WEBVTT - Maximizing Luck: Masters in Business with Judd Kessler 

0:00:02.520 --> 0:00:11.840
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio News. This is Masters in

0:00:11.920 --> 0:00:15.440
<v Speaker 1>Business with Barry Ritholts on Bloomberg Radio.

0:00:16.239 --> 0:00:20.480
<v Speaker 2>This week on the podcast, another extra special guest, Judd Kessler,

0:00:21.160 --> 0:00:25.599
<v Speaker 2>Wharton professor, author of Lucky by Design, tells us about

0:00:25.720 --> 0:00:31.080
<v Speaker 2>market design, how we allocate scarce resources for everything from

0:00:31.120 --> 0:00:34.920
<v Speaker 2>Taylor Swift tickets to kidneys. I thought the book was

0:00:35.000 --> 0:00:40.360
<v Speaker 2>really interesting, kind of wonky economic analysis, but fascinating, and

0:00:40.400 --> 0:00:45.159
<v Speaker 2>the conversation absolutely fascinating. Also with no further ado, my

0:00:45.400 --> 0:00:49.240
<v Speaker 2>interview of Professor Judd Kesler. So I found the book

0:00:49.240 --> 0:00:53.320
<v Speaker 2>to be really fascinating look at market design, which is

0:00:53.360 --> 0:00:56.480
<v Speaker 2>an area that we don't usually think about. We'll talk

0:00:56.480 --> 0:00:59.040
<v Speaker 2>about the book in a few moments. I want to

0:00:59.080 --> 0:01:05.640
<v Speaker 2>start with your best bachelor's, masters and PhD from Harvard,

0:01:05.680 --> 0:01:08.720
<v Speaker 2>But that wasn't enough. You get a master's in philosophy

0:01:09.200 --> 0:01:11.880
<v Speaker 2>from Cambridge. What was the career plan?

0:01:12.480 --> 0:01:15.680
<v Speaker 3>So the career plan was to go to college and

0:01:15.680 --> 0:01:19.319
<v Speaker 3>then find a career not in academia. That was not

0:01:19.480 --> 0:01:23.040
<v Speaker 3>something that I even thought of as an option. I

0:01:23.160 --> 0:01:25.479
<v Speaker 3>was an econ major. I thought I'd be a consultant.

0:01:25.680 --> 0:01:30.080
<v Speaker 3>I accepted a Bay New York offer to take after graduation.

0:01:31.000 --> 0:01:35.400
<v Speaker 3>But senior year of college I wrote a thesis under

0:01:35.520 --> 0:01:39.119
<v Speaker 3>a supervisor named Alvin Roth, and I loved it. It

0:01:39.200 --> 0:01:42.720
<v Speaker 3>was my first experience doing research, and I thought, this

0:01:42.800 --> 0:01:47.360
<v Speaker 3>is really fun. I'm in the cutting edge of this

0:01:47.520 --> 0:01:51.400
<v Speaker 3>topic that I chose that interests me, and so that

0:01:51.920 --> 0:01:53.400
<v Speaker 3>made me think, all right, maybe I should give it

0:01:53.440 --> 0:01:55.800
<v Speaker 3>a shot. So that was the trip to Cambridge, England,

0:01:56.120 --> 0:02:00.760
<v Speaker 3>was me doing an mfil in economics to see, you know,

0:02:00.840 --> 0:02:02.800
<v Speaker 3>is this something that I might want to pursue as

0:02:02.880 --> 0:02:06.200
<v Speaker 3>a career. I didn't love the pedagogy in England, so

0:02:06.480 --> 0:02:10.040
<v Speaker 3>the courses I wasn't enjoying. But every day I'd come

0:02:10.080 --> 0:02:12.600
<v Speaker 3>home and think, oh, there's some research questions that that

0:02:12.720 --> 0:02:17.200
<v Speaker 3>lecture prompted. And I realized, oh, the research is keeping

0:02:17.240 --> 0:02:19.640
<v Speaker 3>me engaged in this program. Even though I don't love

0:02:19.680 --> 0:02:22.640
<v Speaker 3>the coursework, I probably should be doing this full time.

0:02:22.720 --> 0:02:26.200
<v Speaker 2>What was the research topic in your senior year that

0:02:26.400 --> 0:02:28.160
<v Speaker 2>led you to heading to Inland?

0:02:28.360 --> 0:02:32.280
<v Speaker 3>So it was a experiment. So I'm an experimental economist.

0:02:32.400 --> 0:02:33.920
<v Speaker 3>Most of my not all of it, but most of

0:02:33.960 --> 0:02:37.959
<v Speaker 3>my research is experimental, meaning undergrads are coming into the

0:02:38.040 --> 0:02:42.440
<v Speaker 3>lab playing a game I've designed or we're doing some

0:02:42.560 --> 0:02:46.280
<v Speaker 3>experimentation in the field where people are going about their lives.

0:02:46.280 --> 0:02:48.640
<v Speaker 3>They don't realize that half of them are getting one

0:02:48.720 --> 0:02:50.760
<v Speaker 3>version of an experience and half forgetting the other, and

0:02:50.800 --> 0:02:53.840
<v Speaker 3>we're seeing what the effect is. So my undergrad thesis

0:02:54.000 --> 0:02:59.280
<v Speaker 3>was trying to understand how pairs of people could contribute

0:02:59.320 --> 0:03:01.919
<v Speaker 3>to public go to things that benefited both of them.

0:03:02.560 --> 0:03:06.400
<v Speaker 3>And I learned about, you know, everything that I could

0:03:06.480 --> 0:03:09.919
<v Speaker 3>learn about public good provision, and I varied both the

0:03:09.960 --> 0:03:13.800
<v Speaker 3>structure of the game and how the benefits of the

0:03:13.800 --> 0:03:17.880
<v Speaker 3>public good were split across people. And this was something

0:03:17.880 --> 0:03:21.280
<v Speaker 3>that had never been done before. And my advisor, Al

0:03:21.440 --> 0:03:27.200
<v Speaker 3>was very encouraging, enthusiastic funded the research study. And I

0:03:27.280 --> 0:03:30.400
<v Speaker 3>had this experience of looking at the data and thinking,

0:03:31.000 --> 0:03:33.960
<v Speaker 3>this is the.

0:03:32.880 --> 0:03:34.760
<v Speaker 4>First I'm the first person. I'm on the frontier.

0:03:35.080 --> 0:03:38.400
<v Speaker 3>I'm never going to be an astronaut, but I'm on

0:03:38.440 --> 0:03:41.160
<v Speaker 3>the frontier here exploring the answer to this question that

0:03:41.200 --> 0:03:41.680
<v Speaker 3>interests me.

0:03:42.240 --> 0:03:44.720
<v Speaker 4>I'm looking at the data and discovering the answer.

0:03:44.920 --> 0:03:48.000
<v Speaker 2>So this sounds like it's a cross section of game

0:03:48.080 --> 0:03:50.040
<v Speaker 2>theory and behavioral economics.

0:03:50.440 --> 0:03:56.000
<v Speaker 4>Fair description, exactly right. And it's a paper.

0:03:56.320 --> 0:03:58.680
<v Speaker 3>You know, I've since become an academic, and I've been

0:03:58.680 --> 0:04:00.680
<v Speaker 3>writing research papers for a long time. This one was

0:04:00.720 --> 0:04:05.320
<v Speaker 3>never published, and the reason was that in my twenties

0:04:05.480 --> 0:04:08.240
<v Speaker 3>and even into my thirties, I didn't really know how

0:04:08.280 --> 0:04:08.840
<v Speaker 3>to motivate it.

0:04:08.880 --> 0:04:10.040
<v Speaker 4>I didn't know what it was about.

0:04:10.840 --> 0:04:12.240
<v Speaker 3>You know, at a deep level, I knew what I

0:04:12.280 --> 0:04:15.200
<v Speaker 3>had done, and I knew that it was new and different.

0:04:15.920 --> 0:04:20.440
<v Speaker 3>But I finally cracked the code in my late thirties

0:04:21.080 --> 0:04:24.080
<v Speaker 3>because what I had studied, unbeknownst to me was how

0:04:24.720 --> 0:04:31.520
<v Speaker 3>couples allocate effort to construct public goods in their household.

0:04:31.640 --> 0:04:34.200
<v Speaker 2>Does that mean who cooks, who cleans, who gets the kids,

0:04:34.240 --> 0:04:37.240
<v Speaker 2>who basically pays the bills? Is it just that simple?

0:04:37.360 --> 0:04:37.800
<v Speaker 4>Exactly?

0:04:37.920 --> 0:04:42.320
<v Speaker 3>Well, it's the game was we each put in some effort.

0:04:42.520 --> 0:04:46.240
<v Speaker 3>Sometimes the production is split evenly between the two, and

0:04:46.279 --> 0:04:49.719
<v Speaker 3>sometimes it's split unevenly, so one person gets more of

0:04:49.760 --> 0:04:52.119
<v Speaker 3>the output and the other person gets less.

0:04:52.480 --> 0:04:52.960
<v Speaker 4>And what I.

0:04:52.880 --> 0:04:56.479
<v Speaker 3>Found was that in some structures where we each have

0:04:56.600 --> 0:05:00.960
<v Speaker 3>to match each other's contribution to general rate and output,

0:05:01.279 --> 0:05:04.560
<v Speaker 3>then the inequality didn't matter. Pairs of people, these are

0:05:04.640 --> 0:05:09.000
<v Speaker 3>random strangers. They're able to contribute at high levels. It's

0:05:09.080 --> 0:05:12.560
<v Speaker 3>when we're contributing to the public good and one of

0:05:12.640 --> 0:05:14.599
<v Speaker 3>us can cut back and kind of free ride off.

0:05:14.440 --> 0:05:15.080
<v Speaker 4>Of the other one.

0:05:15.640 --> 0:05:18.159
<v Speaker 3>When we split it equally, we're able to sustain with

0:05:18.240 --> 0:05:21.560
<v Speaker 3>the pair, you know, high levels of contribution. But when

0:05:22.160 --> 0:05:25.279
<v Speaker 3>we're split unequally and one of us can free ride

0:05:25.279 --> 0:05:27.960
<v Speaker 3>off each other, the contribution collapses.

0:05:28.080 --> 0:05:30.000
<v Speaker 2>I was going to say that sounds like a recipe

0:05:30.040 --> 0:05:30.640
<v Speaker 2>for a divorce.

0:05:31.800 --> 0:05:34.040
<v Speaker 3>Well, you know, the reason I was able to later

0:05:34.160 --> 0:05:37.680
<v Speaker 3>understand what I had studied in my twenties was those

0:05:37.720 --> 0:05:40.600
<v Speaker 3>are the situations where, you know, my wife and I

0:05:40.640 --> 0:05:44.320
<v Speaker 3>have conflicts when we both need to contribute for the

0:05:44.360 --> 0:05:47.360
<v Speaker 3>public good to be provided, Like we both have to

0:05:47.360 --> 0:05:51.520
<v Speaker 3>be diligent with bedtimes with our kids because of one

0:05:51.520 --> 0:05:52.279
<v Speaker 3>of us slips.

0:05:52.360 --> 0:05:54.880
<v Speaker 4>Then the kids schedule in them up.

0:05:55.240 --> 0:05:57.440
<v Speaker 3>Then you know, it doesn't matter if I care more

0:05:57.480 --> 0:05:59.440
<v Speaker 3>about that or my wife we kind of both realize

0:05:59.440 --> 0:06:02.640
<v Speaker 3>we have to at the same level, or or we

0:06:02.680 --> 0:06:03.279
<v Speaker 3>both lose.

0:06:03.560 --> 0:06:08.960
<v Speaker 2>Where does it sort of where does that gap between effort? Yeah,

0:06:09.120 --> 0:06:09.919
<v Speaker 2>how does that manifest?

0:06:10.040 --> 0:06:12.560
<v Speaker 3>So if one of us cares more about say the

0:06:12.640 --> 0:06:14.800
<v Speaker 3>kids eating vegetables for.

0:06:14.960 --> 0:06:17.120
<v Speaker 2>How does it house neat? Yeah?

0:06:17.200 --> 0:06:20.839
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, for us, it's you know, the health helpful eating.

0:06:20.920 --> 0:06:23.480
<v Speaker 3>One of us might care more than the other. And

0:06:24.560 --> 0:06:27.680
<v Speaker 3>in that case, you know, if my wife cares more

0:06:27.960 --> 0:06:30.240
<v Speaker 3>and I free write off of her, she fed them

0:06:30.279 --> 0:06:33.640
<v Speaker 3>a healthy lunch, say yesterday, uh, and then I can

0:06:33.640 --> 0:06:35.640
<v Speaker 3>feed them a less healthy dinner when it's my turn.

0:06:36.480 --> 0:06:38.400
<v Speaker 4>That's where the recipe for a disaster.

0:06:38.760 --> 0:06:42.039
<v Speaker 2>Those are O missions? What about co missions? What about

0:06:42.080 --> 0:06:45.320
<v Speaker 2>doing things positively where one of you might slip? How

0:06:45.320 --> 0:06:46.200
<v Speaker 2>does that manifest?

0:06:46.240 --> 0:06:46.400
<v Speaker 5>Oh?

0:06:47.120 --> 0:06:49.240
<v Speaker 3>I mean most of the things I'm thinking of are like,

0:06:49.480 --> 0:06:51.320
<v Speaker 3>are we giving them too much screen time?

0:06:51.400 --> 0:06:51.520
<v Speaker 2>Oh?

0:06:51.560 --> 0:06:52.080
<v Speaker 4>I guess we could.

0:06:52.120 --> 0:06:55.279
<v Speaker 3>It could be uh reading them books at night, you know.

0:06:55.400 --> 0:06:57.159
<v Speaker 3>I mean, so we both care a lot about this,

0:06:57.279 --> 0:06:59.040
<v Speaker 3>so well we'll do it. But if you know, if

0:06:59.040 --> 0:07:01.039
<v Speaker 3>one of us cared more, that would be a recipe

0:07:01.040 --> 0:07:03.599
<v Speaker 3>for a disaster, because that person would read to the

0:07:03.640 --> 0:07:05.240
<v Speaker 3>kids and the other person would say, you know what,

0:07:05.480 --> 0:07:07.440
<v Speaker 3>like you got read to last night, I won't do

0:07:07.520 --> 0:07:11.040
<v Speaker 3>it right, And that's when the trouble.

0:07:11.240 --> 0:07:12.360
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, that's when trouble started.

0:07:12.400 --> 0:07:16.960
<v Speaker 3>So that was my first academic research was exploring those

0:07:17.040 --> 0:07:18.679
<v Speaker 3>kinds of dynamics in two person games.

0:07:18.800 --> 0:07:22.160
<v Speaker 2>How do you go from that to studying market design?

0:07:22.760 --> 0:07:27.480
<v Speaker 3>So this was Alvin Roth the mentor that I mentioned.

0:07:28.080 --> 0:07:31.600
<v Speaker 3>He was my undergrad thesis advisor. And when I was

0:07:31.760 --> 0:07:35.640
<v Speaker 3>getting my PhD, I committed a kind of sin, of

0:07:36.280 --> 0:07:38.960
<v Speaker 3>academic sin, which is you're not supposed to go back

0:07:39.000 --> 0:07:41.480
<v Speaker 3>to the institution you did your undergrad degree to get

0:07:41.480 --> 0:07:44.480
<v Speaker 3>your PhD. But I wanted to work with Al, so

0:07:44.520 --> 0:07:47.240
<v Speaker 3>I kind of I cheated a little bit. I went

0:07:47.280 --> 0:07:49.560
<v Speaker 3>back to Harvard, but it was technically a Harvard Business

0:07:49.600 --> 0:07:53.280
<v Speaker 3>School PhD joint with the Econ Department, so I pretended, oh,

0:07:53.320 --> 0:07:56.280
<v Speaker 3>I'm getting a different angle on this. I ended up

0:07:56.280 --> 0:07:59.240
<v Speaker 3>being helpful because being at the Business school helped me

0:07:59.320 --> 0:08:02.400
<v Speaker 3>transition to mind current job as a Wharton professor. But

0:08:02.640 --> 0:08:05.240
<v Speaker 3>I went back to work with Al, and he was

0:08:05.280 --> 0:08:07.680
<v Speaker 3>doing both He was doing experimental work and he was

0:08:07.680 --> 0:08:10.360
<v Speaker 3>doing market design work. And I had gotten exposure to

0:08:10.400 --> 0:08:13.400
<v Speaker 3>both of them in his course courses as an undergrad

0:08:13.560 --> 0:08:18.080
<v Speaker 3>and an early PhD student. And the research that kind

0:08:18.080 --> 0:08:21.840
<v Speaker 3>of transitioned me was on organ donation and organ allocation.

0:08:22.400 --> 0:08:25.000
<v Speaker 2>The book has some fascinating data points on that. We'll

0:08:25.040 --> 0:08:27.880
<v Speaker 2>talk about that in a bit. I want to stay

0:08:27.920 --> 0:08:31.520
<v Speaker 2>with your background. You end up winning the Vernon Smith

0:08:31.600 --> 0:08:35.320
<v Speaker 2>Scholar Prize in twenty twenty one. What work was that for?

0:08:35.720 --> 0:08:37.840
<v Speaker 3>So that was for a line of work starting with

0:08:37.880 --> 0:08:44.120
<v Speaker 3>this organ allocation work, because that was both a public

0:08:44.160 --> 0:08:48.440
<v Speaker 3>good study like I described in the earlier work and

0:08:48.800 --> 0:08:52.240
<v Speaker 3>policy relevant. And so the Vernon Smith Prize is for

0:08:52.320 --> 0:08:55.960
<v Speaker 3>somebody who's contributed with experimental research in a bunch of

0:08:56.000 --> 0:08:58.600
<v Speaker 3>areas and I had you know, I'd done that, I'd

0:08:58.640 --> 0:09:02.079
<v Speaker 3>done that in organ allocation, done that, and of course allocation.

0:09:02.360 --> 0:09:05.160
<v Speaker 3>I had done work on summer youth employment, but kind

0:09:05.160 --> 0:09:08.680
<v Speaker 3>of always with this experimental lens to try to understand

0:09:09.120 --> 0:09:09.880
<v Speaker 3>what the effects were.

0:09:10.240 --> 0:09:13.920
<v Speaker 2>And what's kind of fascinating is you're clicking off a

0:09:13.920 --> 0:09:17.080
<v Speaker 2>lot of chapters in the book, which are how do

0:09:17.080 --> 0:09:22.000
<v Speaker 2>we allocate scarce resources when there are a variety of

0:09:22.040 --> 0:09:25.760
<v Speaker 2>different ways to do it. Sometimes it's lottery, sometimes it's effort.

0:09:26.600 --> 0:09:30.000
<v Speaker 2>Sometimes it's people paying more to get it, which really

0:09:30.200 --> 0:09:34.600
<v Speaker 2>is I never thought of those things as market design,

0:09:35.000 --> 0:09:38.480
<v Speaker 2>and yet most people look at those things as just hey,

0:09:38.520 --> 0:09:41.920
<v Speaker 2>you got lucky. You got the summer job or the

0:09:41.960 --> 0:09:45.280
<v Speaker 2>course you wanted, or the kidney you needed because you

0:09:45.360 --> 0:09:47.880
<v Speaker 2>signed up. A big theme of the book is, hey,

0:09:47.920 --> 0:09:51.280
<v Speaker 2>this is in luck. This is recognizing all of these

0:09:52.000 --> 0:09:56.840
<v Speaker 2>market design structures and figuring out the rules and playing

0:09:56.880 --> 0:09:57.920
<v Speaker 2>them as well as you can.

0:09:58.480 --> 0:10:02.080
<v Speaker 3>Exactly right in the book. I call these hidden markets

0:10:02.200 --> 0:10:05.320
<v Speaker 3>because they're not the markets that we always think of.

0:10:05.360 --> 0:10:07.480
<v Speaker 3>When we think of markets, we think of the farmer's

0:10:07.520 --> 0:10:09.959
<v Speaker 3>market where you're paying a price for produce. We think

0:10:10.000 --> 0:10:12.600
<v Speaker 3>of the stock market where you're paying a price for

0:10:12.679 --> 0:10:15.840
<v Speaker 3>equity and publicly traded companies. But there are all of

0:10:15.880 --> 0:10:20.600
<v Speaker 3>these markets where you're trying to allocate a scarce resource.

0:10:21.640 --> 0:10:25.200
<v Speaker 3>You might have a price that gets paid, but it's

0:10:25.240 --> 0:10:27.520
<v Speaker 3>not doing all of the work. There's something else that

0:10:27.640 --> 0:10:31.120
<v Speaker 3>is deciding who gets access to the scarce resource. And

0:10:31.160 --> 0:10:33.280
<v Speaker 3>then there are markets where there is no price. We've

0:10:33.280 --> 0:10:36.240
<v Speaker 3>decided that we want to do the allocation without having

0:10:36.280 --> 0:10:38.840
<v Speaker 3>folks pay. We want to distribute it in some other way.

0:10:39.800 --> 0:10:43.400
<v Speaker 3>And these are areas that market design thinks about. But

0:10:43.480 --> 0:10:46.400
<v Speaker 3>that a standard ECON class like the ones I teach

0:10:46.440 --> 0:10:49.800
<v Speaker 3>to my undergrads or MBA students or executives would not

0:10:49.920 --> 0:10:50.760
<v Speaker 3>necessarily cover.

0:10:51.120 --> 0:10:54.040
<v Speaker 2>So other than the students in your warton class, how

0:10:54.040 --> 0:10:58.080
<v Speaker 2>can individuals become more aware of all of these hidden

0:10:58.160 --> 0:11:01.679
<v Speaker 2>market mechanisms and use them to their best advantage?

0:11:01.840 --> 0:11:05.080
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so the first step is recognizing that these things

0:11:05.080 --> 0:11:09.400
<v Speaker 3>are markets. You want access to something, it's scarce, there

0:11:09.520 --> 0:11:14.440
<v Speaker 3>is a limited amount that can be allocated, and you're

0:11:14.440 --> 0:11:17.599
<v Speaker 3>competing with lots of other people who want them. Examples

0:11:17.679 --> 0:11:21.360
<v Speaker 3>might make it more concrete because we're, you know, thinking

0:11:21.360 --> 0:11:23.760
<v Speaker 3>about things that people participate in every day.

0:11:23.800 --> 0:11:24.360
<v Speaker 4>These markets.

0:11:24.360 --> 0:11:27.600
<v Speaker 3>So you want to get a reservation at a hot restaurant,

0:11:27.840 --> 0:11:29.560
<v Speaker 3>you want to get a ticket to a live event.

0:11:30.160 --> 0:11:33.440
<v Speaker 3>You want to get a product that is hard to

0:11:33.480 --> 0:11:37.280
<v Speaker 3>come by, either you know, a clothing special clothing drop

0:11:37.480 --> 0:11:40.559
<v Speaker 3>or this summer it was La Boo boos, the ugly

0:11:40.640 --> 0:11:43.400
<v Speaker 3>cute stuffy dolls, but you could think of beanie babies

0:11:43.640 --> 0:11:45.040
<v Speaker 3>or cabbage patch dolls if you're as.

0:11:44.960 --> 0:11:45.400
<v Speaker 4>Old as me.

0:11:46.040 --> 0:11:49.200
<v Speaker 3>And in these cases there is a price that you pay,

0:11:49.880 --> 0:11:53.040
<v Speaker 3>but there's also some other ordeal that you may have

0:11:53.080 --> 0:11:55.760
<v Speaker 3>to go through to get access to those scarce resources.

0:11:56.720 --> 0:12:01.280
<v Speaker 3>Same thing with benefits or services provided by the government.

0:12:01.400 --> 0:12:04.160
<v Speaker 3>You want to get your kid into public elementary school,

0:12:04.160 --> 0:12:06.079
<v Speaker 3>you want to get a library book, you want to

0:12:06.120 --> 0:12:09.760
<v Speaker 3>get a life saving organ transplant. These are environments where

0:12:10.000 --> 0:12:12.360
<v Speaker 3>you have to understand, okay, what is the rule that

0:12:12.559 --> 0:12:17.240
<v Speaker 3>is doing the allocation, and then how can you use

0:12:17.280 --> 0:12:19.679
<v Speaker 3>your knowledge of that rule to figure out the right strategy.

0:12:19.960 --> 0:12:23.360
<v Speaker 2>Your daughter trying to get into her favorite after school

0:12:23.400 --> 0:12:28.760
<v Speaker 2>program really resonated because it was such a little niche thing.

0:12:29.920 --> 0:12:33.320
<v Speaker 2>It's just one of those everyday life frictions. You don't

0:12:33.360 --> 0:12:36.800
<v Speaker 2>really think of those as markets that have been designed,

0:12:37.160 --> 0:12:40.640
<v Speaker 2>but you do a really nice job explaining any allocation

0:12:40.720 --> 0:12:43.480
<v Speaker 2>of scarce resources is a market decision.

0:12:43.320 --> 0:12:46.520
<v Speaker 3>Exactly, and that one is one of the banes of

0:12:46.559 --> 0:12:49.240
<v Speaker 3>my existence. I have to it's a first come, first

0:12:49.280 --> 0:12:52.360
<v Speaker 3>serve race, which is what I call the experience that

0:12:52.840 --> 0:12:56.720
<v Speaker 3>folks have on a regular basis of there is a

0:12:56.760 --> 0:12:59.560
<v Speaker 3>scarce resource, it is being made available at a point

0:12:59.559 --> 0:13:02.720
<v Speaker 3>in time, and whoever clicks first gets it, whoever calls

0:13:02.720 --> 0:13:06.000
<v Speaker 3>in first in different market structures, is the one who

0:13:06.000 --> 0:13:10.000
<v Speaker 3>can claim that scarce resource. After school programs at my

0:13:10.080 --> 0:13:13.240
<v Speaker 3>daughter's elementary school, this is what the kids are doing

0:13:13.280 --> 0:13:15.920
<v Speaker 3>between two thirty when school lets out, and five thirty

0:13:15.920 --> 0:13:19.280
<v Speaker 3>when working parents can pick them up. There are some

0:13:19.480 --> 0:13:24.400
<v Speaker 3>very popular classes for the kids to do during those hours,

0:13:25.520 --> 0:13:26.720
<v Speaker 3>but there are a lot of kids who want to

0:13:26.720 --> 0:13:30.120
<v Speaker 3>participate in them, and so every semester they will say okay.

0:13:30.200 --> 0:13:35.120
<v Speaker 3>On June twelfth at ten am. We're going to release

0:13:35.400 --> 0:13:40.160
<v Speaker 3>all of the fall semester courses, and whoever clicks to

0:13:40.200 --> 0:13:43.440
<v Speaker 3>claim the spots in those classes first will get them,

0:13:43.600 --> 0:13:45.679
<v Speaker 3>and everybody else will be disappointed.

0:13:46.240 --> 0:13:48.600
<v Speaker 4>And it is a.

0:13:48.559 --> 0:13:50.880
<v Speaker 3>First come for Serve race. And I like the race

0:13:51.320 --> 0:13:54.160
<v Speaker 3>analogy because I don't do a ton of cardio and

0:13:54.200 --> 0:13:56.560
<v Speaker 3>this is where my heart race is faster that you know,

0:13:56.720 --> 0:13:59.360
<v Speaker 3>this is fight or flight, because I know I'm competing

0:13:59.360 --> 0:14:01.640
<v Speaker 3>with all these other parents who want to get their

0:14:01.679 --> 0:14:04.240
<v Speaker 3>kids into these classes. And if my daughter gets what

0:14:04.280 --> 0:14:07.600
<v Speaker 3>she wants, mornings are wonderful, and if she doesn't, it's

0:14:07.679 --> 0:14:09.200
<v Speaker 3>you know, I don't want to go to school today.

0:14:09.360 --> 0:14:12.520
<v Speaker 2>There's some you seem to have an advantage because there

0:14:12.559 --> 0:14:16.280
<v Speaker 2>are some fascinating strategies here. Hey, maybe you don't start

0:14:16.320 --> 0:14:19.120
<v Speaker 2>with the Monday classes. Maybe you do Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday,

0:14:19.600 --> 0:14:21.880
<v Speaker 2>because they're going to fill up while everybody's racing to

0:14:21.960 --> 0:14:24.640
<v Speaker 2>get Monday. And if you're disappointed in a Monday, but

0:14:24.680 --> 0:14:27.480
<v Speaker 2>you've locked in the three ones for the rest of

0:14:27.480 --> 0:14:31.680
<v Speaker 2>the week, there's an advantage. Thinking about how the rest

0:14:31.720 --> 0:14:33.400
<v Speaker 2>of the participants are playing the game.

0:14:33.640 --> 0:14:34.600
<v Speaker 4>This is exactly right.

0:14:34.640 --> 0:14:36.240
<v Speaker 2>So the ball game theory.

0:14:36.480 --> 0:14:38.160
<v Speaker 3>It's all game theory, and I wrote a book about

0:14:38.200 --> 0:14:40.080
<v Speaker 3>game theory. I didn't use the term game theory because

0:14:40.080 --> 0:14:43.360
<v Speaker 3>I didn't want to scare people off. But it's thinking

0:14:43.400 --> 0:14:45.840
<v Speaker 3>about what it is that you want and then what

0:14:45.880 --> 0:14:48.280
<v Speaker 3>it is that other folks might be going for and

0:14:48.360 --> 0:14:52.000
<v Speaker 3>developing the right strategy for that. Now, first come for

0:14:52.120 --> 0:14:56.440
<v Speaker 3>serve races. There's a bunch of strategy that is kind of,

0:14:56.960 --> 0:14:59.680
<v Speaker 3>you know, maybe obvious when you think about it. Of Okay,

0:15:00.000 --> 0:15:01.920
<v Speaker 3>you have to know that it's a race. You have

0:15:02.000 --> 0:15:04.920
<v Speaker 3>to know that this is a situation where you need

0:15:05.000 --> 0:15:08.520
<v Speaker 3>to be available to click.

0:15:08.280 --> 0:15:10.520
<v Speaker 4>As fast as you can at that time.

0:15:10.640 --> 0:15:13.520
<v Speaker 3>Right when I get the email and it says June

0:15:13.560 --> 0:15:16.600
<v Speaker 3>twelfth at ten am is when registration opens. Even if

0:15:16.640 --> 0:15:20.800
<v Speaker 3>I've never participated in the registration for these after school classes,

0:15:21.240 --> 0:15:23.720
<v Speaker 3>the ten am tips me off that something is going

0:15:23.760 --> 0:15:26.400
<v Speaker 3>on at my son's school where the classes are not

0:15:26.960 --> 0:15:31.280
<v Speaker 3>as demanded. There is no ten ams. I mean, there

0:15:31.320 --> 0:15:33.400
<v Speaker 3>might be a time when the registration begins, but nobody

0:15:33.440 --> 0:15:36.000
<v Speaker 3>really cares about it because you can go whenever you

0:15:36.040 --> 0:15:37.920
<v Speaker 3>want that day or later in the week, and there's

0:15:37.960 --> 0:15:43.280
<v Speaker 3>plenty of options available. But this market, the ten am

0:15:43.320 --> 0:15:45.200
<v Speaker 3>tells you all right, by ten oh one or ten

0:15:45.240 --> 0:15:46.760
<v Speaker 3>o two, the good stuff might be taken.

0:15:46.920 --> 0:15:49.960
<v Speaker 2>Did your wife ever get to the French laundry in Napa?

0:15:50.800 --> 0:15:52.600
<v Speaker 3>This was a first time, first of race that I

0:15:53.000 --> 0:15:56.000
<v Speaker 3>talk about in the book. It's for milestone birthdays only

0:15:56.040 --> 0:15:59.360
<v Speaker 3>because it's so expensive. So in the book I talk

0:15:59.400 --> 0:16:02.120
<v Speaker 3>about how we did not get it for her fortieth birthday,

0:16:02.200 --> 0:16:04.040
<v Speaker 3>so she will try again when she's fifty.

0:16:04.480 --> 0:16:09.800
<v Speaker 2>I was reading that and using your strategy imediately thought, oh,

0:16:09.840 --> 0:16:13.560
<v Speaker 2>you're flying out just for a weekend. Four o'clock is

0:16:13.840 --> 0:16:17.160
<v Speaker 2>essentially seven o'clock in New York. Why not do four

0:16:17.240 --> 0:16:20.240
<v Speaker 2>or four to thirty and bang, they're good to go.

0:16:20.360 --> 0:16:24.280
<v Speaker 3>This is exactly so the strategy to play there is

0:16:24.320 --> 0:16:27.280
<v Speaker 3>to think about what I call settling for silver versus

0:16:27.280 --> 0:16:30.680
<v Speaker 3>going for gold. So the settling for silver strategy is,

0:16:31.440 --> 0:16:34.640
<v Speaker 3>you know that seven o'clock or seven thirty is the

0:16:34.640 --> 0:16:36.480
<v Speaker 3>most desirable time to eat, at least you know for

0:16:36.560 --> 0:16:40.120
<v Speaker 3>regular people not in retirement communities. That's the ideal time.

0:16:40.680 --> 0:16:43.720
<v Speaker 3>If you're going to go on a Saturday, that is

0:16:43.760 --> 0:16:46.200
<v Speaker 3>what most people are going to be aiming for. When

0:16:46.240 --> 0:16:48.800
<v Speaker 3>I went for her fortieth birthday to try to register.

0:16:48.840 --> 0:16:50.520
<v Speaker 3>I knew it was a race. I knew when the

0:16:50.600 --> 0:16:52.600
<v Speaker 3>starting gun was going off, I was there, My heart

0:16:52.640 --> 0:16:56.080
<v Speaker 3>was beating fast, and I went first for the seven

0:16:56.200 --> 0:16:58.320
<v Speaker 3>thirty reservation page reloads.

0:16:58.800 --> 0:17:00.680
<v Speaker 4>I don't get it, and I see that.

0:17:00.600 --> 0:17:02.920
<v Speaker 3>Four to thirty still available, so I click for four thirty,

0:17:02.920 --> 0:17:06.520
<v Speaker 3>thinking it's better than nothing, and the page reloads and

0:17:06.600 --> 0:17:07.320
<v Speaker 3>that is also gone.

0:17:07.359 --> 0:17:08.320
<v Speaker 4>So struck out there.

0:17:08.400 --> 0:17:12.600
<v Speaker 3>That's why we're waiting a decade to your point, if

0:17:12.640 --> 0:17:14.240
<v Speaker 3>I had I was doing it as a surprise for

0:17:14.320 --> 0:17:16.399
<v Speaker 3>my wife, if I had planned and talked to her

0:17:16.400 --> 0:17:19.840
<v Speaker 3>about it in advance, we might have recognized four four

0:17:19.960 --> 0:17:21.760
<v Speaker 3>thirty is just is.

0:17:21.760 --> 0:17:23.880
<v Speaker 2>Nearly as good youer an East Coast, it's.

0:17:23.760 --> 0:17:26.360
<v Speaker 3>Nearly as good as seven thirty. And that's the kind

0:17:26.400 --> 0:17:30.440
<v Speaker 3>of situation where you want to settle for silver, where

0:17:30.440 --> 0:17:34.520
<v Speaker 3>you want to go for something where there's less competition. Again,

0:17:34.600 --> 0:17:37.000
<v Speaker 3>the game theory coming in, fewer people are going to

0:17:37.040 --> 0:17:40.399
<v Speaker 3>be going for four four thirty. That is something that

0:17:40.440 --> 0:17:42.840
<v Speaker 3>you actually have a much better shot at if you

0:17:42.920 --> 0:17:45.480
<v Speaker 3>go for it first. You have to act as if

0:17:45.840 --> 0:17:48.840
<v Speaker 3>that is what you wanted all along, right, because when

0:17:48.880 --> 0:17:51.639
<v Speaker 3>the page reloads the first time, four thirty is still available,

0:17:52.040 --> 0:17:54.160
<v Speaker 3>Meaning if instead of going for seven thirty, I gone

0:17:54.160 --> 0:17:56.240
<v Speaker 3>for four to thirty initially as if it was my

0:17:56.359 --> 0:17:59.919
<v Speaker 3>first choice, she would have been able to cross French laundry,

0:18:00.040 --> 0:18:00.560
<v Speaker 3>the bucket list.

0:18:00.640 --> 0:18:01.000
<v Speaker 5>There you go.

0:18:01.560 --> 0:18:06.080
<v Speaker 2>Aside from the east coast West coast difference post pandemic,

0:18:06.680 --> 0:18:09.960
<v Speaker 2>My wife likes to point out that you use apps

0:18:10.000 --> 0:18:13.600
<v Speaker 2>like Open Table RESI, and she says six thirty is

0:18:13.600 --> 0:18:16.120
<v Speaker 2>the new seven thirty because everybody wants to get home

0:18:16.160 --> 0:18:19.119
<v Speaker 2>and stream whatever they're streaming. It's so different than it

0:18:19.200 --> 0:18:21.560
<v Speaker 2>was in the twenty tens. And I'm like, am I

0:18:21.640 --> 0:18:23.399
<v Speaker 2>just getting old? Are we going to start going to

0:18:23.400 --> 0:18:26.000
<v Speaker 2>the early bird specials? She's like, no, no one wants

0:18:26.000 --> 0:18:28.080
<v Speaker 2>to have dinner at ten, nine, ten o'clock at night.

0:18:28.400 --> 0:18:29.000
<v Speaker 4>I believe that.

0:18:29.080 --> 0:18:31.239
<v Speaker 3>And at the French laundry the meals take forever. So

0:18:31.280 --> 0:18:33.040
<v Speaker 3>getting out of there, you know, early.

0:18:32.920 --> 0:18:35.119
<v Speaker 2>For thirty gets you out at nine, ten and five, right,

0:18:35.560 --> 0:18:39.960
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely fascinating. Coming up, we continue our conversation with Judd Kessler,

0:18:40.320 --> 0:18:44.320
<v Speaker 2>Howard Mark's professor at the Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania,

0:18:44.520 --> 0:18:49.200
<v Speaker 2>discussing his new book, Lucky by Design, The Hidden Economics.

0:18:49.240 --> 0:18:52.640
<v Speaker 2>You need to get more of what you want. I'm

0:18:52.680 --> 0:18:55.920
<v Speaker 2>Barry Ridhelts. You're listening to Masters in Business.

0:18:55.840 --> 0:19:07.200
<v Speaker 5>On Bloomberg Radio.

0:19:08.240 --> 0:19:11.040
<v Speaker 2>I'm Barry Dults. You're listening to Masters in Business on

0:19:11.080 --> 0:19:14.560
<v Speaker 2>Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest this week is judde Kessler.

0:19:14.880 --> 0:19:18.480
<v Speaker 2>He is the Howard Marx Professor at the Wharton School

0:19:18.600 --> 0:19:22.040
<v Speaker 2>at the University of Pennsylvania. So I want to talk

0:19:22.160 --> 0:19:26.880
<v Speaker 2>about Lucky by Design. The book is really interesting. I'm

0:19:26.920 --> 0:19:31.240
<v Speaker 2>intrigued by how much of what we think of as

0:19:31.359 --> 0:19:36.639
<v Speaker 2>luck is really just the way allocation mechanisms have been

0:19:36.800 --> 0:19:43.879
<v Speaker 2>either well designed or poorly designed. Lotteries, waitlists, queues, scoring rules, algorithms,

0:19:43.960 --> 0:19:49.960
<v Speaker 2>norms explain this concept that luck by design may really

0:19:50.040 --> 0:19:52.439
<v Speaker 2>be based on some hidden economic rules.

0:19:52.720 --> 0:19:56.960
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so the way the markets operate, there's a set

0:19:57.000 --> 0:19:59.480
<v Speaker 3>of rules that decides who gets what. So we talked

0:19:59.520 --> 0:20:02.480
<v Speaker 3>about first come for serve races, but as you point out,

0:20:02.520 --> 0:20:06.440
<v Speaker 3>there's first come for serve waiting lists. There's lines, there

0:20:06.440 --> 0:20:10.119
<v Speaker 3>are lottery systems where you're putting your name in the

0:20:10.160 --> 0:20:13.240
<v Speaker 3>hat and we're pulling people out. And then they're centralized

0:20:13.280 --> 0:20:17.560
<v Speaker 3>clearing houses where you might rank your preferences over things

0:20:17.640 --> 0:20:19.879
<v Speaker 3>you want. And then there's some priorities or rules in

0:20:19.920 --> 0:20:24.160
<v Speaker 3>the background. And I have this sense that people look

0:20:24.200 --> 0:20:26.760
<v Speaker 3>at these systems and they don't have a framework for

0:20:26.880 --> 0:20:30.000
<v Speaker 3>thinking about them, and so when they participate in these markets,

0:20:30.800 --> 0:20:33.520
<v Speaker 3>they don't really realize they're doing so, and then the

0:20:33.560 --> 0:20:39.520
<v Speaker 3>outcomes seem like they're based on chance, or they try

0:20:39.560 --> 0:20:43.240
<v Speaker 3>to understand them and they struggle and they feel overwhelmed

0:20:43.280 --> 0:20:45.959
<v Speaker 3>and stressed out, and then play a strategy that might

0:20:46.000 --> 0:20:48.040
<v Speaker 3>not be right for them, and then they look around

0:20:48.080 --> 0:20:50.280
<v Speaker 3>and they think, oh, man, that person got what they

0:20:50.359 --> 0:20:51.800
<v Speaker 3>wanted I didn't.

0:20:52.200 --> 0:20:53.639
<v Speaker 4>They must have been lucky.

0:20:53.840 --> 0:20:56.320
<v Speaker 3>Because if you don't understand the system, then it all

0:20:56.359 --> 0:21:01.439
<v Speaker 3>seems like it's happening by chance. But by understanding the

0:21:01.520 --> 0:21:05.960
<v Speaker 3>rules that are applying in each market, you then can recognize, Okay,

0:21:05.960 --> 0:21:08.920
<v Speaker 3>this is a situation where it's a first come, first

0:21:08.960 --> 0:21:12.400
<v Speaker 3>serve waiting list. So I have to put my name

0:21:12.440 --> 0:21:14.480
<v Speaker 3>down early. Then I have to think about the strategy

0:21:14.520 --> 0:21:16.639
<v Speaker 3>I'm going to play when it's my turn. Do I

0:21:16.680 --> 0:21:19.199
<v Speaker 3>take what's offered to me? Do I keep waiting? And

0:21:19.280 --> 0:21:23.439
<v Speaker 3>you have a develop a framework for that. Even in

0:21:23.560 --> 0:21:26.720
<v Speaker 3>lottery allocations, which we often think of as being the

0:21:26.720 --> 0:21:30.480
<v Speaker 3>ones that are based entirely on chance. If you understand

0:21:30.560 --> 0:21:33.840
<v Speaker 3>the rules, you can develop strategies that help you do better.

0:21:34.640 --> 0:21:38.560
<v Speaker 3>So you want to go see a theater production, and

0:21:38.600 --> 0:21:41.560
<v Speaker 3>there's going to be a ticket lottery. You can go.

0:21:41.640 --> 0:21:44.600
<v Speaker 3>You can enter your name for two tickets. But maybe

0:21:44.720 --> 0:21:46.200
<v Speaker 3>you can bring your friend that you're going to go

0:21:46.240 --> 0:21:47.959
<v Speaker 3>see the show with or your partner, and you both enter.

0:21:48.040 --> 0:21:50.399
<v Speaker 3>Now you have twice as many chances. Maybe you get

0:21:50.640 --> 0:21:54.240
<v Speaker 3>a bunch of friends who work nearby to enter, maybe

0:21:54.280 --> 0:21:57.640
<v Speaker 3>it's online. They enter for you. If they lose, they lose,

0:21:57.680 --> 0:21:59.080
<v Speaker 3>but if they win, they come down to the theater,

0:21:59.160 --> 0:22:01.040
<v Speaker 3>pick up the tickets, give them to you. All of

0:22:01.080 --> 0:22:04.119
<v Speaker 3>a sudden, Now you've dramatically increased your chances of winning.

0:22:04.640 --> 0:22:09.280
<v Speaker 3>These are technically allowed. Often by the rules. Sometimes you

0:22:09.320 --> 0:22:12.280
<v Speaker 3>can enter a lottery in years you intend to lose,

0:22:12.480 --> 0:22:18.040
<v Speaker 3>because the system rewards you in subsequent years for prior losses.

0:22:18.080 --> 0:22:19.919
<v Speaker 3>It's trying to be fair over time, and so the

0:22:20.000 --> 0:22:23.760
<v Speaker 3>rules are if you have lost nine years in a row,

0:22:23.800 --> 0:22:26.440
<v Speaker 3>then in your tenth year, you'll get ten entries or

0:22:26.480 --> 0:22:29.480
<v Speaker 3>one hundred entries or a thousand entries relative to someone

0:22:29.520 --> 0:22:32.440
<v Speaker 3>who's entering for the first time. Or maybe you win

0:22:32.480 --> 0:22:34.760
<v Speaker 3>the lottery in a year you don't want to win,

0:22:34.800 --> 0:22:36.800
<v Speaker 3>and you defer what you get for a year, and

0:22:36.840 --> 0:22:39.840
<v Speaker 3>now you basically get to enter this year in the

0:22:39.880 --> 0:22:41.920
<v Speaker 3>hopes of deferring for next year, and if you lose

0:22:41.960 --> 0:22:43.720
<v Speaker 3>this year, you get to enter next year for the

0:22:43.840 --> 0:22:45.960
<v Speaker 3>chance of getting whatever it is next year.

0:22:46.080 --> 0:22:49.119
<v Speaker 2>So you've gone to school at Harvard and Cambridge, you

0:22:49.200 --> 0:22:54.440
<v Speaker 2>teach at University of Pennsylvania. When we look at college admissions,

0:22:55.560 --> 0:23:00.600
<v Speaker 2>that seems to be like a mess of everything, some

0:23:00.600 --> 0:23:05.520
<v Speaker 2>some skill, some checking the boxes, a little bit of lottery,

0:23:05.560 --> 0:23:08.360
<v Speaker 2>a little bit of early admission, first come, first serve.

0:23:09.119 --> 0:23:12.440
<v Speaker 2>What do you think of that entire college admission process?

0:23:12.840 --> 0:23:14.439
<v Speaker 2>What's driving that design?

0:23:14.600 --> 0:23:17.040
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so that is what I call a choose me market.

0:23:17.080 --> 0:23:20.000
<v Speaker 3>It's a two sided market where it's as you point out,

0:23:20.080 --> 0:23:22.400
<v Speaker 3>it's not as simple as any one rule. It's not

0:23:22.520 --> 0:23:24.879
<v Speaker 3>like whoever applies first to the school gets it or

0:23:24.880 --> 0:23:27.600
<v Speaker 3>they're going to totally pick people by lottery.

0:23:28.640 --> 0:23:31.880
<v Speaker 4>They have a strategic decision as an institution.

0:23:32.160 --> 0:23:34.360
<v Speaker 3>Maybe I should say we as an employee of one

0:23:34.359 --> 0:23:39.280
<v Speaker 3>of these institutions. But the features of a choose me market,

0:23:39.320 --> 0:23:42.119
<v Speaker 3>of a two sided market are that there are market

0:23:42.119 --> 0:23:46.040
<v Speaker 3>participants on both sides. So for college admissions, there's applicants

0:23:46.040 --> 0:23:48.239
<v Speaker 3>who are trying to get into the colleges, and then

0:23:48.240 --> 0:23:50.760
<v Speaker 3>there are colleges that are deciding who am I going

0:23:50.800 --> 0:23:55.960
<v Speaker 3>to admit. We're trying to make a class of smart, motivated,

0:23:57.280 --> 0:24:00.640
<v Speaker 3>well rounded or very pointy people who are gonna make

0:24:00.680 --> 0:24:05.879
<v Speaker 3>the class, you know, a rich, fun environment, and the

0:24:06.000 --> 0:24:09.159
<v Speaker 3>dynamics are about you know, are we both succeeding and

0:24:09.200 --> 0:24:12.720
<v Speaker 3>getting what we want? So I think the thing that

0:24:12.760 --> 0:24:15.520
<v Speaker 3>people think of is okay, is the candidates strong enough?

0:24:15.560 --> 0:24:18.240
<v Speaker 3>Do they have good enough grades, good enough SAT scores,

0:24:18.320 --> 0:24:22.520
<v Speaker 3>good enough extracurriculars. But something that we think less about

0:24:22.800 --> 0:24:25.480
<v Speaker 3>as an applicants say, because it requires thinking about the

0:24:25.480 --> 0:24:28.680
<v Speaker 3>other side of the market, is you know, how do

0:24:28.800 --> 0:24:32.119
<v Speaker 3>the universities or colleges feel about the applicants. Well, one

0:24:32.160 --> 0:24:37.720
<v Speaker 3>of the things that they value is high yield. We

0:24:37.800 --> 0:24:42.480
<v Speaker 3>want the people who we admit to enroll in our school.

0:24:42.520 --> 0:24:45.880
<v Speaker 3>We want them to matriculate. When I was applying to college,

0:24:46.400 --> 0:24:49.200
<v Speaker 3>that yield, the fraction of folks you admit who come

0:24:49.760 --> 0:24:52.000
<v Speaker 3>was in the US News and World Report rankings of

0:24:52.040 --> 0:24:56.200
<v Speaker 3>best colleges and universities. It's not anymore, but it's still

0:24:56.240 --> 0:24:58.480
<v Speaker 3>a matter of pride and reputation, because it's hard to

0:24:58.520 --> 0:24:59.960
<v Speaker 3>say you're one of the best schools in the CUNT

0:25:00.400 --> 0:25:02.400
<v Speaker 3>if you know half or two thirds of the people

0:25:02.400 --> 0:25:05.800
<v Speaker 3>you admit choose to go somewhere else. And so when

0:25:05.880 --> 0:25:10.040
<v Speaker 3>you mentioned early admissions, early decision or early action, that

0:25:10.240 --> 0:25:13.680
<v Speaker 3>is where this kind of yield question comes into play.

0:25:13.720 --> 0:25:16.720
<v Speaker 3>So the way that it works with early decision is

0:25:16.760 --> 0:25:20.320
<v Speaker 3>when you apply, say to pen where my employer early decision.

0:25:21.560 --> 0:25:23.760
<v Speaker 3>If you do that, you are committing to come if

0:25:23.760 --> 0:25:27.880
<v Speaker 3>we admit you. So that's great for our yield because

0:25:28.080 --> 0:25:32.800
<v Speaker 3>now you know you're guaranteed to come. And lots of

0:25:32.840 --> 0:25:37.400
<v Speaker 3>schools do this they have an early admission deadline. There's

0:25:37.440 --> 0:25:39.359
<v Speaker 3>also early action where you're not committing, but you can

0:25:39.440 --> 0:25:41.600
<v Speaker 3>only apply to one school early action, and so it

0:25:41.640 --> 0:25:43.719
<v Speaker 3>has similar properties where you're kind of giving up applying

0:25:43.760 --> 0:25:49.480
<v Speaker 3>elsewhere early. And the kind of deal is that emission

0:25:49.520 --> 0:25:53.200
<v Speaker 3>standards appear to be a little lighter, and so researchers

0:25:53.200 --> 0:25:56.439
<v Speaker 3>have estimated it's kind of worth about one hundred SAT

0:25:56.600 --> 0:25:58.919
<v Speaker 3>points if you apply early. It's kind of we're going

0:25:58.960 --> 0:26:00.880
<v Speaker 3>to where we like idea that you want to come.

0:26:00.920 --> 0:26:02.960
<v Speaker 3>We like that you're going to help us with our yield,

0:26:03.200 --> 0:26:06.159
<v Speaker 3>and so you know we're going to kind of be

0:26:06.359 --> 0:26:09.879
<v Speaker 3>more open to having you enter. Now I just say,

0:26:09.920 --> 0:26:11.480
<v Speaker 3>I don't work in the ad missions committee, so this

0:26:11.560 --> 0:26:13.240
<v Speaker 3>is right. This is as an outsider doing, you know,

0:26:13.280 --> 0:26:16.879
<v Speaker 3>looking at the research about it. But all of a sudden,

0:26:16.920 --> 0:26:19.680
<v Speaker 3>then it becomes a strategic decision as you as an applicant,

0:26:20.160 --> 0:26:25.080
<v Speaker 3>So you have one shot in the early decision game

0:26:25.600 --> 0:26:28.880
<v Speaker 3>where do you want to apply? We talked a little

0:26:28.880 --> 0:26:31.280
<v Speaker 3>bit about going for gold or settling for silver. Do

0:26:31.320 --> 0:26:32.720
<v Speaker 3>you go for the thing you really want, the seven

0:26:32.720 --> 0:26:35.399
<v Speaker 3>to thirty reservation at the hot restaurant, or do you

0:26:35.480 --> 0:26:37.960
<v Speaker 3>go for something there where there's less competition, like a

0:26:37.960 --> 0:26:42.800
<v Speaker 3>four to thirty and the early decision game, that strategy

0:26:42.920 --> 0:26:45.359
<v Speaker 3>that's settling for silver strategy might be a smart play

0:26:45.520 --> 0:26:49.720
<v Speaker 3>because if the place you really want to enroll, that

0:26:49.840 --> 0:26:52.600
<v Speaker 3>gold medal option for you is too far out of

0:26:52.600 --> 0:26:56.199
<v Speaker 3>reach that even if you apply early, you're you're not

0:26:56.240 --> 0:26:59.359
<v Speaker 3>going to hit that admission cutoff. Then you're essentially wasting

0:26:59.400 --> 0:27:03.040
<v Speaker 3>that application in that school, and you should be applying

0:27:03.040 --> 0:27:06.119
<v Speaker 3>instead to a place where if you applied early, you

0:27:06.119 --> 0:27:08.359
<v Speaker 3>would actually get in. But if you didn't apply early,

0:27:08.520 --> 0:27:10.119
<v Speaker 3>you wouldn't someplace where you're kind of.

0:27:10.119 --> 0:27:10.800
<v Speaker 4>More on the market.

0:27:10.840 --> 0:27:13.040
<v Speaker 2>That's a very narrow little slice. You have to figure

0:27:13.040 --> 0:27:15.439
<v Speaker 2>out exactly what your odds are.

0:27:15.359 --> 0:27:17.720
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, which you can do with research, with talking to

0:27:17.880 --> 0:27:20.120
<v Speaker 3>other people, you know, seeing you know, how does your

0:27:20.160 --> 0:27:22.600
<v Speaker 3>SAT score compare to the ones that are published on

0:27:22.640 --> 0:27:24.960
<v Speaker 3>the website. You know, the people who went to your

0:27:25.040 --> 0:27:27.400
<v Speaker 3>high school in prior years who succeeded in getting in.

0:27:28.640 --> 0:27:31.280
<v Speaker 3>What were their grades like, what were their extracurriculars like?

0:27:31.359 --> 0:27:33.480
<v Speaker 3>So you know when these when it matters for you,

0:27:33.520 --> 0:27:36.960
<v Speaker 3>the research that you do to figure out how to

0:27:36.960 --> 0:27:41.840
<v Speaker 3>succeed in these markets will inform what strategy you should play.

0:27:41.960 --> 0:27:45.159
<v Speaker 2>Huh, really interesting. Let's talk about the three e's. You

0:27:45.280 --> 0:27:50.120
<v Speaker 2>discuss what's equitable, efficient, and easy when people are designing

0:27:50.800 --> 0:27:54.320
<v Speaker 2>various types of market mechanisms. Give us a little overview

0:27:54.359 --> 0:27:56.359
<v Speaker 2>of that core framing device.

0:27:56.520 --> 0:27:56.800
<v Speaker 4>Yeah.

0:27:56.800 --> 0:28:01.719
<v Speaker 3>So the three e's are about how well a market operates,

0:28:01.800 --> 0:28:06.399
<v Speaker 3>So you mentioned them, efficiency, ease, and equity. Equity is

0:28:06.440 --> 0:28:10.480
<v Speaker 3>about fairness. It's about are we treating the market participants

0:28:11.200 --> 0:28:13.840
<v Speaker 3>equally if that's our goal, right, if we want everybody

0:28:13.880 --> 0:28:16.360
<v Speaker 3>to have an equal chance at getting the scarce resource

0:28:16.560 --> 0:28:21.040
<v Speaker 3>is our allocation mechanism, are our market rules allowing us

0:28:21.080 --> 0:28:24.640
<v Speaker 3>to do that. Efficiency is about making sure that we're

0:28:24.720 --> 0:28:29.200
<v Speaker 3>not wasting any scarce resources and whether the scarce resources

0:28:29.240 --> 0:28:31.280
<v Speaker 3>that we're giving out are being put to their best

0:28:31.280 --> 0:28:33.679
<v Speaker 3>possible use. So if there's someone who really wants something,

0:28:34.080 --> 0:28:37.840
<v Speaker 3>are we recognizing that and saying, oh, actually, as a society,

0:28:37.840 --> 0:28:40.280
<v Speaker 3>we're better off if we give that scarce resource to

0:28:40.040 --> 0:28:44.520
<v Speaker 3>that person. And then ease is the one that think

0:28:44.560 --> 0:28:48.160
<v Speaker 3>standard econ doesn't think that much about. And the reason

0:28:48.280 --> 0:28:53.000
<v Speaker 3>is that prices are easy to work with. You might

0:28:53.000 --> 0:28:54.400
<v Speaker 3>not love that you have to pay a lot of

0:28:54.400 --> 0:28:57.720
<v Speaker 3>money to buy something, but the actual process of buying

0:28:57.760 --> 0:29:00.880
<v Speaker 3>something in a market where price doing all the work

0:29:01.040 --> 0:29:03.800
<v Speaker 3>is trivial. You go to the website, you click a

0:29:03.840 --> 0:29:05.600
<v Speaker 3>button and you know the thing is shipped to you,

0:29:05.720 --> 0:29:07.640
<v Speaker 3>or you walk into a store you pay a price,

0:29:07.800 --> 0:29:11.200
<v Speaker 3>or you know, go online and execute some trade or

0:29:11.240 --> 0:29:12.640
<v Speaker 3>call your broker and do it.

0:29:12.640 --> 0:29:14.800
<v Speaker 4>It's very straightforward to work with prices.

0:29:15.280 --> 0:29:17.840
<v Speaker 2>So let's let's talk a little bit about one of

0:29:17.840 --> 0:29:21.960
<v Speaker 2>the most fascinating market mechanisms that's out there, which is

0:29:22.160 --> 0:29:26.320
<v Speaker 2>live performance tickets. You use the example of Taylor Swift,

0:29:26.320 --> 0:29:29.160
<v Speaker 2>who could have charged a whole lot more for her tour,

0:29:29.240 --> 0:29:32.800
<v Speaker 2>which still made billions of dollars, But lots of other

0:29:32.960 --> 0:29:38.320
<v Speaker 2>artists charge less than the market bears. Why do these

0:29:39.240 --> 0:29:43.160
<v Speaker 2>artists not go for you know, revenue maximizing. What's the

0:29:43.200 --> 0:29:43.880
<v Speaker 2>downside of that?

0:29:44.120 --> 0:29:48.160
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So I when I think about sellers designing, should

0:29:48.160 --> 0:29:51.240
<v Speaker 3>I set a price below the market clearing price? The

0:29:51.240 --> 0:29:53.400
<v Speaker 3>price that I would teach in my econ class is

0:29:54.160 --> 0:29:55.120
<v Speaker 3>going to be the best for them.

0:29:55.320 --> 0:29:58.280
<v Speaker 2>Here's the price, here's the demand. Where that intersects is

0:29:58.880 --> 0:30:01.680
<v Speaker 2>the profit maximize? But they don't do that.

0:30:01.800 --> 0:30:03.880
<v Speaker 3>So before we get to Taylor Swift, let's think about

0:30:03.880 --> 0:30:06.400
<v Speaker 3>the restaurant that is letting there be a line around

0:30:06.400 --> 0:30:10.480
<v Speaker 3>the block, or the fad product that is making it

0:30:10.520 --> 0:30:13.560
<v Speaker 3>hard to get access to their you know, to what

0:30:13.600 --> 0:30:16.520
<v Speaker 3>they're selling. In those cases, I think one of the

0:30:16.560 --> 0:30:20.160
<v Speaker 3>reasons is to bolster future demand. I see a line

0:30:20.200 --> 0:30:22.520
<v Speaker 3>around the block for a restaurant I walk by. I

0:30:22.600 --> 0:30:24.440
<v Speaker 3>might have never heard of the restaurant before, but I

0:30:24.480 --> 0:30:26.720
<v Speaker 3>look and I think, oh man, that restaurant must be

0:30:26.720 --> 0:30:27.160
<v Speaker 3>really good.

0:30:27.240 --> 0:30:28.080
<v Speaker 4>Look at that line.

0:30:29.160 --> 0:30:33.960
<v Speaker 3>That might mean that I get turned into a future customer,

0:30:34.080 --> 0:30:36.040
<v Speaker 3>or at least somebody who's interested in going when the

0:30:36.080 --> 0:30:37.200
<v Speaker 3>line might be a little shorter.

0:30:37.440 --> 0:30:41.880
<v Speaker 2>Lots of buzz, lots of pr just by the virtue

0:30:41.960 --> 0:30:45.400
<v Speaker 2>that it looks like more people want a limited scarce restart.

0:30:45.240 --> 0:30:48.280
<v Speaker 3>Correct, and that we see that, you know, throughout with

0:30:48.360 --> 0:30:51.600
<v Speaker 3>lots of fad products or with you know, scarcity driving

0:30:51.680 --> 0:30:54.440
<v Speaker 3>interest in demand. Now, I don't think Taylor Swift has

0:30:54.480 --> 0:30:56.160
<v Speaker 3>to do that. I think we all know who she is.

0:30:56.560 --> 0:31:01.160
<v Speaker 3>Her fans are famously loyal, and she, you know, doesn't

0:31:01.160 --> 0:31:04.920
<v Speaker 3>have to worry so much about getting more people to

0:31:04.960 --> 0:31:07.280
<v Speaker 3>be interested in her as an artist, so she might

0:31:07.360 --> 0:31:11.440
<v Speaker 3>have other considerations. She might think more about the equity

0:31:11.800 --> 0:31:15.000
<v Speaker 3>and the efficiency of the allocation of her scarce resource.

0:31:15.400 --> 0:31:19.040
<v Speaker 3>And you know, one reason she might not charge very

0:31:19.120 --> 0:31:22.320
<v Speaker 3>high prices, which might be you know, hundreds of dollars

0:31:22.320 --> 0:31:25.040
<v Speaker 3>for the cheapest ticket and thousands for the kind of

0:31:25.040 --> 0:31:28.960
<v Speaker 3>closer to the stage seats, is that she's a billionaire.

0:31:29.520 --> 0:31:30.360
<v Speaker 4>Her swifties.

0:31:31.040 --> 0:31:33.360
<v Speaker 3>I'm sure she has billionaire fans because she's such a

0:31:33.400 --> 0:31:36.680
<v Speaker 3>great artist, But most of her fans, a few thousand

0:31:36.720 --> 0:31:38.600
<v Speaker 3>dollars is going to be a big chunk of their

0:31:39.440 --> 0:31:43.400
<v Speaker 3>income for that month or more, and so it might

0:31:43.400 --> 0:31:45.720
<v Speaker 3>not be a great look if she's charging what would

0:31:45.760 --> 0:31:48.520
<v Speaker 3>be market clearing prices. So for the Eras tour, she

0:31:48.640 --> 0:31:51.720
<v Speaker 3>charges forty nine dollars for the cheapest seats. The average

0:31:51.800 --> 0:31:55.720
<v Speaker 3>ticket price was just above two hundred and so at

0:31:55.720 --> 0:31:59.160
<v Speaker 3>those prices, you know there's going to be massive access demand.

0:32:00.120 --> 0:32:02.800
<v Speaker 3>She might think that that's more fair that that might be,

0:32:02.920 --> 0:32:04.720
<v Speaker 3>you know, not just because it will make her look bad,

0:32:04.720 --> 0:32:07.520
<v Speaker 3>but also she might want her fans to be able

0:32:07.560 --> 0:32:11.040
<v Speaker 3>to come and only have to pay forty nine or

0:32:11.120 --> 0:32:13.920
<v Speaker 3>ninety nine or one hundred and ninety nine dollars. It

0:32:14.000 --> 0:32:17.520
<v Speaker 3>might also be that those folks really really want to go.

0:32:17.560 --> 0:32:20.640
<v Speaker 3>So you think about efficiency, there's no guarantee that the

0:32:20.640 --> 0:32:24.440
<v Speaker 3>person who can pay the most actually values going to

0:32:24.520 --> 0:32:28.800
<v Speaker 3>the concert the most. If her biggest fans have less

0:32:28.800 --> 0:32:32.960
<v Speaker 3>income than you know, the fans who can pay more,

0:32:33.880 --> 0:32:38.080
<v Speaker 3>they're going to get pushed out. Whenever the market is

0:32:38.080 --> 0:32:39.920
<v Speaker 3>relying exclusively on price, you.

0:32:39.920 --> 0:32:43.800
<v Speaker 2>End up with a series of rentiers and middlemen that

0:32:44.400 --> 0:32:49.520
<v Speaker 2>arguably contribute nothing positive to society and just exact a cost.

0:32:49.560 --> 0:32:51.600
<v Speaker 2>In the book, I don't remember was it the UK

0:32:52.120 --> 0:32:56.560
<v Speaker 2>or Europe EU that they banned places like stub hub

0:32:56.600 --> 0:32:58.920
<v Speaker 2>and those sort of ticket middlemen.

0:32:59.120 --> 0:32:59.320
<v Speaker 4>Yeah.

0:32:59.360 --> 0:33:03.200
<v Speaker 3>So this is one of the super interesting things about

0:33:03.480 --> 0:33:08.080
<v Speaker 3>these hidden markets is that whenever you are giving folks

0:33:08.160 --> 0:33:11.520
<v Speaker 3>access to a scarce resource at a below market price

0:33:11.640 --> 0:33:15.880
<v Speaker 3>and there is the opportunity to resell it, you will

0:33:15.920 --> 0:33:20.200
<v Speaker 3>get middleman. You will get speculators or brokers who come

0:33:20.240 --> 0:33:25.400
<v Speaker 3>in exclusively to try to extract surplus from the fact

0:33:25.400 --> 0:33:29.360
<v Speaker 3>that the market is letting the price kind of be low.

0:33:29.560 --> 0:33:30.040
<v Speaker 4>Initially.

0:33:31.480 --> 0:33:33.440
<v Speaker 3>Now there are economists who say, oh, that's how it's

0:33:33.440 --> 0:33:35.640
<v Speaker 3>supposed to work, We're supposed to get to market clearing prices.

0:33:35.680 --> 0:33:38.080
<v Speaker 4>But that's not what I.

0:33:38.120 --> 0:33:42.000
<v Speaker 3>Argue, because the seller has decided that she, in this case,

0:33:42.120 --> 0:33:46.360
<v Speaker 3>wants to keep the price low. She wants people, regular

0:33:46.400 --> 0:33:48.320
<v Speaker 3>people to be able to buy for forty nine ninety

0:33:48.360 --> 0:33:53.080
<v Speaker 3>nine hundred nine ninety dollars. So the middleman becomes a

0:33:53.160 --> 0:33:56.520
<v Speaker 3>problem that the market has to address. One way to

0:33:56.560 --> 0:34:00.000
<v Speaker 3>do that is ban resale. But then you get situations

0:34:00.160 --> 0:34:05.719
<v Speaker 3>where this was the London Olympics, where there were seats

0:34:05.760 --> 0:34:08.600
<v Speaker 3>that were empty to see some of the events, when

0:34:08.640 --> 0:34:11.879
<v Speaker 3>there are people standing outside the stadium who would desperately

0:34:12.200 --> 0:34:14.600
<v Speaker 3>want to get in, but because there's no way for

0:34:14.680 --> 0:34:17.640
<v Speaker 3>the tickets to be redistributed. Know, you end up with

0:34:17.680 --> 0:34:19.759
<v Speaker 3>empty seats, which is clearly inefficient.

0:34:19.840 --> 0:34:22.840
<v Speaker 2>Well, you could redistribute them at a ten percent markup

0:34:22.960 --> 0:34:25.960
<v Speaker 2>or something like that. So there's only once you can't

0:34:26.000 --> 0:34:26.799
<v Speaker 2>just go ten ten ten.

0:34:27.280 --> 0:34:29.319
<v Speaker 3>So this is the question is you know, how do

0:34:29.400 --> 0:34:31.319
<v Speaker 3>we innovate in this market? So in the book, I

0:34:31.320 --> 0:34:32.919
<v Speaker 3>have some ideas about how to do it. I think

0:34:33.000 --> 0:34:36.240
<v Speaker 3>one key problem with how a lot of live event

0:34:36.280 --> 0:34:39.919
<v Speaker 3>tickets are being allocated is that they're relying on first come,

0:34:39.920 --> 0:34:44.319
<v Speaker 3>first serve. First come, first serve races is the way

0:34:44.360 --> 0:34:46.959
<v Speaker 3>that we do it on the internet now, and that

0:34:47.640 --> 0:34:52.200
<v Speaker 3>allows the ticket brokers to program bots that will race

0:34:52.400 --> 0:34:57.359
<v Speaker 3>faster than any human can, and that is going to

0:34:57.400 --> 0:35:00.440
<v Speaker 3>mean that the folks who are building the bots with

0:35:00.480 --> 0:35:03.280
<v Speaker 3>the intention of getting a bunch of tickets and reselling

0:35:03.360 --> 0:35:06.560
<v Speaker 3>them are going to be at an advantage and be

0:35:06.600 --> 0:35:11.680
<v Speaker 3>able to extract surplus. The FTC sued Ticketmaster a few

0:35:11.680 --> 0:35:16.800
<v Speaker 3>months ago about this issue, basically letting their b bots

0:35:16.840 --> 0:35:18.399
<v Speaker 3>on the platform that extract.

0:35:18.040 --> 0:35:20.480
<v Speaker 2>Loading their own bots that then resell at higher price.

0:35:20.719 --> 0:35:22.400
<v Speaker 3>Well, this is part of the problem, which is the

0:35:23.719 --> 0:35:27.480
<v Speaker 3>secondary market platforms, the ones that are facilitating the trades

0:35:27.520 --> 0:35:31.239
<v Speaker 3>between the brokers or regular people who buy tickets, but

0:35:31.280 --> 0:35:34.240
<v Speaker 3>then you can't go and have to resell them. Those

0:35:34.640 --> 0:35:39.160
<v Speaker 3>platforms are benefiting from the sales. They get hefty fees.

0:35:39.200 --> 0:35:42.960
<v Speaker 3>I bought tickets recently, and my calculation was that Ticketmaster,

0:35:43.040 --> 0:35:45.759
<v Speaker 3>where I was reselling them, I was buying them and

0:35:45.800 --> 0:35:48.359
<v Speaker 3>then I had friends who canceled how to resell them,

0:35:48.719 --> 0:35:51.200
<v Speaker 3>was getting thirty percent of the transaction.

0:35:51.239 --> 0:35:54.520
<v Speaker 2>Probably you would think the artists would be the one

0:35:54.560 --> 0:35:59.759
<v Speaker 2>that should garner those gains. I've heard I love the

0:36:00.080 --> 0:36:04.080
<v Speaker 2>Russian crypto is a solution in search of a problem.

0:36:04.440 --> 0:36:06.880
<v Speaker 2>One would imagine that if the tickets and I'm not

0:36:07.120 --> 0:36:11.040
<v Speaker 2>a you know, bitcoin bro, but if you could sell

0:36:11.040 --> 0:36:13.920
<v Speaker 2>tickets on the blockchain, and there's a smart contract built

0:36:13.920 --> 0:36:17.040
<v Speaker 2>into that that the artist gets half of the resale price,

0:36:17.760 --> 0:36:19.640
<v Speaker 2>it changes dynamics there a lot.

0:36:19.760 --> 0:36:20.360
<v Speaker 4>So you could do that.

0:36:20.400 --> 0:36:23.120
<v Speaker 3>But of course, if the artists wanted more, they could

0:36:23.160 --> 0:36:25.839
<v Speaker 3>just raise the prices. Right, they don't need they don't

0:36:25.840 --> 0:36:29.600
<v Speaker 3>need the resale market to extract that surplus. Right the

0:36:29.640 --> 0:36:31.399
<v Speaker 3>what I describe in the book, it doesn't You don't

0:36:31.440 --> 0:36:33.719
<v Speaker 3>need to go all the way to the blockchain for it.

0:36:34.080 --> 0:36:38.879
<v Speaker 3>You do need names on tickets, meaning really yeah, because.

0:36:38.719 --> 0:36:40.799
<v Speaker 2>Right, so it's ticket and ID not just as.

0:36:41.360 --> 0:36:43.560
<v Speaker 3>But yeah, and it seems complicated because then it's like, oh,

0:36:43.560 --> 0:36:44.920
<v Speaker 3>I'm going to the it's like going to the airport.

0:36:44.960 --> 0:36:46.080
<v Speaker 3>I don't want to go to a concert to be

0:36:46.120 --> 0:36:48.520
<v Speaker 3>like going to an airport. Although last concert I went

0:36:48.560 --> 0:36:51.200
<v Speaker 3>to had to go through security anyway detector.

0:36:50.880 --> 0:36:52.920
<v Speaker 2>Of Madison Square Garden for a Knix game.

0:36:52.920 --> 0:36:55.759
<v Speaker 3>So exactly. But but no, your phone can identify who

0:36:55.760 --> 0:36:58.120
<v Speaker 3>you are. If I tap my tickets through my phone, right,

0:36:58.200 --> 0:37:00.760
<v Speaker 3>it can validate who I am. Facial recognition is getting

0:37:00.840 --> 0:37:05.440
<v Speaker 3>very good, and so you know, there's clear the service

0:37:05.480 --> 0:37:08.120
<v Speaker 3>you use at the airport, if that's something you've subscribed to,

0:37:08.239 --> 0:37:11.800
<v Speaker 3>they have similar style products that get.

0:37:11.719 --> 0:37:13.080
<v Speaker 4>Used at venues.

0:37:13.600 --> 0:37:15.960
<v Speaker 3>Major League Baseball has had a version of this that

0:37:16.000 --> 0:37:20.239
<v Speaker 3>they rolled out at some point. And so validating that

0:37:20.280 --> 0:37:23.120
<v Speaker 3>you are named on the ticket is easy to do

0:37:23.880 --> 0:37:24.720
<v Speaker 3>or getting easier.

0:37:25.400 --> 0:37:27.040
<v Speaker 4>If you don't have.

0:37:26.960 --> 0:37:31.239
<v Speaker 3>That, then you could put some cap on resale, but

0:37:31.360 --> 0:37:34.600
<v Speaker 3>then you know, it doesn't. Nothing stops anybody if they

0:37:34.600 --> 0:37:38.160
<v Speaker 3>have a physical ticket from doing what used to happen,

0:37:38.160 --> 0:37:40.480
<v Speaker 3>which is standing you know, outside the venue and selling

0:37:40.520 --> 0:37:43.240
<v Speaker 3>them or or selling them on some third party platform

0:37:43.239 --> 0:37:47.359
<v Speaker 3>that's not tracking how much more the ticket is you know,

0:37:47.400 --> 0:37:50.000
<v Speaker 3>being paid for right if it's in cash, there's no

0:37:50.040 --> 0:37:51.640
<v Speaker 3>way to validate that it's only ten percent.

0:37:52.360 --> 0:37:53.719
<v Speaker 4>And then the other thing you have to do, and

0:37:53.719 --> 0:37:54.520
<v Speaker 4>this is trickier.

0:37:55.120 --> 0:37:59.120
<v Speaker 3>It is a different type of change is get away

0:37:59.120 --> 0:38:02.560
<v Speaker 3>from first comfort because even if you have names on tickets,

0:38:02.960 --> 0:38:05.960
<v Speaker 3>but you're doing a first comfort serve race, the folks

0:38:06.000 --> 0:38:08.520
<v Speaker 3>who program the fastest bots are still going to be

0:38:08.560 --> 0:38:10.200
<v Speaker 3>able to extract surplus.

0:38:10.280 --> 0:38:15.120
<v Speaker 2>So could someone like Taylor Swift with an army of Swifties. Hey,

0:38:15.239 --> 0:38:18.520
<v Speaker 2>sign up here and it's two tickets per name, and

0:38:18.600 --> 0:38:21.520
<v Speaker 2>you have to be in their system for that long.

0:38:21.640 --> 0:38:24.560
<v Speaker 2>And so at least what is Madison Square Garden twenty

0:38:24.600 --> 0:38:27.840
<v Speaker 2>five thousand people? At least the first ten thousand tickets

0:38:28.080 --> 0:38:30.319
<v Speaker 2>are going to go to local people who are her

0:38:30.400 --> 0:38:30.919
<v Speaker 2>fan base.

0:38:31.080 --> 0:38:34.879
<v Speaker 3>So for the aristour that we started talking about, they

0:38:34.920 --> 0:38:40.840
<v Speaker 3>did something similar where they did a verified fan process.

0:38:40.880 --> 0:38:42.680
<v Speaker 3>We had a validate who you were, and then folks

0:38:42.760 --> 0:38:47.040
<v Speaker 3>came to the website if they were lucky enough to

0:38:47.360 --> 0:38:49.480
<v Speaker 3>after being verified, to win a lot. So they're still

0:38:49.520 --> 0:38:53.480
<v Speaker 3>a lottery, still a lottery. But then then fair lottery

0:38:53.520 --> 0:38:57.480
<v Speaker 3>among people that they thought were real folks rather than brokers,

0:38:58.160 --> 0:39:01.080
<v Speaker 3>and then you had to wait in a virtual queue

0:39:01.120 --> 0:39:04.440
<v Speaker 3>and wait for some people hours. So what ended up

0:39:04.440 --> 0:39:06.879
<v Speaker 3>happening was they claimed there were a lot of bot

0:39:06.920 --> 0:39:11.160
<v Speaker 3>attacks trying people that didn't have the verified fan code

0:39:11.160 --> 0:39:13.400
<v Speaker 3>that they needed to buy. The tickets were coming and

0:39:13.480 --> 0:39:15.960
<v Speaker 3>the systems ground to a halt and they crash and

0:39:15.960 --> 0:39:17.680
<v Speaker 3>people were waiting for hours, and so all of a

0:39:17.719 --> 0:39:19.840
<v Speaker 3>sudden you had to first come for a serve line

0:39:19.960 --> 0:39:22.560
<v Speaker 3>built into the system that was supposed to be a lottery,

0:39:23.000 --> 0:39:25.600
<v Speaker 3>where now you're going through an ordeal. We talked about,

0:39:25.640 --> 0:39:27.839
<v Speaker 3>you know, is the market easy. It's not easy. If

0:39:27.880 --> 0:39:30.240
<v Speaker 3>you have to wait online in front of your computer

0:39:30.320 --> 0:39:33.719
<v Speaker 3>for hours, it's almost as painful as having to wait

0:39:33.760 --> 0:39:36.080
<v Speaker 3>outside the box office, which we used to do for hours.

0:39:36.560 --> 0:39:39.279
<v Speaker 3>And so, you know, I think the solution is to

0:39:39.320 --> 0:39:43.080
<v Speaker 3>actually lean more on the lottery and basically say, look,

0:39:43.760 --> 0:39:46.000
<v Speaker 3>at some point, we're just going to have you put

0:39:46.000 --> 0:39:48.560
<v Speaker 3>your name in, say what your preferences are, what shows

0:39:48.600 --> 0:39:51.080
<v Speaker 3>you want to see her perform at, which sections you'd

0:39:51.080 --> 0:39:53.560
<v Speaker 3>be willing to buy tickets for, and you're going to

0:39:53.640 --> 0:39:55.759
<v Speaker 3>enter yourself in and we will tell you whether you won,

0:39:56.480 --> 0:39:57.759
<v Speaker 3>but you don't have to be there and pick the

0:39:57.800 --> 0:39:58.840
<v Speaker 3>specific seats.

0:39:59.200 --> 0:39:59.359
<v Speaker 4>Right.

0:39:59.360 --> 0:40:00.799
<v Speaker 3>You can say I want, I prefer to be in

0:40:00.800 --> 0:40:02.480
<v Speaker 3>the center, and I'm willing to pay more whatever. But

0:40:03.360 --> 0:40:06.800
<v Speaker 3>that would make the participation in the market way easier.

0:40:07.200 --> 0:40:09.840
<v Speaker 3>You could run, you know, whole tours or sections of

0:40:09.880 --> 0:40:13.440
<v Speaker 3>tours at once. You could reward folks who are more flexible.

0:40:13.480 --> 0:40:16.080
<v Speaker 3>If I'm willing to see Taylor Swift perform at any

0:40:16.200 --> 0:40:19.319
<v Speaker 3>venue you know on the East Coast, and I'll go

0:40:19.360 --> 0:40:21.839
<v Speaker 3>to any show and sit in any section, i am

0:40:21.960 --> 0:40:25.440
<v Speaker 3>revealing myself to be a very big swiftye that.

0:40:25.400 --> 0:40:27.600
<v Speaker 2>There is more a broker that wants to flip the ticket.

0:40:27.719 --> 0:40:29.560
<v Speaker 3>Well, but if the names are on it, then I'm

0:40:29.600 --> 0:40:31.640
<v Speaker 3>stuck if I have to return it. If I can't go,

0:40:31.719 --> 0:40:33.560
<v Speaker 3>I have to return it to the you know, to

0:40:33.600 --> 0:40:35.680
<v Speaker 3>Swift and she can give it to somebody on the waitlist,

0:40:36.280 --> 0:40:38.720
<v Speaker 3>but on the randomized waitlist, right like, you could design

0:40:38.800 --> 0:40:42.760
<v Speaker 3>the system to basically cut out the brokers altogether.

0:40:42.840 --> 0:40:45.880
<v Speaker 2>So the craziest thing about the brokers in the US,

0:40:46.280 --> 0:40:50.359
<v Speaker 2>I heard stories from several people who said, rather than

0:40:50.480 --> 0:40:53.719
<v Speaker 2>pay the markup in the US, it was cheaper to

0:40:53.880 --> 0:40:58.600
<v Speaker 2>secure tickets in Paris or London, fly over there, stay

0:40:58.600 --> 0:41:00.799
<v Speaker 2>in a hotel for a few days, go to the

0:41:00.840 --> 0:41:03.720
<v Speaker 2>show and go home. That was less expensive than paying

0:41:03.760 --> 0:41:07.120
<v Speaker 2>full boat to any of the seat geeks. Stub hub

0:41:07.520 --> 0:41:10.319
<v Speaker 2>middlemen that you know they charge with the market, will back.

0:41:10.360 --> 0:41:12.040
<v Speaker 3>They charge with the market, will bear. They don't add

0:41:12.040 --> 0:41:14.719
<v Speaker 3>anything to the production. And yeah it could be you know,

0:41:14.760 --> 0:41:16.480
<v Speaker 3>and you get a vacation out of it. You go

0:41:16.520 --> 0:41:17.600
<v Speaker 3>to Paris to see the show.

0:41:17.920 --> 0:41:21.480
<v Speaker 2>Coming up, we continue our conversation with Judd Kessler, professor

0:41:21.520 --> 0:41:25.240
<v Speaker 2>at the Wharton School, discussing Lucky by Design The Hidden

0:41:25.280 --> 0:41:27.920
<v Speaker 2>Economics You Need to Get More of what you Want.

0:41:28.320 --> 0:41:31.759
<v Speaker 2>I'm Barry Ridults. You're listening to Masters in Business on

0:41:31.880 --> 0:41:48.719
<v Speaker 2>Bloomberg Radio. I'm Burry Redults. You're listening to Masters in

0:41:48.760 --> 0:41:51.759
<v Speaker 2>Business on Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest this week

0:41:51.800 --> 0:41:56.040
<v Speaker 2>is Professor Judd Kessler. He teaches behavioral economics and market

0:41:56.080 --> 0:42:00.239
<v Speaker 2>design at the Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania. His

0:42:00.280 --> 0:42:03.800
<v Speaker 2>new book, Lucky by Design, The Hidden Economics You Need

0:42:03.960 --> 0:42:06.240
<v Speaker 2>to Get More of what you Want is out now.

0:42:06.960 --> 0:42:09.440
<v Speaker 2>So let's talk a little bit about some things that

0:42:09.480 --> 0:42:15.400
<v Speaker 2>are lucky by Design. One of the things that slightly

0:42:15.440 --> 0:42:20.400
<v Speaker 2>before my time but certainly resonated was what took place

0:42:21.040 --> 0:42:25.600
<v Speaker 2>during Vietnam with the draft lottery. Some of the data

0:42:25.840 --> 0:42:29.480
<v Speaker 2>was pretty shocking. At the time African Americans made up

0:42:29.520 --> 0:42:33.120
<v Speaker 2>eleven percent of the population, they were twenty two percent

0:42:33.160 --> 0:42:37.880
<v Speaker 2>of the people that were drafted and twenty two percent

0:42:37.880 --> 0:42:43.040
<v Speaker 2>of the casualties, two x the representative population. Why did

0:42:43.080 --> 0:42:44.479
<v Speaker 2>that go down that way?

0:42:44.960 --> 0:42:48.359
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So the situation that arises when you have these

0:42:48.400 --> 0:42:51.479
<v Speaker 3>hidden markets is whoever's in charge of the market gets

0:42:51.520 --> 0:42:56.040
<v Speaker 3>to pick the rules, and they might not be equitable

0:42:56.120 --> 0:43:02.440
<v Speaker 3>or efficient or easy. And the Vietnam draft, before the lottery,

0:43:02.480 --> 0:43:06.160
<v Speaker 3>which was introduced to kind of correct some of these issues,

0:43:07.320 --> 0:43:09.680
<v Speaker 3>had a bunch of loopholes in them. In the system,

0:43:09.800 --> 0:43:12.880
<v Speaker 3>so you could get a deferment for various reasons. You

0:43:12.920 --> 0:43:16.080
<v Speaker 3>could have some of your friends or family members, lobby

0:43:16.080 --> 0:43:19.040
<v Speaker 3>folks on the local draft boards that were going to

0:43:19.120 --> 0:43:22.600
<v Speaker 3>decide which men of that age were going to be

0:43:22.640 --> 0:43:23.040
<v Speaker 3>sent to be.

0:43:23.080 --> 0:43:25.440
<v Speaker 2>So if you were politically connected, you had a better shot.

0:43:25.520 --> 0:43:31.000
<v Speaker 3>Politically connected, wealthier, wider. Those were the things that let folks.

0:43:30.719 --> 0:43:34.160
<v Speaker 2>So you could have a medical disability, you could be

0:43:34.200 --> 0:43:36.200
<v Speaker 2>in college or grad school you.

0:43:36.120 --> 0:43:38.000
<v Speaker 4>Could go to the National Guard, so you would be

0:43:38.160 --> 0:43:38.880
<v Speaker 4>kind of stay.

0:43:38.640 --> 0:43:42.360
<v Speaker 2>Staty, and not everybody gets gets admitted to the National Guard.

0:43:42.200 --> 0:43:46.560
<v Speaker 3>Correct, So having a kind of way to circumvent what

0:43:46.600 --> 0:43:51.719
<v Speaker 3>would have been the task of going overseas. The loopholes

0:43:51.760 --> 0:43:54.399
<v Speaker 3>were kind of played by a few, and a bunch

0:43:54.400 --> 0:43:57.480
<v Speaker 3>of folks did not either have the means or have

0:43:57.560 --> 0:44:00.319
<v Speaker 3>the connections or kind of know that this was a

0:44:00.320 --> 0:44:01.680
<v Speaker 3>way out.

0:44:01.719 --> 0:44:05.840
<v Speaker 2>Did the lottery, And I learned a lot more than

0:44:05.880 --> 0:44:08.360
<v Speaker 2>I knew about it in the book. So they just

0:44:08.520 --> 0:44:11.760
<v Speaker 2>randomly picked birth dates, your month and day of birth,

0:44:12.239 --> 0:44:14.480
<v Speaker 2>and that was the order in which people were drafted.

0:44:14.880 --> 0:44:17.839
<v Speaker 2>How did that impact how things? Yeah, so they see

0:44:18.040 --> 0:44:19.640
<v Speaker 2>they did have the desired effects.

0:44:19.680 --> 0:44:21.400
<v Speaker 3>Well, I mean it had the desired effect. There were

0:44:21.440 --> 0:44:23.880
<v Speaker 3>still loopholes that you could use to get out of service,

0:44:23.920 --> 0:44:26.279
<v Speaker 3>but it had the desired effect of three hundred and

0:44:26.320 --> 0:44:30.000
<v Speaker 3>sixty six possible birth dates, including February twenty ninth, because

0:44:30.239 --> 0:44:32.680
<v Speaker 3>you didn't want to leave those folks out. You know,

0:44:32.719 --> 0:44:35.560
<v Speaker 3>they got pulled in order, they randomly when at a time,

0:44:35.719 --> 0:44:38.560
<v Speaker 3>and then the way the lottery worked was they were

0:44:38.680 --> 0:44:40.400
<v Speaker 3>just called down the number. So folks who were old

0:44:40.480 --> 0:44:43.000
<v Speaker 3>enough to remember this. At my father's generation, this was

0:44:43.040 --> 0:44:46.000
<v Speaker 3>a big deal and you know you wanted to have

0:44:46.080 --> 0:44:49.400
<v Speaker 3>a later you have your birth date picked later, so

0:44:49.440 --> 0:44:53.200
<v Speaker 3>you were less likely to be called now again, still loopholes.

0:44:53.320 --> 0:44:56.880
<v Speaker 3>But folks looking back history, you know, at history, say

0:44:57.239 --> 0:45:00.920
<v Speaker 3>this helped facilitate the anti war movement and that eventually

0:45:00.920 --> 0:45:04.120
<v Speaker 3>got the US out of Southeast Asia. Because when you

0:45:04.239 --> 0:45:07.880
<v Speaker 3>have well educated, wealthier kind of folks who have a

0:45:07.880 --> 0:45:12.920
<v Speaker 3>little bit more socioeconomic status, a little more power in society,

0:45:13.280 --> 0:45:17.200
<v Speaker 3>when their sons started getting called up and you know

0:45:17.239 --> 0:45:19.080
<v Speaker 3>this was a fair system and so it was harder

0:45:19.120 --> 0:45:23.000
<v Speaker 3>to get out. Then you saw a bunch more kind

0:45:23.040 --> 0:45:26.239
<v Speaker 3>of influential folks saying, no, no, this is not a war

0:45:26.280 --> 0:45:27.879
<v Speaker 3>we want to be in for the long term.

0:45:27.960 --> 0:45:28.160
<v Speaker 4>Huh.

0:45:28.280 --> 0:45:31.719
<v Speaker 2>Really really interesting. Let's talk about the area that you

0:45:31.760 --> 0:45:36.520
<v Speaker 2>spent so much of your career on, which is organ donation,

0:45:36.800 --> 0:45:41.600
<v Speaker 2>and what those rules look like. To start, I have

0:45:41.719 --> 0:45:45.480
<v Speaker 2>to ask about the numbers. There are one hundred thousand

0:45:45.480 --> 0:45:50.640
<v Speaker 2>Americans on an organ waiting list, organ transplant waiting list.

0:45:51.080 --> 0:45:54.000
<v Speaker 2>I was shocked to read of that one hundred thousand,

0:45:54.320 --> 0:45:56.080
<v Speaker 2>ninety percent or waiting for a kidney.

0:45:56.120 --> 0:45:56.960
<v Speaker 5>That's amazing.

0:45:57.320 --> 0:46:00.799
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean, so the reason for that is that

0:46:01.360 --> 0:46:03.319
<v Speaker 3>there is dialysis.

0:46:02.560 --> 0:46:04.759
<v Speaker 5>For kidney fails, which can keep you alive.

0:46:04.520 --> 0:46:08.000
<v Speaker 3>For five or more years. I mean, you want to

0:46:08.000 --> 0:46:11.480
<v Speaker 3>get a kidney as soon as possible. Dialysis is time intensive,

0:46:11.520 --> 0:46:15.279
<v Speaker 3>it's painful, it's expensive, although the cost is borne by

0:46:15.320 --> 0:46:19.800
<v Speaker 3>Medicare primarily after a certain number of months that your insurance,

0:46:20.080 --> 0:46:22.720
<v Speaker 3>your private insurance covers it and then it gets handed

0:46:22.719 --> 0:46:25.319
<v Speaker 3>off to Medicare. So there's a lot of costs that

0:46:25.360 --> 0:46:27.080
<v Speaker 3>go into it. But of course, if you don't have

0:46:27.160 --> 0:46:31.400
<v Speaker 3>a kidney that you can get as a recipient, if

0:46:31.400 --> 0:46:34.000
<v Speaker 3>there isn't a donor kidney available, this is your only option.

0:46:34.440 --> 0:46:37.400
<v Speaker 3>But this is why the waiting list for kidneys is

0:46:37.440 --> 0:46:40.040
<v Speaker 3>so long, because folks can kind of wait for an

0:46:40.040 --> 0:46:43.359
<v Speaker 3>extended period of time. Think about another organ, like a liver,

0:46:43.640 --> 0:46:45.920
<v Speaker 3>there is no dialysis, so at some point, if your

0:46:45.960 --> 0:46:49.279
<v Speaker 3>liver function gets bad enough, you either need a transplant

0:46:49.480 --> 0:46:54.120
<v Speaker 3>or that's it. So this is why the kidney list,

0:46:54.800 --> 0:46:56.720
<v Speaker 3>you know, goes on for so long. But it's also

0:46:57.160 --> 0:47:02.000
<v Speaker 3>a major financial burden in addition to all the emotional

0:47:02.040 --> 0:47:05.160
<v Speaker 3>and physical burden that the folks, the patients in their

0:47:05.160 --> 0:47:10.040
<v Speaker 3>families face That estimate suggests that it's basically one percent

0:47:10.840 --> 0:47:15.640
<v Speaker 3>of the federal budget is spent on end stage renal disease,

0:47:15.760 --> 0:47:19.239
<v Speaker 3>on on folks who have kidney failure because Medicare is

0:47:19.280 --> 0:47:23.080
<v Speaker 3>covering it. You know, medicare big chunk of the federal budget,

0:47:23.120 --> 0:47:26.520
<v Speaker 3>and this in particular, this line item is very expensive.

0:47:26.640 --> 0:47:30.160
<v Speaker 2>And the crazy thing about this another data point that

0:47:30.239 --> 0:47:35.080
<v Speaker 2>shot me is sometimes an imperfect match shows up and

0:47:35.120 --> 0:47:37.719
<v Speaker 2>you have the option of you know, rolling it over

0:47:37.760 --> 0:47:40.400
<v Speaker 2>and saying I'll wait for the next one. Twenty percent

0:47:40.440 --> 0:47:43.200
<v Speaker 2>of the donated kidneys are just thrown away.

0:47:43.680 --> 0:47:47.239
<v Speaker 3>This is the nature of these first come, first serve

0:47:47.320 --> 0:47:50.680
<v Speaker 3>waiting lists. So you know, there's when an organ becomes available,

0:47:50.880 --> 0:47:54.080
<v Speaker 3>there's a list that's generated. It's based on how close

0:47:54.120 --> 0:47:56.960
<v Speaker 3>you are to the transplant center, on the medical match

0:47:57.080 --> 0:48:00.319
<v Speaker 3>between the organ donor and the recipient. So there's a

0:48:00.360 --> 0:48:02.799
<v Speaker 3>bunch of considerations that come in, including how long you've

0:48:02.840 --> 0:48:06.000
<v Speaker 3>been waiting. So if you've been waiting many years on dialysis,

0:48:06.000 --> 0:48:08.399
<v Speaker 3>you're going to be closer to the top of the list.

0:48:08.800 --> 0:48:11.680
<v Speaker 3>So an organ becomes available and you, as the patient,

0:48:12.200 --> 0:48:15.000
<v Speaker 3>with the help of your doctor, have to decide is

0:48:15.040 --> 0:48:16.799
<v Speaker 3>this going to be an organ I take or not.

0:48:18.000 --> 0:48:20.880
<v Speaker 3>Some of the information about whether it's a good match

0:48:20.880 --> 0:48:24.440
<v Speaker 3>for you we only can learn after the organ has

0:48:24.480 --> 0:48:27.840
<v Speaker 3>been removed from the donor who's you know, passed away.

0:48:28.520 --> 0:48:32.279
<v Speaker 3>And so now we have testing that's getting done on

0:48:32.360 --> 0:48:33.560
<v Speaker 3>the organ and there's.

0:48:33.400 --> 0:48:35.080
<v Speaker 4>Only so much time.

0:48:35.280 --> 0:48:37.880
<v Speaker 3>Yeah you so you know, we have this testing getting

0:48:37.920 --> 0:48:40.600
<v Speaker 3>done and folks are getting are learning all right, this

0:48:40.840 --> 0:48:42.640
<v Speaker 3>it could be this organ that you take, or we

0:48:42.640 --> 0:48:44.239
<v Speaker 3>can keep waiting and if you're at the top of

0:48:44.280 --> 0:48:47.080
<v Speaker 3>the list, maybe you get offered a bunch of organs.

0:48:47.120 --> 0:48:50.920
<v Speaker 3>And so you know, it is hard to get through

0:48:51.000 --> 0:48:54.120
<v Speaker 3>the whole list of you know, you know, ninety thousand

0:48:54.160 --> 0:48:56.359
<v Speaker 3>folks waiting for the organ, and so you know, if

0:48:56.360 --> 0:48:59.200
<v Speaker 3>the organ's not great and we can't identify somebody who

0:48:59.360 --> 0:49:01.840
<v Speaker 3>might take it, a way to suscort it.

0:49:01.920 --> 0:49:05.200
<v Speaker 2>As kind of fascinated by the example you describe with

0:49:05.320 --> 0:49:09.759
<v Speaker 2>what they do in Israel that if you check I'm

0:49:09.800 --> 0:49:14.160
<v Speaker 2>willing to be an organ donor three years prior, you're

0:49:14.239 --> 0:49:18.239
<v Speaker 2>higher on the recipient list. The theory being, hey, if

0:49:18.280 --> 0:49:22.680
<v Speaker 2>everybody understands this is that many more organs available for transplant.

0:49:23.200 --> 0:49:26.680
<v Speaker 2>How has that tested out in real life? And are

0:49:26.800 --> 0:49:30.560
<v Speaker 2>any states here putting them into work.

0:49:30.640 --> 0:49:34.840
<v Speaker 3>This was the research that got me into market design.

0:49:34.920 --> 0:49:37.680
<v Speaker 3>In particular, I was working with al we started thinking

0:49:37.680 --> 0:49:40.600
<v Speaker 3>about organs. It has this nice feature of being a

0:49:40.600 --> 0:49:43.880
<v Speaker 3>public good. If I agreed a register as an organ donor,

0:49:44.840 --> 0:49:47.880
<v Speaker 3>hopefully I won't be in this situation, but my organs

0:49:47.880 --> 0:49:50.520
<v Speaker 3>are available for transplant if I die in a way

0:49:50.280 --> 0:49:55.359
<v Speaker 3>that makes them available. When folks agreed a register, they

0:49:55.400 --> 0:50:00.719
<v Speaker 3>are making this scarce resource the organ They're making it

0:50:00.800 --> 0:50:03.839
<v Speaker 3>be less scarce. There are more organs available in expectation

0:50:04.160 --> 0:50:08.280
<v Speaker 3>if folks are registered. So a bunch of countries, including Israel,

0:50:08.360 --> 0:50:13.160
<v Speaker 3>but also Chile, China and Singapore have built into their

0:50:13.200 --> 0:50:18.240
<v Speaker 3>allocation rules an incentive to get people to provide this resource,

0:50:18.239 --> 0:50:20.640
<v Speaker 3>to make it less scarce. And as you said, they

0:50:21.480 --> 0:50:23.960
<v Speaker 3>in Israel it's three years. But you can think about

0:50:24.160 --> 0:50:27.239
<v Speaker 3>doing it different ways. Where if you're eighteen years old

0:50:27.320 --> 0:50:29.799
<v Speaker 3>and you're going to the DMV and it's the first

0:50:29.800 --> 0:50:31.400
<v Speaker 3>time you've ever been asked do you want to be

0:50:31.440 --> 0:50:36.319
<v Speaker 3>an organ donor? You are rewarded if you say yes,

0:50:37.800 --> 0:50:40.040
<v Speaker 3>insofar as you know fifty years later, if you end

0:50:40.120 --> 0:50:42.799
<v Speaker 3>up needing a kidney, you're going to get priority over

0:50:42.880 --> 0:50:45.080
<v Speaker 3>someone that's kind of in the same situation as you,

0:50:45.200 --> 0:50:46.960
<v Speaker 3>but when they were eighteen, said no, no, no, I don't

0:50:47.000 --> 0:50:50.000
<v Speaker 3>want to help out other people. And so we saw

0:50:50.080 --> 0:50:53.600
<v Speaker 3>when we did our research that this incentive of being

0:50:53.920 --> 0:50:56.680
<v Speaker 3>given the option to be a donor so that you

0:50:56.719 --> 0:51:00.000
<v Speaker 3>can have priority later on induced a lot more people

0:51:00.360 --> 0:51:03.359
<v Speaker 3>to say they wanted to donate in a game that

0:51:03.440 --> 0:51:06.000
<v Speaker 3>was modeled on that decision. We looked at Israel and

0:51:06.040 --> 0:51:10.080
<v Speaker 3>we saw when Israel implemented it, our estimates suggests about

0:51:10.080 --> 0:51:12.800
<v Speaker 3>one hundred thousand more people. And Israel's a small country,

0:51:12.920 --> 0:51:15.799
<v Speaker 3>so it's a lot. Yeah, it's a lot signed up

0:51:15.960 --> 0:51:19.480
<v Speaker 3>in the run up, you know, kind of before they

0:51:19.560 --> 0:51:21.640
<v Speaker 3>announced it, and they were letting people sign up, and

0:51:22.200 --> 0:51:24.480
<v Speaker 3>it was the date when if you signed up before,

0:51:24.480 --> 0:51:27.239
<v Speaker 3>you'd immediately have priority. Otherwise you'd have to wait the

0:51:27.280 --> 0:51:29.480
<v Speaker 3>three years to avoid I mean the three years, by

0:51:29.480 --> 0:51:32.319
<v Speaker 3>the way, is to avoid a loophole where I get

0:51:32.360 --> 0:51:33.880
<v Speaker 3>sick and need a kidney and I go sign a

0:51:33.880 --> 0:51:36.200
<v Speaker 3>donor card and then I have priority that would totally

0:51:36.239 --> 0:51:38.880
<v Speaker 3>underline purpose, which we have research showing that you know

0:51:39.000 --> 0:51:41.160
<v Speaker 3>that it would in fact undermine it. So yeah, so

0:51:41.200 --> 0:51:43.560
<v Speaker 3>then they they implemented it, and it seems to work.

0:51:44.120 --> 0:51:46.640
<v Speaker 2>Have any places in the US adopted this.

0:51:46.800 --> 0:51:48.640
<v Speaker 3>No, so it would have to be this is not

0:51:48.719 --> 0:51:52.440
<v Speaker 3>a state by state thing. That Oregon allocation systems are national,

0:51:52.560 --> 0:51:55.160
<v Speaker 3>and so you would need the country as a whole

0:51:55.320 --> 0:51:59.200
<v Speaker 3>the to have a change in the allocation rules. So

0:51:59.719 --> 0:52:02.239
<v Speaker 3>I have been advocating for that since we did that

0:52:02.280 --> 0:52:05.040
<v Speaker 3>research over a decade ago, but you know, we have

0:52:05.120 --> 0:52:08.640
<v Speaker 3>not yet had movement on that, although I remain perennially

0:52:08.680 --> 0:52:12.640
<v Speaker 3>optimistic because it's been you know, many years, and the

0:52:12.640 --> 0:52:15.200
<v Speaker 3>problem isn't getting better. So basically, anything we can do

0:52:15.920 --> 0:52:18.680
<v Speaker 3>to make this scarce resource less scarce is valuable.

0:52:18.960 --> 0:52:22.960
<v Speaker 2>I'm recalling Richard Thaylor's book Nudge. I think he co

0:52:23.000 --> 0:52:26.560
<v Speaker 2>wrote that with Cas Sunstein, And there was questions about

0:52:26.600 --> 0:52:30.160
<v Speaker 2>opt out and opt in. In other words, if everybody

0:52:30.200 --> 0:52:33.120
<v Speaker 2>by default is an organ donor, but you have to

0:52:33.160 --> 0:52:35.960
<v Speaker 2>opt out. The reasons people don't want to do that

0:52:36.920 --> 0:52:40.240
<v Speaker 2>religious reasons and other But is that a potential?

0:52:40.520 --> 0:52:41.600
<v Speaker 4>So that was.

0:52:43.040 --> 0:52:45.680
<v Speaker 3>That was like a great hope of behavioral economics, was

0:52:45.680 --> 0:52:49.799
<v Speaker 3>that these kinds of nudges in choice arrket. Yeah, so

0:52:49.880 --> 0:52:52.239
<v Speaker 3>this is a case. There are many places where it works. Well,

0:52:52.280 --> 0:52:54.600
<v Speaker 3>this is a case where it doesn't. And the reason

0:52:54.640 --> 0:52:57.839
<v Speaker 3>it doesn't is that, you know, if you are say

0:52:57.840 --> 0:53:00.080
<v Speaker 3>it's an opt out system, so I should pause and

0:53:00.080 --> 0:53:01.560
<v Speaker 3>say we don't. We can't do that in the US

0:53:01.600 --> 0:53:05.719
<v Speaker 3>without a major law change because oregons fall under the

0:53:05.760 --> 0:53:08.560
<v Speaker 3>Gift Act, So you know, you have to actually make

0:53:08.600 --> 0:53:11.160
<v Speaker 3>an affirmative statement that you want. You know, you could

0:53:11.160 --> 0:53:13.319
<v Speaker 3>make it salvage law. So if you're not using it,

0:53:13.400 --> 0:53:15.840
<v Speaker 3>we can take it, right, But that's people might not

0:53:15.880 --> 0:53:17.920
<v Speaker 3>want to do that. But but in the in the

0:53:17.920 --> 0:53:21.360
<v Speaker 3>countries that use these opt out systems, the next of

0:53:21.440 --> 0:53:24.560
<v Speaker 3>kin are still consulted, right, so you know, what the

0:53:25.360 --> 0:53:27.040
<v Speaker 3>next of kin are told is that the person did

0:53:27.080 --> 0:53:30.200
<v Speaker 3>not opt out and the defaults basically to the next

0:53:30.239 --> 0:53:33.400
<v Speaker 3>of kin to decide. And so what the research shows

0:53:33.440 --> 0:53:36.400
<v Speaker 3>is that there just isn't a delta between the countries

0:53:36.400 --> 0:53:38.920
<v Speaker 3>that use opt in and the countries that use opt out.

0:53:38.760 --> 0:53:42.000
<v Speaker 2>Because it always goes to that affirmative decision.

0:53:42.239 --> 0:53:44.560
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, and when when you know I've opted in, I

0:53:44.600 --> 0:53:46.440
<v Speaker 3>mean I might be special because I talk about it

0:53:46.520 --> 0:53:49.160
<v Speaker 3>a lot, right, But but if you've opted in, then

0:53:49.200 --> 0:53:51.360
<v Speaker 3>the next of kin see that and they know that

0:53:51.400 --> 0:53:53.319
<v Speaker 3>it was your wish right, you did, you said at

0:53:53.320 --> 0:53:56.080
<v Speaker 3>some point, yes, I want to register. They know that

0:53:56.080 --> 0:53:58.719
<v Speaker 3>that you want to do that, and so if you

0:53:58.760 --> 0:54:01.439
<v Speaker 3>pass away, they know that they should donate your organs,

0:54:01.440 --> 0:54:04.319
<v Speaker 3>so they're not going to stand in the way. It is,

0:54:04.400 --> 0:54:06.920
<v Speaker 3>you know, a binding agreement to be an organ donor.

0:54:06.920 --> 0:54:10.680
<v Speaker 3>But of course if the next of kin don't want it, right,

0:54:11.000 --> 0:54:13.280
<v Speaker 3>they're the only ones who are left around to sue

0:54:13.280 --> 0:54:16.440
<v Speaker 3>the doctors. Right so so so, but it ends up

0:54:16.440 --> 0:54:19.080
<v Speaker 3>being the case if you register. You know, the vast

0:54:19.080 --> 0:54:22.480
<v Speaker 3>majority of folks who register have their organs recovered.

0:54:22.560 --> 0:54:25.480
<v Speaker 2>I found a lot of the book had really surprising

0:54:26.160 --> 0:54:30.360
<v Speaker 2>themes and data doing your research. What's the thing that

0:54:30.440 --> 0:54:34.160
<v Speaker 2>surprised you most about market design? What sort of things

0:54:34.200 --> 0:54:37.040
<v Speaker 2>did you go, huh that that doesn't make any sense.

0:54:38.000 --> 0:54:39.600
<v Speaker 3>So at the end of the book I talk about

0:54:39.600 --> 0:54:41.960
<v Speaker 3>you know, how you are a market designer. We've talked

0:54:42.000 --> 0:54:44.120
<v Speaker 3>about you as a market participant. We've talked about others

0:54:44.160 --> 0:54:48.239
<v Speaker 3>as market designers. But hidden market is one where there's

0:54:48.239 --> 0:54:52.840
<v Speaker 3>a scarce resource that needs to get allocated without prices

0:54:52.880 --> 0:54:56.080
<v Speaker 3>being what determines who gets what. And if you think

0:54:56.080 --> 0:54:58.239
<v Speaker 3>about it that way, you are a market designer for

0:54:58.360 --> 0:55:01.000
<v Speaker 3>things like your time and attention, which lots of people want.

0:55:01.040 --> 0:55:03.279
<v Speaker 3>They want to have you respond to their emails. They

0:55:03.280 --> 0:55:04.920
<v Speaker 3>want to get on your calendar, and you have to

0:55:04.960 --> 0:55:08.480
<v Speaker 3>decide who you serve and who you don't. That's the preface.

0:55:08.640 --> 0:55:11.240
<v Speaker 3>The thing that I learned was a set of market

0:55:11.280 --> 0:55:14.000
<v Speaker 3>rules that I thought made no sense, which was how

0:55:14.040 --> 0:55:17.759
<v Speaker 3>we used to allocate water from the Colorado River. So

0:55:18.080 --> 0:55:22.719
<v Speaker 3>for many years the rule was first in time, first

0:55:22.800 --> 0:55:27.680
<v Speaker 3>and right, which meant that the first folks to tap

0:55:27.719 --> 0:55:29.960
<v Speaker 3>the river to take water out to divert for their

0:55:29.960 --> 0:55:33.880
<v Speaker 3>own purposes kind of always got their allotment. So that

0:55:33.960 --> 0:55:36.520
<v Speaker 3>was California in nineteen oh one, where they diverted water

0:55:36.560 --> 0:55:41.520
<v Speaker 3>from the river to turn a desert into farmland. And

0:55:41.600 --> 0:55:46.080
<v Speaker 3>then decades later, when there was a drought and there

0:55:46.120 --> 0:55:50.120
<v Speaker 3>was less water coming down the Colorado, the California got

0:55:50.160 --> 0:55:53.439
<v Speaker 3>to keep the exact same allotment, and folks who tapped

0:55:53.480 --> 0:55:56.160
<v Speaker 3>the river later, like the city of Phoenix, Arizona, which

0:55:56.160 --> 0:55:59.080
<v Speaker 3>in nineteen oh one was ten or fifteen thousand people

0:55:59.120 --> 0:56:01.680
<v Speaker 3>but it's now a million and a half, they had

0:56:01.680 --> 0:56:03.560
<v Speaker 3>to cut back, even though for them it was drinking

0:56:03.600 --> 0:56:05.799
<v Speaker 3>water and for California it was you know, to grow

0:56:05.840 --> 0:56:09.200
<v Speaker 3>alfalfa to feed to livestock. So I looked at that

0:56:09.200 --> 0:56:12.480
<v Speaker 3>and I thought, oh man, what a terrible It's not efficient,

0:56:12.560 --> 0:56:15.879
<v Speaker 3>it's not equitable. The race that determined who got what

0:56:16.040 --> 0:56:20.600
<v Speaker 3>was run, you know, a century ago. And so you know,

0:56:20.640 --> 0:56:22.759
<v Speaker 3>I'm thinking of feeling like, oh man, isn't it great

0:56:22.800 --> 0:56:25.160
<v Speaker 3>that we don't use these kinds of systems anymore? And

0:56:25.200 --> 0:56:27.880
<v Speaker 3>then I looked at my calendar and I saw my

0:56:28.000 --> 0:56:30.960
<v Speaker 3>recurring meetings on there, and I thought, that's first and

0:56:31.000 --> 0:56:33.120
<v Speaker 3>time first, and right I'm doing what they were doing

0:56:33.120 --> 0:56:35.239
<v Speaker 3>with the Colorado river a meeting that I put on

0:56:35.239 --> 0:56:38.520
<v Speaker 3>my calendar, you know, two years ago that takes Thursday

0:56:38.600 --> 0:56:42.000
<v Speaker 3>at eleven am. Every week Thursday at eleven am. Is

0:56:42.040 --> 0:56:45.719
<v Speaker 3>being allocated to you know, this this project, even if

0:56:45.760 --> 0:56:49.320
<v Speaker 3>it's not the most efficient or equitable use of my time.

0:56:50.000 --> 0:56:52.319
<v Speaker 3>And I realized, like, oh man, you know, there's some

0:56:52.320 --> 0:56:55.000
<v Speaker 3>stuff that's sacrosanct, like my teaching, but a lot of

0:56:55.000 --> 0:56:59.480
<v Speaker 3>these recurring meetings, it's not adhering to the efficiency and

0:56:59.480 --> 0:57:03.239
<v Speaker 3>equity standards that I would want for my allocations.

0:57:03.360 --> 0:57:06.920
<v Speaker 2>Huh. Having read the book, I keep coming across things.

0:57:07.600 --> 0:57:09.880
<v Speaker 2>As I was reading it. I was thinking about different things.

0:57:10.320 --> 0:57:13.000
<v Speaker 2>And then either yesterday or this morning, I saw a

0:57:13.000 --> 0:57:17.080
<v Speaker 2>Wall Street Journal piece the new mayor elect in New

0:57:17.160 --> 0:57:21.040
<v Speaker 2>York once the freeze prices not just on apartments but

0:57:21.160 --> 0:57:24.439
<v Speaker 2>at Yankee Stadium on hot dogs and beer. And there's

0:57:24.600 --> 0:57:28.080
<v Speaker 2>a couple of interesting issues that, hey, are people going

0:57:28.160 --> 0:57:31.520
<v Speaker 2>to get too drunk? But some other stadiums have done

0:57:31.520 --> 0:57:35.320
<v Speaker 2>this and it's worked out really well. When we look

0:57:35.360 --> 0:57:38.680
<v Speaker 2>at price controls, how do you think about rent control

0:57:38.720 --> 0:57:43.880
<v Speaker 2>for apartments or capping the price of hot dogs? Costco

0:57:44.120 --> 0:57:47.360
<v Speaker 2>very famously has the dollar fifty hot dog for them

0:57:47.480 --> 0:57:50.640
<v Speaker 2>thirty six years. How do you think about those different

0:57:50.720 --> 0:57:55.160
<v Speaker 2>price mechanisms really as a form of branding or marketing.

0:57:55.480 --> 0:57:58.040
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean I love the Costco hot dog, so

0:57:58.040 --> 0:58:00.000
<v Speaker 3>I can see the branding of marketing, you know, benefit

0:58:00.040 --> 0:58:03.320
<v Speaker 3>it's there. I have thought a bunch about this because

0:58:04.560 --> 0:58:07.960
<v Speaker 3>that has the potential to create hidden markets or exacerbate

0:58:08.000 --> 0:58:10.760
<v Speaker 3>hidden markets that are already there. So I recently wrote

0:58:10.760 --> 0:58:14.280
<v Speaker 3>a piece about affordable housing lotteries. So this is in

0:58:14.320 --> 0:58:17.960
<v Speaker 3>New York City and a bunch of major cities around

0:58:18.000 --> 0:58:22.160
<v Speaker 3>the world. Do this where a new development will be

0:58:22.200 --> 0:58:27.200
<v Speaker 3>built and you'll have thirty percent of the units that

0:58:27.240 --> 0:58:30.919
<v Speaker 3>are built are going to be designated affordable, meaning folks

0:58:30.960 --> 0:58:32.840
<v Speaker 3>are only expected to spend thirty percent.

0:58:32.560 --> 0:58:33.760
<v Speaker 4>Of their income on housing.

0:58:35.040 --> 0:58:39.640
<v Speaker 3>But there are so many people who are finding rents

0:58:39.680 --> 0:58:41.400
<v Speaker 3>hard to bear in New York City and these other

0:58:41.440 --> 0:58:45.840
<v Speaker 3>big cities that the lotteries get flooded. So in a

0:58:46.400 --> 0:58:51.200
<v Speaker 3>last full year, there were about six million applicants for

0:58:51.240 --> 0:58:54.880
<v Speaker 3>about ten thousand units. So each lottery entry has a

0:58:54.920 --> 0:58:59.320
<v Speaker 3>one and six hundred chance of winning, and so as

0:58:59.320 --> 0:59:02.080
<v Speaker 3>a result, folks are kind of constantly applying to these

0:59:02.120 --> 0:59:04.440
<v Speaker 3>lotteries because that's the only way that you're gonna have

0:59:04.440 --> 0:59:06.000
<v Speaker 3>a chance of getting something, is if you're applying to

0:59:06.000 --> 0:59:09.960
<v Speaker 3>every possible lottery. But then there's all these inefficiencies that

0:59:10.000 --> 0:59:12.400
<v Speaker 3>can crop up. Maybe I win a lottery, I get

0:59:12.400 --> 0:59:16.080
<v Speaker 3>really lucky, but it's it's not in my desirable, desired neighborhood.

0:59:16.600 --> 0:59:18.160
<v Speaker 3>It was still a good lottery to enter. It is

0:59:18.200 --> 0:59:21.080
<v Speaker 3>better to get affordable housing than not. Maybe you win

0:59:21.560 --> 0:59:24.400
<v Speaker 3>in the neighborhood that I want, there's no way, but

0:59:24.440 --> 0:59:26.160
<v Speaker 3>there's no way for us to switch, right, It's kind

0:59:26.160 --> 0:59:28.800
<v Speaker 3>of like golden handcuffs. If you forgetting an affordable place,

0:59:29.440 --> 0:59:32.120
<v Speaker 3>and you know the same thing with freezing rent, where

0:59:32.520 --> 0:59:35.640
<v Speaker 3>you know, the folks who are in rent controlled or

0:59:35.640 --> 0:59:38.640
<v Speaker 3>rent stabilized apartment that you know are going to be

0:59:38.720 --> 0:59:42.000
<v Speaker 3>able to kind of keep paying that low rate. You know,

0:59:42.040 --> 0:59:45.640
<v Speaker 3>that's great for them, but that doesn't solve the bigger problem.

0:59:45.680 --> 0:59:45.800
<v Speaker 4>Right.

0:59:45.840 --> 0:59:50.080
<v Speaker 3>It's it's affordability for the lucky few, but not for

0:59:50.320 --> 0:59:51.880
<v Speaker 3>other folks who are moving to the city for the

0:59:51.920 --> 0:59:54.880
<v Speaker 3>first time and want to make a life here. And

0:59:54.960 --> 0:59:58.800
<v Speaker 3>so you know, I can see why folks are eager

0:59:58.840 --> 1:00:02.280
<v Speaker 3>to do that, but it's hard to think about how

1:00:02.280 --> 1:00:06.880
<v Speaker 3>to solve that problem without broader changes, right.

1:00:06.920 --> 1:00:10.640
<v Speaker 2>It doesn't move the needle on the broader underlying problem.

1:00:11.040 --> 1:00:14.240
<v Speaker 2>It just for that handful. It kind of raises the

1:00:14.320 --> 1:00:19.160
<v Speaker 2>issue of nimbiism and just not building well. Since the

1:00:19.840 --> 1:00:25.680
<v Speaker 2>Great Financial Crisis, we've wildly underbuilt single family homes. Affordable

1:00:25.720 --> 1:00:28.360
<v Speaker 2>housing go down the list. The focus has been on

1:00:28.440 --> 1:00:31.920
<v Speaker 2>luxury properties because hey, there's the most amount of economic

1:00:31.960 --> 1:00:35.320
<v Speaker 2>benefit for the builders to put their time and energy.

1:00:35.360 --> 1:00:38.040
<v Speaker 3>But this is definitely, you know, a supply and demand problem.

1:00:38.200 --> 1:00:40.680
<v Speaker 3>If you want to bring costs down, you have to

1:00:40.720 --> 1:00:43.280
<v Speaker 3>increase supply. And you know, as an economist, we are

1:00:43.320 --> 1:00:47.080
<v Speaker 3>trained to kind of think one step further. So I'd

1:00:47.120 --> 1:00:49.640
<v Speaker 3>have to read the specific policy about the you know,

1:00:50.040 --> 1:00:54.120
<v Speaker 3>Yankee Stadium concessions, right, but my first instinct would be, Oh,

1:00:54.160 --> 1:00:57.880
<v Speaker 3>if you cap the price of concessions, the logical next

1:00:57.880 --> 1:00:59.720
<v Speaker 3>step is that the ticket price goes up a little bit.

1:00:59.800 --> 1:01:00.000
<v Speaker 4>Right.

1:01:00.120 --> 1:01:02.200
<v Speaker 3>It's like, now, all of a sudden, it's cheaper to

1:01:02.240 --> 1:01:04.720
<v Speaker 3>go to you know, to have the full night out

1:01:04.880 --> 1:01:07.240
<v Speaker 3>at the you know, city Field or at Yankee Stadium.

1:01:07.880 --> 1:01:09.680
<v Speaker 3>And so, you know, is there also going to be

1:01:09.720 --> 1:01:12.440
<v Speaker 3>a price control on the ticket or or not? And

1:01:12.520 --> 1:01:15.360
<v Speaker 3>then are we actually getting the gains that we want

1:01:15.600 --> 1:01:18.720
<v Speaker 3>or you know, are we are we getting nice sound bites.

1:01:18.760 --> 1:01:23.480
<v Speaker 2>The thing about constructing your own market design is kind

1:01:23.520 --> 1:01:26.600
<v Speaker 2>of interesting. I have a friend Dave, who comes to

1:01:26.720 --> 1:01:30.320
<v Speaker 2>New York a couple of times a quarter, works in finance,

1:01:30.360 --> 1:01:33.760
<v Speaker 2>comes down from the Berkshires, and since he's one person

1:01:34.040 --> 1:01:39.680
<v Speaker 2>and doesn't care which Broadway show he goes to, his

1:01:40.160 --> 1:01:43.600
<v Speaker 2>market design hack is he waits to depending on the day,

1:01:43.640 --> 1:01:46.120
<v Speaker 2>five minutes to seven or five minutes to eight, the

1:01:46.200 --> 1:01:50.840
<v Speaker 2>price's plummet. Yes, they're about to expire worthless. Oh, Hamilton

1:01:50.960 --> 1:01:54.040
<v Speaker 2>for half price, let's go wicked half price and he's

1:01:54.080 --> 1:01:58.960
<v Speaker 2>seen half the stuff on Broadway at shockingly reasonable prices.

1:01:59.000 --> 1:02:01.760
<v Speaker 2>So as I was reading this, I thought about that,

1:02:02.280 --> 1:02:05.640
<v Speaker 2>and then I just had an experience up in Newport

1:02:05.720 --> 1:02:09.520
<v Speaker 2>my first time visiting. You wrote about this in the book,

1:02:09.760 --> 1:02:12.920
<v Speaker 2>about the restaurant reservations in the waiting list. So we

1:02:12.960 --> 1:02:15.680
<v Speaker 2>stayed at this hotel and there's a super hot restaurant

1:02:15.760 --> 1:02:18.080
<v Speaker 2>there which I didn't even know about. We made other

1:02:18.160 --> 1:02:23.280
<v Speaker 2>reservations for the weekend, and we stop in and there's

1:02:23.360 --> 1:02:28.400
<v Speaker 2>a line of people at five o'clock waiting to sit

1:02:28.480 --> 1:02:31.040
<v Speaker 2>at the bar. I said, we're on the waiting list.

1:02:31.080 --> 1:02:33.600
<v Speaker 2>He's like, well, we have like one hundred seats and

1:02:33.640 --> 1:02:36.680
<v Speaker 2>the waiting list is about four hundred long. Oh forget it.

1:02:37.000 --> 1:02:40.600
<v Speaker 2>And I said something to the matre d and he said,

1:02:40.760 --> 1:02:42.720
<v Speaker 2>why don't you come down later and see what the

1:02:42.760 --> 1:02:45.160
<v Speaker 2>line looks like. It usually moves pretty and it was

1:02:45.200 --> 1:02:46.840
<v Speaker 2>beautiful out you could see it at the bar. It

1:02:46.880 --> 1:02:50.080
<v Speaker 2>was outdoors, so it was like we had a seven

1:02:50.120 --> 1:02:55.160
<v Speaker 2>o'clock reservation. The goal the goal, and we walked and

1:02:55.160 --> 1:02:56.440
<v Speaker 2>we were going to walk to the restaurant. So we

1:02:56.560 --> 1:03:00.920
<v Speaker 2>come down like six thirty, no line the bar. So

1:03:01.080 --> 1:03:03.920
<v Speaker 2>I said, hey, you're not seeing people at the bar.

1:03:03.960 --> 1:03:06.520
<v Speaker 2>You no, there's no line, get over there. And it

1:03:06.600 --> 1:03:08.720
<v Speaker 2>was just simply being nice in the matri d and

1:03:08.760 --> 1:03:11.880
<v Speaker 2>asking a question was was that behavioral?

1:03:11.920 --> 1:03:12.120
<v Speaker 4>Heck?

1:03:12.600 --> 1:03:15.000
<v Speaker 3>This is, you know, learning about the market and the

1:03:15.040 --> 1:03:19.520
<v Speaker 3>market rules and getting inside information about when when is

1:03:19.560 --> 1:03:23.800
<v Speaker 3>there less demand? What is the optimal strategy in this environment?

1:03:23.920 --> 1:03:27.840
<v Speaker 3>It requires often doing a little bit of research, but

1:03:27.960 --> 1:03:31.760
<v Speaker 3>it's not unattainable. We all have the ability to think

1:03:31.800 --> 1:03:33.920
<v Speaker 3>about the market rules, think about who will know the

1:03:33.960 --> 1:03:37.520
<v Speaker 3>matre d. You know, if you're polite to him or her,

1:03:38.560 --> 1:03:40.760
<v Speaker 3>they might want you to come and give you the

1:03:40.800 --> 1:03:44.200
<v Speaker 3>inside tips. But you know, you have to kind of

1:03:44.280 --> 1:03:47.400
<v Speaker 3>have to either do your own research or have folks

1:03:47.800 --> 1:03:51.600
<v Speaker 3>advise you that you trust. And yeah, you can. You

1:03:51.640 --> 1:03:54.560
<v Speaker 3>can often succeed in markets where other people fall.

1:03:55.160 --> 1:03:57.320
<v Speaker 2>So I only have you for another ten minutes, So

1:03:57.440 --> 1:04:01.000
<v Speaker 2>let me jump to my favorite questions school my guests,

1:04:01.120 --> 1:04:04.840
<v Speaker 2>starting with tell us about your mentors who helped shape

1:04:04.840 --> 1:04:05.400
<v Speaker 2>your career.

1:04:05.720 --> 1:04:08.640
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so the main one, I mean already mentioned him,

1:04:08.720 --> 1:04:11.120
<v Speaker 3>so you can see how big an influence is. Alvin Roth.

1:04:11.280 --> 1:04:14.440
<v Speaker 3>So he took me in as an undergrad mentee. I

1:04:14.800 --> 1:04:16.600
<v Speaker 3>had this story in the book and then it got

1:04:16.600 --> 1:04:18.720
<v Speaker 3>cut for space. So I put it in the acknowledgments

1:04:18.800 --> 1:04:21.960
<v Speaker 3>because it was such a formative experience for me where

1:04:22.560 --> 1:04:26.640
<v Speaker 3>I was taking his PhD class as a senior in

1:04:26.760 --> 1:04:28.440
<v Speaker 3>undergrad and so I was kind of a little bit

1:04:28.480 --> 1:04:32.160
<v Speaker 3>out of place already, and I wanted to write a

1:04:32.200 --> 1:04:34.320
<v Speaker 3>senior thesis the thing that kicked me off to this

1:04:34.400 --> 1:04:36.440
<v Speaker 3>career and you know, put me at this table talking

1:04:36.440 --> 1:04:39.960
<v Speaker 3>to you. Now, I had procrastinated asking him to be

1:04:40.160 --> 1:04:42.680
<v Speaker 3>my advisor because I was a little intimidated, I felt

1:04:42.680 --> 1:04:45.080
<v Speaker 3>attle out of place, and you know, I came up

1:04:45.120 --> 1:04:46.960
<v Speaker 3>to him on the day the form was due and

1:04:47.040 --> 1:04:49.600
<v Speaker 3>I said, I want to write a senior thesis. I

1:04:49.600 --> 1:04:52.480
<v Speaker 3>would really like for you to advise it. You know,

1:04:52.520 --> 1:04:54.160
<v Speaker 3>the form is due today, but you know, and this

1:04:54.200 --> 1:04:55.760
<v Speaker 3>is the commitment. He was like, all right, why don't

1:04:55.760 --> 1:04:57.560
<v Speaker 3>I sign the form and we'll see how it goes.

1:04:58.120 --> 1:05:00.760
<v Speaker 3>And he signed the form and you know, the his history,

1:05:01.320 --> 1:05:04.760
<v Speaker 3>but it was both the idea that you know, I

1:05:04.800 --> 1:05:07.920
<v Speaker 3>could be involved in learning new things that people didn't

1:05:07.920 --> 1:05:11.000
<v Speaker 3>know before and do it with somebody who was willing

1:05:11.000 --> 1:05:11.600
<v Speaker 3>to mentor me.

1:05:12.120 --> 1:05:13.840
<v Speaker 4>That was a real, real big impact.

1:05:14.000 --> 1:05:16.440
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I can imagine what are some of your favorite books?

1:05:16.440 --> 1:05:17.760
<v Speaker 2>What are you reading right now?

1:05:18.040 --> 1:05:21.280
<v Speaker 3>So there, this is a pop Econ book, my book

1:05:21.360 --> 1:05:25.680
<v Speaker 3>Lucky by Design. It's in the spirit of another pop

1:05:25.720 --> 1:05:28.320
<v Speaker 3>Econ book about market design which Al wrote, which is

1:05:28.320 --> 1:05:30.800
<v Speaker 3>called Who Gets What and Why? And so for a

1:05:30.840 --> 1:05:32.760
<v Speaker 3>while I didn't want to write another, you know, pop

1:05:33.240 --> 1:05:34.920
<v Speaker 3>market design bookcase I didn't want to step on his

1:05:34.960 --> 1:05:35.960
<v Speaker 3>toes as a.

1:05:35.880 --> 1:05:38.040
<v Speaker 2>Great title who Gets What and Why?

1:05:38.120 --> 1:05:40.240
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, And there's a little in the text of my

1:05:40.280 --> 1:05:42.480
<v Speaker 3>book and kind of I drop that every so often,

1:05:42.560 --> 1:05:46.240
<v Speaker 3>the kind of question, that wording of that question. So

1:05:46.320 --> 1:05:49.320
<v Speaker 3>that was an idea for me, This idea that you

1:05:49.360 --> 1:05:52.440
<v Speaker 3>can communicate these market design concepts to regular folks. I

1:05:52.480 --> 1:05:54.840
<v Speaker 3>recommend my book, but also that book for folks who

1:05:54.840 --> 1:05:59.120
<v Speaker 3>are interested in this. My colleague, whose office is next

1:05:59.160 --> 1:06:00.920
<v Speaker 3>to mine, had a book that came out a few

1:06:00.920 --> 1:06:01.920
<v Speaker 3>weeks before mine.

1:06:02.120 --> 1:06:03.160
<v Speaker 4>It's called Having It All.

1:06:03.800 --> 1:06:07.960
<v Speaker 3>So my colleague is Caren Low, and I'm really enjoying

1:06:07.960 --> 1:06:09.800
<v Speaker 3>that book. I mean, I've heard about everything that was

1:06:09.840 --> 1:06:13.120
<v Speaker 3>in it, you know, along along the way. But she

1:06:13.320 --> 1:06:18.720
<v Speaker 3>writes about the time that women and their partners spend

1:06:19.000 --> 1:06:24.200
<v Speaker 3>in doing household production and how society has progressed over

1:06:24.440 --> 1:06:29.320
<v Speaker 3>decades where women have entered the workforce, but the norms

1:06:29.560 --> 1:06:31.880
<v Speaker 3>at home about how time is.

1:06:32.040 --> 1:06:33.680
<v Speaker 4>You know, household chores are split.

1:06:34.560 --> 1:06:37.560
<v Speaker 3>It has not changed, so women end up really yeah,

1:06:38.320 --> 1:06:41.520
<v Speaker 3>the data in that book is quite shocking. I mean,

1:06:41.520 --> 1:06:44.320
<v Speaker 3>I'd been hearing about it as she was doing the research.

1:06:44.360 --> 1:06:49.280
<v Speaker 3>But you know, women, even in households where they earn

1:06:49.440 --> 1:06:53.120
<v Speaker 3>more than their male partners, will still be doing more

1:06:54.320 --> 1:06:57.920
<v Speaker 3>labor all of that stuff at home, so that you know,

1:06:58.120 --> 1:06:59.720
<v Speaker 3>in my book, I talk a little bit about how

1:06:59.760 --> 1:07:05.200
<v Speaker 3>my wife and I manage our household responsibilities using the

1:07:05.240 --> 1:07:08.400
<v Speaker 3>concepts of market design to kind of avoid some of

1:07:08.440 --> 1:07:13.000
<v Speaker 3>these systematic problems that that on average couples display.

1:07:13.320 --> 1:07:15.640
<v Speaker 2>Huh really, you know I love to cook, but I

1:07:15.720 --> 1:07:18.800
<v Speaker 2>tend to make a giant mess. And my wife is

1:07:18.880 --> 1:07:22.080
<v Speaker 2>convinced that it's a purposeful strategy, so she could and

1:07:22.120 --> 1:07:25.400
<v Speaker 2>it's I'm like, honey, we're married thirty years, you know me?

1:07:26.000 --> 1:07:27.800
<v Speaker 2>Is this how I rolled? You know?

1:07:27.840 --> 1:07:31.160
<v Speaker 3>You gotta yeah, sometimes this is just my technique. But

1:07:31.440 --> 1:07:33.360
<v Speaker 3>one of the things that I talk about in the

1:07:33.360 --> 1:07:34.640
<v Speaker 3>book and must.

1:07:34.440 --> 1:07:35.760
<v Speaker 2>You pour from so high?

1:07:35.920 --> 1:07:37.560
<v Speaker 4>It's olive oil.

1:07:37.880 --> 1:07:39.240
<v Speaker 2>It doesn't need that high.

1:07:39.240 --> 1:07:42.680
<v Speaker 4>You got to get that aired and it's it's part

1:07:42.680 --> 1:07:43.800
<v Speaker 4>of the fun. But no.

1:07:44.320 --> 1:07:48.200
<v Speaker 3>One of the strategies is having one person be in

1:07:48.320 --> 1:07:52.960
<v Speaker 3>charge of the whole task from conception to execution. So

1:07:53.000 --> 1:07:56.560
<v Speaker 3>that means if you are cooking, you're also cleaning. Would

1:07:56.560 --> 1:07:59.000
<v Speaker 3>be part of that, right, because then the incentives are aligned.

1:07:59.040 --> 1:08:01.680
<v Speaker 3>When when you don't do that, the person who cooks

1:08:02.120 --> 1:08:04.200
<v Speaker 3>can leave a giant mass the other person cleans. That

1:08:04.520 --> 1:08:09.000
<v Speaker 3>seems fair, but the decisions, the resentment comes in and

1:08:09.040 --> 1:08:10.760
<v Speaker 3>why are you making such a big mess? And so

1:08:10.800 --> 1:08:12.640
<v Speaker 3>it turns out it, you know, might be more efficient

1:08:12.680 --> 1:08:15.440
<v Speaker 3>and equitable if one person does that whole task and

1:08:15.440 --> 1:08:17.760
<v Speaker 3>somebody else does a whole other time. Right, you cook

1:08:17.800 --> 1:08:20.160
<v Speaker 3>and I'll do the laundry and clean the floors. And

1:08:20.200 --> 1:08:22.840
<v Speaker 3>that's the you know, the split that might be fair.

1:08:23.000 --> 1:08:25.040
<v Speaker 2>You know, I'm usually out the door early, or if

1:08:25.040 --> 1:08:27.920
<v Speaker 2>I'm home, I'm at the desk writing, so she takes

1:08:27.960 --> 1:08:31.719
<v Speaker 2>care of the dogs and during the weekend I try

1:08:31.720 --> 1:08:34.000
<v Speaker 2>and give her a break and feed and walk the

1:08:34.080 --> 1:08:38.080
<v Speaker 2>dogs early. We've never discussed it. It just kind of

1:08:38.680 --> 1:08:39.679
<v Speaker 2>worked out that way.

1:08:39.560 --> 1:08:41.120
<v Speaker 4>That sometimes that's how it happens.

1:08:41.160 --> 1:08:43.640
<v Speaker 3>But you know, for those who are not finding it

1:08:43.680 --> 1:08:46.680
<v Speaker 3>that easy, talking it out and kind of splitting the

1:08:46.680 --> 1:08:49.040
<v Speaker 3>tasks is an effective strategy.

1:08:49.200 --> 1:08:51.439
<v Speaker 2>Tell us what's keeping you entertained these days? What are

1:08:51.439 --> 1:08:57.479
<v Speaker 2>you watching or listening to? Either podcasts or Amazon Prime, Netflix, whatever.

1:08:57.680 --> 1:09:02.439
<v Speaker 3>So I am a major fan of The Simpsons. Yeah,

1:09:02.560 --> 1:09:03.639
<v Speaker 3>I have always loved it.

1:09:03.720 --> 1:09:05.719
<v Speaker 2>What are we up to season forty something?

1:09:05.840 --> 1:09:09.040
<v Speaker 3>It's crazy almost Yeah, And but what has been great

1:09:09.080 --> 1:09:12.760
<v Speaker 3>I found throughout my life, you know, rewatching old episodes

1:09:12.800 --> 1:09:14.599
<v Speaker 3>that I kind of get jokes that I didn't get before,

1:09:14.640 --> 1:09:16.280
<v Speaker 3>which makes sense right when I started watching.

1:09:16.800 --> 1:09:18.639
<v Speaker 2>It's one of those things that works for just both

1:09:18.720 --> 1:09:21.000
<v Speaker 2>kids and adults at the same time, exactly.

1:09:21.040 --> 1:09:24.640
<v Speaker 3>And so what has been phenomenal for me is exposing

1:09:24.640 --> 1:09:27.160
<v Speaker 3>my kids to it for the first time. And you know,

1:09:27.240 --> 1:09:29.240
<v Speaker 3>I'll say, so, I'll make some reference to something, and

1:09:29.240 --> 1:09:30.519
<v Speaker 3>my kids will be like, what are you talking about?

1:09:30.520 --> 1:09:32.479
<v Speaker 3>And then I'll pull up the YouTube clip I'll show

1:09:32.520 --> 1:09:33.920
<v Speaker 3>it to them, and then they'll be like, oh, can

1:09:33.960 --> 1:09:36.120
<v Speaker 3>you know can we watch that episode? So that has

1:09:36.120 --> 1:09:36.800
<v Speaker 3>been phenomenal.

1:09:37.000 --> 1:09:39.800
<v Speaker 2>Our final two questions, What sort of advice would you

1:09:39.800 --> 1:09:43.080
<v Speaker 2>give to a recent college grad interest in the career

1:09:43.320 --> 1:09:48.600
<v Speaker 2>in either market design or economics or academia.

1:09:49.080 --> 1:09:53.479
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So, academia. There is a path forward for folks

1:09:53.520 --> 1:09:57.080
<v Speaker 3>who have just graduated college and are thinking about this,

1:09:57.760 --> 1:10:01.120
<v Speaker 3>and that is to get some experience doing research to

1:10:01.160 --> 1:10:05.960
<v Speaker 3>see if you like it. Because the market for tenure

1:10:06.000 --> 1:10:11.200
<v Speaker 3>track academic positions is getting tightened, we're feeling the political

1:10:11.240 --> 1:10:12.679
<v Speaker 3>wins as well as other things.

1:10:12.680 --> 1:10:17.680
<v Speaker 2>They've kind of demographically, there's slightly smaller admission classes and

1:10:17.800 --> 1:10:20.920
<v Speaker 2>I just read seventeen percent drop in international students. That's

1:10:20.960 --> 1:10:21.599
<v Speaker 2>a big number.

1:10:21.920 --> 1:10:26.400
<v Speaker 3>For a lot of the universities that have big PhD programs.

1:10:26.760 --> 1:10:32.880
<v Speaker 3>The budgets for things like the PhD program will depend

1:10:33.000 --> 1:10:37.240
<v Speaker 3>on their revenue streams, and foreign students coming for undergrad

1:10:37.320 --> 1:10:40.000
<v Speaker 3>or for master's degrees is a big revenue source for

1:10:40.000 --> 1:10:42.439
<v Speaker 3>a lot of institutions. So all of that is to

1:10:42.479 --> 1:10:45.800
<v Speaker 3>say that academia remains a great option for folks who

1:10:45.840 --> 1:10:48.320
<v Speaker 3>are interested in it, but it's getting harder and harder.

1:10:49.160 --> 1:10:51.360
<v Speaker 3>But if folks are interested getting and they have not

1:10:51.439 --> 1:10:53.160
<v Speaker 3>yet done it, they may have done it in undergrad

1:10:53.400 --> 1:10:57.840
<v Speaker 3>getting exposure to the research experience. There are predoctoral programs

1:10:57.840 --> 1:11:03.240
<v Speaker 3>for folks who work with academic researchers on their projects

1:11:03.280 --> 1:11:05.200
<v Speaker 3>and kind of get a sense of what is actually like,

1:11:05.880 --> 1:11:08.400
<v Speaker 3>there are master's programs that folks can participate in to

1:11:08.400 --> 1:11:11.160
<v Speaker 3>see what the coursework is like, So that is definitely

1:11:11.479 --> 1:11:15.040
<v Speaker 3>one way to go. There are kids who started earlier,

1:11:15.040 --> 1:11:17.840
<v Speaker 3>who started in college, but I was not one of them,

1:11:17.920 --> 1:11:20.519
<v Speaker 3>right I told the story about senior year kind of realizing, oh,

1:11:20.560 --> 1:11:22.800
<v Speaker 3>I want to do academia. So I hadn't done any

1:11:22.840 --> 1:11:26.479
<v Speaker 3>research assistant work until after I graduated, but is that

1:11:26.600 --> 1:11:28.240
<v Speaker 3>was the next step for me, was saying, Okay, I

1:11:28.240 --> 1:11:30.320
<v Speaker 3>want to see what this is like. So it is

1:11:30.439 --> 1:11:32.720
<v Speaker 3>a path to do, but you should only do it

1:11:32.760 --> 1:11:36.880
<v Speaker 3>if you really want to have a job that only

1:11:37.040 --> 1:11:39.800
<v Speaker 3>someone with a PhD can have, because there are a

1:11:39.840 --> 1:11:41.760
<v Speaker 3>lot of great jobs out there for folks interested in

1:11:41.800 --> 1:11:44.560
<v Speaker 3>these topics, but not in academia.

1:11:44.640 --> 1:11:47.880
<v Speaker 2>So final question, what do you know about the world

1:11:48.080 --> 1:11:53.000
<v Speaker 2>of market designs and economics or even academia that would

1:11:53.000 --> 1:11:55.559
<v Speaker 2>have been useful twenty plus years ago when you were

1:11:55.880 --> 1:11:56.879
<v Speaker 2>first getting started.

1:11:57.080 --> 1:11:57.320
<v Speaker 4>Yeah.

1:11:57.360 --> 1:12:02.320
<v Speaker 3>I think something I've recently developed in part researching for

1:12:02.360 --> 1:12:06.479
<v Speaker 3>the book is just how diverse the hidden markets are

1:12:06.960 --> 1:12:11.760
<v Speaker 3>that we participate in every day. As a young economist

1:12:11.800 --> 1:12:17.320
<v Speaker 3>being trained in how markets worked, I thought basically exclusively

1:12:17.360 --> 1:12:20.720
<v Speaker 3>about prices and the price mechanisms. That was how I

1:12:20.840 --> 1:12:22.720
<v Speaker 3>was taught that those were the markets I looked at.

1:12:23.320 --> 1:12:26.439
<v Speaker 3>And it's only recently that I've realized markets are much

1:12:26.479 --> 1:12:30.920
<v Speaker 3>broader than that, and thinking through the rules of those markets,

1:12:31.240 --> 1:12:34.160
<v Speaker 3>how we could design them better so that, you know,

1:12:34.200 --> 1:12:36.960
<v Speaker 3>they're more equitable and efficient and easy for participants. I

1:12:37.000 --> 1:12:39.639
<v Speaker 3>think there's a lot of gains for us to have

1:12:39.680 --> 1:12:41.840
<v Speaker 3>as a society, So I'm excited to be working on

1:12:41.880 --> 1:12:43.720
<v Speaker 3>it for the next twenty years. But if I if

1:12:43.720 --> 1:12:45.800
<v Speaker 3>I could go back twenty years and say, hey, maybe

1:12:45.800 --> 1:12:48.679
<v Speaker 3>focus on these markets a little bit more, because there's

1:12:48.720 --> 1:12:51.280
<v Speaker 3>a lot of low hanging fruit where we could be

1:12:51.320 --> 1:12:55.360
<v Speaker 3>making things better for everybody. You know, I wish I

1:12:55.400 --> 1:12:57.880
<v Speaker 3>knew that, and I want others to kind of look

1:12:57.920 --> 1:13:00.240
<v Speaker 3>at these markets and say, yeah, this could be better.

1:13:00.640 --> 1:13:05.439
<v Speaker 2>Fascinating. Professor really enjoyed the conversation we have been speaking with.

1:13:05.640 --> 1:13:11.200
<v Speaker 2>Judd Kessler, professor of behavioral economics and market design at

1:13:11.240 --> 1:13:14.400
<v Speaker 2>Wharton at the University of Pennsylvania and author of the

1:13:14.439 --> 1:13:18.320
<v Speaker 2>new book Lucky by Design, The Hidden Economics. You need

1:13:18.640 --> 1:13:21.640
<v Speaker 2>to get more of what you want. I would be

1:13:21.720 --> 1:13:24.680
<v Speaker 2>remiss if I failed to thank the crack team that

1:13:24.840 --> 1:13:29.000
<v Speaker 2>helps me put these conversations together each and every week.

1:13:29.400 --> 1:13:33.760
<v Speaker 2>Alexis Noriega is my video producer. Joan Russo is my

1:13:33.920 --> 1:13:39.320
<v Speaker 2>research assistant. Anna Luke is my producer. I'm Barry Rutolts.

1:13:39.720 --> 1:14:04.280
<v Speaker 2>You've been listening to Master's in Business on Bloomberg Radio.