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Speaker 1: This is Mesters in Business with very Renaults on Bluebird Radio.

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Speaker 1: This weekend on the podcast, I have an extra special

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Speaker 1: guest returning to the show, Jack Divine, thirty two year

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Speaker 1: veteran of the CIA. His resume is just too long

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Speaker 1: to to go over. We talked about a lot of it. Uh.

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Speaker 1: He was instrumental in pushing the Russians out of Afghanistan

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Speaker 1: in the nineteen eighties. UH. He helped run the Counternarcotics

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Speaker 1: division for the CIA. He He's just had so many

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Speaker 1: roles within the intelligence world. Um. Really quite quite an

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Speaker 1: astonishing career. His new book is all about Russia's aggression

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Speaker 1: against the West, not in the Cold War era but today,

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Speaker 1: and it's quite fascinating and very revealing, in particular how

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Speaker 1: the Russians have so skillfully used social media to foment

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Speaker 1: unrest and anger and essentially turn Americans against each other.

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Speaker 1: They're not the only reason why the country is having issues,

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Speaker 1: but they are clearly pouring fuel on the fire. It's

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Speaker 1: quite fascinating. Really, a person with an endless amount of

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Speaker 1: of inside and knowledge from a unique position with no

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Speaker 1: further ado. My conversation with the CIA's Jack Divine, this

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Speaker 1: is Mesters in Business with very Renaults on Bloomberg Radio.

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Speaker 1: This week, I have an extra special guest. His name

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Speaker 1: is Jack Divine. He is a thirty two year veteran

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Speaker 1: of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he has served as

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Speaker 1: Acting Director and Associate Director of Operations. He was the

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Speaker 1: Chief of the Latin American Division and head of Counternarcotic Center,

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Speaker 1: where he was awarded the CIA's Meritorious Officer Award and

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Speaker 1: Distinguished Intelligence Medal. He has written a number of books

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Speaker 1: on the intelligence fields, his most recent Spymaster's Prism, the

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Speaker 1: Fight against Russian Aggression. He was chief of the Afghan

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Speaker 1: Task Force and in seven helped drive the Stinger anti

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Speaker 1: aircraft program UH, the handheld missile that took out Russian

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Speaker 1: helicopters and really changed the course of the war, sending

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Speaker 1: the Russians fleeing from Afghanistan. It couldn't be more timely

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Speaker 1: given our recent withdrawal. Jack Divine, Welcome back to Bloomberg Break.

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Speaker 1: So let's start a little bit with your background, and

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Speaker 1: but I guess I really have to lead with Afghanistan.

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Speaker 1: Tell us a little bit about your perspective as to

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Speaker 1: what's going on in that nation and where the United

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Speaker 1: States went wrong other than the fact that we were

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Speaker 1: there for two full decades. Well, I think it all starts.

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Speaker 1: It's like many things. How do you get into something

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Speaker 1: in the first place off and determines how you get

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Speaker 1: how do you get out years later? So I think

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Speaker 1: we all were quite shaking, and that's an understatement. By

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Speaker 1: the attack against the Twin Towers in New York and

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Speaker 1: the Pentagon and uh Alkida attacked, and this country, our

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Speaker 1: beloved country. Everybody wanted to get the people responsible immediately

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Speaker 1: and go get in Latin. And we knew he was

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Speaker 1: in uh he was in Afghanistan, so naturally there was

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Speaker 1: a program. The US government immediately decided we're going to

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Speaker 1: go get them, and within hours the c I had

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Speaker 1: a team on the on the ground already had on

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Speaker 1: the ground, but a team coming in to work with

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Speaker 1: some of the Mujadine leaders that in the Northern Alliance,

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Speaker 1: which I had worked with years earlier, and the Special

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Speaker 1: Forces were coming in right behind them. They would have

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Speaker 1: been there at the same time, as I understand that

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Speaker 1: the paperwork got tied up, but the Special Forces wanted

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Speaker 1: to be there and they did a magnificent job. And

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Speaker 1: uh actually you know, eleven took place, but you know

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Speaker 1: we we the government fell, the Taliban government fell. People

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Speaker 1: forgot this in November and in November seven, so you

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Speaker 1: know that early covert action program now bombing. The very

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Speaker 1: first thing was bombing in October. And the reason I

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Speaker 1: mentioned this is, you know, we basically had them brought down.

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Speaker 1: Um and are overt military arrived a night the nineteenth

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Speaker 1: of October. The government fell, you know, a few days later.

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Speaker 1: So did we really need an army? As a question,

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Speaker 1: I wrote an op ed piece that's still floating around

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Speaker 1: today in July of the C I a solution, which is,

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Speaker 1: let's not put it. We're not We're not going to

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Speaker 1: win with the army on the ground. We should be

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Speaker 1: working to get ben Latin and then where our interests apply,

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Speaker 1: we're covertly. So I think the big judgment call was

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Speaker 1: that we needed to put our army on the ground.

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Speaker 1: Once we made that decision, then your next there's no

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Speaker 1: question that we could drive them off the field, and

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Speaker 1: we did. The question is how do you get out?

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Speaker 1: And you know, the thought that we would be there

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Speaker 1: twenty years later was probably not on anybody's mind. So UM,

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Speaker 1: fast forward, we get up the hundred sousand troops too

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Speaker 1: in the Obama administration. Then you know it started to

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Speaker 1: bring it down, and you know there's a big argument,

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Speaker 1: big argument today issued that it's not a big argument.

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Speaker 1: I think the bast majority if people down the States

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Speaker 1: think it is time to leave. But I think what

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Speaker 1: we were looking at isn't so much that we were

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Speaker 1: leaving the last few days. I think they really criticism.

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Speaker 1: Criticism is on how did we manage you know, the

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Speaker 1: exit and could have been avoided. I think we're a

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Speaker 1: tremendous number of progressional inquiries and so on about this,

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Speaker 1: and this will be a lingering issue. So I don't

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Speaker 1: think it's about this was the time to get out.

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Speaker 1: I mean I've been saying this for a long time.

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Speaker 1: It's you know, how do you get out? And being

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Speaker 1: careful not to get into things where we put troops

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Speaker 1: on the ground, because that is a longer commitment. And

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Speaker 1: I'm an advocate for using covert and my whole career

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Speaker 1: was devoted to covert action. I am a believer that

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Speaker 1: even with troops on the ground, if we would have

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Speaker 1: remained focused on Afghanistan and come up with a plan

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Speaker 1: to do we have to do and then get out

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Speaker 1: of that country. It could have been a much cheaper, shorter,

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Speaker 1: more effective war. How accurate is it to say that

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Speaker 1: the adventure in Iraq, and I use those words purposefully,

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Speaker 1: a war of choice that had nothing to do with

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Speaker 1: on eleven that distracted us from the task at hand

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Speaker 1: in Afghanistan is part of the factors that led to

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Speaker 1: this snaffoo that we see currently going on today. I

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Speaker 1: think historians, when they go back, because you need to

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Speaker 1: get away from it, everyone's committed. They had a role,

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Speaker 1: so they're defending their roles and that's but I think

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Speaker 1: when history looks back, we're gonna have a hard time

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Speaker 1: explaining exactly why we went into a rock because they

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Speaker 1: didn't have weapons of fast destruction right um, and there

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Speaker 1: was nothing Even if they had them, there was nothing

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Speaker 1: indicating that it was going to be used against the

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Speaker 1: United States. And the proof of the Puddy became they

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Speaker 1: didn't happen, so they certainly weren't wasn't an eminent threat.

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Speaker 1: So I think there were a lot of us at

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Speaker 1: that time that scratched our head about why we're going

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Speaker 1: to rocket? Rocket is nothing new without Kaida, so you know,

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Speaker 1: and this is I'm not a Johnny come late on this.

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Speaker 1: I was stumped at the time. Um, and I go

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Speaker 1: into that both of my books that you know. I

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Speaker 1: think it was one of the great errors in our

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Speaker 1: our foreign policy and youth of our tremendous force. I

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Speaker 1: mean so, um, you know, we spent a lot of

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Speaker 1: time and money and most importantly our precious military personnel.

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Speaker 1: So I think it was a great distraction. We missed

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Speaker 1: the main point, which was go getting bed I was

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Speaker 1: or another rockted where I was very critical of our

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Speaker 1: government for not getting him. We took years to find him.

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Speaker 1: He was in Pakistan. So invading Afghanistan, uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: when the guy was in Pakistan is uh. You know,

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Speaker 1: we again restorans and book back and scratched their head. However,

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Speaker 1: I was for going after him and going into Afghanistan.

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Speaker 1: But as I said covertly, but the Iraq War is

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Speaker 1: one thing that I've learned over the years in the CIA,

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Speaker 1: were all consuming that there was. Once you decide you're

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Speaker 1: going to commit to a war, almost all your other activities,

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Speaker 1: and particularly in a NaSTA security arena, are all driven

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Speaker 1: by that war. You stopped looking at less about Russia

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Speaker 1: and less about China though, it's it becomes all consuming

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Speaker 1: all of your personnel. They're hired against that mission. So

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Speaker 1: it all there's you know, institutions. It is the wars.

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Speaker 1: You know, when they drag on, they have tremendous change,

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Speaker 1: has tremendous change about your natural security structure, and there's

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Speaker 1: a long tail to it paying for it that it

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Speaker 1: was trillions of dollars are gonna be paid for by

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Speaker 1: our grandkids. So you know, I think history is gonna

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Speaker 1: be really hard on decision to go in and to

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Speaker 1: have stayed as long as we did. And you know,

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Speaker 1: there was universal support, so there's no wing to you

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Speaker 1: can blame it on. We probably gets the Democrats. The

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Speaker 1: President and I had to brief exchange. I mean, you know,

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Speaker 1: there weren't a lot of people shouting about going into

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Speaker 1: a rock at the time, and I just found it

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Speaker 1: really um umbfound me that we we went in No. Eleven.

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Speaker 1: I think you could have invaded anywhere and would have

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Speaker 1: gotten support. And that's been some of the criticism of

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Speaker 1: the Bush Cheney administration. But let me circle back to

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Speaker 1: the point you just made about wars being all consuming

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Speaker 1: and leading us to take our eye off of other balls.

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Speaker 1: That are in the air. Clearly the focus has been

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Speaker 1: on the Middle East for the past twenty years, since

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Speaker 1: certainly since nine eleven. But in Spymaster's Prison, the Fight

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Speaker 1: against Russian Aggression, you make a very cogent case that

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Speaker 1: Russia remains a dangerous adversary, that they weren't distracted by

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Speaker 1: what was going on in the Middle East, and that

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Speaker 1: they very capably built up assets against the United States,

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Speaker 1: which which they have been deploying quite successfully without a

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Speaker 1: whole lot of counter from us. To tell us about

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Speaker 1: the motivations that led you to write this new book, well,

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Speaker 1: a couple of really key questions, and in your point

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Speaker 1: that I mean a tackle, and I mean the first

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Speaker 1: one is, you know, it's not that I'm you know,

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Speaker 1: using Kentucky when they trying to figure out what happened

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Speaker 1: in terms of our attention. I mean very clearly in

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Speaker 1: our public records, the budget against you know, the Soviet Union,

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Speaker 1: if you will, and supposed to Russia drive from you

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Speaker 1: in the full ward down to ten percent. Now they're

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Speaker 1: building it back. And in the first book, Good Hunting,

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Speaker 1: I mentioned sort of at the end, not mentioned I

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Speaker 1: go into some lens that terrorism is going to be

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Speaker 1: with us, and in fact, it's been with us since

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Speaker 1: the beginning of time. But it spikes, and it's spiked

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Speaker 1: the nine eleven and isis and we had to do

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Speaker 1: what we had to do. But the real or bigger, arching,

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Speaker 1: over arching, longer issues will be the return of competition

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Speaker 1: among nation states, and that's where we are. The dialogue

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Speaker 1: is about China, Korea, Russia or on it. So that's

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Speaker 1: where the new national security emphasis. Can't take your eye

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Speaker 1: off of terrorism. But there was a clear trend, but

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Speaker 1: we were all in. I mean, when you put an

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Speaker 1: army on the ground and you get up the hundred

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Speaker 1: thousand troops and a hundred thousand contractors and billions of dollars,

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Speaker 1: so much effort goes into that that there's the government

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Speaker 1: isn't fungible in the sense that you know, you're gonna

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Speaker 1: have to take people off of something to cover it

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Speaker 1: and you have to hire new people. So I think

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Speaker 1: we became, you know, we felt that the big, the

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Speaker 1: big targets, we're not going to be the competitors that

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Speaker 1: there are today. China clearly has loomed large. That should

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Speaker 1: not have been a surprise. But your point, which is

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Speaker 1: a I think a really good one. Is we sort

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Speaker 1: of behind neglective. I could use that old phrase about Russia.

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Speaker 1: It was somehow it wasn't the Soviet Union, so and

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Speaker 1: it wasn't didn't have the economy of China, has the

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Speaker 1: economy of Spain or Italy. We should worry less about it.

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Speaker 1: But no one stood back and said, well, who's actually

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Speaker 1: working against us? In ourn A secured another who's actually

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Speaker 1: operating against us and particularly United States? And this is

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Speaker 1: what drove me to the book, And that is when

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Speaker 1: I saw the elections in UH was again flabbergast that

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Speaker 1: not that the Russians were in collecting information and cyber

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Speaker 1: I mean, that's been going on and will continue to

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Speaker 1: go on and going on for as far as I

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Speaker 1: can see. What they did it was really different, a

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Speaker 1: size me change Grohich. I couldn't believe they did, which

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Speaker 1: is they took the information and used it politically inside

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Speaker 1: the United States. And that is not what happened to

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Speaker 1: Cold War. As I go into the book, there was

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Speaker 1: we've fought each other all around the world, but we

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Speaker 1: did not run big sophisticated covert action operations inside Russia

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Speaker 1: after Stalin, and they weren't rather a few books on

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Speaker 1: the screen. But this as a general principle understanding. They

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Speaker 1: were not operating United States in our political system, So

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Speaker 1: isn't so much that they were collecting the intelligence that

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Speaker 1: they were in there. And that's what drove me up

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Speaker 1: the wall. I wanted to screen from the rooftops and

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Speaker 1: pay attention. The Russians are deep into our cyber world,

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Speaker 1: the new world of combat, and they're very effective. They've

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Speaker 1: been doing this and they've had us. They've been penetrating

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Speaker 1: us for longer than the Chinese. And we can get

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Speaker 1: to that, but they're using it and we need to

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Speaker 1: respond to that. So that is the you know, Clarine

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Speaker 1: call if you will, from on the spy master's prison.

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Speaker 1: Let's talk a little bit about the competition between the

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Speaker 1: United States and Russia. The US is an open society.

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Speaker 1: We have a free press or robust constitution, a First

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Speaker 1: Amendment that guarantees freedom of the press. Does this put

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Speaker 1: us at a competitive disadvantage against those nations that would

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Speaker 1: take advantage of our freedoms and openness. It's a double

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Speaker 1: edged sword, and I will take the open, free, democratic

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Speaker 1: side of the sword in the sense that during the

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Speaker 1: Cold War, you know, we talked about the spying business.

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Speaker 1: Having that is our mantra brought many of the best

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Speaker 1: agents to us. The best supporters the world to help

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Speaker 1: us are allies to help us. Was that flag flying high?

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Speaker 1: How would you like there's been a Russian kg VH

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Speaker 1: I selling the economy in right? I mean, uh, your advantage.

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Speaker 1: It's a tough sell, right, We're talking a lot of

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Speaker 1: people in business try and sell that, so it's a

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Speaker 1: great advantage. However, there is the other side of the coin,

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Speaker 1: which is if you want to we have a system

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Speaker 1: that looks broken in some ways. On this next point,

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Speaker 1: we need to get a consensus. And of teritarian governments,

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Speaker 1: you don't need a consensus, right, you can move more quickly.

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Speaker 1: The Chinese can move quickly. The Russians got the Iranians

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Speaker 1: because they don't have to have with the Congress and solve.

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Speaker 1: But I want to stick with Congress despite my misgivings

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Speaker 1: about some some parts of it. But my point is

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Speaker 1: when you get into the cyber the cyber type of world,

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Speaker 1: our openness provides a level of vulnerabilities that in warfare

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Speaker 1: gives them an edgement um and and I should add

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Speaker 1: just one point there not to get pustomisty. I think

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Speaker 1: we're very powerful in our capabilities in the cyber war.

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Speaker 1: The big issue is, because we're a democracy, going to

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Speaker 1: your point, Barry, in order to use it against an adversary,

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Speaker 1: we need to get a consensus. We need to get

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Speaker 1: tigress to improvement. The president can't do that unilaterally because

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Speaker 1: it is action, it's covert action, and you'd have to

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Speaker 1: get approval. So today's world, being a democracy, you have

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Speaker 1: to go through that process and what you're looking at

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Speaker 1: and before that and after that, they do not have

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Speaker 1: the same compunction season straints, so they have an edge.

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Speaker 1: But I still want to stick with our system because

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Speaker 1: at some point the system will come together. I know

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Speaker 1: that seems Pollyannis in this moment, but we'll come together

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Speaker 1: and we will get a consensus on what we need

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Speaker 1: to do in the cyber warfare. But we don't have

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Speaker 1: it now. And it is where did disadvantage in a

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Speaker 1: weakness now? Which goes to your You're I think very

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Speaker 1: perceptive question. Tell us about Moscow rules? What are they

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Speaker 1: and when did they start changing? So when I looked

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Speaker 1: at the election as we were just talking to our election,

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Speaker 1: and you know, I was hearing that the KGB was

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Speaker 1: actually interfere in our political process I had. I was

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Speaker 1: in denial at first that they can't do that, that's

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Speaker 1: that's that's a politically stupid But now back and say,

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Speaker 1: maybe it wasn't so stupid after all. In their part,

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Speaker 1: the second part was that's not how we played the

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Speaker 1: Cold War, didn't somebody briefed Putin Putin was actually in

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Speaker 1: the Cold War? It was you know, and Dresden, And

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Speaker 1: we can talk about that at some point. What were

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Speaker 1: the rules that you can't find them? It's like the

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Speaker 1: Magna Carter, you know, it's a little hard to get

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Speaker 1: your hands around the exact document. But there was an

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Speaker 1: understanding that there are certain things that weren't going to happen.

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Speaker 1: Where are we on the Cold War. We were not

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Speaker 1: going to counterfeit each other's money. Why we would destroy

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Speaker 1: the world economy, so we both had the capability to

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Speaker 1: do it. That never happened. We wouldn't um uh rough

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Speaker 1: off each other's officers because we were fighting all around

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Speaker 1: the world, and we would have no chaos in the

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Speaker 1: intelligence world. But there are a few exceptions on that,

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Speaker 1: but by and large, um that was an understanding the

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Speaker 1: others understanding was, you know, we can run operations around

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Speaker 1: the world against each other, Afghanistan, Chili, Um, Egypt, wherever

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Speaker 1: the crisis, whether Italy after the war, but we were

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Speaker 1: not going to meddle in each in each country's programs.

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Speaker 1: And I was in charge of it, as you know,

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Speaker 1: for a period of time number two and then acting

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Speaker 1: for number one. It's number one, And you know, I

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Speaker 1: would just tell you the idea of phone came up

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Speaker 1: and said, look, let's run a cute operation in Russia's

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Speaker 1: Look that's that's not how we played this game. And

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Speaker 1: so uh, the Moscow rules, we need to get back

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Speaker 1: to the table. And I'll tell it's not just the election.

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Speaker 1: Election is just the manifestation of the problem, and that is,

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Speaker 1: how are we going to conduct cyber warfare? We can

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Speaker 1: have treaties on missiles and boundaries and treaties on management

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Speaker 1: of water and so on, but how do you manage

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Speaker 1: cyber when it's invisible? So you have to have and

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Speaker 1: that comes hard to a democratic system. In other words,

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Speaker 1: we'd like things out in the open. We came very

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Speaker 1: slowly the intelligence business. Through history. We we build up

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Speaker 1: intelligence and back the way. So how are we going

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Speaker 1: to deal with cyber and the truth of the matter

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Speaker 1: is in my estimation, and I hope it was. That

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Speaker 1: was hopeful that I was hearing something and the first

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Speaker 1: discussions with Prutinent they were going to defer, so the

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Speaker 1: second level officials to sort of work out things. I

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Speaker 1: was hoping, and I don't know that to be the case,

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Speaker 1: that there'd be some understanding among the intelligence groups at

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Speaker 1: a very high level. This is not a committee. This

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Speaker 1: is really one or two people agreeing that we should

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Speaker 1: we know what you're doing, you know what we're doing.

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Speaker 1: Let's understand each other. You either we're going to stay

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Speaker 1: out of each other political system, and if they don't,

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Speaker 1: then you get to the really hard But this is

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Speaker 1: where we needed consensus in this country. How do we

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Speaker 1: respond to that aggressive Russian aggression inside of our our

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Speaker 1: political and economic system. So what is there obviously was

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Speaker 1: a will full calculus made by Vladimir Putin to violate

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Speaker 1: these rules. Did he just see us as sort of

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Speaker 1: distracted and vulnerable and thought, let me go mess with them? What? What?

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Speaker 1: What's behind such a radical change in the relationship between

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Speaker 1: two very powerful nations. I think it goes to the

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Speaker 1: personality of and it goes to a strategic decision um

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Speaker 1: on the personality. As I said, he was. He wanted

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Speaker 1: to be a KGV officer at seventeen. They turned him down,

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Speaker 1: but he actually got into KGB. You have to be

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Speaker 1: you know, it was hard to get into the KGVS,

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Speaker 1: just like it's very hard to get into c I A.

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Speaker 1: I'm an exception, but which set that aside. But so

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Speaker 1: he would he knew what he wanted to be come

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Speaker 1: he wanted to defend, you know, the system. He was

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Speaker 1: a true believer. And they didn't send him to Paris,

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Speaker 1: the wine and dyeing the French, or Washington and hang

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Speaker 1: out in Georgetown that they sendim to Dresden. And Dresden

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Speaker 1: is you know, the bleak, dark East Germany, the famous

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Speaker 1: Marcus Wolf, the real Carla Uh of Lucy's books. I mean,

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Speaker 1: he had more spies Marcus Wolfs than I think any

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Speaker 1: they should state had at the time. So he was

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Speaker 1: in the dark side of the Cold War. And Uh

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Speaker 1: when Sony Union fell, he was crushed his whole world.

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Speaker 1: And I think he was committed and he remains it,

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Speaker 1: and people need to understand he is committed to the

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Speaker 1: reconstitution of the Great Russian not so much the Communist Party,

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Speaker 1: but Russia being powerful and it's intelligence arms being powerful

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Speaker 1: and guess what and adnemy be in the United States.

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Speaker 1: And I have how hard time come to terms with it.

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Speaker 1: But when I look at the psychology, he grew up

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Speaker 1: in a world where the number one enemy of the

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Speaker 1: KGB was the the the US, and that's still there.

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Speaker 1: He hasn't mind that we're in amplacable and of me

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Speaker 1: and the truth of that his adversaries, like myself, I

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Speaker 1: think we don't have a good relationship with Russia. There's

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Speaker 1: a awful lot of similarhyberties with Russia, and uh, it's

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Speaker 1: it's role in Europe and we shouldn't be adversary. So

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Speaker 1: it's on that psychological level, and then we can go

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Speaker 1: into the whole psychology of Wood and if you like,

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Speaker 1: I think he actually believes that we're an adversary in

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Speaker 1: a way that I don't believe is the case. The

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Speaker 1: second thing is they've developed a strategy, a military strategy,

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Speaker 1: and it's uh attributed to one other generals more pronounced right,

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Speaker 1: and he was the head of the armed forces, and

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Speaker 1: he latest said, well, that's not really his strategy. It's

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Speaker 1: called a hybrid strategy means when you're facing adversaries, use military, economic, political,

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Speaker 1: what cyber. In other words, they have made cyber part

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Speaker 1: of their military strategy and the use of it and

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Speaker 1: the use of this information. Other words, what you saw

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Speaker 1: in it the States, there is only the visible eventually

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Speaker 1: saw a visible part of of of a military strategy,

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Speaker 1: and that is you weaken your adversary or if you'd

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Speaker 1: like something softer competitor, by getting into their system, into

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Speaker 1: their cyber world and causing trouble and making them a

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Speaker 1: weaker political force. And I think it was both politically, um,

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Speaker 1: I mean not politically psychologically driven, but I think it

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Speaker 1: was part of their strategy. If there's an opportunity to weakness,

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Speaker 1: they will And I refer to the dabbling in Venezuela.

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Speaker 1: You know, they're trying to do what they didn't call

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Speaker 1: war challenges everywhere. The one to keep your eye on today,

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Speaker 1: not necessarily next year, but today is if you're looking

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Speaker 1: at you know, you look at today, what was Russia's

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Speaker 1: role with the Taliban? What are they going to be

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Speaker 1: doing and what what do they want done? And I

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Speaker 1: absolutely time issue their objective in the caleban one was

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Speaker 1: to make life visible for the US and to use

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Speaker 1: whatever capabilities have had. And I think that story will

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Speaker 1: will unfold. So we need to recognize, yes, China is

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Speaker 1: that they you know, tremendous military force, but united about

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Speaker 1: Russia is fighting about its wife. But it's actually punching

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Speaker 1: is China isn't training, you know, really good vigorous training.

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Speaker 1: One of the things you mentioned in the book is

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Speaker 1: that Putin is essentially the newest tsar in a long

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Speaker 1: line of tzars. How did you come to that conclusion.

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Speaker 1: Is it a function of his net worth, which I've

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Speaker 1: seen all sorts of crazy numbers about, or just his

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Speaker 1: consolidation of power and really being the Russian autocrat. I

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Speaker 1: think first of all, you know, they counter intelligent people,

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Speaker 1: and say, are you going to get excited if I

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Speaker 1: said this? But I think it's a very talented guy,

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Speaker 1: really smart, cunning, so sense you know, he's this, this

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Speaker 1: is a worthy adversary. So what happened? If you do

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Speaker 1: he went into the KGB, the that's called Spymaster's prison.

429
00:26:09,960 --> 00:26:12,520
Speaker 1: You know, he's just he was a spy master. He

430
00:26:12,640 --> 00:26:15,280
Speaker 1: ran spy you know, and there's a way of looking

431
00:26:15,320 --> 00:26:17,840
Speaker 1: at the world and one of the one of the

432
00:26:17,960 --> 00:26:21,160
Speaker 1: characteristics you strive where it's not that you're not emotionally

433
00:26:23,119 --> 00:26:26,800
Speaker 1: a cold fish, but when you're thinking, you have to

434
00:26:26,800 --> 00:26:29,840
Speaker 1: look at the realities of the situation and just whether

435
00:26:29,920 --> 00:26:31,600
Speaker 1: you like them or not, you've got to deal with it.

436
00:26:31,720 --> 00:26:34,680
Speaker 1: So I think he's a realist and what he's his

437
00:26:34,840 --> 00:26:39,040
Speaker 1: objective is is to make it's a consolidate power. How

438
00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:42,640
Speaker 1: do you become strong? Powerful? And so maybe he didn't

439
00:26:42,640 --> 00:26:45,720
Speaker 1: set out to be Thezar, but you know, he left

440
00:26:45,720 --> 00:26:49,160
Speaker 1: it and he got involved with the politics, and Petersburg

441
00:26:49,280 --> 00:26:53,800
Speaker 1: became the uh come on, something more elegant than diagnom.

442
00:26:53,840 --> 00:26:57,280
Speaker 1: But he had a lot of interacting with the political process.

443
00:26:57,920 --> 00:26:59,960
Speaker 1: But then he ended up being the head of their version,

444
00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:03,280
Speaker 1: the FBI. People forget he was the head of the

445
00:27:03,520 --> 00:27:06,720
Speaker 1: f SPEED. That's the FBI. What is that? That runs

446
00:27:06,880 --> 00:27:11,120
Speaker 1: by his intelligence, hard edged information, tough guy. You don't

447
00:27:11,160 --> 00:27:14,240
Speaker 1: get there by accident, let me tell you. In Russia,

448
00:27:14,760 --> 00:27:19,880
Speaker 1: so and then Uh he was the political process, put

449
00:27:19,960 --> 00:27:25,640
Speaker 1: him around the Yeltsin circle, and people were forgotten. The oligarchs,

450
00:27:25,840 --> 00:27:28,440
Speaker 1: the old timers thought well, let's bring putin and he's

451
00:27:28,480 --> 00:27:33,200
Speaker 1: a he can be he can be the success of

452
00:27:33,280 --> 00:27:36,320
Speaker 1: the Yelton because we can all manage him, we can

453
00:27:36,359 --> 00:27:38,120
Speaker 1: all manage them. What they missed that they had someone

454
00:27:38,119 --> 00:27:43,720
Speaker 1: of those places coming as they were, and quickly consolidated

455
00:27:43,760 --> 00:27:47,960
Speaker 1: his position. He's a real political animal, the first order,

456
00:27:48,880 --> 00:27:53,520
Speaker 1: and and so little by little he consolidated his position.

457
00:27:53,560 --> 00:27:55,439
Speaker 1: But he was a real operator, and I think we

458
00:27:55,480 --> 00:27:59,240
Speaker 1: have to understand that and not underestimated. But we need

459
00:27:59,280 --> 00:28:02,600
Speaker 1: to understand how he abuses. And it's not you know,

460
00:28:02,800 --> 00:28:04,879
Speaker 1: the warm embrace. I looked in his eyes and me

461
00:28:05,119 --> 00:28:07,000
Speaker 1: you know, I know it was called me the truth.

462
00:28:07,080 --> 00:28:10,200
Speaker 1: I mean, this is this is this is about naive.

463
00:28:11,080 --> 00:28:13,280
Speaker 1: There's a line in the book that kind of cracked

464
00:28:13,280 --> 00:28:17,400
Speaker 1: me up, not just that he's a spymaster president, but quote,

465
00:28:17,880 --> 00:28:22,440
Speaker 1: there's no such thing as a former KGB agent. Explained

466
00:28:22,520 --> 00:28:26,399
Speaker 1: that that's him. That's him. That's what he said. I

467
00:28:26,440 --> 00:28:29,119
Speaker 1: didn't say that. I would say there's such thing as

468
00:28:29,119 --> 00:28:32,399
Speaker 1: a former CIA guy. But that doesn't mean I'm the Taylor.

469
00:28:32,440 --> 00:28:35,119
Speaker 1: It means that there's a mindset. And what Putin is

470
00:28:35,160 --> 00:28:38,360
Speaker 1: saying to you is, don't be confused. I know how

471
00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:41,440
Speaker 1: to run operations. I mean so and that at that

472
00:28:41,800 --> 00:28:44,840
Speaker 1: I was the head of all operations. So where there

473
00:28:44,960 --> 00:28:47,960
Speaker 1: where there is I think a major fall. And the

474
00:28:48,000 --> 00:28:50,560
Speaker 1: guy that I gave, you know what, I would you

475
00:28:51,360 --> 00:28:53,880
Speaker 1: give the Alexander the grace or something. It might not

476
00:28:53,920 --> 00:28:55,840
Speaker 1: have been a nice guy, but he knew how to organize.

477
00:28:56,960 --> 00:29:00,440
Speaker 1: What I would say about was wrong with his ategy

478
00:29:01,800 --> 00:29:05,200
Speaker 1: is it's the basic principle, which is where his enemies.

479
00:29:05,840 --> 00:29:08,600
Speaker 1: I mean, if he put all the political skills into

480
00:29:08,640 --> 00:29:12,840
Speaker 1: becoming uh, joining the wet and becoming a real partner

481
00:29:12,880 --> 00:29:15,880
Speaker 1: in the West, I think the Russian economy would be

482
00:29:16,280 --> 00:29:19,360
Speaker 1: stronger there, more potential would be reached and the world

483
00:29:19,520 --> 00:29:21,880
Speaker 1: be a better place. But I think he's decided he's

484
00:29:21,880 --> 00:29:24,640
Speaker 1: going to play his hand and it's better for him

485
00:29:24,640 --> 00:29:27,760
Speaker 1: to be the tough guy in charge of a smaller Russia,

486
00:29:28,240 --> 00:29:31,959
Speaker 1: a less dynamic economic Russia. But be in charge, and

487
00:29:32,040 --> 00:29:34,080
Speaker 1: that when you open up to the West, and you

488
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:36,800
Speaker 1: open up to the democratic process is associated with it.

489
00:29:37,400 --> 00:29:40,280
Speaker 1: He can't count on consolidating and holding on the power.

490
00:29:40,400 --> 00:29:42,840
Speaker 1: So I think he's decided to play the shorthand, which

491
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:46,520
Speaker 1: would make him UH not Outsider the Great or Peter

492
00:29:46,640 --> 00:29:52,880
Speaker 1: the Great right, so he he is a a tzar um,

493
00:29:52,960 --> 00:29:55,320
Speaker 1: but on the on the on the smaller scale. I

494
00:29:55,880 --> 00:30:01,000
Speaker 1: do think he's a truly a major advers in fact

495
00:30:01,040 --> 00:30:04,840
Speaker 1: we're confronting today. You know, leadership is a really important thing.

496
00:30:04,880 --> 00:30:07,120
Speaker 1: But you know, she is not exactly a walk in

497
00:30:07,160 --> 00:30:09,080
Speaker 1: the park either. I mean, you're not a tough guy

498
00:30:09,200 --> 00:30:12,040
Speaker 1: or the Iranians or the North Koreans. And there was

499
00:30:12,560 --> 00:30:17,080
Speaker 1: the president United States past and present. We are now

500
00:30:17,560 --> 00:30:23,760
Speaker 1: terrorism was a highly decentralized problem. Right now, once the

501
00:30:24,520 --> 00:30:29,440
Speaker 1: know that again, situation reaches a certain point of stability,

502
00:30:29,480 --> 00:30:32,800
Speaker 1: which it will not nothing, not favorably for us, but

503
00:30:32,960 --> 00:30:36,400
Speaker 1: stability we will return to. One of the President's biggest

504
00:30:36,440 --> 00:30:42,440
Speaker 1: challenges will be dealing with hard minded competitors who have nothing,

505
00:30:43,280 --> 00:30:46,280
Speaker 1: have very little time for the democratic process as we

506
00:30:46,360 --> 00:30:50,440
Speaker 1: understand it. And some of the last putent question for now,

507
00:30:50,840 --> 00:30:54,160
Speaker 1: some of the estimates of his net worth, what he

508
00:30:54,400 --> 00:30:58,000
Speaker 1: snuck out of the country and has hidden elsewhere, puts

509
00:30:58,080 --> 00:31:01,720
Speaker 1: him amongst the wealthiest five or so people in the

510
00:31:01,720 --> 00:31:05,920
Speaker 1: world eight billion. Are these just sensational numbers with no

511
00:31:06,000 --> 00:31:10,280
Speaker 1: basis in reality, or has he really moved a lot

512
00:31:10,320 --> 00:31:16,080
Speaker 1: of Russia's wealth elsewhere as sort of his uh emergency

513
00:31:16,160 --> 00:31:20,560
Speaker 1: life raft, or maybe it's his retirement planning well, I

514
00:31:20,600 --> 00:31:23,800
Speaker 1: think one of the big problems with all autocratic leaders is,

515
00:31:24,160 --> 00:31:26,720
Speaker 1: you know, you really don't get to enjoy a lot

516
00:31:26,720 --> 00:31:31,720
Speaker 1: of your retirement money. Um. But I would say this,

517
00:31:31,800 --> 00:31:33,600
Speaker 1: I don't know where he ranks in terms of the

518
00:31:33,640 --> 00:31:38,160
Speaker 1: wealth of the top hundred people in the world, but

519
00:31:38,320 --> 00:31:41,680
Speaker 1: he is substantially wealthy. You know, you don't. I can't

520
00:31:41,680 --> 00:31:44,520
Speaker 1: think of an example in history where you've held the

521
00:31:44,560 --> 00:31:50,280
Speaker 1: type of power hell without a large aggrandizement of your fortune.

522
00:31:50,640 --> 00:31:53,120
Speaker 1: He's certainly not working on what we would call gs

523
00:31:53,160 --> 00:31:57,400
Speaker 1: pension in the United States, right, it's not the way, uh,

524
00:31:57,800 --> 00:31:59,800
Speaker 1: the world worked for the best by knowledge? So then

525
00:32:00,080 --> 00:32:04,160
Speaker 1: was this video wherever they got this video from my god?

526
00:32:04,400 --> 00:32:09,880
Speaker 1: So I would say, uh, he has a masked of fortune.

527
00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:13,560
Speaker 1: That's not surprising and it's not unique in history with

528
00:32:13,640 --> 00:32:18,880
Speaker 1: the people that hold that much power. And whether they

529
00:32:18,920 --> 00:32:21,600
Speaker 1: can track it down with the penny, I'll leave other

530
00:32:21,680 --> 00:32:25,080
Speaker 1: experts to go there, but I would say substantially wealthy

531
00:32:25,240 --> 00:32:29,240
Speaker 1: and amongst one of the wealthiest men today. Quite interesting.

532
00:32:29,760 --> 00:32:32,240
Speaker 1: Let's talk a little bit about the state of the

533
00:32:32,320 --> 00:32:37,800
Speaker 1: agency and in particular cyber warfare, which seems to be

534
00:32:37,880 --> 00:32:42,360
Speaker 1: everywhere from China to North Korea to Iran and especially

535
00:32:42,880 --> 00:32:46,360
Speaker 1: UH in Russia. And let's start with what is the

536
00:32:46,440 --> 00:32:50,800
Speaker 1: Internet Research Agency? It sounds like a pretty benign title.

537
00:32:51,560 --> 00:32:54,880
Speaker 1: I couldn't help but smile a little bit. The operational

538
00:32:54,960 --> 00:32:57,840
Speaker 1: director of CIA Inspiring Group used to be called the

539
00:33:00,200 --> 00:33:04,920
Speaker 1: director for plans something you see something like the Internet

540
00:33:04,960 --> 00:33:08,000
Speaker 1: Research Agency, it has the same ring. It's a It

541
00:33:08,120 --> 00:33:11,320
Speaker 1: is really an elite hacking group, and it's the centralization

542
00:33:12,800 --> 00:33:16,440
Speaker 1: of their capabilities. It's a troll farm. I mean, they

543
00:33:16,440 --> 00:33:19,440
Speaker 1: have the ability to go in and create personas and

544
00:33:19,480 --> 00:33:22,400
Speaker 1: they do a really good job of it. Uh. It

545
00:33:22,560 --> 00:33:29,320
Speaker 1: is there platform, one of their principal platforms of executing

546
00:33:29,360 --> 00:33:32,000
Speaker 1: their cyber program. And again the g r U and

547
00:33:32,120 --> 00:33:38,240
Speaker 1: the SPR that's that's Military Intelligence TRU and the old

548
00:33:38,320 --> 00:33:42,040
Speaker 1: KGB is now called the SVR. So this is really

549
00:33:42,080 --> 00:33:46,040
Speaker 1: a platform that's used and it was used during the election.

550
00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:52,640
Speaker 1: All the face fake identities and the operational activity that

551
00:33:52,720 --> 00:33:57,800
Speaker 1: they were involved in emanated from from those intelligence agencies,

552
00:33:57,840 --> 00:34:01,640
Speaker 1: and the ira A played a part of them. So

553
00:34:01,720 --> 00:34:06,760
Speaker 1: let's talk a little bit about the involvement generally in

554
00:34:06,920 --> 00:34:12,000
Speaker 1: social media, but specifically in the election. What's the purpose

555
00:34:12,239 --> 00:34:17,839
Speaker 1: of disinformation, what advantage accrues to the Russians. If the

556
00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:22,879
Speaker 1: US is busy sniping at each other over Twitter and Facebook, well,

557
00:34:22,920 --> 00:34:26,080
Speaker 1: I think the big advantage is I mean, I think

558
00:34:26,080 --> 00:34:28,359
Speaker 1: it's a political advantage that which if you can make

559
00:34:29,400 --> 00:34:32,000
Speaker 1: people angry with each other in the United States. You know,

560
00:34:32,040 --> 00:34:36,160
Speaker 1: there's a whole list of of organizations that they don't

561
00:34:36,200 --> 00:34:41,719
Speaker 1: really care. Whether it's Proud Boys, are ah Q, I

562
00:34:41,880 --> 00:34:46,000
Speaker 1: ON and U and Tea. They don't really care about

563
00:34:46,040 --> 00:34:47,799
Speaker 1: the mission of them. And in some ways, I'm going

564
00:34:47,840 --> 00:34:49,279
Speaker 1: to tell you, I don't think I'm not even sure

565
00:34:49,280 --> 00:34:53,000
Speaker 1: how much they cared about Trump. The bigger objective was

566
00:34:53,080 --> 00:34:57,920
Speaker 1: how you start up and make Americans unhappy among themselves.

567
00:34:58,400 --> 00:35:02,200
Speaker 1: I'm happy about the issues, you know, to make uh,

568
00:35:02,320 --> 00:35:06,480
Speaker 1: any type of special interest group feel that they're being disadvantage.

569
00:35:06,520 --> 00:35:09,880
Speaker 1: So it is really psyche warfare. Used to be called

570
00:35:10,760 --> 00:35:14,759
Speaker 1: psychological warfare, and it's used in every body going back.

571
00:35:15,280 --> 00:35:17,560
Speaker 1: I was just thinking that the Battle of Jerry. You

572
00:35:17,719 --> 00:35:20,359
Speaker 1: mentioned that, right, you were out there and you blow

573
00:35:20,440 --> 00:35:22,520
Speaker 1: the horns and make it sound like there's a thousand,

574
00:35:23,040 --> 00:35:26,160
Speaker 1: thousands of troops when there isn't. I mean, so people

575
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:31,560
Speaker 1: lying aligned themselves, uh and organized around this information for

576
00:35:31,680 --> 00:35:35,440
Speaker 1: a worldward through the famous body that they was the bridge,

577
00:35:35,480 --> 00:35:38,200
Speaker 1: put a note on it and floated the body to

578
00:35:38,320 --> 00:35:41,560
Speaker 1: the Germans would find it and think we were coming

579
00:35:41,560 --> 00:35:45,000
Speaker 1: in some place other than the Normandy, the Russians and

580
00:35:45,320 --> 00:35:48,759
Speaker 1: Spymaster's prison, which I thought was particularly interesting. And we

581
00:35:48,800 --> 00:35:51,120
Speaker 1: know about it because the guy that was involved in it.

582
00:35:51,520 --> 00:35:54,319
Speaker 1: Eventually the fact was affected to the west. His name

583
00:35:54,400 --> 00:35:58,120
Speaker 1: is Pittman KGB guy. And so in the sixties, like

584
00:35:58,480 --> 00:36:01,120
Speaker 1: sixty four, all of the sudden there's a member of

585
00:36:01,160 --> 00:36:06,680
Speaker 1: a young Young person college at the timement the they

586
00:36:06,680 --> 00:36:11,359
Speaker 1: found the treasure trove of Nazi documents and Devil Lake

587
00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:15,120
Speaker 1: and in and you found all these incriminating documents about

588
00:36:15,120 --> 00:36:18,440
Speaker 1: the German citizens that worked with the Nazis, and you know,

589
00:36:18,520 --> 00:36:21,000
Speaker 1: got into New York Times and it was a big story,

590
00:36:21,120 --> 00:36:23,319
Speaker 1: your story. The only problem with it was it was

591
00:36:23,360 --> 00:36:27,040
Speaker 1: a KGB operation operation next to him, right, And what

592
00:36:27,120 --> 00:36:31,000
Speaker 1: they did is they falsified the documents and as they said,

593
00:36:32,760 --> 00:36:36,360
Speaker 1: himself was part of the team that you know, organized this,

594
00:36:36,440 --> 00:36:39,799
Speaker 1: so it looked like it was a private sector discovery.

595
00:36:40,440 --> 00:36:44,759
Speaker 1: So the purpose was to write Germans hate each other,

596
00:36:45,000 --> 00:36:51,240
Speaker 1: you know. So disinformation has always been a tool psychological

597
00:36:51,280 --> 00:36:54,680
Speaker 1: warfare of the military, but also in the intelligence world,

598
00:36:55,000 --> 00:36:59,359
Speaker 1: and you know, substituting Stalin's head and putting someone I mean,

599
00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:02,880
Speaker 1: you know, it goes on and on. The difference today

600
00:37:03,400 --> 00:37:06,319
Speaker 1: is when I was in the agency, you know, you

601
00:37:06,320 --> 00:37:08,920
Speaker 1: don't have limited capabilities as they said. You know, you

602
00:37:08,960 --> 00:37:11,200
Speaker 1: found the body during World War Two and you put

603
00:37:11,239 --> 00:37:14,640
Speaker 1: a note on it. Right today, we live in a

604
00:37:14,640 --> 00:37:18,640
Speaker 1: whole new world social media. It's like it's almost like

605
00:37:18,680 --> 00:37:23,960
Speaker 1: a nuclear weapon and its ability to generate tremendous force.

606
00:37:24,560 --> 00:37:28,760
Speaker 1: So the ability to use disinformation, and as we all understood,

607
00:37:28,840 --> 00:37:31,960
Speaker 1: the Russians have been into disinformation and never stopped and

608
00:37:32,000 --> 00:37:35,840
Speaker 1: it's something that they do quite well actually, and in

609
00:37:35,920 --> 00:37:39,399
Speaker 1: the modern days, I'm told that the personas they make

610
00:37:39,480 --> 00:37:42,480
Speaker 1: look very legitimate. They really put time into it. So

611
00:37:43,120 --> 00:37:45,360
Speaker 1: it's a new way of warfare. So there is a warfare,

612
00:37:45,480 --> 00:37:48,440
Speaker 1: there's warfare being taken taking place. And I would submit

613
00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:54,040
Speaker 1: on the in Afghanistan today that Russia is using social

614
00:37:54,080 --> 00:37:58,440
Speaker 1: media to create tensions and problems that are adverse to

615
00:37:58,520 --> 00:38:02,040
Speaker 1: our our inter So this information is part of the

616
00:38:02,080 --> 00:38:05,439
Speaker 1: big game, so to speak. So around the time of

617
00:38:05,480 --> 00:38:10,920
Speaker 1: the election, we heard the name Cozy Bear, Who or

618
00:38:11,000 --> 00:38:16,759
Speaker 1: what is Cozy Bear? Cozy Bear, Fancy Bear, U, Lady Bear.

619
00:38:16,840 --> 00:38:20,920
Speaker 1: These are all operational names that you have been given

620
00:38:21,000 --> 00:38:25,520
Speaker 1: to t r U and SBR entities. Cozy Bear was

621
00:38:25,640 --> 00:38:30,760
Speaker 1: actually discovered by Dutch intelligence and it was the Russians

622
00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:34,440
Speaker 1: actually going into our system, and the Dutch alerted this

623
00:38:34,520 --> 00:38:38,160
Speaker 1: to him. They were the first ones to discover Cozy

624
00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:43,160
Speaker 1: Bear being designed to stir up trouble the United States

625
00:38:44,160 --> 00:38:49,160
Speaker 1: during the election. Again almost like the operation I mentored

626
00:38:49,200 --> 00:38:53,760
Speaker 1: Bittman is called Operation Neptune. So Cozy Bear is really

627
00:38:53,840 --> 00:38:58,520
Speaker 1: an operational name for an activity. And you know when

628
00:38:58,560 --> 00:39:05,520
Speaker 1: you when you engaged in sort of meddling inside our country,

629
00:39:05,560 --> 00:39:09,200
Speaker 1: they got the nickname Cozy there, right, So it's it's

630
00:39:09,239 --> 00:39:11,759
Speaker 1: not it's the name of an activity rather than a

631
00:39:11,880 --> 00:39:15,840
Speaker 1: specific group. And then what took place in why was

632
00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:19,800
Speaker 1: it the g r U probing the US election system?

633
00:39:20,239 --> 00:39:24,200
Speaker 1: I think they both are, you know, and uh, I

634
00:39:24,280 --> 00:39:26,600
Speaker 1: can't tell you whether it's a coordinated or not. There's

635
00:39:26,640 --> 00:39:29,799
Speaker 1: probably a bit like our own intelligence world that you

636
00:39:29,840 --> 00:39:32,320
Speaker 1: know a lot of things are coordinated, but some things aren't.

637
00:39:33,080 --> 00:39:36,480
Speaker 1: But did Jerry you and this is true in our

638
00:39:36,520 --> 00:39:39,920
Speaker 1: own system, you know, Big data and the ability to

639
00:39:40,160 --> 00:39:45,399
Speaker 1: mass big data often requires a tremendous computer power. So

640
00:39:45,640 --> 00:39:49,880
Speaker 1: in our world, you know, n s A has tremendous

641
00:39:49,880 --> 00:39:52,000
Speaker 1: capabilities in the cyber world. And now we have a

642
00:39:52,040 --> 00:39:55,960
Speaker 1: military command called Cyber Command. And the reason is because

643
00:39:56,040 --> 00:40:03,080
Speaker 1: it requires a tremendous amount of uh of uh firepower

644
00:40:03,120 --> 00:40:06,080
Speaker 1: if you will, in the cyber world and personnel. So

645
00:40:07,160 --> 00:40:12,680
Speaker 1: uh it's a consequence the military is better equipped to

646
00:40:12,719 --> 00:40:18,759
Speaker 1: handle what I would call large um large cyber activities.

647
00:40:18,800 --> 00:40:22,200
Speaker 1: And that's why we have a cyber command today. The CIA,

648
00:40:22,320 --> 00:40:25,160
Speaker 1: and again this would be you know, my personal judgment,

649
00:40:25,400 --> 00:40:29,920
Speaker 1: and and and the KGV sp R probably do more

650
00:40:29,960 --> 00:40:32,640
Speaker 1: surgical things. In other words, they're not trying to mass

651
00:40:32,680 --> 00:40:35,440
Speaker 1: all the data and grind it down in supercomputers, but

652
00:40:36,120 --> 00:40:40,520
Speaker 1: are looking at surgical things, targeted types of activities. So,

653
00:40:41,719 --> 00:40:44,440
Speaker 1: but both of them are under flying under the same flag,

654
00:40:44,560 --> 00:40:51,920
Speaker 1: which is it is too run operations that that weaken

655
00:40:52,160 --> 00:40:55,719
Speaker 1: the political fabric of the United States. So let's talk

656
00:40:55,760 --> 00:40:58,840
Speaker 1: about some of those operations that are attempts to weaken

657
00:40:58,920 --> 00:41:02,920
Speaker 1: the social fabric. Here. I want there's a run of

658
00:41:03,000 --> 00:41:05,360
Speaker 1: things you've you've referenced. I want to ask you about

659
00:41:06,000 --> 00:41:09,040
Speaker 1: you mentioned Q and on are the Russians stirring up

660
00:41:09,080 --> 00:41:11,680
Speaker 1: trouble with that group? Well, I think there's a number

661
00:41:11,680 --> 00:41:14,160
Speaker 1: of things that have emerged the book that I it's

662
00:41:14,520 --> 00:41:17,600
Speaker 1: it's it's really what are the types of groups that

663
00:41:17,640 --> 00:41:22,440
Speaker 1: they would be looking at Antipa right, uh? Doing on? Uh?

664
00:41:22,840 --> 00:41:25,319
Speaker 1: They started in the vac the nation program putting out

665
00:41:25,360 --> 00:41:29,759
Speaker 1: this information about the vaccination and then that vaccinations are

666
00:41:29,880 --> 00:41:34,680
Speaker 1: vaccinations were not not not good, not not effective? Right,

667
00:41:34,719 --> 00:41:38,760
Speaker 1: so uh and then where were the Chinese doing about

668
00:41:38,800 --> 00:41:43,640
Speaker 1: where did the where did the virus start? And so um,

669
00:41:43,640 --> 00:41:50,200
Speaker 1: you know proud boys, uh, white supremacist right climate. I mean,

670
00:41:50,280 --> 00:41:53,160
Speaker 1: they're taking issues and it's not as though, as I said,

671
00:41:53,760 --> 00:41:55,600
Speaker 1: you don't want to overweight that they're working with the

672
00:41:55,640 --> 00:41:59,000
Speaker 1: conservatives or the left or whatever. They are just taking

673
00:41:59,040 --> 00:42:03,919
Speaker 1: advantages where a ce friction inside of our system and

674
00:42:04,280 --> 00:42:10,920
Speaker 1: try to agitate. So um, I think you know, the FBI,

675
00:42:11,160 --> 00:42:13,719
Speaker 1: I would think would be immensely busy and trying to

676
00:42:13,760 --> 00:42:16,040
Speaker 1: figure this out, as well as the n s A.

677
00:42:17,040 --> 00:42:19,799
Speaker 1: And how deep are they now the end of the day,

678
00:42:20,000 --> 00:42:24,360
Speaker 1: I don't think I think it's a nuisance at this point.

679
00:42:24,760 --> 00:42:27,920
Speaker 1: I think the what we really need to be concerned.

680
00:42:27,960 --> 00:42:31,520
Speaker 1: Is it a real potential if they decided up the

681
00:42:31,600 --> 00:42:34,440
Speaker 1: anti I mean, how far could they push it? And

682
00:42:34,680 --> 00:42:37,560
Speaker 1: second of all, we need to nip it in the butt.

683
00:42:37,600 --> 00:42:40,080
Speaker 1: It's not exactly the but I think it's blooming, if

684
00:42:40,120 --> 00:42:44,319
Speaker 1: you will. But I think we need to have some understanding.

685
00:42:44,360 --> 00:42:46,840
Speaker 1: This cannot be going checked where you know we have

686
00:42:47,360 --> 00:42:50,879
Speaker 1: you picked whatever group. Now there's any group that has

687
00:42:50,920 --> 00:42:54,920
Speaker 1: a voice that you know, and particularly conspiratorial mindset, And

688
00:42:55,239 --> 00:42:58,480
Speaker 1: that is much larger than I anticipated, even though I

689
00:42:58,520 --> 00:43:01,360
Speaker 1: came for the world of conspirators. Right, Maybe it's because

690
00:43:01,400 --> 00:43:06,040
Speaker 1: I know too much that the conspiracies are harder to

691
00:43:06,239 --> 00:43:10,200
Speaker 1: bring about them, one would think. But there is a

692
00:43:10,239 --> 00:43:13,240
Speaker 1: mindset in the United States, and I'm only now thinking

693
00:43:13,360 --> 00:43:16,600
Speaker 1: of where where are the roots of this mindset? And

694
00:43:16,640 --> 00:43:20,840
Speaker 1: it's a conspiratorial one. We become less less sanguine about

695
00:43:20,840 --> 00:43:24,279
Speaker 1: our government and our institutions, and we're more susceptible we

696
00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:27,560
Speaker 1: used to be. And I'm trying to figure what is changing.

697
00:43:27,600 --> 00:43:30,000
Speaker 1: And then I mean, it's kind of right before us. Right,

698
00:43:30,040 --> 00:43:33,560
Speaker 1: it's the cyber world and social media in other words,

699
00:43:33,640 --> 00:43:38,560
Speaker 1: today it is so much easier stir up trouble among

700
00:43:38,760 --> 00:43:42,600
Speaker 1: among people and I think we have to realize that

701
00:43:42,719 --> 00:43:46,959
Speaker 1: it's not a lot of this isn't just internal. Much

702
00:43:47,000 --> 00:43:50,040
Speaker 1: of it is going to be taking advantages by all

703
00:43:50,120 --> 00:43:53,160
Speaker 1: of our competitors how to make this week. And we

704
00:43:53,239 --> 00:43:55,640
Speaker 1: have to be susceptible, I mean, we have to be

705
00:43:56,360 --> 00:43:59,239
Speaker 1: perceptive about this, and we have to be able to

706
00:43:59,280 --> 00:44:01,480
Speaker 1: address it with is doing it. And that's why I

707
00:44:01,520 --> 00:44:04,759
Speaker 1: think we need have really tough discussions. The Russians are

708
00:44:04,760 --> 00:44:07,320
Speaker 1: the ones that are really doing it now. The Chinese

709
00:44:07,320 --> 00:44:11,520
Speaker 1: looked at we know this from public intelligence reports have

710
00:44:11,680 --> 00:44:15,160
Speaker 1: made public by the Intelligence Comminity, but decided not to

711
00:44:15,280 --> 00:44:19,279
Speaker 1: In others they did one Trump is being too tough

712
00:44:19,320 --> 00:44:21,440
Speaker 1: on them or whatever, but they decided that we can

713
00:44:21,480 --> 00:44:23,400
Speaker 1: live with that, but we're not going to do with

714
00:44:23,440 --> 00:44:26,520
Speaker 1: the Russians. But they looked at it, you know. But

715
00:44:26,600 --> 00:44:32,520
Speaker 1: the Russians, they're gonna go, why why step back if

716
00:44:32,560 --> 00:44:34,839
Speaker 1: you're not being forced to step back? And they need

717
00:44:34,880 --> 00:44:37,560
Speaker 1: to remember, right, start with the perius of power players.

718
00:44:37,600 --> 00:44:40,160
Speaker 1: So a power player looks for vulnerabilities, pushes in it,

719
00:44:40,840 --> 00:44:43,440
Speaker 1: and you won't. You don't back up unless its power.

720
00:44:43,480 --> 00:44:46,600
Speaker 1: You're not going to jaw bone the prutinents of this world.

721
00:44:46,840 --> 00:44:49,960
Speaker 1: The shades of this world with sweet words. You know

722
00:44:50,160 --> 00:44:53,839
Speaker 1: that they if you accept that they're power players, they

723
00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:56,320
Speaker 1: recognize power. We have to make sure we don't delude

724
00:44:56,360 --> 00:44:59,719
Speaker 1: their power. Or one of the things about democracy touched

725
00:44:59,719 --> 00:45:03,600
Speaker 1: tho is really interesting and we don't think about it enough.

726
00:45:04,360 --> 00:45:08,520
Speaker 1: Americans really restrainful. I know it doesn't feel like that today,

727
00:45:08,560 --> 00:45:12,120
Speaker 1: but so that you know, we don't really use our force.

728
00:45:12,280 --> 00:45:14,040
Speaker 1: The rest of the world looks at us and being

729
00:45:14,120 --> 00:45:18,719
Speaker 1: much more, much stronger, and have a different view of

730
00:45:18,800 --> 00:45:22,759
Speaker 1: us and our power. We tend not to use use

731
00:45:22,840 --> 00:45:26,319
Speaker 1: our power as much as if our country were an

732
00:45:26,320 --> 00:45:30,120
Speaker 1: authoritarian oriented case and didn't have to go before the public.

733
00:45:30,200 --> 00:45:36,399
Speaker 1: So the you know, we're not using our power by

734
00:45:36,520 --> 00:45:40,719
Speaker 1: choice at this point, the counter cyber cyber warfare, and

735
00:45:40,800 --> 00:45:44,480
Speaker 1: the question is when will we reach that consensus and

736
00:45:44,560 --> 00:45:47,719
Speaker 1: the will of United people that we're not going to tolerate,

737
00:45:49,160 --> 00:45:52,520
Speaker 1: you know, intrusions into our political process. So let me

738
00:45:52,880 --> 00:45:55,160
Speaker 1: reference some of the things you you write about in

739
00:45:55,200 --> 00:45:57,840
Speaker 1: the book that was kind of fascinating. I didn't have

740
00:45:57,880 --> 00:46:02,560
Speaker 1: any idea that the Russians were out buying Facebook accounts

741
00:46:02,560 --> 00:46:07,960
Speaker 1: and Twitter accounts and other local accounts in order to

742
00:46:08,040 --> 00:46:11,399
Speaker 1: use that as part of their agit prop. Uh that

743
00:46:11,520 --> 00:46:14,160
Speaker 1: was that was really kind of shocking. Who are the

744
00:46:14,280 --> 00:46:19,120
Speaker 1: useful idiots that are selling these things to the Russians

745
00:46:19,600 --> 00:46:22,359
Speaker 1: because I have to imagine someone wants to buy your

746
00:46:22,400 --> 00:46:25,560
Speaker 1: Facebook account. No good could ever come out of that.

747
00:46:27,040 --> 00:46:29,520
Speaker 1: They create their own personas. I mean, they actually create

748
00:46:29,560 --> 00:46:33,000
Speaker 1: people that you think they that they actually exist, or

749
00:46:33,080 --> 00:46:38,279
Speaker 1: as they create uh, fake identities and run them on

750
00:46:38,400 --> 00:46:41,759
Speaker 1: Facebook and Twitter. Right, Remember they did that years ago.

751
00:46:42,360 --> 00:46:45,200
Speaker 1: We had a spy in the Famous Spy. There was

752
00:46:45,239 --> 00:46:48,719
Speaker 1: a movie with Tom Hanks a few years ago, um,

753
00:46:48,760 --> 00:46:51,919
Speaker 1: and it was Rudolph Able, right. He came here under

754
00:46:51,960 --> 00:46:56,399
Speaker 1: fourth documents and then they have the show the Americans. Right,

755
00:46:56,760 --> 00:46:59,160
Speaker 1: this is all old Russia's stuff. But if he moved

756
00:46:59,160 --> 00:47:04,080
Speaker 1: to today, it's not one person. You're building identities, You're

757
00:47:04,160 --> 00:47:08,960
Speaker 1: you're you're building social media identities that look real, you know.

758
00:47:09,040 --> 00:47:13,000
Speaker 1: And so they had I have in front of me

759
00:47:13,200 --> 00:47:16,680
Speaker 1: right now. But I think you know, two thousand, they

760
00:47:16,680 --> 00:47:21,480
Speaker 1: had like twenty nine thousand Facebook spots that you get hit,

761
00:47:22,080 --> 00:47:25,920
Speaker 1: you know, they had Twitter accounts. I mean, they were

762
00:47:25,960 --> 00:47:30,160
Speaker 1: out there. I think the when I did the research

763
00:47:30,200 --> 00:47:32,560
Speaker 1: on it, I think we I think from the low

764
00:47:32,680 --> 00:47:36,120
Speaker 1: end Uh concluded that they had like twenty million hits,

765
00:47:36,239 --> 00:47:39,520
Speaker 1: twenty nine million hits. There was It wasn't trivial. That

766
00:47:39,719 --> 00:47:42,719
Speaker 1: wasn't like one guy came in with a false document, right,

767
00:47:42,760 --> 00:47:45,240
Speaker 1: this was we were out there. They were peddling among

768
00:47:45,360 --> 00:47:48,560
Speaker 1: twenty nine million people. But I think if you look

769
00:47:48,600 --> 00:47:51,160
Speaker 1: at them and the numbers and the aggregate, it it

770
00:47:51,280 --> 00:47:55,319
Speaker 1: looks really big. But I think at the end of

771
00:47:55,320 --> 00:47:58,680
Speaker 1: the day, the election was really the American people were

772
00:47:58,719 --> 00:48:01,320
Speaker 1: voting on bigger issues in their mind, and the Russians

773
00:48:01,320 --> 00:48:05,719
Speaker 1: firm working around the edges. But the potential is there.

774
00:48:06,160 --> 00:48:09,680
Speaker 1: And even if they only changed two thousand votes or

775
00:48:09,840 --> 00:48:15,040
Speaker 1: made two thousand people, man, that's two thousand too many. Right, Well,

776
00:48:15,120 --> 00:48:18,239
Speaker 1: let's look at let's look at Brexit, which was you know,

777
00:48:18,280 --> 00:48:20,960
Speaker 1: pretty much a dead split down the middle with a

778
00:48:21,120 --> 00:48:26,319
Speaker 1: slight advantage to the Brexiters. Were the Russians agitating for

779
00:48:26,560 --> 00:48:30,440
Speaker 1: the UK against the EU and and did they have

780
00:48:30,520 --> 00:48:34,120
Speaker 1: an impact there? Yeah, I honestly I don't know the answer.

781
00:48:35,000 --> 00:48:38,640
Speaker 1: But you know, the Brits are in some way, I mean,

782
00:48:40,480 --> 00:48:43,960
Speaker 1: our closest ally, I would say we have the Canadians

783
00:48:43,960 --> 00:48:50,120
Speaker 1: that are are close to us, Australians are the five eyes. Um.

784
00:48:50,239 --> 00:48:53,440
Speaker 1: I think one of the problems for footing and that

785
00:48:53,640 --> 00:48:58,520
Speaker 1: issue would be is it better for Russia UH to

786
00:48:58,640 --> 00:49:03,840
Speaker 1: have the UK in or out of NATO? So would

787
00:49:03,880 --> 00:49:07,799
Speaker 1: the conclusion be they be better out? Um, I'm not

788
00:49:07,840 --> 00:49:10,760
Speaker 1: sure they'd make that call because it might mean closer

789
00:49:10,800 --> 00:49:13,920
Speaker 1: alliance with the US. So I don't know whether they

790
00:49:14,080 --> 00:49:20,480
Speaker 1: don't have any um, primary source research on that, but

791
00:49:20,600 --> 00:49:24,719
Speaker 1: it felt to them like it was advantageous. Then I

792
00:49:24,760 --> 00:49:27,960
Speaker 1: would suspect that they you know, and as you were saying,

793
00:49:28,480 --> 00:49:30,560
Speaker 1: you could work within the margins, but you have to

794
00:49:30,640 --> 00:49:34,040
Speaker 1: make a decision and a lot of times even autocrats

795
00:49:34,040 --> 00:49:37,120
Speaker 1: are stuck with you know, tell me how this plays

796
00:49:37,160 --> 00:49:40,120
Speaker 1: out again, I mean, does it all worked or our favor?

797
00:49:40,440 --> 00:49:43,279
Speaker 1: But to human beings and so they can make a

798
00:49:43,320 --> 00:49:48,279
Speaker 1: snap decision. So I don't think Russia changed and had

799
00:49:48,320 --> 00:49:54,080
Speaker 1: the impact of on on Breakfast. I mean, I think

800
00:49:54,080 --> 00:49:55,759
Speaker 1: it's like the American election. I think it is what

801
00:49:55,840 --> 00:49:58,799
Speaker 1: it is, and I think it up for a lot

802
00:49:58,840 --> 00:50:02,880
Speaker 1: of other over arching issues beyond what the Russians might

803
00:50:02,920 --> 00:50:05,640
Speaker 1: be able to start up. Right, you mentioned in the

804
00:50:05,680 --> 00:50:10,920
Speaker 1: book after the election, there were these not my president rallies,

805
00:50:11,920 --> 00:50:15,200
Speaker 1: tell us who was behind those and who was agitating

806
00:50:15,239 --> 00:50:19,840
Speaker 1: for those. So again, you have a lot of folks

807
00:50:19,960 --> 00:50:23,239
Speaker 1: that in the world of social media, almost spontaneously, you

808
00:50:23,239 --> 00:50:26,399
Speaker 1: don't know who starts the first the first tweet on it,

809
00:50:26,520 --> 00:50:29,880
Speaker 1: right or whatever. But I think once the Russians saw it,

810
00:50:29,960 --> 00:50:35,160
Speaker 1: I think are are reporting would indicate that they saw

811
00:50:35,280 --> 00:50:39,000
Speaker 1: that as an opportunity, so that that is that is

812
00:50:39,120 --> 00:50:44,879
Speaker 1: one area where they were um developing Facebook points and agitating.

813
00:50:44,960 --> 00:50:47,600
Speaker 1: So but where they be driving force. I won't give

814
00:50:47,640 --> 00:50:50,839
Speaker 1: them that credit yet, right, all right, but they saw

815
00:50:50,920 --> 00:50:54,680
Speaker 1: it and it was in their interest to have a

816
00:50:54,760 --> 00:50:57,759
Speaker 1: segment of the population to feel that the presidented state

817
00:50:57,840 --> 00:51:01,359
Speaker 1: is illegitimate members. Anytime you're an adversary and you can

818
00:51:01,440 --> 00:51:05,960
Speaker 1: play that card that weekends your adversary. So they surely

819
00:51:06,000 --> 00:51:08,920
Speaker 1: were in into it where they braids behind it. Now,

820
00:51:08,960 --> 00:51:11,759
Speaker 1: I think that was going to come. It did come

821
00:51:11,880 --> 00:51:14,560
Speaker 1: with or without. But would they play in it short

822
00:51:15,040 --> 00:51:17,839
Speaker 1: and as I said, you know, around the edges, it's

823
00:51:18,080 --> 00:51:22,319
Speaker 1: you know, it's um you know, I'm not saying to

824
00:51:22,320 --> 00:51:24,480
Speaker 1: make a difference, but they were playing in it. I'm

825
00:51:24,520 --> 00:51:28,320
Speaker 1: concerned that they're playing across the broad spectrum of things,

826
00:51:28,520 --> 00:51:32,040
Speaker 1: and the potential if not checked, then they will create

827
00:51:32,200 --> 00:51:34,600
Speaker 1: not my president right, how much money are they going

828
00:51:34,680 --> 00:51:37,600
Speaker 1: to throw into In other words, it can become really

829
00:51:37,680 --> 00:51:40,640
Speaker 1: quite disruptive. Now we could do the same thing inside Russia.

830
00:51:40,680 --> 00:51:43,120
Speaker 1: I mean he needs to understand that. But I don't

831
00:51:43,120 --> 00:51:45,440
Speaker 1: think he believes we're going to do it right. I

832
00:51:45,440 --> 00:51:49,000
Speaker 1: don't think he feels that. You know, we're responding, and

833
00:51:49,040 --> 00:51:53,960
Speaker 1: I think the last thing our president said, uh was

834
00:51:54,280 --> 00:51:57,560
Speaker 1: we're gonna respond in kind. What does that mean? Put

835
00:51:57,680 --> 00:52:00,920
Speaker 1: are saying, well, okay, well, what what is that going

836
00:52:00,920 --> 00:52:02,960
Speaker 1: to what's that going to look like? But I think

837
00:52:02,960 --> 00:52:05,160
Speaker 1: that's why you have to have a private discussion between

838
00:52:05,200 --> 00:52:11,520
Speaker 1: intelligence people saying let me tell you what it looks like. So, yeah,

839
00:52:11,560 --> 00:52:15,840
Speaker 1: so you know we have to star otherwise we're have

840
00:52:17,000 --> 00:52:18,880
Speaker 1: you know, this is like a nircular weapon. You know,

841
00:52:18,920 --> 00:52:21,160
Speaker 1: you have mutual destruction, right so at a certain point

842
00:52:21,200 --> 00:52:24,120
Speaker 1: you don't do it right, you contain yourself and then

843
00:52:24,160 --> 00:52:26,440
Speaker 1: we don't have that right now. Right now, the Russians field,

844
00:52:27,040 --> 00:52:29,960
Speaker 1: you know, investing your system, You're not doing much in

845
00:52:30,040 --> 00:52:33,080
Speaker 1: my system. I don't see any incentive to stop. I'm

846
00:52:33,120 --> 00:52:35,800
Speaker 1: doing a lot of R and D right now. I'm testing.

847
00:52:35,880 --> 00:52:38,520
Speaker 1: I mean, I don't need to be so flipped about it,

848
00:52:38,560 --> 00:52:41,279
Speaker 1: but you know, I'm testing this and seeing how we

849
00:52:41,320 --> 00:52:43,080
Speaker 1: can do this and how we can work within the

850
00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:46,720
Speaker 1: U S system. Right. But if let's say we really

851
00:52:46,719 --> 00:52:48,600
Speaker 1: got to the mat and we were, you know, at

852
00:52:48,640 --> 00:52:52,440
Speaker 1: each other's throat, I mean, we're looking at small potatoes

853
00:52:52,480 --> 00:52:54,480
Speaker 1: compared to what they could do and what we could do.

854
00:52:54,920 --> 00:52:57,799
Speaker 1: What do you think the reaction in Moscow was to

855
00:52:58,000 --> 00:53:02,360
Speaker 1: the January six insurrection and that that took place earlier

856
00:53:02,400 --> 00:53:07,399
Speaker 1: this year. Were they surprised by that? Were they agitating

857
00:53:07,440 --> 00:53:10,399
Speaker 1: by that? Or they're just very happy to sit back

858
00:53:10,440 --> 00:53:13,120
Speaker 1: and say, hey, if you guys are gonna find amost yourselves,

859
00:53:13,600 --> 00:53:15,640
Speaker 1: we could just you know, never get in the way

860
00:53:15,680 --> 00:53:19,040
Speaker 1: of an enemy shooting themselves in the foot. I think

861
00:53:19,040 --> 00:53:22,719
Speaker 1: it's the ladder which it happened so fast. It's the

862
00:53:22,719 --> 00:53:25,359
Speaker 1: type of thing you can't prepare. But the other thing is,

863
00:53:25,840 --> 00:53:28,920
Speaker 1: it's one thing that creative persona out there are about

864
00:53:29,480 --> 00:53:32,759
Speaker 1: not my president, right, it's another one to deliberately be

865
00:53:32,880 --> 00:53:37,880
Speaker 1: involved in a violent act against the capital. Right, that's

866
00:53:37,920 --> 00:53:41,359
Speaker 1: a bit too risky, I think for even Putin, who

867
00:53:41,440 --> 00:53:43,640
Speaker 1: is not risk avert I think you don't want to

868
00:53:43,640 --> 00:53:46,759
Speaker 1: be caught out on that one. That absolutely requires an

869
00:53:46,760 --> 00:53:50,319
Speaker 1: American response. That's pretty dynamic. So I don't think they

870
00:53:50,320 --> 00:53:53,680
Speaker 1: had to tank the chance to evaluated way it. You know,

871
00:53:53,800 --> 00:53:56,520
Speaker 1: it just happened too fast. But if you're asking me,

872
00:53:56,560 --> 00:53:59,799
Speaker 1: how do they feel about it? It It, Wow, that's when

873
00:53:59,840 --> 00:54:01,640
Speaker 1: we didn't have to work on. But that really worked

874
00:54:01,640 --> 00:54:04,640
Speaker 1: out within our plan. It's now you know, we're now

875
00:54:04,640 --> 00:54:06,640
Speaker 1: they're gonna have investigations that are going to turn on

876
00:54:06,680 --> 00:54:10,759
Speaker 1: each other. So but we're looking at our own weaknesses

877
00:54:11,040 --> 00:54:13,440
Speaker 1: and they're sitting there looking at them, and they're thinking

878
00:54:13,440 --> 00:54:16,880
Speaker 1: about how do you left reach it? Remember, he studied,

879
00:54:17,360 --> 00:54:20,120
Speaker 1: he's he was, he's a judo expert. I think he's

880
00:54:20,160 --> 00:54:24,160
Speaker 1: a black belt design He under he understands how you

881
00:54:24,239 --> 00:54:27,560
Speaker 1: use the other price and strength against him, right, and

882
00:54:27,880 --> 00:54:31,240
Speaker 1: so so I think, you know these are judo place

883
00:54:31,880 --> 00:54:35,920
Speaker 1: m that's really interesting. So you one of the things

884
00:54:35,960 --> 00:54:37,560
Speaker 1: you wrote in the book that I found kind of

885
00:54:37,600 --> 00:54:42,680
Speaker 1: intriguing was as long as there's an autocratic government in Moscow,

886
00:54:42,960 --> 00:54:45,240
Speaker 1: there will be people willing to spy for the West.

887
00:54:46,040 --> 00:54:49,759
Speaker 1: That raises two questions, why does an autocratic government lead

888
00:54:49,800 --> 00:54:54,080
Speaker 1: to that? And second, why do Americans and Westerners occasionally

889
00:54:54,120 --> 00:54:58,200
Speaker 1: spy for Russia? You would think in in the battle

890
00:54:58,239 --> 00:55:02,440
Speaker 1: of good versus evil. It maybe it's not crystal clear,

891
00:55:03,000 --> 00:55:06,040
Speaker 1: but but it seems like they've been the bad guy

892
00:55:06,080 --> 00:55:08,520
Speaker 1: for a long time. Tell us a little bit about

893
00:55:08,520 --> 00:55:11,880
Speaker 1: why people spy for us and why do people spy

894
00:55:11,960 --> 00:55:15,760
Speaker 1: for them. There's a commonality on one level, and don't

895
00:55:15,800 --> 00:55:17,880
Speaker 1: let me leave you without going there. But let me

896
00:55:17,920 --> 00:55:22,799
Speaker 1: go to the first set of of issues on this.

897
00:55:23,440 --> 00:55:26,160
Speaker 1: And as I said at the very beginning, working from

898
00:55:26,160 --> 00:55:30,960
Speaker 1: a democratic system, we had much more of a drawal

899
00:55:31,040 --> 00:55:33,279
Speaker 1: to get people to want to work with us, not

900
00:55:33,360 --> 00:55:37,160
Speaker 1: just Russians, every group, right, and it was it was

901
00:55:37,200 --> 00:55:39,640
Speaker 1: not a hard sell because a lot of people were

902
00:55:39,640 --> 00:55:42,960
Speaker 1: dissatisfied with their own country because it was a repressive

903
00:55:42,960 --> 00:55:46,239
Speaker 1: One might repressive, have a repressive but when you have

904
00:55:46,280 --> 00:55:49,319
Speaker 1: an autocratic government, you have people that are much more

905
00:55:49,360 --> 00:55:53,680
Speaker 1: disadvantaged and have do not have a release for their descent.

906
00:55:53,920 --> 00:55:56,040
Speaker 1: The United States has lots of room for descent. You

907
00:55:56,040 --> 00:55:58,960
Speaker 1: can say whatever you want, whatever you want, and you

908
00:55:59,040 --> 00:56:01,160
Speaker 1: can go move on of another job and so on.

909
00:56:02,440 --> 00:56:06,319
Speaker 1: So we have that that release and there are you know,

910
00:56:07,880 --> 00:56:13,440
Speaker 1: percentage wide fewer people that our element. When Russia first

911
00:56:13,480 --> 00:56:17,320
Speaker 1: started and the Communists started, right, there was an appeal

912
00:56:17,719 --> 00:56:20,400
Speaker 1: people believed in communism. Right, we have a number of

913
00:56:20,400 --> 00:56:24,520
Speaker 1: people both in the UK United States became spies, ideological spies,

914
00:56:24,880 --> 00:56:29,400
Speaker 1: not for money but for the cause. But by the

915
00:56:29,440 --> 00:56:32,400
Speaker 1: time you got the Stalin I mean, and then World

916
00:56:32,400 --> 00:56:36,840
Speaker 1: War two broke out and Hitler and uh and Stalin

917
00:56:36,960 --> 00:56:41,320
Speaker 1: agreed on how to handle Poland, I mean that everybody

918
00:56:41,400 --> 00:56:44,919
Speaker 1: was disillusioned. So it was really hard and illogically after

919
00:56:44,960 --> 00:56:47,640
Speaker 1: the fifties to get people to really want to become

920
00:56:47,680 --> 00:56:51,080
Speaker 1: a communist, so they had a rupper product. But then

921
00:56:51,160 --> 00:56:54,280
Speaker 1: there's the world. So in the bigger sweep of things,

922
00:56:54,840 --> 00:56:59,040
Speaker 1: I think democracies have a big, bigger opportunity and fewer

923
00:56:59,520 --> 00:57:05,160
Speaker 1: fewer posts that are spy candidates. But there are spy candidates,

924
00:57:05,160 --> 00:57:07,400
Speaker 1: and I will get to that the right of the side.

925
00:57:08,280 --> 00:57:11,359
Speaker 1: I think a lot of people just discrantled and they

926
00:57:11,400 --> 00:57:14,280
Speaker 1: came and volunteered their service. So many of the KGB

927
00:57:14,480 --> 00:57:18,400
Speaker 1: sources and Jerry sources and people like that Kane dots

928
00:57:18,600 --> 00:57:21,800
Speaker 1: rather than as people finding finding them. But then what

929
00:57:21,920 --> 00:57:25,280
Speaker 1: makes people spy gets to another level, so you have

930
00:57:25,320 --> 00:57:28,959
Speaker 1: the overarching ideological, economic, political, but then you have why

931
00:57:29,280 --> 00:57:32,920
Speaker 1: as a person betrayed. And what's really interesting when you

932
00:57:32,960 --> 00:57:37,400
Speaker 1: study the most famous spies, what I found is it's

933
00:57:37,400 --> 00:57:42,640
Speaker 1: not about ideology. It's you take the famous American spy

934
00:57:42,720 --> 00:57:47,080
Speaker 1: inside the CIA, Rick Games or Robert Hansen inside the FBI,

935
00:57:47,880 --> 00:57:50,400
Speaker 1: and you look at their personalities and you find they

936
00:57:50,480 --> 00:57:53,560
Speaker 1: share the same thing. They think they're really smart, smarter

937
00:57:53,640 --> 00:57:57,440
Speaker 1: than everybody else. Sadly for them, they're not smarter than

938
00:57:57,480 --> 00:58:00,880
Speaker 1: anybody else. But they are all so lazy. So when

939
00:58:00,920 --> 00:58:03,080
Speaker 1: you have you think you're really smart, you're lazy, and

940
00:58:03,120 --> 00:58:06,080
Speaker 1: you work inside the US government, you end up getting

941
00:58:06,080 --> 00:58:09,600
Speaker 1: promoted less frequently, right, And then when you get proto

942
00:58:09,720 --> 00:58:13,840
Speaker 1: that's frequently if the system is against you, right, you're

943
00:58:13,880 --> 00:58:17,240
Speaker 1: not recognized for the genius that you are. You're not appreciated, right,

944
00:58:17,720 --> 00:58:21,840
Speaker 1: and you become alienated within your small world. So people

945
00:58:21,920 --> 00:58:26,480
Speaker 1: often defect inside of that world that they're disgruntled about

946
00:58:27,400 --> 00:58:32,480
Speaker 1: the squeeze on their ego and their their recognition. And

947
00:58:32,640 --> 00:58:34,520
Speaker 1: you know, you look at aims, and you look at

948
00:58:34,560 --> 00:58:38,560
Speaker 1: hands and look at spies, they often have that in trade.

949
00:58:38,600 --> 00:58:41,480
Speaker 1: So I wouldn't look for someone that's a gambler drinker. Yes,

950
00:58:41,600 --> 00:58:45,480
Speaker 1: look for them, uh um, but look for the person

951
00:58:45,520 --> 00:58:48,960
Speaker 1: and had a huge ego and it's delusional about themselves

952
00:58:49,040 --> 00:58:52,320
Speaker 1: and are underperforming. That's where I would go hunting for spies.

953
00:58:52,360 --> 00:58:55,960
Speaker 1: And they're in every society. Quite interesting. I wish we

954
00:58:55,960 --> 00:58:58,280
Speaker 1: had time to get to China, but will have to

955
00:58:58,280 --> 00:59:00,240
Speaker 1: save that for the next time. I have to ask

956
00:59:00,320 --> 00:59:04,400
Speaker 1: you before we get to our favorite questions. One last question.

957
00:59:04,440 --> 00:59:08,920
Speaker 1: Another quote from the book, which is quote fundamentally the

958
00:59:09,080 --> 00:59:13,840
Speaker 1: ultimate lesson to take away is this, never trust the Russians.

959
00:59:14,040 --> 00:59:18,120
Speaker 1: Explain that I was going to name the at least

960
00:59:18,120 --> 00:59:20,520
Speaker 1: the subtitle never Trust the Russians. So I had a

961
00:59:20,560 --> 00:59:23,280
Speaker 1: plaque in my office. I now have a dono my

962
00:59:23,360 --> 00:59:26,600
Speaker 1: house of the shore, and it's a quote from the

963
00:59:26,720 --> 00:59:31,840
Speaker 1: last democratic president in Afghanistan seven of you Economy talks

964
00:59:31,880 --> 00:59:34,040
Speaker 1: to his son and this is the quote and it says,

965
00:59:34,480 --> 00:59:36,840
Speaker 1: my son, my sn My last advice to you is

966
00:59:36,920 --> 00:59:39,600
Speaker 1: never trust the Russian Now, that plaque was given to

967
00:59:39,640 --> 00:59:43,240
Speaker 1: me by Charlie Wilson, you know Charlie Wilson Court, which

968
00:59:43,240 --> 00:59:46,480
Speaker 1: is what Charlie's were. And I go into the bug.

969
00:59:46,480 --> 00:59:49,280
Speaker 1: It was actually the US government program, but the US

970
00:59:49,320 --> 00:59:51,880
Speaker 1: government program doesn't make for movies, so I gotta look

971
00:59:51,920 --> 00:59:55,320
Speaker 1: like Tom Hanks and like that, or Charlie Wilson didn't

972
00:59:55,320 --> 00:59:59,160
Speaker 1: look like it. But my point is it had a

973
00:59:59,240 --> 01:00:03,960
Speaker 1: sentimental because it was if you look at it from

974
01:00:04,000 --> 01:00:06,200
Speaker 1: the eyes of the Afghanis. And I would say to

975
01:00:06,240 --> 01:00:09,280
Speaker 1: them today, watch the Russians on your border today. But

976
01:00:10,320 --> 01:00:12,680
Speaker 1: I don't mean it in the sure sense that never

977
01:00:12,720 --> 01:00:16,000
Speaker 1: ever ever trust them. But in this day and age,

978
01:00:16,000 --> 01:00:17,760
Speaker 1: I would say you need to pay more attention to

979
01:00:17,840 --> 01:00:20,760
Speaker 1: what they're they're up to. I honestly believe that some

980
01:00:20,840 --> 01:00:22,960
Speaker 1: were out there there may be an opportunity to do

981
01:00:23,040 --> 01:00:26,040
Speaker 1: business with them and they and I'm more I think

982
01:00:26,040 --> 01:00:28,680
Speaker 1: the natural course of events would be to bring us together.

983
01:00:28,920 --> 01:00:33,120
Speaker 1: But I think for for today, the manager is really

984
01:00:33,160 --> 01:00:35,440
Speaker 1: meant to say, hey, look, pay attention. The Russians are

985
01:00:35,480 --> 01:00:40,840
Speaker 1: not benign and so you really can't trust um, you know,

986
01:00:41,840 --> 01:00:45,040
Speaker 1: standing in front of the Helsinki and saying, you know,

987
01:00:45,280 --> 01:00:48,760
Speaker 1: I mean the next KGB got there for I can

988
01:00:48,760 --> 01:00:51,440
Speaker 1: tell you that no, we're not spying on you, and

989
01:00:51,480 --> 01:00:55,120
Speaker 1: it's anoxy more and but so my point is, uh,

990
01:00:56,000 --> 01:00:58,120
Speaker 1: this is a moment to remember who Russia is. So

991
01:00:58,160 --> 01:01:01,360
Speaker 1: it's not communism. They're not coming to they'd be more

992
01:01:01,400 --> 01:01:04,040
Speaker 1: threatening if they had an ideology. There is no ideology.

993
01:01:04,360 --> 01:01:07,720
Speaker 1: So let's jump to our speed round our favorite five questions.

994
01:01:08,160 --> 01:01:11,200
Speaker 1: We ask all our guests, starting with tell us what

995
01:01:11,240 --> 01:01:14,600
Speaker 1: you're streaming these days? Give us your favorite Netflix or

996
01:01:14,720 --> 01:01:19,200
Speaker 1: Amazon Prime viewing material. You know it's interesting. Let me

997
01:01:19,240 --> 01:01:21,240
Speaker 1: start with what I don't watch, which I think will

998
01:01:21,280 --> 01:01:25,240
Speaker 1: surprise your audience. You know I don't watch in James

999
01:01:25,320 --> 01:01:29,960
Speaker 1: Bond movies, right, don't watch most five movies. Uh. I

1000
01:01:30,040 --> 01:01:33,240
Speaker 1: used to resent them because I thought this isn't the

1001
01:01:33,280 --> 01:01:35,680
Speaker 1: way it is that trivializes the business. And then I

1002
01:01:35,720 --> 01:01:38,479
Speaker 1: began to realize, sees, if everyone thinks I'm James Bond,

1003
01:01:38,520 --> 01:01:40,800
Speaker 1: they think I'm I'm lipping in. If you know what

1004
01:01:40,840 --> 01:01:45,280
Speaker 1: I look like, uh, Connor, you would know white. I'm

1005
01:01:45,480 --> 01:01:50,360
Speaker 1: more favorbly disposed to work those seve but I um

1006
01:01:50,480 --> 01:01:53,160
Speaker 1: to be interesting. I will look did look at a

1007
01:01:53,160 --> 01:01:57,040
Speaker 1: couple of the caras. The first ones were good, the

1008
01:01:57,080 --> 01:02:00,560
Speaker 1: slid came in from the gul But basically I really

1009
01:02:00,560 --> 01:02:04,520
Speaker 1: go to another place. I look at Masterpiece theater. You know,

1010
01:02:04,880 --> 01:02:09,160
Speaker 1: I'll watch you know, the Crown or some things by

1011
01:02:10,200 --> 01:02:12,560
Speaker 1: Jane this and you say, well, that's kind of light stuff,

1012
01:02:12,960 --> 01:02:15,080
Speaker 1: but you know, it's such a relief and you get

1013
01:02:15,080 --> 01:02:18,720
Speaker 1: back to a world where people have manners and personal

1014
01:02:18,760 --> 01:02:22,520
Speaker 1: dignity and so on. So I find those tranquilizing in

1015
01:02:22,520 --> 01:02:25,560
Speaker 1: the most positive sense. So I'm I'm a big fan

1016
01:02:25,640 --> 01:02:29,720
Speaker 1: of the pps that I lived in Britain for for

1017
01:02:29,760 --> 01:02:33,280
Speaker 1: a substantial amount of time, and I grew to enjoy

1018
01:02:33,400 --> 01:02:36,520
Speaker 1: that and so on. So that's where you'll find me

1019
01:02:36,560 --> 01:02:42,120
Speaker 1: on Prime and Netflix. Uh, most often on the podcast.

1020
01:02:42,160 --> 01:02:46,000
Speaker 1: I did an awful lot of podcasts during the promotion

1021
01:02:46,040 --> 01:02:50,920
Speaker 1: of the book, and I enjoyed doing by the way, UM,

1022
01:02:51,000 --> 01:02:54,080
Speaker 1: but I'm not a follower of the particular podcast. I

1023
01:02:54,120 --> 01:02:58,760
Speaker 1: spend a lot of time going through what I would

1024
01:02:58,800 --> 01:03:03,760
Speaker 1: call the more traditional media outlets and uh, and I

1025
01:03:03,880 --> 01:03:06,480
Speaker 1: probably if I had more time, I should since should

1026
01:03:06,680 --> 01:03:10,080
Speaker 1: focus in on podcast I enjoyed several several of them,

1027
01:03:10,120 --> 01:03:13,480
Speaker 1: but UM, I tend not to be a podcast follower

1028
01:03:13,520 --> 01:03:17,800
Speaker 1: except my own. Tell us about some of your early

1029
01:03:17,840 --> 01:03:21,880
Speaker 1: mentors who helped shape your career in the world of intelligence.

1030
01:03:22,760 --> 01:03:24,840
Speaker 1: One of the great things about writing a book, and

1031
01:03:24,880 --> 01:03:27,360
Speaker 1: we could spend a lot of time on the advantage

1032
01:03:27,360 --> 01:03:29,080
Speaker 1: of writing a book and things that I did not

1033
01:03:29,200 --> 01:03:32,280
Speaker 1: think I would get out of it. One of one

1034
01:03:32,280 --> 01:03:34,040
Speaker 1: of those as a young person, you said, well, I

1035
01:03:34,080 --> 01:03:36,160
Speaker 1: made it by myself, right, That's how I got there.

1036
01:03:36,160 --> 01:03:37,560
Speaker 1: And then you go back, you write a book. He said,

1037
01:03:37,560 --> 01:03:40,480
Speaker 1: We'll wait a minute, start looking at your career and

1038
01:03:40,560 --> 01:03:43,280
Speaker 1: at every step of the way. And this is a

1039
01:03:43,320 --> 01:03:46,640
Speaker 1: tribute to all of them, that I had a series

1040
01:03:46,680 --> 01:03:50,040
Speaker 1: of bosses one after the other, but actually put up

1041
01:03:50,080 --> 01:03:52,960
Speaker 1: with me so and mentored me and stopped me from

1042
01:03:52,960 --> 01:03:57,600
Speaker 1: stepping on on on my foot. If you're will and

1043
01:03:57,800 --> 01:04:01,000
Speaker 1: uh you know from my first chief and Chili and

1044
01:04:01,720 --> 01:04:03,600
Speaker 1: I can't be care with the names because some are

1045
01:04:03,640 --> 01:04:06,720
Speaker 1: not and some are. But at every step of the way,

1046
01:04:07,920 --> 01:04:12,240
Speaker 1: the agency seemed to reach out and pull me towards

1047
01:04:12,280 --> 01:04:15,320
Speaker 1: something positive. And I think in retrospect, I ran the

1048
01:04:15,440 --> 01:04:19,880
Speaker 1: things like Chili and Afghanistan, so I was predisposed to

1049
01:04:20,200 --> 01:04:23,200
Speaker 1: sort of the action arm of it. So I I

1050
01:04:23,320 --> 01:04:27,280
Speaker 1: owe uh I easily. In the book, it's very clearly

1051
01:04:27,680 --> 01:04:30,720
Speaker 1: I described each of them is sort of putting a

1052
01:04:30,800 --> 01:04:34,440
Speaker 1: helping helping hand is the right word. I don't know

1053
01:04:34,440 --> 01:04:37,680
Speaker 1: how I would have gotten to survive my first assignment

1054
01:04:37,720 --> 01:04:43,640
Speaker 1: without bosses that were uh um, interested in being helpful.

1055
01:04:43,960 --> 01:04:47,600
Speaker 1: They called trade craft. The business is spying, and you

1056
01:04:47,640 --> 01:04:50,080
Speaker 1: know it's the word craft is really interesting. It's like

1057
01:04:50,120 --> 01:04:54,160
Speaker 1: a journeyman, right, And the best of the best managers

1058
01:04:54,160 --> 01:04:56,320
Speaker 1: in CIA that I worked for looked at as a

1059
01:04:56,440 --> 01:04:58,680
Speaker 1: trade jack. We're going to show you. You know, you

1060
01:04:58,760 --> 01:05:00,840
Speaker 1: went through training, you jumped the planes, but we're going

1061
01:05:00,880 --> 01:05:05,080
Speaker 1: to show you how it really works. And I'm very

1062
01:05:05,080 --> 01:05:08,760
Speaker 1: grateful and I admired the generation of people that I

1063
01:05:08,960 --> 01:05:12,840
Speaker 1: worked for that, uh, we're true pat There was one

1064
01:05:12,880 --> 01:05:15,560
Speaker 1: thing they all had in common. There were very diverse people,

1065
01:05:15,960 --> 01:05:21,240
Speaker 1: they were all true patriots and and at high integrity.

1066
01:05:21,280 --> 01:05:24,520
Speaker 1: I know that's a hard adjective for people to swallow

1067
01:05:24,680 --> 01:05:29,320
Speaker 1: and CIA, but you'd be amazed of the dichotomy between

1068
01:05:29,320 --> 01:05:33,720
Speaker 1: the integrity inside the institution and how it exercised power

1069
01:05:33,800 --> 01:05:39,440
Speaker 1: with approval of department adjusted. Quite quite interesting. Tell us

1070
01:05:39,480 --> 01:05:41,919
Speaker 1: about some of your favorite books and and what you're

1071
01:05:41,920 --> 01:05:45,840
Speaker 1: reading recently. Well, I think the one I've been enjoying

1072
01:05:45,920 --> 01:05:48,720
Speaker 1: and I've been going through it slowly, and I actually

1073
01:05:48,720 --> 01:05:51,080
Speaker 1: think it's very apropos I got so much out of it.

1074
01:05:51,160 --> 01:05:55,520
Speaker 1: It's Ulysses S. Grant by run turn off. Now why

1075
01:05:55,560 --> 01:05:58,120
Speaker 1: is it important? You know, you look at the Civil

1076
01:05:58,120 --> 01:06:01,800
Speaker 1: War and everybody and Robert E. Lee, the great general,

1077
01:06:01,960 --> 01:06:03,760
Speaker 1: the you know, feather in his hat and all this,

1078
01:06:03,920 --> 01:06:07,440
Speaker 1: and you look at the scrumpy cigar ashes on his coat.

1079
01:06:09,160 --> 01:06:12,600
Speaker 1: Drank too much unussy, says Brand. But when I dug

1080
01:06:12,640 --> 01:06:14,280
Speaker 1: into the book, there was something I didn't know. He

1081
01:06:14,360 --> 01:06:18,240
Speaker 1: was a quartermaster words. He knew how to make things move.

1082
01:06:18,360 --> 01:06:21,360
Speaker 1: When you look at the Civil War, so much of

1083
01:06:21,400 --> 01:06:23,720
Speaker 1: war fighting, and this comes to I want to come

1084
01:06:23,760 --> 01:06:28,800
Speaker 1: to Afghanistan. Logistics. I mean the real heroes of not

1085
01:06:29,000 --> 01:06:36,600
Speaker 1: Charlie Wilson, Jack Divide, uh well Bearden, but it's it's

1086
01:06:36,640 --> 01:06:39,520
Speaker 1: the logistics guy, people to make the mules get where

1087
01:06:39,520 --> 01:06:41,320
Speaker 1: they want to go and the guns where they are,

1088
01:06:41,600 --> 01:06:45,680
Speaker 1: helping the negotia. There's logistics and Afghanistan in many ways.

1089
01:06:46,040 --> 01:06:48,439
Speaker 1: And when you go to the war, you know, yeah,

1090
01:06:48,880 --> 01:06:52,160
Speaker 1: you need a mccarthur here and there perhaps, but you

1091
01:06:52,240 --> 01:06:54,800
Speaker 1: really need the logistics guy. And unless he says, Brand

1092
01:06:55,320 --> 01:06:58,800
Speaker 1: was the logistics guy. And when you look at his formation,

1093
01:06:59,000 --> 01:07:02,520
Speaker 1: it tells you about value do things. So when I

1094
01:07:02,560 --> 01:07:04,760
Speaker 1: have time, I spent a lot of time reading newspapers

1095
01:07:04,760 --> 01:07:08,000
Speaker 1: and magazines, and because I'm required to stay up in

1096
01:07:08,040 --> 01:07:13,680
Speaker 1: the world, I tend to go to biographies and history

1097
01:07:13,680 --> 01:07:17,480
Speaker 1: and I found a lot. You know, Doris Currency went

1098
01:07:17,560 --> 01:07:19,959
Speaker 1: on Tap that I read last year, which who thinks

1099
01:07:20,000 --> 01:07:23,400
Speaker 1: about Tap? And when you read it an amazing career.

1100
01:07:23,480 --> 01:07:26,360
Speaker 1: Not gonna be in president, but you know, proconsul and

1101
01:07:26,400 --> 01:07:30,920
Speaker 1: the Philippines and on the Supreme Court. I got halfway

1102
01:07:30,960 --> 01:07:35,560
Speaker 1: through one on Pulk and I started on McCulloch's Pioneers

1103
01:07:35,680 --> 01:07:37,960
Speaker 1: and who think who thought of Ohio was being a

1104
01:07:38,040 --> 01:07:42,360
Speaker 1: pioneer state and what it took Americans in the world

1105
01:07:42,400 --> 01:07:44,520
Speaker 1: they lived, and he would think it was it was

1106
01:07:44,560 --> 01:07:48,160
Speaker 1: one of the formative aspects of our life. And then

1107
01:07:48,160 --> 01:07:49,919
Speaker 1: the one that I've enjoyed is a fun book, because

1108
01:07:49,920 --> 01:07:51,720
Speaker 1: I don't read a lot of fun books, and maybe

1109
01:07:51,800 --> 01:07:54,880
Speaker 1: I should someday. This is a great book that's going

1110
01:07:54,920 --> 01:07:56,960
Speaker 1: to make a movie out of it. It's just taking

1111
01:07:57,040 --> 01:08:01,479
Speaker 1: forever and it's poisoned about that really about the crew

1112
01:08:01,560 --> 01:08:06,120
Speaker 1: team that raced in the nineteen thirty six Olympics, the

1113
01:08:06,320 --> 01:08:11,960
Speaker 1: Nazi Germany and what it took to get there. The

1114
01:08:11,960 --> 01:08:16,000
Speaker 1: the lumberjacked out of Wisconsin going to that race, and

1115
01:08:16,920 --> 01:08:19,160
Speaker 1: hinching out of victory. And it's also you can find

1116
01:08:19,200 --> 01:08:24,599
Speaker 1: it on on online that they look it up, safety read,

1117
01:08:24,640 --> 01:08:27,760
Speaker 1: look up nineteen thirty six Olympics rowing. I mean it's

1118
01:08:27,960 --> 01:08:30,960
Speaker 1: it's America at its best. So I enjoyed it was

1119
01:08:31,000 --> 01:08:34,120
Speaker 1: a good read. And uh, and I do tend to

1120
01:08:34,120 --> 01:08:38,640
Speaker 1: stick to biographies. Interesting. What sort of advice would you

1121
01:08:38,680 --> 01:08:42,160
Speaker 1: give to a recent college grad who was interested in

1122
01:08:42,200 --> 01:08:49,080
Speaker 1: a career in either government service or intelligence. The scenicna

1123
01:08:49,479 --> 01:08:53,519
Speaker 1: and this is you really want to be a you

1124
01:08:53,680 --> 01:08:56,720
Speaker 1: really have the one to serve your country? And he said, well,

1125
01:08:56,760 --> 01:08:58,960
Speaker 1: that's the crssade, of course you do. Now you really

1126
01:08:58,960 --> 01:09:02,559
Speaker 1: have to say, is this you will you will not

1127
01:09:02,640 --> 01:09:05,880
Speaker 1: get through the door. It's the it's the glue that

1128
01:09:06,040 --> 01:09:11,320
Speaker 1: holds it together. The second thing I would say is, uh,

1129
01:09:12,320 --> 01:09:15,400
Speaker 1: you know, make sure your education is broad based. You

1130
01:09:15,439 --> 01:09:17,960
Speaker 1: know someone's gonna say, look, China is the place learn Chinese.

1131
01:09:17,960 --> 01:09:20,639
Speaker 1: Maybe maybe maybe it won't be, you know, maybe things

1132
01:09:20,640 --> 01:09:23,840
Speaker 1: that happen here by the time you get ready. Um,

1133
01:09:24,000 --> 01:09:28,360
Speaker 1: the broad broad based and understanding the history of not

1134
01:09:28,439 --> 01:09:30,559
Speaker 1: in in this country of the world. I would invest.

1135
01:09:30,880 --> 01:09:33,200
Speaker 1: I would invest in that and not worry too much

1136
01:09:33,200 --> 01:09:38,320
Speaker 1: about the specialization and study and read, read the best

1137
01:09:38,360 --> 01:09:41,280
Speaker 1: books written on it, and servedly please include mind that's

1138
01:09:41,320 --> 01:09:43,920
Speaker 1: the first. I should have said, that's number one. But

1139
01:09:44,560 --> 01:09:47,680
Speaker 1: um no, I think it's having a world view. And

1140
01:09:48,240 --> 01:09:51,040
Speaker 1: as I said, I really wanted to serve your country

1141
01:09:51,160 --> 01:09:54,439
Speaker 1: is critical. You want to make a dollar that may

1142
01:09:54,439 --> 01:09:58,599
Speaker 1: not be the best place interesting. And our final question,

1143
01:09:58,880 --> 01:10:02,880
Speaker 1: what do you know about the world of intelligence counterintelligence

1144
01:10:03,280 --> 01:10:07,240
Speaker 1: spycraft today that you wish you knew forty years or

1145
01:10:07,280 --> 01:10:13,719
Speaker 1: so ago when you were first getting started. Uh that's

1146
01:10:13,760 --> 01:10:18,719
Speaker 1: a profound, a profound question. I I would say that

1147
01:10:19,640 --> 01:10:26,719
Speaker 1: again from my perspective. Um, Graham, Cream write a book.

1148
01:10:26,960 --> 01:10:30,800
Speaker 1: You know the human factor and that what the essence

1149
01:10:30,840 --> 01:10:33,680
Speaker 1: of the human factor is the best laid plans of

1150
01:10:33,760 --> 01:10:36,960
Speaker 1: mice and men. Right, whatever your plan, whatever you're doing,

1151
01:10:37,479 --> 01:10:42,320
Speaker 1: you gotta double your planning triple. You're planning because something

1152
01:10:42,439 --> 01:10:44,320
Speaker 1: is going to happen and you're not you're not ready

1153
01:10:44,360 --> 01:10:47,920
Speaker 1: for it. And uh, you know, if we we look

1154
01:10:48,000 --> 01:10:53,040
Speaker 1: at modern events in Central Asia, Uh, you know, uh,

1155
01:10:53,520 --> 01:10:58,519
Speaker 1: having the plumbing in planning. Uh, the importance of planning.

1156
01:10:58,600 --> 01:10:59,920
Speaker 1: The other thing that I would say, and I should

1157
01:10:59,920 --> 01:11:03,520
Speaker 1: have said this almost first, and I found the paucity

1158
01:11:03,600 --> 01:11:06,200
Speaker 1: of it. I thought, at every level I went up,

1159
01:11:06,240 --> 01:11:09,160
Speaker 1: I would get to the level where there's strategic thinking right,

1160
01:11:09,680 --> 01:11:11,960
Speaker 1: and you keep looking for it. And then I found

1161
01:11:11,960 --> 01:11:15,320
Speaker 1: that most of most of the intelligence role, most of

1162
01:11:15,360 --> 01:11:18,800
Speaker 1: the world is is around tactical thinking, what are we

1163
01:11:18,840 --> 01:11:21,559
Speaker 1: going to do today? What are we doing tomorrow? And

1164
01:11:21,640 --> 01:11:26,000
Speaker 1: it's very hard to build into life and the strategic things.

1165
01:11:26,400 --> 01:11:30,560
Speaker 1: And of all places, uh, a retreatment head of the

1166
01:11:30,600 --> 01:11:33,400
Speaker 1: Plumber's union that was sixteen came to me and he said,

1167
01:11:33,800 --> 01:11:38,120
Speaker 1: remember three things. Firm handshake, never have your picture taken

1168
01:11:38,560 --> 01:11:41,519
Speaker 1: with a drink in your hand. And spend the first

1169
01:11:41,560 --> 01:11:44,040
Speaker 1: five minutes before you get out of bed thinking about

1170
01:11:44,720 --> 01:11:47,639
Speaker 1: the bigger aspects of your life. And that's a good

1171
01:11:47,680 --> 01:11:50,200
Speaker 1: I mean from a blue collar guy. That's you know,

1172
01:11:51,400 --> 01:11:54,920
Speaker 1: high level thinking. And I would say for young people,

1173
01:11:55,360 --> 01:12:00,519
Speaker 1: make sure you put time in the strategic be thinking

1174
01:12:00,560 --> 01:12:02,200
Speaker 1: and not just how to get from me to be

1175
01:12:02,640 --> 01:12:06,280
Speaker 1: quite quite interesting. Jack Divine, thank you for being so

1176
01:12:06,479 --> 01:12:10,639
Speaker 1: generous with your time. We have been speaking with long

1177
01:12:10,760 --> 01:12:15,200
Speaker 1: term CIA veteran Jack Divine, author most recently of The

1178
01:12:15,240 --> 01:12:19,799
Speaker 1: Spymaster's Prism, The Fight against Russian Aggression. If you enjoyed

1179
01:12:19,840 --> 01:12:23,080
Speaker 1: this conversation, Well, be sure and check out any of

1180
01:12:23,120 --> 01:12:27,880
Speaker 1: our prior three hundred and sixty seven conversations we've had before.

1181
01:12:27,960 --> 01:12:32,280
Speaker 1: You can find those at iTunes, Spotify, wherever you find

1182
01:12:32,320 --> 01:12:36,440
Speaker 1: your favorite podcasts. We love your comments, feedback and suggestions

1183
01:12:36,640 --> 01:12:40,120
Speaker 1: right to us at m IB podcast at Bloomberg dot net.

1184
01:12:40,560 --> 01:12:43,640
Speaker 1: You can sign up for my daily reads at ritals

1185
01:12:43,720 --> 01:12:46,960
Speaker 1: dot com. Follow me on Twitter at rit Halts. I

1186
01:12:47,040 --> 01:12:50,320
Speaker 1: would be remiss if I forgot to mention our crack

1187
01:12:50,439 --> 01:12:54,679
Speaker 1: staff that helps put these conversations together each week. Tim

1188
01:12:54,760 --> 01:12:57,960
Speaker 1: Harrow is my audio engineer. A Tika val Bran is

1189
01:12:58,000 --> 01:13:03,000
Speaker 1: my project manager. My Kaelbatnick is my director of research.

1190
01:13:03,160 --> 01:13:07,200
Speaker 1: Paris Walter is my producer. I'm Barrier Bults. You've been

1191
01:13:07,240 --> 01:13:10,439
Speaker 1: listening to Passers of Business. I'm Bloomberg Ridd