1 00:00:00,920 --> 00:00:04,080 Speaker 1: Welcome to you stuff you should know friend House Stuff 2 00:00:04,080 --> 00:00:13,039 Speaker 1: Works dot Com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm 3 00:00:13,119 --> 00:00:17,040 Speaker 1: Josh Clark. There's Charles W Chuck Bryant and Knowles over there. 4 00:00:17,079 --> 00:00:24,239 Speaker 1: So this stuff you should know. Yeah, the Web edition. Yeah, 5 00:00:24,280 --> 00:00:26,800 Speaker 1: we've heard of the web Uh huh. I want to 6 00:00:26,840 --> 00:00:29,639 Speaker 1: point out there's a work party going on. This is 7 00:00:29,640 --> 00:00:32,239 Speaker 1: how dedicated we are. Right outside our door, people are 8 00:00:32,240 --> 00:00:34,560 Speaker 1: out there drinking and eating and having a good time 9 00:00:34,600 --> 00:00:39,160 Speaker 1: and drinking alcohol. We're just in here working free alcohol. Yep. 10 00:00:39,760 --> 00:00:42,120 Speaker 1: Even Knolls over there eating right in front of us. Yes, 11 00:00:42,240 --> 00:00:48,560 Speaker 1: thanks for that because it's making a lot easier. So um, Chuck, Yes, 12 00:00:49,040 --> 00:00:52,400 Speaker 1: have you heard of Anonymous? I have? Indeed, I have 13 00:00:52,600 --> 00:00:55,120 Speaker 1: heard of Anonymous as well, because you know, I read 14 00:00:55,120 --> 00:00:58,400 Speaker 1: the newspaper and things like that. You're a hip, happening guy. 15 00:00:58,560 --> 00:01:03,360 Speaker 1: Super um. But I didn't understand really in any way 16 00:01:03,520 --> 00:01:08,000 Speaker 1: how Anonymous actually worked until researching this episode. Very interesting. 17 00:01:08,400 --> 00:01:11,720 Speaker 1: I think we should say we're not experts here, probably 18 00:01:11,760 --> 00:01:14,480 Speaker 1: going to get some stuff wrong. Let's just hope it's 19 00:01:14,600 --> 00:01:18,640 Speaker 1: a little like mostly right rather than maybe like the 20 00:01:18,680 --> 00:01:23,679 Speaker 1: Sun episode. We're sorry and advance Anonymous right, So take 21 00:01:24,080 --> 00:01:26,280 Speaker 1: take your ire out on us. I think we're in 22 00:01:26,840 --> 00:01:30,640 Speaker 1: good shape. Actually, I read one of their key characteristics 23 00:01:32,400 --> 00:01:35,559 Speaker 1: is that they don't talk about the group, they don't 24 00:01:35,920 --> 00:01:39,919 Speaker 1: disclose their own identity, and they don't attack the media. 25 00:01:40,120 --> 00:01:43,440 Speaker 1: Typically they don't. There was actually an attack carried out 26 00:01:43,840 --> 00:01:48,640 Speaker 1: by an anonymous offshoot named wool sec that, um, I 27 00:01:48,640 --> 00:01:50,480 Speaker 1: guess you could call it an attack of the front 28 00:01:50,520 --> 00:01:55,360 Speaker 1: Line PBSS frontline website. Yeah, they posted a fake news 29 00:01:55,360 --> 00:01:58,960 Speaker 1: story that said Tupac was alive and well in New Zealand. 30 00:02:00,120 --> 00:02:02,120 Speaker 1: I don't know if that really constitutes an attack. I 31 00:02:02,160 --> 00:02:05,280 Speaker 1: guess technically it does, but that that did get some 32 00:02:05,320 --> 00:02:07,880 Speaker 1: people in the media a little little nervous, like, oh, 33 00:02:08,000 --> 00:02:10,000 Speaker 1: is the media now fair game? But I think yeah, 34 00:02:10,000 --> 00:02:13,119 Speaker 1: for the most part, we're media. If we're anything right, 35 00:02:13,240 --> 00:02:16,519 Speaker 1: I think a we have some listeners who are a 36 00:02:16,639 --> 00:02:19,440 Speaker 1: nons which is what anonymous members are called. You think 37 00:02:19,520 --> 00:02:22,680 Speaker 1: so absolutely, You're probably right, not a doubt in my mind. 38 00:02:23,080 --> 00:02:26,600 Speaker 1: And I think they're gonna love this because they like press, 39 00:02:26,639 --> 00:02:29,600 Speaker 1: they like you know, headlines, and they like for people 40 00:02:29,639 --> 00:02:32,080 Speaker 1: to know what they're doing. Even though they are in 41 00:02:32,080 --> 00:02:36,760 Speaker 1: the shadows as far as their identities they are, they 42 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:39,440 Speaker 1: fully claim what they do and stand behind what they do, 43 00:02:39,960 --> 00:02:42,400 Speaker 1: you know. Yeah, And then I mean, I think it's 44 00:02:42,440 --> 00:02:47,600 Speaker 1: pretty smart to keep their identities anonymous because there are 45 00:02:47,600 --> 00:02:50,720 Speaker 1: a lot of federalities after anybody who does any kind 46 00:02:50,760 --> 00:02:54,120 Speaker 1: of computer crime these days, and the laws are really 47 00:02:54,200 --> 00:03:01,360 Speaker 1: draconian and really strict and really disproportionately um tough. Yes, 48 00:03:01,480 --> 00:03:04,440 Speaker 1: And the government uses some of the same tactics that 49 00:03:04,520 --> 00:03:08,959 Speaker 1: Anonymous uses to go after people an anonymous, which which 50 00:03:08,960 --> 00:03:11,400 Speaker 1: as we'll see, really ticks Anonymous off. Yeah. They think 51 00:03:11,400 --> 00:03:14,600 Speaker 1: they're big fat hypocrites basically, and they have a pretty 52 00:03:14,600 --> 00:03:20,440 Speaker 1: decent case in a lot of cases. So chuckers, Um, 53 00:03:20,480 --> 00:03:22,720 Speaker 1: I guess let's start at the beginning. Yeah, I don't 54 00:03:22,720 --> 00:03:24,400 Speaker 1: want to do that deal where people like you never 55 00:03:24,440 --> 00:03:27,400 Speaker 1: even said what Anonymous was, right. So, Anonymous is a 56 00:03:27,440 --> 00:03:32,200 Speaker 1: group of activists, hacker activists. That term was coined I 57 00:03:32,240 --> 00:03:36,000 Speaker 1: think in either six by a Cult of the Dead 58 00:03:36,080 --> 00:03:40,080 Speaker 1: Cow member, which was an early hackers group. They really 59 00:03:40,120 --> 00:03:42,920 Speaker 1: kind of set the stage in the eighties and nineties 60 00:03:42,960 --> 00:03:46,640 Speaker 1: of what computer hackers and actually telephone hackers initially are 61 00:03:46,680 --> 00:03:49,520 Speaker 1: meant to do. And and the idea is that um, 62 00:03:49,720 --> 00:03:53,360 Speaker 1: freedom of speech and in the freedom of information is 63 00:03:53,400 --> 00:03:55,960 Speaker 1: sacro sanct should not be messed with, and people who 64 00:03:56,000 --> 00:03:58,520 Speaker 1: do mess with it deserve to be messed with themselves. 65 00:03:58,560 --> 00:04:02,800 Speaker 1: But even that contains real Yeah, and they are. They've 66 00:04:02,800 --> 00:04:08,360 Speaker 1: been described as everything from a collective um to a uh, 67 00:04:08,560 --> 00:04:12,760 Speaker 1: shape shifting subculture, so that Miko kipon En called them 68 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:15,920 Speaker 1: or Bear Brown, a Texas journalist, said, uh, they're what 69 00:04:16,000 --> 00:04:19,520 Speaker 1: they really are as a series of relationships. Yeah, so 70 00:04:19,600 --> 00:04:23,440 Speaker 1: it's you know, it's all very secretive. It's not and 71 00:04:23,520 --> 00:04:25,920 Speaker 1: we'll get into this more, but it's not an organization 72 00:04:26,160 --> 00:04:28,320 Speaker 1: and where they go and meet every week with a 73 00:04:28,400 --> 00:04:32,159 Speaker 1: president and of treasurer and they wear their guy Fox 74 00:04:32,279 --> 00:04:34,880 Speaker 1: masks and they get together and decide what to do next. Right, 75 00:04:34,920 --> 00:04:38,520 Speaker 1: which makes them really, really really difficult to take on 76 00:04:39,040 --> 00:04:42,000 Speaker 1: if you're a centralized body like the US federal government, 77 00:04:42,640 --> 00:04:46,840 Speaker 1: because really, and what Anonymous is is an idea and 78 00:04:46,920 --> 00:04:50,120 Speaker 1: a concept and there's an ever shifting group of people 79 00:04:50,600 --> 00:04:52,839 Speaker 1: that come in and out of it. And the whole 80 00:04:52,880 --> 00:04:57,640 Speaker 1: idea is pretty simple. If somebody sees a wrong going 81 00:04:57,720 --> 00:05:00,440 Speaker 1: on somewhere in the world, and the person and carrying 82 00:05:00,440 --> 00:05:03,320 Speaker 1: out that wrong can be gotten to via the Internet, 83 00:05:04,080 --> 00:05:06,479 Speaker 1: then they go and they try to rally the troops, 84 00:05:06,839 --> 00:05:09,040 Speaker 1: and if enough people say, you know what, you're right, 85 00:05:09,120 --> 00:05:11,560 Speaker 1: that is messed up and we should do something about it, 86 00:05:12,200 --> 00:05:16,240 Speaker 1: they that that idea will have enough support that what 87 00:05:16,440 --> 00:05:19,280 Speaker 1: happens is Anonymous that ends up carrying out an op 88 00:05:19,360 --> 00:05:23,240 Speaker 1: an operation against that target, and there you go. Those 89 00:05:23,279 --> 00:05:27,640 Speaker 1: people may never join together again for another operation, that 90 00:05:27,640 --> 00:05:30,920 Speaker 1: that operation may end up becoming an even larger operation. 91 00:05:31,240 --> 00:05:34,880 Speaker 1: It's totally unpredictable and it's completely fluid, and that means 92 00:05:34,880 --> 00:05:36,920 Speaker 1: that if you bust some people, which the US government 93 00:05:36,920 --> 00:05:39,839 Speaker 1: has done plenty of times, there's gonna be tons of 94 00:05:39,839 --> 00:05:42,400 Speaker 1: other people to come take their place. Yeah, you can't 95 00:05:42,720 --> 00:05:48,200 Speaker 1: kill Anonymous, uh, And what might happen is everything from 96 00:05:48,279 --> 00:05:50,760 Speaker 1: something a little more lighthearted like taking over your website 97 00:05:50,800 --> 00:05:54,320 Speaker 1: and replacing the banners with your own messages, to completely 98 00:05:54,400 --> 00:05:59,479 Speaker 1: disabling your website altogether so no one can even access it. 99 00:06:00,839 --> 00:06:02,920 Speaker 1: The writer named Brian Kelly said there are three key 100 00:06:03,000 --> 00:06:07,039 Speaker 1: characteristics of the group. One an unrelenting moral stance on 101 00:06:07,080 --> 00:06:10,640 Speaker 1: issues and rights, regardless of direct provocations. In other words, 102 00:06:11,080 --> 00:06:13,440 Speaker 1: it's not like someone's messing with Anonymous, so they're gonna 103 00:06:13,480 --> 00:06:17,120 Speaker 1: fight back. In fact, it rarely is. It's usually you know, 104 00:06:17,200 --> 00:06:22,039 Speaker 1: like Westberg Baptist Church or Scientology. Uh, and that's I 105 00:06:22,120 --> 00:06:24,760 Speaker 1: don't I know that that's that covers all of Anonymous. 106 00:06:24,800 --> 00:06:28,080 Speaker 1: There's long almost from the beginning, there's long been fractures 107 00:06:28,080 --> 00:06:31,160 Speaker 1: in the group between people who just want lulls, which 108 00:06:31,200 --> 00:06:36,320 Speaker 1: is like entertaining yourself at other people's expense, basically trolling people, 109 00:06:36,400 --> 00:06:38,960 Speaker 1: just a mess with them for last whatever, and others 110 00:06:39,000 --> 00:06:42,640 Speaker 1: who say, no, we've got a really powerful weapon here. 111 00:06:42,880 --> 00:06:46,200 Speaker 1: The Internet is serious business and we need to go um, 112 00:06:46,480 --> 00:06:50,080 Speaker 1: we need to use it for like moral crusades. Basically 113 00:06:51,160 --> 00:06:55,840 Speaker 1: uh number two, a physical presence that accompanies the online hacking. 114 00:06:56,320 --> 00:06:59,760 Speaker 1: So don't just stop it like disabling someone's website, but 115 00:07:00,040 --> 00:07:02,479 Speaker 1: get out in the streets with those Guy Fox masks. 116 00:07:03,240 --> 00:07:06,200 Speaker 1: If you've seen the movie V for Fvendetta, or you 117 00:07:06,279 --> 00:07:09,760 Speaker 1: know anything about the fifth of November, you know the 118 00:07:09,760 --> 00:07:12,840 Speaker 1: mask that I'm referring to. Yeah. Um, And actually that 119 00:07:13,120 --> 00:07:17,320 Speaker 1: mask being used by Anonymous goes back even beyond V 120 00:07:17,440 --> 00:07:21,240 Speaker 1: for Vendetta. Actually there was a meme called um fail 121 00:07:21,440 --> 00:07:24,920 Speaker 1: I think epic fail guy Yeah, and he was the meme. 122 00:07:24,960 --> 00:07:26,960 Speaker 1: It was like a stick figure wearing the Guy Fox 123 00:07:27,040 --> 00:07:29,800 Speaker 1: mask and everywhere he went. He just screwed everything up. 124 00:07:29,960 --> 00:07:32,040 Speaker 1: It's cool mask. Yeah, so they were like, we'll use 125 00:07:32,080 --> 00:07:37,040 Speaker 1: that mask. And number three a distinctive brand, which you 126 00:07:37,040 --> 00:07:39,640 Speaker 1: know is that guy Fox mask. I mean they're great 127 00:07:39,640 --> 00:07:42,800 Speaker 1: at branding. Yeah, you know that. In the in the 128 00:07:43,200 --> 00:07:45,200 Speaker 1: suit and tie with a question mark in place of 129 00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:48,360 Speaker 1: a head is one of their logos, which is great logo. 130 00:07:48,880 --> 00:07:53,680 Speaker 1: And what is there? What is there their logline? We 131 00:07:53,760 --> 00:07:57,120 Speaker 1: are Anonymous, we are legion. We do not forgive, we 132 00:07:57,200 --> 00:08:01,400 Speaker 1: do not forget, expect us a little creepy. It is 133 00:08:01,440 --> 00:08:06,720 Speaker 1: a little creepy. They're scaring. Uh, they're scaring people who 134 00:08:07,040 --> 00:08:09,960 Speaker 1: and I'm not scared, but if you're doing something wrong, 135 00:08:10,080 --> 00:08:12,440 Speaker 1: then you should be scared, you know what I'm saying. Yes, 136 00:08:13,240 --> 00:08:15,640 Speaker 1: And a lot of people will say, well, no, actually 137 00:08:16,000 --> 00:08:18,320 Speaker 1: there's um you know, Anonymous will come after you even 138 00:08:18,360 --> 00:08:22,480 Speaker 1: if you didn't do anything really wrong. Um, that's not 139 00:08:22,520 --> 00:08:25,880 Speaker 1: necessarily true. There are like offshoots to have you know, 140 00:08:25,960 --> 00:08:29,040 Speaker 1: come and gone that that do believe much more in 141 00:08:29,120 --> 00:08:30,880 Speaker 1: mayhem and stuff like that. But when you think of 142 00:08:30,920 --> 00:08:33,679 Speaker 1: Anonymous these days, typically you do think of there is 143 00:08:33,720 --> 00:08:38,080 Speaker 1: some sort of moral aspect tomension to the thing that's 144 00:08:38,080 --> 00:08:40,199 Speaker 1: being carried out. And it depends on what your definition 145 00:08:40,240 --> 00:08:42,040 Speaker 1: of right and wrong is too be there. Clearly a 146 00:08:42,080 --> 00:08:45,720 Speaker 1: lot of people think that there anarchists that should be 147 00:08:45,800 --> 00:08:49,240 Speaker 1: jailed and throw away the key. There's other people who think, no, 148 00:08:49,440 --> 00:08:54,360 Speaker 1: you know what they're they're taking on the immoral corporate giants, 149 00:08:55,120 --> 00:08:57,880 Speaker 1: not just corporate giants that are doing really bad things 150 00:08:58,240 --> 00:09:03,720 Speaker 1: behind closed doors. Pretty interesting, Oh, it's super interesting. Should 151 00:09:03,720 --> 00:09:06,440 Speaker 1: we take a break? Sure? All right, let's take a 152 00:09:06,440 --> 00:09:08,240 Speaker 1: break and we'll dig in a little bit more right 153 00:09:08,280 --> 00:09:20,440 Speaker 1: after this. Hey, everybody out there in podcast land, we 154 00:09:20,480 --> 00:09:22,720 Speaker 1: want to alert your to what we're gonna call a 155 00:09:22,760 --> 00:09:27,000 Speaker 1: podcasting event, an event like the moon landing, but for podcasting. Basically, 156 00:09:27,080 --> 00:09:29,559 Speaker 1: that's right. It's a new podcast from ge Podcast Theater 157 00:09:29,640 --> 00:09:33,240 Speaker 1: and Panopally called The Message. It's an eight episode series 158 00:09:33,600 --> 00:09:36,360 Speaker 1: that's pretty much gonna blow your scientific mind. Yep. The 159 00:09:36,400 --> 00:09:39,319 Speaker 1: Message follows the story of Nicki Tomlin, a PhD in 160 00:09:39,400 --> 00:09:42,480 Speaker 1: linguistics from the University of Chicago, who follows a team 161 00:09:42,480 --> 00:09:45,880 Speaker 1: of cryptologists at a research think tank called Cipher. These 162 00:09:45,960 --> 00:09:48,560 Speaker 1: researchers are trying to decode a message that was received 163 00:09:48,559 --> 00:09:53,079 Speaker 1: from outer space seventy years ago. It's gonna be pretty awesome, man, 164 00:09:53,120 --> 00:09:55,280 Speaker 1: that's amazing. And if you want to subscribe, and you 165 00:09:55,320 --> 00:09:58,240 Speaker 1: should just go to iTunes look it up or wherever 166 00:09:58,280 --> 00:10:00,280 Speaker 1: you get your podcasts. Yeah, we'll be you and that 167 00:10:00,320 --> 00:10:02,800 Speaker 1: won't we That's right available now wherever you get podcast 168 00:10:02,880 --> 00:10:18,560 Speaker 1: including iTunes, g E, podcast theaters. The message. So, Chuck, 169 00:10:18,640 --> 00:10:20,800 Speaker 1: let's go back to the beginning, shall we be? This 170 00:10:20,920 --> 00:10:23,200 Speaker 1: whole idea of like, you know, we are legion, we 171 00:10:23,280 --> 00:10:26,800 Speaker 1: do not forget, we do not forgive, expect us. That's 172 00:10:26,800 --> 00:10:30,720 Speaker 1: a pretty far cry from how Anonymous ended up starting, right. Yeah. 173 00:10:30,960 --> 00:10:34,400 Speaker 1: So there's this site um called four chan. Four Chan 174 00:10:34,559 --> 00:10:37,200 Speaker 1: has all sorts of what are called image boards, right yeah. 175 00:10:37,200 --> 00:10:40,160 Speaker 1: It was created in two thousand three by a fifteen 176 00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:43,480 Speaker 1: year old and Christopher Pool. And Christopher Pool's whole thing 177 00:10:43,520 --> 00:10:45,640 Speaker 1: was like, I want to have a place on the 178 00:10:45,679 --> 00:10:50,720 Speaker 1: Internet that's totally censer free and anonymous. Yes self, no 179 00:10:50,880 --> 00:10:54,840 Speaker 1: self censorship. No, there's nobody in charge, there's no rules, 180 00:10:54,880 --> 00:10:58,240 Speaker 1: there's no nothing like that. Um, it is just whatever 181 00:10:58,280 --> 00:11:00,120 Speaker 1: you want to post, whatever you want to say, you 182 00:11:00,120 --> 00:11:03,760 Speaker 1: want to troll somebody troll them, and it's it's it's all. 183 00:11:04,000 --> 00:11:06,720 Speaker 1: Let's just not take things too seriously, shall we? But 184 00:11:06,840 --> 00:11:09,240 Speaker 1: let's also see how far we can push other people 185 00:11:09,320 --> 00:11:14,640 Speaker 1: to take things seriously. And um so four chan attracted 186 00:11:14,720 --> 00:11:17,800 Speaker 1: a certain kind of um net is in I guess 187 00:11:18,080 --> 00:11:21,439 Speaker 1: pretty quickly off the bat and this one, this one 188 00:11:21,480 --> 00:11:26,679 Speaker 1: image board in particular um b slash b slash. It's like, uh, 189 00:11:27,320 --> 00:11:31,120 Speaker 1: four chan dot org slash b slashes, it's the random board, 190 00:11:31,440 --> 00:11:36,959 Speaker 1: it's whatever. Um people started kind of congregating there and 191 00:11:37,040 --> 00:11:40,920 Speaker 1: finding that um, they they all shared this kind of 192 00:11:40,960 --> 00:11:46,120 Speaker 1: like desire to mess with people. Yeah, and then Anonymous 193 00:11:46,120 --> 00:11:48,640 Speaker 1: sort of evolved out of that because there were some 194 00:11:48,679 --> 00:11:51,240 Speaker 1: people saying, you know what, let's step this up a 195 00:11:51,280 --> 00:11:54,240 Speaker 1: notch and let's not just goof off and have fun. 196 00:11:54,640 --> 00:11:59,440 Speaker 1: Let's actually let's like actually trying to accomplish something for good. Yeah, 197 00:11:59,440 --> 00:12:02,439 Speaker 1: and again that caused that caused a riff, like right 198 00:12:02,480 --> 00:12:05,120 Speaker 1: from the beginning because some of the people were like, no, originally, 199 00:12:05,559 --> 00:12:07,440 Speaker 1: we're doing this for fun. There was this thing called 200 00:12:07,480 --> 00:12:10,840 Speaker 1: the Hebo Hotel, which is basically like a kind of 201 00:12:10,840 --> 00:12:14,120 Speaker 1: a weird second life hang out that they went and 202 00:12:14,240 --> 00:12:19,520 Speaker 1: infiltrated and just populated UM with characters that would like 203 00:12:19,600 --> 00:12:22,960 Speaker 1: block the pool or basically just like shut down the site, 204 00:12:23,000 --> 00:12:25,439 Speaker 1: take it over, just to mess with people, and it 205 00:12:25,480 --> 00:12:28,679 Speaker 1: was fun. They were having fun doing it, just screwing 206 00:12:28,720 --> 00:12:32,960 Speaker 1: with people, and other people said, um, no, let's use 207 00:12:33,000 --> 00:12:35,520 Speaker 1: this for good. And that actually kind of came accidentally 208 00:12:35,880 --> 00:12:38,400 Speaker 1: out of messing with a guy named Hal Turner. Have 209 00:12:38,480 --> 00:12:44,839 Speaker 1: you heard of him? Uh? Hal Turner? Right? So Hal 210 00:12:44,960 --> 00:12:50,319 Speaker 1: Turner was this um extraordinarily racist radio host and he 211 00:12:50,640 --> 00:12:53,160 Speaker 1: UM got pranked by some of the original four Chun 212 00:12:53,480 --> 00:12:57,480 Speaker 1: message board members, right Uh. He was getting like prank 213 00:12:57,559 --> 00:12:59,839 Speaker 1: calls or whatever, and he recorded the calls and some 214 00:13:00,000 --> 00:13:02,760 Speaker 1: how got the data and UM published it on his 215 00:13:02,840 --> 00:13:05,120 Speaker 1: site or released it to his fans and said, hey, 216 00:13:05,200 --> 00:13:07,280 Speaker 1: why don't you guys go figure out who these people are? 217 00:13:07,600 --> 00:13:10,400 Speaker 1: And they figured out some of them, including some underage 218 00:13:10,559 --> 00:13:14,160 Speaker 1: message board members whose parents addresses were posted now on 219 00:13:14,280 --> 00:13:21,800 Speaker 1: this virulently racist radio hosts UM website. And so the 220 00:13:21,880 --> 00:13:25,480 Speaker 1: people from Fortune said take that down, and he said no, 221 00:13:25,960 --> 00:13:27,880 Speaker 1: and they said, okay, well that was your one warning 222 00:13:28,480 --> 00:13:30,200 Speaker 1: and they went to town on this guy. And by 223 00:13:30,240 --> 00:13:33,000 Speaker 1: the time they were done with Hal Turner, UM, he 224 00:13:33,080 --> 00:13:35,800 Speaker 1: was off the air. He was off the air, UM 225 00:13:35,880 --> 00:13:38,360 Speaker 1: and in prison for I think a couple of years, 226 00:13:39,200 --> 00:13:41,959 Speaker 1: threatening federal judges. They basically went and found like all 227 00:13:42,000 --> 00:13:44,760 Speaker 1: these emails and stuff and just published everything, including like 228 00:13:44,840 --> 00:13:47,320 Speaker 1: his home address, all this stuff. They took like his 229 00:13:47,600 --> 00:13:51,280 Speaker 1: tactic and just turned it on him a million times over. 230 00:13:51,679 --> 00:13:54,800 Speaker 1: And that was the one where people said, hey, we 231 00:13:54,960 --> 00:13:58,760 Speaker 1: just did something really good. We just got a racist 232 00:13:59,000 --> 00:14:01,600 Speaker 1: radio host off air that was thrilling. We should use 233 00:14:01,600 --> 00:14:04,600 Speaker 1: our stuff for good. And again some people said no, 234 00:14:04,720 --> 00:14:07,160 Speaker 1: we're just in it for the lulls. Other people said no, 235 00:14:07,280 --> 00:14:09,679 Speaker 1: we should do this morally. And then even other people said, well, 236 00:14:09,679 --> 00:14:11,760 Speaker 1: wait a minute, wait a minute, what are you guys doing, 237 00:14:12,040 --> 00:14:14,240 Speaker 1: Like that guy had a right to free speech and 238 00:14:14,280 --> 00:14:16,000 Speaker 1: you just drove him off the air. How can you 239 00:14:16,040 --> 00:14:18,880 Speaker 1: possibly be proud of that? The prong that said no, 240 00:14:19,000 --> 00:14:20,960 Speaker 1: there was some good moral dimension to what we just 241 00:14:21,000 --> 00:14:25,000 Speaker 1: did using our computing skills for good. What we determine 242 00:14:25,120 --> 00:14:28,560 Speaker 1: is good, um, is that's the direction we should go. 243 00:14:28,720 --> 00:14:30,240 Speaker 1: And it kind of took off from there. It was 244 00:14:30,240 --> 00:14:35,040 Speaker 1: supported by the Operation against Scientology. Yeah, that came along 245 00:14:35,040 --> 00:14:36,720 Speaker 1: in the two thousand and eight. That was one of 246 00:14:36,720 --> 00:14:42,120 Speaker 1: their first big ops. It's called the Channeology And basically 247 00:14:42,120 --> 00:14:47,080 Speaker 1: what they came across was a video UM that we've well, 248 00:14:47,120 --> 00:14:51,520 Speaker 1: I was about say, we've all seen everybody obsessed with Scientology, 249 00:14:51,560 --> 00:14:56,760 Speaker 1: but to the famous Tom Cruise video where he's um, oh, 250 00:14:56,800 --> 00:14:58,800 Speaker 1: he's sort of just rambling and he seems a little 251 00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:02,040 Speaker 1: crazy and cookie and talking about Scientology, and it got 252 00:15:02,040 --> 00:15:06,080 Speaker 1: out there and Scientology said, um, not very smartly, like, 253 00:15:06,240 --> 00:15:09,800 Speaker 1: we want to remove this from the Internet, which is impossible. 254 00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:13,720 Speaker 1: I can't do that because it's two thousand eight at 255 00:15:13,760 --> 00:15:16,000 Speaker 1: the time, but they were doing a pretty good job 256 00:15:16,040 --> 00:15:18,560 Speaker 1: of it. Apparently, Yeah, I saw it, and this was 257 00:15:18,640 --> 00:15:22,640 Speaker 1: before the channelogy op so they were trying to get 258 00:15:22,640 --> 00:15:25,840 Speaker 1: it down and UM anonymous basically city you know it. Now, 259 00:15:26,920 --> 00:15:29,440 Speaker 1: what we're gonna do is, we're gonna we're gonna attack 260 00:15:29,600 --> 00:15:33,320 Speaker 1: your website. We're gonna get your everything about Scientology off 261 00:15:33,320 --> 00:15:36,200 Speaker 1: the internet. We're gonna um what's it called a di 262 00:15:36,360 --> 00:15:40,320 Speaker 1: DOS attack, right, a distributed denial of service attack, which 263 00:15:40,360 --> 00:15:44,560 Speaker 1: is kind of key to an anonymous op um. They 264 00:15:44,680 --> 00:15:47,880 Speaker 1: attacked Google um with a google bomb for Scientology, So 265 00:15:47,920 --> 00:15:50,720 Speaker 1: if you typed in dangerous cult, it directed you to 266 00:15:50,760 --> 00:15:55,080 Speaker 1: the Scientology website. They had hundreds and hundreds of pizzas 267 00:15:55,200 --> 00:15:58,600 Speaker 1: ordered and sent to Scientology offices worldwide, have you heard 268 00:15:58,640 --> 00:16:01,880 Speaker 1: of black faxes. Yeah, they sent them jet black facts 269 00:16:02,040 --> 00:16:03,760 Speaker 1: so they would just run out of the ink right 270 00:16:03,840 --> 00:16:07,080 Speaker 1: over and over again. Yeah, which all you know, those 271 00:16:07,080 --> 00:16:12,800 Speaker 1: are all pretty silly, little harmless um pranks. The Scientologists 272 00:16:12,800 --> 00:16:14,800 Speaker 1: didn't take it that way. No, they weren't happy. In fact, 273 00:16:14,840 --> 00:16:16,800 Speaker 1: I think they went to the FBI. They did, you 274 00:16:16,840 --> 00:16:19,240 Speaker 1: need to look into these people, right, and so we 275 00:16:19,280 --> 00:16:20,800 Speaker 1: have to we have to pause her for a second 276 00:16:20,800 --> 00:16:24,080 Speaker 1: and point something out. One um. With both the hell 277 00:16:24,200 --> 00:16:28,320 Speaker 1: Turner oup and Project Channology, a lot of people say, like, 278 00:16:28,360 --> 00:16:32,200 Speaker 1: oh man, they went after this um, this racist uh 279 00:16:32,760 --> 00:16:34,640 Speaker 1: radio host and got him off the air. So they 280 00:16:34,640 --> 00:16:38,360 Speaker 1: went after Scientology, which is a roundly hated cult and 281 00:16:38,360 --> 00:16:40,920 Speaker 1: and tried to drive them out of business. And the 282 00:16:41,000 --> 00:16:43,280 Speaker 1: idea is it just stops there. But if you go 283 00:16:43,320 --> 00:16:45,600 Speaker 1: a little further, both of those operations were based on 284 00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:51,800 Speaker 1: infractions by the offending parties against the Internet. Hell Turner 285 00:16:51,880 --> 00:16:56,800 Speaker 1: posted underage four chain users parents addresses on his website. 286 00:16:56,840 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 1: Wouldn't take it down. That's a rule broken. That's why 287 00:16:59,680 --> 00:17:02,760 Speaker 1: they went an after him. Scientology. They tried to censor 288 00:17:02,880 --> 00:17:05,480 Speaker 1: the Internet, and Anonymous thinks of the Internet is like 289 00:17:05,560 --> 00:17:08,000 Speaker 1: their Internet they're the cops of the Internet as far 290 00:17:08,040 --> 00:17:10,359 Speaker 1: as they're concerned, and the Internet is not to be 291 00:17:10,440 --> 00:17:13,320 Speaker 1: messed with, and they protected like that. UM. And so 292 00:17:13,440 --> 00:17:15,840 Speaker 1: when Scientology tried to take that video down and was 293 00:17:15,840 --> 00:17:19,000 Speaker 1: trying to sue people who kept it up, that was 294 00:17:19,359 --> 00:17:22,280 Speaker 1: that was censorship ship of the Internet. That's why Anonymous 295 00:17:22,280 --> 00:17:24,600 Speaker 1: went after the Internet. But again, just like the Hall 296 00:17:24,720 --> 00:17:29,080 Speaker 1: Trener operation, the the Project Channology thing took on this 297 00:17:29,119 --> 00:17:33,520 Speaker 1: moral dimension and Anonymous was called upon just by UM 298 00:17:33,640 --> 00:17:37,240 Speaker 1: a guy named Mark Bunker, who was already an ardent 299 00:17:37,240 --> 00:17:39,639 Speaker 1: critic of Scientologists, and he said, why don't you guys 300 00:17:39,680 --> 00:17:42,919 Speaker 1: like use your your your what you're doing for legal 301 00:17:42,960 --> 00:17:47,400 Speaker 1: productive ways, And so Anonymous called for actual physical protests 302 00:17:47,520 --> 00:17:50,760 Speaker 1: of Scientology's churches around the world. Yeah, and I think 303 00:17:50,760 --> 00:17:53,840 Speaker 1: now that's that's become one of their hallmarks. That's why 304 00:17:53,880 --> 00:17:58,520 Speaker 1: they want to pair the activist activity with a physical 305 00:17:58,520 --> 00:18:02,239 Speaker 1: presence and a YouTube video which says have you ever 306 00:18:02,280 --> 00:18:05,600 Speaker 1: seen those? Yeah, they're creepy and awesome they are. They're 307 00:18:05,600 --> 00:18:07,680 Speaker 1: really well done. It looks it's it's just the whole 308 00:18:07,680 --> 00:18:10,320 Speaker 1: thing is like very Mr robot esque, right, And with 309 00:18:10,440 --> 00:18:13,720 Speaker 1: every with every video that they released, with every operation, 310 00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:16,520 Speaker 1: they release a video ahead of time saying what's gonna happen, 311 00:18:16,560 --> 00:18:19,320 Speaker 1: what's going down? Right? Yeah, exactly. And it's very smart 312 00:18:19,359 --> 00:18:22,639 Speaker 1: to do that because number one, um, they're they're taking 313 00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:25,440 Speaker 1: account they're showing that they're accountable for their actions. They're 314 00:18:25,480 --> 00:18:28,320 Speaker 1: taking accountability for it. But also it keeps them from 315 00:18:28,359 --> 00:18:33,120 Speaker 1: being scapegoated, and it keeps other people from claiming uh 316 00:18:33,280 --> 00:18:36,879 Speaker 1: their work, you know. Yeah. In two thousand ten, with 317 00:18:36,960 --> 00:18:41,520 Speaker 1: Operation Payback, UM, they realized they found out that MasterCard, Visa, 318 00:18:41,560 --> 00:18:45,760 Speaker 1: and PayPal said we're gonna stop. You won't be able 319 00:18:45,800 --> 00:18:48,840 Speaker 1: to donate to wiki leaks using our services anymore. We're 320 00:18:48,880 --> 00:18:52,000 Speaker 1: gonna shut that down, which in and of itself they 321 00:18:52,040 --> 00:18:56,119 Speaker 1: figured was bad, but as evidence they went and found like, 322 00:18:56,280 --> 00:19:00,600 Speaker 1: um skinhead websites that you could still donate to using 323 00:19:00,640 --> 00:19:04,320 Speaker 1: those three mechanisms, but you couldn't donate to wiki leaks. 324 00:19:04,320 --> 00:19:06,800 Speaker 1: They were like, okay, that's messed up. Yeah, so they said, 325 00:19:06,800 --> 00:19:08,800 Speaker 1: you know what we're gonna do, Um, We're gonna shut 326 00:19:08,840 --> 00:19:11,640 Speaker 1: you guys down. And they did. It was a cyber attack, 327 00:19:11,760 --> 00:19:14,520 Speaker 1: and they disabled the home pages of Visa, master Card, 328 00:19:14,560 --> 00:19:18,560 Speaker 1: and PayPal and um, you know, gloated they had their 329 00:19:18,600 --> 00:19:22,600 Speaker 1: own special little smarmie messages back like U. There are 330 00:19:22,640 --> 00:19:25,320 Speaker 1: some things Wiki leaks can't do. For everything else, there's 331 00:19:25,359 --> 00:19:29,320 Speaker 1: operation payback. Yeah, And so like I said before, with UM, 332 00:19:29,359 --> 00:19:32,520 Speaker 1: with an anonymous ops like that, people may disband and 333 00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:35,520 Speaker 1: never worked together in another one, or your operation may 334 00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:38,399 Speaker 1: grow to include even more stuff. An operation payback is 335 00:19:38,400 --> 00:19:40,800 Speaker 1: a really good example of the ladder of those two. 336 00:19:41,280 --> 00:19:44,879 Speaker 1: It started out because UM at some point the United 337 00:19:44,920 --> 00:19:49,160 Speaker 1: States government hired an Indian firm, an Indian software firm 338 00:19:49,280 --> 00:19:53,280 Speaker 1: UM to launch d d o S attacks on these 339 00:19:53,280 --> 00:19:58,720 Speaker 1: two sites, Mega Upload and pirates Bay, and UM shut 340 00:19:58,760 --> 00:20:01,080 Speaker 1: them down basically. And both of those are file sharing sites, 341 00:20:01,200 --> 00:20:05,360 Speaker 1: typically illegal file sharing sites. And so the US government 342 00:20:05,400 --> 00:20:09,600 Speaker 1: was using the same tactics d d o S attacks 343 00:20:09,840 --> 00:20:14,119 Speaker 1: that they were also prosecuting the hackers and an Anonymous 344 00:20:14,119 --> 00:20:17,320 Speaker 1: for using. But they were using it with impunity, and 345 00:20:17,480 --> 00:20:20,240 Speaker 1: that really ticked Anonymous off. And we should also say 346 00:20:20,240 --> 00:20:22,200 Speaker 1: what a d d o S is, right, So Chuck, 347 00:20:22,280 --> 00:20:26,640 Speaker 1: it's basically it's taking when you contact a website. When 348 00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:28,760 Speaker 1: you go to a website, you're contacting its server to 349 00:20:28,800 --> 00:20:31,920 Speaker 1: request all the information on the page. If a bunch 350 00:20:31,920 --> 00:20:34,720 Speaker 1: of people do that at once, the server becomes overloaded 351 00:20:34,840 --> 00:20:36,840 Speaker 1: and the people who legitimately want to use the site 352 00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:39,520 Speaker 1: can't get in, or the server becomes so overloaded the 353 00:20:39,520 --> 00:20:42,960 Speaker 1: site crashes down right. So one of anonymous is key 354 00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:45,840 Speaker 1: tactics is to do a distributed anallyis service where a 355 00:20:45,880 --> 00:20:48,359 Speaker 1: bunch of people are doing that all at once, hitting 356 00:20:48,400 --> 00:20:51,200 Speaker 1: the site to overload it. And then there's even software 357 00:20:51,280 --> 00:20:54,919 Speaker 1: called the low orbit Ion Cannon which anybody can go 358 00:20:55,000 --> 00:20:57,000 Speaker 1: download and use and you type in a U r 359 00:20:57,160 --> 00:21:00,520 Speaker 1: L and this thing like really hits a site like 360 00:21:00,600 --> 00:21:02,520 Speaker 1: it's like a bunch of people all at once hitting 361 00:21:02,560 --> 00:21:05,640 Speaker 1: it with just this one computer. Um, we should say 362 00:21:05,680 --> 00:21:08,919 Speaker 1: that you can be prosecuted, and many people have been 363 00:21:08,960 --> 00:21:12,160 Speaker 1: prosecuted in says, to jail just for using that. Yeah, 364 00:21:12,160 --> 00:21:14,640 Speaker 1: not unless you're the U. S. Government. Again, but that's 365 00:21:14,640 --> 00:21:17,199 Speaker 1: what set off Operation Payback was that the government was 366 00:21:17,280 --> 00:21:20,640 Speaker 1: using these the same tactic that they were prosecuting other 367 00:21:20,680 --> 00:21:25,240 Speaker 1: people for. Yeah, and uh, because they didn't want any confusion, um, 368 00:21:25,320 --> 00:21:28,560 Speaker 1: and for people to say, oh, yeah, well they clearly 369 00:21:28,600 --> 00:21:30,960 Speaker 1: just want to download movies for free and stuff like that. 370 00:21:31,440 --> 00:21:33,640 Speaker 1: They have their YouTube video where they're like, no, that's 371 00:21:33,640 --> 00:21:35,600 Speaker 1: not why we're doing this, right, We're doing that because 372 00:21:35,640 --> 00:21:38,199 Speaker 1: you guys are using the same taxics tactics that you're 373 00:21:38,240 --> 00:21:41,359 Speaker 1: prosecuting us for for other people for exactly, and so 374 00:21:41,440 --> 00:21:44,080 Speaker 1: Operation Payback. Then at about that time they found out 375 00:21:44,119 --> 00:21:48,639 Speaker 1: about the Wiki League stop payment from UM PayPal and 376 00:21:49,040 --> 00:21:52,760 Speaker 1: MasterCard and Visa, and they extended it even further. PayPal 377 00:21:52,840 --> 00:21:55,520 Speaker 1: said it costs them five and a half million bucks. Yeah, 378 00:21:55,600 --> 00:21:58,040 Speaker 1: which is a small dent and PayPal, but still it's 379 00:21:58,359 --> 00:22:01,480 Speaker 1: you know, no, it is substantial. The idea though. UM. 380 00:22:01,520 --> 00:22:06,320 Speaker 1: There's this really great UH documentary that's that's available for 381 00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:11,919 Speaker 1: free on Anonymous official YouTube channel. I haven't seen that 382 00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:15,320 Speaker 1: when this one's called the Story of Anonymous UM and 383 00:22:15,400 --> 00:22:18,640 Speaker 1: it's it's pretty good. It's very straightforward, and it's got 384 00:22:18,680 --> 00:22:21,119 Speaker 1: a lot of the people who were involved in the 385 00:22:21,160 --> 00:22:23,560 Speaker 1: early days UM. And I think he goes up to 386 00:22:23,600 --> 00:22:26,800 Speaker 1: like two thousand eleven or twelve UM, but it's definitely 387 00:22:26,800 --> 00:22:30,320 Speaker 1: worth watching. But it interviews this kid who downloaded the 388 00:22:30,440 --> 00:22:35,399 Speaker 1: low orbit ion cannon and engaged in UM project channelogy 389 00:22:35,440 --> 00:22:38,840 Speaker 1: against scientology, right, and the FBI came to his door 390 00:22:38,960 --> 00:22:41,679 Speaker 1: and arrested him, and he got like he's he I 391 00:22:41,720 --> 00:22:44,520 Speaker 1: think he got like time served, so he didn't actually 392 00:22:44,520 --> 00:22:48,520 Speaker 1: have to serve prison time, but he was um like 393 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:50,920 Speaker 1: he wasn't allowed near a computer for twelve months or 394 00:22:50,960 --> 00:22:54,480 Speaker 1: else he would be arrested. Um And it was really 395 00:22:54,560 --> 00:22:59,640 Speaker 1: bizarre punishment considering that he was just requesting the Church 396 00:22:59,680 --> 00:23:03,440 Speaker 1: of Science Atology's website for its information to it to 397 00:23:03,560 --> 00:23:06,360 Speaker 1: the nth degree. But that was it. He didn't make 398 00:23:06,359 --> 00:23:09,320 Speaker 1: any threats, he didn't order any pizzas, he didn't do anything. 399 00:23:09,840 --> 00:23:12,880 Speaker 1: And when you when you think of the other term 400 00:23:12,960 --> 00:23:16,600 Speaker 1: for d d O S attacks, they're called virtual sit ins. 401 00:23:17,000 --> 00:23:18,800 Speaker 1: It really kind of drives home the idea that this 402 00:23:18,840 --> 00:23:22,760 Speaker 1: is a form of protest that's being harshly, harshly punished 403 00:23:22,800 --> 00:23:26,520 Speaker 1: by the federal government in the US, which is really strange. 404 00:23:26,560 --> 00:23:29,760 Speaker 1: Like there's a Wired article written by a guy named 405 00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:33,720 Speaker 1: Tore Ecklin who's a very famous lawyer for these kinds 406 00:23:33,720 --> 00:23:37,720 Speaker 1: of cases, and um, it's called America must end its 407 00:23:37,760 --> 00:23:40,440 Speaker 1: paranoid war on hackers, And he really kind of lays 408 00:23:40,440 --> 00:23:43,200 Speaker 1: it out there, like here's what's going on. Like most 409 00:23:43,200 --> 00:23:47,480 Speaker 1: people don't realize this, but there's a there's an untoward 410 00:23:47,680 --> 00:23:51,680 Speaker 1: amount of punishment being leveled at people who are protesting 411 00:23:51,720 --> 00:23:55,440 Speaker 1: stuff legitimately by using things like d d O S 412 00:23:55,480 --> 00:23:58,960 Speaker 1: attacks And they're going to prison for like ten years 413 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:02,760 Speaker 1: for this stuff, and that's messed up, it says, and 414 00:24:02,840 --> 00:24:05,320 Speaker 1: I agree, I agree to. Uh. Some of the other 415 00:24:05,359 --> 00:24:09,600 Speaker 1: things they've done. We mentioned Westboro Baptist Church UM, which 416 00:24:10,520 --> 00:24:12,200 Speaker 1: a lot of people just say as a hate group 417 00:24:12,280 --> 00:24:14,800 Speaker 1: in disguise as a church. I think it's labeled by 418 00:24:15,040 --> 00:24:18,680 Speaker 1: by the government as such. Well, they would like take 419 00:24:18,720 --> 00:24:22,439 Speaker 1: over their website and put messages of peace and tolerance. 420 00:24:23,160 --> 00:24:27,040 Speaker 1: Probably really rankled them. Uh. They would pose as uh 421 00:24:27,440 --> 00:24:30,720 Speaker 1: young girls online to Laura in sexual predators and then 422 00:24:30,760 --> 00:24:36,160 Speaker 1: send that information to the police to expose pedophiles. Uh. 423 00:24:36,200 --> 00:24:39,399 Speaker 1: What else have they done? Well, they were instrumental in 424 00:24:39,440 --> 00:24:42,879 Speaker 1: the Arab spring. Yeah, they basically had a pretty large 425 00:24:42,880 --> 00:24:47,640 Speaker 1: hand Anonymous did in um overthrowing the Egyptian government. Yeah, 426 00:24:47,680 --> 00:24:51,120 Speaker 1: they like to top of dictators. Yes. And the reason why, 427 00:24:51,160 --> 00:24:54,800 Speaker 1: specifically in Egypt that really ticked them off was Mubarik 428 00:24:54,920 --> 00:24:57,960 Speaker 1: shut off the Internet. And again, just like with hal Turner, 429 00:24:58,119 --> 00:25:00,760 Speaker 1: just like with scientology, just like with the government, you 430 00:25:00,800 --> 00:25:03,000 Speaker 1: don't mess with the Internet if you don't want to 431 00:25:03,160 --> 00:25:07,480 Speaker 1: excite uh, Anonymous, as I are right, UM, and so 432 00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:13,520 Speaker 1: they they helped Egyptian dissidents by UM basically instructing them 433 00:25:13,520 --> 00:25:16,520 Speaker 1: on how to get the internet back online there, how 434 00:25:16,600 --> 00:25:20,560 Speaker 1: to set up like virtual networks UM that couldn't be 435 00:25:20,600 --> 00:25:23,520 Speaker 1: shut down by the government. Some of them went to 436 00:25:23,600 --> 00:25:26,280 Speaker 1: the point of just communicating with these people and then 437 00:25:26,320 --> 00:25:29,359 Speaker 1: turning those communications into tweets for them, and then they 438 00:25:29,400 --> 00:25:33,959 Speaker 1: also disseminated video of the government UM carrying out violence 439 00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:36,919 Speaker 1: against protesters and spread it out to the world. They 440 00:25:36,960 --> 00:25:39,080 Speaker 1: had a huge hand in the Arab spring, not just 441 00:25:39,119 --> 00:25:41,920 Speaker 1: in Egypt and in Tunisia as well. Yeah, they've they've 442 00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:47,879 Speaker 1: also had their hand in the the situation in Ferguson, Missouri, UM, 443 00:25:47,920 --> 00:25:53,720 Speaker 1: Occupy Wall Street, UM, untold amounts of like police brutality 444 00:25:53,760 --> 00:25:57,679 Speaker 1: cases or a police cover ups. Stupenville rape case, that 445 00:25:57,760 --> 00:26:00,320 Speaker 1: was a big one. Yeah, in two thousand twelve, sixteen 446 00:26:00,359 --> 00:26:03,240 Speaker 1: year old girl sixteen year old girl was sexually assaulted 447 00:26:03,920 --> 00:26:07,080 Speaker 1: and they found out, you know what, there's a cover 448 00:26:07,160 --> 00:26:09,560 Speaker 1: up going on here. So there was an offshoot called 449 00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:13,320 Speaker 1: night KAY and I g h D SEC and they 450 00:26:13,600 --> 00:26:16,440 Speaker 1: launched a crusade that said, you know what, here's what's 451 00:26:16,440 --> 00:26:18,920 Speaker 1: going on here. There's a cover up going on. Uh, 452 00:26:18,960 --> 00:26:22,679 Speaker 1: And they finally uncovered and publicized the names of two 453 00:26:23,119 --> 00:26:25,919 Speaker 1: star players in the high school football team that allegedly 454 00:26:26,119 --> 00:26:28,520 Speaker 1: committed this assault. That we're being covered up. So it 455 00:26:28,640 --> 00:26:30,720 Speaker 1: was a big deal, they basically and and it was. 456 00:26:30,960 --> 00:26:34,720 Speaker 1: That's a perfect example of an anonymous op. Right, there's 457 00:26:34,720 --> 00:26:37,080 Speaker 1: an injustice in this little tiny corner of the world 458 00:26:37,160 --> 00:26:39,560 Speaker 1: where Ohio meets West Virginia that no one else had 459 00:26:39,600 --> 00:26:42,720 Speaker 1: ever heard about. That somebody got onto the four cham 460 00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:46,160 Speaker 1: board and tell told everybody about this, and people started 461 00:26:46,160 --> 00:26:49,600 Speaker 1: saying enough, people started saying we should do something about this. 462 00:26:50,119 --> 00:26:53,240 Speaker 1: And um, they they left the message board, hit the 463 00:26:53,240 --> 00:26:56,359 Speaker 1: I r C Internet relay chat channels right and started 464 00:26:56,359 --> 00:26:59,960 Speaker 1: communicating with one another and figuring out how to launch 465 00:27:00,040 --> 00:27:01,879 Speaker 1: this attack and what to do and who to attack. 466 00:27:02,240 --> 00:27:06,160 Speaker 1: And then they attacked and and in the real world 467 00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:10,600 Speaker 1: there were repercussions. And that's that's anonymous. This whole jam 468 00:27:10,840 --> 00:27:12,960 Speaker 1: is they go do something, get a bunch of headlines. 469 00:27:13,240 --> 00:27:16,679 Speaker 1: And then not only did anonymous do this, Why did 470 00:27:16,720 --> 00:27:18,600 Speaker 1: Anonymous do this? Who did they do it too? Oh, 471 00:27:18,600 --> 00:27:20,359 Speaker 1: we should go look at that. And now all of 472 00:27:20,400 --> 00:27:24,240 Speaker 1: a sudden, this little tiny corner of where Ohio, West Virginia. 473 00:27:24,480 --> 00:27:27,680 Speaker 1: Everybody's heard of and everybody's heard about it in the absolute, wet, 474 00:27:27,800 --> 00:27:31,399 Speaker 1: worse terms. That's an anonymous operation. And then all the 475 00:27:31,440 --> 00:27:36,359 Speaker 1: people who who were part of it disbanded. But on 476 00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:39,880 Speaker 1: the other hand, UM, the data dump that Anonymous had 477 00:27:39,960 --> 00:27:44,479 Speaker 1: about about Steubenville, the rape case UM contain a lot 478 00:27:44,600 --> 00:27:48,680 Speaker 1: of unvetted facts and things like that, and a lot 479 00:27:48,720 --> 00:27:52,640 Speaker 1: of people were unfairly treated, targeted from the docks thing 480 00:27:52,680 --> 00:27:55,560 Speaker 1: that resulted. So, I mean, I guess the point is 481 00:27:55,600 --> 00:27:58,960 Speaker 1: that Stephenville is a good example of how anonymous UM, 482 00:27:59,040 --> 00:28:02,879 Speaker 1: even when herring out some sort of moral justice, also 483 00:28:02,960 --> 00:28:05,439 Speaker 1: has a there's an amoral dimension to it, and that 484 00:28:05,480 --> 00:28:09,000 Speaker 1: there's a lot of innocent people who can become casualties 485 00:28:09,040 --> 00:28:12,000 Speaker 1: as a result too. There's actually a really good Gawker 486 00:28:12,119 --> 00:28:15,080 Speaker 1: article about UM stuben Ville a year later. I think 487 00:28:15,119 --> 00:28:17,600 Speaker 1: it was UM the town that was torn apart by 488 00:28:17,680 --> 00:28:20,639 Speaker 1: what two people did or something like that. Alright, so 489 00:28:20,760 --> 00:28:22,840 Speaker 1: let's uh, let's take a quick break here and we'll 490 00:28:22,880 --> 00:28:26,520 Speaker 1: come back and we'll talk about who Anonymous is and uh, 491 00:28:26,760 --> 00:28:51,680 Speaker 1: how you can become a member right after this. Alright, 492 00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:56,080 Speaker 1: So Anonymous is UM. It's tough to define it's stuff 493 00:28:56,120 --> 00:28:59,880 Speaker 1: to pinpoint because they are hiding in plain sight. There's 494 00:29:00,040 --> 00:29:03,120 Speaker 1: not You can't go to anonymous dot com and and 495 00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:06,440 Speaker 1: sign up for their newsletter and buy your mask in 496 00:29:06,480 --> 00:29:09,920 Speaker 1: the in the store and um, say I want to 497 00:29:09,920 --> 00:29:13,800 Speaker 1: become a member, just fill out this application. Uh, it 498 00:29:13,840 --> 00:29:17,160 Speaker 1: doesn't work that way. You should probably not accept applications 499 00:29:17,240 --> 00:29:21,520 Speaker 1: to be a part of anonymous because it's probably a setup. Yes, exactly. 500 00:29:22,160 --> 00:29:24,440 Speaker 1: But there is something called a non news which does 501 00:29:24,560 --> 00:29:28,480 Speaker 1: post information about ops. Uh, you're probably not gonna you're 502 00:29:28,520 --> 00:29:33,800 Speaker 1: not gonna learn too much inside real information as a 503 00:29:33,840 --> 00:29:37,040 Speaker 1: casual Internet browser. No. And it's more like, um, if 504 00:29:37,080 --> 00:29:40,440 Speaker 1: you follow a non news on Twitter, say you may 505 00:29:40,560 --> 00:29:45,239 Speaker 1: like for operation payback. Um, I think they listed like 506 00:29:45,360 --> 00:29:47,840 Speaker 1: the visa site or something and they said fire at will, 507 00:29:48,320 --> 00:29:51,280 Speaker 1: and um, it was a link to the low orbit 508 00:29:51,320 --> 00:29:54,920 Speaker 1: ion cannon and the visa website that you post that 509 00:29:55,000 --> 00:29:57,160 Speaker 1: you r l in and it was a way to 510 00:29:57,360 --> 00:29:59,680 Speaker 1: just get anybody involved in the d D O S thing. 511 00:30:00,680 --> 00:30:02,840 Speaker 1: The problem is is that that's that is that can 512 00:30:02,880 --> 00:30:05,480 Speaker 1: be very dangerous if you're just a casual person downloading 513 00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:08,040 Speaker 1: low or a bit ion canon and you're just doing 514 00:30:08,040 --> 00:30:11,000 Speaker 1: this because you're having fun helping Anonymous and you're not 515 00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:14,640 Speaker 1: covering your trucks in any way, shape or form. In 516 00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:16,440 Speaker 1: the FBI comes and knocks on your door, you may 517 00:30:16,480 --> 00:30:19,080 Speaker 1: be facing several years in jail because they're looking to 518 00:30:19,080 --> 00:30:21,520 Speaker 1: make an example out of you. Absolutely no, you gotta 519 00:30:21,520 --> 00:30:23,360 Speaker 1: do a lot of work in fact to even get 520 00:30:23,400 --> 00:30:26,719 Speaker 1: in there. Uh. And once you find yourself um in 521 00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:29,360 Speaker 1: one of these forums where there's real information being discussed, 522 00:30:30,000 --> 00:30:33,200 Speaker 1: you sort of need to prove your worth uh with 523 00:30:33,240 --> 00:30:36,760 Speaker 1: either ideas or specific skill or knowledge you might have. 524 00:30:37,480 --> 00:30:40,680 Speaker 1: And then you may be invited to participate in one 525 00:30:40,680 --> 00:30:43,480 Speaker 1: way or another as an ANON. And again, even if 526 00:30:43,560 --> 00:30:46,400 Speaker 1: you are at the top of your game at at 527 00:30:46,480 --> 00:30:48,600 Speaker 1: what anybody in the media would think of as like 528 00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:51,960 Speaker 1: a member of Anonymous, like one of the true um, 529 00:30:52,280 --> 00:30:55,520 Speaker 1: the long term members who's done a lot of ops. Um, 530 00:30:55,680 --> 00:30:58,040 Speaker 1: you can still get busted. A guy named Jeremy Hammond 531 00:30:58,440 --> 00:31:02,200 Speaker 1: was busted and got years or some stuff. Named Barrett 532 00:31:02,240 --> 00:31:06,360 Speaker 1: Brown was busted and got five years for some stuff. 533 00:31:06,640 --> 00:31:09,120 Speaker 1: And all again, all of this is just computer crime 534 00:31:09,160 --> 00:31:13,000 Speaker 1: we're talking about. So again, if this is really like 535 00:31:13,360 --> 00:31:18,000 Speaker 1: cranking your case, just there's a there's a lot of 536 00:31:18,040 --> 00:31:22,240 Speaker 1: repercussions to this. Yeah, there's there's a misconception to that. 537 00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:26,160 Speaker 1: UM it is Uh, it's a bunch of brilliant UM 538 00:31:26,600 --> 00:31:30,440 Speaker 1: code writers and hackers. Apparently only about a fifth of 539 00:31:30,520 --> 00:31:35,040 Speaker 1: ANNs or true hackers. UM. Who who said that? Um, 540 00:31:35,280 --> 00:31:41,240 Speaker 1: there's an anthropologist, Gabriella Coleman. Actually, UM, she is an 541 00:31:41,240 --> 00:31:45,000 Speaker 1: expert at Anonymous and has written several books and is 542 00:31:45,000 --> 00:31:48,560 Speaker 1: in that documentary I was talking about. So only a 543 00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:51,560 Speaker 1: fifth or are hackers and the rest are quote geets 544 00:31:51,560 --> 00:31:54,840 Speaker 1: and protesters. But UM, apparently you don't have to be 545 00:31:54,880 --> 00:31:56,600 Speaker 1: some brilliant hacker. They will call on you if you 546 00:31:56,600 --> 00:31:59,160 Speaker 1: have some other skill, if you have good ideas, if 547 00:31:59,160 --> 00:32:02,240 Speaker 1: you're a graphics signer, if you're have if you're a 548 00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:04,720 Speaker 1: good writer, you can help put together a press release, 549 00:32:05,040 --> 00:32:06,600 Speaker 1: if you're a filmmaker and you want to do these 550 00:32:06,600 --> 00:32:10,080 Speaker 1: YouTube videos. There's all sorts of ways that UM, you 551 00:32:10,120 --> 00:32:12,720 Speaker 1: can contribute if you want to contribute and being ANN 552 00:32:12,800 --> 00:32:16,520 Speaker 1: aside from being a coder. UM and the idea that 553 00:32:16,600 --> 00:32:20,320 Speaker 1: they're completely what's put out there is that they have 554 00:32:20,360 --> 00:32:23,959 Speaker 1: no hierarchy whatsoever, that everyone's equal, everyone has equal footing, 555 00:32:24,240 --> 00:32:28,080 Speaker 1: There is no leader whatsoever. UM. It is just this 556 00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:33,560 Speaker 1: big amorphous group of a non's that isn't entirely accurate. Um, 557 00:32:33,680 --> 00:32:35,800 Speaker 1: they may not have a president and vice president per 558 00:32:35,800 --> 00:32:42,520 Speaker 1: se or a treasurer, but um, supposedly they do have uh, 559 00:32:42,880 --> 00:32:45,200 Speaker 1: four or five people who are really good at doing 560 00:32:45,200 --> 00:32:48,680 Speaker 1: what they do. So they sort of take turns emerging 561 00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:51,640 Speaker 1: as the leader of a specific op maybe because then 562 00:32:51,640 --> 00:32:53,920 Speaker 1: the fall of the background in another perhaps and you 563 00:32:54,000 --> 00:32:56,120 Speaker 1: become a leader whether you want to be or not, 564 00:32:56,640 --> 00:33:00,440 Speaker 1: based on your skills as an organizer. Yeah. Um, if 565 00:33:00,480 --> 00:33:04,160 Speaker 1: you are just naturally somebody who can rally the troops, 566 00:33:04,680 --> 00:33:07,840 Speaker 1: then your ops are going to be the most successful 567 00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:11,000 Speaker 1: because you're gonna attract the most people, and um, you're 568 00:33:11,040 --> 00:33:12,880 Speaker 1: going to attract the guy who wants to put out 569 00:33:12,920 --> 00:33:15,400 Speaker 1: like a good video for it. You're gonna get the 570 00:33:15,400 --> 00:33:18,200 Speaker 1: most results. You're gonna get the most information, the biggest 571 00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:21,640 Speaker 1: data dumps. Just naturally, that's how it happens. And people 572 00:33:21,720 --> 00:33:24,280 Speaker 1: follow like, Commander X does it did a really great 573 00:33:24,360 --> 00:33:26,200 Speaker 1: job on that ops, so let's listen and hear what 574 00:33:26,280 --> 00:33:28,960 Speaker 1: he does next, right, But then other people are like, well, 575 00:33:29,040 --> 00:33:31,600 Speaker 1: Commander X, you need to shut your mouth because you 576 00:33:31,680 --> 00:33:34,600 Speaker 1: talk to the media and even though you've been you know, 577 00:33:34,720 --> 00:33:37,560 Speaker 1: in in the hacker culture since the eighties or whatever. 578 00:33:38,080 --> 00:33:40,680 Speaker 1: You Um, you have a loud mouth, and that's not 579 00:33:40,800 --> 00:33:44,640 Speaker 1: cool for this. So on on a message board, he 580 00:33:44,680 --> 00:33:49,040 Speaker 1: could be getting deferential respect. Commander X is a real person, 581 00:33:49,080 --> 00:33:52,240 Speaker 1: by the way, UM, and he could be being called 582 00:33:52,600 --> 00:33:55,800 Speaker 1: opposer at the same time, and both of those comments 583 00:33:55,880 --> 00:33:57,880 Speaker 1: have equal weight on the message board no matter how 584 00:33:57,920 --> 00:34:00,560 Speaker 1: long Commander X has been doing this. Yeah, there's a 585 00:34:00,560 --> 00:34:04,120 Speaker 1: lot of duality with anonymous UM. Some people look at 586 00:34:04,160 --> 00:34:06,000 Speaker 1: him as a as a beacon of light for those 587 00:34:06,040 --> 00:34:10,480 Speaker 1: who don't have a voice. UM. Attorney General UH Eric 588 00:34:10,520 --> 00:34:13,640 Speaker 1: Holder in two thousand thirteen said they are a steadily 589 00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:17,680 Speaker 1: increasing threat to America's economy and national security interests. Uh. 590 00:34:17,719 --> 00:34:20,400 Speaker 1: People uh A, nons will say, you know what, I 591 00:34:20,480 --> 00:34:23,400 Speaker 1: don't say that because we're not We're not stealing money, 592 00:34:23,480 --> 00:34:29,200 Speaker 1: we're not robbing h banks digitally, we're not after financial 593 00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:33,799 Speaker 1: gain at all. UM. We're out to expose people that 594 00:34:33,840 --> 00:34:36,480 Speaker 1: are doing bad things for the most part. And but 595 00:34:36,640 --> 00:34:39,680 Speaker 1: like you said earlier, though, when they're offshoots, there's always 596 00:34:39,719 --> 00:34:42,160 Speaker 1: gonna be bad apples. I guess, yeah, there are. I mean, like, 597 00:34:42,239 --> 00:34:45,840 Speaker 1: for example, the Westboro Baptist Church. They did, um, they doxed. 598 00:34:46,200 --> 00:34:51,600 Speaker 1: It's where you get the person's personal information, home address, 599 00:34:51,640 --> 00:34:53,719 Speaker 1: phone number, all that stuff and post it out to 600 00:34:53,840 --> 00:34:57,359 Speaker 1: the masses. That's tricky and dangerous, it is, but it's 601 00:34:57,360 --> 00:34:59,920 Speaker 1: Fred Phelps, so nobody really shed a tear the problem 602 00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:01,759 Speaker 1: as they also did that the Libby Phelps, who was 603 00:35:01,760 --> 00:35:05,400 Speaker 1: Fred Phelps, his granddaughter who had very publicly distanced herself 604 00:35:05,400 --> 00:35:07,440 Speaker 1: from the church and denounced it and said, I don't 605 00:35:07,440 --> 00:35:10,200 Speaker 1: agree with what my grandfather des ert says. She's still 606 00:35:10,239 --> 00:35:14,080 Speaker 1: got docs out there and my personal information exactly. So 607 00:35:14,080 --> 00:35:16,759 Speaker 1: so yeah, there's a lot of like lull sec is 608 00:35:16,760 --> 00:35:21,520 Speaker 1: another another example they they were They were this group 609 00:35:21,560 --> 00:35:24,560 Speaker 1: I think of like six or seven people, um, who 610 00:35:24,640 --> 00:35:28,279 Speaker 1: carried out what's commonly called fifty Days of Mayhem where 611 00:35:28,320 --> 00:35:30,760 Speaker 1: they just went crazy. They just hit whoever they wanted. 612 00:35:31,440 --> 00:35:35,479 Speaker 1: The Uh. This this business called Magnets dot com got 613 00:35:35,560 --> 00:35:38,680 Speaker 1: hit because they called their customer service reps and asked 614 00:35:38,719 --> 00:35:41,200 Speaker 1: them how magnets work, and the customer service reps couldn't 615 00:35:41,200 --> 00:35:43,880 Speaker 1: tell them, so they launched an operation against them. They 616 00:35:43,880 --> 00:35:46,040 Speaker 1: should have told them listen to our podcast on Max 617 00:35:46,160 --> 00:35:49,080 Speaker 1: totally should have I assume that our podcast probably spurred 618 00:35:49,120 --> 00:35:52,560 Speaker 1: that phone call to begin with. But um, so, yeah, 619 00:35:52,600 --> 00:35:54,839 Speaker 1: there are groups that do this. But then overall, if 620 00:35:54,880 --> 00:35:58,319 Speaker 1: you think about Anonymous, it is they do the ones 621 00:35:58,360 --> 00:36:00,520 Speaker 1: that get the most pressed, the ops they could most press, 622 00:36:00,640 --> 00:36:03,200 Speaker 1: usually have the most moral to mention, it makes Anonymous 623 00:36:03,239 --> 00:36:07,239 Speaker 1: seem the most robin hoodie. Like the Ku Klux Klan dump, Yeah, 624 00:36:07,280 --> 00:36:10,400 Speaker 1: that just happened within the past couple of weeks, and 625 00:36:10,440 --> 00:36:13,920 Speaker 1: they went after the clan and um got doses on 626 00:36:15,000 --> 00:36:17,799 Speaker 1: several hundred members. And I don't think there were any 627 00:36:17,880 --> 00:36:20,920 Speaker 1: huge revelations necessarily, and there there were a few, Okay, 628 00:36:20,920 --> 00:36:23,040 Speaker 1: so there were some. But the point is they went 629 00:36:23,080 --> 00:36:25,640 Speaker 1: after the clan and they basically shined a light on 630 00:36:25,680 --> 00:36:29,279 Speaker 1: the idea that the clan is still very much around. Yeah, 631 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:31,520 Speaker 1: but there were also people, I think there was a 632 00:36:31,600 --> 00:36:35,000 Speaker 1: senator or congress person or something that was exposed that 633 00:36:35,040 --> 00:36:37,520 Speaker 1: were like, I have never been involved in the clan. 634 00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:40,680 Speaker 1: So there was there was a separate dump that occurred 635 00:36:40,719 --> 00:36:44,040 Speaker 1: before the actual one that Anonymous came. Because they can 636 00:36:44,080 --> 00:36:46,480 Speaker 1: communicate with the media, they're able to do this and 637 00:36:46,480 --> 00:36:48,920 Speaker 1: they said, that wasn't us, that's not our research. We 638 00:36:48,960 --> 00:36:52,960 Speaker 1: can't vouch for that interesting. Yeah, yeah, yeah, I mean, 639 00:36:53,120 --> 00:36:57,680 Speaker 1: like I said, that's that's tricky business. When you're exposing people, 640 00:36:57,880 --> 00:37:01,560 Speaker 1: those are real lives. Um, you better make sure you've 641 00:37:01,560 --> 00:37:03,719 Speaker 1: done your homework and you've gotten it right, you know 642 00:37:03,760 --> 00:37:07,640 Speaker 1: what I mean. And I think Anonymous thinks they're getting 643 00:37:07,640 --> 00:37:12,040 Speaker 1: it right. Yeah. I think they tend to think that. Sure, 644 00:37:12,239 --> 00:37:14,839 Speaker 1: Like I don't think they're just generally going about their 645 00:37:14,880 --> 00:37:18,080 Speaker 1: business willy nilly because they want to be effective to 646 00:37:18,200 --> 00:37:20,000 Speaker 1: not get a bad rap. They don't want to have 647 00:37:20,000 --> 00:37:23,120 Speaker 1: anything that people can use against them, you know, to 648 00:37:23,160 --> 00:37:24,640 Speaker 1: say like, well look what they did here. They were 649 00:37:24,640 --> 00:37:26,960 Speaker 1: completely wrong. Yeah. At the same time, though, there is 650 00:37:27,040 --> 00:37:32,200 Speaker 1: definitely a thread of you know, appreciating Mayhem for Mayhem's sake, 651 00:37:32,280 --> 00:37:35,520 Speaker 1: and with some people who who work under the anonymous 652 00:37:35,520 --> 00:37:37,160 Speaker 1: banner as well well, which is what you're gonna get 653 00:37:37,200 --> 00:37:40,600 Speaker 1: when you're not a well defined like group with boundaries. 654 00:37:40,680 --> 00:37:44,120 Speaker 1: When you're this a morphous everyone is anonymous type of thing, 655 00:37:44,280 --> 00:37:46,080 Speaker 1: you know you're gonna have that happen. But I think 656 00:37:46,120 --> 00:37:50,040 Speaker 1: it is kind of a pretty astounding that despite no 657 00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:53,759 Speaker 1: central authority whatsoever, it isn't just more like crazy and 658 00:37:53,840 --> 00:37:57,040 Speaker 1: frenetic and just way more Mayhem centric that it actually 659 00:37:57,080 --> 00:38:00,839 Speaker 1: does carry out these ops that do have like repercussions 660 00:38:00,920 --> 00:38:03,400 Speaker 1: that the average person can look at and say, I 661 00:38:03,480 --> 00:38:05,799 Speaker 1: kind of agree with that, Like I agree with the 662 00:38:05,840 --> 00:38:08,920 Speaker 1: outcome of this. I think somebody got there due who 663 00:38:09,120 --> 00:38:12,080 Speaker 1: had it coming anything else I do. There's one last thing, 664 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:15,960 Speaker 1: so that the name anonymous came from four Chan. If 665 00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:18,799 Speaker 1: you log into four chan, you can post anonymously, like 666 00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:21,080 Speaker 1: you said I think early on. The whole reason why 667 00:38:21,080 --> 00:38:25,040 Speaker 1: it's because that just helps the keep people from self 668 00:38:25,080 --> 00:38:28,839 Speaker 1: censoring because you're posting anonymously. But then the this joke 669 00:38:28,960 --> 00:38:32,120 Speaker 1: kind of developed on four Chan that Anonymous all these 670 00:38:32,120 --> 00:38:35,040 Speaker 1: people with the thing that the anonymous handle, we're really 671 00:38:35,080 --> 00:38:39,080 Speaker 1: just one omnipresent person. And that's where the using that 672 00:38:39,280 --> 00:38:44,000 Speaker 1: term for these ops, this group, this collective group came from. 673 00:38:44,280 --> 00:38:46,000 Speaker 1: Did you ever go to Fortune? Did you check it out? 674 00:38:48,120 --> 00:38:51,920 Speaker 1: I've never felt so old than when but even Reddit 675 00:38:52,000 --> 00:38:53,879 Speaker 1: does that to me. I just go to Yeah, read 676 00:38:53,920 --> 00:38:56,360 Speaker 1: it's definitely look like that, and I'm just like I 677 00:38:56,360 --> 00:38:58,399 Speaker 1: don't even know where to look, you know, I feel 678 00:38:58,400 --> 00:39:00,520 Speaker 1: like an old man for sure. Yeah, And I'm like 679 00:39:00,600 --> 00:39:03,759 Speaker 1: I don't understand what this means. I'm sure it's hilarious, 680 00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:06,440 Speaker 1: but I don't understand it. Some of it's funny on 681 00:39:06,480 --> 00:39:09,920 Speaker 1: its face, for sure, but others just like, yeah, I 682 00:39:09,920 --> 00:39:11,759 Speaker 1: spent a little time on four Chune earlier today just 683 00:39:11,800 --> 00:39:14,640 Speaker 1: sort of looking around and yeah, it's not my bag. 684 00:39:14,680 --> 00:39:19,399 Speaker 1: But people are into it. They definitely are. Yes, Uh, 685 00:39:19,640 --> 00:39:22,000 Speaker 1: you got anything else, dude? No. I thought I enjoyed 686 00:39:22,000 --> 00:39:23,560 Speaker 1: this and I thought it was good. Oh we left 687 00:39:23,560 --> 00:39:27,520 Speaker 1: out the HP Gary thing. What's that? So? So in 688 00:39:28,640 --> 00:39:32,320 Speaker 1: a few years back, this security company named HB Gary. 689 00:39:32,960 --> 00:39:36,000 Speaker 1: The CEO named Aaron Barr came out to the Financial 690 00:39:36,000 --> 00:39:38,560 Speaker 1: Times and said, I've infiltrated Anonymous. I know who all 691 00:39:38,600 --> 00:39:40,680 Speaker 1: the top guys are, and I'm going to the FBI 692 00:39:40,760 --> 00:39:43,319 Speaker 1: with it. So some people in Anonymous, so let's go 693 00:39:43,360 --> 00:39:45,920 Speaker 1: see what this guy's talking about. Cracked into their website, 694 00:39:46,000 --> 00:39:48,760 Speaker 1: found out he was totally full of it, but found 695 00:39:48,800 --> 00:39:52,040 Speaker 1: a presentation that's that had all these dirty tricks for 696 00:39:52,160 --> 00:39:55,040 Speaker 1: undermining Anonymous and wiki leaks and like getting people to 697 00:39:55,120 --> 00:39:57,120 Speaker 1: turn on one another all that. So they're like, we're 698 00:39:57,160 --> 00:39:59,520 Speaker 1: gonna go after this guy because he was He was 699 00:39:59,600 --> 00:40:02,200 Speaker 1: publicly boasting too that he was going to take down Anonymous, 700 00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:03,920 Speaker 1: and that is not a smart thing to do. No, 701 00:40:04,080 --> 00:40:08,279 Speaker 1: And there's actually in that Anonymous UM documentary. Uh, there's 702 00:40:08,320 --> 00:40:12,040 Speaker 1: some hilarious clips from Stephen Colbert explaining what this guy 703 00:40:12,080 --> 00:40:15,080 Speaker 1: did and equated it too. He put his penis into 704 00:40:15,080 --> 00:40:17,839 Speaker 1: a hornet's nest and this is gonna turn out about 705 00:40:17,880 --> 00:40:22,440 Speaker 1: the same way and it did physical reaction. Yeah. Image, 706 00:40:22,520 --> 00:40:24,840 Speaker 1: So the guy the CEO ends up stepping down a 707 00:40:24,960 --> 00:40:28,319 Speaker 1: CEO and like drops out of public. They totally just 708 00:40:28,960 --> 00:40:32,399 Speaker 1: really got the guy and and really I think they Yeah, 709 00:40:32,640 --> 00:40:34,080 Speaker 1: it was that was a dumb thing to do on 710 00:40:34,160 --> 00:40:37,000 Speaker 1: his part, But not only was it dumb for him personally, 711 00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:40,200 Speaker 1: it also gave Anonymous a really great opportunity to show 712 00:40:40,360 --> 00:40:44,200 Speaker 1: just how you don't mess with Anonymous. You know, that 713 00:40:44,320 --> 00:40:48,160 Speaker 1: was it. That's Anonymous. If you want to know more, seriously, 714 00:40:48,200 --> 00:40:51,279 Speaker 1: go check out that UM. Well, every documentary you can 715 00:40:51,280 --> 00:40:53,440 Speaker 1: see that's over an hour and a half long is 716 00:40:53,480 --> 00:40:57,319 Speaker 1: probably pretty good. And then also there's this UM there's 717 00:40:57,360 --> 00:41:01,200 Speaker 1: a presy by a person named Choi Ju Hook called 718 00:41:01,239 --> 00:41:04,320 Speaker 1: Copy of Anonymous, which is a really great basic explainer 719 00:41:04,400 --> 00:41:07,319 Speaker 1: on Anonymous and how it works and functions. By it 720 00:41:07,360 --> 00:41:10,320 Speaker 1: sounds like somebody who's at least hung out with members 721 00:41:10,320 --> 00:41:13,520 Speaker 1: if if isn't one himself for herself, I bet you 722 00:41:13,480 --> 00:41:16,120 Speaker 1: you've hung out with a member of Anonymous. We may 723 00:41:16,160 --> 00:41:17,799 Speaker 1: have one or two in this office. You never know 724 00:41:18,880 --> 00:41:24,440 Speaker 1: my bunnies on Ben Bowlin sure stuff, but he's such 725 00:41:24,480 --> 00:41:26,960 Speaker 1: an obvious choice. It's got to be somebody wouldn't think 726 00:41:27,000 --> 00:41:30,080 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know? Yeah, Like is it you, Chuck? 727 00:41:30,120 --> 00:41:32,279 Speaker 1: It's yeah, it's like it's a Holly from stuff you 728 00:41:32,320 --> 00:41:37,960 Speaker 1: mis't right, Yeah, she loves star wars and activists. If 729 00:41:37,960 --> 00:41:40,120 Speaker 1: you want to know more about Anonymous, also, you can 730 00:41:40,160 --> 00:41:42,560 Speaker 1: go type that word into the search part how stuffworks 731 00:41:42,600 --> 00:41:47,640 Speaker 1: dot com instance, they said search parts time for listener mail. Yeah, 732 00:41:47,640 --> 00:41:51,480 Speaker 1: and speaking of mail, if you are an Anonymous member, 733 00:41:51,960 --> 00:41:55,719 Speaker 1: right us because I want to know something. I don't 734 00:41:55,719 --> 00:41:57,600 Speaker 1: know if I'm gonna buy it though somebody's like, I'm 735 00:41:57,640 --> 00:42:00,400 Speaker 1: an Anonymous dear Josh and Chuck. Yeah, love Arey from 736 00:42:00,440 --> 00:42:03,439 Speaker 1: Gary Jones at No. But if I get some weird 737 00:42:03,480 --> 00:42:05,520 Speaker 1: and cryptic thing, uh, I don't know. I think we'll 738 00:42:05,520 --> 00:42:08,960 Speaker 1: mem what if we like posted video to YouTube and 739 00:42:09,080 --> 00:42:12,879 Speaker 1: be awesome unless it's saying like we're coming after you 740 00:42:12,920 --> 00:42:18,600 Speaker 1: guys know, did we do a good job? Um? All 741 00:42:18,680 --> 00:42:21,960 Speaker 1: right listener mail, what is this? Um, I'm just gonna 742 00:42:21,960 --> 00:42:24,360 Speaker 1: call it from an English listener. Hey, guys, I'm just 743 00:42:24,440 --> 00:42:26,680 Speaker 1: an eighteen year old from the UK, but you have 744 00:42:26,760 --> 00:42:30,200 Speaker 1: my most sincere congratulations for running the bets podcast out there. 745 00:42:30,800 --> 00:42:36,000 Speaker 1: And I've listened to Cereal right. Your flowing conversation style 746 00:42:36,040 --> 00:42:38,640 Speaker 1: works so well and it's always a pleasure listening to you. Uh. 747 00:42:38,719 --> 00:42:41,440 Speaker 1: And you guys have to compete with British radio voices, 748 00:42:42,040 --> 00:42:44,600 Speaker 1: so that's saying something. It really is because they are class. 749 00:42:45,120 --> 00:42:47,560 Speaker 1: Having burned through eight hundred two episodes and seven months, 750 00:42:48,640 --> 00:42:53,239 Speaker 1: I finally ended in a wonderful, spooky spectacular. You have 751 00:42:53,320 --> 00:42:56,520 Speaker 1: been there with me through break up, six flights, eight 752 00:42:56,560 --> 00:43:00,520 Speaker 1: long distance trains, three A levels, which is some sort 753 00:43:00,520 --> 00:43:03,239 Speaker 1: of education thing in England. Oh, I think that's um 754 00:43:03,320 --> 00:43:07,200 Speaker 1: like exams finals, four new jobs, one bite crash, one 755 00:43:07,280 --> 00:43:11,560 Speaker 1: results day. All of this in six months, uh, seven months, 756 00:43:11,600 --> 00:43:14,640 Speaker 1: an InterRail trip around Europe and a very lonely night 757 00:43:14,760 --> 00:43:19,600 Speaker 1: in Brighton train station. Four jobs in seven months? Is 758 00:43:19,600 --> 00:43:22,800 Speaker 1: this guy? Hit man? You have four new jobs? Huh? Interesting? 759 00:43:23,239 --> 00:43:25,520 Speaker 1: It's been a crazy time in my life, sounds like it, 760 00:43:25,960 --> 00:43:28,799 Speaker 1: and you've been the constant that's kept me saying so big, 761 00:43:28,840 --> 00:43:32,640 Speaker 1: thanks to all of you. That's awesome. I show no favoritism. 762 00:43:32,719 --> 00:43:36,759 Speaker 1: You've made it, Barrel, I think you're saying, like between us, Yeah, 763 00:43:36,800 --> 00:43:38,600 Speaker 1: you run an awesome podcast. Keep it up, look forward 764 00:43:38,640 --> 00:43:40,400 Speaker 1: to the next eight hundred. Do you have one question? 765 00:43:40,719 --> 00:43:42,359 Speaker 1: Do you guys get along when the mic is off? 766 00:43:43,000 --> 00:43:45,719 Speaker 1: Fantastic chemistry and I've always wondered if it overcomes from 767 00:43:45,719 --> 00:43:47,399 Speaker 1: your friendship or if you two are just the most 768 00:43:47,520 --> 00:43:50,879 Speaker 1: professional people ever. I've gone on too long. All the best, 769 00:43:51,719 --> 00:43:55,880 Speaker 1: Hector Leech Clay. Thanks. Oh that's a British name. Uh, 770 00:43:56,040 --> 00:43:58,160 Speaker 1: you guys better come to the UK for a live show. 771 00:43:58,400 --> 00:44:01,160 Speaker 1: We are yes, and of course we get along off 772 00:44:01,160 --> 00:44:04,239 Speaker 1: the air. We would not you've seen our TV show. 773 00:44:04,239 --> 00:44:05,680 Speaker 1: You know we're not actors. We would not be able 774 00:44:05,719 --> 00:44:07,960 Speaker 1: to take our way through this. Check has been gazing 775 00:44:07,960 --> 00:44:10,759 Speaker 1: into my eyes this whole episode. Yeah, if it was 776 00:44:10,880 --> 00:44:15,719 Speaker 1: this not some Sunshine Boys situation? Was that? Um? Is 777 00:44:15,760 --> 00:44:18,680 Speaker 1: that George Burns? Just feel google at people Sunshine Boys. 778 00:44:19,040 --> 00:44:24,600 Speaker 1: That'll it'll all become clear. Nice good reference. Thanks Hector 779 00:44:24,719 --> 00:44:28,960 Speaker 1: Leech Clay Esquire the third Yeah, or he's Hector Leech 780 00:44:29,040 --> 00:44:31,400 Speaker 1: from Clay. I don't know it's Clay at place? Is 781 00:44:31,400 --> 00:44:33,879 Speaker 1: it Leech hyphen clay because that would be his last name, 782 00:44:34,719 --> 00:44:37,600 Speaker 1: but that they know, they do that a lot over there, 783 00:44:37,719 --> 00:44:41,120 Speaker 1: big on that. Yeah, um, well thanks a lot, Hector. 784 00:44:41,160 --> 00:44:43,480 Speaker 1: We appreciate that, and thank you for not playing flavors. 785 00:44:43,560 --> 00:44:47,600 Speaker 1: Isn't that the ideal human somebody who appreciates us both equally? Sure? 786 00:44:47,760 --> 00:44:50,120 Speaker 1: Sure so um. If you want to get in touch 787 00:44:50,160 --> 00:44:51,880 Speaker 1: with us, you can tweet to us at s y 788 00:44:52,000 --> 00:44:54,800 Speaker 1: s K podcast tweet. You can join us on Facebook, 789 00:44:54,840 --> 00:44:58,120 Speaker 1: dot com, slash stuff you Should Know, book book, You 790 00:44:58,160 --> 00:45:00,200 Speaker 1: can send us an email to Stuff Podcast, us to 791 00:45:00,239 --> 00:45:03,280 Speaker 1: how stuff Works dot com type type, and as always, 792 00:45:03,360 --> 00:45:05,279 Speaker 1: joined us at at home on the web Stuff you 793 00:45:05,360 --> 00:45:13,160 Speaker 1: Should Know dot com for more on this and thousands 794 00:45:13,160 --> 00:45:22,800 Speaker 1: of other topics. Is it how stuff Works dot com. 795 00:45:16,320 --> 00:45:16,560 Speaker 1: Yah