1 00:00:03,160 --> 00:00:07,960 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brussel from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:09,280 --> 00:00:12,200 Speaker 1: There's been more than a decade of litigation, two trips 3 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:15,040 Speaker 1: to the Second Circuit and one trip to the Supreme Court, 4 00:00:15,320 --> 00:00:18,479 Speaker 1: but the court is giving Goldman Sachs another chance to 5 00:00:18,600 --> 00:00:22,720 Speaker 1: stop a shareholder's securities fraud lawsuit. The question is whether 6 00:00:22,800 --> 00:00:25,759 Speaker 1: another trip to the Second Circuit will make a difference. 7 00:00:26,239 --> 00:00:30,400 Speaker 1: A decade ago, investors filed a class action lawsuit alleging 8 00:00:30,440 --> 00:00:32,519 Speaker 1: they were deceived to the tune of as much as 9 00:00:32,600 --> 00:00:37,199 Speaker 1: thirteen billion dollars by Goldman's repeated public assurances that it 10 00:00:37,280 --> 00:00:40,839 Speaker 1: was being vigilant about avoiding conflicts of interest. But Goldman 11 00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:44,519 Speaker 1: said those assurances were so generic they couldn't possibly have 12 00:00:44,560 --> 00:00:47,879 Speaker 1: been responsible for propping up the stock price. In the 13 00:00:47,920 --> 00:00:52,000 Speaker 1: majority opinion, Justice Amy Coney Barrett said both sides in 14 00:00:52,000 --> 00:00:55,800 Speaker 1: the case agreed that the generic nature of a misrepresentation 15 00:00:56,240 --> 00:01:00,000 Speaker 1: often will be important evidence of a lack of price impact, 16 00:01:00,000 --> 00:01:03,320 Speaker 1: echoing her statements during the oral arguments. So now we 17 00:01:03,400 --> 00:01:06,520 Speaker 1: are left you in this position where you've both moved 18 00:01:06,840 --> 00:01:09,399 Speaker 1: more closely together, and now we have to decide what 19 00:01:09,480 --> 00:01:12,640 Speaker 1: to do about the Second Circuit's opinion and because barred 20 00:01:12,720 --> 00:01:16,080 Speaker 1: rule that it was unclear whether the Second Circuit properly 21 00:01:16,160 --> 00:01:21,200 Speaker 1: considered the generic nature of Goldman's alleged misrepresentations, the Court 22 00:01:21,280 --> 00:01:24,520 Speaker 1: sent the case back to the Second Circuit to revisit 23 00:01:24,560 --> 00:01:28,720 Speaker 1: the issue. Joining me a securities litigator, Mark Rifkin, a 24 00:01:28,800 --> 00:01:33,320 Speaker 1: partner wolf Haldenstein, start by telling us what the issue 25 00:01:33,520 --> 00:01:38,640 Speaker 1: was in the case. Sure, So, the Supreme Court was 26 00:01:38,880 --> 00:01:42,320 Speaker 1: asked to decide two questions in the case. The first 27 00:01:42,360 --> 00:01:46,360 Speaker 1: question they were asked to answer is whether the court 28 00:01:46,400 --> 00:01:50,680 Speaker 1: should consider the generic nature of an alleged misstatement or 29 00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:56,440 Speaker 1: omission in deciding whether the presumption of reliance the basic 30 00:01:56,520 --> 00:02:00,640 Speaker 1: presumption of reliance has been revited. And then the second 31 00:02:00,720 --> 00:02:05,080 Speaker 1: question the Court was asked to decide is whether the 32 00:02:05,160 --> 00:02:09,560 Speaker 1: defendants bear the burden of proof were merely a burden 33 00:02:09,600 --> 00:02:13,640 Speaker 1: to produce evidence to rebut that presumption. What did the 34 00:02:13,680 --> 00:02:17,080 Speaker 1: court decide so on the first question, the Court said 35 00:02:17,120 --> 00:02:20,840 Speaker 1: that the dispute about whether the generic nature of a 36 00:02:20,919 --> 00:02:25,880 Speaker 1: misrepresentation is to be considered at the class certification stage, 37 00:02:25,960 --> 00:02:32,200 Speaker 1: that question evaporated because the plaintiff and the defendant agreed 38 00:02:33,040 --> 00:02:38,240 Speaker 1: that whether a statement is generic, it is a consideration 39 00:02:38,280 --> 00:02:42,040 Speaker 1: that the court should make at the class certification stage 40 00:02:42,120 --> 00:02:45,959 Speaker 1: because the more generic a statement is, the less likely 41 00:02:46,000 --> 00:02:49,160 Speaker 1: it is to have some price impact, and that is 42 00:02:49,240 --> 00:02:52,959 Speaker 1: relevant to class certification. So that was an outcome, although 43 00:02:53,000 --> 00:02:55,240 Speaker 1: it wasn't really much of a decision, because as the 44 00:02:55,240 --> 00:02:57,960 Speaker 1: court said, there wasn't much of a dispute at the 45 00:02:58,080 --> 00:03:00,440 Speaker 1: end of the day. And then on the second question, 46 00:03:01,240 --> 00:03:05,520 Speaker 1: the court said that the defendant does bear the burden 47 00:03:05,840 --> 00:03:10,240 Speaker 1: of proof, not merely the burdens of producing evidence in 48 00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:14,079 Speaker 1: order to try to rebut the basic presumption of reliance. 49 00:03:14,880 --> 00:03:19,120 Speaker 1: So both sides seemed to say that they were pleased 50 00:03:19,160 --> 00:03:22,640 Speaker 1: with the decision. Yes, well, I think that there's a 51 00:03:22,760 --> 00:03:25,400 Speaker 1: little bit of room for both sides to be pleased. 52 00:03:25,400 --> 00:03:27,760 Speaker 1: But on the whole, I think this is this is 53 00:03:27,760 --> 00:03:30,800 Speaker 1: a bigger victory for the pointiffs side of these cases 54 00:03:30,800 --> 00:03:33,200 Speaker 1: than it is for the defendants side of these cases, 55 00:03:33,280 --> 00:03:37,280 Speaker 1: because the Bldman was asking for a decision that would 56 00:03:37,280 --> 00:03:42,280 Speaker 1: have substantially changed the way Rule twenty three is applied 57 00:03:42,320 --> 00:03:46,400 Speaker 1: in securities cases. So the pointiff gets the claim I 58 00:03:46,440 --> 00:03:50,360 Speaker 1: think the bigger victory because I think the plaintiffs faced 59 00:03:50,560 --> 00:03:54,040 Speaker 1: a higher risk going in. But as I expected, this 60 00:03:54,120 --> 00:03:57,760 Speaker 1: was largely a decision that upheld prior precedent, and the 61 00:03:57,800 --> 00:04:00,280 Speaker 1: Court said, we mean what we say when we say 62 00:04:00,320 --> 00:04:03,360 Speaker 1: that the presumption is valid, and this is how it's 63 00:04:03,360 --> 00:04:05,720 Speaker 1: going to be followed. So I think there's you know, 64 00:04:06,040 --> 00:04:09,200 Speaker 1: a little bit for everybody in the decision, but a bigger, 65 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:12,800 Speaker 1: bigger victory for the pointiffs sent for the defendants. So 66 00:04:12,840 --> 00:04:15,400 Speaker 1: it goes back to the Second Circuit. Didn't the Second 67 00:04:15,440 --> 00:04:21,760 Speaker 1: Circuit already consider the generic nature of the misrepresentation? Well? 68 00:04:21,800 --> 00:04:24,159 Speaker 1: I think the Second Circuit did, and I think the 69 00:04:24,200 --> 00:04:28,680 Speaker 1: Second Circuit gave it more than sufficient consideration. And Justice 70 00:04:28,680 --> 00:04:31,800 Speaker 1: Sodomy are dissented from that part of the decision that 71 00:04:32,040 --> 00:04:35,919 Speaker 1: remanded back to the Second Circuit. But I guess in 72 00:04:35,960 --> 00:04:39,599 Speaker 1: an abundance of caution, the Supreme Court sent it back 73 00:04:39,600 --> 00:04:43,440 Speaker 1: to the Second Circuit for further consideration. And maybe that's 74 00:04:43,800 --> 00:04:46,919 Speaker 1: you know, something of a nod to Judge Sullivan, who 75 00:04:47,520 --> 00:04:50,839 Speaker 1: was the dissenting voice in in the Second Circuit on 76 00:04:50,839 --> 00:04:54,240 Speaker 1: what was in the Second Circuit a second appeal. So 77 00:04:54,320 --> 00:04:58,240 Speaker 1: this goes back now for reconsideration of the second appeal. 78 00:04:58,320 --> 00:04:59,919 Speaker 1: But I don't think the outcome is going to be 79 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:02,760 Speaker 1: any different the second time around. On that. On that 80 00:05:02,800 --> 00:05:06,080 Speaker 1: second field, I think that the court has been satisfied 81 00:05:06,120 --> 00:05:11,080 Speaker 1: that the statements were specific enough in the context of 82 00:05:12,080 --> 00:05:17,080 Speaker 1: Goldman's overall presentation of its business, and I think that's 83 00:05:17,120 --> 00:05:21,480 Speaker 1: the relevant part here. The statements themselves, although they were 84 00:05:21,640 --> 00:05:26,120 Speaker 1: generally of a generic nature, they were specific enough in 85 00:05:26,200 --> 00:05:31,720 Speaker 1: the context of Goldman's business that they would be material 86 00:05:31,920 --> 00:05:38,000 Speaker 1: to investors who were considering buying Goldman stock. So Mark 87 00:05:38,120 --> 00:05:43,800 Speaker 1: In the Securities and Exchange Commission sued Goldman, accusing it 88 00:05:43,839 --> 00:05:47,440 Speaker 1: of creating and selling advocates without disclosing that the hedge 89 00:05:47,440 --> 00:05:51,400 Speaker 1: fund Pauls and In Company helped pick the underlying securities 90 00:05:51,400 --> 00:05:55,919 Speaker 1: and bet against the vehicle. Goldman later paid five million 91 00:05:56,040 --> 00:05:59,360 Speaker 1: dollars to settle with the SEC though it didn't admit 92 00:05:59,440 --> 00:06:01,960 Speaker 1: wrong doing. The firms that it made a mistake in 93 00:06:02,040 --> 00:06:05,839 Speaker 1: not disclosing the pulse and roll. Explain that to me, 94 00:06:05,920 --> 00:06:10,360 Speaker 1: how do you make a mistake but that's not wrongdoing? Well, 95 00:06:10,400 --> 00:06:15,400 Speaker 1: I think that's a compromise between the sec and Goldman. 96 00:06:15,520 --> 00:06:19,159 Speaker 1: I think Goldman was unprepared to admit that it really 97 00:06:20,040 --> 00:06:26,599 Speaker 1: violated any obligations, either to customers or two investors, because 98 00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:33,279 Speaker 1: it's so important to Goldman's business model, that customers can 99 00:06:33,320 --> 00:06:38,240 Speaker 1: trust it, that they had no choice but to insist 100 00:06:39,080 --> 00:06:42,400 Speaker 1: that it be characterized as nothing more than a mistake. 101 00:06:43,000 --> 00:06:46,360 Speaker 1: And that's why, by the way, I think that's why 102 00:06:46,560 --> 00:06:52,560 Speaker 1: the statements, even though they are generally generic kinds of statements, 103 00:06:53,240 --> 00:06:57,479 Speaker 1: are important in the context of Goldman's business. Goldman depends 104 00:06:57,560 --> 00:07:02,960 Speaker 1: upon its credibility and its integrity to do the business 105 00:07:03,000 --> 00:07:05,840 Speaker 1: it does. To be able to attract the clients attracts, 106 00:07:06,400 --> 00:07:10,560 Speaker 1: to get the kind of investors it gets. Goldman has 107 00:07:10,600 --> 00:07:17,560 Speaker 1: to have a pristine reputation, and so the statements about 108 00:07:17,680 --> 00:07:22,640 Speaker 1: its business and how it operates its business are in 109 00:07:22,720 --> 00:07:27,240 Speaker 1: fact material here. I don't think they're just throw away 110 00:07:27,280 --> 00:07:31,720 Speaker 1: lines in a public document. I think they're important. And 111 00:07:31,760 --> 00:07:36,200 Speaker 1: that's why Goldman. That's why Goldman couldn't admit to any 112 00:07:36,640 --> 00:07:40,560 Speaker 1: real wrongdoing in settling with the sec. So if this 113 00:07:40,720 --> 00:07:45,560 Speaker 1: goes to trial, will will the jury here about the settlement. 114 00:07:46,640 --> 00:07:48,520 Speaker 1: I think the jury has a right to hear about 115 00:07:48,520 --> 00:07:52,120 Speaker 1: the prosecution and the settlements. Yes, and and Goldman will 116 00:07:52,200 --> 00:07:57,400 Speaker 1: argue because they didn't admit any wrongdoing that there probative 117 00:07:57,480 --> 00:08:00,760 Speaker 1: value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice. Us, but 118 00:08:00,880 --> 00:08:03,360 Speaker 1: ultimately a judge is going to decide whether that's true 119 00:08:03,480 --> 00:08:06,520 Speaker 1: or not. And I think that I think that it 120 00:08:06,560 --> 00:08:11,000 Speaker 1: would be um important for jurors to know that Goldman 121 00:08:11,200 --> 00:08:16,679 Speaker 1: was accused of the wrongdoing and ultimately settled those claims, 122 00:08:16,840 --> 00:08:18,760 Speaker 1: but leave it to Goldman to say, well, we settled 123 00:08:18,760 --> 00:08:21,840 Speaker 1: because it was cheaper than fighting, and let the jury 124 00:08:21,880 --> 00:08:26,640 Speaker 1: decide whether that's a credible explanation or not. I'm generally 125 00:08:26,640 --> 00:08:29,120 Speaker 1: in the view that you know, jurors are entitled to 126 00:08:29,120 --> 00:08:32,959 Speaker 1: make those kinds of decisions, and it is unusual that 127 00:08:32,960 --> 00:08:36,679 Speaker 1: Goldman admitted that it made a quote mistake. Well, more 128 00:08:36,679 --> 00:08:39,080 Speaker 1: and more we're finding that that there's pressure on the 129 00:08:39,080 --> 00:08:43,559 Speaker 1: part of regulators to um to insist on an admission 130 00:08:43,559 --> 00:08:48,920 Speaker 1: of wrongdoing, and and for Goldman to admit a mistake, yes, 131 00:08:49,000 --> 00:08:53,320 Speaker 1: I think it's pretty extraordinary. But remember this was something 132 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:57,560 Speaker 1: that Goldman really couldn't afford to lose. There's no way 133 00:08:57,600 --> 00:08:59,440 Speaker 1: they could have run that risk. It would have been 134 00:09:00,120 --> 00:09:02,959 Speaker 1: a bet the farm kind of a case for government 135 00:09:03,040 --> 00:09:06,920 Speaker 1: to fight. And and I think they had to do 136 00:09:06,960 --> 00:09:09,960 Speaker 1: what they did in order to be able to continue 137 00:09:10,000 --> 00:09:12,920 Speaker 1: to operate the way they do. And and that's that's why. 138 00:09:12,960 --> 00:09:16,360 Speaker 1: I think the statements they made that are an issue 139 00:09:16,600 --> 00:09:20,199 Speaker 1: in in the case the Supreme Court decided, are so 140 00:09:20,360 --> 00:09:26,200 Speaker 1: vitally important to investors. What about the partial descent of 141 00:09:26,720 --> 00:09:34,000 Speaker 1: justice score such joined by Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Yeah, 142 00:09:34,040 --> 00:09:38,400 Speaker 1: I think that. I think that they're swimming upstream. I 143 00:09:38,440 --> 00:09:43,360 Speaker 1: think the the Court, the majority decision Um Justice Paris 144 00:09:43,559 --> 00:09:47,560 Speaker 1: majority decision is is spot on. And when when the 145 00:09:47,600 --> 00:09:51,280 Speaker 1: Court said in Basic and in Haliburton too, that the 146 00:09:51,360 --> 00:09:55,480 Speaker 1: defendant may rebut the presumption of reliance by showing that 147 00:09:55,600 --> 00:09:59,240 Speaker 1: the misrepresentation did not affect the public price for the stock, 148 00:10:00,200 --> 00:10:03,280 Speaker 1: That's not merely a burden of production. That's a burden 149 00:10:03,320 --> 00:10:07,959 Speaker 1: of proof. And I think, uh, Justice course, with Justice 150 00:10:07,960 --> 00:10:12,360 Speaker 1: Thomas and Justice Alito joining in the dissent, I think 151 00:10:12,360 --> 00:10:15,720 Speaker 1: they're looking to change the precedent and I don't think 152 00:10:15,760 --> 00:10:19,160 Speaker 1: the Supreme Court is ready to do that. And June, 153 00:10:19,160 --> 00:10:23,120 Speaker 1: you know, I've said for many years, and even as 154 00:10:23,200 --> 00:10:28,320 Speaker 1: this Supreme Court becomes progressively more conservative on more and 155 00:10:28,440 --> 00:10:34,000 Speaker 1: more issues, they have consistently maintained a very neutral approach 156 00:10:34,679 --> 00:10:39,080 Speaker 1: two class certification questions, and this is another example of that. 157 00:10:39,200 --> 00:10:42,920 Speaker 1: I think the I think the Courts decision on that 158 00:10:42,960 --> 00:10:48,360 Speaker 1: second question that the burden of proof is on the defendant, 159 00:10:48,440 --> 00:10:52,160 Speaker 1: not merely the burden of production is a it's a 160 00:10:52,480 --> 00:10:58,160 Speaker 1: middle of the road UH decision that continues to apply 161 00:10:58,320 --> 00:11:01,160 Speaker 1: the law of the way the Court has for many, 162 00:11:01,200 --> 00:11:05,560 Speaker 1: many many years. And and Justice score such wanted to 163 00:11:05,600 --> 00:11:12,000 Speaker 1: move that UH, move that outcome to a different UH 164 00:11:12,040 --> 00:11:15,040 Speaker 1: through a different playing field, and and the majority said no. 165 00:11:16,360 --> 00:11:20,120 Speaker 1: And so this court, despite being labeled a business friendly court, 166 00:11:20,880 --> 00:11:25,320 Speaker 1: has has been not so business friendly and class certification cases. 167 00:11:26,320 --> 00:11:29,200 Speaker 1: I think that that's correct. I think this Court has 168 00:11:29,240 --> 00:11:35,480 Speaker 1: been neutral in class certification decisions for many, many many years. 169 00:11:35,520 --> 00:11:40,040 Speaker 1: And I think that that trend has been um prevalent, 170 00:11:40,800 --> 00:11:45,080 Speaker 1: even as the Court has has moved to the right 171 00:11:45,400 --> 00:11:48,560 Speaker 1: on a number of issues, not just business writing issues, 172 00:11:48,600 --> 00:11:51,320 Speaker 1: but all sorts of issues. This is an area where 173 00:11:51,320 --> 00:11:56,240 Speaker 1: the Court sees and recognizes the the utility of of 174 00:11:56,360 --> 00:12:02,240 Speaker 1: class certification and and is not going too radically change 175 00:12:02,280 --> 00:12:05,640 Speaker 1: the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants under Rule 176 00:12:05,679 --> 00:12:10,600 Speaker 1: twenty three in in business oriented cases. And and so 177 00:12:10,720 --> 00:12:13,440 Speaker 1: this is this is one in a long line of 178 00:12:13,480 --> 00:12:17,320 Speaker 1: cases that I think are are neutral in their approach 179 00:12:17,320 --> 00:12:20,720 Speaker 1: to rule and class certification. And so this was a 180 00:12:20,840 --> 00:12:27,120 Speaker 1: nod also too, two starry, decisive observing precedent. That's exactly right. 181 00:12:27,280 --> 00:12:30,160 Speaker 1: And and that's why I think UM justice course such 182 00:12:30,200 --> 00:12:35,120 Speaker 1: could not could not gather enough support for UM for 183 00:12:35,120 --> 00:12:39,920 Speaker 1: for his position at least in the descent to change 184 00:12:40,080 --> 00:12:45,240 Speaker 1: the the approach on U on the on the burden 185 00:12:45,240 --> 00:12:48,360 Speaker 1: approoved to rebut the presumption. I think this is This 186 00:12:48,400 --> 00:12:50,520 Speaker 1: is story decisive right up and down the line from 187 00:12:50,520 --> 00:12:53,160 Speaker 1: the first question to the second question. I think the 188 00:12:53,200 --> 00:12:55,839 Speaker 1: Court has simply continued to apply the law of the 189 00:12:55,880 --> 00:12:59,480 Speaker 1: same way it has for decades. Thanks for being the 190 00:12:59,480 --> 00:13:04,280 Speaker 1: Bloomberg on Shell. Mark that securities litigator Mark Rifkin a 191 00:13:04,360 --> 00:13:09,640 Speaker 1: partner Wolf Haldenstein. In a splinter decision, the Supreme Court 192 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:12,880 Speaker 1: left intact a board that has invalidated more than two 193 00:13:12,920 --> 00:13:18,000 Speaker 1: thousand patents resolving constitutional issues by giving a presidentially appointed 194 00:13:18,000 --> 00:13:22,160 Speaker 1: official more power to overturn the board's decisions. Joining me 195 00:13:22,240 --> 00:13:24,880 Speaker 1: is Harold Crant, a professor at the Chicago Kent College 196 00:13:24,880 --> 00:13:27,880 Speaker 1: of Law. He'll tell us what the Court's decision turned on. 197 00:13:28,360 --> 00:13:32,800 Speaker 1: The case turned on how much authority do administrative judges have? 198 00:13:33,000 --> 00:13:36,000 Speaker 1: In other cases? The Court is held at a ministry 199 00:13:36,080 --> 00:13:40,439 Speaker 1: judges exercise authority, but they should be considered inferior officers 200 00:13:40,480 --> 00:13:44,320 Speaker 1: because they don't have binding final authority. And what made 201 00:13:44,320 --> 00:13:47,840 Speaker 1: this case sort of in between was that these judges 202 00:13:47,880 --> 00:13:50,960 Speaker 1: do have binding final authority and decisions, but they're subject 203 00:13:51,000 --> 00:13:55,360 Speaker 1: to an array of regulatory controls by the Director of 204 00:13:55,480 --> 00:13:58,400 Speaker 1: the Patent Trademark Office. So the case kind of fell 205 00:13:58,440 --> 00:14:01,959 Speaker 1: in between some of the prior president and it turned 206 00:14:02,040 --> 00:14:05,160 Speaker 1: on how clear of a line needs to be drawn 207 00:14:05,240 --> 00:14:10,239 Speaker 1: between the president and his appointment authority and individuals exercising 208 00:14:10,360 --> 00:14:14,959 Speaker 1: significant authority in the executive branch, and Chief Justice Roberts 209 00:14:15,200 --> 00:14:17,920 Speaker 1: relied upon originalist thinking and his view of the unitary 210 00:14:17,960 --> 00:14:22,040 Speaker 1: presidency to say that because there's final decision making authority 211 00:14:22,080 --> 00:14:25,239 Speaker 1: in these judges, they have to be subject to presidential 212 00:14:25,240 --> 00:14:28,880 Speaker 1: appointment in order to square what's going on with the 213 00:14:28,920 --> 00:14:32,200 Speaker 1: idea of a unitary executive. And I think that clearly 214 00:14:32,280 --> 00:14:36,560 Speaker 1: shows that in Chief Justice Robert's mind, it's important to 215 00:14:36,640 --> 00:14:40,880 Speaker 1: have strong executive branch controls by the president, which suggested 216 00:14:40,960 --> 00:14:44,880 Speaker 1: maybe we're going to see that the Court will outlaw 217 00:14:44,960 --> 00:14:48,239 Speaker 1: these so termed independent agencies, which has been in existence 218 00:14:48,240 --> 00:14:52,400 Speaker 1: for hundreds of years. Independent agencies are defined by having 219 00:14:52,840 --> 00:14:56,840 Speaker 1: ahead who is protected from the plinary removal authority of 220 00:14:56,920 --> 00:14:59,520 Speaker 1: the president. And so we're seeing a lot of cases 221 00:14:59,560 --> 00:15:02,240 Speaker 1: in the low courts, one on the Supreme Court doctrine 222 00:15:02,640 --> 00:15:05,280 Speaker 1: which sort of questions when the president has to have 223 00:15:05,600 --> 00:15:10,680 Speaker 1: plinary removal authority over individuals in the executive branch. And 224 00:15:10,920 --> 00:15:13,920 Speaker 1: Chief Justice Roberts has been quite clear here that he's 225 00:15:14,360 --> 00:15:17,400 Speaker 1: non minimalist with respect to that kind of issue of 226 00:15:17,440 --> 00:15:21,960 Speaker 1: presidential control. And I think his decision and art Threx 227 00:15:22,160 --> 00:15:26,400 Speaker 1: is consistent with his prior decisions that president has to 228 00:15:26,440 --> 00:15:30,240 Speaker 1: have removal authority and appointment authority over any of her 229 00:15:30,280 --> 00:15:35,560 Speaker 1: most individuals, exercising considerable authority in the executive branch. The 230 00:15:35,640 --> 00:15:40,000 Speaker 1: Chief was very creative in the remedy. He constructed tell 231 00:15:40,080 --> 00:15:45,080 Speaker 1: us about that the majority crafts a unique remedy and 232 00:15:45,160 --> 00:15:48,000 Speaker 1: says that instead of having to sort of change the 233 00:15:48,080 --> 00:15:51,800 Speaker 1: structure of administrative patent judges, the Court will had take 234 00:15:51,880 --> 00:15:56,360 Speaker 1: the initiative of changing the statute so that the Director 235 00:15:56,560 --> 00:16:00,960 Speaker 1: of the Patent Trademark Office can now review the administrative 236 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:05,160 Speaker 1: handjective decisions before they can become final. And some of 237 00:16:05,160 --> 00:16:09,320 Speaker 1: the justices criticized the Chief of being so adventurous in 238 00:16:09,440 --> 00:16:14,320 Speaker 1: rewriting a statute and actually being a kind of judicial 239 00:16:14,440 --> 00:16:18,360 Speaker 1: maximalist in deciding the Court had the power to remix 240 00:16:18,640 --> 00:16:21,360 Speaker 1: various elements of the statute together in order to sustain 241 00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:26,240 Speaker 1: its constitutionality. Justice Thomas and dissent Um would have just 242 00:16:26,280 --> 00:16:31,920 Speaker 1: said that there was nothing constitutionally infirm about the structure whatsoever. 243 00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:35,040 Speaker 1: Bus he looked at all the duties exercised by the 244 00:16:35,040 --> 00:16:38,320 Speaker 1: indistrative pan judges instead, you know, taken as a whole, 245 00:16:39,160 --> 00:16:43,160 Speaker 1: we should be able to consider these individuals as inferior officers, 246 00:16:43,360 --> 00:16:46,240 Speaker 1: meaning that they exercise significant authority under the laws of 247 00:16:46,320 --> 00:16:50,480 Speaker 1: United States. Um, But they're not so powerful and so 248 00:16:50,640 --> 00:16:55,560 Speaker 1: influential that the President must have appointment authority over them. 249 00:16:55,680 --> 00:17:01,160 Speaker 1: How often does the Supreme Court rewrite statutes? Yeah, the 250 00:17:01,240 --> 00:17:05,000 Speaker 1: Supreme Court has to rewrite statutes to certain extent. Under 251 00:17:05,040 --> 00:17:10,040 Speaker 1: separability analysis, the Court asks, if one perfection of an 252 00:17:10,080 --> 00:17:14,160 Speaker 1: act is struck down because it's unconstitutional, can the remainder 253 00:17:14,320 --> 00:17:19,119 Speaker 1: of the statute survives? And in terms of doctrine, the 254 00:17:19,200 --> 00:17:23,320 Speaker 1: Court asked, what would Congress prefer to strike down the 255 00:17:23,480 --> 00:17:27,160 Speaker 1: entire statute or to keep the part of the statute 256 00:17:27,560 --> 00:17:31,040 Speaker 1: that was not struck down, and that's known as separability analysis. 257 00:17:31,119 --> 00:17:34,880 Speaker 1: But in this case, the Court decided that Congress would 258 00:17:34,880 --> 00:17:39,440 Speaker 1: have wanted, in essence, the statute to be left as 259 00:17:39,440 --> 00:17:43,359 Speaker 1: it is, but by taking another part of the statute 260 00:17:43,440 --> 00:17:46,119 Speaker 1: and changing it, even though that was never challenged before 261 00:17:46,119 --> 00:17:49,199 Speaker 1: the court. So, in essence, the Court took away some 262 00:17:49,359 --> 00:17:53,360 Speaker 1: authority different authority from the administrative patent judges to ensure 263 00:17:53,520 --> 00:17:57,359 Speaker 1: that they could be considered inferior officers and therefore that 264 00:17:57,440 --> 00:18:00,479 Speaker 1: the structure of the statute would be a pell So 265 00:18:00,520 --> 00:18:03,359 Speaker 1: it's a very sort of creative use of the several 266 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:07,960 Speaker 1: billion analysis in order to uphold um the constitutional status 267 00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:11,080 Speaker 1: of these administrative patent judges. And that was the creative 268 00:18:11,080 --> 00:18:15,920 Speaker 1: remedy forged by the Chief Justice. But it is a 269 00:18:16,000 --> 00:18:19,720 Speaker 1: change from the typical severe billion analysis that we see. Well, 270 00:18:19,720 --> 00:18:22,960 Speaker 1: there are no hardening coalitions on the court in that perspective, 271 00:18:23,000 --> 00:18:25,320 Speaker 1: I think the Supreme Court has taken a step towards 272 00:18:25,359 --> 00:18:30,399 Speaker 1: establishing some continuous independent reputation. I mean, the right is 273 00:18:31,400 --> 00:18:33,720 Speaker 1: being a little upset with each other, and indeed the 274 00:18:34,240 --> 00:18:37,080 Speaker 1: at the two ends, it's it's a Leado is leased. 275 00:18:37,119 --> 00:18:40,880 Speaker 1: Often in the majority justice Leado and Justice kavanas most 276 00:18:40,920 --> 00:18:44,480 Speaker 1: often in the majority so far, and we had even 277 00:18:44,520 --> 00:18:48,879 Speaker 1: the last couple of days were Justice Thomas writes a 278 00:18:49,160 --> 00:18:53,879 Speaker 1: liberal dissent, chastising Chief Justice Robbert's opinion is being overly 279 00:18:54,040 --> 00:18:58,520 Speaker 1: formalistic in finding that the administrative patent judges had to 280 00:18:58,520 --> 00:19:01,720 Speaker 1: be classified as a pier or your offices or rather 281 00:19:02,119 --> 00:19:05,840 Speaker 1: justice to something of a surprise and more functionalist approach, 282 00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:09,640 Speaker 1: and said, in light of all these factors and how 283 00:19:09,680 --> 00:19:12,720 Speaker 1: powerful these judges are, um, we should think of them 284 00:19:12,760 --> 00:19:15,800 Speaker 1: as being inferior officers. Therefore, have no problem with the 285 00:19:15,800 --> 00:19:19,239 Speaker 1: appointment's clause in terms of how they are appointed, and 286 00:19:19,280 --> 00:19:23,119 Speaker 1: that would have satisfied the entire case. Justice Thomas is 287 00:19:23,119 --> 00:19:26,760 Speaker 1: out flanking even some of the liberals on the Court. Um. 288 00:19:26,840 --> 00:19:30,440 Speaker 1: At the same time, Justice Thomas did write the majority 289 00:19:30,440 --> 00:19:32,639 Speaker 1: opinion and the that's these case, which had to do 290 00:19:32,640 --> 00:19:35,119 Speaker 1: with the scope of the alien toward statute. In that 291 00:19:35,240 --> 00:19:38,760 Speaker 1: case you had a more conservative view um than the 292 00:19:38,840 --> 00:19:41,360 Speaker 1: rest of the court. But those are just two examples 293 00:19:41,640 --> 00:19:45,640 Speaker 1: of how fractured the Court has been. Justice Alito has 294 00:19:45,720 --> 00:19:49,240 Speaker 1: chided the majority in descent both in the Obama Your 295 00:19:49,240 --> 00:19:53,639 Speaker 1: Foster Care case for not taking the opportunity to strike 296 00:19:53,720 --> 00:19:58,040 Speaker 1: more boldly on behalf of conservative interests in one case 297 00:19:58,080 --> 00:20:02,159 Speaker 1: striking down Obamacare and the other case sort of establishing 298 00:20:02,160 --> 00:20:06,679 Speaker 1: a firmer rights religion in the Foster Care case. So 299 00:20:06,760 --> 00:20:08,840 Speaker 1: he's sort of being in temperate saying, hey, this is 300 00:20:08,840 --> 00:20:12,400 Speaker 1: our time, we have to move forward, and his allies 301 00:20:12,480 --> 00:20:14,800 Speaker 1: on on the right are not taking the queue and 302 00:20:15,000 --> 00:20:21,400 Speaker 1: having taken more incrementalist decisions. And so far Justice Barrett 303 00:20:21,400 --> 00:20:26,680 Speaker 1: has been more as an ally of Chief Justice Roberts incrementalism, 304 00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:28,800 Speaker 1: as we saw in the Foster Care case, by the 305 00:20:28,840 --> 00:20:33,359 Speaker 1: Philadelphia UM as we saw in the Obamacare case. And 306 00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:36,760 Speaker 1: so there's no stable coalitions. We all see a very 307 00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:39,840 Speaker 1: marked shift to right for the court. M Rather, it's 308 00:20:39,880 --> 00:20:43,800 Speaker 1: really been a more sort of modestly conservative court to date. 309 00:20:44,520 --> 00:20:48,040 Speaker 1: We have you ever seen Justice Thomas sort of swing 310 00:20:48,119 --> 00:20:51,320 Speaker 1: back and forth this way? UM. I was very surprised 311 00:20:51,320 --> 00:20:54,760 Speaker 1: at his decision today in Artitects, UM, and I think 312 00:20:54,760 --> 00:20:58,800 Speaker 1: others will be as well. And but he's always taken 313 00:20:59,240 --> 00:21:03,080 Speaker 1: somewhat of a union you. He doesn't uh necessarily followed 314 00:21:03,119 --> 00:21:06,040 Speaker 1: the teachings of others or the meanings of others, and 315 00:21:06,520 --> 00:21:11,080 Speaker 1: not right to the doctrinaire over the formalistic with respect 316 00:21:11,080 --> 00:21:13,800 Speaker 1: to the deployment clause, and he was felt free to 317 00:21:13,880 --> 00:21:17,520 Speaker 1: articulate his views despite what his colleagues sent. During the 318 00:21:17,560 --> 00:21:20,520 Speaker 1: confirmation hearings for the new justices the last three there 319 00:21:20,560 --> 00:21:24,520 Speaker 1: was a lot of talk about originalism textualism. Do you 320 00:21:24,600 --> 00:21:28,080 Speaker 1: see those three following that they are? They are all 321 00:21:28,240 --> 00:21:33,639 Speaker 1: following originalism. There was a great deal of of invocations 322 00:21:33,680 --> 00:21:37,040 Speaker 1: of the Framers in the most recent decisions. So they 323 00:21:37,080 --> 00:21:41,639 Speaker 1: don't agree on what lessons to draw from the Framers, 324 00:21:41,680 --> 00:21:45,320 Speaker 1: and they don't agree when they should rely upon the 325 00:21:45,320 --> 00:21:48,639 Speaker 1: Framers as opposed to, for instance, the plain language of 326 00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:54,680 Speaker 1: the statute. So those differences amongst the sort of conservative justices, 327 00:21:55,040 --> 00:21:58,720 Speaker 1: in combination with Chief Justice roberts assistance on a kind 328 00:21:58,720 --> 00:22:03,520 Speaker 1: of slower uh minimalist approach, has meant so far we 329 00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:08,159 Speaker 1: don't have a united right word shift to the court. 330 00:22:08,560 --> 00:22:11,040 Speaker 1: And I'll be interesting to see in the coming term 331 00:22:11,040 --> 00:22:15,200 Speaker 1: whether that will hold. But that's certainly been very noticeable 332 00:22:15,280 --> 00:22:20,640 Speaker 1: so far. Let's turn to a decision last week where 333 00:22:20,680 --> 00:22:24,359 Speaker 1: the Court gave companies a broader shield against lawsuits by 334 00:22:24,480 --> 00:22:30,240 Speaker 1: victims of overseas atrocities and rejected accusations that Nestlee and 335 00:22:30,320 --> 00:22:33,919 Speaker 1: Cargill were complicit in the use of child slavery on 336 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:38,840 Speaker 1: Ivory Coast cocoa farms. So the justices took the case 337 00:22:39,000 --> 00:22:42,400 Speaker 1: in order to examine whether the Alien Towards Statute could 338 00:22:42,440 --> 00:22:46,760 Speaker 1: apply to a corporate defendant as opposed to an individual. 339 00:22:47,119 --> 00:22:50,320 Speaker 1: In The theory was that corporate defendants weren't very prevalent 340 00:22:50,560 --> 00:22:55,000 Speaker 1: back of so that Congress may have intended only to 341 00:22:55,080 --> 00:22:59,160 Speaker 1: include individuals as defendants within the scope of the Act. 342 00:22:59,600 --> 00:23:02,720 Speaker 1: But they changed their minds after oral argument, and the 343 00:23:02,800 --> 00:23:06,520 Speaker 1: court decided eight to one on a different theory. The 344 00:23:06,640 --> 00:23:10,080 Speaker 1: court held instead that the plaintiffs had not shown a 345 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:16,399 Speaker 1: sufficient nexus to the acts complained of to the United States, 346 00:23:16,480 --> 00:23:20,280 Speaker 1: and in that case, there are Molly citizens who allegedly 347 00:23:20,400 --> 00:23:23,840 Speaker 1: were called into slavery to work in for Nestle and 348 00:23:23,920 --> 00:23:27,760 Speaker 1: Cargo and other sort of food manufacturers in Ivory Coast, 349 00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:32,480 Speaker 1: and they sued Cargo and US Corporation and the U 350 00:23:32,560 --> 00:23:36,199 Speaker 1: S subsidiary of Nestles in the United States, arguing that 351 00:23:36,280 --> 00:23:40,199 Speaker 1: aiding and embetting childhood slavery should be recognized as a 352 00:23:40,320 --> 00:23:44,320 Speaker 1: international torch in violation of the law of nations. Therefore 353 00:23:44,359 --> 00:23:48,200 Speaker 1: subject to suit under the Alien Toward Statute. The Court, however, 354 00:23:48,280 --> 00:23:51,560 Speaker 1: held at least eight of the justices held that there 355 00:23:51,600 --> 00:23:54,840 Speaker 1: had to be more conducts than just sort of having 356 00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:57,719 Speaker 1: a place of business in the United States like Cargo 357 00:23:57,840 --> 00:24:00,960 Speaker 1: and Nestles did more than just general corporate presence, more 358 00:24:00,960 --> 00:24:04,800 Speaker 1: than just corporate affairs, that the actual planning or carrying 359 00:24:04,800 --> 00:24:07,000 Speaker 1: out of the duties had to take place in the 360 00:24:07,119 --> 00:24:11,360 Speaker 1: United States as well. So, practically speaking, the Court has 361 00:24:11,680 --> 00:24:15,520 Speaker 1: shut the door even more firmly against future suits under 362 00:24:15,560 --> 00:24:18,480 Speaker 1: the Alien Tour Statute because the plaintiffs had to show 363 00:24:18,560 --> 00:24:23,560 Speaker 1: such a strong connection between conduct in the United States 364 00:24:23,640 --> 00:24:27,399 Speaker 1: and the acts that allegedly are against the law of nations. 365 00:24:27,440 --> 00:24:31,199 Speaker 1: Interestingly in the decision is that a majority of the 366 00:24:31,240 --> 00:24:35,560 Speaker 1: court seemed to come to an agreement that corporate defendants 367 00:24:35,640 --> 00:24:39,040 Speaker 1: can be sued under the Alien Tour Statute, but nonetheless 368 00:24:39,040 --> 00:24:41,919 Speaker 1: they decided the case on a different ground, and a 369 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:45,600 Speaker 1: minority of the justices said that we can no longer 370 00:24:46,040 --> 00:24:48,560 Speaker 1: find any kind of new violations in the national law 371 00:24:48,680 --> 00:24:53,000 Speaker 1: there were unknown to the framers in and Justice Thomas 372 00:24:53,040 --> 00:24:56,640 Speaker 1: said that only those three areas that have been recognized 373 00:24:56,680 --> 00:25:02,760 Speaker 1: our interference with ambassadors, interference with safe passages, and interference 374 00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:07,879 Speaker 1: with shipping right through piracy, and so somewhat counterintuitively, a 375 00:25:07,960 --> 00:25:11,639 Speaker 1: number of justices would say, we will only recognize towards 376 00:25:11,680 --> 00:25:14,840 Speaker 1: in those three areas, and we won't even admit of 377 00:25:15,119 --> 00:25:18,359 Speaker 1: a tort of something like slavery or a tort of 378 00:25:18,480 --> 00:25:23,320 Speaker 1: genocide because shockingly that wasn't recognized back in nine But 379 00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:27,280 Speaker 1: nonetheless the court majority does not make that holding. Thanks hell. 380 00:25:27,640 --> 00:25:30,320 Speaker 1: That's Harold Grant of the Chicago Kent College of Law. 381 00:25:31,240 --> 00:25:33,480 Speaker 1: And that's it for the edition of the Bloomberg Lawn Show. 382 00:25:33,880 --> 00:25:36,040 Speaker 1: Remember you can always at the latest legal news on 383 00:25:36,119 --> 00:25:38,639 Speaker 1: our Bloomberg Lawn podcast. You can find them on you 384 00:25:38,680 --> 00:25:42,400 Speaker 1: can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www 385 00:25:42,560 --> 00:25:46,800 Speaker 1: dot Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast, slash Law, and please 386 00:25:46,880 --> 00:25:49,280 Speaker 1: join me every week and that attend the m eastern 387 00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:51,159 Speaker 1: right here on Joomlugg Radio