1 00:00:00,480 --> 00:00:04,280 Speaker 1: The interesting thing about conspiracy theories is they explain everything. 2 00:00:04,360 --> 00:00:07,360 Speaker 1: They're self licking ice cream cones. And this one, we 3 00:00:07,440 --> 00:00:10,840 Speaker 1: have a mystery about a conspiracy and a conspiracy theory, 4 00:00:10,880 --> 00:00:12,920 Speaker 1: and we don't have the answers to it, and we're 5 00:00:12,960 --> 00:00:15,280 Speaker 1: still looking for it, and it has real victims. 6 00:00:17,280 --> 00:00:19,840 Speaker 2: I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry o'she I. 7 00:00:19,920 --> 00:00:22,920 Speaker 3: Served in the CIA's Clandestine Service for twenty eight years, 8 00:00:22,960 --> 00:00:25,400 Speaker 3: living undercover all around the world. 9 00:00:25,200 --> 00:00:27,560 Speaker 1: And in my thirty three years with the CIA, I 10 00:00:27,600 --> 00:00:30,400 Speaker 1: served in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. 11 00:00:30,600 --> 00:00:32,879 Speaker 3: Although we don't usually look at it this way, we 12 00:00:33,000 --> 00:00:35,200 Speaker 3: created conspiracies. 13 00:00:34,520 --> 00:00:37,519 Speaker 1: In our operations. We got people to believe things that 14 00:00:37,560 --> 00:00:38,240 Speaker 1: weren't true. 15 00:00:38,360 --> 00:00:41,320 Speaker 3: Now we're investigating the conspiracy theories we see in the 16 00:00:41,360 --> 00:00:42,560 Speaker 3: news almost every day. 17 00:00:42,760 --> 00:00:45,040 Speaker 1: Will break them down for you to determine whether they 18 00:00:45,040 --> 00:00:47,440 Speaker 1: could be real or whether we're being manipulated. 19 00:00:47,720 --> 00:00:55,480 Speaker 3: Welcome to Mission Implausible. This week's podcast, episode two on 20 00:00:55,520 --> 00:00:58,280 Speaker 3: Havana Syndrome, a series of a parent attacks on American 21 00:00:58,320 --> 00:01:02,200 Speaker 3: diplomats and intelligence officers that left many national security professionals 22 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:05,679 Speaker 3: with serious brain injuries, was recorded prior to new details 23 00:01:05,680 --> 00:01:08,560 Speaker 3: that surfaced on Sunday March thirty, first, the news magazine 24 00:01:08,600 --> 00:01:12,080 Speaker 3: sixty Minutes, along with investigators at The Insider, published new 25 00:01:12,120 --> 00:01:16,039 Speaker 3: information highly suggestive that Russian military intelligence operatives are behind 26 00:01:16,040 --> 00:01:19,000 Speaker 3: these attacks which have been occurring since twenty fourteen. We 27 00:01:19,040 --> 00:01:21,240 Speaker 3: would encourage you to watch and read the articles. The 28 00:01:21,240 --> 00:01:25,560 Speaker 3: Insider piece, entitled Unraveling Havana Syndrome was written by Michael Weiss, 29 00:01:25,600 --> 00:01:28,160 Speaker 3: who we interviewed for an episode coming out shortly. Also, 30 00:01:28,240 --> 00:01:30,520 Speaker 3: our guest today who was a victim of these attacks, 31 00:01:30,560 --> 00:01:34,040 Speaker 3: Mark Palmeropolis, has a powerful and personal story in the Insider. 32 00:01:34,160 --> 00:01:37,280 Speaker 3: The new information surfaces really serious questions. So far, the 33 00:01:37,280 --> 00:01:40,080 Speaker 3: government denies that any foreign entity is behind the attacks, 34 00:01:40,240 --> 00:01:42,880 Speaker 3: as we posited, and the new information seems to confirm 35 00:01:42,959 --> 00:01:46,160 Speaker 3: there is clearly strong, circumstantial evidence that our public servants 36 00:01:46,200 --> 00:01:48,760 Speaker 3: are victims of a Russian attack. Why is the administration 37 00:01:48,880 --> 00:01:51,200 Speaker 3: so adamant that the brain injuries were not the result 38 00:01:51,240 --> 00:01:54,080 Speaker 3: of an attack. Does the CIA have information surfaced in 39 00:01:54,120 --> 00:01:56,400 Speaker 3: the recent articles, but is keeping it secret? And if so, 40 00:01:56,560 --> 00:01:59,600 Speaker 3: why are they afraid to'll deter US diplomats and intelligence 41 00:01:59,640 --> 00:02:02,240 Speaker 3: officers from serving overseas. Do they not want to face 42 00:02:02,240 --> 00:02:04,600 Speaker 3: the implications of a foreign attack which would pressure the 43 00:02:04,600 --> 00:02:07,360 Speaker 3: administration to respond forcefully in any event. All of this 44 00:02:07,440 --> 00:02:10,240 Speaker 3: is consistent with Russian activities over the past decade. Their 45 00:02:10,240 --> 00:02:13,000 Speaker 3: actions are just deniable enough to force inaction and take 46 00:02:13,040 --> 00:02:15,679 Speaker 3: advantage of our doubt and hesitancy. While we fight over 47 00:02:15,720 --> 00:02:18,480 Speaker 3: what is true, Vladimir Putin acts. We will discuss these 48 00:02:18,520 --> 00:02:25,000 Speaker 3: issues and many more on today's episode of Mission Implausible. Adam, 49 00:02:25,080 --> 00:02:27,960 Speaker 3: I understand you have moved away from the big city 50 00:02:27,960 --> 00:02:30,880 Speaker 3: and you now live somewhere in the rural parts of 51 00:02:30,919 --> 00:02:32,000 Speaker 3: New England. Is that true? 52 00:02:32,280 --> 00:02:35,120 Speaker 4: That is very true. I gotta say, I am really 53 00:02:35,280 --> 00:02:38,120 Speaker 4: learning that a kind of New York way of living 54 00:02:38,120 --> 00:02:43,120 Speaker 4: in the world, a sort of directness, an abrasiveness, doesn't 55 00:02:43,120 --> 00:02:45,600 Speaker 4: go over well. I guess what I'm saying is, don't 56 00:02:45,600 --> 00:02:49,160 Speaker 4: move here, whatever you do, John. 57 00:02:49,440 --> 00:02:51,560 Speaker 1: So, Adam, I grew up in the country, and I 58 00:02:51,639 --> 00:02:54,360 Speaker 1: give you a bit of wisdom that when it's not 59 00:02:54,560 --> 00:02:58,320 Speaker 1: actually dangerous to roll your windows down and feed the bears, 60 00:02:58,360 --> 00:03:02,240 Speaker 1: it's actually quite safe. What's unsafe is stop feeding the bears. 61 00:03:02,400 --> 00:03:04,639 Speaker 4: All right, guys, Well, we're getting back to I mean, 62 00:03:04,639 --> 00:03:07,400 Speaker 4: I think, on a very special episode of Mission Implausible. 63 00:03:07,440 --> 00:03:10,000 Speaker 4: Let's get into part two of Havana syndrome. 64 00:03:10,880 --> 00:03:13,840 Speaker 1: I'm really pleased to have Fay Flam with us today, 65 00:03:14,080 --> 00:03:17,080 Speaker 1: who is a genuinely cool person. So, Fay, you're a 66 00:03:17,080 --> 00:03:21,440 Speaker 1: columnist for Bloomberg, but in your past you're a science person, right, 67 00:03:21,440 --> 00:03:24,440 Speaker 1: You've got a degree of geophysics and science writing. 68 00:03:24,760 --> 00:03:28,080 Speaker 5: Yeah, I'm still a science writer. I do science columns 69 00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:30,040 Speaker 5: for Bloomberg for their opinion section. 70 00:03:30,360 --> 00:03:32,280 Speaker 3: Let's talk a little bit about this thing that's been 71 00:03:32,320 --> 00:03:35,480 Speaker 3: called Havana syndrome in the intelligence comunity. Now they call 72 00:03:35,520 --> 00:03:38,400 Speaker 3: it traumatic brain injuries or TBIs. So can you give 73 00:03:38,480 --> 00:03:39,760 Speaker 3: us a little bit of a sense of some of 74 00:03:39,800 --> 00:03:40,440 Speaker 3: your thoughts on that. 75 00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:43,440 Speaker 5: Yeah, well, it started out as a small group of 76 00:03:43,480 --> 00:03:45,600 Speaker 5: people and then it grew and grew and grew on. 77 00:03:45,640 --> 00:03:48,280 Speaker 5: There were news stories recently that said that about fifteen 78 00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:52,040 Speaker 5: hundred people have actually claimed to have Havana syndrome. And 79 00:03:52,400 --> 00:03:54,480 Speaker 5: at first there was a theory flow to that it 80 00:03:54,560 --> 00:03:57,920 Speaker 5: might be a sonic weapon, because one of the very 81 00:03:58,000 --> 00:04:01,280 Speaker 5: first people to develop part problems was a young guy 82 00:04:01,360 --> 00:04:04,520 Speaker 5: who heard a loud sound and then developed hearing loss 83 00:04:04,760 --> 00:04:07,720 Speaker 5: and ten itis. But then other people didn't hear a 84 00:04:07,760 --> 00:04:11,440 Speaker 5: noise or they heard different kinds of noises. And then 85 00:04:11,480 --> 00:04:13,960 Speaker 5: somewhere along the line, somebody floated the idea of a 86 00:04:14,000 --> 00:04:19,320 Speaker 5: microwave weapon, that somehow, some enemy faction was actually beaming 87 00:04:19,440 --> 00:04:24,720 Speaker 5: microwaves into people's heads. And this actually was something that 88 00:04:24,960 --> 00:04:28,600 Speaker 5: a certain number of doctors kind of latched onto early on. 89 00:04:28,800 --> 00:04:32,320 Speaker 5: There was even a National Academy of Sciences panel where 90 00:04:32,520 --> 00:04:36,880 Speaker 5: they deemed this the most likely cause, but physicists who 91 00:04:36,960 --> 00:04:41,560 Speaker 5: know something about microwaves dismissed it pretty quickly, because, as 92 00:04:41,760 --> 00:04:45,400 Speaker 5: one person pointed out, it's actually a myth that microwaves 93 00:04:45,480 --> 00:04:48,479 Speaker 5: cook things from the inside out, and that's part of 94 00:04:48,520 --> 00:04:50,400 Speaker 5: what makes people think, oh, yeah, I could like get 95 00:04:50,400 --> 00:04:53,400 Speaker 5: to your brain, you know, without causing any external damage. 96 00:04:53,720 --> 00:04:57,159 Speaker 5: And then another group called the Jason's That Jason is 97 00:04:57,240 --> 00:05:00,719 Speaker 5: a group of physicists that's been advised the government on 98 00:05:00,800 --> 00:05:04,080 Speaker 5: nuclear weapons and all kinds of different science related issues. 99 00:05:04,240 --> 00:05:06,840 Speaker 5: They've looked at this too, and they concluded that it 100 00:05:06,880 --> 00:05:11,920 Speaker 5: was most likely to have a psychosomatic origin. And I 101 00:05:11,960 --> 00:05:14,640 Speaker 5: have written a couple columns about this, and in one 102 00:05:14,720 --> 00:05:19,160 Speaker 5: I talked to a neurologist who's an expert on psychosomatic conditions, 103 00:05:19,160 --> 00:05:21,800 Speaker 5: and I learned something really important about this, which is. 104 00:05:22,000 --> 00:05:25,239 Speaker 5: We tend to sort of dismiss psychosomatic as meaning fake 105 00:05:25,440 --> 00:05:28,039 Speaker 5: or all in your head, imagined in some way, that 106 00:05:28,080 --> 00:05:30,440 Speaker 5: it's not real and not really a problem. But the 107 00:05:30,480 --> 00:05:32,960 Speaker 5: way she described it, I realized it has to do 108 00:05:33,120 --> 00:05:35,440 Speaker 5: with the you know, the connection between the mind and 109 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:37,839 Speaker 5: the body, which is not well understood, and that people 110 00:05:37,920 --> 00:05:40,680 Speaker 5: are really suffering and can't just get over it when 111 00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:44,760 Speaker 5: they have psychosomatic conditions. And so I left thinking Havana 112 00:05:44,800 --> 00:05:49,280 Speaker 5: syndrome is real, it probably has a big psychosomatic component, 113 00:05:49,600 --> 00:05:52,200 Speaker 5: and that people are suffering from that. 114 00:05:53,040 --> 00:05:55,040 Speaker 1: So I want to explore what you say by when 115 00:05:55,040 --> 00:05:57,080 Speaker 1: we talk about this, and I want to be clear 116 00:05:57,080 --> 00:06:00,839 Speaker 1: that we don't have any certainty what this is is right, 117 00:06:01,240 --> 00:06:04,720 Speaker 1: so piss big prologue. We know, because John is a 118 00:06:04,760 --> 00:06:09,080 Speaker 1: victim of it, that the Russians do do things like 119 00:06:09,560 --> 00:06:13,440 Speaker 1: be microwaves at the embassy, and we know that it 120 00:06:13,520 --> 00:06:16,440 Speaker 1: goes back to the nineteen seventies. We know that Kissinger 121 00:06:16,720 --> 00:06:21,960 Speaker 1: was talking with then Soviet foreign Minister Dobreenan about the 122 00:06:22,040 --> 00:06:23,919 Speaker 1: issue of bombing. 123 00:06:23,480 --> 00:06:25,080 Speaker 2: The embassy with microwaves. 124 00:06:25,240 --> 00:06:27,120 Speaker 1: And when I say microwaves, I want to sort of 125 00:06:27,120 --> 00:06:28,960 Speaker 1: work back as we use the termine we all think 126 00:06:28,960 --> 00:06:31,880 Speaker 1: of like the microwave oven, but microwaves are not actually 127 00:06:31,960 --> 00:06:32,440 Speaker 1: that they are. 128 00:06:32,480 --> 00:06:35,240 Speaker 2: It's a form of help me out here, FAE. 129 00:06:35,040 --> 00:06:40,040 Speaker 5: Elect electromagnetic radio electromannet radiation exactly right, Yes, And it's 130 00:06:40,040 --> 00:06:42,520 Speaker 5: a long wavelength so we can go through things. It's 131 00:06:42,560 --> 00:06:46,560 Speaker 5: not like l you know, it's it's a big spectrum. 132 00:06:46,600 --> 00:06:48,960 Speaker 5: And this is on the long wavelength end. 133 00:06:49,360 --> 00:06:49,560 Speaker 2: Right. 134 00:06:49,880 --> 00:06:53,080 Speaker 1: So we know that the Russians have bathed our embassy 135 00:06:53,160 --> 00:06:57,720 Speaker 1: in microwaves. We know they be electromegletic energy, whether it's 136 00:06:57,760 --> 00:07:00,720 Speaker 1: microwaves or other sorts at the embassy for all sorts 137 00:07:00,720 --> 00:07:03,960 Speaker 1: of reasons. We know they put carcinogenic spy dust on 138 00:07:04,040 --> 00:07:06,560 Speaker 1: our officers. And I'll just throw this in that my 139 00:07:06,720 --> 00:07:10,560 Speaker 1: understanding is that the Russians did experiment with this sort 140 00:07:10,560 --> 00:07:13,640 Speaker 1: of thing, as has the US military. There was there 141 00:07:13,680 --> 00:07:16,480 Speaker 1: was the MEDUSA project, and I'm just going to bring 142 00:07:16,480 --> 00:07:18,960 Speaker 1: it up because I love what MEDUSA stands for. It's 143 00:07:19,000 --> 00:07:24,560 Speaker 1: the mob Excess to turrent using silent audio, a weapon 144 00:07:24,800 --> 00:07:27,400 Speaker 1: crowd control device that was worked on in the year 145 00:07:27,440 --> 00:07:30,720 Speaker 1: two thousands, and that the US military was looking at 146 00:07:30,800 --> 00:07:33,720 Speaker 1: this in the late sixties and early seventies, where they 147 00:07:33,840 --> 00:07:36,080 Speaker 1: determined that as far as they could tell with what 148 00:07:36,120 --> 00:07:38,560 Speaker 1: they were using, it was having no impact on Reese's monkeys. 149 00:07:38,720 --> 00:07:42,760 Speaker 1: And then lastly on the demographic fifteen hundred, I would say, 150 00:07:42,840 --> 00:07:46,160 Speaker 1: if it's that large, knowing how things operate, that's too 151 00:07:46,240 --> 00:07:47,800 Speaker 1: large a number, too large a demographic. 152 00:07:47,880 --> 00:07:49,920 Speaker 3: Well, yeah, let me address that. One of the problems 153 00:07:49,920 --> 00:07:53,320 Speaker 3: we have here is that this happened largely to people 154 00:07:53,640 --> 00:07:56,760 Speaker 3: who live inside a closed secret system right in the CIA, 155 00:07:56,920 --> 00:08:00,679 Speaker 3: and so therefore we're responding to what media account, let's say, 156 00:08:00,720 --> 00:08:03,400 Speaker 3: of this. So what happened was there were several people 157 00:08:03,600 --> 00:08:07,440 Speaker 3: in several places after the original Havana victims that reported 158 00:08:07,480 --> 00:08:10,360 Speaker 3: that they thought they suffered from this I got brain 159 00:08:10,400 --> 00:08:13,760 Speaker 3: injuries from what they believed was some sort of targeted attack. 160 00:08:14,400 --> 00:08:16,800 Speaker 3: And for a long time, the agency and the agency 161 00:08:16,880 --> 00:08:19,000 Speaker 3: leadership didn't want to deal with it. They'd pushed back 162 00:08:19,040 --> 00:08:22,120 Speaker 3: against these people. They're worried about if they agree that 163 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:24,160 Speaker 3: these people got hit, then other people are going to 164 00:08:24,240 --> 00:08:26,800 Speaker 3: say they did it. So once the new director came in, 165 00:08:27,000 --> 00:08:29,080 Speaker 3: he said, Okay, we have to deal with this. We 166 00:08:29,160 --> 00:08:31,040 Speaker 3: have to try to help these people who believe they 167 00:08:31,040 --> 00:08:33,319 Speaker 3: were hurt, and they sent out a message to everybody 168 00:08:33,320 --> 00:08:35,920 Speaker 3: in the organization saying, if you think there's anything that 169 00:08:35,960 --> 00:08:38,880 Speaker 3: you're having, some sort of brain injury or anything that 170 00:08:38,960 --> 00:08:41,160 Speaker 3: might have happened to you, please stand up and report it. 171 00:08:41,520 --> 00:08:44,880 Speaker 3: And yes, fifteen hundred or more people said, yeah, maybe me. 172 00:08:45,240 --> 00:08:47,480 Speaker 3: And of course, now we've had people in Afghanistan and 173 00:08:47,520 --> 00:08:50,200 Speaker 3: in Iraq and they've been around bombings and all these 174 00:08:50,200 --> 00:08:52,839 Speaker 3: other kind of things. And my understanding is they've come 175 00:08:52,880 --> 00:08:54,800 Speaker 3: down to the fact that maybe twenty or thirty of 176 00:08:54,840 --> 00:08:57,720 Speaker 3: these people are ones that they believe are the ones 177 00:08:57,760 --> 00:08:59,720 Speaker 3: that could be legitimate victims of this thing. The other 178 00:08:59,760 --> 00:09:02,400 Speaker 3: people may have something, they may have problems, but it 179 00:09:02,440 --> 00:09:06,199 Speaker 3: doesn't fit into this pattern of a potential attack. 180 00:09:06,480 --> 00:09:08,079 Speaker 5: Yeah, and that's why, I mean, there can be more 181 00:09:08,120 --> 00:09:10,120 Speaker 5: than one thing going on. And I know there were 182 00:09:10,160 --> 00:09:13,679 Speaker 5: a lot of reports about different kinds of really bad harassment, 183 00:09:13,800 --> 00:09:17,200 Speaker 5: especially in Havana, that people were reporting, you know, that 184 00:09:17,400 --> 00:09:21,080 Speaker 5: dog excrement was in their cars and people were breaking 185 00:09:21,120 --> 00:09:24,920 Speaker 5: into their homes. And when it comes to science and technology, 186 00:09:25,040 --> 00:09:26,720 Speaker 5: the things that are really unlikely are things that would 187 00:09:26,800 --> 00:09:29,720 Speaker 5: violate the laws of science as we know them. But 188 00:09:29,960 --> 00:09:33,679 Speaker 5: if something is sort of not scientifically impossible, but just 189 00:09:33,760 --> 00:09:36,840 Speaker 5: a technology that we don't quite understand, well, then it 190 00:09:36,920 --> 00:09:39,640 Speaker 5: may be possible. I think the research there is actually 191 00:09:39,720 --> 00:09:41,440 Speaker 5: quite a bit of research, and I think that's why 192 00:09:41,480 --> 00:09:43,280 Speaker 5: the Jason group was skeptical. 193 00:09:43,559 --> 00:09:45,280 Speaker 3: One thing I want to say about the Jason's because 194 00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:47,280 Speaker 3: we in the Agency would use the Jacon's to bring 195 00:09:47,320 --> 00:09:49,760 Speaker 3: them in to look at things that we saw. For example, 196 00:09:49,760 --> 00:09:52,200 Speaker 3: when I was in Moscow, we had reporting about some 197 00:09:52,240 --> 00:09:54,640 Speaker 3: of the things that the Russians were doing scientifically, like 198 00:09:54,760 --> 00:09:56,680 Speaker 3: Jerry talked about in cmbassy and these type of things, 199 00:09:56,679 --> 00:09:58,520 Speaker 3: and we would actually bring the Jasons in to study 200 00:09:58,559 --> 00:10:01,320 Speaker 3: these things, and frankly, I've seen times when they were wrong. 201 00:10:01,440 --> 00:10:04,120 Speaker 3: So they we would present them things that we were 202 00:10:04,120 --> 00:10:06,080 Speaker 3: getting reporting that the Russians were doing, and we would 203 00:10:06,080 --> 00:10:08,319 Speaker 3: get reports back from them saying, oh, this is impossible, 204 00:10:08,360 --> 00:10:10,080 Speaker 3: this is not something doesn't make any sense, it doesn't 205 00:10:10,120 --> 00:10:12,880 Speaker 3: make scientific sense. And over time we would actually then 206 00:10:12,960 --> 00:10:16,400 Speaker 3: find out more specifics about this and they'd be like, oh, yeah, well, 207 00:10:16,400 --> 00:10:18,760 Speaker 3: actually we never thought about it that way. The Russians 208 00:10:18,760 --> 00:10:20,959 Speaker 3: are approaching things in a completely different way than they 209 00:10:21,000 --> 00:10:23,720 Speaker 3: should or we would or other things. So and in 210 00:10:23,760 --> 00:10:26,240 Speaker 3: my case, these adjacents, in this case that was an 211 00:10:26,240 --> 00:10:29,000 Speaker 3: early report, and none of them had any access to 212 00:10:29,040 --> 00:10:32,360 Speaker 3: any of these victims. So yeah, I trust them as scientists. 213 00:10:32,440 --> 00:10:35,320 Speaker 3: But we in the government, when we get involved somewhere, 214 00:10:35,480 --> 00:10:37,760 Speaker 3: if we're going to be successful, say you know, in 215 00:10:37,800 --> 00:10:41,240 Speaker 3: Afghanistan or whatever, we weren't successful, we often talk about 216 00:10:41,280 --> 00:10:43,360 Speaker 3: an all of government approach and you could say, ohause, 217 00:10:43,360 --> 00:10:45,400 Speaker 3: this could be sort of mass hysteria or something. But 218 00:10:45,440 --> 00:10:48,320 Speaker 3: then from people on the ground, how do you explain, 219 00:10:48,400 --> 00:10:51,040 Speaker 3: for example, then that some of the patterns that we've seen, 220 00:10:51,160 --> 00:10:53,840 Speaker 3: we've seen patterns of these twenty or thirty people who 221 00:10:54,160 --> 00:10:56,760 Speaker 3: believe that they've been hit by this, they are overwhelmingly 222 00:10:56,880 --> 00:11:00,360 Speaker 3: people in the CIA who worked on Russia issues that 223 00:11:00,440 --> 00:11:02,920 Speaker 3: are in specific countries where the Russians and others have 224 00:11:03,040 --> 00:11:05,920 Speaker 3: freedom of movement. And so how does mass hysteria happen 225 00:11:05,960 --> 00:11:07,920 Speaker 3: to one person here, one person there, one person there, 226 00:11:07,920 --> 00:11:09,120 Speaker 3: and that now it's possible. 227 00:11:09,200 --> 00:11:12,280 Speaker 5: I mean, obviously the first case can't be mass hysteria. 228 00:11:12,480 --> 00:11:16,440 Speaker 5: It starts with something, and so something happened to a 229 00:11:16,480 --> 00:11:19,199 Speaker 5: few people. When it starts to blow up to fifteen 230 00:11:19,320 --> 00:11:22,000 Speaker 5: hundred people, then there's something psychological going on. In the 231 00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:24,480 Speaker 5: power of suggestion, I guess the question is you know, 232 00:11:24,640 --> 00:11:26,520 Speaker 5: why settle on a microwave weapon? 233 00:11:26,640 --> 00:11:28,240 Speaker 3: You know exactly, Let's put that away. 234 00:11:28,679 --> 00:11:31,920 Speaker 1: Yeah, I think using the word attack we also may 235 00:11:31,920 --> 00:11:35,160 Speaker 1: be going down a wrong path. So what the Russians 236 00:11:35,320 --> 00:11:38,800 Speaker 1: again from an intelligence offers perspective, and John is the 237 00:11:38,880 --> 00:11:39,600 Speaker 1: Russia exper. 238 00:11:39,440 --> 00:11:41,679 Speaker 3: We're also assuming Russia here too, which is what we're 239 00:11:41,679 --> 00:11:42,839 Speaker 3: also going in a certain direction. 240 00:11:42,880 --> 00:11:44,560 Speaker 1: We're making an assumption that it would have to be 241 00:11:44,559 --> 00:11:47,239 Speaker 1: a nation state with significant resources. 242 00:11:47,280 --> 00:11:47,880 Speaker 2: We don't know. 243 00:11:48,440 --> 00:11:51,360 Speaker 1: It could be that the attacks are not actually at 244 00:11:51,400 --> 00:11:55,520 Speaker 1: tacks against people, but it takes against devices. And it 245 00:11:55,559 --> 00:11:58,520 Speaker 1: could be that the Russians, the adversaries, you may not 246 00:11:58,600 --> 00:12:01,400 Speaker 1: even know themselves. Why the impact is going to be 247 00:12:01,480 --> 00:12:03,400 Speaker 1: on human beings when you're trying to shut off a 248 00:12:03,440 --> 00:12:05,560 Speaker 1: cell phone or go after a cell phone or a 249 00:12:05,600 --> 00:12:09,400 Speaker 1: piece of specialized electronic equipment and you use some sort 250 00:12:09,440 --> 00:12:11,160 Speaker 1: of electroathletic energy. 251 00:12:11,400 --> 00:12:14,360 Speaker 3: But is there anything existing, any sort of scientific thing 252 00:12:14,360 --> 00:12:17,520 Speaker 3: that could be weaponized that could have this kind of effect? 253 00:12:17,800 --> 00:12:20,760 Speaker 5: Well, you know, I have interviewed a couple of different 254 00:12:20,840 --> 00:12:23,960 Speaker 5: people on this that I think were helpful. One was 255 00:12:24,080 --> 00:12:27,400 Speaker 5: a scientists who had worked at Los Alamos for years 256 00:12:27,520 --> 00:12:31,240 Speaker 5: and was familiar with our own US research on microwave weapons, 257 00:12:31,760 --> 00:12:36,120 Speaker 5: and was very skeptical that such a thing exists. You know, 258 00:12:36,200 --> 00:12:39,760 Speaker 5: people have looked at a few things, you know, since 259 00:12:39,800 --> 00:12:42,120 Speaker 5: people were breaking into their homes, people have looked at 260 00:12:42,120 --> 00:12:44,360 Speaker 5: whether it could be some sort of a virus, even 261 00:12:44,720 --> 00:12:47,240 Speaker 5: you know, some sort of a microbe, some sort of 262 00:12:47,280 --> 00:12:50,360 Speaker 5: a chemical or poison that their homes had been tampered with, 263 00:12:50,400 --> 00:12:54,040 Speaker 5: their furniture had been rearranged. But maybe they had experimented 264 00:12:54,080 --> 00:12:56,680 Speaker 5: with ways to poison people in a low level way 265 00:12:56,760 --> 00:13:00,679 Speaker 5: so that it wasn't obvious exactly when and where it started, 266 00:13:00,760 --> 00:13:02,840 Speaker 5: but where they did start to feel sick. 267 00:13:02,920 --> 00:13:05,640 Speaker 3: When I lived overseas and places where that it didn't 268 00:13:05,840 --> 00:13:08,160 Speaker 3: like us, people did break into our houses routinely, in 269 00:13:08,720 --> 00:13:11,120 Speaker 3: things and nervous. The thing I was maybe most nervous 270 00:13:11,160 --> 00:13:13,079 Speaker 3: is when I would go to get a haircut. I'd 271 00:13:13,120 --> 00:13:14,520 Speaker 3: be sitting there and I think, like this guy could 272 00:13:14,520 --> 00:13:15,280 Speaker 3: just slip my throat. 273 00:13:15,440 --> 00:13:18,319 Speaker 2: Oh my god, let's take a break. We'll be right back, 274 00:13:24,480 --> 00:13:25,679 Speaker 2: and boom, we're back. 275 00:13:27,120 --> 00:13:29,559 Speaker 1: When you get a dog whistle and you blow into it, 276 00:13:29,840 --> 00:13:34,000 Speaker 1: we don't hear anything, and yet this high pitched auditory 277 00:13:34,160 --> 00:13:37,040 Speaker 1: stimulus will hurt a dog's ear because it impacts on 278 00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:38,920 Speaker 1: the bone and it's in their ear. 279 00:13:39,679 --> 00:13:40,920 Speaker 2: Is it possible. 280 00:13:40,760 --> 00:13:44,520 Speaker 1: Also sort of audio waves or just on the noise 281 00:13:44,559 --> 00:13:45,840 Speaker 1: spectrum that could. 282 00:13:45,640 --> 00:13:48,320 Speaker 5: Impact a lot of people reported hearing noises. 283 00:13:48,440 --> 00:13:51,120 Speaker 1: So if I was wanted to build a machine, they 284 00:13:51,160 --> 00:13:55,119 Speaker 1: had vibrations like in the audio, you know, noise vibrations, 285 00:13:55,120 --> 00:13:57,240 Speaker 1: but we can't hear it like dogs hand some sounding 286 00:13:57,320 --> 00:13:59,120 Speaker 1: that might shake a person's brain. 287 00:13:59,640 --> 00:14:02,880 Speaker 5: That was actually part of the theory behind the microwaves. 288 00:14:02,960 --> 00:14:04,839 Speaker 5: Is there something called the Fray effect? I don't know 289 00:14:04,920 --> 00:14:10,160 Speaker 5: if you cloked at the guy that was studying the 290 00:14:10,280 --> 00:14:14,560 Speaker 5: physiological effects of microwaves. I think he was originally commissioned 291 00:14:14,600 --> 00:14:17,520 Speaker 5: by the Navy to look at whether naval officers on 292 00:14:17,640 --> 00:14:20,520 Speaker 5: ships who were being exposed to radar were being damaged 293 00:14:20,560 --> 00:14:22,880 Speaker 5: by it. And I guess he actually put himself in 294 00:14:22,920 --> 00:14:25,920 Speaker 5: the path the microwaves and heard this clicking sound. 295 00:14:25,960 --> 00:14:27,360 Speaker 2: When this was taking place. 296 00:14:27,480 --> 00:14:31,800 Speaker 1: Initially, my understanding is that senior agency officials did not. 297 00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:33,520 Speaker 2: Want to take this to the White House. 298 00:14:33,920 --> 00:14:37,760 Speaker 1: It was precarious to tell the White House that Vladimir 299 00:14:37,760 --> 00:14:41,000 Speaker 1: Putin is a bad guy, right and to go after 300 00:14:41,040 --> 00:14:44,040 Speaker 1: this aggressively. To do this, because if you found out 301 00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:46,480 Speaker 1: that the Russians were doing something or if it was 302 00:14:46,880 --> 00:14:51,640 Speaker 1: likely that is either a causes belly attacking us inside 303 00:14:51,720 --> 00:14:55,800 Speaker 1: of our own embassy, right that has serious consequences for this, 304 00:14:56,480 --> 00:15:00,600 Speaker 1: and that White House didn't want to know, and so 305 00:15:00,720 --> 00:15:06,120 Speaker 1: there was a huge bureaucratic, but very real disincentive to 306 00:15:06,320 --> 00:15:07,720 Speaker 1: follow this up aggressively. 307 00:15:07,880 --> 00:15:10,120 Speaker 3: I think even this White House would not want to 308 00:15:10,120 --> 00:15:12,480 Speaker 3: do that because you're forced to then respond. In other words, 309 00:15:12,520 --> 00:15:16,120 Speaker 3: you know, you've made their life more difficult, only if 310 00:15:16,160 --> 00:15:16,600 Speaker 3: you have. 311 00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:19,960 Speaker 1: One hundred percent certainty. Right what you're doing is, let's 312 00:15:20,000 --> 00:15:23,360 Speaker 1: go back to Russia. You're accusing Russia, so you have 313 00:15:23,440 --> 00:15:28,920 Speaker 1: to be one hundred thousand friggin percent certain, not ninety 314 00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:29,520 Speaker 1: nine percent. 315 00:15:29,560 --> 00:15:31,280 Speaker 3: So you're talking to a science person and you're calling 316 00:15:31,320 --> 00:15:33,960 Speaker 3: one hundred thousand percent, like, well, it's like, yeah. 317 00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:36,000 Speaker 1: One hundred thousand percent, it's more than nine hundred and 318 00:15:36,040 --> 00:15:38,520 Speaker 1: ninety nine thousand percent. The fact that it walks like 319 00:15:38,560 --> 00:15:42,160 Speaker 1: a duck and clacks like a duck doesn't always mean 320 00:15:42,200 --> 00:15:44,760 Speaker 1: it's a duck. So I think we're I think we're 321 00:15:44,760 --> 00:15:48,560 Speaker 1: in agreement that we simply don't have enough data to 322 00:15:48,640 --> 00:15:52,880 Speaker 1: determine whether or not some sort of device was used 323 00:15:53,080 --> 00:15:54,880 Speaker 1: to impact on an officer rights. 324 00:15:55,000 --> 00:15:56,960 Speaker 2: This is still an open question, right. 325 00:15:56,920 --> 00:15:59,000 Speaker 5: Yeah, I agree with that. Yeah, that was fun. 326 00:15:59,120 --> 00:16:05,480 Speaker 3: Thank you Faith for putting up with Jerry. Our next 327 00:16:05,560 --> 00:16:09,320 Speaker 3: guest is Mark Palmeropolis. Mark is a friend of ours 328 00:16:09,480 --> 00:16:12,560 Speaker 3: and a career CIA Clandestine Service officer like we were. 329 00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:14,840 Speaker 3: He spent most of his career in the Middle East 330 00:16:14,880 --> 00:16:18,000 Speaker 3: and in war zones before working in senior leadership back 331 00:16:18,000 --> 00:16:21,200 Speaker 3: at CIA headquarters, and his career sadly was cut short 332 00:16:21,400 --> 00:16:24,320 Speaker 3: when he suffered an attack by what was then called 333 00:16:24,320 --> 00:16:27,320 Speaker 3: the Havana syndrome. Since he was sort of forced out 334 00:16:27,360 --> 00:16:29,280 Speaker 3: of the government and it needed to get medical help, 335 00:16:29,640 --> 00:16:32,520 Speaker 3: he's become a senior Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council. 336 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:36,400 Speaker 3: He's a regular on MSNBC and The Joe Scarborough Show, 337 00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:39,400 Speaker 3: among other places, has written a variety of opinion pieces 338 00:16:39,440 --> 00:16:43,240 Speaker 3: and a well respected management leadership book. And so Mark, 339 00:16:43,280 --> 00:16:45,080 Speaker 3: it's really great to have you here today. I was 340 00:16:45,080 --> 00:16:47,280 Speaker 3: wondering if you could provide our listeners maybe just sort 341 00:16:47,280 --> 00:16:50,680 Speaker 3: of a short overview of what happened to you both 342 00:16:50,760 --> 00:16:53,280 Speaker 3: in the field physically and then sort of the follow up. 343 00:16:53,520 --> 00:16:56,520 Speaker 6: Sure. Sure, and it's good to be here. With old friends, 344 00:16:56,640 --> 00:16:58,440 Speaker 6: and I will say, as you know, as I tell 345 00:16:58,480 --> 00:17:01,640 Speaker 6: my story, I have to give some credit to people 346 00:17:01,720 --> 00:17:04,639 Speaker 6: like John and Jerry who actually stood by me. There 347 00:17:04,640 --> 00:17:07,159 Speaker 6: are some really hard times when you go through the 348 00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:09,919 Speaker 6: kind of what I went through and battle the government 349 00:17:09,920 --> 00:17:13,159 Speaker 6: frankly in public. Ultimately win, but you make some enemies 350 00:17:13,200 --> 00:17:15,680 Speaker 6: from inside our old outfit and you end up knowing 351 00:17:15,720 --> 00:17:17,720 Speaker 6: who your true friends are. So both of you have 352 00:17:17,800 --> 00:17:19,800 Speaker 6: been that, and trust me, it's noticed by me and 353 00:17:19,840 --> 00:17:22,679 Speaker 6: my family, and you know, my life really changed in 354 00:17:22,720 --> 00:17:25,920 Speaker 6: December of twenty seventeen. I had been a long time 355 00:17:26,160 --> 00:17:28,320 Speaker 6: CIA officer, a case officer. I'd spent a lot of 356 00:17:28,320 --> 00:17:30,040 Speaker 6: time in the Middle East. As you noted, the last 357 00:17:30,119 --> 00:17:31,920 Speaker 6: job I actually had when I was promoted at the 358 00:17:31,960 --> 00:17:34,320 Speaker 6: Senior Intelligence Service, I was made first the deputy and 359 00:17:34,320 --> 00:17:36,480 Speaker 6: then the chief of operations over it's called the Europe 360 00:17:36,480 --> 00:17:39,600 Speaker 6: and Eurasian Mission Center, which was the entity responsible for 361 00:17:39,720 --> 00:17:42,440 Speaker 6: our work from everywhere from Ireland to the farthest time 362 00:17:42,560 --> 00:17:45,159 Speaker 6: zones of Russia. And with that, because I was a 363 00:17:45,160 --> 00:17:47,560 Speaker 6: career Middle East officer, I wanted to take a trip 364 00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:50,320 Speaker 6: to Russia. I wanted to meet the ambassador John Huntsman, 365 00:17:50,400 --> 00:17:52,320 Speaker 6: and then I wanted to just see for myself because 366 00:17:52,320 --> 00:17:54,240 Speaker 6: I was overseeing this part of the world. So in 367 00:17:54,240 --> 00:17:56,960 Speaker 6: December of twenty seventeen, I made a faithful trip to 368 00:17:57,040 --> 00:17:59,520 Speaker 6: Moscow again to meet the ambassador, and of course I 369 00:17:59,520 --> 00:18:02,560 Speaker 6: actually was meeting with counterparts and the Russian security services, 370 00:18:02,640 --> 00:18:04,359 Speaker 6: and a lot of folks ask you know why is that. Well, 371 00:18:04,359 --> 00:18:06,199 Speaker 6: even the darkest days of the Cold War, John, we 372 00:18:06,240 --> 00:18:09,679 Speaker 6: had not a productive but a relationship with the KGB 373 00:18:09,880 --> 00:18:12,400 Speaker 6: where the CIA and a KGB would have open channels, 374 00:18:12,400 --> 00:18:14,320 Speaker 6: and so we still have that with Russia, and that, frankly, 375 00:18:14,440 --> 00:18:16,679 Speaker 6: is important. So I was going to meet my counterparts, 376 00:18:16,720 --> 00:18:19,280 Speaker 6: both in the external service, the SPR and the internal 377 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:22,119 Speaker 6: service the FSB. The Russians did not want me to 378 00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:24,520 Speaker 6: take the trip. As we applied for the visa, received 379 00:18:24,520 --> 00:18:26,359 Speaker 6: the visa, they called back they wanted to rescind it. 380 00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:27,840 Speaker 6: They thought I was going to be doing something to 381 00:18:27,920 --> 00:18:30,359 Speaker 6: Farius there, which is ridiculous. I was a member of 382 00:18:30,359 --> 00:18:32,880 Speaker 6: the Senior Intelligence Service. I was going there very overtly 383 00:18:32,920 --> 00:18:34,879 Speaker 6: telling them I was going. But for some reason they 384 00:18:34,880 --> 00:18:38,000 Speaker 6: were spooked by this, and so we insisted on myself 385 00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:40,120 Speaker 6: and one other officer going and about two or three 386 00:18:40,200 --> 00:18:41,760 Speaker 6: nights into the trip, as I'm staying at a five 387 00:18:41,920 --> 00:18:44,680 Speaker 6: star hotel within what John you probably know, there's two 388 00:18:44,720 --> 00:18:47,200 Speaker 6: blocks of the US Embassy, that's the Marriott. I woke 389 00:18:47,240 --> 00:18:49,040 Speaker 6: up in the middle of the night with an incredible 390 00:18:49,080 --> 00:18:52,760 Speaker 6: case of vertigo, a splitting headache. I felt physically sick. 391 00:18:52,800 --> 00:18:55,000 Speaker 6: I had tonight is ringing in my ears. And this 392 00:18:55,040 --> 00:18:57,920 Speaker 6: started really this terrible medical journey which caused me to 393 00:18:57,960 --> 00:19:00,800 Speaker 6: retire from the CIA, ultimately to go public begging for 394 00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:03,200 Speaker 6: medical care and ending up at Walter Reid with the 395 00:19:03,600 --> 00:19:07,520 Speaker 6: traumatic brain injury diagnosis. But something seriously, it did happen 396 00:19:07,560 --> 00:19:09,920 Speaker 6: to me that night in Moscow. I was at the 397 00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:11,800 Speaker 6: kind of the top of my game and physical and 398 00:19:11,840 --> 00:19:14,280 Speaker 6: mental health, and I turned into someone that you could 399 00:19:14,280 --> 00:19:17,400 Speaker 6: almost not recognize. So quite a story, and I hope 400 00:19:17,440 --> 00:19:19,760 Speaker 6: it doesn't define my career, but something that I always 401 00:19:19,760 --> 00:19:20,320 Speaker 6: have to live with. 402 00:19:20,600 --> 00:19:23,840 Speaker 3: So, Mark, when this happened, you had to retire. I 403 00:19:23,840 --> 00:19:26,040 Speaker 3: think you still say that even to this day you 404 00:19:26,080 --> 00:19:28,600 Speaker 3: have daily splitting headaches. Had to go to Walter Reed 405 00:19:28,640 --> 00:19:31,040 Speaker 3: as you mentioned, and get help. And so I want 406 00:19:31,080 --> 00:19:33,280 Speaker 3: to ask, sort of probably a tough question, who are 407 00:19:33,280 --> 00:19:36,159 Speaker 3: the people that handled it well inside and outside the 408 00:19:36,240 --> 00:19:37,880 Speaker 3: US government, and who are the people who you think 409 00:19:37,920 --> 00:19:38,760 Speaker 3: handled it poorly. 410 00:19:38,960 --> 00:19:41,520 Speaker 6: It's a very fair question and answers to that question, 411 00:19:41,560 --> 00:19:44,760 Speaker 6: I've provided directly not only to senior CIA leadership over heres, 412 00:19:44,760 --> 00:19:47,240 Speaker 6: but also to the oversight committees both in the House 413 00:19:47,280 --> 00:19:49,320 Speaker 6: and the Senate who have investigated this, because I was 414 00:19:49,400 --> 00:19:51,560 Speaker 6: very upset on how this was handled. So I came 415 00:19:51,600 --> 00:19:54,280 Speaker 6: back from ten days in Moscow and Saint Petersburg and 416 00:19:54,440 --> 00:19:57,680 Speaker 6: I was in agony. I had terrible splitting headaches. Things 417 00:19:57,680 --> 00:19:59,720 Speaker 6: got worse when I got back. I developed brain fag 418 00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:03,080 Speaker 6: my long distance vision, I couldn't drive, I had some 419 00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:06,280 Speaker 6: cognitive issues. And I went to our office medical services 420 00:20:06,320 --> 00:20:08,400 Speaker 6: and I said, look, something happened to me there. And 421 00:20:08,880 --> 00:20:10,720 Speaker 6: in the back of my mind I thought of what 422 00:20:10,840 --> 00:20:13,679 Speaker 6: had occurred back in twenty sixteen to our diplomats at 423 00:20:13,680 --> 00:20:16,359 Speaker 6: the US Embassy in Havana, Cuba, and I said, you know, 424 00:20:16,640 --> 00:20:18,480 Speaker 6: could this be that? And they put me through some 425 00:20:18,640 --> 00:20:21,800 Speaker 6: very rudimentary tests. I literally walking down, touching my finger 426 00:20:21,840 --> 00:20:24,399 Speaker 6: to my nose or something, and they said, no, you 427 00:20:24,440 --> 00:20:26,200 Speaker 6: don't have those same kind of symptoms, even though I 428 00:20:26,240 --> 00:20:29,159 Speaker 6: did have kind of vertigo and occipital neualogia, which is 429 00:20:29,160 --> 00:20:31,439 Speaker 6: a splitting headache in the back, and some of the 430 00:20:31,440 --> 00:20:33,679 Speaker 6: things that actually the other Havana victims did have. But 431 00:20:34,119 --> 00:20:37,200 Speaker 6: originally the Offico Medical Services said no, and this started 432 00:20:37,400 --> 00:20:39,520 Speaker 6: a long standing back and forth. There was a young 433 00:20:39,560 --> 00:20:41,920 Speaker 6: doctor there who was a champion. The senior elements of 434 00:20:41,960 --> 00:20:44,240 Speaker 6: the Office of Medical Services kind of said no. And 435 00:20:44,240 --> 00:20:46,320 Speaker 6: basically what I was asking to do was go to 436 00:20:46,359 --> 00:20:49,280 Speaker 6: the University of Pennsylvania where they were treating some of 437 00:20:49,280 --> 00:20:51,200 Speaker 6: the Havana victims. And I said, look, something is wrong 438 00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:52,840 Speaker 6: with me. I can't even go to work for more 439 00:20:52,840 --> 00:20:53,800 Speaker 6: than two or three hours. 440 00:20:54,119 --> 00:20:55,720 Speaker 4: I just was a mess. 441 00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:59,520 Speaker 6: And the Office of Medical Services senior leadership rejected this. 442 00:21:00,040 --> 00:21:01,840 Speaker 6: Then I finally had to retire because of it, which 443 00:21:01,880 --> 00:21:04,840 Speaker 6: was pretty tragic. Just as I was retiring, the then 444 00:21:04,920 --> 00:21:07,720 Speaker 6: deputy Director of Operations, actually she called me and she said, 445 00:21:07,720 --> 00:21:09,760 Speaker 6: would you come be one of my deputies one of 446 00:21:09,760 --> 00:21:13,280 Speaker 6: the addo's associate deputy director of operations, John and Jerry. 447 00:21:13,280 --> 00:21:15,800 Speaker 6: You both know, that's a tremendous honor. That's getting to 448 00:21:15,800 --> 00:21:17,879 Speaker 6: the seventh floor of CI. But I had to say no, 449 00:21:18,040 --> 00:21:21,159 Speaker 6: I couldn't do it, and so I retired. And just 450 00:21:21,200 --> 00:21:24,520 Speaker 6: as I was retiring. Some other officers were coming in 451 00:21:24,560 --> 00:21:26,640 Speaker 6: from the field afflicted by this, and they did get 452 00:21:26,640 --> 00:21:29,199 Speaker 6: treated at Walter Reed's Traumatic Brain Injury Center. It's called 453 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:31,879 Speaker 6: the National Intrepid Center of Excellence called NICO. And so, 454 00:21:31,960 --> 00:21:34,720 Speaker 6: while the Offesome Medical Services at first kind of rejected me, 455 00:21:34,880 --> 00:21:38,480 Speaker 6: as I now retire and I have dialogue in with CIA, 456 00:21:38,640 --> 00:21:41,439 Speaker 6: OFFESO Medical Services is saying no as well, but this 457 00:21:41,520 --> 00:21:45,399 Speaker 6: time senior leadership CIA also is kind of denigrating my request. 458 00:21:45,520 --> 00:21:48,000 Speaker 6: All I wanted was a frickin' doctor's appointment. I'm not 459 00:21:48,040 --> 00:21:50,639 Speaker 6: asking for anything else. But for whatever reason, CIA just 460 00:21:50,720 --> 00:21:53,960 Speaker 6: kept saying no. And so finally I went public a 461 00:21:53,960 --> 00:21:56,399 Speaker 6: good friend now I think a journalist John that you 462 00:21:56,440 --> 00:21:58,800 Speaker 6: know as well, Julia Yaffi, who's a Russian specialist. I 463 00:21:58,800 --> 00:22:00,680 Speaker 6: contacted her and I said, I have a story to tell. 464 00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:02,520 Speaker 6: I went to the agency and I told them I 465 00:22:02,560 --> 00:22:04,440 Speaker 6: was going to do this so they wouldn't be surprised, 466 00:22:04,520 --> 00:22:06,440 Speaker 6: even though they were very angry. And so the story 467 00:22:06,480 --> 00:22:09,359 Speaker 6: finally came out and embarrassed the agency to such an 468 00:22:09,359 --> 00:22:12,800 Speaker 6: extent three former CIA directors actually called our seventh floor 469 00:22:12,880 --> 00:22:14,760 Speaker 6: and asked, what the hell are they doing? Please? Send 470 00:22:14,840 --> 00:22:16,840 Speaker 6: Mark to the doctor, and then they did at that 471 00:22:16,920 --> 00:22:20,320 Speaker 6: point approved me going to Walter Reed and So, which 472 00:22:20,359 --> 00:22:22,720 Speaker 6: was a one month intensive program for traumatic brain injury 473 00:22:22,760 --> 00:22:25,720 Speaker 6: where I was diagnosed with the TBI. But you talk 474 00:22:25,760 --> 00:22:27,880 Speaker 6: about who are the good guys in this good guys 475 00:22:27,880 --> 00:22:30,000 Speaker 6: are my friends or the good gals my friends? You 476 00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:32,840 Speaker 6: stuck with me? It's the junior doctor at CIA. And 477 00:22:32,880 --> 00:22:35,160 Speaker 6: those that really did me a lot of harm were 478 00:22:35,200 --> 00:22:37,760 Speaker 6: the senior medical staff at the Office of Medical Services 479 00:22:37,760 --> 00:22:41,719 Speaker 6: and senior officials. But those that again rejected a simple 480 00:22:41,760 --> 00:22:46,320 Speaker 6: request for me to get medical treatment. And finally, when 481 00:22:46,359 --> 00:22:48,840 Speaker 6: this all kind of became much more in public, both 482 00:22:48,960 --> 00:22:51,760 Speaker 6: Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor, and Bill Burns, the 483 00:22:51,800 --> 00:22:54,520 Speaker 6: CI director, actually visited with Walter Reid and met with 484 00:22:54,560 --> 00:22:58,480 Speaker 6: my doctors and the deputy director at NIKO at Walter 485 00:22:58,520 --> 00:23:00,760 Speaker 6: Reed told them. They said, the delay in Mark's care 486 00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:04,200 Speaker 6: was really detrimental. You caused him an immense amount of suffering. 487 00:23:04,480 --> 00:23:06,680 Speaker 1: But do you think it was because it was either 488 00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:09,520 Speaker 1: something to do with you or something to do with 489 00:23:09,880 --> 00:23:12,920 Speaker 1: the Havanna syndrome in general, or is it something that 490 00:23:12,960 --> 00:23:17,199 Speaker 1: they didn't want to confront the possibility of Russia causing 491 00:23:17,240 --> 00:23:21,280 Speaker 1: harm to one of our officers because that demands a response, 492 00:23:21,400 --> 00:23:25,399 Speaker 1: right and with that administration, that's a tall order without 493 00:23:25,840 --> 00:23:31,600 Speaker 1: to be clear and playing devil's without having like specific evidence. 494 00:23:31,480 --> 00:23:33,720 Speaker 2: And maybe not even wanting to have that evidence. So 495 00:23:34,119 --> 00:23:35,119 Speaker 2: what are you your. 496 00:23:34,960 --> 00:23:37,360 Speaker 6: Thoughts, No, Jerry, that's a great question. I've gone through 497 00:23:37,359 --> 00:23:39,760 Speaker 6: this in my mind so many different times. I will 498 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:42,160 Speaker 6: say there was an Inspectral General's report that was done 499 00:23:42,160 --> 00:23:45,040 Speaker 6: on this that detailed the agency's response, and I can't 500 00:23:45,040 --> 00:23:47,560 Speaker 6: talk about the details of it, but I was allowed 501 00:23:47,600 --> 00:23:50,720 Speaker 6: to read it, and it's not very flattering towards senior 502 00:23:50,720 --> 00:23:53,520 Speaker 6: officials in terms of denying care. And these are you know, 503 00:23:53,680 --> 00:23:55,840 Speaker 6: other kind of tip of the spirit case officers who 504 00:23:55,920 --> 00:23:58,000 Speaker 6: served around the world who I've seen them go out 505 00:23:58,040 --> 00:23:59,800 Speaker 6: to the field and I've seen them come back after 506 00:24:00,119 --> 00:24:02,879 Speaker 6: something like this had happened, and they are in fact vegetables, 507 00:24:02,880 --> 00:24:06,120 Speaker 6: and it's a terrible thing to even say. They're medically retired, 508 00:24:06,200 --> 00:24:09,000 Speaker 6: they've gone blind, they some have had cancers, they have 509 00:24:09,080 --> 00:24:11,480 Speaker 6: lost the total ability to work. So let me just 510 00:24:11,480 --> 00:24:14,280 Speaker 6: start that with something indeed happened. And so I think 511 00:24:14,280 --> 00:24:17,800 Speaker 6: that the organization just by default doesn't want to have 512 00:24:17,960 --> 00:24:21,040 Speaker 6: this kind of unknown cold case hanging out there, because 513 00:24:21,040 --> 00:24:23,000 Speaker 6: then it caused into question and your ability to keep 514 00:24:23,000 --> 00:24:26,000 Speaker 6: yourself and your family safe overseas. And frankly, and both 515 00:24:26,000 --> 00:24:27,439 Speaker 6: of you know this, both of you have been on 516 00:24:27,520 --> 00:24:31,000 Speaker 6: unaccompanied assignments, will go in harm's way, and the drop 517 00:24:31,000 --> 00:24:33,200 Speaker 6: of a hat taking your families is a different story. 518 00:24:33,240 --> 00:24:35,160 Speaker 6: And I'm sure you're going to have others on say 519 00:24:35,160 --> 00:24:37,480 Speaker 6: this is all psychosomatic or there's you know, there's some 520 00:24:37,560 --> 00:24:40,200 Speaker 6: kind of mass hysteria. Well that doesn't apply to someone 521 00:24:40,240 --> 00:24:42,560 Speaker 6: like myself, who was in top physical condition when this 522 00:24:42,640 --> 00:24:44,960 Speaker 6: happened to me. But if it is a hostile foreign actor, 523 00:24:44,960 --> 00:24:47,320 Speaker 6: it's an act of war against our personnel, it's probably 524 00:24:47,359 --> 00:24:51,080 Speaker 6: a brilliant COVID action plan. It's caused enormous dissension within 525 00:24:51,160 --> 00:24:54,520 Speaker 6: our ranks. It's still in essence non attributable. But if 526 00:24:54,520 --> 00:24:56,080 Speaker 6: we ever found out who did it, what do we 527 00:24:56,160 --> 00:24:59,960 Speaker 6: do in response? What I equate with the most? And again, 528 00:25:00,000 --> 00:25:01,919 Speaker 6: and it's another issue that I think that a previous 529 00:25:01,920 --> 00:25:05,520 Speaker 6: administration kind of fouled up is the bounties that the 530 00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:09,440 Speaker 6: Russians put on our soldiers in Afghanistan. Everyone I've talked 531 00:25:09,440 --> 00:25:11,840 Speaker 6: to in our old service there's one hundred percent convinced 532 00:25:11,840 --> 00:25:14,560 Speaker 6: by this. They've seen all the intelligence. There's no doubt 533 00:25:14,800 --> 00:25:17,119 Speaker 6: the Russians were behind this, and we never held them 534 00:25:17,119 --> 00:25:19,760 Speaker 6: accountable because how do you hold the Russians accountable? 535 00:25:19,760 --> 00:25:20,119 Speaker 1: There? 536 00:25:21,040 --> 00:25:23,119 Speaker 3: We got to take a break now and we'll be 537 00:25:23,200 --> 00:25:24,160 Speaker 3: back in just a minute. 538 00:25:29,359 --> 00:25:31,080 Speaker 2: And we're back, So. 539 00:25:30,960 --> 00:25:32,760 Speaker 3: Mark, tell me about the medical side of this. What 540 00:25:32,800 --> 00:25:35,439 Speaker 3: have you learned about what happened to your head and 541 00:25:35,480 --> 00:25:38,520 Speaker 3: to others? And what do the doctors say. 542 00:25:38,640 --> 00:25:41,240 Speaker 6: I've seen every doctor under the sun. I mean, I've 543 00:25:41,280 --> 00:25:44,240 Speaker 6: done everything. I've been through traditional medicine. I've been through 544 00:25:44,240 --> 00:25:48,280 Speaker 6: alternative medicine. I've been poked and prodded and acupuncture, and 545 00:25:48,359 --> 00:25:49,920 Speaker 6: I was willing to do just about anything because I 546 00:25:49,960 --> 00:25:52,520 Speaker 6: was in so much pain. So the doctors at Walter 547 00:25:52,600 --> 00:25:54,879 Speaker 6: read you know again, this is the most advanced traumatic 548 00:25:54,880 --> 00:25:59,000 Speaker 6: brain injury clinic on the planet. I've had seven MRIs. 549 00:25:59,080 --> 00:26:01,120 Speaker 6: If things come up on imaging for me, I've had 550 00:26:01,160 --> 00:26:03,760 Speaker 6: so many blood tests under the sun. We yet some 551 00:26:03,800 --> 00:26:06,240 Speaker 6: of us have received compensation for this, and under what's 552 00:26:06,280 --> 00:26:09,359 Speaker 6: called the Havana Act. And under the Havana Act, compensation 553 00:26:09,840 --> 00:26:12,960 Speaker 6: this was to provide some remuneration for those of us 554 00:26:13,000 --> 00:26:14,919 Speaker 6: and it's not wasn't a lot of money, but my 555 00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:17,760 Speaker 6: doctors had to actually write and sign and provide to 556 00:26:17,840 --> 00:26:20,639 Speaker 6: CIA that YEP, mark as a traumatic brain injury is 557 00:26:20,640 --> 00:26:22,320 Speaker 6: from an external event and it's not based on a 558 00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:23,280 Speaker 6: pre existing condition. 559 00:26:23,840 --> 00:26:27,000 Speaker 2: So where exactly do we stand on this? Is it? 560 00:26:27,320 --> 00:26:30,480 Speaker 1: The agency just doesn't know if something happened, or they 561 00:26:30,520 --> 00:26:32,520 Speaker 1: accept something happened, but they don't know how or when 562 00:26:32,680 --> 00:26:34,120 Speaker 1: or has that shifted at all? 563 00:26:34,400 --> 00:26:36,720 Speaker 6: Well if everything shifted wildly. So let me just say 564 00:26:36,760 --> 00:26:39,760 Speaker 6: that there are a couple dozen cases that they can't solve, 565 00:26:40,240 --> 00:26:42,399 Speaker 6: and that's always buried in the headlines, and I'm one 566 00:26:42,440 --> 00:26:45,080 Speaker 6: of those cases. These are also the cases that they're 567 00:26:45,119 --> 00:26:48,680 Speaker 6: providing compensation to. The agency trying to do the right 568 00:26:48,720 --> 00:26:51,399 Speaker 6: thing really screwed up by basically sending a worldwide message 569 00:26:51,400 --> 00:26:53,639 Speaker 6: out saying everyone who's got a headache, right in, And 570 00:26:53,680 --> 00:26:56,520 Speaker 6: they got a thousand cases. Then they solved the ninety 571 00:26:56,600 --> 00:26:59,080 Speaker 6: nine point one percent of the cases, and then they 572 00:26:59,119 --> 00:27:01,159 Speaker 6: patted themselves in the because they saw them all. But 573 00:27:01,240 --> 00:27:03,439 Speaker 6: these were never real to begin with, so ultimately you're 574 00:27:03,520 --> 00:27:06,800 Speaker 6: left with several dozen. When they're briefing journalists. My friends 575 00:27:06,840 --> 00:27:08,560 Speaker 6: were in the National Scurity Media went down there and 576 00:27:08,600 --> 00:27:11,359 Speaker 6: they said, none of that's true, even the two dozen cases. 577 00:27:11,600 --> 00:27:13,440 Speaker 6: And some of my friends were journalists, said what about 578 00:27:13,440 --> 00:27:16,320 Speaker 6: Mark and they said no pre existing condition? Well's I know, 579 00:27:16,359 --> 00:27:18,800 Speaker 6: that's bullshit. So I got pissed off and I called 580 00:27:18,840 --> 00:27:21,439 Speaker 6: into the agency and I went and they admitted to me, no, 581 00:27:21,840 --> 00:27:23,880 Speaker 6: you know, you were actually one of the two dozen 582 00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:26,320 Speaker 6: who were not sure about and we have no intelligence 583 00:27:26,320 --> 00:27:29,600 Speaker 6: whatsoever that suggests that anything happened or that nothing happened. 584 00:27:29,640 --> 00:27:32,040 Speaker 6: So basically, you know, so they're making conclusions on everybody 585 00:27:32,080 --> 00:27:33,440 Speaker 6: based on an absence of evidence. 586 00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:36,080 Speaker 3: For outsiders, they don't understand that the agency has made 587 00:27:36,119 --> 00:27:39,000 Speaker 3: up of very different tribes or groups. The analytic cadre 588 00:27:39,080 --> 00:27:41,240 Speaker 3: are the people who make assessments by getting all the 589 00:27:41,240 --> 00:27:44,800 Speaker 3: information from all the various collectors, technical and human and 590 00:27:45,160 --> 00:27:48,000 Speaker 3: and everything else, and they have to put together assessment 591 00:27:48,080 --> 00:27:50,360 Speaker 3: for sort of all sorts of things that administrations would 592 00:27:50,400 --> 00:27:53,480 Speaker 3: be interested in on their security issues. And frankly just 593 00:27:53,520 --> 00:27:56,000 Speaker 3: the recent history as they've been burned several times by 594 00:27:56,040 --> 00:27:59,760 Speaker 3: making false assessments or bias, and they take that very 595 00:28:00,359 --> 00:28:03,800 Speaker 3: and they've trained their new analysts and they're very careful 596 00:28:03,880 --> 00:28:06,600 Speaker 3: not to go too far anymore, because essentially there's a 597 00:28:06,600 --> 00:28:09,040 Speaker 3: lot of things around WMD in the Iraq War that 598 00:28:09,600 --> 00:28:12,520 Speaker 3: in some ways analysts got blamed for things, maybe more 599 00:28:12,560 --> 00:28:16,199 Speaker 3: than they needed to be. But in this case, I 600 00:28:16,240 --> 00:28:21,320 Speaker 3: think they're so nervous about providing an analytic judgment because 601 00:28:21,359 --> 00:28:25,440 Speaker 3: they know that if they say something happened and administration 602 00:28:25,680 --> 00:28:27,840 Speaker 3: is going to be forced to act. If you're going 603 00:28:27,880 --> 00:28:29,920 Speaker 3: to put something down on the desk of the present 604 00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:33,600 Speaker 3: United States and say a foreign country attacked and harmed 605 00:28:33,960 --> 00:28:37,119 Speaker 3: American intelligence officers and diplomats, the administration has to do 606 00:28:37,160 --> 00:28:38,200 Speaker 3: something as an active war. 607 00:28:38,360 --> 00:28:40,040 Speaker 6: One of the theories that I always had was that 608 00:28:40,200 --> 00:28:44,320 Speaker 6: some kind of device, originally probably used for signals intelligence collection, 609 00:28:44,400 --> 00:28:47,520 Speaker 6: they actually realize harmed people and they start deploying. 610 00:28:47,080 --> 00:28:50,040 Speaker 1: This mark for people listening in, I want to make 611 00:28:50,080 --> 00:28:51,960 Speaker 1: a quick comment and get your take on it. So, 612 00:28:52,520 --> 00:28:54,720 Speaker 1: like you, I've served in difficult places and brought my 613 00:28:54,800 --> 00:29:01,640 Speaker 1: family unhealthy places. You know, Cobra's malaria, Dangyo, were medical care, right, 614 00:29:01,760 --> 00:29:04,880 Speaker 1: no blood transfusions, you know, nothing, and yet we brought 615 00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:08,040 Speaker 1: our families there knowing it was unsafe, right, brought our 616 00:29:08,080 --> 00:29:08,800 Speaker 1: young kids there. 617 00:29:09,240 --> 00:29:12,840 Speaker 2: And I have to say I was pretty satisfied with. 618 00:29:12,960 --> 00:29:17,960 Speaker 1: The agency's willingness to engage on those traditional things, to 619 00:29:18,120 --> 00:29:21,560 Speaker 1: include things like mental health care right for families. I 620 00:29:21,560 --> 00:29:24,040 Speaker 1: thought they were very engaging as a coos in some 621 00:29:24,080 --> 00:29:26,280 Speaker 1: of these places they've seen family struggle with mental health. 622 00:29:26,400 --> 00:29:29,640 Speaker 1: The agency was always very good about that. So what 623 00:29:29,680 --> 00:29:33,160 Speaker 1: you're saying here, and I completely accept it, it's sort 624 00:29:33,200 --> 00:29:36,160 Speaker 1: of an anomaly at least to what I personally have 625 00:29:36,320 --> 00:29:37,680 Speaker 1: experienced with the agency. 626 00:29:37,720 --> 00:29:39,320 Speaker 2: They've been pretty darn good. 627 00:29:39,480 --> 00:29:42,720 Speaker 3: There's one outstanding thing here that may have suggested why 628 00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:45,880 Speaker 3: senior management would be hesitant, and that was Donald Trump. So, 629 00:29:46,400 --> 00:29:49,560 Speaker 3: as we know, Donald Trump in his administration was very 630 00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:52,200 Speaker 3: close to Vladimir Putin, and to this day he says 631 00:29:52,240 --> 00:29:55,560 Speaker 3: wonderful things about Vladimir Putin, even after the invasion and 632 00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:58,120 Speaker 3: the murders and rapes in Ukraine, and it was well 633 00:29:58,160 --> 00:30:00,960 Speaker 3: known to the outside world that anyone who came to 634 00:30:01,040 --> 00:30:03,920 Speaker 3: him with something bad about Russia, he would sort of 635 00:30:03,920 --> 00:30:05,400 Speaker 3: snap at them in the back in their face, like it, 636 00:30:05,440 --> 00:30:08,160 Speaker 3: what doesn't do your career well to come continue to 637 00:30:08,200 --> 00:30:10,680 Speaker 3: come into the White House saying bad things about Latim 638 00:30:10,680 --> 00:30:12,040 Speaker 3: Reputin and Russia. 639 00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:15,080 Speaker 6: And we know that from our former senior colleagues saying that, 640 00:30:15,120 --> 00:30:16,320 Speaker 6: hell no, we're not going to go you know, with 641 00:30:16,320 --> 00:30:18,120 Speaker 6: the former briefers, so like we're not briefing stuff on 642 00:30:18,200 --> 00:30:20,080 Speaker 6: Russia to Trump today, he'll go crazy. Let's just keep 643 00:30:20,120 --> 00:30:22,200 Speaker 6: it out. To me, it's much more a case of 644 00:30:22,280 --> 00:30:25,320 Speaker 6: just kind of gross incompetence. And of course the analytic 645 00:30:25,320 --> 00:30:28,680 Speaker 6: assessments on this did occur in the next administration that 646 00:30:29,080 --> 00:30:32,640 Speaker 6: they occurred under President Biden, who my understanding did take 647 00:30:32,680 --> 00:30:33,520 Speaker 6: this very seriously. 648 00:30:34,200 --> 00:30:38,160 Speaker 1: During the Trump administration abroad, we were told many times, 649 00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:41,520 Speaker 1: don't write this down, like what senior officials were saying 650 00:30:41,560 --> 00:30:44,680 Speaker 1: about the adminision. Don't write this down, don't tell us 651 00:30:44,760 --> 00:30:47,840 Speaker 1: this officially, don't make this happen because we'll have to 652 00:30:47,920 --> 00:30:50,160 Speaker 1: deal with it. And eventually you do that once or 653 00:30:50,160 --> 00:30:53,640 Speaker 1: twice and you just don't anymore. You just kind of know. Mark, 654 00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:56,200 Speaker 1: thank you very much for coming in today. As always, 655 00:30:56,240 --> 00:30:59,040 Speaker 1: it's really enjoyable talking to you. If this time not 656 00:30:59,200 --> 00:31:02,560 Speaker 1: over a beer, certainly next time. So yeah, thank you very. 657 00:31:02,600 --> 00:31:05,120 Speaker 6: Much, Thank you all very much, appreciate all your support. 658 00:31:06,520 --> 00:31:11,000 Speaker 3: Now our friend and producer Adam Davidson is joining us. Well, 659 00:31:11,000 --> 00:31:11,640 Speaker 3: welcome Adam. 660 00:31:11,800 --> 00:31:14,720 Speaker 4: Hey guys, it feels like this episode around a Vanas 661 00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:17,520 Speaker 4: syndrome is tempted to call it a very special episode, 662 00:31:17,680 --> 00:31:22,120 Speaker 4: because this one really touches you, right, This affects your friends. 663 00:31:22,160 --> 00:31:25,120 Speaker 4: This one isn't some theory. This is your life. 664 00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:26,920 Speaker 3: Well, I think you know from the interview with Mark 665 00:31:27,160 --> 00:31:29,000 Speaker 3: he was a colleague and friend, and so it's important 666 00:31:29,040 --> 00:31:31,200 Speaker 3: to us in that way, but in a bigger sense 667 00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:34,160 Speaker 3: for the work we did living around the world. It's 668 00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:36,640 Speaker 3: a big deal because it's a mystery that still hasn't 669 00:31:36,680 --> 00:31:40,440 Speaker 3: been solved, but it's impacting our diplomats and our intelligence 670 00:31:40,440 --> 00:31:42,440 Speaker 3: officers and our military officers around the world every day. 671 00:31:42,520 --> 00:31:42,720 Speaker 2: Yeah. 672 00:31:42,920 --> 00:31:47,000 Speaker 1: The interesting thing about conspiracy theories is they explain everything right. 673 00:31:47,040 --> 00:31:50,280 Speaker 1: They're self licking ice cream cones. And this one. We 674 00:31:50,320 --> 00:31:53,760 Speaker 1: have a mystery about a conspiracy and a conspiracy theory, 675 00:31:53,800 --> 00:31:55,840 Speaker 1: and we don't have the answers to it, and we're 676 00:31:55,840 --> 00:31:58,120 Speaker 1: still looking for it, and it has real victims. 677 00:31:58,480 --> 00:32:00,160 Speaker 3: I put it in the same bucket a lot with 678 00:32:00,360 --> 00:32:04,760 Speaker 3: the Russian efforts against our election in twenty sixteen. And 679 00:32:04,800 --> 00:32:06,880 Speaker 3: it is not a mystery necessarily that we're going to 680 00:32:06,880 --> 00:32:09,680 Speaker 3: get an answer to, because if in fact, foreign intelligence 681 00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:12,520 Speaker 3: agencies are involved in these kind of things. It's their job, 682 00:32:12,600 --> 00:32:15,640 Speaker 3: their professional obligation, to keep secrets. When sometimes we are 683 00:32:15,720 --> 00:32:18,120 Speaker 3: lucky and we find spies that give us the answer 684 00:32:18,120 --> 00:32:20,560 Speaker 3: to these questions, maybe years after the fact. But it 685 00:32:20,600 --> 00:32:21,960 Speaker 3: isn't as if this is just out there in the 686 00:32:21,960 --> 00:32:23,520 Speaker 3: ether and all of a sudden it's going to come 687 00:32:23,520 --> 00:32:25,280 Speaker 3: to us. It may be something that we never learned 688 00:32:25,320 --> 00:32:26,440 Speaker 3: the true story behind. 689 00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:30,320 Speaker 1: There's an impact too that we don't talk about so much. 690 00:32:30,840 --> 00:32:33,920 Speaker 1: If people are worried about exposing their families. If like 691 00:32:34,000 --> 00:32:36,200 Speaker 1: if you go to Moscow and you're worried that your kids, 692 00:32:36,200 --> 00:32:38,280 Speaker 1: so your spouse is going to be exposed to this 693 00:32:38,400 --> 00:32:41,520 Speaker 1: and damage, you may not go. Just like in the 694 00:32:41,600 --> 00:32:47,360 Speaker 1: case where going to places where journalists are routinely murdered Somalia, Afghanistan, 695 00:32:47,560 --> 00:32:51,400 Speaker 1: Northern Iraq, there's no good journalism on that because it's 696 00:32:51,440 --> 00:32:52,800 Speaker 1: simply too dangerous. 697 00:32:52,960 --> 00:32:56,400 Speaker 3: I worked in Pakistan and there would be stories about 698 00:32:56,720 --> 00:33:01,280 Speaker 3: from the tribal areas in Pakistan where and others were living, 699 00:33:01,320 --> 00:33:04,120 Speaker 3: and you'd see these stories in the Western press about 700 00:33:04,200 --> 00:33:07,200 Speaker 3: what American drone strikes might be doing. And you knew 701 00:33:07,240 --> 00:33:09,360 Speaker 3: that there was no Western press that went in there, 702 00:33:09,480 --> 00:33:11,800 Speaker 3: none because it was too dangerous for them. So these 703 00:33:11,840 --> 00:33:14,880 Speaker 3: stories are coming second and third hand and also oftentimes 704 00:33:14,880 --> 00:33:17,600 Speaker 3: manipulated by the local government to get their point of 705 00:33:17,720 --> 00:33:19,960 Speaker 3: view across because people can't go in there. And so 706 00:33:20,160 --> 00:33:22,320 Speaker 3: think about those just personal things that are happening to 707 00:33:22,360 --> 00:33:24,800 Speaker 3: all these people as they try to get out and 708 00:33:25,120 --> 00:33:27,200 Speaker 3: do the work for the American public well, whether they 709 00:33:27,280 --> 00:33:28,840 Speaker 3: be journalists, diplomats, or spies. 710 00:33:29,040 --> 00:33:31,640 Speaker 4: Do you think the chaos is the goal, like the 711 00:33:31,760 --> 00:33:34,800 Speaker 4: lack of us knowing the kind of invisible menace is 712 00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:37,160 Speaker 4: that serving the interests of whoever's doing this. 713 00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:40,840 Speaker 1: Absolutely, menace is a really good word. I think in 714 00:33:40,880 --> 00:33:43,240 Speaker 1: Russia there's a saying John would know it better you 715 00:33:43,400 --> 00:33:44,920 Speaker 1: kill a chicken to scare the monkey. 716 00:33:45,120 --> 00:33:45,400 Speaker 2: Yeah. 717 00:33:45,440 --> 00:33:48,680 Speaker 4: I mean actually the field of like FIGN correspondence, there's 718 00:33:48,800 --> 00:33:51,120 Speaker 4: fewer of them, and part of that is there's less money. 719 00:33:51,280 --> 00:33:51,480 Speaker 2: Yeah. 720 00:33:51,520 --> 00:33:53,760 Speaker 4: But I have a bunch of friends who died, and 721 00:33:54,520 --> 00:33:56,880 Speaker 4: there are few who died in Libya. There are a 722 00:33:56,880 --> 00:34:00,200 Speaker 4: few who died in Syria. There used to be more 723 00:34:00,280 --> 00:34:04,760 Speaker 4: rules that journalists were sort of seen generally as noncombatants 724 00:34:04,800 --> 00:34:07,840 Speaker 4: and both sides had an interest, So that has gone away. 725 00:34:08,880 --> 00:34:09,919 Speaker 2: That's an interesting point. 726 00:34:09,960 --> 00:34:14,640 Speaker 1: Adam in that really truly, and no shit, CIA does 727 00:34:14,680 --> 00:34:18,120 Speaker 1: not use journalism cover because we don't want to taint them. 728 00:34:18,400 --> 00:34:19,759 Speaker 2: And the Russians know that. 729 00:34:19,880 --> 00:34:22,640 Speaker 1: Even Al Kaida knew that they didn't go after journalists 730 00:34:22,640 --> 00:34:26,000 Speaker 1: because they knew CIA didn't use them. And then you 731 00:34:26,040 --> 00:34:29,160 Speaker 1: get into the current Russian government and isis and it 732 00:34:29,200 --> 00:34:33,440 Speaker 1: simply doesn't matter anymore. It's about terror, intimidation and the 733 00:34:33,480 --> 00:34:34,560 Speaker 1: word you use menace. 734 00:34:34,800 --> 00:34:36,680 Speaker 4: So this is a real conspiracy. 735 00:34:36,920 --> 00:34:40,319 Speaker 3: Probably, I think something's happening, whether it's directed to do 736 00:34:40,560 --> 00:34:43,640 Speaker 3: harm specifically, or it's some sort of surveillance device that 737 00:34:43,760 --> 00:34:45,200 Speaker 3: creates this type of damage. 738 00:34:45,200 --> 00:34:48,120 Speaker 1: Perhaps, Yeah, Adam, I think it's important for people to 739 00:34:48,200 --> 00:34:52,120 Speaker 1: understand that when looking at conspiracy theories and conspiracies, it's 740 00:34:52,200 --> 00:34:56,279 Speaker 1: not always a binary answer. It's not always yes it's 741 00:34:56,280 --> 00:34:59,280 Speaker 1: true or no it's false. But there's a sliding scale. 742 00:34:59,320 --> 00:35:03,520 Speaker 1: And on this one, and I'd say it's credible to likely, 743 00:35:03,800 --> 00:35:07,319 Speaker 1: even if there's no specific proof that we can point to. 744 00:35:07,440 --> 00:35:09,560 Speaker 3: Oftentimes it takes years and years and we have to 745 00:35:09,560 --> 00:35:11,960 Speaker 3: get a lucky break before we figure out what's happening. 746 00:35:12,120 --> 00:35:14,680 Speaker 1: For this, if I had to make a prediction, it 747 00:35:14,719 --> 00:35:18,799 Speaker 1: would be that one fine day a disgruntled Russian guy 748 00:35:18,880 --> 00:35:21,920 Speaker 1: is going to walk in and say, for five million bucks, 749 00:35:22,239 --> 00:35:23,799 Speaker 1: I'll tell you whether it's a duck or not. 750 00:35:23,920 --> 00:35:26,120 Speaker 4: Do you think most things do eventually come out? My 751 00:35:26,280 --> 00:35:28,000 Speaker 4: view is a lot of things never come out. We 752 00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:28,640 Speaker 4: just won't know. 753 00:35:28,760 --> 00:35:30,600 Speaker 3: I think there's a chance with this one that it 754 00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:32,960 Speaker 3: may come out. But in the intelligence world, like we 755 00:35:33,000 --> 00:35:35,360 Speaker 3: may get a source who tells us exactly what's happening, 756 00:35:35,480 --> 00:35:37,160 Speaker 3: but we want to keep that source secret because that 757 00:35:37,239 --> 00:35:39,399 Speaker 3: source probably knows other things that are important to us. 758 00:35:39,440 --> 00:35:41,520 Speaker 3: But we're not going to publicize that or put it 759 00:35:41,520 --> 00:35:43,400 Speaker 3: out into the public because we want to protect that 760 00:35:43,480 --> 00:35:46,000 Speaker 3: source for the information that person has on other things. 761 00:35:46,440 --> 00:35:50,520 Speaker 1: And for anybody out there listening in from say Moscow, 762 00:35:51,160 --> 00:35:51,640 Speaker 1: write us. 763 00:35:51,719 --> 00:35:53,000 Speaker 2: We'll make it worth your while. 764 00:35:53,920 --> 00:35:57,120 Speaker 4: Of all the promises you've given agents is you'll get 765 00:35:57,160 --> 00:35:58,880 Speaker 4: to be on a podcast. Where would that be? 766 00:36:00,239 --> 00:36:01,839 Speaker 3: Thought? Is? So? 767 00:36:01,960 --> 00:36:03,719 Speaker 4: One thing I keep thinking about with all of this 768 00:36:04,120 --> 00:36:07,080 Speaker 4: is what is this a solution for? Assuming there is 769 00:36:07,120 --> 00:36:10,319 Speaker 4: something happening and someone's doing it, why what are like, 770 00:36:10,400 --> 00:36:13,640 Speaker 4: if it's a threatening thing, wouldn't they want it known? 771 00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:15,799 Speaker 3: Interesting that you bring that up, because we call it 772 00:36:15,920 --> 00:36:18,520 Speaker 3: we just call it implausible deniability, Right, So the Russians 773 00:36:18,560 --> 00:36:20,839 Speaker 3: would do things that were they were done by their 774 00:36:20,880 --> 00:36:23,120 Speaker 3: secret services, but they wanted people to know. So when 775 00:36:23,120 --> 00:36:25,840 Speaker 3: they murdered someone in England with some form of chemical 776 00:36:25,880 --> 00:36:29,279 Speaker 3: attack colonium, they didn't admit it, but everybody knew what 777 00:36:29,320 --> 00:36:31,560 Speaker 3: was happening, and it sent a signal to people. And 778 00:36:31,600 --> 00:36:34,319 Speaker 3: when they killed navalny, it sent a signal even though 779 00:36:34,320 --> 00:36:37,799 Speaker 3: they didn't admit what they did. And so it's not clear, like, 780 00:36:37,880 --> 00:36:40,000 Speaker 3: why are they hurting people? When this first happened, I 781 00:36:40,040 --> 00:36:42,480 Speaker 3: wrote an article saying it could be some sort of 782 00:36:42,560 --> 00:36:46,880 Speaker 3: surveillance technology or something they're using that has the effect 783 00:36:46,920 --> 00:36:50,200 Speaker 3: of hurting people. And so at this point it's still 784 00:36:50,239 --> 00:36:52,840 Speaker 3: not clear whether this is meant to send a signal 785 00:36:52,880 --> 00:36:54,719 Speaker 3: that the gloves are off. Is this meant to send 786 00:36:54,719 --> 00:36:57,319 Speaker 3: a signal that American Intelligence Office should never feel safe 787 00:36:57,360 --> 00:36:58,000 Speaker 3: around the world? 788 00:36:58,320 --> 00:37:00,239 Speaker 4: All Right, the two of you know as much much 789 00:37:00,520 --> 00:37:03,719 Speaker 4: as anyone does about this. What's your theory? What do 790 00:37:03,760 --> 00:37:04,880 Speaker 4: you think is happening here? 791 00:37:05,400 --> 00:37:10,080 Speaker 1: Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The fact 792 00:37:10,120 --> 00:37:14,400 Speaker 1: that apparently we can't pin it on a particular actor 793 00:37:14,960 --> 00:37:18,000 Speaker 1: doesn't mean that it can't be pinned on one someday 794 00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:22,480 Speaker 1: for me. Evaluating all the evaluable evidence, I think the 795 00:37:22,480 --> 00:37:26,240 Speaker 1: most likely story is that some of these people were 796 00:37:26,719 --> 00:37:31,480 Speaker 1: the victims of some sort of hostile intervention or attack. 797 00:37:32,040 --> 00:37:32,759 Speaker 2: I agree with that. 798 00:37:32,800 --> 00:37:36,000 Speaker 3: So I see enough patterns here that are consistent with 799 00:37:36,400 --> 00:37:38,719 Speaker 3: what Russian special units have been seen to be doing 800 00:37:38,800 --> 00:37:41,759 Speaker 3: in recent years. I think Vladimir Putin has decided that 801 00:37:41,840 --> 00:37:44,359 Speaker 3: he's going to get serious, and he's willing to take 802 00:37:44,480 --> 00:37:47,319 Speaker 3: steps that aren't normally taken in this world. And we've 803 00:37:47,360 --> 00:37:50,520 Speaker 3: seen special units travel in Europe and get involved in assassinations. 804 00:37:50,520 --> 00:37:53,240 Speaker 3: We've seen special units get involved in explosions in Eastern 805 00:37:53,280 --> 00:37:55,480 Speaker 3: Europe and the Central Europe. We've seen them go after 806 00:37:55,560 --> 00:37:58,440 Speaker 3: their enemies. And so I tend to think we're going 807 00:37:58,480 --> 00:38:01,640 Speaker 3: to find that this is a Russian operation to go 808 00:38:01,719 --> 00:38:05,080 Speaker 3: after people that they believe are involved in Russian operation, 809 00:38:05,239 --> 00:38:07,680 Speaker 3: because Laimir Putin has sort of changed the rules of 810 00:38:07,719 --> 00:38:08,080 Speaker 3: the game. 811 00:38:08,320 --> 00:38:10,200 Speaker 1: And I'll go out on a limb here and I'm 812 00:38:10,200 --> 00:38:13,759 Speaker 1: going to say that this guy Alexander Khu's mienof who 813 00:38:13,840 --> 00:38:17,560 Speaker 1: was the defector to the Ukrainian side when in Spain 814 00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:19,719 Speaker 1: he was found with twelve bullets in the back of 815 00:38:19,760 --> 00:38:22,359 Speaker 1: his head and a parking garage. I'm going to say 816 00:38:22,360 --> 00:38:24,800 Speaker 1: that that wasn't an accident, right, I mean, I can't 817 00:38:24,840 --> 00:38:26,560 Speaker 1: prove it, but I'm just thinking. 818 00:38:26,360 --> 00:38:27,520 Speaker 4: I thought it was suicide. 819 00:38:27,640 --> 00:38:31,160 Speaker 3: Well, yeah, the first seven maybe the bullets were a problem, 820 00:38:31,160 --> 00:38:33,719 Speaker 3: but then when they ran over his body back and forth. 821 00:38:34,120 --> 00:38:37,080 Speaker 2: That's right. This is a light look at And I 822 00:38:37,160 --> 00:38:38,560 Speaker 2: really had a serious subject though. 823 00:38:38,600 --> 00:38:40,640 Speaker 1: I mean, you know, people have been really heard, and 824 00:38:40,680 --> 00:38:42,920 Speaker 1: you know that's underlines that conspiracy theories. 825 00:38:43,080 --> 00:38:44,920 Speaker 3: Well, I'm glad we had Mark on because I mean, 826 00:38:44,960 --> 00:38:47,200 Speaker 3: I've seen what's happened to me. He was an aggressive 827 00:38:47,239 --> 00:38:50,520 Speaker 3: and talented officer who suffers every day with you know, 828 00:38:50,560 --> 00:38:51,240 Speaker 3: brain injury. 829 00:38:51,480 --> 00:38:54,560 Speaker 4: You know, there used to be typically not always, but 830 00:38:54,640 --> 00:38:57,480 Speaker 4: there was something of the rules of the road. If 831 00:38:57,480 --> 00:39:00,400 Speaker 4: you covered a war, you were taken on risk. Both 832 00:39:00,520 --> 00:39:04,680 Speaker 4: sides tended to respect journalists right to exist. Saw some 833 00:39:04,840 --> 00:39:08,160 Speaker 4: benefit and that's gone, and it's scary in a different 834 00:39:08,200 --> 00:39:11,880 Speaker 4: way to cover more. All Right, I'm looking forward to 835 00:39:11,960 --> 00:39:14,839 Speaker 4: going back to shows about Goofy's conspiracy theories that are 836 00:39:14,840 --> 00:39:18,719 Speaker 4: clearly not true. So join us next time on Mission Implausible. 837 00:39:23,360 --> 00:39:27,040 Speaker 1: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry o'sha John 838 00:39:27,080 --> 00:39:28,520 Speaker 1: Cipher and Jonathan Stern. 839 00:39:28,719 --> 00:39:32,080 Speaker 2: The associate producers are Rachel Harner and David Sollinger. 840 00:39:32,440 --> 00:39:35,200 Speaker 1: This has been a production of honorable, mention and abominable 841 00:39:35,239 --> 00:39:38,320 Speaker 1: pictures for iHeartMedia.