people than search engines could.

0:37:21.800 --> 0:37:25.760
<v Speaker 1>I mean, people use social networks to connect with friends

0:37:25.920 --> 0:37:29.120
<v Speaker 1>and to share stuff about themselves and the people they like.

0:37:29.480 --> 0:37:33.239
<v Speaker 1>So people were willingly giving up tons of information that

0:37:33.360 --> 0:37:37.840
<v Speaker 1>an advertiser might find extremely relevant. And so Facebook's business

0:37:37.880 --> 0:37:41.960
<v Speaker 1>model largely fell into the realm of collecting and analyzing

0:37:42.000 --> 0:37:45.760
<v Speaker 1>information about users, both from their activities on the platform

0:37:45.800 --> 0:37:50.879
<v Speaker 1>itself and through the consultation of cookies, and Facebook could

0:37:51.000 --> 0:37:54.799
<v Speaker 1>use that information to place highly relevant ads on specific

0:37:54.920 --> 0:38:02.880
<v Speaker 1>user pages. This became the absolute foundation of Facebook strategy

0:38:03.000 --> 0:38:06.560
<v Speaker 1>for the desktop experience, and how they generate revenue, and

0:38:06.600 --> 0:38:11.239
<v Speaker 1>the value proposition Facebook has for advertisers is incredible. They

0:38:11.239 --> 0:38:15.200
<v Speaker 1>can say, Hey, practically everyone in the world is on

0:38:15.239 --> 0:38:18.239
<v Speaker 1>our platform, and we know what they all like and

0:38:18.280 --> 0:38:23.360
<v Speaker 1>what they dislike because of cookies and their activities on Facebook. Plus,

0:38:23.719 --> 0:38:28.160
<v Speaker 1>we've developed algorithms that keep people on Facebook longer. So

0:38:28.239 --> 0:38:31.279
<v Speaker 1>if you advertise on us, we can make sure that

0:38:31.360 --> 0:38:33.759
<v Speaker 1>the people who are most likely to respond to your

0:38:33.880 --> 0:38:37.480
<v Speaker 1>ad are the people who see that ad, and we

0:38:37.520 --> 0:38:40.520
<v Speaker 1>can make sure that they see your ad a lot.

0:38:41.719 --> 0:38:44.640
<v Speaker 1>This also began to introduce the era of read targeting.

0:38:45.000 --> 0:38:47.480
<v Speaker 1>So if you've ever had the experience of going to

0:38:47.800 --> 0:38:52.480
<v Speaker 1>different websites but seeing the same ads play on those websites,

0:38:53.000 --> 0:38:57.080
<v Speaker 1>you've been experiencing red targeting. Maybe you were doing some

0:38:57.200 --> 0:39:00.479
<v Speaker 1>comparison shopping for I don't know how, with a brand

0:39:00.480 --> 0:39:04.280
<v Speaker 1>new toaster, but for whatever reason, you didn't pull the trigger.

0:39:04.520 --> 0:39:06.880
<v Speaker 1>Maybe you went as far as looking at a specific

0:39:06.920 --> 0:39:10.839
<v Speaker 1>toasters page on a shopping site like Amazon, but you

0:39:10.920 --> 0:39:15.120
<v Speaker 1>didn't move forward with the purchase. But now suddenly everywhere

0:39:15.160 --> 0:39:18.680
<v Speaker 1>you go you seem to be seeing ads for that toaster,

0:39:19.360 --> 0:39:23.880
<v Speaker 1>or maybe it's a different but similar toaster. This is retargeting.

0:39:24.280 --> 0:39:26.600
<v Speaker 1>The cookies on your computer have a record of you

0:39:26.800 --> 0:39:29.799
<v Speaker 1>visiting that toaster page, and they also include the fact

0:39:29.880 --> 0:39:32.440
<v Speaker 1>that you didn't actually purchase the toaster when you went

0:39:32.520 --> 0:39:35.960
<v Speaker 1>to that page. Those cookies allow various websites that have

0:39:36.120 --> 0:39:39.680
<v Speaker 1>deals with ad companies that are working with this toaster

0:39:39.760 --> 0:39:44.640
<v Speaker 1>manufacturer to dynamically insert ads for that toaster on all

0:39:44.680 --> 0:39:47.279
<v Speaker 1>the various sites that you go to with the goal

0:39:47.360 --> 0:39:49.800
<v Speaker 1>of convincing you to finally follow through on your purchase

0:39:49.840 --> 0:39:53.840
<v Speaker 1>and buy that dang toaster. All right, we are still

0:39:53.880 --> 0:39:58.080
<v Speaker 1>only just approaching the surface level of water from the

0:39:58.120 --> 0:40:02.080
<v Speaker 1>tip of the iceberg. The really valuable stuff is below

0:40:02.160 --> 0:40:05.160
<v Speaker 1>the surface, and we have Apple to thank for it.

0:40:05.760 --> 0:40:18.240
<v Speaker 1>I'll explain more when we get back. On June seven,

0:40:18.320 --> 0:40:22.320
<v Speaker 1>Apple launched the iPhone. While other smartphones predated the iPhone,

0:40:22.360 --> 0:40:24.240
<v Speaker 1>it's safe to say that the iPhone was the first

0:40:24.360 --> 0:40:29.760
<v Speaker 1>truly successful consumer smartphone that appealed to the mainstream market. Previously,

0:40:29.800 --> 0:40:34.680
<v Speaker 1>smartphones pretty much just targeted geeks and executives. Now everybody

0:40:34.719 --> 0:40:38.680
<v Speaker 1>wanted one. The smartphone would open up brand new opportunities

0:40:38.800 --> 0:40:42.200
<v Speaker 1>for data collection. In two thousand eight, Apple launched the

0:40:42.239 --> 0:40:45.880
<v Speaker 1>first iPhone to include a GPS chip. This allowed for

0:40:45.960 --> 0:40:49.160
<v Speaker 1>really useful features for the users, such as real time

0:40:49.200 --> 0:40:51.239
<v Speaker 1>maps that can give you an accurate view of your

0:40:51.280 --> 0:40:55.680
<v Speaker 1>current location. That was huge, right, enormous benefit, But it

0:40:55.760 --> 0:40:58.920
<v Speaker 1>also meant that along with all the data that companies

0:40:58.960 --> 0:41:02.080
<v Speaker 1>could access thanks to cookies and social media posts and

0:41:02.120 --> 0:41:06.680
<v Speaker 1>search engine activity, they can now also add location data

0:41:06.880 --> 0:41:09.680
<v Speaker 1>to the mix as well. Now companies can know what

0:41:09.800 --> 0:41:12.319
<v Speaker 1>you were doing online and where you were in the

0:41:12.360 --> 0:41:15.640
<v Speaker 1>actual world. Now, to be clear, companies could do that

0:41:15.680 --> 0:41:18.360
<v Speaker 1>for folks who were accessing the Internet on desktops or

0:41:18.440 --> 0:41:21.239
<v Speaker 1>laptops as well. It's just that we don't tend to

0:41:21.360 --> 0:41:24.279
<v Speaker 1>carry desktops around with us at all, and for those

0:41:24.280 --> 0:41:26.799
<v Speaker 1>of us who do use laptops, we don't have them

0:41:26.880 --> 0:41:31.240
<v Speaker 1>on an active all the time. But a smartphone that's different.

0:41:31.520 --> 0:41:33.919
<v Speaker 1>That's a device that can ping back to home base

0:41:34.239 --> 0:41:36.719
<v Speaker 1>several times a day, sometimes more than a hundred times

0:41:36.719 --> 0:41:39.520
<v Speaker 1>a day, and that pain can include stuff like how

0:41:39.600 --> 0:41:42.319
<v Speaker 1>much screen time you've spent on the device that day,

0:41:42.640 --> 0:41:46.240
<v Speaker 1>what apps you've been using, what sites and services you've accessed,

0:41:46.600 --> 0:41:50.440
<v Speaker 1>and where in the world you happen to be. And again,

0:41:50.840 --> 0:41:53.919
<v Speaker 1>this allows companies to target more specific ads your way,

0:41:54.239 --> 0:41:56.839
<v Speaker 1>and now those ads could be location based as well

0:41:56.880 --> 0:42:00.200
<v Speaker 1>as activity based. So maybe you're wandering around a new

0:42:00.239 --> 0:42:03.279
<v Speaker 1>city and you start seeing ads for specific locations like

0:42:03.440 --> 0:42:07.560
<v Speaker 1>restaurants or shops or amusement parks or whatever. On the

0:42:07.600 --> 0:42:09.879
<v Speaker 1>one hand, that could be really useful as you try

0:42:09.960 --> 0:42:12.440
<v Speaker 1>to find things that you might want to experience in

0:42:12.480 --> 0:42:15.239
<v Speaker 1>a new place. But on the other it indicated that

0:42:15.320 --> 0:42:18.880
<v Speaker 1>the smartphone was really gathering a ton of information about you.

0:42:19.719 --> 0:42:22.120
<v Speaker 1>And then there's that scenario I mentioned at the top

0:42:22.160 --> 0:42:24.640
<v Speaker 1>of this episode. If you hang out with other folks

0:42:24.640 --> 0:42:28.840
<v Speaker 1>and everyone happens to have a smartphone, everyone is generating data,

0:42:28.920 --> 0:42:31.759
<v Speaker 1>whether they're actively using their phones or not. And part

0:42:31.760 --> 0:42:34.919
<v Speaker 1>of that data isn't just what they're doing or where

0:42:34.960 --> 0:42:37.960
<v Speaker 1>they are, but also who there with. And now our

0:42:38.000 --> 0:42:41.560
<v Speaker 1>relationships with one another, the time we spend with each other,

0:42:41.600 --> 0:42:45.000
<v Speaker 1>and the places where we spend it, that all becomes

0:42:45.120 --> 0:42:48.720
<v Speaker 1>part of the data grab as well. It represents another

0:42:48.760 --> 0:42:52.560
<v Speaker 1>way that companies can leverage and exploit the information we generate.

0:42:53.280 --> 0:42:56.160
<v Speaker 1>One of the industries that grew out of all of

0:42:56.200 --> 0:43:00.680
<v Speaker 1>this was the data brokerage industry. These are companies that

0:43:00.800 --> 0:43:06.319
<v Speaker 1>collect and maintain massive data repositories about well about us.

0:43:06.920 --> 0:43:09.960
<v Speaker 1>These companies buy and sell personal information as if it

0:43:10.000 --> 0:43:13.320
<v Speaker 1>were any other commodity, because for a lot of entities

0:43:13.320 --> 0:43:17.080
<v Speaker 1>out there, that's exactly what our personal information is. So

0:43:17.239 --> 0:43:19.520
<v Speaker 1>even for companies that might not have the means to

0:43:19.560 --> 0:43:23.960
<v Speaker 1>collect your personal data directly through their own services, can

0:43:24.040 --> 0:43:27.760
<v Speaker 1>pay to get hold of those sweet ones and zeros

0:43:27.800 --> 0:43:31.280
<v Speaker 1>through using data brokers. The U. S State of Vermont

0:43:31.440 --> 0:43:34.040
<v Speaker 1>passed a law a couple of years ago that mandated

0:43:34.080 --> 0:43:37.440
<v Speaker 1>that any company that bought or sold third party personal

0:43:37.520 --> 0:43:41.439
<v Speaker 1>data had to register with the Secretary of State. As

0:43:41.440 --> 0:43:45.520
<v Speaker 1>a result, one hundred twenty one companies registered with the

0:43:45.640 --> 0:43:49.400
<v Speaker 1>Vermont state government. The companies didn't have to provide information

0:43:49.480 --> 0:43:52.560
<v Speaker 1>about who was in their databases. They didn't have to

0:43:52.600 --> 0:43:56.040
<v Speaker 1>say how many people were in them. The rules didn't

0:43:56.040 --> 0:44:00.680
<v Speaker 1>require that these companies make available any information about consumers

0:44:00.719 --> 0:44:03.960
<v Speaker 1>to those consumers, which means if you wanted to check

0:44:04.000 --> 0:44:08.200
<v Speaker 1>to see how much dirt any of those companies might

0:44:08.280 --> 0:44:11.840
<v Speaker 1>have on you, and you, you know, lived in Vermont,

0:44:12.080 --> 0:44:14.279
<v Speaker 1>well you would kind of still be out of luck

0:44:14.320 --> 0:44:16.839
<v Speaker 1>because the law didn't go that far. The law did

0:44:16.880 --> 0:44:19.720
<v Speaker 1>require that the companies had to inform the government about

0:44:19.760 --> 0:44:23.280
<v Speaker 1>any kind of opt out features that the companies provided,

0:44:23.640 --> 0:44:26.719
<v Speaker 1>but that only assumed that they actually were providing an

0:44:26.719 --> 0:44:30.959
<v Speaker 1>opt out feature for the average consumer. What this means

0:44:31.040 --> 0:44:33.920
<v Speaker 1>is that there are more than one companies trafficking and

0:44:34.000 --> 0:44:37.560
<v Speaker 1>personal data, and yours could be among them, and to

0:44:37.680 --> 0:44:41.319
<v Speaker 1>opt out of that system, you would have to contact

0:44:41.440 --> 0:44:44.200
<v Speaker 1>each and every one of these data brokers and go

0:44:44.280 --> 0:44:48.120
<v Speaker 1>through whatever process they might have in order to opt out,

0:44:48.880 --> 0:44:53.040
<v Speaker 1>because by default we are all opted into that system.

0:44:53.080 --> 0:44:55.759
<v Speaker 1>In some cases, we did have a choice, in the

0:44:55.800 --> 0:44:58.360
<v Speaker 1>sense that the choice was whether or not we wanted

0:44:58.360 --> 0:45:02.000
<v Speaker 1>to use a specific service or platform or visit a

0:45:02.040 --> 0:45:05.960
<v Speaker 1>specific website. Again, this is frequently where those long user

0:45:06.000 --> 0:45:08.720
<v Speaker 1>agreements come in, the ones most of us skip right over,

0:45:08.840 --> 0:45:11.040
<v Speaker 1>so that we just click on that I agree button

0:45:11.080 --> 0:45:13.560
<v Speaker 1>and get on with it. We might not be aware

0:45:13.760 --> 0:45:15.560
<v Speaker 1>that we just gave consent to have all of our

0:45:15.640 --> 0:45:18.640
<v Speaker 1>data collected, but that's arguably on us if we didn't

0:45:18.680 --> 0:45:22.200
<v Speaker 1>bother to read the terms and conditions. But in other cases,

0:45:22.560 --> 0:45:25.040
<v Speaker 1>we might not ever have really had a chance to

0:45:25.120 --> 0:45:28.560
<v Speaker 1>opt out of a specific data brokers collections at all

0:45:29.080 --> 0:45:31.919
<v Speaker 1>because we never had direct contact with some of those

0:45:32.000 --> 0:45:36.280
<v Speaker 1>data brokers. Because again information is bought, sold, and traded

0:45:36.360 --> 0:45:39.200
<v Speaker 1>like crazy. So some of these companies are just buying

0:45:39.280 --> 0:45:42.359
<v Speaker 1>up data that was collected by someone else and we

0:45:42.440 --> 0:45:46.520
<v Speaker 1>only ever had contact with that initial point. So as

0:45:46.560 --> 0:45:48.480
<v Speaker 1>an example, let's say that you sign up for a

0:45:48.560 --> 0:45:53.360
<v Speaker 1>social networking platform. We'll call it space Look. So you

0:45:53.440 --> 0:45:57.160
<v Speaker 1>sign up on space Look, and there's this long, boring

0:45:57.280 --> 0:46:00.160
<v Speaker 1>passage of information that you've got to scroll through so

0:46:00.200 --> 0:46:02.400
<v Speaker 1>that you can click the I Agree button, so you

0:46:02.480 --> 0:46:04.880
<v Speaker 1>zoom past all the dull stuff so that you can

0:46:04.920 --> 0:46:08.280
<v Speaker 1>finally get to uploading photos of your adorable kitty cat online.

0:46:08.800 --> 0:46:12.520
<v Speaker 1>But in that dull passage, there are terms that explain

0:46:12.600 --> 0:46:16.120
<v Speaker 1>that space Look will be collecting information about you and

0:46:16.160 --> 0:46:19.520
<v Speaker 1>then using the information to serve you ads. And in addition,

0:46:19.920 --> 0:46:23.640
<v Speaker 1>space Look might also sell or share your personal information

0:46:23.920 --> 0:46:28.399
<v Speaker 1>with other third party entities. So you've effectively signed over

0:46:28.440 --> 0:46:31.440
<v Speaker 1>your personal data to space Look for it to do

0:46:31.520 --> 0:46:34.080
<v Speaker 1>whatever it wants with it within the confines of the

0:46:34.120 --> 0:46:37.560
<v Speaker 1>agreement that you've clicked on, and your info might get

0:46:37.600 --> 0:46:40.920
<v Speaker 1>sent to various data brokers that otherwise you have never

0:46:40.960 --> 0:46:47.080
<v Speaker 1>heard of and never contacted. But wait, it gets worse. Recently,

0:46:47.520 --> 0:46:50.160
<v Speaker 1>Facebook and Google have been in the News for putting

0:46:50.200 --> 0:46:51.920
<v Speaker 1>up a bit of a fuss when it comes to

0:46:52.000 --> 0:46:55.080
<v Speaker 1>the types of data collection that are available to them.

0:46:55.440 --> 0:46:58.960
<v Speaker 1>Facebook got upset at Apple for a new change in

0:46:59.040 --> 0:47:03.040
<v Speaker 1>privacy settings on iOS devices, and it requires Facebook to

0:47:03.080 --> 0:47:06.880
<v Speaker 1>inform users about how it wants to collect data regarding

0:47:07.200 --> 0:47:10.719
<v Speaker 1>user activity on those iOS devices. So like iPhones and

0:47:11.320 --> 0:47:15.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, iPads, things like that, that activity includes the

0:47:15.280 --> 0:47:18.480
<v Speaker 1>use of other apps on the device. So, in other words,

0:47:19.320 --> 0:47:23.360
<v Speaker 1>Facebook collects information on users app activity even if that

0:47:23.440 --> 0:47:27.319
<v Speaker 1>activity isn't directly involving Facebook itself. So if you do

0:47:27.360 --> 0:47:30.640
<v Speaker 1>any banking on your phone, or shopping, or maybe you

0:47:30.680 --> 0:47:34.239
<v Speaker 1>play certain mobile games, well, Facebook wants to know about

0:47:34.280 --> 0:47:39.320
<v Speaker 1>all that because that data is valuable. Apples change requires

0:47:39.320 --> 0:47:43.360
<v Speaker 1>Facebook to alert users that it wants to collect that data,

0:47:43.520 --> 0:47:46.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of like this, this app wants to know your location.

0:47:47.040 --> 0:47:49.800
<v Speaker 1>Is that okay? It's similar to that, And it gives

0:47:49.920 --> 0:47:52.960
<v Speaker 1>the chance for users to opt out of that process

0:47:53.200 --> 0:47:57.040
<v Speaker 1>right then and there in that alert. And Facebook hates

0:47:57.320 --> 0:48:00.319
<v Speaker 1>that because if you give people the choice is to

0:48:00.440 --> 0:48:05.000
<v Speaker 1>not be tracked, often they take that choice. They just

0:48:05.280 --> 0:48:08.879
<v Speaker 1>you know, have to know about it first. So if

0:48:08.920 --> 0:48:12.759
<v Speaker 1>you aren't allowed to bury that notice in page two

0:48:12.800 --> 0:48:15.920
<v Speaker 1>of settings or in a deep user agreement, Well, then

0:48:15.920 --> 0:48:18.520
<v Speaker 1>a lot of folks might just take the option to

0:48:18.640 --> 0:48:22.640
<v Speaker 1>opt out, which means that's a hit on Facebook's revenue,

0:48:23.000 --> 0:48:26.120
<v Speaker 1>and Facebook and a fan of that, it has launched

0:48:26.160 --> 0:48:29.360
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of a campaign that essentially argues that

0:48:29.440 --> 0:48:32.560
<v Speaker 1>Apple's new rules are harmful to small businesses and that

0:48:32.600 --> 0:48:36.400
<v Speaker 1>people should feel badly about opting out, which is um,

0:48:36.560 --> 0:48:40.319
<v Speaker 1>super disingenuous. If you ask me, Facebook, I don't think

0:48:40.440 --> 0:48:44.080
<v Speaker 1>is at all concerned about small businesses except to the

0:48:44.160 --> 0:48:49.560
<v Speaker 1>extent at which those small businesses spend money on Facebook. Similarly,

0:48:50.080 --> 0:48:53.440
<v Speaker 1>Google was in the news when internal documents leaked showing

0:48:53.520 --> 0:48:57.759
<v Speaker 1>that the company had leaned hard on Android device manufacturers

0:48:58.440 --> 0:49:04.480
<v Speaker 1>to hide geo tracking opt out features deep in settings.

0:49:04.560 --> 0:49:07.160
<v Speaker 1>And so Google was essentially saying, hey, that's cool that

0:49:07.200 --> 0:49:09.239
<v Speaker 1>you want to make this Android smartphone, do us a

0:49:09.280 --> 0:49:12.480
<v Speaker 1>solid for the geo tracking stuff. Hide that like on

0:49:12.600 --> 0:49:15.120
<v Speaker 1>page two or three of your settings, so that nobody

0:49:15.160 --> 0:49:18.040
<v Speaker 1>ever bothers to go that far. And the goal was

0:49:18.080 --> 0:49:20.120
<v Speaker 1>just to make it harder for people to find where

0:49:20.160 --> 0:49:22.800
<v Speaker 1>they could turn off geo tracking, so that the company

0:49:22.840 --> 0:49:26.120
<v Speaker 1>could continue to collect that sweet data without too many

0:49:26.160 --> 0:49:31.719
<v Speaker 1>people opting out dirty pool Google. Just a few years ago,

0:49:31.880 --> 0:49:34.480
<v Speaker 1>all this data would have been alarming, but it also

0:49:34.800 --> 0:49:36.839
<v Speaker 1>would have been kind of burdened by the fact that

0:49:37.200 --> 0:49:41.000
<v Speaker 1>there's just so much information that's hard to do anything

0:49:41.040 --> 0:49:44.240
<v Speaker 1>with it. So it's one thing to collect enormous amounts

0:49:44.239 --> 0:49:47.440
<v Speaker 1>of personal information, but it's another to actually find a

0:49:47.520 --> 0:49:50.359
<v Speaker 1>meaningful use for all that data. You get a lot

0:49:50.400 --> 0:49:53.360
<v Speaker 1>of noise along with a little bit of signal. But

0:49:53.440 --> 0:49:57.360
<v Speaker 1>over the past few years, data analysis has advanced dramatically

0:49:57.520 --> 0:50:01.400
<v Speaker 1>and it's become much more sophisticated. Big data, which was

0:50:01.400 --> 0:50:04.240
<v Speaker 1>a buzz term that came largely from the marketing world,

0:50:05.040 --> 0:50:07.840
<v Speaker 1>is a real thing now, and when paired with systems

0:50:07.840 --> 0:50:11.719
<v Speaker 1>that use strategies like machine learning, advertising companies are able

0:50:11.760 --> 0:50:15.120
<v Speaker 1>to get incredibly detailed looks at who each of us

0:50:15.239 --> 0:50:19.719
<v Speaker 1>happens to be. Our data can be parsed and contextualized

0:50:20.080 --> 0:50:24.000
<v Speaker 1>in millions of ways that are incredibly valuable to countless

0:50:24.000 --> 0:50:28.480
<v Speaker 1>people and organizations. Some of those might be largely benign,

0:50:28.880 --> 0:50:32.560
<v Speaker 1>or at least no more malicious than your typical capitalistic endeavor,

0:50:32.960 --> 0:50:36.440
<v Speaker 1>but some might be way more malevolent. And of course

0:50:36.560 --> 0:50:40.160
<v Speaker 1>I haven't even touched on the burden of good stewardship

0:50:40.280 --> 0:50:44.040
<v Speaker 1>when it comes to protecting data. Many of those one

0:50:44.160 --> 0:50:47.680
<v Speaker 1>data broker companies have been targets of hackers, and more

0:50:47.760 --> 0:50:50.360
<v Speaker 1>than a few have had some pretty nasty data breaches

0:50:50.520 --> 0:50:54.319
<v Speaker 1>over the years. So I guess the whole point of

0:50:54.320 --> 0:50:57.279
<v Speaker 1>this episode is to really explain how technology in the

0:50:57.320 --> 0:51:02.680
<v Speaker 1>digital age largely centers around the collection and exploitation of information,

0:51:03.040 --> 0:51:05.800
<v Speaker 1>and that a lot of that information comes from people

0:51:05.880 --> 0:51:08.919
<v Speaker 1>like us, and that if we feel strongly about that,

0:51:09.280 --> 0:51:13.560
<v Speaker 1>we have to take steps to address this issue. Unfortunately,

0:51:13.680 --> 0:51:18.439
<v Speaker 1>right now, those steps are often laborious and convoluted. It's

0:51:18.600 --> 0:51:24.240
<v Speaker 1>easy to get discouraged. It's easy to prioritize convenience over privacy.

0:51:24.360 --> 0:51:27.399
<v Speaker 1>It's easy to give into the statement that Mark Zuckerberg

0:51:27.440 --> 0:51:31.560
<v Speaker 1>famously made in two when he said privacy is dead.

0:51:32.239 --> 0:51:37.040
<v Speaker 1>But as we see implementations of systems that exploit our data,

0:51:37.160 --> 0:51:42.759
<v Speaker 1>and as these become undeniably more invasive, it might benefit

0:51:42.880 --> 0:51:45.799
<v Speaker 1>us to look at them more closely and act in

0:51:45.840 --> 0:51:49.560
<v Speaker 1>our own self interest, because I assure you most of

0:51:49.560 --> 0:51:52.080
<v Speaker 1>these companies are not going to do that for us.

0:51:52.960 --> 0:51:56.880
<v Speaker 1>I'm talking to you, Stephanie, yes, you. I've personalized this

0:51:56.920 --> 0:52:01.160
<v Speaker 1>episode for every listener, and you, step phany need to

0:52:01.200 --> 0:52:05.400
<v Speaker 1>take action. I'm kidding. I didn't personalize this podcast, and

0:52:05.440 --> 0:52:08.840
<v Speaker 1>anyone not named Stephanie is probably just confused, and anyone

0:52:08.840 --> 0:52:11.759
<v Speaker 1>who is named Stephanie is probably flipping out. But no,

0:52:11.880 --> 0:52:13.799
<v Speaker 1>I just wrote that as a joke. But it is

0:52:13.840 --> 0:52:16.040
<v Speaker 1>the sort of thing that websites and apps and other

0:52:16.080 --> 0:52:21.000
<v Speaker 1>Internet related services can do for reals. In fact, technically,

0:52:21.360 --> 0:52:24.040
<v Speaker 1>with enough work, a podcast like this could probably do

0:52:24.120 --> 0:52:25.959
<v Speaker 1>it too. It would just require me to go through

0:52:26.760 --> 0:52:29.279
<v Speaker 1>a very long list of names and record them and

0:52:29.320 --> 0:52:33.480
<v Speaker 1>then have dynamic insertion of that statement in the podcast

0:52:33.840 --> 0:52:36.600
<v Speaker 1>and targeted to specific listeners. It would be a lot

0:52:36.600 --> 0:52:38.440
<v Speaker 1>of work, is what I'm saying, something that I am

0:52:38.480 --> 0:52:42.239
<v Speaker 1>not willing to do, but it could be done, and

0:52:42.320 --> 0:52:46.719
<v Speaker 1>maybe that's not always a good thing. All right. That

0:52:46.800 --> 0:52:50.400
<v Speaker 1>wraps up this very long soapbox edition of tech Stuff.

0:52:50.440 --> 0:52:53.920
<v Speaker 1>Hope you guys learned something in that and found some

0:52:54.040 --> 0:52:57.080
<v Speaker 1>value in that discussion. I will be doing some more

0:52:57.120 --> 0:53:01.560
<v Speaker 1>episodes about privacy related materials like Kappa. I do want

0:53:01.600 --> 0:53:05.040
<v Speaker 1>to talk about that and the intent of that legislation

0:53:05.080 --> 0:53:07.560
<v Speaker 1>as well as the actual impact of it, So look

0:53:07.600 --> 0:53:09.400
<v Speaker 1>forward to that in the future. But If you have

0:53:09.480 --> 0:53:11.799
<v Speaker 1>suggestions for things I should cover in future episodes of

0:53:11.800 --> 0:53:14.120
<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff, reach out to me. The best place to

0:53:14.160 --> 0:53:16.680
<v Speaker 1>do that is on Twitter. The handle for the show

0:53:16.840 --> 0:53:19.880
<v Speaker 1>is tech Stuff H s W and I'll talk to

0:53:19.880 --> 0:53:28.919
<v Speaker 1>you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an I Heart

0:53:29.000 --> 0:53:32.759
<v Speaker 1>Radio production. For more podcasts from My Heart Radio, visit

0:53:32.800 --> 0:53:35.840
<v Speaker 1>the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you

0:53:35.960 --> 0:53:37.280
<v Speaker 1>listen to your favorite shows.