1 00:00:15,356 --> 00:00:24,116 Speaker 1: Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show 2 00:00:24,116 --> 00:00:27,716 Speaker 1: where we explored the stories behind the stories in the news. 3 00:00:28,356 --> 00:00:32,996 Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. This week, no story is more pressing 4 00:00:33,356 --> 00:00:37,236 Speaker 1: in the United States and elsewhere than the fall of 5 00:00:37,316 --> 00:00:40,636 Speaker 1: Kabul in the aftermath of the US announcement that it 6 00:00:40,756 --> 00:00:45,196 Speaker 1: is imminently withdrawing from Afghanistan. As this story broke, I 7 00:00:45,316 --> 00:00:48,356 Speaker 1: knew that the person I wanted most to hear from 8 00:00:48,396 --> 00:00:52,436 Speaker 1: about it was doctor Emil Simpson. Emil is a former 9 00:00:52,476 --> 00:00:56,036 Speaker 1: British Army officer who served three tours of duty in 10 00:00:56,076 --> 00:01:00,636 Speaker 1: Afghanistan with the Royal Gurkha Rifles. He is a scholar 11 00:01:00,676 --> 00:01:03,716 Speaker 1: who wrote an extraordinary book, War from the Ground Up, 12 00:01:04,036 --> 00:01:08,756 Speaker 1: twenty first Century Combat as Politics, that described new forms 13 00:01:08,796 --> 00:01:11,396 Speaker 1: of war fair both from the standpoint of the soldiers 14 00:01:11,436 --> 00:01:14,316 Speaker 1: on the ground and from the big picture perspective of 15 00:01:14,436 --> 00:01:18,156 Speaker 1: military strategy. He's also a scholar of international law and 16 00:01:18,196 --> 00:01:22,316 Speaker 1: international relations, and currently is a barrister in London working 17 00:01:22,356 --> 00:01:26,676 Speaker 1: on international and commercial matters. Emil, thank you so much 18 00:01:26,756 --> 00:01:34,796 Speaker 1: for joining me, especially on short notice. Emil. Let's start 19 00:01:34,836 --> 00:01:39,036 Speaker 1: with the immediate question of the evacuation, which we're all 20 00:01:39,116 --> 00:01:43,836 Speaker 1: watching in real time. How is it going, and how 21 00:01:43,836 --> 00:01:48,556 Speaker 1: would you compare it to other instances of evacuation from Afghanistan, 22 00:01:48,676 --> 00:01:52,156 Speaker 1: since eventually, it seems any power that decides that it 23 00:01:52,196 --> 00:01:57,996 Speaker 1: wants to govern Afghanistan ends up evacuating inner hurry. Yes, well, 24 00:01:58,076 --> 00:02:01,916 Speaker 1: from what I understand the evacuation, the plan is to 25 00:02:01,996 --> 00:02:05,476 Speaker 1: complete it in two or three days. The Nazi evacuation 26 00:02:05,516 --> 00:02:07,596 Speaker 1: of our forces, it's a question mark as to how 27 00:02:07,596 --> 00:02:10,236 Speaker 1: we're going to get out inter as others who helped 28 00:02:10,316 --> 00:02:13,156 Speaker 1: us who are not part of that evacuation. And that's 29 00:02:13,236 --> 00:02:17,796 Speaker 1: clearly a severe problem in terms of the kind of 30 00:02:17,876 --> 00:02:20,956 Speaker 1: very near term situation. The basic problem is that because 31 00:02:21,196 --> 00:02:25,196 Speaker 1: the US evacuated Background air Base sometime ago, there's only 32 00:02:25,236 --> 00:02:27,876 Speaker 1: one airfield effectively in Afghanistan that we can use, and 33 00:02:27,876 --> 00:02:31,236 Speaker 1: that's that's the Comble Airport, which only has one runaway 34 00:02:31,356 --> 00:02:34,236 Speaker 1: and is overlooked by high ground. So it's clearly very vulnerable. 35 00:02:34,596 --> 00:02:37,476 Speaker 1: So you could have, you know, an accident. So regards 36 00:02:37,476 --> 00:02:39,796 Speaker 1: to what Taliban leaderships say, a kind of unit on 37 00:02:39,836 --> 00:02:42,236 Speaker 1: the ground that doesn't follow them might decide to take 38 00:02:42,276 --> 00:02:44,796 Speaker 1: a pot shot at a plane that clearly would be disastrous. 39 00:02:44,836 --> 00:02:47,276 Speaker 1: That that's the kind of flash point that could happen, 40 00:02:47,556 --> 00:02:49,756 Speaker 1: but short of that, it looks like we're just going 41 00:02:49,756 --> 00:02:54,356 Speaker 1: to get out without further do really, as long as 42 00:02:54,356 --> 00:02:59,036 Speaker 1: there's no accident, you know, for me personally, I do 43 00:02:59,756 --> 00:03:04,196 Speaker 1: remember vividly the expect not just the interpreters but of 44 00:03:04,236 --> 00:03:08,156 Speaker 1: cause them too, but also just the ordinary Afghan soldiers 45 00:03:08,356 --> 00:03:10,596 Speaker 1: and especially you know, their officers who are basically the 46 00:03:10,596 --> 00:03:14,836 Speaker 1: people I was working with on a daily basis. Who 47 00:03:14,836 --> 00:03:17,196 Speaker 1: are my age. These aren't the kind of high level 48 00:03:17,556 --> 00:03:19,476 Speaker 1: officials in Kabul who are cr up. These are guys 49 00:03:19,516 --> 00:03:24,996 Speaker 1: who and women too, who were very brave and very hopeful, 50 00:03:25,116 --> 00:03:28,836 Speaker 1: very idealistic. They'd grown up really with this new government 51 00:03:28,916 --> 00:03:30,476 Speaker 1: or at these they didn't remember the had a bands, 52 00:03:30,476 --> 00:03:35,636 Speaker 1: they're too young, wanted a sort of better Afghanistan, and 53 00:03:36,236 --> 00:03:39,916 Speaker 1: they really were putting their lives on the line for 54 00:03:39,996 --> 00:03:44,596 Speaker 1: this project. And those are the people who have basically 55 00:03:44,636 --> 00:03:47,676 Speaker 1: been abandoned, you know, unlike US, I mean, Western Force 56 00:03:47,756 --> 00:03:50,756 Speaker 1: is obviously for extremely hard too. These guys were deployed 57 00:03:50,756 --> 00:03:52,556 Speaker 1: constantly on the ground. You know, they were in Hell 58 00:03:52,636 --> 00:03:55,076 Speaker 1: Mount for ten years without relief. I mean maybe a 59 00:03:55,116 --> 00:03:57,876 Speaker 1: week back in Kabul or whatever, but basically they were 60 00:03:57,916 --> 00:04:01,476 Speaker 1: just constantly there. This was their life. This wasn't at all, 61 00:04:01,556 --> 00:04:04,396 Speaker 1: This was their life, and they didn't have the option 62 00:04:04,396 --> 00:04:07,916 Speaker 1: to leave Afghanistan. I don't know whether it crossed their 63 00:04:07,916 --> 00:04:11,116 Speaker 1: mind that day they might have to evacuate, but that's 64 00:04:11,156 --> 00:04:13,556 Speaker 1: the position we're in now, and we absolutely have a 65 00:04:13,596 --> 00:04:17,116 Speaker 1: moral obligation to evacuate these people. You know, regardless of 66 00:04:17,116 --> 00:04:19,076 Speaker 1: whether we leave Ghanistan, we should be ashamed of banding 67 00:04:19,116 --> 00:04:21,196 Speaker 1: these people because this isn't These aren't kind of numbers. 68 00:04:21,196 --> 00:04:23,796 Speaker 1: These are real people. And personally, I think it's not 69 00:04:23,836 --> 00:04:27,036 Speaker 1: good enough just to evacuate the interpreters, because yes, we 70 00:04:27,076 --> 00:04:29,956 Speaker 1: shouldn't evacuate those people, but there's a whole bunch of 71 00:04:30,196 --> 00:04:34,156 Speaker 1: very brave Afghan junior officers and you know, equivalent in 72 00:04:34,196 --> 00:04:37,876 Speaker 1: the government who have served us, and we should evacuated 73 00:04:37,876 --> 00:04:41,316 Speaker 1: them and their families too. That that is absolutely moral responsibility. 74 00:04:41,476 --> 00:04:45,356 Speaker 1: The West bears at the moment in terms of historical comparisons, 75 00:04:46,116 --> 00:04:49,996 Speaker 1: the evacuation of Kabal in eighteen forty two after the 76 00:04:49,996 --> 00:04:52,796 Speaker 1: First Afghan War, when the entire British army was destroyed, 77 00:04:53,596 --> 00:04:56,876 Speaker 1: so that that clearly is an instant of an evacuation 78 00:04:56,916 --> 00:04:59,316 Speaker 1: that went far worse. But you know, an example that 79 00:04:59,396 --> 00:05:02,516 Speaker 1: evacuation that went better is that would be the Soviet experience, 80 00:05:02,596 --> 00:05:06,716 Speaker 1: in which the Soviet main force left Afghanistan in nineteen 81 00:05:06,756 --> 00:05:10,556 Speaker 1: eighty nine having trained a Naska forces of roughly the 82 00:05:10,596 --> 00:05:14,956 Speaker 1: same size, about three hundred thousand, and those Afghan forces 83 00:05:14,956 --> 00:05:19,076 Speaker 1: fought on for another two years until the Soviet Union 84 00:05:19,156 --> 00:05:23,556 Speaker 1: itself collapsed in nineteen ninety one. And the Soviet force 85 00:05:23,636 --> 00:05:28,116 Speaker 1: also counterattacked critically. So when the Mujadin massed immediately after 86 00:05:28,156 --> 00:05:32,476 Speaker 1: the Soviet withdrawal, the Soviet main force withdraw the Mujadin 87 00:05:32,596 --> 00:05:35,876 Speaker 1: tried to attack Jaulalabad in a conventional kind of attack. 88 00:05:36,596 --> 00:05:39,876 Speaker 1: The Afghan Soviet Army, with Soviet air support and some 89 00:05:40,116 --> 00:05:45,796 Speaker 1: artillery support, counterattacks and severely defeated the Mujadin, who basically fragmented, 90 00:05:46,476 --> 00:05:49,476 Speaker 1: and that brought them more time. So there are important 91 00:05:49,636 --> 00:05:53,836 Speaker 1: comparisons being made in terms of the historical analogies. Another 92 00:05:53,876 --> 00:05:56,876 Speaker 1: analogy that's foremost in the minds of Americans, of course, 93 00:05:57,156 --> 00:06:00,596 Speaker 1: is the American withdrawal from South Vietnam in the wake 94 00:06:00,636 --> 00:06:04,516 Speaker 1: of the fall of Saigan. As we know, in that instance, 95 00:06:05,196 --> 00:06:07,516 Speaker 1: some people who had been allied with the United States 96 00:06:07,556 --> 00:06:10,356 Speaker 1: and have helped the United States were able to get out, 97 00:06:10,396 --> 00:06:14,716 Speaker 1: but the great majority were essentially left to their fates, 98 00:06:14,756 --> 00:06:18,876 Speaker 1: some to be oppressed or even killed by the North Vietnamese, 99 00:06:19,036 --> 00:06:23,716 Speaker 1: others to desperately get onto boats and hope that the 100 00:06:23,996 --> 00:06:26,236 Speaker 1: rafts or barely see where the vessels they were on, 101 00:06:26,276 --> 00:06:29,316 Speaker 1: would take them somewhere. And certainly from news reports, it 102 00:06:29,396 --> 00:06:32,356 Speaker 1: sounds as though there may be a significant number of 103 00:06:32,876 --> 00:06:36,436 Speaker 1: people who worked with the Allies in Afghanistan who don't 104 00:06:36,476 --> 00:06:39,436 Speaker 1: manage to get out. I was wondering whether when you 105 00:06:39,516 --> 00:06:41,916 Speaker 1: were on the ground now a bit more than a 106 00:06:41,916 --> 00:06:46,876 Speaker 1: decade ago as an officer, whether the locals who worked 107 00:06:46,956 --> 00:06:50,796 Speaker 1: with you were already thinking about what would happen if 108 00:06:50,796 --> 00:06:54,356 Speaker 1: the war were lost and they were left to their fates. 109 00:06:54,756 --> 00:06:57,356 Speaker 1: Was that on their minds? Was it something you discussed 110 00:06:57,356 --> 00:06:59,196 Speaker 1: with them, or was it something that nobody wants to 111 00:06:59,196 --> 00:07:02,036 Speaker 1: talk about because it was too terrible a prospect. It 112 00:07:02,076 --> 00:07:04,036 Speaker 1: depended on where you were in the country. I think 113 00:07:04,156 --> 00:07:07,876 Speaker 1: in southern Afghanistan people did not think that the army 114 00:07:07,916 --> 00:07:10,036 Speaker 1: would hold out in the country side, at least not 115 00:07:10,076 --> 00:07:13,276 Speaker 1: in the whole countryside. Because the Taliban is predominantly a 116 00:07:13,516 --> 00:07:16,476 Speaker 1: Christian movement from the south and east to Afghanistan. People 117 00:07:16,516 --> 00:07:18,676 Speaker 1: did not think that the north to Afghanistan, or the 118 00:07:18,716 --> 00:07:21,556 Speaker 1: center or the big cities would fall to the Taliban, 119 00:07:21,676 --> 00:07:25,076 Speaker 1: because that's that's the Soviet analogy in nineteen eighty eight, 120 00:07:25,196 --> 00:07:28,396 Speaker 1: that the Majudin took the countryside, especially in the south 121 00:07:28,396 --> 00:07:30,716 Speaker 1: and east, they did not take the north, or the 122 00:07:30,756 --> 00:07:34,076 Speaker 1: center or the big cities. It is heartrap heart rendering 123 00:07:34,156 --> 00:07:38,636 Speaker 1: seeing or hearing about the experience of those who worked 124 00:07:38,676 --> 00:07:42,516 Speaker 1: with us who couldn't get out, And indeed it's particularly 125 00:07:42,556 --> 00:07:46,636 Speaker 1: poignant when one has oneself given those assurances, not necessarily 126 00:07:46,636 --> 00:07:49,916 Speaker 1: in absolute terms, but certainly implied. You know, when you're 127 00:07:50,236 --> 00:07:51,716 Speaker 1: leading to platoon of soldiers and you go to from 128 00:07:51,716 --> 00:07:55,316 Speaker 1: Afghan village you're based there for six months, and the 129 00:07:55,396 --> 00:07:57,876 Speaker 1: local elder or you know that their people are trying 130 00:07:57,916 --> 00:07:59,796 Speaker 1: to make decisions about whether to support you or not, 131 00:08:00,076 --> 00:08:03,076 Speaker 1: and you're trying to encourage them. You are implicitly giving assurances. 132 00:08:03,396 --> 00:08:05,636 Speaker 1: And sure you're not giving insurances and your personally, it's 133 00:08:05,636 --> 00:08:08,196 Speaker 1: not you're personally making the promise. You're a you're acting 134 00:08:08,196 --> 00:08:12,716 Speaker 1: as a representative channeling national policy. But they are nonetheless 135 00:08:12,756 --> 00:08:15,756 Speaker 1: real promises, and there are real life and death. Effectually 136 00:08:15,796 --> 00:08:18,956 Speaker 1: decisions and risk calculations made on the base of those assurances, 137 00:08:19,036 --> 00:08:21,076 Speaker 1: and so when those people are sold out, which they 138 00:08:21,076 --> 00:08:23,476 Speaker 1: absolutely have been, you know, you can say, well, that's 139 00:08:23,476 --> 00:08:25,636 Speaker 1: not a national interest. That doesn't change the fact that 140 00:08:25,636 --> 00:08:27,636 Speaker 1: promises have been given. And if you're the one who 141 00:08:27,676 --> 00:08:30,996 Speaker 1: actually gave the promises, as you know thousands of Western 142 00:08:30,876 --> 00:08:34,476 Speaker 1: military personnel and diplomats and aid workers would have done, 143 00:08:34,796 --> 00:08:39,836 Speaker 1: that's a very different moral proposition. That's very tough, and 144 00:08:39,876 --> 00:08:43,356 Speaker 1: I can imagine what you're feeling around it. What went 145 00:08:43,436 --> 00:08:47,116 Speaker 1: wrong in the most recent period of time, I mean, 146 00:08:47,716 --> 00:08:51,556 Speaker 1: the US, the UK, other actors spent upwards of a 147 00:08:51,596 --> 00:08:57,956 Speaker 1: trillion dollars on trying to shore up, train and essentially 148 00:08:58,036 --> 00:09:02,396 Speaker 1: buck up an Afghan military, and yet it seemed that 149 00:09:02,516 --> 00:09:06,116 Speaker 1: once the final withdrawal was announced, the response of the 150 00:09:06,116 --> 00:09:09,836 Speaker 1: Afghan military effectively was to lose more. I think that 151 00:09:09,876 --> 00:09:14,436 Speaker 1: it couldn't win and give up the ghost relatively quickly. 152 00:09:15,116 --> 00:09:20,276 Speaker 1: Why what's happening here? The first thing to say, I 153 00:09:20,356 --> 00:09:22,916 Speaker 1: think this is not a story that's really cut through 154 00:09:23,556 --> 00:09:25,036 Speaker 1: in the last couple of days, but even in the 155 00:09:25,076 --> 00:09:28,276 Speaker 1: last five years, frankly is the number of Afghan casualties. 156 00:09:28,596 --> 00:09:32,156 Speaker 1: So the basic message from President Biden is the Afghans 157 00:09:32,476 --> 00:09:36,676 Speaker 1: won't fight for themselves, therefore Western soldiers should not fight 158 00:09:37,276 --> 00:09:40,756 Speaker 1: for them when they won't fight for themselves. Were that true, 159 00:09:40,796 --> 00:09:43,396 Speaker 1: that would be a good argument. But that's not the case, 160 00:09:43,436 --> 00:09:47,036 Speaker 1: at least in a five year time frame. So although 161 00:09:47,116 --> 00:09:50,676 Speaker 1: the country numbers are estimates, it's roughly a ballpark figure. 162 00:09:50,716 --> 00:09:53,636 Speaker 1: So if you look at the Brookings Institution Afghan Index, 163 00:09:53,636 --> 00:09:58,436 Speaker 1: which is most reliable source, they've estimated forty five thousands, 164 00:09:58,516 --> 00:10:02,556 Speaker 1: so that's forty five thousand Afghan security forces. That's police 165 00:10:02,556 --> 00:10:07,116 Speaker 1: an army deaths between two thousand and fourteen and two twenty, 166 00:10:07,236 --> 00:10:10,916 Speaker 1: so just over five six years. So you compare that 167 00:10:10,956 --> 00:10:14,356 Speaker 1: to US forces which are just under two thousand, five 168 00:10:14,476 --> 00:10:17,196 Speaker 1: hundred deaths, and then coalition deaths of another two thousand 169 00:10:17,236 --> 00:10:20,156 Speaker 1: and another two roughly contractors, So about five or six 170 00:10:20,196 --> 00:10:23,916 Speaker 1: thousand Western death if you liked, the Afghan forces have 171 00:10:23,996 --> 00:10:27,476 Speaker 1: taken about eight times more dead and then you're going 172 00:10:27,516 --> 00:10:29,276 Speaker 1: to have a factor of about three in terms of 173 00:10:29,276 --> 00:10:32,716 Speaker 1: wounded from that. So the idea that the Afghan army 174 00:10:32,836 --> 00:10:35,316 Speaker 1: have not fought is it is not right. Forty five 175 00:10:35,356 --> 00:10:38,036 Speaker 1: thousand of them if that estimate is right, or even 176 00:10:38,036 --> 00:10:41,556 Speaker 1: close to being right have for and died doing exactly that. 177 00:10:42,156 --> 00:10:45,036 Speaker 1: Were they fighting for their government? No, their government is 178 00:10:45,036 --> 00:10:47,396 Speaker 1: crupt and rotten, and everyone knows that they're fighting for 179 00:10:47,436 --> 00:10:50,716 Speaker 1: their families, who, unlike their leadership, don't have the option 180 00:10:50,876 --> 00:10:55,116 Speaker 1: of leaving Afghanistan. They were fighting in remote provinces with 181 00:10:55,196 --> 00:10:57,476 Speaker 1: their backs to the wall for the last five years, 182 00:10:57,476 --> 00:11:01,196 Speaker 1: basically getting hammered and taking a lot of Catholics. Granted 183 00:11:01,316 --> 00:11:05,596 Speaker 1: they weren't fighting completely independently. They had crucially Western logistical 184 00:11:05,636 --> 00:11:08,396 Speaker 1: support the Afghan army mainly because of massive corruption at 185 00:11:08,396 --> 00:11:11,276 Speaker 1: the higher levels of government, and the army was unable 186 00:11:11,316 --> 00:11:15,556 Speaker 1: to do logistics. You put to you put those two 187 00:11:15,556 --> 00:11:17,636 Speaker 1: factors together, and you've got an army that's basically being 188 00:11:17,676 --> 00:11:20,276 Speaker 1: hammered in terms of catalties and has fought bravely, but 189 00:11:20,676 --> 00:11:24,516 Speaker 1: it's morale's very low. The Taliban attack right at the 190 00:11:24,596 --> 00:11:28,156 Speaker 1: very moment at which that Afghan force has to adapt 191 00:11:28,236 --> 00:11:30,156 Speaker 1: to having no logistics support, so they can't get their 192 00:11:30,196 --> 00:11:33,316 Speaker 1: couches out, they can't get ammunition and other supplies forward, 193 00:11:34,236 --> 00:11:36,836 Speaker 1: and at the same time they see various members of 194 00:11:36,876 --> 00:11:40,956 Speaker 1: their government at the cabinet level basically tweeting oh, I've resigned, 195 00:11:40,956 --> 00:11:44,156 Speaker 1: I'm leaving my leaving combolts Jordan, my family in Dubai 196 00:11:44,236 --> 00:11:48,116 Speaker 1: or whatever, and finally enough morale collapses. You know, query 197 00:11:48,156 --> 00:11:50,676 Speaker 1: whether a Western force would be an indifferent You know, 198 00:11:50,916 --> 00:11:54,916 Speaker 1: it's entirely understandable why the Afghan regular forces, isolated and 199 00:11:54,916 --> 00:11:59,236 Speaker 1: abandoned in these provinces basically gave up. It is also 200 00:11:59,276 --> 00:12:02,716 Speaker 1: clever as the final point of the Taliban to attack 201 00:12:02,796 --> 00:12:06,116 Speaker 1: the southern towns first, because they basically attacks and the 202 00:12:06,116 --> 00:12:09,036 Speaker 1: southern the big southern towns, and that triggered the Afghan 203 00:12:09,196 --> 00:12:11,756 Speaker 1: government to deploy its reserves special forces kind of the 204 00:12:11,916 --> 00:12:14,316 Speaker 1: unit they went south, and then the Taliban switched they 205 00:12:14,356 --> 00:12:17,036 Speaker 1: main effort and sat the north. In conjunction with clever 206 00:12:17,036 --> 00:12:19,476 Speaker 1: political tactics from negotiating strends and stuff, and you put 207 00:12:19,516 --> 00:12:22,636 Speaker 1: that together, it's not surprising that the whole thing fell 208 00:12:22,676 --> 00:12:26,916 Speaker 1: apart emil. A question that's really very pressing for a 209 00:12:26,956 --> 00:12:30,836 Speaker 1: lot of listeners, myself included, is do you think this 210 00:12:30,996 --> 00:12:34,236 Speaker 1: withdrawal was correct? Was it the right thing to do? 211 00:12:34,316 --> 00:12:36,956 Speaker 1: Because part of what you're saying in terms of the 212 00:12:36,956 --> 00:12:40,836 Speaker 1: directionality of the war suggests that there wasn't really a 213 00:12:40,956 --> 00:12:44,676 Speaker 1: viable way either for the security forces to beat the 214 00:12:44,676 --> 00:12:47,956 Speaker 1: Taliban or even to just hold them off indefinitely. And 215 00:12:47,996 --> 00:12:50,236 Speaker 1: that starts to contribute to the idea that withdrawal was 216 00:12:50,876 --> 00:12:53,396 Speaker 1: the right thing to do. But of course the alternative 217 00:12:53,396 --> 00:12:56,436 Speaker 1: picture would be one in which there were ways to 218 00:12:56,556 --> 00:12:59,756 Speaker 1: withdraw eventually, but to do it in a different way 219 00:12:59,756 --> 00:13:02,436 Speaker 1: that would have a chance of stopping the country from 220 00:13:02,476 --> 00:13:04,756 Speaker 1: falling into the hands of the Taliban in this way. 221 00:13:04,796 --> 00:13:06,756 Speaker 1: So what is your view on that was the withdrawal 222 00:13:06,756 --> 00:13:10,156 Speaker 1: the right thing to do? Now well as the military side, 223 00:13:10,196 --> 00:13:12,556 Speaker 1: on the political side. On the military side, the US 224 00:13:12,676 --> 00:13:15,356 Speaker 1: could in theory have stayed there indefinitely. Had a force 225 00:13:15,396 --> 00:13:17,756 Speaker 1: of roughly two thousand, five hundreds by the end, spending 226 00:13:17,836 --> 00:13:20,916 Speaker 1: roughly three billion dollars a month on a military budget 227 00:13:20,956 --> 00:13:23,476 Speaker 1: of around just under eight hundred billion dollars a year. 228 00:13:24,036 --> 00:13:26,636 Speaker 1: That's a significant but it's not a huge cost objectively, 229 00:13:26,756 --> 00:13:28,836 Speaker 1: so you could just carried on. I should mention that 230 00:13:29,236 --> 00:13:31,916 Speaker 1: eight US soldiers died in twenty twenty, so that's a 231 00:13:31,916 --> 00:13:34,676 Speaker 1: serious number, but it's pals a comparison to the Afghan 232 00:13:34,676 --> 00:13:38,396 Speaker 1: categies at numb As I mentioned. Politically, clearly, there was 233 00:13:38,436 --> 00:13:40,276 Speaker 1: an appetite for that, So how do you square that. 234 00:13:40,996 --> 00:13:42,756 Speaker 1: On the one hand, you've got this fact that when 235 00:13:42,796 --> 00:13:46,836 Speaker 1: the US is there as a backstop, providing sport, providing logistics, crucially, 236 00:13:46,916 --> 00:13:49,916 Speaker 1: the Afghan forces can carry on. You could have maintained 237 00:13:49,916 --> 00:13:52,676 Speaker 1: the stalemate indefinitely, but there's no political wealth of the 238 00:13:52,676 --> 00:13:56,036 Speaker 1: indefinite presence. Answer. You have to get a peace deal, 239 00:13:56,196 --> 00:13:59,796 Speaker 1: So you have to use the stalemate as leverage to 240 00:13:59,796 --> 00:14:02,436 Speaker 1: get a pace deal with the Taliban. That PCAL wasn't coming. 241 00:14:03,316 --> 00:14:05,916 Speaker 1: I think a mistake was not to counterattack in the 242 00:14:05,996 --> 00:14:08,676 Speaker 1: last two weeks. The Taliban attack kind of paralyzed us. 243 00:14:08,796 --> 00:14:13,996 Speaker 1: They too fast. We appeared unable to move almost I mentioned, 244 00:14:14,076 --> 00:14:17,236 Speaker 1: you know, in nineteen eighty nine the Soviets did counter 245 00:14:17,236 --> 00:14:22,636 Speaker 1: attack at Lalabad. And when a gorilla force changes from 246 00:14:22,676 --> 00:14:24,716 Speaker 1: being a gorilla force to being a conventional force, as 247 00:14:24,756 --> 00:14:26,836 Speaker 1: they must do to take a country, that's their most 248 00:14:26,876 --> 00:14:29,076 Speaker 1: vable moment. That's when you can really fight them for 249 00:14:29,116 --> 00:14:31,716 Speaker 1: once conventionally, and it wouldn't have been very hard to 250 00:14:31,756 --> 00:14:35,276 Speaker 1: inflict serious losses on them and basically forced them into 251 00:14:35,356 --> 00:14:38,236 Speaker 1: you know, at least at least give the peace deal 252 00:14:38,236 --> 00:14:40,956 Speaker 1: a chance. That's how Aban I think will surprised themselves 253 00:14:40,996 --> 00:14:42,796 Speaker 1: are how easily they took Kaba, And indeed, you know 254 00:14:42,836 --> 00:14:46,236 Speaker 1: you're talking about Sigon earlier. Note how in seventy two 255 00:14:46,356 --> 00:14:48,476 Speaker 1: in the East to seventy two the North Vietnamese also 256 00:14:48,516 --> 00:14:52,036 Speaker 1: tried to attack the Easter Offensive, and the Americans did 257 00:14:52,076 --> 00:14:56,036 Speaker 1: counter attack. And I'm surprised North Etnams with their political 258 00:14:56,076 --> 00:14:58,636 Speaker 1: will and bought more time, and he bought time for 259 00:14:58,676 --> 00:15:01,116 Speaker 1: the peace deal. And I mean, obviously it collapsed in 260 00:15:01,156 --> 00:15:03,276 Speaker 1: the end, but bought more time. So you know, a 261 00:15:03,276 --> 00:15:05,436 Speaker 1: counter attack would have helped to get that peace deal. 262 00:15:05,476 --> 00:15:09,116 Speaker 1: What it happened, who knows. It's impossible to be certain 263 00:15:09,116 --> 00:15:13,316 Speaker 1: about these things. But I think we should have counter 264 00:15:13,316 --> 00:15:16,596 Speaker 1: attack in terms of the wider decision. You know, it's 265 00:15:16,636 --> 00:15:19,596 Speaker 1: for the US president's judge, US natural interest. I'm not American. 266 00:15:19,676 --> 00:15:21,636 Speaker 1: It's not made to say that the Americans should or 267 00:15:21,636 --> 00:15:24,796 Speaker 1: shouldn't bear that cost. That's President Biden. And if he 268 00:15:24,836 --> 00:15:28,116 Speaker 1: thinks that that cost is too much, it I mean, 269 00:15:28,156 --> 00:15:30,796 Speaker 1: I think people in the Biden administration would probably respond 270 00:15:30,796 --> 00:15:33,196 Speaker 1: to that by saying that there was effectively a counter 271 00:15:33,276 --> 00:15:37,236 Speaker 1: attack in the second term of the Obama administration, and 272 00:15:37,276 --> 00:15:40,996 Speaker 1: that that was the effort that they hoped would be 273 00:15:41,076 --> 00:15:44,156 Speaker 1: able to turn the tide, but that it failed. That 274 00:15:44,276 --> 00:15:46,916 Speaker 1: then the Trump administration was just in a holding pattern, 275 00:15:46,956 --> 00:15:49,356 Speaker 1: and that Biden had already decided himself. And this is 276 00:15:49,356 --> 00:15:53,036 Speaker 1: pretty clear he had already decided, now seven years ago 277 00:15:53,116 --> 00:15:57,076 Speaker 1: or eight years ago, that this wasn't worth continuing. And 278 00:15:57,196 --> 00:16:00,876 Speaker 1: once he had that view, the possibility of motivating a 279 00:16:00,876 --> 00:16:04,476 Speaker 1: counter attack would have been pretty difficult because the Talbin 280 00:16:04,556 --> 00:16:06,236 Speaker 1: would have just tried to wait it out. You know, 281 00:16:06,236 --> 00:16:07,916 Speaker 1: they would have said, listen, you don't really mean it. 282 00:16:08,076 --> 00:16:09,996 Speaker 1: So if he had said, listen, we're just counterattacking in 283 00:16:10,116 --> 00:16:12,636 Speaker 1: order to change the strategic calculus and make the Taliband negotiate, 284 00:16:12,796 --> 00:16:14,636 Speaker 1: which was a version of what the United States had 285 00:16:14,636 --> 00:16:17,836 Speaker 1: already said between twenty twelve and twenty fifteen, it just 286 00:16:17,876 --> 00:16:20,996 Speaker 1: wouldn't have worked. Yeah, you put your finger on the 287 00:16:21,036 --> 00:16:23,316 Speaker 1: pulse of the master. If you like, the key is surprised. 288 00:16:23,356 --> 00:16:25,156 Speaker 1: You've got to make the Taliban think it's in the 289 00:16:25,196 --> 00:16:30,036 Speaker 1: minds of the enemy. That's where victory lies. It's psychological state, 290 00:16:30,076 --> 00:16:34,436 Speaker 1: if you like, and surprised works in Afghanstan. The surgery 291 00:16:34,476 --> 00:16:37,596 Speaker 1: was not surprised. It was telegraphed the idea was we'll 292 00:16:37,596 --> 00:16:39,796 Speaker 1: search for three years and then we'll draw down. So 293 00:16:39,836 --> 00:16:42,636 Speaker 1: it was all very predictable, very telegraphed, no surprise, and 294 00:16:42,716 --> 00:16:44,836 Speaker 1: indeed this points to a broader failing in the West 295 00:16:44,916 --> 00:16:48,436 Speaker 1: approach strategy, at least in my view, whereby we think 296 00:16:48,436 --> 00:16:50,956 Speaker 1: strategy is a kind of form of project management. It's 297 00:16:50,956 --> 00:16:53,476 Speaker 1: a kind of strategy taught in business scopes where you know, 298 00:16:53,556 --> 00:16:55,756 Speaker 1: if you want to build a house or something, you 299 00:16:55,796 --> 00:16:57,676 Speaker 1: get your workers, your money, and your materials and you 300 00:16:57,996 --> 00:17:00,516 Speaker 1: put put them in a spreadsheet, and you know, things 301 00:17:00,596 --> 00:17:02,596 Speaker 1: might go wrong, like you might get some bad weather 302 00:17:02,676 --> 00:17:04,796 Speaker 1: or something for a month, but and that might delay you. 303 00:17:04,836 --> 00:17:06,956 Speaker 1: But ultimately you can get from A to B through 304 00:17:06,956 --> 00:17:10,716 Speaker 1: the pretty kind of techno crash approach where you just 305 00:17:10,756 --> 00:17:14,036 Speaker 1: put resources on a spreadsheet and your project manage with 306 00:17:14,156 --> 00:17:16,596 Speaker 1: no account of the enemy, no account of the enemy whatsoever, 307 00:17:16,636 --> 00:17:19,156 Speaker 1: as if wres some kind of scientific endeavor, and that's 308 00:17:19,156 --> 00:17:22,276 Speaker 1: just completely wrong. War is all about getting into the 309 00:17:22,316 --> 00:17:24,756 Speaker 1: mind of the enemies, about initiative, seizing the initiative, and 310 00:17:24,796 --> 00:17:28,156 Speaker 1: holding the initiative, and it's much more psychological than that. 311 00:17:28,196 --> 00:17:31,116 Speaker 1: And in Afghanistan, actually, you know, in retrospect, maybe we 312 00:17:31,116 --> 00:17:33,436 Speaker 1: shouldn't urge in two thousand and nine, maybe we should 313 00:17:33,436 --> 00:17:35,596 Speaker 1: actually have researched and actually put some pressure on n 314 00:17:35,636 --> 00:17:38,636 Speaker 1: Fan government to do more themselves. But ultimately, if you 315 00:17:38,716 --> 00:17:41,476 Speaker 1: step away from all this, it's not about these kind 316 00:17:41,516 --> 00:17:44,276 Speaker 1: of set template approaches. You know, does a surge work 317 00:17:44,276 --> 00:17:46,476 Speaker 1: in the abstract? You can't tell. The question is can 318 00:17:46,556 --> 00:17:50,316 Speaker 1: you use surprise to regain the initiative so doubt in 319 00:17:50,316 --> 00:17:53,356 Speaker 1: the minds of your opponent, such as to get them 320 00:17:53,356 --> 00:17:55,556 Speaker 1: to at least think, oh, maybe it is my interest 321 00:17:55,636 --> 00:17:57,236 Speaker 1: to do a PCE deal because I don't know what 322 00:17:57,276 --> 00:17:59,116 Speaker 1: the outcome is going to be. That wasn't the case here. 323 00:17:59,156 --> 00:18:02,036 Speaker 1: The Taliban could totally plan around the US and Western 324 00:18:02,076 --> 00:18:06,436 Speaker 1: plan and then hit the forces Afghanic horses extremely hard 325 00:18:06,476 --> 00:18:08,556 Speaker 1: when we took the justic support away and basically with 326 00:18:10,116 --> 00:18:21,916 Speaker 1: we'll be back in a moment. I mean, I'm really 327 00:18:21,956 --> 00:18:26,916 Speaker 1: fascinated by what you've just said, the idea that somehow 328 00:18:26,956 --> 00:18:30,516 Speaker 1: the US in particular maybe Western forces more generally tended 329 00:18:30,556 --> 00:18:33,116 Speaker 1: to think about Afghanistan as though it were a war 330 00:18:33,196 --> 00:18:36,076 Speaker 1: without an enemy, you know, a war you're fighting in 331 00:18:36,076 --> 00:18:38,716 Speaker 1: your own head, where you think that logistics are really 332 00:18:38,716 --> 00:18:41,596 Speaker 1: about what you're going to do. Seems to fit into 333 00:18:41,996 --> 00:18:46,356 Speaker 1: a kind of systemic failure throughout this war, maybe deriving 334 00:18:46,396 --> 00:18:49,356 Speaker 1: from the fact that in the early invasion the Taliban 335 00:18:49,796 --> 00:18:53,716 Speaker 1: ran away relatively quickly and were then not treated as 336 00:18:53,836 --> 00:18:56,796 Speaker 1: a serious opponent, a serious enemy who had to be 337 00:18:57,276 --> 00:19:00,796 Speaker 1: surprised and engaged, but were rather thought of almost as 338 00:19:00,796 --> 00:19:03,316 Speaker 1: though they were the drip drip drip of a body 339 00:19:03,356 --> 00:19:06,516 Speaker 1: of water, and the question was could we hold out 340 00:19:06,516 --> 00:19:09,636 Speaker 1: against that drip, drip drip, rather than could we actually 341 00:19:09,756 --> 00:19:12,476 Speaker 1: conceptualize the enemy as a set of human beings, as 342 00:19:12,476 --> 00:19:15,196 Speaker 1: another who needed to be engaged, which, as you say, 343 00:19:15,276 --> 00:19:17,756 Speaker 1: is crucial to warfare. Why do you think, I mean, 344 00:19:17,796 --> 00:19:20,156 Speaker 1: when we turn to lessons learned here, one of the 345 00:19:20,156 --> 00:19:22,996 Speaker 1: crucial ones is surely that's no way to fight a war. 346 00:19:23,076 --> 00:19:24,156 Speaker 1: You know, if you're going to fight a war, you 347 00:19:24,236 --> 00:19:26,356 Speaker 1: have to conceptualize the enemy. You have to put your 348 00:19:26,396 --> 00:19:28,516 Speaker 1: mind inside the mind of the enemy, and you have 349 00:19:28,556 --> 00:19:32,476 Speaker 1: to do the things that will defeat the enemy. And why, 350 00:19:32,716 --> 00:19:35,876 Speaker 1: why why did the United States approach war in this way? 351 00:19:35,956 --> 00:19:38,956 Speaker 1: Is it something about our training? Is it's something about 352 00:19:38,996 --> 00:19:41,476 Speaker 1: how we conceptualize war. Is it's something about the tremendous 353 00:19:41,476 --> 00:19:45,516 Speaker 1: disparity between our resources and the resources of the enemy. 354 00:19:45,596 --> 00:19:47,756 Speaker 1: What what put us in a position to make these 355 00:19:47,796 --> 00:19:51,276 Speaker 1: mistakes which to me as you depict them, sound rather fundamental. Yes, 356 00:19:51,356 --> 00:19:53,596 Speaker 1: well it's I mean, the term war is a good 357 00:19:53,596 --> 00:19:55,556 Speaker 1: place to start. I mean, clearly, Afghana stands war in 358 00:19:55,556 --> 00:19:58,716 Speaker 1: a sense that there is at a high level of 359 00:19:58,756 --> 00:20:00,636 Speaker 1: violence going on on the ground, and that the kind 360 00:20:00,636 --> 00:20:03,796 Speaker 1: of combat tactics are not this similar across different kinds 361 00:20:03,836 --> 00:20:06,516 Speaker 1: of wars. But really there is a fundamental difference between 362 00:20:06,596 --> 00:20:09,356 Speaker 1: interstate war, which our finite in the sense that that 363 00:20:09,396 --> 00:20:13,276 Speaker 1: there are two governments with whom you can negotiate a pcedal. 364 00:20:13,356 --> 00:20:16,716 Speaker 1: So effectively you've got two kind of hierarchies fighting each other. 365 00:20:16,796 --> 00:20:18,636 Speaker 1: You know, you use military force against the base of 366 00:20:18,676 --> 00:20:20,556 Speaker 1: the hierarchy of the army, and that sort of tingles 367 00:20:20,636 --> 00:20:22,596 Speaker 1: up the nerve system of the state the other side 368 00:20:22,716 --> 00:20:24,876 Speaker 1: to a government, and that government kind of gets the 369 00:20:24,876 --> 00:20:28,156 Speaker 1: message and it is defeated. That's completely different when you're 370 00:20:28,196 --> 00:20:30,396 Speaker 1: dealing with a network. A network is flat and loose, 371 00:20:30,476 --> 00:20:32,356 Speaker 1: there's no real leadship structure. So how are you going 372 00:20:32,436 --> 00:20:34,076 Speaker 1: to how are you going to win? In the kind 373 00:20:34,076 --> 00:20:37,196 Speaker 1: of political sense, you can't. Actually you're managing an ongoing 374 00:20:37,236 --> 00:20:40,276 Speaker 1: security problem without trying to escalate and without getting sucked 375 00:20:40,276 --> 00:20:42,316 Speaker 1: into things like nation building. Really just trying to deal 376 00:20:42,356 --> 00:20:46,596 Speaker 1: with the security side of things, and war is not 377 00:20:46,676 --> 00:20:49,636 Speaker 1: often that even that appropriate label. So it's much more 378 00:20:49,716 --> 00:20:53,116 Speaker 1: often sometimes akin to policing operations, where you know, in 379 00:20:53,116 --> 00:20:55,396 Speaker 1: a western city, no one expects the police to defeat 380 00:20:55,436 --> 00:20:58,636 Speaker 1: crime in a decisive sense. Rather you manage it. Now, 381 00:20:58,676 --> 00:21:01,316 Speaker 1: clearly it's not exactly policing, but there is a spectrum 382 00:21:01,356 --> 00:21:05,516 Speaker 1: of activity and treating these conflicts as war with these 383 00:21:05,596 --> 00:21:08,356 Speaker 1: kind of expectations of decisive outcomes where you have surgies 384 00:21:08,396 --> 00:21:11,196 Speaker 1: for like three years and somehow expect the military to 385 00:21:11,316 --> 00:21:13,476 Speaker 1: deliver you a decisive outcome in three years. That's that's 386 00:21:13,516 --> 00:21:18,756 Speaker 1: not helpful. Actually, you need to have lower intensity but 387 00:21:18,836 --> 00:21:21,276 Speaker 1: longer term presence with lower expectations of what you can 388 00:21:21,276 --> 00:21:25,356 Speaker 1: achieve in order to manage risk over longer time frames, 389 00:21:25,516 --> 00:21:29,956 Speaker 1: without these kind of fantastic expectations of decisive victories. And 390 00:21:29,996 --> 00:21:33,036 Speaker 1: so there's a spectrum in terms of political outcomes. Is 391 00:21:33,036 --> 00:21:35,076 Speaker 1: there even an enemy or are you dealing with a 392 00:21:35,196 --> 00:21:39,116 Speaker 1: kind of kaleidoscopic bunch of factions who can change depending 393 00:21:39,156 --> 00:21:41,756 Speaker 1: on how you define the enemy. I think in Afghanistan 394 00:21:41,836 --> 00:21:43,996 Speaker 1: that was an issue. You know, we started off defining 395 00:21:44,036 --> 00:21:47,476 Speaker 1: an enemy narrowly as aar Qaida, and that was broadly 396 00:21:47,476 --> 00:21:49,836 Speaker 1: even the position still two thousand and five, and then 397 00:21:49,876 --> 00:21:52,476 Speaker 1: in two thousand and five we went into the South 398 00:21:52,556 --> 00:21:55,196 Speaker 1: and the east in bulk. There are already some forces, 399 00:21:55,316 --> 00:21:58,156 Speaker 1: but really very few forces before that, especially in the South, 400 00:21:58,836 --> 00:22:01,156 Speaker 1: and we started sort of treating everyone who short at 401 00:22:01,236 --> 00:22:03,436 Speaker 1: us as you know, the enemy and attributing to the 402 00:22:03,836 --> 00:22:07,036 Speaker 1: single corporate identity are either Taliban, and actually that wasn't 403 00:22:07,076 --> 00:22:08,716 Speaker 1: the case. There was lots of lots of different factions 404 00:22:08,756 --> 00:22:14,276 Speaker 1: on the ground, and by tlicely disaggregating a network, franchise 405 00:22:14,396 --> 00:22:17,836 Speaker 1: movement into its constituent parts, you can use much less 406 00:22:17,876 --> 00:22:20,156 Speaker 1: force as little false as possible, so you're only using 407 00:22:20,196 --> 00:22:23,276 Speaker 1: force against the really hardcore. And that's absolutely not what 408 00:22:23,436 --> 00:22:26,316 Speaker 1: we did. We use force much too broadly against far 409 00:22:26,396 --> 00:22:29,556 Speaker 1: too many factions because we didn't have that political, low 410 00:22:29,636 --> 00:22:32,396 Speaker 1: level political insight, which is so crucial, and thus we 411 00:22:33,196 --> 00:22:37,556 Speaker 1: very quickly found ourselves swimming upstream against an ever expanding insurgency. 412 00:22:37,956 --> 00:22:40,156 Speaker 1: So a lesson here, you know, not to the tactical level, 413 00:22:40,196 --> 00:22:41,956 Speaker 1: but at the kind of global level too, is always 414 00:22:41,956 --> 00:22:44,716 Speaker 1: a disaggregate to try to not group everyone in the 415 00:22:44,836 --> 00:22:48,036 Speaker 1: same brush, owise you end up fighting kind of everyone really, 416 00:22:48,836 --> 00:22:52,636 Speaker 1: and you know, that's that goes to basically back this 417 00:22:52,756 --> 00:22:56,836 Speaker 1: concept of war, not treating everything through this binary paradigm 418 00:22:56,876 --> 00:22:59,636 Speaker 1: of war in which as a clear line between military 419 00:22:59,676 --> 00:23:03,276 Speaker 1: and political activity. That's not the case, especially in says 420 00:23:03,316 --> 00:23:06,036 Speaker 1: context with the information revolution, whereby you know, you get 421 00:23:06,076 --> 00:23:09,876 Speaker 1: a lot more networks. What was your experience of that 422 00:23:10,076 --> 00:23:12,476 Speaker 1: when you were on the ground, I mean, when did 423 00:23:12,556 --> 00:23:17,876 Speaker 1: you find yourself able to try to do that kind 424 00:23:17,916 --> 00:23:20,236 Speaker 1: of disaggregation at the local level and not just treat 425 00:23:20,276 --> 00:23:22,916 Speaker 1: anybody who might be shooting at you and your soldiers 426 00:23:23,116 --> 00:23:27,596 Speaker 1: as definitively at the Taliban Or was it simply the 427 00:23:27,676 --> 00:23:30,196 Speaker 1: case that the lack of differentiation at the higher level 428 00:23:30,236 --> 00:23:33,996 Speaker 1: of command made it all but impossible for you, you know, 429 00:23:34,396 --> 00:23:37,356 Speaker 1: to do differently on a day and in day out 430 00:23:37,436 --> 00:23:39,436 Speaker 1: basis very much so. I mean on my first one, 431 00:23:39,476 --> 00:23:41,396 Speaker 1: not so much because I was a protune commander, but 432 00:23:41,476 --> 00:23:43,196 Speaker 1: on my second tour, when I was actually working on 433 00:23:43,276 --> 00:23:45,516 Speaker 1: planning operations, and my third tour, I was very much 434 00:23:45,556 --> 00:23:48,516 Speaker 1: able to do that, and it's totally possible. You need 435 00:23:48,556 --> 00:23:51,356 Speaker 1: to think about things differently. You need to be doing 436 00:23:51,636 --> 00:23:54,796 Speaker 1: networking hours on the grounds understanding who's who. I mean, 437 00:23:54,876 --> 00:23:56,556 Speaker 1: this is almost obvious, you know, if you're the British 438 00:23:56,636 --> 00:23:58,956 Speaker 1: Army in Northern Ireland, it's like going in there and saying, oh, well, 439 00:23:59,076 --> 00:24:01,436 Speaker 1: what's a Catholic, what's a Protestant? You know, these are 440 00:24:01,436 --> 00:24:04,876 Speaker 1: the fundamental kind of cultural drivers of this conflict. And 441 00:24:04,996 --> 00:24:07,276 Speaker 1: we just went in southern Afghanistan thinking everyone's either Afghan 442 00:24:07,356 --> 00:24:09,996 Speaker 1: Government or Taliban, and actually it's much more sophisticated than that, 443 00:24:10,076 --> 00:24:11,796 Speaker 1: and it's not particularly hard to kind of find out 444 00:24:11,836 --> 00:24:16,156 Speaker 1: who these tribes are as the barracks, alazai Ishize Popalzi, 445 00:24:16,316 --> 00:24:18,196 Speaker 1: and they all have different motivations. And then there's the 446 00:24:18,316 --> 00:24:21,676 Speaker 1: narco dealers as well, and you can quite easily find 447 00:24:21,676 --> 00:24:24,356 Speaker 1: out what these different cultural kind of groups are just 448 00:24:24,476 --> 00:24:28,116 Speaker 1: by asking people. It is absolutely doable. But a problem. 449 00:24:28,236 --> 00:24:31,396 Speaker 1: A further problem is that the nature of civil military relations, 450 00:24:31,556 --> 00:24:33,876 Speaker 1: the paradigm we have is a very much one way model. 451 00:24:34,596 --> 00:24:38,476 Speaker 1: It's the idea that there's this very hard division between 452 00:24:38,676 --> 00:24:41,716 Speaker 1: the political side and the military side. Neither side Shoor trespass. 453 00:24:41,956 --> 00:24:44,676 Speaker 1: I mean that comes from a really post Korean War 454 00:24:45,476 --> 00:24:48,276 Speaker 1: model where you didn't want to get the military with 455 00:24:48,356 --> 00:24:50,156 Speaker 1: their things on the nuclear trigger because then you can 456 00:24:50,196 --> 00:24:52,116 Speaker 1: have a nuclear war. And that makes sense. So it 457 00:24:52,196 --> 00:24:54,756 Speaker 1: absolutely makes sense that the military should stay out of 458 00:24:56,516 --> 00:25:00,956 Speaker 1: politics in a kind of political sense, and indeed in 459 00:25:01,036 --> 00:25:03,356 Speaker 1: that context and the nuclear context, which should stay out 460 00:25:03,436 --> 00:25:06,436 Speaker 1: that those kindcisions too. But in a counterinsurgency, you absolutely 461 00:25:06,516 --> 00:25:10,076 Speaker 1: need people on the ground to be able to say this, actually, 462 00:25:10,236 --> 00:25:12,276 Speaker 1: at a political level, that's not working. We shouldn't be 463 00:25:13,276 --> 00:25:15,676 Speaker 1: pushing this policy lining to it doesn't work with this tribe. 464 00:25:15,756 --> 00:25:17,436 Speaker 1: We should be doing that, we shouldn't be doing this. 465 00:25:17,916 --> 00:25:20,836 Speaker 1: So for example, the classic example in southern Afkanastan was narcotics. 466 00:25:21,076 --> 00:25:24,556 Speaker 1: The anti narcomission pretty much alienated everybody. You know, query 467 00:25:24,596 --> 00:25:26,316 Speaker 1: why we're doing it? Well, were there to fight terrorism 468 00:25:26,396 --> 00:25:29,036 Speaker 1: or drugs? I mean, we could fight drugs, that's a 469 00:25:29,036 --> 00:25:32,436 Speaker 1: political decision. But would we would cut about nine percent 470 00:25:32,476 --> 00:25:35,516 Speaker 1: of the enemy out if we didn't fight drugs. No 471 00:25:35,596 --> 00:25:37,356 Speaker 1: one would listen to the military on the ground. That's 472 00:25:37,436 --> 00:25:39,716 Speaker 1: not our job. We're not allowed to talk about politics. 473 00:25:39,996 --> 00:25:43,076 Speaker 1: You just fight the enemy. We'll do the politics. This 474 00:25:43,156 --> 00:25:45,476 Speaker 1: idea that politics is. It's something that's some like higher up. 475 00:25:46,196 --> 00:25:50,276 Speaker 1: It's not the right approach, and it challenges and requires 476 00:25:50,316 --> 00:25:54,036 Speaker 1: us to reconfigure this paradigm of civil military relations. It 477 00:25:54,116 --> 00:25:57,276 Speaker 1: needs to be much more fluid and dynamic and flatter. 478 00:25:58,396 --> 00:25:59,716 Speaker 1: What I hear you saying there, and I think this 479 00:25:59,876 --> 00:26:01,916 Speaker 1: is also as I read it, one of the themes 480 00:26:01,956 --> 00:26:05,236 Speaker 1: if You're a Terrific book is that it would be 481 00:26:05,316 --> 00:26:07,396 Speaker 1: a mistake to think that in a world where the 482 00:26:07,556 --> 00:26:10,356 Speaker 1: enemy is networked and flat, that the way to fight 483 00:26:10,436 --> 00:26:13,916 Speaker 1: it is in some hierarchical sense where the decisions about 484 00:26:13,956 --> 00:26:16,236 Speaker 1: quote unquote politics are made somewhere up to chain and 485 00:26:16,316 --> 00:26:19,756 Speaker 1: then the decisions about military tactics are made down on 486 00:26:19,876 --> 00:26:23,036 Speaker 1: the ground. In fact, to fight a war against a flat, 487 00:26:23,156 --> 00:26:25,436 Speaker 1: networked enemy, you have to be flatter, you have to 488 00:26:25,476 --> 00:26:27,596 Speaker 1: be more networked, and we have to break down the 489 00:26:27,756 --> 00:26:32,716 Speaker 1: artificial distinction between a political judgment and a tactical judgment, 490 00:26:33,276 --> 00:26:36,676 Speaker 1: especially in an operation that has certain features of trying 491 00:26:36,756 --> 00:26:39,836 Speaker 1: to keep the peace, namely a counterinsurgency. No exactly, there's 492 00:26:39,876 --> 00:26:42,076 Speaker 1: this expression out gorilla. The gorilla. You know, if you're 493 00:26:42,076 --> 00:26:44,436 Speaker 1: a Western, big heavy Western falls you're basically a kind 494 00:26:44,436 --> 00:26:46,156 Speaker 1: of elephant trying to catch a kind of mouse, And 495 00:26:46,196 --> 00:26:49,596 Speaker 1: so obviously when the mouse hears the elephant going through 496 00:26:49,676 --> 00:26:52,236 Speaker 1: the jungle, hears it from miles away and runs away, 497 00:26:52,236 --> 00:26:55,116 Speaker 1: and it's impossible to catch the mouse email. I want 498 00:26:55,116 --> 00:26:58,356 Speaker 1: to turn now in our concluding moments of our conversation 499 00:26:58,556 --> 00:27:01,476 Speaker 1: to the question of how much it matters for the 500 00:27:01,636 --> 00:27:05,316 Speaker 1: US role in the international order that the US managed 501 00:27:05,556 --> 00:27:09,436 Speaker 1: to lose this war. Now, one could say, as was 502 00:27:09,476 --> 00:27:12,076 Speaker 1: the takeaway from the Vietnam War, where the US learned 503 00:27:12,236 --> 00:27:16,196 Speaker 1: that it couldn't defeat an enemy like South Vietnam. Here 504 00:27:16,316 --> 00:27:19,596 Speaker 1: the takeaway is that the US couldn't defeat a persistent 505 00:27:19,716 --> 00:27:24,036 Speaker 1: insurgent force like the Taliban, but that that doesn't necessarily 506 00:27:24,196 --> 00:27:27,596 Speaker 1: mean that the position of the US visavi China with 507 00:27:27,676 --> 00:27:32,156 Speaker 1: respect to Taiwan, for example, or visa its position in 508 00:27:32,236 --> 00:27:35,316 Speaker 1: other places in the world where its geostrategic power remains crucial, 509 00:27:35,796 --> 00:27:39,236 Speaker 1: has really fundamentally changed. Or you could say, listen, there 510 00:27:39,316 --> 00:27:41,556 Speaker 1: must be a bigger takeaway of a failure like this 511 00:27:41,716 --> 00:27:45,396 Speaker 1: twenty years, a trillion dollars, failure to achieve its goals, 512 00:27:45,596 --> 00:27:48,436 Speaker 1: failure to learn the lessons of counterinsurgency that should have 513 00:27:48,476 --> 00:27:52,356 Speaker 1: been learned from Vietnam surely has consequences, And I'm wondering 514 00:27:52,436 --> 00:27:55,116 Speaker 1: where you come down in that grand debate, which is 515 00:27:55,156 --> 00:28:00,316 Speaker 1: really just beginning now. Yeah, in terms of international order, Noah, 516 00:28:00,516 --> 00:28:03,796 Speaker 1: the key is what happens next in Afghanistan. So question one, 517 00:28:03,956 --> 00:28:06,756 Speaker 1: who really are the Taliban? Their pr is all very 518 00:28:07,076 --> 00:28:09,916 Speaker 1: rosy and glossy. They say they're can happen inclusive government, 519 00:28:10,156 --> 00:28:14,276 Speaker 1: including women, for example, and have an amnesty for government 520 00:28:14,316 --> 00:28:17,316 Speaker 1: officials and everyone in fact, and if that were really 521 00:28:17,356 --> 00:28:20,596 Speaker 1: worthy case, then the West could live with that and 522 00:28:20,716 --> 00:28:24,276 Speaker 1: that won't badly damage US press, if you like. On 523 00:28:24,356 --> 00:28:26,916 Speaker 1: the other hand, if one their pr is not true 524 00:28:26,916 --> 00:28:29,636 Speaker 1: to reality, then that wouldn't be the case. But the 525 00:28:29,716 --> 00:28:32,556 Speaker 1: real issue is that can the Taliban even maintain control 526 00:28:32,556 --> 00:28:35,276 Speaker 1: of the country. They've been united through a common enemy 527 00:28:35,716 --> 00:28:39,276 Speaker 1: for the past twenty years and now actually the Taliban 528 00:28:39,396 --> 00:28:41,716 Speaker 1: being a franchise movement, the question is whether those different 529 00:28:41,796 --> 00:28:44,076 Speaker 1: factions will start to come apart. So you've got some 530 00:28:44,436 --> 00:28:47,756 Speaker 1: more moderate, some more extreme, and the whole country could 531 00:28:47,836 --> 00:28:50,436 Speaker 1: send in civil war, creating a haven for terrorists. That 532 00:28:50,436 --> 00:28:54,436 Speaker 1: would clearly be extremely damaging for US credibility in terms 533 00:28:54,436 --> 00:28:57,316 Speaker 1: of having to potentially go back in there and deal 534 00:28:57,396 --> 00:28:59,676 Speaker 1: with that, or just take it on risk and accept 535 00:28:59,716 --> 00:29:03,116 Speaker 1: the consequences. Neither of those good options. Beyond Afghanistan and 536 00:29:03,156 --> 00:29:05,796 Speaker 1: beyond the kind of terrorism question, I don't think that 537 00:29:05,876 --> 00:29:08,756 Speaker 1: this is going to undermine US alliances in East Asia 538 00:29:08,836 --> 00:29:11,796 Speaker 1: on the country. The whole point of this move was 539 00:29:11,836 --> 00:29:15,556 Speaker 1: to reinforce alliances in Asia, So I don't think that's 540 00:29:15,596 --> 00:29:18,236 Speaker 1: going to be undermined. But perhaps the contrarian answer is 541 00:29:18,316 --> 00:29:21,196 Speaker 1: that is the West being repeating the mistake of not 542 00:29:21,356 --> 00:29:25,996 Speaker 1: using surprise, not being imaginative here. If the West and 543 00:29:26,036 --> 00:29:29,996 Speaker 1: semicly United States starts just putting all its effort into 544 00:29:30,076 --> 00:29:33,236 Speaker 1: focusing on Taiwan really and the defense in the Far 545 00:29:33,356 --> 00:29:36,916 Speaker 1: East in a very conventional sense, is that not going 546 00:29:36,996 --> 00:29:40,276 Speaker 1: to open the door for states that basically want to 547 00:29:40,356 --> 00:29:43,556 Speaker 1: undermine US and Western interests across the rest of the world. 548 00:29:44,156 --> 00:29:47,876 Speaker 1: So China and Russia primarily using all kinds of means, 549 00:29:47,956 --> 00:29:53,756 Speaker 1: not just military means, but also geoeconomic means and informational means, 550 00:29:54,556 --> 00:29:56,956 Speaker 1: and all kinds of sort of grazoon tactics we've seen 551 00:29:56,996 --> 00:30:00,196 Speaker 1: in the past ten years or so to undermine interests 552 00:30:00,436 --> 00:30:02,196 Speaker 1: Western interests in the rest of the world while we're 553 00:30:02,236 --> 00:30:05,956 Speaker 1: focused on on the Far East. In a very conventional sense, 554 00:30:06,156 --> 00:30:09,436 Speaker 1: that's the actual risk, and there could be a a 555 00:30:09,556 --> 00:30:12,516 Speaker 1: kind of ironic outcome where the worst there's all this 556 00:30:12,636 --> 00:30:15,076 Speaker 1: effort to kind of shift pivot to Asia if you like, 557 00:30:15,156 --> 00:30:18,516 Speaker 1: and telegraphics intentions in a very unimaginative way, and the 558 00:30:18,596 --> 00:30:21,236 Speaker 1: other countries just plan around that. And actually there isn't 559 00:30:21,236 --> 00:30:23,716 Speaker 1: any big fight over Taiwan. But there's no sort of 560 00:30:23,756 --> 00:30:27,676 Speaker 1: decisive moment which US power ends. Rather, there's kind of 561 00:30:27,716 --> 00:30:29,956 Speaker 1: death by a thousand cuts, which indeed is how the 562 00:30:29,996 --> 00:30:32,596 Speaker 1: British Empire basically ended, and how most empires end in 563 00:30:32,636 --> 00:30:35,756 Speaker 1: that if indeed empires the right analogy. But the point is, 564 00:30:35,996 --> 00:30:38,716 Speaker 1: in terms of the kind of superpower, is that really 565 00:30:39,116 --> 00:30:40,876 Speaker 1: what's going to happen. I think actually that's more likely 566 00:30:40,916 --> 00:30:43,916 Speaker 1: to happen than any kind of decisive battle. And really, 567 00:30:44,116 --> 00:30:48,676 Speaker 1: if we want to stand by our values and Western values, 568 00:30:48,676 --> 00:30:50,676 Speaker 1: which I think personally how worth fighting for or at 569 00:30:50,716 --> 00:30:52,556 Speaker 1: least worth sounding up for. Not I don't mean fighting 570 00:30:52,596 --> 00:30:56,596 Speaker 1: necessarily ligial sense. It requires us to be more agile 571 00:30:56,956 --> 00:31:00,196 Speaker 1: and to think about strategy in a way that actually 572 00:31:00,276 --> 00:31:04,756 Speaker 1: uses the values of surprise and flexibility of means not 573 00:31:04,916 --> 00:31:07,836 Speaker 1: always focusing on the military side of things, but at 574 00:31:07,876 --> 00:31:10,996 Speaker 1: the same time where there is a need to intervene, 575 00:31:11,156 --> 00:31:14,276 Speaker 1: not to do regime change, but on the contrary regime support. 576 00:31:14,476 --> 00:31:16,436 Speaker 1: You know, I gave the example of France and Marley earlier. 577 00:31:16,716 --> 00:31:20,276 Speaker 1: Then we should do that and not always be completely predictable. 578 00:31:21,996 --> 00:31:33,356 Speaker 1: We'll be right back, Emil. I want to thank you 579 00:31:33,556 --> 00:31:38,756 Speaker 1: for this fascinating account of events on the ground and 580 00:31:38,996 --> 00:31:42,836 Speaker 1: they're deeper, meaning in Afghanistan, and also of course for 581 00:31:42,956 --> 00:31:46,556 Speaker 1: your combination of being a soldier on the ground and 582 00:31:46,636 --> 00:31:50,116 Speaker 1: then a scholar explaining things to the world and to 583 00:31:50,236 --> 00:31:53,636 Speaker 1: all of us. For me talking to you, I was 584 00:31:53,756 --> 00:31:59,596 Speaker 1: just deeply struck by the reality of the number of 585 00:31:59,676 --> 00:32:04,116 Speaker 1: Afghan dead. Forty five thousand Afghan dead soldiers is close 586 00:32:04,156 --> 00:32:06,996 Speaker 1: to the total number that the US lost in Vietnam. 587 00:32:07,076 --> 00:32:10,236 Speaker 1: It's a very significant cost. And very struck by your 588 00:32:10,276 --> 00:32:13,836 Speaker 1: observation that it wasn't just that the US and the 589 00:32:13,916 --> 00:32:16,396 Speaker 1: Afghan security forces lost the ward, but that the Taliban 590 00:32:16,676 --> 00:32:19,876 Speaker 1: really want it. I was also very very struck by 591 00:32:19,956 --> 00:32:23,636 Speaker 1: your observation that we failed to think about this war 592 00:32:23,756 --> 00:32:26,356 Speaker 1: from the standpoint of the enemy and therefore failed to 593 00:32:26,436 --> 00:32:30,436 Speaker 1: have the advantage of surprise. I was really struck by 594 00:32:30,516 --> 00:32:33,956 Speaker 1: your point that in a networked world where the enemy 595 00:32:34,116 --> 00:32:37,036 Speaker 1: is flat and networked, we need to do the same. 596 00:32:37,156 --> 00:32:38,836 Speaker 1: And then if you want to catch a mouse, you 597 00:32:38,916 --> 00:32:40,956 Speaker 1: can't be an elephant, maybe you actually need to be 598 00:32:41,036 --> 00:32:44,276 Speaker 1: something closer to a cat. And last, but not least, 599 00:32:44,316 --> 00:32:48,276 Speaker 1: just very struck by your point that the deep failure 600 00:32:48,356 --> 00:32:53,036 Speaker 1: of the US here does have broader geopolitical consequences that 601 00:32:53,116 --> 00:32:57,316 Speaker 1: we're going to be grappling with in the future. So 602 00:32:57,396 --> 00:33:00,716 Speaker 1: I want to again thank you for your analysis and 603 00:33:01,196 --> 00:33:04,916 Speaker 1: for your commentary, for your service, and for coming on 604 00:33:05,076 --> 00:33:07,796 Speaker 1: Deep Background to explain this to us on short notice. 605 00:33:07,916 --> 00:33:19,436 Speaker 1: Thank you, Amil, Thank you very much. Deep Background is 606 00:33:19,476 --> 00:33:22,876 Speaker 1: brought to you by Pushkin Industries. Our producer is Mola Board, 607 00:33:23,156 --> 00:33:26,476 Speaker 1: our engineer is Ben Tolliday, and our showrunner is Sophie 608 00:33:26,516 --> 00:33:31,356 Speaker 1: Crane mckibbon. Editorial support from noahm Osband. Theme music by 609 00:33:31,436 --> 00:33:34,996 Speaker 1: Luis Gara at Pushkin. Thanks to Mia Lobell, Julia Barton, 610 00:33:35,276 --> 00:33:39,836 Speaker 1: Lydia Gencott, Heather Faine, Carlie Migliori, Maggie Taylor, Eric Sandler, 611 00:33:40,036 --> 00:33:43,316 Speaker 1: and Jacob Weissberg. You can find me on Twitter at 612 00:33:43,356 --> 00:33:46,556 Speaker 1: Noah R. Feldman. I also write a column from Bloomberg Opinion, 613 00:33:46,756 --> 00:33:49,716 Speaker 1: which you can find at bloomberg dot com slash Feldman. 614 00:33:50,156 --> 00:33:53,596 Speaker 1: To discover Bloomberg's original slate of podcasts, go to bloomberg 615 00:33:53,636 --> 00:33:56,516 Speaker 1: dot com slash podcasts, and if you liked what you 616 00:33:56,636 --> 00:33:59,556 Speaker 1: heard today, please write a review or tell a friend. 617 00:34:00,156 --> 00:34:01,836 Speaker 1: This is deep background