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Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technologies with

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello everybody,

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Speaker 1: and welcome to tech stuff. My name is Chris Poulette,

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Speaker 1: and I'm an editor here at how stuff works dot Com.

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Speaker 1: Sitting across from me as well. Normally sits next to me,

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Speaker 1: but today we're sitting across one another. It's senior writer

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. Hey, there, you know this uh, this new

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Speaker 1: podcast um situation here where you're actually sitting across from

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Speaker 1: me is totally throwing me off. Yeah, it's it's kind

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Speaker 1: of creepy. I just wish they hadn't put razor blades

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Speaker 1: in the chair. I just wish because it's really uncomfortable.

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Speaker 1: I just wish you didn't have dead eyes. Well, you know,

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Speaker 1: so let's uh, let's start off this podcast on a

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Speaker 1: positive note. All right? Then? Still we started over there? No, no, no,

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Speaker 1: we're gonna keep going. We're one take. Darn it, don't

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Speaker 1: you remember we do this in one take. I just

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Speaker 1: should respect my privacy. Oh well, I'm you know, I'm

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Speaker 1: so sorry. You know, I try to respect everyone's private information,

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Speaker 1: just like one of our favorite social media network gig sites.

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Speaker 1: Oh yeah, why don't we lead in with a little

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Speaker 1: listener mail because I've got something for you. Okay, So

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Speaker 1: here's some listener mail. This comes from Anne Marie, who says, Hi, Jonathan,

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Speaker 1: Hi Chris. I enjoy your podcast and would be interested

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Speaker 1: in hearing a podcast about just how much information Facebook

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Speaker 1: apps can draw. I think many folks would be interested

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Speaker 1: in hearing about just how much information info can be

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Speaker 1: pulled by the apps and games, even if you set

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Speaker 1: your privacy settings to not send out much info. Thanks

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Speaker 1: for the great work and Marie. So today we're gonna

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Speaker 1: talk about Facebook applications, your privacy, and how these three

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Speaker 1: things come together to essentially devour your privacy. They don't see,

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Speaker 1: your privacy pretty much goes out the window. Yes, um,

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Speaker 1: and I don't think most people do want to know.

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Speaker 1: I think most people don't want to know. First of all,

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Speaker 1: let's step in the way back machine. In fact, I

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Speaker 1: expect to hear amazing time traveling special effects. So let's

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Speaker 1: let's revel in that. I bet there will be some.

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Speaker 1: It wasn't that nice boy. That's no pressure to live

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Speaker 1: at all, is it? Sorry? Liz. But anyway you'll come

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Speaker 1: up with something we've said that. Oh you know, I

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Speaker 1: totally forgot to set the time. We're gonna have to

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Speaker 1: do it again. No, no, no, We'll just we'll just

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Speaker 1: imagine that we did. So let's go back to when

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Speaker 1: Facebook first premieres, and of course it's originally for college students.

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Speaker 1: Eventually it gets rolled out to high school students, and

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Speaker 1: then a little bit later it gets rolled out to

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Speaker 1: the rest of us who graduated long ago, and uh,

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Speaker 1: and took over. Actually yeah, and so at this point,

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Speaker 1: Facebook does not have any third party applications. Uh. It

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Speaker 1: had a lot of applications that Facebook develop for themselves, uh,

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Speaker 1: in partnership with other people in some cases, or other companies.

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Speaker 1: But that's right. So before May two thousand seven, you

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Speaker 1: had basic applications like being able to share photos and

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Speaker 1: things like that. But but that was about it, right,

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Speaker 1: and so Facebook was the only entity you were dealing

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Speaker 1: with in that in that case, and then in May

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Speaker 1: two thousand seven, Facebook starts to talk about it's uh

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Speaker 1: Application Developer program, where they start to allow third parties

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Speaker 1: to develop applications to run on Facebook. Facebook would act

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Speaker 1: as the platform and the applications would run on top

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Speaker 1: of it. The applications themselves would exist on other servers,

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Speaker 1: so it's not Facebook's servers that are running these other apps.

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Speaker 1: And these could be practically anything that you can imagine.

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Speaker 1: And a lot of the early apps were things like,

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Speaker 1: you know, uh, zombies, pirates, Ninja's like you could you

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Speaker 1: could play games where you're tagging people to become zombies

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Speaker 1: or pirates, ninjas or whatever. Your friend just bit you, Yeah, really,

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Speaker 1: do you want to join Werewolf Wars or whatever it was?

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Speaker 1: And so, um, well poking was around before because that

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Speaker 1: was a Facebook thing, but their super Poke super Poke

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Speaker 1: is different, yes, super duper Poke, yes, yes, all the

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Speaker 1: different Poke variations. Um so those kind of explode onto

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Speaker 1: the scene. And what people may not have realized at

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Speaker 1: the beginning was that by opting into these applications, they

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Speaker 1: were essentially giving these third parties access to all of

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Speaker 1: their information, and according to the terms of service, those

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Speaker 1: third parties could pretty much do whatever they wanted with

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Speaker 1: that information. And not only was it your information, it

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Speaker 1: was linked to your friends pages as well, and in

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Speaker 1: some cases at least the developer would be able to

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Speaker 1: access your friends pages even if your friends had set

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Speaker 1: their profiles to private. So let's say that you have

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Speaker 1: set your profile to private, I have Okay, well this

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Speaker 1: this is very fitting, all right. So for those of

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Speaker 1: you who have set your profiles to private, I imagine

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Speaker 1: that one of the reasons for that is so that

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Speaker 1: you were not targeted by third parties, by people who

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Speaker 1: are just you know, wanting to sell you something or whatever.

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Speaker 1: You just want your Facebook experience to be you and

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Speaker 1: the friends that you have chosen to contact and and

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Speaker 1: connect with through Facebook. You don't want anything beyond that. Uh.

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Speaker 1: The problem with these apps is that if any of

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Speaker 1: those friends that you have connected with were to install

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Speaker 1: one of these apps on their on their Facebook profile,

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Speaker 1: that third party developer would now be able to read

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Speaker 1: your information as if he or she were one of

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Speaker 1: your friends. So this is a problem obviously, it's already

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Speaker 1: that's a violation of privacy right there. Now, what kind

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Speaker 1: of information are we talking about, Well, anything that you

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Speaker 1: might have given Facebook. So any of your you know,

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Speaker 1: sexual preferences or relationship status. Um, you're the way you

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Speaker 1: vote movies, you like TV today, that's a big one.

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Speaker 1: Your birth day, your gender, um, well, none of that

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Speaker 1: could be used for any kind of identity theft. Well,

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Speaker 1: I mean, not like social security numbers. It could. However,

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Speaker 1: it could very easily be used in some cases for

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Speaker 1: identity theft. Actually, but I was I was being facetious.

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Speaker 1: I I understand, but sometimes we have to spell these

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Speaker 1: out because otherwise I get listener mail um and so, yes,

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Speaker 1: it could be used for identity theft. But even if

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Speaker 1: it's not used for that, it can be used. These

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Speaker 1: third party developers could sell your information to vendors who

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Speaker 1: are targeting advertising at you. And again, you have no

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Speaker 1: say in this because it's all part of the terms

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Speaker 1: of service in the applications. And and furthermore, in the

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Speaker 1: early days of apps, one of the biggest problems was

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Speaker 1: that applications it had absolutely no need to access all

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Speaker 1: of that information. By default, we're getting all of that information. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: So you'd be like, Hey, I want this cool application

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Speaker 1: that lets me give virtual balloons to my friends, and

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Speaker 1: suddenly you know, you're you're you install that application, and

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Speaker 1: you've just handed over your information, including things like your

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Speaker 1: relationship status and your sexual orientation and your job history

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Speaker 1: and your education history. Why do they need that if

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Speaker 1: all you're doing is handing over a picture of a

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Speaker 1: balloon to one of your friends. Yes, yes, that's true.

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Speaker 1: Or you know, if you wanted to find out which

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Speaker 1: Harry Potter house you belong to. Yes. Oh, don't even

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Speaker 1: get me started on quizzes. All right, So anyone who

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Speaker 1: has befriended me on Facebook probably knows that I I

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Speaker 1: harbor a deep seated hatred for quizzes on Facebook. I

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Speaker 1: think that they are the most irritating app to come

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Speaker 1: out of Facebook, or out of any third party developer,

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Speaker 1: I should say, because again, Facebook is not the one

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Speaker 1: developing this, They're just providing the platform. Um. It's one

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Speaker 1: of the most irritating things to come out uh in

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Speaker 1: the Facebook realm. Ever, Um, I I hate seeing them.

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Speaker 1: First of all. I think pretty much every quiz will

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Speaker 1: tell you. The result will tell you what you wanted

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Speaker 1: to hear in the first place. Yes, so you don't

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Speaker 1: learn anything new about yourself by taking one of these quizzes, Okay,

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Speaker 1: you're not gonna learn that. Hey, you know what I

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Speaker 1: learned today. I'm a slithering No if you're sliw yeah, okay, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean I'm slithering through and through. I mean we

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Speaker 1: all know this. That's I mean that's the you know,

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Speaker 1: dark Mark, I'm all about it. You know, it's gonna

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Speaker 1: move the next tattoo. So the uh, that's the thing

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Speaker 1: is that it wouldn't tell me something I didn't already know.

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Speaker 1: You know, I'm gonna answer these and and a lot

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Speaker 1: of people I'm guessing are answering these quizzes in such

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Speaker 1: a way so that they'll get the result they want sure,

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Speaker 1: you know, like they're like, oh, I don't want to

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Speaker 1: be Cyclops, want of Wolverine, So I'm going to choose

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Speaker 1: this answer because that's more of a Wolverine answer. So,

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Speaker 1: because anybody can write these quizzes and so they're often

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Speaker 1: very very transparent to begin with. Right now, That's another

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Speaker 1: interesting thing is that people can write these quizzes using

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Speaker 1: different apps. Now that you have to install the app

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Speaker 1: again through Facebook to be able to write these quizzes.

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Speaker 1: So first of all, you're giving a third party developer

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Speaker 1: access to your information because you want to write a quiz,

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Speaker 1: and then they're getting information from everyone who takes that

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Speaker 1: quiz because they're the ones who developed the tool for

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Speaker 1: the quiz itself. The information is not coming back to

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Speaker 1: you when people take your quiz. It's going. And I'm

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Speaker 1: not talking about you know, their results. No one, no

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Speaker 1: one over at the application cares about what the results are.

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Speaker 1: They care about that personal data. So the people who

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Speaker 1: make the applications that allow you to create quizzes, they've

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Speaker 1: got enormous databases full of information because every so many

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Speaker 1: people are creating quizzes and taking quizzes. That's one of

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Speaker 1: the things that you see if you do a lot

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Speaker 1: of reading about so social networks, as Jonathan and I have,

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Speaker 1: is that a lot of people see the value in

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Speaker 1: companies like Facebook and Twitter in my space is not

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Speaker 1: in the website itself, but in the information about the

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Speaker 1: subscribers because they're able to market to those people and

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Speaker 1: that the amazing demographic information that they've got at their disposal. Um,

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Speaker 1: that's the real value of the company. So basically, any

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Speaker 1: of that information that gets distributed to other parties also

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Speaker 1: gives them, you know, the same the same or similar

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Speaker 1: types of power. Of course, Um, some of that's changing,

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Speaker 1: you know. I actually saw right before we came in,

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Speaker 1: I saw an article on the Computer World that Tony

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Speaker 1: Bradley had written. Um, there's a company in Seattle called

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Speaker 1: app Bank, and they are going to help people write

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Speaker 1: apps essentially um as in, you know, you can actually

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Speaker 1: create your own apps and quizzes using their platform and

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Speaker 1: basically they get a cut of whatever money you make

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Speaker 1: with your app or quiz. UM. So that's kind of

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Speaker 1: interesting because I don't know if that information you know,

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Speaker 1: not to put I I don't know what app banks

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Speaker 1: motives are. I would assume that they are legitimate, you

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Speaker 1: know organization that is, you know, involved in and trying

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Speaker 1: to create and cash in on their ability to help

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Speaker 1: you make applications because the applications themselves. UM. You know,

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Speaker 1: there are quite a few legitimate applications out there for

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Speaker 1: Facebook and they are making you know, money for those developers.

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Speaker 1: So you know, I don't I don't think at bank

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Speaker 1: UH is trying to do anything nefarious, but that doesn't

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Speaker 1: stop anybody from signing up for, you know, for their

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Speaker 1: services and trying to get information that way, so you know,

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Speaker 1: they're gonna have to be very careful. I think I

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Speaker 1: think it's important for any person using Facebook to understand

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Speaker 1: that when you install an app on your Facebook, UM,

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Speaker 1: you are essentially giving that vendor access to your profile

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Speaker 1: as if you were befriending that person. UM, keep that

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Speaker 1: in mind. So if you post stuff on your Facebook

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Speaker 1: that you know, you don't mind if your friends see it,

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Speaker 1: but you don't really want anyone else to see it,

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Speaker 1: remember that before you start installing apps, because you are

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Speaker 1: essentially giving that that entity the same rights as your

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Speaker 1: friends and UM and again like the whole, if you

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Speaker 1: set your your says to private and someone else, uh

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Speaker 1: installs this app and that allows the vendor to look

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Speaker 1: in at you, that would probably upset you. I mean

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Speaker 1: it would upset me. And it's true, it totally can happen. Um.

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Speaker 1: This has caused lots of issues for Facebook. There was

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Speaker 1: one point where Facebook said Facebook executives were saying that, uh,

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Speaker 1: they were going to change the app development process so

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Speaker 1: that apps would only be able to access the information

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Speaker 1: they absolutely needed to have in order to function the

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Speaker 1: way they were supposed to function. You know why that is?

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Speaker 1: It's because groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, the

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Speaker 1: a c l U and uh, you know, the Canadian

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Speaker 1: Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic have been putting pressure

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Speaker 1: on Facebook to change their policies. It's called Facebook A

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Speaker 1: I knew you were going to do that. You love

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Speaker 1: you love listener mail from Canada. I've got I've got

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Speaker 1: more to say about Canada in a little bit, but

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Speaker 1: go ahead, okay, Uh yeah, I mean apparently Facebook was

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Speaker 1: retaining information from accounts that had been closed, and uh

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Speaker 1: that's you know, against the law, and in Canada, right,

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Speaker 1: there was there was one point where I saw I

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Speaker 1: saw a claim from a Facebook executive that was made

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Speaker 1: to someone who writes it for Senet. I apologize because

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Speaker 1: I this is from memory. It's just from an article

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Speaker 1: I've read ages ago. But I remember that the executive

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Speaker 1: said that they Facebook was certain that once that the

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Speaker 1: data that the vendors had wasn't being used for any

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Speaker 1: uh any well, you know, underhanded purposes, and the reporters

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Speaker 1: once was. There's no way Facebook would know that because

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Speaker 1: once the information leaves your servers, you don't know what

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Speaker 1: how it's being used. I mean, you you can maybe

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Speaker 1: hopefully weed out the obvious bad apples from the bunch,

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Speaker 1: but there's no guarantee that any particular vendor is behaving

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Speaker 1: the way it should based upon the general policies. Of course,

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Speaker 1: that's not limited to you know, social media. That's you know,

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Speaker 1: well sure sure, But the point being that, you know,

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Speaker 1: Facebook really couldn't make this guarantee that the data was

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Speaker 1: but that good. But they don't know. Now, let's let's

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Speaker 1: talk quickly about Beacon, since that just beacon, Beacon Beacon.

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Speaker 1: So Beacon was this, uh, this this concept that Facebook

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Speaker 1: came up with that was almost universally um decried. They

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Speaker 1: people just hated the idea of Beacon anyone who was

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Speaker 1: like really looking into the privacy issues anyway. So there's

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Speaker 1: what Beacon did was it was a kind of an

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Speaker 1: application that would was automatically part of Facebook. You didn't

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Speaker 1: opt into this, In fact, you had to opt out

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Speaker 1: of it. And Facebook doesn't necessarily make things easy to

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Speaker 1: opt out of. You have to really know where to look. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: you have to really know where to look in order

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Speaker 1: to change certain privacy settings and do things like opt

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Speaker 1: out of applications like Beacon. And the idea behind Beacon

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Speaker 1: was that it would link your activities through various sights

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Speaker 1: to your Facebook accounts, so that you could presumably keep

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Speaker 1: your friends up to speed with what it was you

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Speaker 1: were interested in. And the idea behind here is kind of,

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Speaker 1: you know, as kind of nice as the idea is

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Speaker 1: that you know you can if you're interested in a

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Speaker 1: in a book series, for example, you would automatically let

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Speaker 1: people know that, hey, you just purchase the latest you

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Speaker 1: know in this in this series of books, so people

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Speaker 1: could say, hey, you know, maybe I should read that

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Speaker 1: because he's a cool guy. I like his taste, and

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Speaker 1: he's reading this. Now. Let's say it sort of serves

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Speaker 1: two purposes. I mean, one, you've got the social networking

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Speaker 1: aspect of it, where you're sharing cool stuff with your friends. Hey,

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Speaker 1: I just checked out this cool new cd uh. And

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Speaker 1: you have the company on the other end, who goes, hey,

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Speaker 1: and you can buy it from my store right now

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Speaker 1: for just only that. But again more targeting advertising because

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Speaker 1: they start seeing what individual people like to purchase and

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Speaker 1: then they can target ads specifically at you based on that,

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Speaker 1: and and it makes sense you'd go, Okay, well, they

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Speaker 1: probably won't mind this as much because we're adding sort

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Speaker 1: of a social flavor to it and maybe it'll get

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Speaker 1: people to be cool. And it's kind of like I

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Speaker 1: think it was kind of presuming that this way, it

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Speaker 1: takes out the middleman, Like, you know, you would probably

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Speaker 1: want people to know that you are shooting this series,

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Speaker 1: so we're just gonna take that that extra step of

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Speaker 1: you having to type it out and we're just gonna

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Speaker 1: make that automatic, which could possibly go wrong with this.

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Speaker 1: So here's some Here's some issues that Facebook thought about

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Speaker 1: before they implemented this, or if they did think about it,

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Speaker 1: they didn't think about it hard enough. One is that

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Speaker 1: let's say that you're searching for something that you don't

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Speaker 1: necessarily want the world to know that you're looking for.

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Speaker 1: Let's say that you're uh buying a book on cancer treatments. Okay,

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Speaker 1: that's very serious issue. And now suddenly if it goes

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Speaker 1: to your Facebook that so and so just bought, you know,

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Speaker 1: living with Cancer book. Now all these people who may

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Speaker 1: not have known whether you know, whether it's you who

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Speaker 1: are suffering through this or you're buying it for someone

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Speaker 1: else that you share about. You don't want all your

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Speaker 1: Facebook friends to something like, oh my god, are you

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Speaker 1: okay if you're not ready to talk about that kind

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Speaker 1: of thing, especially if it's not you know, your own

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Speaker 1: condition and it's someone else's. You don't want every the

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Speaker 1: whole world to know that you just bought this book.

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Speaker 1: So there's that there's that kind of privacy issue, And

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Speaker 1: of course there's also you know, if you were buying

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Speaker 1: something a little more lascivious. Let's say the heaving bosom

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Speaker 1: for instance. Now in hardback, if you wanted to go

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Speaker 1: and purchase the heaving bosom, uh, you know, then next thing,

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Speaker 1: you know, everyone knows you bought this, and you're going

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Speaker 1: to withstand tons and tons of teasing for the rest

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Speaker 1: of your natural life. Please stop. Look, it was for

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Speaker 1: a relative anyway, Or let's say you were purchasing it

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Speaker 1: for someone a gift, a surprise for that person. But

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Speaker 1: it's not a surprise anymore because it was published on Facebook.

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Speaker 1: And that's a good point. So that's a very good

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Speaker 1: reason right there. Yeah, there are plenty of reasons that

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Speaker 1: have nothing to do with oh, well, you know it's

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Speaker 1: all the people who are worried about their you know,

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Speaker 1: they're porn getting out there on Facebook. No, it has

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Speaker 1: nothing to do with that. I mean for some people, sure,

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Speaker 1: I'm sure it has something to do with that. But

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Speaker 1: it goes well beyond just those kind of like he he,

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Speaker 1: he's a naughty boy kind of of comments. You know,

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Speaker 1: there are a lot of legitimate reasons why a perfectly

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Speaker 1: innocent purchase you would not want that to be broadcast

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Speaker 1: across the world Wide Web, and Facebook is pretty broad.

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Speaker 1: I mean there's millions, hundreds of millions of users. So

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Speaker 1: Beacon got a lot of complaints starting off the right.

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Speaker 1: Off the bat actually ended up there ended up being

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Speaker 1: a class action lawsuit leveled against Facebook, uh by by

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Speaker 1: a group of users who all claimed that Beacon was

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Speaker 1: violating their privacy and that, for instance, the main crux

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Speaker 1: here was an issue with Blockbuster. Okay, so that was

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Speaker 1: one of the vendors that was partnered with Beacon. If

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Speaker 1: you were to rent a movie from Blockbuster, it would

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Speaker 1: send that out on your Facebook feed, and suddenly everyone

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Speaker 1: knows that you just rented you know, Big Trouble Little China,

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Speaker 1: best movie ever made, by the way, Um, I haven't

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Speaker 1: seen it. Yeah, no, it's it's Big Trouble Little China.

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Speaker 1: Godfather too. Um so you haven't seen cud Father to

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Speaker 1: Oh my god. Alright, wait, I gotta take a moment.

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Speaker 1: I don't know that I can continue just off the bat. Right,

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Speaker 1: So anyway, with broadcast this, well that's technically against the law.

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Speaker 1: Companies like Blockbuster are legally obligated to keep that information private. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's it's in this specific instance, right, It's not all media.

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Speaker 1: It's in in this broke a specific law, right, a

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Speaker 1: specific law that states that that vendors that rent out

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Speaker 1: in films cannot publish what people are renting, what specific

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Speaker 1: people are renting. Now you might be able to say, like,

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Speaker 1: this is the most popular rental this month, but that's

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Speaker 1: different because it's anonymous. You're not saying Bob Smith rented

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Speaker 1: this this month. So anyway, that that class action lawsuit

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Speaker 1: eventually lead to Facebook saying, WHOA, sorry, we totally did

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Speaker 1: not think this through before we pushed beacon out the door,

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Speaker 1: and they quietly discontinued it, and then in September of

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Speaker 1: two thousand nine they officially killed it. Uh. Now, Facebook Connect,

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Speaker 1: which is a new service on Facebook, does a lot

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Speaker 1: of the same things, but it's all opt in. You

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Speaker 1: can choose what you you share with Facebook Connect, as

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Speaker 1: opposed to it being you know, the default. So that's

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Speaker 1: that's a good step. But I mean, it does a

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Speaker 1: lot of the same things. So if you're using Facebook Connect,

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Speaker 1: just be aware that it's essentially the same thing. It's

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Speaker 1: just now they're they're doing it with your permission as

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Speaker 1: opposed to just assuming you're okay with it, right, right,

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Speaker 1: You know there there actually have been, um, some applications

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Speaker 1: that have asked for very sensitive information like credit card numbers,

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Speaker 1: et cetera, and um, you gotta wonder what they're going

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Speaker 1: to do with that. Um you really shouldn't wonder. Just

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Speaker 1: don't use those Yeah, that's I've actually seen an article

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Speaker 1: by by somebody who didn't realize that it had nothing

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Speaker 1: to do with you know, um, they were giving away

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Speaker 1: their very personal information. Yeah no, no, you really shouldn't

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Speaker 1: be giving them that kind of stuff. Giving adding those

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Speaker 1: kind of aplications gives them the vendors way too much

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Speaker 1: power over your information, whether they're planning on doing anything

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Speaker 1: with it or not. That's beside the point. Now, some

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Speaker 1: some applications are actually phishing scams. They're trying to get

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Speaker 1: your personal information so that they can neither commit identity

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Speaker 1: theft or they can do a credit card fraud or whatever. Um,

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Speaker 1: So you know, looking to see what kind of information

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Speaker 1: they're asking for and thinking about it before you just agree.

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Speaker 1: That's that's key, you know. I mean, even if Facebook

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Speaker 1: really buckles down and tries to prevent as much uh

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Speaker 1: hanky panky as possible, stuff is gonna get through. Because

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Speaker 1: we're talking about thousands of applications being added all the

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Speaker 1: time and Facebook can't police all of them. If they did,

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Speaker 1: then it would suddenly be a huge nightmare for Facebook.

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Speaker 1: I mean you you know they they I'm sure they

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Speaker 1: don't even have the manpower to do that. So, unlike

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Speaker 1: Apple's App Store, where they review each app thoroughly before

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Speaker 1: it goes live, I don't know how much time Facebook

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Speaker 1: can spend looking at each individual application before it goes

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Speaker 1: live on on the site. Um And a part of

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Speaker 1: their philosophy was that the hive mind would kind of

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Speaker 1: sort out what's good and what's not good, that people

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Speaker 1: would adopt applications that are fun and useful and they

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Speaker 1: would ignore the ones that are kind of fishy. I

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Speaker 1: don't know how true that is, because if you look

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Speaker 1: at some of the pictures people post to Facebook, I

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Speaker 1: would say that some people don't have that critical thinking skill.

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Speaker 1: You know. I'm just saying, if you have a picture

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Speaker 1: of yourself unconscious with a bottle of booze laying next

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Speaker 1: to your head as your profile picture, you may not

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Speaker 1: have the critical thinking skills necessary to determine what is

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Speaker 1: and is not a good application. Because you know, employers

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Speaker 1: look at Facebook. Potential employers look at Facebook. Pretty sure

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Speaker 1: a picture of you passed out next to a bottle

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Speaker 1: is not gonna be the kind of thing that most

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Speaker 1: employers are going to be looking for, unless you're interviewing

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Speaker 1: for maxim or something. But um, so I said I

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Speaker 1: was going to get back to Canada. Yeah, I was

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Speaker 1: kind of hoping you'd forget about that. No, no, no,

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Speaker 1: I've remembered day. So the Privacy Commission in Canada had

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Speaker 1: major issues with Facebook. Um and took these issues to

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Speaker 1: Facebook and demanded that Facebook makes some changes. And the

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00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:29,399
Speaker 1: very first thing they they raised. The first issue they

427
00:24:29,440 --> 00:24:32,479
Speaker 1: raised was third party application developers. So let me just

428
00:24:32,520 --> 00:24:35,879
Speaker 1: read this. This is a quick overview of what happened

429
00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:39,520
Speaker 1: and what Facebook says it's going to do. The sharing

430
00:24:39,560 --> 00:24:43,080
Speaker 1: of personal information with third party developers creating Facebook applications

431
00:24:43,119 --> 00:24:46,680
Speaker 1: such as games and quizzes raises serious privacy risks. With

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00:24:46,720 --> 00:24:49,760
Speaker 1: more than one million developers around the globe, the Commissioner

433
00:24:49,840 --> 00:24:53,199
Speaker 1: is concerned about a lack of adequate safeguards to effectively

434
00:24:53,280 --> 00:24:57,240
Speaker 1: restrict those developers from accessing users personal information, along with

435
00:24:57,280 --> 00:25:02,879
Speaker 1: information about their online friends. Facebook's response, Facebook has agreed

436
00:25:02,920 --> 00:25:05,640
Speaker 1: to retrofit its application platform in a way that will

437
00:25:05,680 --> 00:25:10,399
Speaker 1: prevent any application from accessing information until it obtains express

438
00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:15,080
Speaker 1: consent for each category of personal information which wishes to access.

439
00:25:16,280 --> 00:25:20,600
Speaker 1: Under this new permissions model, users adding an application will

440
00:25:20,640 --> 00:25:24,920
Speaker 1: be advised that the application wants access to specific categories

441
00:25:24,960 --> 00:25:27,440
Speaker 1: of information. The user will be able to control which

442
00:25:27,480 --> 00:25:30,520
Speaker 1: categories of information and application is permitted to to access.

443
00:25:31,080 --> 00:25:34,000
Speaker 1: There will also be a link to a statement by

444
00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:37,040
Speaker 1: the developer to explain how it will use the data,

445
00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:39,679
Speaker 1: which I think is kind of interesting. That's that's the

446
00:25:39,680 --> 00:25:41,880
Speaker 1: first I've ever heard that about a link to actually

447
00:25:41,920 --> 00:25:48,399
Speaker 1: say this is why we need the information that we're requesting. Um.

448
00:25:48,400 --> 00:25:51,159
Speaker 1: No telling when this will take effect, but apparently Facebook

449
00:25:51,160 --> 00:25:55,680
Speaker 1: says they'll totally do it, okay, UM, if you're curious.

450
00:25:56,160 --> 00:25:58,959
Speaker 1: The other elements that the Privacy Commission was concerned with

451
00:25:59,160 --> 00:26:03,639
Speaker 1: was d activating versus deleting accounts on Facebook, because if

452
00:26:03,680 --> 00:26:07,040
Speaker 1: you deactivate, you haven't deleted. You're just you're just stepping back.

453
00:26:07,600 --> 00:26:10,840
Speaker 1: We know, some of your information stays out there unless

454
00:26:10,880 --> 00:26:13,440
Speaker 1: that you've written on other people's wall, you know, all

455
00:26:13,440 --> 00:26:15,600
Speaker 1: that kind of stuff. If their accounts are still active,

456
00:26:15,640 --> 00:26:17,639
Speaker 1: that that material is still there well that and that

457
00:26:17,720 --> 00:26:19,680
Speaker 1: was part of the issue was that they were stating,

458
00:26:19,760 --> 00:26:23,720
Speaker 1: you know, Facebook really needs to define the difference between

459
00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:26,320
Speaker 1: de activating and deleting, make it clear to the user,

460
00:26:26,880 --> 00:26:30,000
Speaker 1: and make it easy for a user to choose whichever

461
00:26:30,040 --> 00:26:33,720
Speaker 1: option he or she wants, because again, it ain't easy

462
00:26:33,760 --> 00:26:35,679
Speaker 1: to find this stuff. You've got to really hunt around.

463
00:26:36,520 --> 00:26:38,399
Speaker 1: But I mean that's you know, the whole purpose of

464
00:26:38,440 --> 00:26:41,200
Speaker 1: the site is to connect people to each other, so

465
00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:43,879
Speaker 1: it kind of, you know, making it easy to pop

466
00:26:43,880 --> 00:26:48,000
Speaker 1: out of that is antithetical to their business model. Um.

467
00:26:48,000 --> 00:26:51,520
Speaker 1: The other two elements were personal information of non users,

468
00:26:51,720 --> 00:26:54,240
Speaker 1: so people who don't actually use Facebook but are visiting

469
00:26:54,320 --> 00:26:58,639
Speaker 1: Facebook to look at whatever. And what to do with

470
00:26:58,720 --> 00:27:02,800
Speaker 1: the accounts of deceit users, which we've talked about a

471
00:27:02,800 --> 00:27:06,040
Speaker 1: little bit. You know, what happens to your online identity

472
00:27:06,040 --> 00:27:10,840
Speaker 1: when you, you you know, shuffle off the mortal coil. I've

473
00:27:10,880 --> 00:27:12,920
Speaker 1: been doing some research on that. I want to hit

474
00:27:12,960 --> 00:27:15,360
Speaker 1: that again in greater details. Yeah, we're going to do another,

475
00:27:16,080 --> 00:27:18,960
Speaker 1: I think, because that is a really interesting It's becoming

476
00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:23,560
Speaker 1: more and more relevant because as as the current generation

477
00:27:23,800 --> 00:27:26,960
Speaker 1: that's really the movers and shakers of of what's going

478
00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:29,639
Speaker 1: on today and future generations which are going to be

479
00:27:29,680 --> 00:27:33,600
Speaker 1: even more integrated with the online world. It's the stuff

480
00:27:33,680 --> 00:27:38,919
Speaker 1: is kind of important. Um So anyway, good on you

481
00:27:39,040 --> 00:27:42,679
Speaker 1: Canada for taking Facebook the task and holding them responsible

482
00:27:42,720 --> 00:27:44,800
Speaker 1: for this kind of stuff because you know, it's just

483
00:27:45,960 --> 00:27:48,760
Speaker 1: it's and and hopefully this will these will be policies

484
00:27:48,800 --> 00:27:50,720
Speaker 1: that will roll out worldwide and it won't just be

485
00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:53,960
Speaker 1: for our Canadian friends, because then will be like, why

486
00:27:53,960 --> 00:27:57,720
Speaker 1: do they get all the privacy? Really, you need to

487
00:27:57,760 --> 00:28:04,240
Speaker 1: stop like poutine? What oh now that you're gonna get

488
00:28:04,240 --> 00:28:09,480
Speaker 1: mail now? You know, because you just you just denigrated

489
00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:13,399
Speaker 1: a a national food buddy. I don't like a lot

490
00:28:13,440 --> 00:28:16,040
Speaker 1: of American national foods, is sure, Chris is a very

491
00:28:16,040 --> 00:28:22,119
Speaker 1: picky eater. That's not even a joke. So let's boil

492
00:28:22,160 --> 00:28:27,159
Speaker 1: it down. Okay, Facebook apps, Yes, they do get access

493
00:28:27,200 --> 00:28:30,840
Speaker 1: to your information. Uh. Depending upon the application, it may

494
00:28:30,880 --> 00:28:34,119
Speaker 1: get access to a lot of your information. What they

495
00:28:34,160 --> 00:28:36,960
Speaker 1: do with that information is pretty much up to them.

496
00:28:37,119 --> 00:28:39,840
Speaker 1: Um So, if you're okay with your information being spread

497
00:28:39,840 --> 00:28:42,160
Speaker 1: throughout the Worldwide Web and being used for things like

498
00:28:42,480 --> 00:28:46,480
Speaker 1: targeting advertising or whatever, feel free to use those applications.

499
00:28:47,120 --> 00:28:48,920
Speaker 1: If you're a little more concerned, about your privacy. You

500
00:28:48,960 --> 00:28:51,640
Speaker 1: might want to cut back a bit on the application use,

501
00:28:52,400 --> 00:28:55,720
Speaker 1: especially applications that you don't know who's behind it, right,

502
00:28:55,800 --> 00:28:59,720
Speaker 1: and quizzes, just stop doing them. Stop doing quizzes because

503
00:28:59,760 --> 00:29:02,600
Speaker 1: really they're they're so irritating to have those pop up

504
00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:05,640
Speaker 1: and fee fill up my friend feed so that I

505
00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:07,880
Speaker 1: can't read any status is because I have to find

506
00:29:07,880 --> 00:29:12,800
Speaker 1: out which hobbit my buddy is you read friend feed?

507
00:29:13,960 --> 00:29:17,560
Speaker 1: I'm stunned. My my friend the my news feed where

508
00:29:17,560 --> 00:29:21,400
Speaker 1: all my friends status is feed dot com. No, I

509
00:29:21,600 --> 00:29:26,440
Speaker 1: very rarely get a friend feed. Yeah, Facebook, So we'll

510
00:29:26,440 --> 00:29:29,600
Speaker 1: see how that works out. But uh and yeah, like

511
00:29:29,640 --> 00:29:31,400
Speaker 1: I said, the quizzes don't really tell you anything you

512
00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:35,840
Speaker 1: didn't already know, so it's useless anyway. Please stop taking them. Okay,

513
00:29:36,120 --> 00:29:39,640
Speaker 1: that's thank you, So I do too, but that a

514
00:29:39,680 --> 00:29:42,280
Speaker 1: new one pops up every day, at least one, and

515
00:29:42,320 --> 00:29:44,400
Speaker 1: I've got friends who will take like six or seven

516
00:29:44,400 --> 00:29:47,920
Speaker 1: at a time, so you'll just bloom blue bloop and uh. Yeah,

517
00:29:48,160 --> 00:29:51,680
Speaker 1: I wanted to create a quiz that said what kind

518
00:29:51,720 --> 00:29:54,680
Speaker 1: of Facebook user are you? And no matter what answers

519
00:29:54,720 --> 00:29:57,040
Speaker 1: you put in, the result would be you're the kind

520
00:29:57,040 --> 00:30:00,280
Speaker 1: of jerk who likes to take Facebook quizzes. You know

521
00:30:00,320 --> 00:30:02,160
Speaker 1: it's he's going to do that now. Well, I can't

522
00:30:02,240 --> 00:30:04,840
Speaker 1: because the quiz tool that I wanted to use specifically

523
00:30:04,840 --> 00:30:07,360
Speaker 1: stated that you can't use the term Facebook in your

524
00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:11,400
Speaker 1: quiz because they want to protect their their corporate identity.

525
00:30:11,720 --> 00:30:14,239
Speaker 1: So even if I had created one, it wouldn't have

526
00:30:14,360 --> 00:30:18,040
Speaker 1: worked out. And so you guys are spared my my

527
00:30:18,360 --> 00:30:23,200
Speaker 1: snarky quiz. Well that's about all I have about Facebook

528
00:30:23,200 --> 00:30:26,600
Speaker 1: apps and privacy. So I guess this takes us to

529
00:30:26,800 --> 00:30:33,680
Speaker 1: our second installment of Listener, ma'am. And this listener mail

530
00:30:33,760 --> 00:30:36,800
Speaker 1: comes from Nosh and I hope I'm saying that correctly

531
00:30:37,320 --> 00:30:42,280
Speaker 1: because I don't have an pronunciation guide. Hi. I'm Noh

532
00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:45,960
Speaker 1: twelve years, nine months and twenty six days old and

533
00:30:46,160 --> 00:30:49,760
Speaker 1: I'm from Vietnam. How are you guys doing. I really

534
00:30:49,760 --> 00:30:52,040
Speaker 1: like your podcast, so just keep on rocking. I would

535
00:30:52,040 --> 00:30:53,720
Speaker 1: also like to thank you guys for putting in the

536
00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:56,440
Speaker 1: effort to make a great and enjoyable podcast. But I

537
00:30:56,480 --> 00:30:59,080
Speaker 1: have a request and could you guys simply at the

538
00:30:59,160 --> 00:31:01,320
Speaker 1: end of every podcast us provide a short and brief

539
00:31:01,360 --> 00:31:03,560
Speaker 1: summary covering all the main points that you guys were

540
00:31:03,600 --> 00:31:07,840
Speaker 1: talking about so I can memorize them more easily. Thanks well,

541
00:31:07,960 --> 00:31:10,080
Speaker 1: thank you so much for that email. It's very nice

542
00:31:10,080 --> 00:31:12,160
Speaker 1: of you to write. Um, we tried to sum up

543
00:31:12,160 --> 00:31:15,120
Speaker 1: a little bit just then, because yeah, summing up is

544
00:31:15,120 --> 00:31:18,600
Speaker 1: is useful. The challenge for us is that we don't

545
00:31:18,640 --> 00:31:22,640
Speaker 1: script these podcasts out at all. Chris and I sit down,

546
00:31:22,800 --> 00:31:25,080
Speaker 1: we've done our research, and then we just talk out

547
00:31:25,120 --> 00:31:28,560
Speaker 1: through a you know, whatever the topic is, talk around

548
00:31:28,640 --> 00:31:32,600
Speaker 1: it and give it context. So it's challenging to sum

549
00:31:32,680 --> 00:31:35,800
Speaker 1: up at the end because it's just a conversation. So

550
00:31:35,840 --> 00:31:38,360
Speaker 1: it's it's for one thing, I have to remember what

551
00:31:38,400 --> 00:31:41,880
Speaker 1: I've talked about little last twenty five minutes, and I

552
00:31:42,000 --> 00:31:44,560
Speaker 1: have trouble remembering what I said two minutes ago. So

553
00:31:44,840 --> 00:31:46,480
Speaker 1: but we will see what we can do. We'll try

554
00:31:46,520 --> 00:31:49,040
Speaker 1: and be as clear as possible, because we do understand

555
00:31:49,080 --> 00:31:53,600
Speaker 1: the need for that kind of summary. If any of

556
00:31:53,600 --> 00:31:57,920
Speaker 1: you have any comments, questions, concerns, anything like that, not

557
00:31:58,640 --> 00:32:02,000
Speaker 1: no noah tech quests like my computer is not doing this,

558
00:32:02,920 --> 00:32:06,480
Speaker 1: no tech support, but any other kind of questions, you

559
00:32:06,480 --> 00:32:09,560
Speaker 1: can write us. Our email address is tech stuff at

560
00:32:09,640 --> 00:32:12,080
Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com. If you want to learn more,

561
00:32:12,120 --> 00:32:15,120
Speaker 1: about Facebook and different kinds of applications. You can read

562
00:32:15,120 --> 00:32:17,320
Speaker 1: about that at how stuff works dot com. Crispy and

563
00:32:17,320 --> 00:32:23,120
Speaker 1: I will put you again really soon for moral thiss

564
00:32:23,120 --> 00:32:25,640
Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics does it how stuff works

565
00:32:25,640 --> 00:32:27,760
Speaker 1: dot com and be sure to check out the new

566
00:32:27,800 --> 00:32:30,960
Speaker 1: tech stuff blog now on the how stuff Works homepage,

567
00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:37,840
Speaker 1: brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

568
00:32:38,160 --> 00:32:39,400
Speaker 1: It's ready, are you