1 00:00:15,640 --> 00:00:19,080 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff. Our guest today is Ben C. Solomon, 2 00:00:19,320 --> 00:00:22,639 Speaker 1: a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and filmmaker who reports on 3 00:00:22,720 --> 00:00:26,520 Speaker 1: combat zones and international crises. His work has appeared as 4 00:00:26,520 --> 00:00:28,680 Speaker 1: in New York Times, on WECE, and in the Wall 5 00:00:28,720 --> 00:00:32,600 Speaker 1: Street Journal, and a recent Instagram video of Ben's really 6 00:00:32,600 --> 00:00:33,320 Speaker 1: caught my attention. 7 00:00:34,080 --> 00:00:36,960 Speaker 2: The way that the Irridians have designed current status of 8 00:00:37,000 --> 00:00:40,879 Speaker 2: this war. It won't be about who has the biggest guns. 9 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:44,200 Speaker 2: It'll be about who can afford to keep pulling the trigger. 10 00:00:44,520 --> 00:00:48,559 Speaker 1: It had the following caption, just follow the money. In 11 00:00:48,640 --> 00:00:50,599 Speaker 1: the first few days of this conflict, the US has 12 00:00:50,640 --> 00:00:54,040 Speaker 1: fired over eight hundred Patriot missiles. They cost about four 13 00:00:54,040 --> 00:00:57,600 Speaker 1: million dollars per missile. An Iranian shah Head drone costs 14 00:00:57,640 --> 00:01:00,640 Speaker 1: about thirty thousand dollars to make. So how is this 15 00:01:00,760 --> 00:01:01,480 Speaker 1: going to work? 16 00:01:02,080 --> 00:01:02,240 Speaker 2: How? 17 00:01:02,280 --> 00:01:02,680 Speaker 1: Indeed? 18 00:01:03,200 --> 00:01:05,360 Speaker 2: Ben, welcome, Thanks thanks for having me. 19 00:01:05,640 --> 00:01:06,800 Speaker 1: So you asked the. 20 00:01:06,840 --> 00:01:10,199 Speaker 2: Question, what's the onset? You know, I don't think there's 21 00:01:10,319 --> 00:01:14,760 Speaker 2: still a clear guideline for the Americans. I think that 22 00:01:15,000 --> 00:01:19,160 Speaker 2: when the fighting started, it was pretty obvious that the 23 00:01:19,200 --> 00:01:21,840 Speaker 2: American military thought that this was going to be a 24 00:01:21,840 --> 00:01:23,280 Speaker 2: pretty fast process. 25 00:01:23,360 --> 00:01:24,440 Speaker 1: I ever heard that one before. 26 00:01:26,240 --> 00:01:31,240 Speaker 2: It's Yeah, it's kind of played out to a lot 27 00:01:31,280 --> 00:01:34,160 Speaker 2: of complicated ways for the way that the military works. 28 00:01:34,600 --> 00:01:36,840 Speaker 2: I think that a lot of the advisors in the 29 00:01:36,840 --> 00:01:40,080 Speaker 2: Pentagon had been advising against this, and a lot of 30 00:01:39,680 --> 00:01:44,960 Speaker 2: the mechanisms that they have for defending against the attacks 31 00:01:44,959 --> 00:01:48,640 Speaker 2: that they probably expected are in fact ready. But the 32 00:01:48,680 --> 00:01:51,680 Speaker 2: attacks they didn't expect are the ones that are coming now, 33 00:01:52,040 --> 00:01:55,640 Speaker 2: and that's really drones. And because of that, it's become 34 00:01:55,760 --> 00:01:59,360 Speaker 2: a really financially imbalanced fight and that's where their problems 35 00:01:59,360 --> 00:01:59,800 Speaker 2: are now. 36 00:02:00,200 --> 00:02:02,760 Speaker 1: Now, how is it they didn't expect drones because the 37 00:02:02,800 --> 00:02:06,160 Speaker 1: Iranians famously have been manufacturing sha head drones, which is 38 00:02:06,200 --> 00:02:09,320 Speaker 1: showing up on the battlefield in Ukraine for the Russians 39 00:02:09,320 --> 00:02:11,840 Speaker 1: for the last thral four years. So Iran even as 40 00:02:11,880 --> 00:02:13,760 Speaker 1: a reader of the newspaper, you know that they have 41 00:02:13,800 --> 00:02:15,559 Speaker 1: a big drone manufacturing capability. 42 00:02:15,680 --> 00:02:19,880 Speaker 2: Well, you know, I can't speak to the American military 43 00:02:19,960 --> 00:02:22,880 Speaker 2: manufacturing and what maybe they did or didn't expect, but 44 00:02:23,360 --> 00:02:25,200 Speaker 2: what we can deduce from the way that it's played 45 00:02:25,200 --> 00:02:27,680 Speaker 2: out over the past few weeks is that they really, 46 00:02:27,760 --> 00:02:29,760 Speaker 2: even if they had thought about your head drones, they 47 00:02:29,760 --> 00:02:31,560 Speaker 2: didn't plan for it to go for more than a 48 00:02:31,600 --> 00:02:34,880 Speaker 2: few days, and because of that, what we're seeing is 49 00:02:34,919 --> 00:02:37,720 Speaker 2: real imbalance in arms. The ship head drones are about 50 00:02:37,720 --> 00:02:41,120 Speaker 2: thirty thousand dollars each twenty thirty thousand dollars. They're really basic, 51 00:02:41,160 --> 00:02:43,880 Speaker 2: they're really easy to make, and for someone like me 52 00:02:43,919 --> 00:02:46,520 Speaker 2: who's been working and covering Ukraine for many years now, 53 00:02:46,720 --> 00:02:48,799 Speaker 2: you see them all the time. I mean they are 54 00:02:48,919 --> 00:02:52,200 Speaker 2: if you are a Ukrainian living in the city, you 55 00:02:52,400 --> 00:02:55,240 Speaker 2: know it well. You know the sound. It's haunting. It 56 00:02:55,320 --> 00:02:58,480 Speaker 2: sounds like a buzzing in the air, and it happens 57 00:02:58,560 --> 00:03:00,639 Speaker 2: every few nights that these things are crashing in. 58 00:03:00,960 --> 00:03:01,799 Speaker 1: What do they look like. 59 00:03:02,160 --> 00:03:04,600 Speaker 2: They're kind of, you know, their fiberglass hull. They're about 60 00:03:05,040 --> 00:03:06,839 Speaker 2: i don't know, like the size of maybe like half 61 00:03:06,880 --> 00:03:10,360 Speaker 2: of like a car. They are pretty basic. In the front, 62 00:03:10,360 --> 00:03:12,480 Speaker 2: they have a long tube and then the back is 63 00:03:12,520 --> 00:03:17,760 Speaker 2: a engine that is it's basically the Iranian who developed 64 00:03:17,760 --> 00:03:20,760 Speaker 2: the Iranian military forces who developed it, like reverse engineered 65 00:03:20,960 --> 00:03:24,360 Speaker 2: a what is basically the engine of a VW Beetle. 66 00:03:24,680 --> 00:03:28,720 Speaker 2: It's about a two hundred horsepower engine that they apparently 67 00:03:28,760 --> 00:03:31,360 Speaker 2: found in a different arms or a different a different 68 00:03:31,360 --> 00:03:34,280 Speaker 2: a small aircraft, a German aircraft and then a reverse 69 00:03:34,360 --> 00:03:37,760 Speaker 2: engineer this thing to be a small and powerful engine 70 00:03:37,760 --> 00:03:41,240 Speaker 2: that can fly hundreds of miles. So it's loud, it's 71 00:03:41,680 --> 00:03:45,160 Speaker 2: it's buzzing and annoying, and it's really cheap and basic. 72 00:03:45,200 --> 00:03:48,360 Speaker 2: It's not a really complicated piece of tech. It's it's 73 00:03:48,440 --> 00:03:51,960 Speaker 2: really low tech. So in fact, it's it's like super simple. 74 00:03:52,280 --> 00:03:56,000 Speaker 2: And their ability over the past three years since it's 75 00:03:56,080 --> 00:03:59,119 Speaker 2: kind of been most prevalent in Ukraine to perfect it 76 00:03:59,200 --> 00:04:02,240 Speaker 2: is really why this conflict is as complicated as it 77 00:04:02,280 --> 00:04:02,960 Speaker 2: is right now. 78 00:04:03,160 --> 00:04:06,200 Speaker 1: These drones crossed I think about thirty thousand dollars to make, 79 00:04:06,720 --> 00:04:10,400 Speaker 1: and they're known as suicide drones, and what the Iranians 80 00:04:10,400 --> 00:04:13,160 Speaker 1: have been doing is flying them basically at the Gulf 81 00:04:13,240 --> 00:04:17,640 Speaker 1: and Israel. And the core of your story is that 82 00:04:17,680 --> 00:04:21,080 Speaker 1: the price of shooting these out of the air is unsustainable, 83 00:04:21,120 --> 00:04:24,360 Speaker 1: both financially and in terms of missile supplies. 84 00:04:24,600 --> 00:04:26,680 Speaker 2: Yeah, so a she shed drone, like you said, it's 85 00:04:26,680 --> 00:04:31,320 Speaker 2: about thirty thousand dollars, simple, basic structure, and the American 86 00:04:31,360 --> 00:04:33,919 Speaker 2: defenses that are going up against it are a couple 87 00:04:33,960 --> 00:04:37,400 Speaker 2: of different air defense systems, all of which are the 88 00:04:37,440 --> 00:04:41,720 Speaker 2: most advanced in the world. Unbelievably well put together, but 89 00:04:41,800 --> 00:04:47,520 Speaker 2: also stupidly expensive. The Patriot missile system fires a projectile. 90 00:04:47,720 --> 00:04:51,320 Speaker 2: It's about four million dollars. The Nasam's air defense system 91 00:04:51,400 --> 00:04:53,839 Speaker 2: is about one million dollars. These are the best of 92 00:04:53,839 --> 00:04:55,920 Speaker 2: the best air defense technologies. So when you want to 93 00:04:55,920 --> 00:04:58,440 Speaker 2: shoot something down, that's what you want. And that's why 94 00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:00,720 Speaker 2: the Ukrainians have been pushing the America to get it 95 00:05:00,760 --> 00:05:03,520 Speaker 2: for many years. That's why many other nations are hoping 96 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:06,400 Speaker 2: to make them or copy them in some way. But 97 00:05:06,760 --> 00:05:09,400 Speaker 2: because they're so expensive, Iran is taking advantage of that. 98 00:05:09,720 --> 00:05:12,120 Speaker 2: It is so easy for them to fire as many 99 00:05:12,240 --> 00:05:15,920 Speaker 2: drones as they possibly can thirty thousand dollars shots, and 100 00:05:16,200 --> 00:05:18,479 Speaker 2: to take it down. The Americans have to at this 101 00:05:18,640 --> 00:05:22,360 Speaker 2: point fire four million dollar shots. It doesn't add up. 102 00:05:22,560 --> 00:05:25,560 Speaker 2: And to top it all off, we only can make 103 00:05:25,680 --> 00:05:28,480 Speaker 2: The American military can only make about six hundred Patriot 104 00:05:28,480 --> 00:05:31,680 Speaker 2: missiles a year. Their production line, which is slow and procedural, 105 00:05:32,040 --> 00:05:34,919 Speaker 2: means that they have to really like preserve it in ways. 106 00:05:34,920 --> 00:05:37,320 Speaker 2: That's why it's been so complicated selling it and giving 107 00:05:37,320 --> 00:05:39,640 Speaker 2: it to the Ukrainians, and it's why now after the 108 00:05:39,680 --> 00:05:41,400 Speaker 2: first week of this war, it was said that something 109 00:05:41,440 --> 00:05:43,559 Speaker 2: like two hundred or three hundred of them had already 110 00:05:43,600 --> 00:05:46,200 Speaker 2: been fired. That's about half the stock of a year, 111 00:05:46,640 --> 00:05:48,200 Speaker 2: and a lot of the stock that they probably have 112 00:05:48,279 --> 00:05:51,719 Speaker 2: even ready. So I think very quickly they realized this 113 00:05:51,960 --> 00:05:54,440 Speaker 2: is not going to last as long as they as 114 00:05:54,480 --> 00:05:56,560 Speaker 2: they need, and they got to figure out something else. 115 00:05:57,080 --> 00:05:58,479 Speaker 2: And now I think they're scrambling. 116 00:05:58,560 --> 00:06:00,480 Speaker 1: I want to ask you about what the ops are 117 00:06:00,520 --> 00:06:02,840 Speaker 1: on the figuring out something else before we get there. 118 00:06:03,200 --> 00:06:05,279 Speaker 1: Why did the Uranians develop this drone? 119 00:06:05,600 --> 00:06:08,080 Speaker 2: So the shah head drone is so shahad is it 120 00:06:08,200 --> 00:06:13,280 Speaker 2: translates to martyrs like a suicide drone. I think originally 121 00:06:13,320 --> 00:06:15,679 Speaker 2: it was. I don't know for sure, but the first 122 00:06:15,680 --> 00:06:17,880 Speaker 2: early days of it and when it kind of came 123 00:06:17,920 --> 00:06:21,719 Speaker 2: to its biggest prevalence was in Ukraine. The Russians started 124 00:06:21,800 --> 00:06:24,440 Speaker 2: using it to basically do the exact same technique that 125 00:06:24,480 --> 00:06:27,240 Speaker 2: the Iranians are doing now, which is to overwhelm the 126 00:06:27,279 --> 00:06:30,680 Speaker 2: system with attacks. In terms of trying to make the 127 00:06:30,720 --> 00:06:33,400 Speaker 2: best weapon or the most effective weapon, this was not that. 128 00:06:33,480 --> 00:06:35,520 Speaker 2: This is just one that you can make cheap, fast 129 00:06:35,600 --> 00:06:38,560 Speaker 2: and easy, and the idea is to just overload anything 130 00:06:38,600 --> 00:06:41,080 Speaker 2: you fired at. If you fire fifty of these things, 131 00:06:41,320 --> 00:06:42,880 Speaker 2: A couple of them are going to get through and 132 00:06:42,880 --> 00:06:45,960 Speaker 2: they're going to do some damage. They are accurate to 133 00:06:46,000 --> 00:06:47,880 Speaker 2: a point. They're not the most accurate, but they're not 134 00:06:47,920 --> 00:06:50,799 Speaker 2: the worst. And over the past three years, the Russians 135 00:06:50,839 --> 00:06:54,920 Speaker 2: have been using them NonStop. The chart that we've seen 136 00:06:54,920 --> 00:06:56,600 Speaker 2: that of just how many of these things have gone 137 00:06:56,640 --> 00:06:59,200 Speaker 2: up in the past few years just keeps going up 138 00:06:59,200 --> 00:07:01,480 Speaker 2: and up and up. Four the Russian usage in Ukraine, 139 00:07:01,960 --> 00:07:05,760 Speaker 2: and it's really kind of perfected the system of how 140 00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:10,120 Speaker 2: you can totally overwhelm their defenses. The Iranians, it's unclear 141 00:07:10,120 --> 00:07:12,560 Speaker 2: as to how and why they put it together, but 142 00:07:12,560 --> 00:07:15,920 Speaker 2: they're very proud of this system. It's become folklore, it's 143 00:07:15,960 --> 00:07:19,800 Speaker 2: become so widely used, it's become so effective that people 144 00:07:19,800 --> 00:07:22,200 Speaker 2: are really out of it in the Iranian military, and 145 00:07:22,200 --> 00:07:24,840 Speaker 2: as well they should be. They've really kind of used 146 00:07:24,880 --> 00:07:30,920 Speaker 2: a scrappy, small system that subverts and uses asymmetrical warfare, 147 00:07:31,360 --> 00:07:33,400 Speaker 2: the idea that we are a weaker system, and we 148 00:07:33,440 --> 00:07:35,520 Speaker 2: know we don't have the same amount of arms and 149 00:07:35,600 --> 00:07:37,880 Speaker 2: power as you, but if we can find a scrappy 150 00:07:37,920 --> 00:07:39,720 Speaker 2: way to make it hurt for you, then we win 151 00:07:40,040 --> 00:07:41,480 Speaker 2: and that's really what these drones are doing. 152 00:07:41,600 --> 00:07:44,280 Speaker 1: I remember in two thousand and one, I was a 153 00:07:44,360 --> 00:07:48,640 Speaker 1: high school debater and one of the debate topics was 154 00:07:49,920 --> 00:07:52,920 Speaker 1: about the war in Afghanistan, and I found this great 155 00:07:53,040 --> 00:07:56,320 Speaker 1: quote that I rolled out with enthusiasm, which was some 156 00:07:56,440 --> 00:08:00,000 Speaker 1: talent bound spokesperson that said, the Americans have the watch shit, 157 00:08:00,080 --> 00:08:02,680 Speaker 1: but the Tallee Band have the time. Fast forward twenty 158 00:08:02,760 --> 00:08:06,120 Speaker 1: ish years and the Taleban are backing power in Afghanistan. 159 00:08:06,280 --> 00:08:09,480 Speaker 1: And that sense of the watches and the time, you 160 00:08:09,520 --> 00:08:12,120 Speaker 1: can't help thinking about it when you think about this story. 161 00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:14,440 Speaker 2: Yeah, I think about that quote a lot too. It's 162 00:08:14,960 --> 00:08:18,520 Speaker 2: widely known, it's well documented. It's something that kind of 163 00:08:18,840 --> 00:08:21,520 Speaker 2: has kind of become the most prevalent takeaway from that conflict, 164 00:08:21,920 --> 00:08:24,320 Speaker 2: and I think the core of it is exactly what 165 00:08:24,320 --> 00:08:27,680 Speaker 2: we're seeing today, which is asymmetrical warfare. It's this idea 166 00:08:27,720 --> 00:08:30,480 Speaker 2: that one side's big and powerful, and it's got Patriot 167 00:08:30,480 --> 00:08:33,360 Speaker 2: missiles millions of dollars to keep making them. What do 168 00:08:33,400 --> 00:08:35,560 Speaker 2: you have? What is the thing that you are able 169 00:08:35,600 --> 00:08:37,199 Speaker 2: to do that the other side can't, and how can 170 00:08:37,240 --> 00:08:40,480 Speaker 2: you make it painful for them? With these drones, they've 171 00:08:40,520 --> 00:08:44,959 Speaker 2: really kind of gained the economic system of war. These 172 00:08:45,040 --> 00:08:48,319 Speaker 2: drones are able to just keep firing and keep attacking, 173 00:08:48,400 --> 00:08:52,360 Speaker 2: and keep just pushing more and more problems into the 174 00:08:52,360 --> 00:08:55,319 Speaker 2: hands of the defenses. If you think about it, when 175 00:08:55,480 --> 00:08:58,319 Speaker 2: the Iranian military fire is a drone off, they win. 176 00:08:58,559 --> 00:09:00,920 Speaker 2: No matter what happens, they win. Either it gets shot 177 00:09:00,960 --> 00:09:04,679 Speaker 2: down and costs the Americans billions of dollars, or they're 178 00:09:04,760 --> 00:09:08,240 Speaker 2: hidden something and making damage. So anytime one of these fires, 179 00:09:08,400 --> 00:09:10,720 Speaker 2: they win. And that's kind of why this is such 180 00:09:10,760 --> 00:09:11,480 Speaker 2: an effective tool. 181 00:09:11,559 --> 00:09:14,200 Speaker 1: Right now, now we're recording this a few days before 182 00:09:14,240 --> 00:09:16,680 Speaker 1: it will air. It's Thursday, the twelfth of March today. 183 00:09:16,960 --> 00:09:19,880 Speaker 1: But I'm curious, are we seeing the Americans and the 184 00:09:20,280 --> 00:09:23,400 Speaker 1: Gulf nations having to stop making hard choices about what 185 00:09:23,520 --> 00:09:25,880 Speaker 1: to intercept already? Is that something which is going to 186 00:09:26,160 --> 00:09:27,520 Speaker 1: make come in the next days, Well. 187 00:09:27,440 --> 00:09:30,320 Speaker 2: It's unclear when and how. Right now, there was a 188 00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:34,080 Speaker 2: report from I can't remember, I think it was the 189 00:09:34,200 --> 00:09:38,000 Speaker 2: Washington Post that had some sources inside the Pentagon that 190 00:09:38,120 --> 00:09:40,520 Speaker 2: were saying that they are going to start very soon 191 00:09:40,520 --> 00:09:42,560 Speaker 2: having to make tough choices about what to defend and 192 00:09:42,600 --> 00:09:45,040 Speaker 2: what not to. Now this is not to say that 193 00:09:45,360 --> 00:09:47,560 Speaker 2: the rate of drones that are being fired is at 194 00:09:47,559 --> 00:09:48,880 Speaker 2: the same rate that it was at the beginning of 195 00:09:48,920 --> 00:09:51,960 Speaker 2: the war. It's not. The Americans' response to this is 196 00:09:52,000 --> 00:09:55,400 Speaker 2: to hit launch sites, and it's been effective. The amount 197 00:09:55,400 --> 00:09:57,240 Speaker 2: of drones that are flying out is gotten out about 198 00:09:57,240 --> 00:10:00,360 Speaker 2: eighty something percent, Like there's just not as many flying around. 199 00:10:00,880 --> 00:10:04,840 Speaker 2: So the eighty percent of launches eight percent of drones 200 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:09,200 Speaker 2: from Iran in the air has gone down significantly. So 201 00:10:09,400 --> 00:10:11,560 Speaker 2: it's changed the way that I think Iranians are thinking 202 00:10:11,600 --> 00:10:13,839 Speaker 2: about this too. They are also being judicious in the 203 00:10:13,840 --> 00:10:17,480 Speaker 2: way that they're firing drones because the Americans do have 204 00:10:17,520 --> 00:10:21,040 Speaker 2: a better view of where attacks can happen and how 205 00:10:21,040 --> 00:10:23,439 Speaker 2: they can shut them down. I mean, the Americans are 206 00:10:23,440 --> 00:10:27,160 Speaker 2: not losing the tactical fight right now by any means. 207 00:10:27,200 --> 00:10:30,280 Speaker 2: They are attacking many, many sites, and they're proud that 208 00:10:30,360 --> 00:10:32,559 Speaker 2: you can see it on the scent Calm Twitter. They 209 00:10:32,559 --> 00:10:36,080 Speaker 2: are filling the feed with all of the attacks they're doing, 210 00:10:36,160 --> 00:10:38,160 Speaker 2: and it is many and it's really hurt in the Iranians. 211 00:10:38,200 --> 00:10:42,120 Speaker 2: So they're not it's not completely out that the Americans 212 00:10:42,160 --> 00:10:45,600 Speaker 2: are having effective strikes on these targets, but still the 213 00:10:45,640 --> 00:10:47,720 Speaker 2: way that the Iranians are able to fight. It's going 214 00:10:47,800 --> 00:10:49,560 Speaker 2: to get more and more complicated, and you see it 215 00:10:49,559 --> 00:10:50,920 Speaker 2: now in the Strait of Horn moves. 216 00:10:51,240 --> 00:10:52,360 Speaker 1: Well, I want to come to that, but let me 217 00:10:52,400 --> 00:10:57,000 Speaker 1: ask you first. Key difference here being the Americans have 218 00:10:57,720 --> 00:11:02,240 Speaker 1: access to long range missiles and air power, as do 219 00:11:02,280 --> 00:11:05,079 Speaker 1: the Israelis, and therefore they can knock out the launch 220 00:11:05,160 --> 00:11:08,840 Speaker 1: sites of the shah Head drones in Iran, whereas the 221 00:11:08,960 --> 00:11:11,920 Speaker 1: Ukrainians have not been able to successfully attach the launch 222 00:11:11,960 --> 00:11:15,280 Speaker 1: sites of the Shahad drones in Russia. 223 00:11:15,360 --> 00:11:19,520 Speaker 2: Sometimes yes, sometimes no, I mean the Ukrainians are the 224 00:11:19,559 --> 00:11:22,760 Speaker 2: most interesting part of the Shahead conversation by far. The 225 00:11:22,840 --> 00:11:24,920 Speaker 2: Ukrainians have spent the past three years dealing with these 226 00:11:24,920 --> 00:11:28,160 Speaker 2: things and spent the past three years creatively coming up 227 00:11:28,200 --> 00:11:32,319 Speaker 2: with ways to stop them. That's ranged from taking fifty 228 00:11:32,400 --> 00:11:35,560 Speaker 2: cal machine guns and World War Two style shooting up 229 00:11:35,600 --> 00:11:37,320 Speaker 2: in the night sky and trying to knock these things 230 00:11:37,400 --> 00:11:42,320 Speaker 2: down to really high tech solutions creating interceptor drones, which 231 00:11:42,360 --> 00:11:47,680 Speaker 2: are basically smaller, faster drones that have tracking systems on 232 00:11:47,760 --> 00:11:50,120 Speaker 2: them that see the Shahad, which is fairly slow the 233 00:11:50,320 --> 00:11:53,160 Speaker 2: head is not a fast weapon, and chase it down 234 00:11:53,160 --> 00:11:55,240 Speaker 2: the air and knock it out of the sky, and 235 00:11:55,280 --> 00:11:57,280 Speaker 2: they are proving to be effective too, and that's a 236 00:11:57,320 --> 00:11:59,760 Speaker 2: tech that they're developing more and more so. For the 237 00:11:59,840 --> 00:12:01,880 Speaker 2: U Crainians, the shahdrone is something that they've been dealing 238 00:12:01,920 --> 00:12:03,520 Speaker 2: with all the time, and not in a way that 239 00:12:03,559 --> 00:12:05,680 Speaker 2: the Americans have, which is to say lots of money, 240 00:12:05,960 --> 00:12:08,760 Speaker 2: lots of support, and lots of expensive missiles to shoot 241 00:12:08,800 --> 00:12:11,080 Speaker 2: them down. They have to come up with scrappy, low 242 00:12:11,120 --> 00:12:14,560 Speaker 2: tech ways to destroy these things. And again, they're not 243 00:12:14,600 --> 00:12:16,880 Speaker 2: that hard to shoot down. They are slow, they're not 244 00:12:17,000 --> 00:12:20,040 Speaker 2: that well made. They are meant to be a haunting 245 00:12:20,240 --> 00:12:23,600 Speaker 2: slow device, so it's not that hard to shoot them down. 246 00:12:23,600 --> 00:12:26,000 Speaker 2: But if there's hundreds of them, then you have to 247 00:12:26,000 --> 00:12:26,560 Speaker 2: worry about it. 248 00:12:26,679 --> 00:12:30,680 Speaker 1: You probabished an extraordinary video from Ukraine, and I think 249 00:12:30,720 --> 00:12:33,640 Speaker 1: you had access that I've never seen before to be 250 00:12:33,640 --> 00:12:38,760 Speaker 1: able to shoot inside a drone targeting facility in Ukraine 251 00:12:38,920 --> 00:12:41,360 Speaker 1: and meet some of the most senior figures in the 252 00:12:41,480 --> 00:12:46,000 Speaker 1: Ukraine Drone Warfare Department, one of whom said to you, 253 00:12:46,559 --> 00:12:49,199 Speaker 1: with drones, the world will never be the same again. 254 00:12:50,080 --> 00:12:53,520 Speaker 1: NATO country's understanding of drones does not match what we 255 00:12:53,640 --> 00:12:55,719 Speaker 1: understood in twenty twenty two. 256 00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:58,439 Speaker 2: Yeah, and he's proving to be more and more right. 257 00:12:58,720 --> 00:13:02,240 Speaker 2: I think that something that you Ukrainians pride themselves on 258 00:13:02,400 --> 00:13:07,520 Speaker 2: is their ability to creatively find fighting solutions in a 259 00:13:07,640 --> 00:13:11,120 Speaker 2: terrible situation without much support and kind of just with 260 00:13:11,200 --> 00:13:15,000 Speaker 2: grassroots movements to make these things happen. The colonel that 261 00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:17,680 Speaker 2: I talked to, he is somebody that has spent so 262 00:13:17,760 --> 00:13:21,959 Speaker 2: much time perfecting drones, making it an assembly line process 263 00:13:22,559 --> 00:13:25,520 Speaker 2: that this is someone that really knows how and what 264 00:13:25,559 --> 00:13:28,640 Speaker 2: the complications of fighting are with them. And he's saying, 265 00:13:28,760 --> 00:13:31,120 Speaker 2: he was saying to us when we interviewed him, they 266 00:13:31,160 --> 00:13:33,680 Speaker 2: need our help. The NATO needs us to come in 267 00:13:33,720 --> 00:13:36,120 Speaker 2: and teach them what they know, because soon they're going 268 00:13:36,160 --> 00:13:38,720 Speaker 2: to have this problem too. We shot that in November 269 00:13:38,760 --> 00:13:42,079 Speaker 2: of last year, November twenty twenty five, and now, however, 270 00:13:42,160 --> 00:13:45,200 Speaker 2: many months later in March twenty twenty six, he's proving 271 00:13:45,240 --> 00:13:47,800 Speaker 2: to be right more and more. And there's been reports 272 00:13:48,040 --> 00:13:50,679 Speaker 2: that some of the Gulf nations are starting to enlist 273 00:13:50,880 --> 00:13:55,080 Speaker 2: the Ukrainian drone expertise and bring them over. We haven't 274 00:13:55,120 --> 00:13:56,800 Speaker 2: seen what that looks like yet. That was a tweet 275 00:13:56,800 --> 00:13:58,840 Speaker 2: from President Zelenski a couple of days ago. That said 276 00:13:58,840 --> 00:14:01,679 Speaker 2: that that's happening, but it's something that I think the 277 00:14:01,840 --> 00:14:03,959 Speaker 2: Ukrainians are proud of and want to be a part of. 278 00:14:04,200 --> 00:14:06,200 Speaker 2: But it also brings it in more questions about where 279 00:14:06,240 --> 00:14:08,480 Speaker 2: this war will go. So much of the fighting in 280 00:14:08,559 --> 00:14:12,679 Speaker 2: Ukraine has been localized to just those two nations. With 281 00:14:12,840 --> 00:14:15,319 Speaker 2: this new fighting in Iran, how much the Ukrainians will 282 00:14:15,320 --> 00:14:20,160 Speaker 2: be involved and the NATO defense in golf country's defense, 283 00:14:20,560 --> 00:14:23,640 Speaker 2: and more importantly, how much Russia will be involved in 284 00:14:23,840 --> 00:14:27,160 Speaker 2: directing Iranians and how to use these shahads in interesting ways, 285 00:14:27,200 --> 00:14:28,880 Speaker 2: which is also some other reports that are coming out 286 00:14:28,880 --> 00:14:31,160 Speaker 2: of the word seeing will mean a lot to the 287 00:14:31,200 --> 00:14:32,320 Speaker 2: next stages of this fight. 288 00:14:32,600 --> 00:14:35,080 Speaker 1: You mentioned Zelenski, I mean, I think he said that, 289 00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:39,840 Speaker 1: if I'm not mistaken, Ukrainian interceptor drones and now defending 290 00:14:39,920 --> 00:14:42,320 Speaker 1: US military interest in the Gulf and in Jordan. 291 00:14:42,320 --> 00:14:45,400 Speaker 2: Right, That's yeah. I mean, so far the sources that 292 00:14:45,440 --> 00:14:47,400 Speaker 2: I've been talking to who I'm in touch with the Ukrainians, 293 00:14:47,800 --> 00:14:49,760 Speaker 2: I haven't heard about what that looks like on the 294 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:52,720 Speaker 2: ground yet. I have no doubt that people are in 295 00:14:52,800 --> 00:14:55,800 Speaker 2: motion and that the Ukrainians are a part of these 296 00:14:56,480 --> 00:14:59,640 Speaker 2: next processes. But I think It's time will tell how 297 00:14:59,680 --> 00:15:03,160 Speaker 2: involved all Ukrainians will get in these processes, and how 298 00:15:03,600 --> 00:15:07,600 Speaker 2: the Gulf nations and for that matter, in America will 299 00:15:08,000 --> 00:15:10,440 Speaker 2: react to their expertise, and what will mean to them. 300 00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:16,640 Speaker 1: There's a certain irony here. Your eyes widened, right, I mean, 301 00:15:17,680 --> 00:15:18,680 Speaker 1: it's kind of extraordinary. 302 00:15:19,080 --> 00:15:24,040 Speaker 2: I've spent the past three plus years covering this war 303 00:15:24,040 --> 00:15:28,520 Speaker 2: in Ukraine and watching the American interest in it and 304 00:15:28,560 --> 00:15:33,040 Speaker 2: American connection to that fight just really just drop off 305 00:15:33,120 --> 00:15:35,640 Speaker 2: a cliff. When I first started reporting there in twenty 306 00:15:35,680 --> 00:15:40,320 Speaker 2: twenty two, people were so passionate about this fight and 307 00:15:40,720 --> 00:15:43,680 Speaker 2: the defense of Ukraine and what it meant to kind 308 00:15:43,680 --> 00:15:46,640 Speaker 2: of stand up against Russia. And then over the years 309 00:15:46,640 --> 00:15:48,440 Speaker 2: it kind of dipped, and it dipped politically too, it 310 00:15:48,480 --> 00:15:52,280 Speaker 2: dipped most importantly financially. And with that dip, the Ukrainians 311 00:15:52,320 --> 00:15:56,320 Speaker 2: have felt abandoned in many ways, and in that abandonment, 312 00:15:56,400 --> 00:15:57,840 Speaker 2: they've had to figure out how to do it on 313 00:15:57,880 --> 00:16:00,640 Speaker 2: their own. And that's where we're at now in of drones. 314 00:16:00,920 --> 00:16:02,480 Speaker 2: So the fact that some of these nations are now 315 00:16:02,520 --> 00:16:04,640 Speaker 2: turning to Ukraine and saying, hey, can you help us 316 00:16:04,640 --> 00:16:07,000 Speaker 2: with this? What do you know about this? It's it's 317 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:10,000 Speaker 2: a kind of a wild step, and as someone who's 318 00:16:10,080 --> 00:16:14,760 Speaker 2: kind of covered closely and covered drones intensely and almost 319 00:16:14,760 --> 00:16:17,640 Speaker 2: been killed by them. Uh, it's it's kind of amazing 320 00:16:17,640 --> 00:16:21,040 Speaker 2: to me and and kind of flabbergasting to know that 321 00:16:21,080 --> 00:16:22,800 Speaker 2: the rest of the world is finally waking up to 322 00:16:22,840 --> 00:16:26,160 Speaker 2: what Ukraine has been screaming now for years, which is 323 00:16:26,520 --> 00:16:29,600 Speaker 2: drones are here and they're not going anywhere. The future 324 00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:32,760 Speaker 2: of war will involve drones in every single way, and 325 00:16:32,800 --> 00:16:34,080 Speaker 2: there's no going back from that. 326 00:16:49,160 --> 00:16:52,160 Speaker 1: After the break, Can defense tech companies actually keep up 327 00:16:52,320 --> 00:17:15,560 Speaker 1: with the pace of war stay with us? It's also interesting, 328 00:17:15,600 --> 00:17:19,480 Speaker 1: I mean, the US has apparently copied the Iranian shah 329 00:17:19,480 --> 00:17:21,560 Speaker 1: head drone technology from Iran. You're shaking your hay, Is 330 00:17:21,560 --> 00:17:22,359 Speaker 1: that true or not true? 331 00:17:22,720 --> 00:17:25,240 Speaker 2: It's very true. In fact, there was a video online 332 00:17:25,280 --> 00:17:29,160 Speaker 2: circulating of one that had crashed in Iraq and some 333 00:17:29,280 --> 00:17:33,640 Speaker 2: people were filming themselves picking it up and checking it out. 334 00:17:34,200 --> 00:17:37,280 Speaker 2: But it's not even a secret. I mean, the Americans 335 00:17:37,280 --> 00:17:39,639 Speaker 2: are proud of it. They were in the early stages 336 00:17:39,680 --> 00:17:42,520 Speaker 2: of the war putting out press releases and videos and 337 00:17:42,560 --> 00:17:45,800 Speaker 2: photos saying like, here's our version of this tech. I 338 00:17:45,800 --> 00:17:47,800 Speaker 2: don't think the problem for any of these governments, in 339 00:17:47,840 --> 00:17:50,760 Speaker 2: any of these militaries is that they don't believe that 340 00:17:50,840 --> 00:17:53,480 Speaker 2: drones are important. I just don't think anybody has used 341 00:17:53,480 --> 00:17:55,840 Speaker 2: it yet. I don't think anybody has applied it in 342 00:17:55,880 --> 00:18:00,600 Speaker 2: ways that are useful except the Ukrainians, the Russian and 343 00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:03,760 Speaker 2: now the Iranians. I think the Americans are playing ketchup. 344 00:18:03,800 --> 00:18:06,360 Speaker 2: I think a lot of NATO countries are also playing ketchup. 345 00:18:06,800 --> 00:18:09,439 Speaker 2: But for the most part, like I was saying, like 346 00:18:09,600 --> 00:18:11,920 Speaker 2: these things are here to stay, and I don't think 347 00:18:12,000 --> 00:18:16,119 Speaker 2: the Americans have any like any qualms about saying how 348 00:18:16,160 --> 00:18:17,720 Speaker 2: important it is, saying how much they want to be 349 00:18:17,760 --> 00:18:19,200 Speaker 2: a part of that game. I mean to the point 350 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:21,000 Speaker 2: that you know, there was news the other day that 351 00:18:21,040 --> 00:18:24,760 Speaker 2: the sons of President Trump were investing in military drone 352 00:18:24,800 --> 00:18:29,119 Speaker 2: technology companies. But it's incredible. It's there's no hiding that 353 00:18:29,160 --> 00:18:32,520 Speaker 2: these things are happening. And I think anybody that is 354 00:18:33,200 --> 00:18:36,120 Speaker 2: running companies they're involved with drones or thinking about drone 355 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:39,080 Speaker 2: defense knows that after this war that everybody's going to 356 00:18:39,080 --> 00:18:40,080 Speaker 2: be kind of jumping at this. 357 00:18:40,480 --> 00:18:43,719 Speaker 1: Lauren Kahn, who is a former Pentagon policy advisor, has 358 00:18:43,760 --> 00:18:46,320 Speaker 1: said this is the first case in a long time, 359 00:18:46,480 --> 00:18:49,200 Speaker 1: really since the early days of the Cold War, whether 360 00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:52,560 Speaker 1: the US has seen a capability produced by an adversary 361 00:18:52,960 --> 00:18:55,240 Speaker 1: and decided it fills a gap and then decide to 362 00:18:55,280 --> 00:18:58,600 Speaker 1: produce it. She's referring specifically to Shih drones, and how 363 00:18:58,640 --> 00:19:01,639 Speaker 1: are they actually being used by the You know, it's unclear. 364 00:19:01,760 --> 00:19:04,679 Speaker 2: I think that right now, in the early days of 365 00:19:04,720 --> 00:19:06,840 Speaker 2: the war and the early days of the fighting in Iran, 366 00:19:07,440 --> 00:19:10,399 Speaker 2: they were used in kind of limited capacities in different 367 00:19:10,400 --> 00:19:13,480 Speaker 2: strike sites. I don't think that the US military has 368 00:19:13,520 --> 00:19:15,720 Speaker 2: a really clear plan for how they want to use them. 369 00:19:15,720 --> 00:19:18,479 Speaker 2: They just know they want them. So there's not been 370 00:19:18,480 --> 00:19:20,439 Speaker 2: a lot of reporting, a lot of understanding where they go. 371 00:19:20,920 --> 00:19:24,320 Speaker 2: But what we do know is that the reporter you're 372 00:19:24,359 --> 00:19:29,520 Speaker 2: talking about is absolutely right. These weapons are not simple 373 00:19:29,880 --> 00:19:33,680 Speaker 2: things that are made kind of specific to one fight 374 00:19:33,760 --> 00:19:36,000 Speaker 2: or another. There's something that is really going to be 375 00:19:36,040 --> 00:19:39,360 Speaker 2: prevalent throughout the next stages of any kind of conflict. 376 00:19:39,640 --> 00:19:44,119 Speaker 2: You see Shah drones in Sudan. We heard about a 377 00:19:44,359 --> 00:19:48,520 Speaker 2: drone strike in Congo yesterday. When I was in Sudan 378 00:19:48,600 --> 00:19:51,040 Speaker 2: reporting a few years ago, it was one of the 379 00:19:51,080 --> 00:19:54,800 Speaker 2: weirdest feelings to be worried about drones in a country 380 00:19:54,800 --> 00:19:57,040 Speaker 2: that I had just left Ukraine a month before, and 381 00:19:57,080 --> 00:20:00,000 Speaker 2: now I'm in another country again worrying about conflict with drones, 382 00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:01,679 Speaker 2: And I think that's going to be the common feeling 383 00:20:02,080 --> 00:20:04,840 Speaker 2: for so long now. I think anywhere that there is 384 00:20:05,560 --> 00:20:09,119 Speaker 2: people trying to kill each other, drones are a effective 385 00:20:09,200 --> 00:20:10,000 Speaker 2: tool to do that. 386 00:20:10,240 --> 00:20:14,080 Speaker 1: Have you looked into the kind of very heavily venture 387 00:20:14,160 --> 00:20:18,320 Speaker 1: backed drone companies like Anderil in the US or Helsing 388 00:20:18,359 --> 00:20:23,400 Speaker 1: in Europe and whether they're drone technology which is exciting 389 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:27,760 Speaker 1: investors from from the Trump kids to Daniel Eck of Spotify, 390 00:20:28,760 --> 00:20:31,840 Speaker 1: whether their drone technology, which has been developed ultimately in 391 00:20:31,880 --> 00:20:35,080 Speaker 1: a vacuum, is going to be competitive on the battlefield 392 00:20:35,160 --> 00:20:39,920 Speaker 1: with the kind of homespun Ukrainian and Iranian technologies. 393 00:20:40,480 --> 00:20:43,679 Speaker 2: Yeah. You know, the most experience that I've had with 394 00:20:44,200 --> 00:20:48,159 Speaker 2: the tech that is surrounding drones from the West was 395 00:20:48,240 --> 00:20:51,520 Speaker 2: kind of maybe two years ago in Ukraine. We were 396 00:20:51,760 --> 00:20:55,240 Speaker 2: covering the fighting around Chasavar for the Wall Street Journal, 397 00:20:55,800 --> 00:20:58,800 Speaker 2: and it was at a time when drones were becoming 398 00:20:58,800 --> 00:21:00,760 Speaker 2: more and more prevalent. It wasn't what it is now, 399 00:21:00,760 --> 00:21:03,200 Speaker 2: which is everything. It's like eighty percent of all strikes 400 00:21:03,280 --> 00:21:05,320 Speaker 2: in Ukraine. But back then it was it was really 401 00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:07,520 Speaker 2: revving up and you were just starting to worry about it. 402 00:21:08,080 --> 00:21:10,000 Speaker 2: And at the Wall Street Journal we said, okay, well, 403 00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:11,480 Speaker 2: how are we going to deal with this? What are 404 00:21:11,560 --> 00:21:15,080 Speaker 2: the mechanisms to defend ourselves? And as a company, our 405 00:21:15,160 --> 00:21:17,920 Speaker 2: security advisors the best in the business. We're going out 406 00:21:17,960 --> 00:21:21,119 Speaker 2: to different companies and saying what do you got, And 407 00:21:21,320 --> 00:21:22,800 Speaker 2: these companies will come back to us and we're like, oh, 408 00:21:22,800 --> 00:21:24,960 Speaker 2: we got the jammer. This is the one. This is 409 00:21:25,000 --> 00:21:26,800 Speaker 2: the perfect one. All you need to do is pay 410 00:21:26,880 --> 00:21:29,520 Speaker 2: us two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. This jammer protects 411 00:21:29,560 --> 00:21:32,600 Speaker 2: your journalists all the way through. And that went to 412 00:21:32,640 --> 00:21:35,119 Speaker 2: the bosses and dow Jones was you know how to 413 00:21:35,320 --> 00:21:36,919 Speaker 2: this is great? Now we have we can do this, 414 00:21:36,960 --> 00:21:39,360 Speaker 2: blah blah blah. And I would turn to the soldiers 415 00:21:39,359 --> 00:21:40,760 Speaker 2: on the ground, these guys who've been living at it, 416 00:21:40,800 --> 00:21:42,120 Speaker 2: and be like, oh, we're going to get this tech. 417 00:21:42,160 --> 00:21:44,760 Speaker 2: It's expensive, it's nice, we got the good stuff. And 418 00:21:44,800 --> 00:21:48,000 Speaker 2: they're like, oh, it's we just used that like last month. 419 00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:51,480 Speaker 2: That doesn't work anymore. Yeah, that's so good. Now used 420 00:21:51,480 --> 00:21:53,080 Speaker 2: to work on this channel. Now they figured out how 421 00:21:53,119 --> 00:21:54,639 Speaker 2: to use it on this channel. So yeah, it's not 422 00:21:54,640 --> 00:21:58,080 Speaker 2: good anymore. Really, the people on the ground are moving 423 00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:01,840 Speaker 2: at light speed the way thrones are changing. And anybody 424 00:22:01,880 --> 00:22:04,040 Speaker 2: who says different, anybody says that they have the answer, 425 00:22:04,280 --> 00:22:07,199 Speaker 2: is trying to sell you something. Because when you're in 426 00:22:07,280 --> 00:22:09,040 Speaker 2: Ukraine and you see these drones and you see that 427 00:22:09,080 --> 00:22:11,280 Speaker 2: the ways that they adapt, and you hang out with 428 00:22:11,440 --> 00:22:14,679 Speaker 2: drone makers, people that produce these things, and kind of 429 00:22:14,680 --> 00:22:16,640 Speaker 2: think about the best ways to use them, you find 430 00:22:16,640 --> 00:22:21,200 Speaker 2: out really quickly that it's just a game of chess. 431 00:22:21,560 --> 00:22:23,520 Speaker 2: They figure out how to stop this thing. How do 432 00:22:23,560 --> 00:22:25,119 Speaker 2: we get around that? Okay, they figure out how to 433 00:22:25,160 --> 00:22:27,119 Speaker 2: stop that thing? How do we get around that? The 434 00:22:27,320 --> 00:22:30,320 Speaker 2: Russians and the Ukrainians are pushing each other in the 435 00:22:30,320 --> 00:22:32,680 Speaker 2: most deadly way to get better and better at this tech. 436 00:22:33,080 --> 00:22:35,280 Speaker 2: So I think a lot of these companies, because they 437 00:22:35,280 --> 00:22:37,080 Speaker 2: are so well funded, are going to figure stuff out. 438 00:22:37,119 --> 00:22:41,240 Speaker 2: They're going to use different ways to progress the effectiveness 439 00:22:41,240 --> 00:22:45,520 Speaker 2: and the deadliness of drones in ways that Ukrainians can't. 440 00:22:45,600 --> 00:22:48,919 Speaker 2: But the real word world experience that the Ukrainians right 441 00:22:49,000 --> 00:22:51,160 Speaker 2: have right now is second to none. 442 00:22:51,640 --> 00:22:56,199 Speaker 1: One of the chilling but also fascinating things about modern 443 00:22:56,240 --> 00:23:02,199 Speaker 1: warfare is social media videos of weapons caches. I remember 444 00:23:02,240 --> 00:23:05,359 Speaker 1: the Pilisco New Generation Cartel a couple of years ago 445 00:23:05,920 --> 00:23:08,520 Speaker 1: did these videos of like their you know, surface to 446 00:23:08,560 --> 00:23:11,800 Speaker 1: our missiles and rocket launchers, and like they were basically 447 00:23:13,080 --> 00:23:15,760 Speaker 1: all but saying we are better equipped than the Mexican 448 00:23:15,760 --> 00:23:19,720 Speaker 1: military in terms of our warfighting ability. The Iranians released 449 00:23:19,760 --> 00:23:23,479 Speaker 1: a video of just this bunker full of naval drones, 450 00:23:23,560 --> 00:23:25,240 Speaker 1: and there's like a kind of dolly shot where you 451 00:23:25,359 --> 00:23:28,199 Speaker 1: just got drone after drone after drone after drone, and 452 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:31,080 Speaker 1: they look kind of like mini speedboats or mini jet skis, 453 00:23:31,160 --> 00:23:34,040 Speaker 1: except I assume they're underwater drones. And their function you 454 00:23:34,080 --> 00:23:36,320 Speaker 1: mentioned the straight up horn moves earlier, which I want 455 00:23:36,320 --> 00:23:38,959 Speaker 1: to come back to now, it is to attack ships. 456 00:23:39,280 --> 00:23:42,800 Speaker 2: So naval drones are the next step in the most 457 00:23:42,920 --> 00:23:46,040 Speaker 2: kind of interesting cat and mouse game of attack drones. 458 00:23:46,520 --> 00:23:50,320 Speaker 2: There is US fees on manned surface vessels, which you 459 00:23:50,359 --> 00:23:52,440 Speaker 2: know you can think about just basically is like RC 460 00:23:52,720 --> 00:23:56,040 Speaker 2: remote controlled boats with lots and lots of explosives on them. 461 00:23:56,119 --> 00:24:00,840 Speaker 2: I mean, that's basically odd. Is these are small, dynamic, 462 00:24:00,920 --> 00:24:04,640 Speaker 2: really agile boats that just ram into ships. And they're 463 00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:07,639 Speaker 2: hard to shoot down and they're hard to kind of 464 00:24:07,640 --> 00:24:10,000 Speaker 2: defend against. And now I think they're seeing a lot 465 00:24:10,000 --> 00:24:12,719 Speaker 2: of talk about swarm tactics, which is the same as 466 00:24:12,760 --> 00:24:15,440 Speaker 2: with shahads, just sending as many as you can so 467 00:24:15,520 --> 00:24:18,400 Speaker 2: that how do you stop all of them. They're designed 468 00:24:18,440 --> 00:24:21,479 Speaker 2: to hit oil tankers because secondary explosions and you can 469 00:24:22,400 --> 00:24:25,960 Speaker 2: light the gas on fire, but also naval ships, coastal infrastructures, 470 00:24:26,080 --> 00:24:27,800 Speaker 2: anything that it can kind of get its hands on. 471 00:24:28,320 --> 00:24:31,199 Speaker 2: And then there's also talk about the UUVs, which is 472 00:24:31,240 --> 00:24:34,280 Speaker 2: the sorry, the unmanned underwater drums. These are the ones 473 00:24:34,320 --> 00:24:38,239 Speaker 2: that are submersive like submarines. They can dive, they can 474 00:24:38,280 --> 00:24:40,520 Speaker 2: go to really deep deaths and kind of go under. 475 00:24:41,040 --> 00:24:44,320 Speaker 2: They can drop mines. Some of the reporting is saying 476 00:24:44,320 --> 00:24:46,400 Speaker 2: that a lot of them are being used to mine 477 00:24:46,440 --> 00:24:48,239 Speaker 2: the Strait of Horror moves right now, and they can 478 00:24:48,280 --> 00:24:49,879 Speaker 2: also be used to attack ships in the middle of 479 00:24:49,920 --> 00:24:52,240 Speaker 2: the night. We've yet to see just how effective these 480 00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:54,040 Speaker 2: things are. I mean, we're hearing about the first strikes 481 00:24:54,040 --> 00:24:56,159 Speaker 2: of these things, but what we do know is how 482 00:24:56,160 --> 00:25:00,000 Speaker 2: they've already been used again in Ukraine. Again, the Ukrainian 483 00:25:00,160 --> 00:25:02,600 Speaker 2: were some of the people that first started innovating with 484 00:25:02,640 --> 00:25:06,200 Speaker 2: these kinds of drones the Black Sea, where the Ukrainians 485 00:25:06,200 --> 00:25:08,680 Speaker 2: had some of the most effective hits with naval drones, 486 00:25:09,119 --> 00:25:11,879 Speaker 2: with some of their prime examples of how useful it 487 00:25:11,960 --> 00:25:15,080 Speaker 2: was for them against the Russian fleets. These are just 488 00:25:15,240 --> 00:25:18,560 Speaker 2: any way that you can decide to send big things 489 00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:22,240 Speaker 2: with explosives on them that are fast but simple enough 490 00:25:22,240 --> 00:25:25,720 Speaker 2: that they can get around big defenses and big big 491 00:25:25,720 --> 00:25:28,119 Speaker 2: things trying to stop it. If you swarm them and 492 00:25:28,160 --> 00:25:30,040 Speaker 2: you send a bunch of them, eventually one or two 493 00:25:30,040 --> 00:25:31,399 Speaker 2: of them are going to get through. And that's what 494 00:25:31,600 --> 00:25:33,720 Speaker 2: I think all of these militaries are now finding out, 495 00:25:34,040 --> 00:25:35,800 Speaker 2: for better or for worse, I means extraordinary. 496 00:25:35,840 --> 00:25:39,399 Speaker 1: People talked all through last year about how the Ukraine 497 00:25:39,480 --> 00:25:42,480 Speaker 1: Russia conflict is a testing ground or a Petrie dish, 498 00:25:42,560 --> 00:25:45,520 Speaker 1: or a foreshadowing of what the future of warfare will be. 499 00:25:46,320 --> 00:25:50,920 Speaker 1: And you know, the Trump decision to strike Iran has 500 00:25:51,240 --> 00:25:54,800 Speaker 1: seemed to have proven that everything people said about how 501 00:25:54,840 --> 00:25:57,080 Speaker 1: the confliction in Ukraine would shape the future of warfare 502 00:25:57,640 --> 00:26:02,240 Speaker 1: has come true, and a hummeled adversary but with access 503 00:26:02,280 --> 00:26:06,560 Speaker 1: to this unmanned and relatedly cheap and mass producible drones 504 00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:12,080 Speaker 1: under sea, surface, sea, and air. I mean, could drag 505 00:26:12,560 --> 00:26:15,520 Speaker 1: the United States into an unending conflict. 506 00:26:15,800 --> 00:26:20,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, I think the whatever the plan was, and whatever 507 00:26:20,480 --> 00:26:23,720 Speaker 2: the plan is in this fight, I think it's probably 508 00:26:23,800 --> 00:26:26,320 Speaker 2: changing very rapidly. It's hard to know what it was. 509 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:27,680 Speaker 2: It's hard to know what it's going to look like 510 00:26:27,720 --> 00:26:31,520 Speaker 2: in the future. But I think that what it looked 511 00:26:31,560 --> 00:26:34,680 Speaker 2: like at the beginning, I saw a lot of similarities 512 00:26:34,800 --> 00:26:37,560 Speaker 2: to the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in twenty 513 00:26:37,600 --> 00:26:44,000 Speaker 2: twenty two. A big, powerful military rushing in with all 514 00:26:44,040 --> 00:26:46,600 Speaker 2: of its might. Now, the biggest and most important comparison 515 00:26:46,680 --> 00:26:49,320 Speaker 2: is that this American strikes on a run or all 516 00:26:49,320 --> 00:26:51,760 Speaker 2: precision strikes with no boots on the ground and that 517 00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:55,399 Speaker 2: we know of, whereas Ukraine was massive amounts of armies 518 00:26:55,440 --> 00:26:58,879 Speaker 2: invading the nations. But at the same time, the similarities 519 00:26:59,280 --> 00:27:02,800 Speaker 2: that are striking are just the amount of kind of 520 00:27:02,840 --> 00:27:06,439 Speaker 2: the what they had not considered going into it, how 521 00:27:06,520 --> 00:27:08,600 Speaker 2: much they are learning on the fly, and how much 522 00:27:08,640 --> 00:27:13,040 Speaker 2: they are having things fail. The Americans thought that this 523 00:27:13,160 --> 00:27:15,120 Speaker 2: was going to be easy. It's clear that they thought 524 00:27:15,160 --> 00:27:17,080 Speaker 2: this was going to be fast. They thought they were 525 00:27:17,080 --> 00:27:18,879 Speaker 2: going to do something that was really effective and then 526 00:27:18,920 --> 00:27:20,719 Speaker 2: move on. That's something that we see from a lot 527 00:27:20,760 --> 00:27:22,560 Speaker 2: of the way that Trump has approached a lot of 528 00:27:22,560 --> 00:27:26,679 Speaker 2: these military actions over the past year. But now it 529 00:27:26,720 --> 00:27:29,160 Speaker 2: hasn't been and hasn't it hasn't been easy to kind 530 00:27:29,160 --> 00:27:31,680 Speaker 2: of set the goals. We still don't. We haven't really 531 00:27:31,720 --> 00:27:33,600 Speaker 2: got a lot of clear answers from the American government 532 00:27:33,600 --> 00:27:36,600 Speaker 2: as to what the goals are. And more importantly, it's 533 00:27:36,680 --> 00:27:40,080 Speaker 2: unclear how it ends, unclear how the US can stop this, 534 00:27:40,720 --> 00:27:43,520 Speaker 2: and from everything that's happening, it's very clear that Iran 535 00:27:43,560 --> 00:27:45,280 Speaker 2: is kind of holding a lot of the keys to 536 00:27:45,320 --> 00:27:48,800 Speaker 2: what happens next. Today the new Iatolda announced he's going 537 00:27:48,880 --> 00:27:52,200 Speaker 2: to continue blocking off the Strait of horror moves. This 538 00:27:52,440 --> 00:27:54,840 Speaker 2: is incredibly important for the Americans to get back open. 539 00:27:54,880 --> 00:27:58,720 Speaker 2: The entire global economy rests on the ability to get 540 00:27:58,760 --> 00:28:01,840 Speaker 2: gas moving again through the through this, through this canal. 541 00:28:01,920 --> 00:28:05,080 Speaker 2: So if it doesn't happen, what happens with the America? 542 00:28:05,160 --> 00:28:07,760 Speaker 2: What do they do to respond? So at this point, 543 00:28:08,160 --> 00:28:10,840 Speaker 2: and in the same way the Russians forcing them thought 544 00:28:10,840 --> 00:28:12,640 Speaker 2: they were gonna take KIV, what did they say they're 545 00:28:12,640 --> 00:28:14,639 Speaker 2: gonna take it? In a couple of days. They didn't. 546 00:28:14,880 --> 00:28:18,280 Speaker 2: It took it took now four years to make you know, 547 00:28:18,560 --> 00:28:22,560 Speaker 2: tiny advances at the cost of millions of soldiers dead 548 00:28:22,960 --> 00:28:25,680 Speaker 2: to be able to get bits and pieces of the country. 549 00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:27,760 Speaker 2: And even for them, it's still not clear where that 550 00:28:27,800 --> 00:28:32,240 Speaker 2: war ends. These wars of attrition, they are terrible for 551 00:28:32,320 --> 00:28:36,960 Speaker 2: everybody involved. And whatever happens next this war and war 552 00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:41,280 Speaker 2: in Iran, if it is anything like Russia, if it's 553 00:28:41,280 --> 00:28:43,280 Speaker 2: anything like that, the way that that's turned out, it's 554 00:28:43,320 --> 00:28:46,680 Speaker 2: going to be costly and painful for everybody on every side. 555 00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:50,000 Speaker 1: And coming back to Ukraine, I mean, there was obviously 556 00:28:50,600 --> 00:28:53,680 Speaker 1: partisans hiding in the forests in the Second World War, 557 00:28:54,160 --> 00:28:57,920 Speaker 1: and the Partisans would ambush Soviet troops and Nazi troops 558 00:28:57,960 --> 00:29:00,960 Speaker 1: and have victories and and you know, kept the conflict 559 00:29:01,000 --> 00:29:06,080 Speaker 1: going and degraded both of those forces. Now you essentially 560 00:29:06,120 --> 00:29:08,680 Speaker 1: can have partisans, But who have range? 561 00:29:09,000 --> 00:29:09,440 Speaker 2: Is that right? 562 00:29:09,480 --> 00:29:12,960 Speaker 1: And what is the ability under pressure, under air power 563 00:29:13,400 --> 00:29:17,200 Speaker 1: and the fire do continue to manufacture these drones for Iran? 564 00:29:17,280 --> 00:29:19,920 Speaker 1: Like is it conceivable that the US could knock out 565 00:29:19,920 --> 00:29:22,640 Speaker 1: the manufacturing capability just with air power? 566 00:29:22,760 --> 00:29:27,440 Speaker 2: That's kind of the big question. We eight nine months 567 00:29:27,480 --> 00:29:30,560 Speaker 2: ago we struck Iran, and we hit the American military, 568 00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:34,440 Speaker 2: hit military sites to try to knock out their nuclear capabilities, 569 00:29:34,480 --> 00:29:37,000 Speaker 2: and then immediately claimed victory, saying we totally knocked it 570 00:29:37,040 --> 00:29:40,320 Speaker 2: all out. We did everything. It's great, We're done that. 571 00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:45,360 Speaker 2: It's unclear of that that happened. We don't know what 572 00:29:45,440 --> 00:29:49,440 Speaker 2: the Iranian military capabilities are, we don't know what their 573 00:29:49,520 --> 00:29:52,800 Speaker 2: response can be, and we don't know what they will 574 00:29:52,840 --> 00:29:56,200 Speaker 2: do next. But a lot of the control rests in 575 00:29:56,240 --> 00:29:59,680 Speaker 2: their ability to kind of withstand. As long as they 576 00:29:59,720 --> 00:30:02,680 Speaker 2: with stand, they are winning. As long as they can 577 00:30:02,760 --> 00:30:05,120 Speaker 2: keep the straight clothes, they are winning. As long as 578 00:30:05,160 --> 00:30:08,400 Speaker 2: they can keep firing drones and keep causing the Americans 579 00:30:08,400 --> 00:30:11,280 Speaker 2: to spend money, they are winning. This is a war 580 00:30:11,400 --> 00:30:15,440 Speaker 2: of holding out, and the Russians, if we're making the comparison, 581 00:30:15,760 --> 00:30:18,920 Speaker 2: are famous for holding out. This is the nation of Stalingrad. 582 00:30:19,200 --> 00:30:20,920 Speaker 2: This is the nation of World War Two. That said, 583 00:30:20,960 --> 00:30:23,480 Speaker 2: you know how many millions of people say their deaths 584 00:30:23,520 --> 00:30:26,600 Speaker 2: to fight off the Nazis and defeat the Nazis by 585 00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:31,280 Speaker 2: numbers alone? The Americans, I don't think. I'm not sure 586 00:30:31,320 --> 00:30:34,520 Speaker 2: how much of the we're able to withstand the pain 587 00:30:34,600 --> 00:30:37,880 Speaker 2: in that sense. On the you know the midterms are coming, 588 00:30:38,360 --> 00:30:41,120 Speaker 2: gas prices are going to start increasing, and it's unclear 589 00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:43,280 Speaker 2: what Trump can do to kind of ease the pain 590 00:30:43,840 --> 00:30:47,800 Speaker 2: of this next process. So the Iranian response and the 591 00:30:47,840 --> 00:30:50,560 Speaker 2: Iranian military capabilities, it's a black box. We just don't 592 00:30:50,600 --> 00:30:53,240 Speaker 2: know what they can and can't do, but I think 593 00:30:53,280 --> 00:30:54,479 Speaker 2: we'll learn as we go. 594 00:30:55,120 --> 00:30:57,280 Speaker 1: Just to close, Ben and thank you. I know this 595 00:30:57,320 --> 00:30:59,280 Speaker 1: is not directly your beat, but this is the Tech 596 00:30:59,320 --> 00:31:01,640 Speaker 1: Stuff podcast, so I had to ask you tech questions. 597 00:31:02,120 --> 00:31:04,120 Speaker 1: What do you make of these Iranian strikes on the 598 00:31:04,200 --> 00:31:05,400 Speaker 1: data centers in the Gulf. 599 00:31:05,840 --> 00:31:09,680 Speaker 2: I think the Iranian attack plan right now is to 600 00:31:09,680 --> 00:31:13,000 Speaker 2: touch on as many painful points they can. You see 601 00:31:13,000 --> 00:31:16,200 Speaker 2: it most importantly in Saudi Arabia. They're attacking oil refiners 602 00:31:16,240 --> 00:31:19,600 Speaker 2: with Shia drones. You see it at the different bases 603 00:31:19,640 --> 00:31:23,000 Speaker 2: that they're attacking all around the Gulf region. And more importantly, 604 00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:25,440 Speaker 2: if they can hit data centers, they know that this 605 00:31:25,480 --> 00:31:28,840 Speaker 2: will cause disruptions to the global trade and the important 606 00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:31,840 Speaker 2: parts that the American and Western governments are investing so 607 00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:35,440 Speaker 2: deeply in. So again, I think this all goes back 608 00:31:35,480 --> 00:31:38,880 Speaker 2: to attrition. How much pain can the Iranian cause and 609 00:31:38,920 --> 00:31:40,760 Speaker 2: where can they cause? It, and how are they going 610 00:31:40,800 --> 00:31:42,280 Speaker 2: to do that in a way that's cheap and can 611 00:31:42,400 --> 00:31:44,400 Speaker 2: last a lot longer than the West can. 612 00:31:50,760 --> 00:32:15,440 Speaker 1: Ben Solomon, thank you, thanks for tech stuff. I'm as Varshian. 613 00:32:15,760 --> 00:32:18,719 Speaker 1: This episode was produced by Eliza Dennis and Melissa Slaughter. 614 00:32:19,480 --> 00:32:22,360 Speaker 1: It was executive produced by me Julian Nata and Kate 615 00:32:22,360 --> 00:32:26,840 Speaker 1: Osborne for Kaleidoscope and Katrina Norvel for iHeart Podcast. The 616 00:32:26,920 --> 00:32:30,600 Speaker 1: engineer is Charles de Montebello from c DM Studios, Jack 617 00:32:30,680 --> 00:32:33,600 Speaker 1: Instey miss this episode, and Kyle Murdoch Rodard theme song. 618 00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:36,160 Speaker 1: Please do rate and review the show wherever you listen 619 00:32:36,240 --> 00:32:44,440 Speaker 1: to your podcasts.