WEBVTT - Fear and the Autonomous Cyber Weapon

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind from how Stuff

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<v Speaker 1>Works dot com. Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow your Mind.

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<v Speaker 1>My name is Robert Lamb and I'm Joe McCormick. And

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<v Speaker 1>so today we're gonna be talking about a an issue

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<v Speaker 1>in the future of technology, actually not just the future,

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<v Speaker 1>the present of technology. And it's going to have to

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<v Speaker 1>do with how we assess threats based on different types

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<v Speaker 1>of technological regimes that exist in the world. And so

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<v Speaker 1>you and I, Robert, are aware that very often we

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<v Speaker 1>fear the wrong things, right, Oh yes, I mean we

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<v Speaker 1>we fear things that are completely disproportionate to the level

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<v Speaker 1>of threat they represent in our lives. And this is

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<v Speaker 1>obvious in some ways because we have phobias of things

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<v Speaker 1>that are totally harmless. Some people are afraid of balloons

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<v Speaker 1>or something. I guess they're not harmful to birds and fish,

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<v Speaker 1>but harmless to us. And some people are afraid of

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know, public speaking, something that is in some

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<v Speaker 1>ways genuinely threatening to your reputation maybe, but it is

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<v Speaker 1>not is not a threat to your to your body,

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<v Speaker 1>to your body integrity. Yeah, and we have a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of these, uh, what some people called paper tigers. You

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<v Speaker 1>know where, in fact, we have a whole classic episode

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<v Speaker 1>of stuff to build your mind about paper tigers, where

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<v Speaker 1>something something that is ultimately not life threatening or even

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<v Speaker 1>even something that's not even gonna cause you actual physical injury. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>we build it up in our minds to the level

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<v Speaker 1>it's really on par with some sort of a large

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<v Speaker 1>predatory creature, you know, in our in our primordial past.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, like we give it the same credence we

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<v Speaker 1>would give a tiger leaping out of the bushes at us.

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<v Speaker 1>So those are the obvious ways that we fear the

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<v Speaker 1>wrong things. We fear stuff that isn't even literally going

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<v Speaker 1>to hurt us. But then people are just wrong in

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<v Speaker 1>the ways they assess the relative dangers of actual physical threats,

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<v Speaker 1>like attacks by animals. You know, people are more afraid of, say,

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<v Speaker 1>being attacked and killed by a shark, But shark kill

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<v Speaker 1>almost nobody. They kill like less than ten people on

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<v Speaker 1>average per year worldwide. Uh, you know, you you are

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<v Speaker 1>extremely unlikely to die by shark attack, even if you

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<v Speaker 1>swim a lot. Meanwhile, animals that don't come in nearly

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<v Speaker 1>as much fear and and grip our minds in the

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<v Speaker 1>same way like dogs kill way more people. Dogs kill

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<v Speaker 1>tens of thousands of people every year, and mosquitoes, which

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<v Speaker 1>spread diseases, they literally kill hundreds of thousands of people annually.

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<v Speaker 1>Nobody's got mosquito phobia. I mean I guess maybe some

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<v Speaker 1>people do. Yeah, it's true, Like at least some people

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<v Speaker 1>have dog phobias. I think you can. You can basically

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<v Speaker 1>look to horror cinema and see this played out right,

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<v Speaker 1>how many how many dog horror films can you think of? Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>you can think of some key ones here and there,

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<v Speaker 1>mainly Kujo, right um, and a few others of note

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<v Speaker 1>you can, And then when you think of shark horror films,

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<v Speaker 1>there's just an endless supply. You could spend the rest

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<v Speaker 1>of your life I think watching terrible shark movies. But

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<v Speaker 1>when it comes to mosquitoes, you basically just have man squito.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's it's not even just a straight up mosquito movie.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a it's a human mosquito hybrid. Well, part of

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<v Speaker 1>it has to do with the kinds of imagery that

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<v Speaker 1>excite our brain. I mean, you just it's hard to

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<v Speaker 1>make a mosquito look scary. Mosquitoes look irritating. Yeah, but

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<v Speaker 1>then on the other hand, Uh, ticks are horrifying looking

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<v Speaker 1>and carry illnesses. And as we pointed out in the past,

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<v Speaker 1>there's only one there's really only one Tick horror film,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's terrific, But there's only one of them. You're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about, the one with Seth Green and Clint Howard,

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<v Speaker 1>Ron Howard's brother. Yeah, I'll make sure that we linked

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<v Speaker 1>to the trailer talk video episode on the Landing page

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<v Speaker 1>for this episode of Stuff to Blow Your Mind, in

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<v Speaker 1>which we talk about this cinematic jewel. Well, if you must.

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<v Speaker 1>But people are also totally off base in the way

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<v Speaker 1>they assess the relative dangers of, say, travel threats. Everybody's

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<v Speaker 1>heard this statistic right about travel travel methods. Oh yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>fear of flying being a huge one. Um, you know

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<v Speaker 1>driving is considerably more dangerous, and yet it's it's flying

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<v Speaker 1>that fills so many of us with varying levels of anxiety.

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<v Speaker 1>I can personally relate to this, and I'm continually fascinated

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<v Speaker 1>and frustrated by the way like this deeper irrational fear

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<v Speaker 1>can overpower, or at least sufficiently overpower my rational understanding

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<v Speaker 1>of the risks. Yeah, I know exactly what you're talking about.

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<v Speaker 1>I I have had various levels of fear of flying

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<v Speaker 1>in the past, And yet I totally understand, Like I've

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<v Speaker 1>read all the statistics about how per mile traveled, you

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<v Speaker 1>are so much safer in a in a commercial airliner

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<v Speaker 1>than you are, say, driving yourself somewhere. Yeah, Like, just

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<v Speaker 1>as a rational human being, you think, well, I can

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<v Speaker 1>just I can educate myself out of this fear. Like

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<v Speaker 1>with it with the airplane thing. I think back to

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<v Speaker 1>m was it the escape pot episode where we talked

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<v Speaker 1>about like where why there are no escape pods on airplanes?

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<v Speaker 1>And it doesn't make sense? Yeah, that it doesn't make sense.

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<v Speaker 1>And also if you are going to encounter a dangerous

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<v Speaker 1>situation than an airplane, like, it's gonna be far more off.

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<v Speaker 1>That's going to be the take off of the landing. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>And uh. And yet I'll I'll run through these facts,

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<v Speaker 1>I'll run through the material that we research and uh,

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<v Speaker 1>and it still doesn't quite penetrate the deeper set anxiety

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<v Speaker 1>that sometimes kicks in while flying. Yeah, And this disconnect

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<v Speaker 1>between what we fear and the actual threat is kind

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<v Speaker 1>of troubling. But but it actually gets worse because you

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<v Speaker 1>can point out some scenarios where fearing the wrong thing

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<v Speaker 1>has direct consequences in reality. So I was reading this

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<v Speaker 1>short article on edge dot org from by the psychology

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<v Speaker 1>professor David G. Myers about how humans just do not

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<v Speaker 1>accurately gauge what the real threats they face are. For example,

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<v Speaker 1>people tend to be very afraid of terrorist attacks, and

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<v Speaker 1>of course that makes sense. Terrorist attacks are straightforwardly terrifying

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<v Speaker 1>like that, they are a horrible thing, but statistically they

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<v Speaker 1>are so unlikely to harm you, just as one example, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>Myers points to how much more likely you are to

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<v Speaker 1>be harmed by writing in a motor vehicle, by being

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<v Speaker 1>in a car accident, than by being a victim of

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<v Speaker 1>a terrorist attack. And yet terrorism is designed exactly to

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<v Speaker 1>make us afraid of threats in an outsized way. That's

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<v Speaker 1>sort of the purpose of it, right, It's to grip

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<v Speaker 1>your mind with a horrifying image that will force you

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<v Speaker 1>to behave irrationally in response. Yeah, kind of a forced

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<v Speaker 1>recategorization of a safe or reasonably safe place. Uh. And

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<v Speaker 1>and of course that can be psychologically damaging. That's again

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<v Speaker 1>the whole point of terrorism. Yeah, exactly. Terrorism plays on

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<v Speaker 1>our psychology. And Myers gives an example of how this

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<v Speaker 1>can work exactly against our interests. So after the nine

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<v Speaker 1>eleven attacks in America, a lot of people were very

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<v Speaker 1>worried about terrorist attacks on airplanes, and as a result,

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<v Speaker 1>fewer people were flying. But Myers did the math on

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<v Speaker 1>the effects of this given the statistics about the relative

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<v Speaker 1>safety of these travel methods, and he discovered that if

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<v Speaker 1>people in general flew an average of twenty less and

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<v Speaker 1>didn't just like not travel anywhere, but instead made all

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<v Speaker 1>those same trips and covered the same out of ground

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<v Speaker 1>by driving, then their risk of fatal injury actually went

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<v Speaker 1>up because scheduled airline flights, as we know, are much

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<v Speaker 1>safer than surface travel by car per mile. So if

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<v Speaker 1>Americans flew less in two thousand one and made the

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<v Speaker 1>same trips by car, we could expect about eight hundred

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<v Speaker 1>more people to die in auto fatalities that year. And

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<v Speaker 1>Myers reports that later there was a German psychologist named

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<v Speaker 1>Gerd Gigerinzer who checked this prediction against travel data for

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<v Speaker 1>the year and the year following the attacks, and gird

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<v Speaker 1>determined that an estimated one thousand, five hundred Americans died

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<v Speaker 1>in traffic accidents while trying to avoid the dangerous of

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<v Speaker 1>air travel. So Myers writes, quote, long after nine eleven,

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<v Speaker 1>the terrorists were still killing us. And in a way

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<v Speaker 1>this is true, that they were able to present people

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<v Speaker 1>with horrifying images that made them behave irrationally, made them

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<v Speaker 1>worry about the wrong things, and actually led to more

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<v Speaker 1>dangerous decisions that hurt more people. And of course this

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<v Speaker 1>is limited merely to people's choice of how to travel

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<v Speaker 1>right there. There are obviously other ways that you can

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<v Speaker 1>say terrorism leads to negative consequences that actually harm the

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<v Speaker 1>people who are seeking security and all that. Political decisions

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<v Speaker 1>and stuff like that, Yeah, basically affecting at at various

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<v Speaker 1>levels how you live your life. Yeah, trying to get

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<v Speaker 1>people to operate on the basis of terror management rather

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<v Speaker 1>than rational decision making. And people don't make good decisions

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<v Speaker 1>when they're terrified. And part of the reason is that

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<v Speaker 1>there's this principle exploited by terrorism. It's the cognitive bias

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<v Speaker 1>known as the availability heuristic. And we've talked about this

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<v Speaker 1>on the show before, but basically, what this means is

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<v Speaker 1>that items and events which you are, which you have

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<v Speaker 1>easily accessible in your memory, are given undo weight in

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<v Speaker 1>our considerations. So when we try to think about what's dangerous,

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<v Speaker 1>what are the things we should worry about and protect

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<v Speaker 1>ourselves against. We actually end up not thinking about what

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<v Speaker 1>is statistically the most relevant threat, but we end up

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<v Speaker 1>thinking basically about what's the most scary. And these are

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<v Speaker 1>two very different things. Scary images stick in the mind,

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<v Speaker 1>and real threats very often go unnoticed. Myers writes, quote,

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<v Speaker 1>Thus we remember and fear disasters, tornadoes, air crashes, attacks

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<v Speaker 1>that kill people dramatically in bunches, while fearing too little

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<v Speaker 1>the threats that claim lives one by one. We hardly

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<v Speaker 1>noticed the half million children dying quietly each day from rhodavirus.

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<v Speaker 1>Bill Gates once observed the equivalent of four seven forty

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<v Speaker 1>seven's full of children every day. And we discount the

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<v Speaker 1>future and its future weapon of mass destruction, climate change.

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<v Speaker 1>And so Myers goes on to quote the American security

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<v Speaker 1>and privacy expert Bruce Schneier, who says, quote, if it's

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<v Speaker 1>in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition

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<v Speaker 1>of news is something that hardly ever happens. Now, of course,

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<v Speaker 1>that's not always the case, because, of course you could

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<v Speaker 1>see news reports about things that are are real things

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<v Speaker 1>to be concerned about. But I think what he's talking

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<v Speaker 1>about there is that if you detect your in a

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<v Speaker 1>situation of if it bleeds, it leads, you should do

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<v Speaker 1>your best not to let the scary spectacle of what

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<v Speaker 1>you're seeing become overrepresented as a threat in your brain.

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<v Speaker 1>And of course it's also the case with false news,

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<v Speaker 1>which we've talked about recently, um, in which case this

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<v Speaker 1>is something that never happens and it can end up

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<v Speaker 1>affecting the way we we live our lives or govern ourselves.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, think to such moral panics at say Satanic

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<v Speaker 1>panic or the or a you know, to a lesser

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<v Speaker 1>degree that the poison candy myth, the idea that Halloween

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<v Speaker 1>candy is going to be tampered with and then handed

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<v Speaker 1>out to children. These are things that that that did

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<v Speaker 1>not happen, but became pervasive ideas. I mean, especially in

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<v Speaker 1>the case of Satanic panic, this is the fiction that

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<v Speaker 1>there is or was an organized effort amongst secret occultists

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<v Speaker 1>to ritually abuse children, a fantasy that resulted in manufactured trauma,

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<v Speaker 1>ruined lives, and a legacy of superstitious persecution and in

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<v Speaker 1>violence in parts of the world, including parts of Africa

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<v Speaker 1>where you kind of see the echo effect of of

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<v Speaker 1>of satanic panic in western nations of predominantly United States

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<v Speaker 1>in the nineteen eighties. Yeah, but we should remember, of course,

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<v Speaker 1>while we talked about the myth, to talk about the

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<v Speaker 1>causal reality. I think a lot of people think what

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<v Speaker 1>was going on when people were coming up with stories

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<v Speaker 1>of Satanic ritual abuse in the eighties was that children

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<v Speaker 1>were being led in interviews and prompted by police and

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<v Speaker 1>therapists and people who had these pre existing ideas in

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<v Speaker 1>their head and children were just sort of like going

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<v Speaker 1>along with what they perceived the adults uh to want

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<v Speaker 1>them to say, right, and and of course it wasn't

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<v Speaker 1>just the children that the children were a major part of.

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<v Speaker 1>You also had adults with these uh these these these

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<v Speaker 1>supposed memories that they were reclaiming through therapy that were

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<v Speaker 1>revealing past satanic abuse. Um. But but yeah, it all,

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<v Speaker 1>it all amounted to a manufactured fear that that so

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<v Speaker 1>many people bought into and the thing that everyone was

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<v Speaker 1>afraid of did not exist and has never existed. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>it's it still floors me there there's an older episode

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<v Speaker 1>of stuff to blow your mind about it. Um what

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<v Speaker 1>to link to that it's it's a fascinating psychological event

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<v Speaker 1>in history that it makes you realize yet again that

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<v Speaker 1>it's the vividness of the imagery and sort of the

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<v Speaker 1>what the what the threat suggests as an idea that

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<v Speaker 1>captures people's fear, not so much the present reality of

0:12:30.600 --> 0:12:34.080
<v Speaker 1>the threat. Yeah, and it drives home just how how

0:12:34.120 --> 0:12:37.400
<v Speaker 1>easy it is, then um psychologically to just to have

0:12:37.480 --> 0:12:41.080
<v Speaker 1>an unbalanced fear of flying or dogs or terrorism or

0:12:41.080 --> 0:12:43.840
<v Speaker 1>what have you. And so for today, I wanted to

0:12:43.840 --> 0:12:48.560
<v Speaker 1>take this principle that we don't exactly fear the right

0:12:48.800 --> 0:12:52.120
<v Speaker 1>thing and and and try to redirect it in one

0:12:52.160 --> 0:12:55.840
<v Speaker 1>particular area, which is the kind of thing we're usually

0:12:55.840 --> 0:12:59.800
<v Speaker 1>worried about when it comes to AI and autonomous weaponry

0:13:00.000 --> 0:13:05.360
<v Speaker 1>and the dangers of technological weapons. I think we are

0:13:05.480 --> 0:13:09.400
<v Speaker 1>worried about the wrong stuff, or more specifically, we're worried

0:13:09.400 --> 0:13:11.920
<v Speaker 1>about stuff that we should be worried about, but we're

0:13:11.920 --> 0:13:16.440
<v Speaker 1>worried almost exclusively about the smaller threat rather than the

0:13:16.520 --> 0:13:19.920
<v Speaker 1>larger threat. The smaller more dramatic. And I think this

0:13:20.000 --> 0:13:22.000
<v Speaker 1>is this is something that came up when you're listening

0:13:22.040 --> 0:13:25.720
<v Speaker 1>the examples earlier. A threat that you could you've given

0:13:25.760 --> 0:13:29.640
<v Speaker 1>the chance physically run from fearing climate change, for instance,

0:13:30.760 --> 0:13:32.200
<v Speaker 1>how do you run from that? How do you hide

0:13:32.200 --> 0:13:35.360
<v Speaker 1>behind a bush? Uh like? But a tornado, on the

0:13:35.360 --> 0:13:39.120
<v Speaker 1>other hand, you could conceivably run into a bunker, right

0:13:39.320 --> 0:13:41.160
<v Speaker 1>you can, you can. You can attach a lot of

0:13:41.200 --> 0:13:44.440
<v Speaker 1>anxiety to it. But then you could conceivably see it

0:13:44.679 --> 0:13:48.559
<v Speaker 1>and and react in real time to its to its threat.

0:13:48.760 --> 0:13:51.920
<v Speaker 1>But if you're in a place where tornadoes don't happen

0:13:52.040 --> 0:13:54.840
<v Speaker 1>very often, say, and you are investing a lot of

0:13:54.960 --> 0:13:59.360
<v Speaker 1>energy and resources into preparing for a tornado threat instead

0:13:59.440 --> 0:14:02.560
<v Speaker 1>of in sting that energy and resources into something that

0:14:02.720 --> 0:14:05.760
<v Speaker 1>will definitely affect you in the future, like say, climate change,

0:14:05.760 --> 0:14:08.240
<v Speaker 1>which will affect most people wherever you are in one

0:14:08.240 --> 0:14:11.720
<v Speaker 1>way or another, especially with all of its secondary downstream effects.

0:14:11.960 --> 0:14:15.600
<v Speaker 1>If you're investing exclusively in the lesser threat, than you

0:14:15.640 --> 0:14:19.560
<v Speaker 1>are doing yourself and your future descendants a disservice. Absolutely.

0:14:19.880 --> 0:14:21.320
<v Speaker 1>All right, Well, let's take a quick break and the

0:14:21.320 --> 0:14:23.720
<v Speaker 1>when we come back, we will talk about different types

0:14:23.960 --> 0:14:29.280
<v Speaker 1>of technological weapon threats. Thank you, thank you. All right,

0:14:29.320 --> 0:14:32.520
<v Speaker 1>we're back. So, Joe, I know that when when we

0:14:32.600 --> 0:14:36.720
<v Speaker 1>when we talk about technological weapon threats, what we're really

0:14:36.720 --> 0:14:39.280
<v Speaker 1>talking about here is of course ED two oh nine.

0:14:39.920 --> 0:14:43.600
<v Speaker 1>We're talking about the terminator, right, We're talking about chopping mall,

0:14:43.680 --> 0:14:46.680
<v Speaker 1>the killer robots of shopping mall that may just go

0:14:46.760 --> 0:14:50.080
<v Speaker 1>out of control and start hunting our teenagers down in

0:14:50.160 --> 0:14:53.720
<v Speaker 1>the malls of the future. Chopping Mall is a fantastic

0:14:53.800 --> 0:14:57.320
<v Speaker 1>piece of eighties trash cinema. But but no, I mean

0:14:57.520 --> 0:15:00.440
<v Speaker 1>that is the thing that captures our mind because you

0:15:00.440 --> 0:15:02.520
<v Speaker 1>can run from it. Yeah, there's a robot with a

0:15:02.600 --> 0:15:06.040
<v Speaker 1>gun on it that that is the standard image. Okay,

0:15:06.080 --> 0:15:10.080
<v Speaker 1>what is the AI autonomous weapon threat of the future.

0:15:10.600 --> 0:15:13.880
<v Speaker 1>It is a terminator. It is those killer robots from

0:15:13.920 --> 0:15:17.920
<v Speaker 1>the Matrix. It is something that is an embodied robot

0:15:18.040 --> 0:15:20.280
<v Speaker 1>that is coming to you know, point a gun at

0:15:20.320 --> 0:15:22.640
<v Speaker 1>you and make you do something, or hunt you down

0:15:22.680 --> 0:15:25.680
<v Speaker 1>for robot sport or something like that. And I want

0:15:25.680 --> 0:15:28.240
<v Speaker 1>to be clear that this is absolutely a real thing

0:15:28.280 --> 0:15:31.000
<v Speaker 1>worth discussing. Not so much I don't know about terminators,

0:15:31.000 --> 0:15:35.120
<v Speaker 1>but the idea of conventional autonomous weapons that I'm not

0:15:35.240 --> 0:15:37.640
<v Speaker 1>saying that is not worth discussing, because it is It's

0:15:37.640 --> 0:15:40.600
<v Speaker 1>been the focus of a lot of international conversation about

0:15:40.640 --> 0:15:43.320
<v Speaker 1>the ethics of warfare. We're actively trying to figure out

0:15:43.320 --> 0:15:46.640
<v Speaker 1>how to regulate this, and there for example United Nations

0:15:46.680 --> 0:15:50.720
<v Speaker 1>Conventions on Discussing Autonomous Conventional Weapons and what we should

0:15:50.760 --> 0:15:54.200
<v Speaker 1>do about them. Yeah, the ideas of Head two oh

0:15:54.280 --> 0:15:58.040
<v Speaker 1>nine terminators, what have you even? Chopping mall Sci five

0:15:58.880 --> 0:16:02.800
<v Speaker 1>has always spoken to our anxieties and our fears, uh,

0:16:02.880 --> 0:16:06.680
<v Speaker 1>and our hopes about technology and where it's going to

0:16:06.680 --> 0:16:09.640
<v Speaker 1>to get us and given us vivid imagery to feed

0:16:09.640 --> 0:16:13.440
<v Speaker 1>our availability heuristic for these types of threats. Yea. And

0:16:13.480 --> 0:16:15.440
<v Speaker 1>of course give us something that we can we can

0:16:15.600 --> 0:16:17.560
<v Speaker 1>we can we can run from you know, we can,

0:16:17.600 --> 0:16:20.040
<v Speaker 1>we can battle, you can fight back against the the

0:16:20.280 --> 0:16:23.480
<v Speaker 1>machines and chopping mall. But to get serious for a minute,

0:16:23.480 --> 0:16:26.600
<v Speaker 1>I mean, we are more and more seeing actual semi

0:16:26.640 --> 0:16:32.200
<v Speaker 1>autonomous weapon technology being introduced into military arsenals around the world. Absolutely.

0:16:32.200 --> 0:16:34.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean you'd have to be under a rock to

0:16:34.680 --> 0:16:38.640
<v Speaker 1>have avoided uh any any coverage of the U. S

0:16:38.680 --> 0:16:42.760
<v Speaker 1>military's use of drone strikes in recent decades. Uh. And

0:16:42.760 --> 0:16:45.240
<v Speaker 1>and that's that's just the tip of the iceberg too.

0:16:45.320 --> 0:16:48.000
<v Speaker 1>I mean I was reading a little bit about autonomous

0:16:48.040 --> 0:16:51.680
<v Speaker 1>weapons in Max tech Mark's recent book Life three point

0:16:51.680 --> 0:16:55.600
<v Speaker 1>oh and he points out that you have. You have

0:16:55.640 --> 0:16:58.640
<v Speaker 1>in the U s military, the US Phalanx system for

0:16:58.720 --> 0:17:03.840
<v Speaker 1>its Ages class cruisers that automatically detect, track, and attack

0:17:03.920 --> 0:17:07.080
<v Speaker 1>threats such as anti ship missiles and aircraft. You may

0:17:07.119 --> 0:17:10.119
<v Speaker 1>have seen images of these these like big dome looking

0:17:10.160 --> 0:17:13.080
<v Speaker 1>devices with the weapon on on the front. Oh yeah,

0:17:13.080 --> 0:17:16.840
<v Speaker 1>I mean we'll think about other types of automatic missile defense,

0:17:16.880 --> 0:17:21.680
<v Speaker 1>the the Israeli Iron Dome system. Yeah. But in particular though,

0:17:22.000 --> 0:17:25.080
<v Speaker 1>this this one system, it's been in service since nineteen eighty,

0:17:25.200 --> 0:17:28.159
<v Speaker 1>still in service today, and it it actually led to

0:17:28.200 --> 0:17:32.160
<v Speaker 1>the nine downing of Iran air Flight six five five,

0:17:32.280 --> 0:17:36.440
<v Speaker 1>a civilian Iranian passenger jet, killed all two nine people

0:17:36.440 --> 0:17:40.480
<v Speaker 1>on board and caused international outrage. There was, however, a

0:17:40.600 --> 0:17:43.520
<v Speaker 1>human in the loop on this system who made the error.

0:17:43.560 --> 0:17:46.359
<v Speaker 1>And that's that's one of the key distinctions between uh,

0:17:46.680 --> 0:17:51.280
<v Speaker 1>some of these contemporary and past autonomous weapons systems and

0:17:51.720 --> 0:17:54.560
<v Speaker 1>the possible future of autonomous weapons systems. Is there a

0:17:54.680 --> 0:17:57.720
<v Speaker 1>human being that is at some point weighing in on

0:17:57.720 --> 0:18:00.439
<v Speaker 1>the decision or having to make a final decision. And

0:18:00.520 --> 0:18:03.879
<v Speaker 1>in pretty much all conventional autonomous weapons systems I can

0:18:03.920 --> 0:18:07.480
<v Speaker 1>think of today, they're they're not fully autonomous there's semi autonomous,

0:18:07.560 --> 0:18:11.280
<v Speaker 1>there's still a human command structure, a human override, there's

0:18:11.280 --> 0:18:15.359
<v Speaker 1>still basically being controlled by humans, but they're making some

0:18:15.440 --> 0:18:20.840
<v Speaker 1>kind of uh, they've got some kind of automatic assistance function, right,

0:18:20.880 --> 0:18:23.840
<v Speaker 1>they'll be they'll be a drone pilot somewhere, or in

0:18:23.920 --> 0:18:26.040
<v Speaker 1>some of these models, I believe it would be you'll

0:18:26.040 --> 0:18:27.880
<v Speaker 1>have a drone pilot and maybe they're looking they're dealing

0:18:27.960 --> 0:18:30.320
<v Speaker 1>with with multiple drones, but there's still a human in

0:18:30.359 --> 0:18:34.159
<v Speaker 1>the loop on that particular weapons system. And just a

0:18:34.200 --> 0:18:38.000
<v Speaker 1>reminder that that Russia is believed to be testing its

0:18:38.000 --> 0:18:41.919
<v Speaker 1>first autonomous nuclear torpedo. The idea with this is that

0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:45.000
<v Speaker 1>it would be guided largely by AI to strike the

0:18:45.080 --> 0:18:48.200
<v Speaker 1>United States even if it lost all communications with Moscow.

0:18:48.800 --> 0:18:51.360
<v Speaker 1>A frightening weapon concept, to be sure, and but it's

0:18:51.359 --> 0:18:53.760
<v Speaker 1>the one that was originally proposed back in the nineties

0:18:53.800 --> 0:18:58.840
<v Speaker 1>sixties by um um Andre Sakarov, and some analysts call

0:18:58.920 --> 0:19:01.760
<v Speaker 1>this a doomsday weapon, and with good reason. That's a

0:19:01.800 --> 0:19:04.600
<v Speaker 1>it's a terrifying concept. It certainly is. I mean, one

0:19:04.680 --> 0:19:07.840
<v Speaker 1>at least hopes that there's there's still human command structure

0:19:08.320 --> 0:19:11.320
<v Speaker 1>there and and but these types of weapons, all these

0:19:11.359 --> 0:19:14.159
<v Speaker 1>things we've been talking about are part of this debate,

0:19:14.200 --> 0:19:16.879
<v Speaker 1>part of this debate that the international community is having

0:19:17.560 --> 0:19:21.240
<v Speaker 1>about what are the ethics of autonomous weapons systems, especially

0:19:21.280 --> 0:19:24.280
<v Speaker 1>if they're not just weapons systems used to say, shoot

0:19:24.359 --> 0:19:27.920
<v Speaker 1>down incoming enemy missiles. I mean that you sort of

0:19:27.960 --> 0:19:30.120
<v Speaker 1>see the difference there right now, Like you can imagine

0:19:30.880 --> 0:19:33.959
<v Speaker 1>missile defense kind of thing is different from something that

0:19:34.040 --> 0:19:36.920
<v Speaker 1>will be aiming at people or aiming at places where

0:19:36.920 --> 0:19:39.920
<v Speaker 1>people could be even though even a missile defense system could,

0:19:40.000 --> 0:19:43.920
<v Speaker 1>of course, as we've seen, go go awry, right right,

0:19:43.960 --> 0:19:46.200
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it becomes increasingly more complicated when you start

0:19:46.240 --> 0:19:50.720
<v Speaker 1>thinking about, um, military engagements, say in a city, if

0:19:50.760 --> 0:19:54.320
<v Speaker 1>you're having to deal with civilians and or or or uh,

0:19:54.880 --> 0:19:58.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, combatants that are not in uniform that sort

0:19:58.160 --> 0:20:03.560
<v Speaker 1>of thing, or any variety of uh, morally complex standoff situation.

0:20:03.920 --> 0:20:06.520
<v Speaker 1>How do you program for that? Yeah, and so that

0:20:06.680 --> 0:20:09.119
<v Speaker 1>is a very important question. But I wanted to focus

0:20:09.200 --> 0:20:14.119
<v Speaker 1>today on a potentially even more dangerous class of weapons

0:20:14.160 --> 0:20:17.920
<v Speaker 1>that can actually hurt many more people, and a class

0:20:17.920 --> 0:20:21.200
<v Speaker 1>of weapons that in fact already exist in some form today.

0:20:21.640 --> 0:20:24.800
<v Speaker 1>And we have a pretty clear vision of how much

0:20:24.840 --> 0:20:27.760
<v Speaker 1>more advanced and how much more dangerous they will continue

0:20:27.800 --> 0:20:31.080
<v Speaker 1>to get in the very near future, even without access

0:20:31.119 --> 0:20:34.960
<v Speaker 1>to heavy weapons or manufacturing capabilities. So I got the

0:20:35.040 --> 0:20:37.359
<v Speaker 1>idea to have this discussion when I read an article

0:20:37.480 --> 0:20:41.520
<v Speaker 1>in Undark magazine, which if Robert you ever read an Undark, Yeah,

0:20:41.520 --> 0:20:42.719
<v Speaker 1>I don't think I've read this one before we can

0:20:42.760 --> 0:20:45.639
<v Speaker 1>mentioned the title. My mind immediately went to various horror

0:20:45.640 --> 0:20:48.639
<v Speaker 1>fiction publications. It's got a horror kind of name. I

0:20:48.640 --> 0:20:52.119
<v Speaker 1>think it's named after We intentionally named after a type

0:20:52.119 --> 0:20:55.879
<v Speaker 1>of radium paint that was used back in the day,

0:20:55.920 --> 0:20:59.240
<v Speaker 1>I think early twentieth century, when before people realize what

0:20:59.320 --> 0:21:01.480
<v Speaker 1>the risks of it were. And that's sort of what

0:21:01.560 --> 0:21:04.600
<v Speaker 1>the magazine explores. That explores science and a lot of

0:21:04.640 --> 0:21:07.919
<v Speaker 1>good long form science writing, exploring the good and the

0:21:07.960 --> 0:21:11.119
<v Speaker 1>bad that science has to offer. But anyway, this article

0:21:11.200 --> 0:21:14.280
<v Speaker 1>was published in July of this year by science journalist

0:21:14.359 --> 0:21:18.480
<v Speaker 1>named Jeremy Sue, and it's called forget killer robots. Autonomous

0:21:18.520 --> 0:21:20.919
<v Speaker 1>weapons are already online. So I was reading this and

0:21:21.200 --> 0:21:23.200
<v Speaker 1>I started thinking about this. I thought this would be

0:21:23.240 --> 0:21:25.720
<v Speaker 1>a good topic for us to talk today. So Sue

0:21:25.920 --> 0:21:29.520
<v Speaker 1>starts by discussing the ways that the problem of autonomous

0:21:29.520 --> 0:21:33.840
<v Speaker 1>weaponry has really captured people's attention worldwide in the conventional

0:21:33.880 --> 0:21:36.280
<v Speaker 1>weapons since and as we've been talking about, there's a

0:21:36.280 --> 0:21:38.840
<v Speaker 1>good reason for this. If we're gonna be increasingly using

0:21:38.960 --> 0:21:42.639
<v Speaker 1>robots and AI programs capable of delivering lethal force on

0:21:42.640 --> 0:21:45.879
<v Speaker 1>the battleground, or I guess to be less uphimistic, if

0:21:45.880 --> 0:21:49.240
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna have machines that can kill people without a

0:21:49.320 --> 0:21:52.680
<v Speaker 1>human taking responsibility and directly making the machine do it,

0:21:53.320 --> 0:21:55.960
<v Speaker 1>we really need to be having serious conversations about the

0:21:55.960 --> 0:21:59.919
<v Speaker 1>ethics of this technology. Should there be international treaties governing

0:22:00.080 --> 0:22:02.800
<v Speaker 1>what kinds of autonomous weapons we allow each other to

0:22:02.840 --> 0:22:05.360
<v Speaker 1>make and so forth? I mean, we've got international treaties

0:22:05.560 --> 0:22:09.720
<v Speaker 1>about nuclear weapons. Shouldn't there be international treaty agreements on

0:22:09.840 --> 0:22:13.280
<v Speaker 1>autonomous weapons? Oh? Yeah, I mean it makes sense. Yet

0:22:13.320 --> 0:22:16.040
<v Speaker 1>to your point, we have we have treaties about nuclear weapons.

0:22:16.040 --> 0:22:18.440
<v Speaker 1>We have we have treaties about biological and chemical agents

0:22:18.480 --> 0:22:20.879
<v Speaker 1>as well. We have treaties about just the way that

0:22:20.920 --> 0:22:25.480
<v Speaker 1>one wages traditional warfare. Their various you know, non nuclear,

0:22:25.880 --> 0:22:30.359
<v Speaker 1>non biological weapons that are also banned under international treaty.

0:22:30.840 --> 0:22:33.040
<v Speaker 1>So it makes sense that we would we would also

0:22:33.160 --> 0:22:37.120
<v Speaker 1>have treaties dealing with autonomous systems. Yeah, it totally makes

0:22:37.160 --> 0:22:39.840
<v Speaker 1>sense in these conversations, as we've been saying, are ongoing.

0:22:40.080 --> 0:22:42.680
<v Speaker 1>Sue writes about how the issue was discussed at a

0:22:42.800 --> 0:22:46.120
<v Speaker 1>United Nations convention in Geneva in April of this year

0:22:46.200 --> 0:22:49.200
<v Speaker 1>in and this was part of an ongoing series of

0:22:49.240 --> 0:22:53.000
<v Speaker 1>conversations with the u N's Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,

0:22:53.080 --> 0:22:56.359
<v Speaker 1>which has a kind of clunky name. But uh, that's

0:22:56.359 --> 0:22:59.080
<v Speaker 1>a useful kind of forum to be having right now.

0:22:59.359 --> 0:23:01.840
<v Speaker 1>But while we're having this debate about the role of

0:23:01.880 --> 0:23:07.119
<v Speaker 1>AI and autonomous programming and conventional deadly weapons, we really

0:23:07.160 --> 0:23:10.520
<v Speaker 1>tend to miss the fact that autonomous weapons are already

0:23:10.560 --> 0:23:14.040
<v Speaker 1>being used widely in warfare around the world. And we're

0:23:14.040 --> 0:23:19.240
<v Speaker 1>talking about cyber warfare, not autonomous guns and bombs and missiles,

0:23:19.280 --> 0:23:23.200
<v Speaker 1>but little pieces of computer code that autonomously attacks systems

0:23:23.240 --> 0:23:27.560
<v Speaker 1>around the world or in targeted places. Plus, with software,

0:23:27.560 --> 0:23:30.880
<v Speaker 1>there's always the worry of replication. YEA. No matter how

0:23:30.920 --> 0:23:35.000
<v Speaker 1>worried you are about a AI controlled nuclear torpedoes, you

0:23:35.080 --> 0:23:37.360
<v Speaker 1>usually don't have to fret about them mating with each

0:23:37.400 --> 0:23:41.880
<v Speaker 1>other and producing a torpedo offspring. Exactly. I mean that

0:23:41.960 --> 0:23:45.760
<v Speaker 1>it introduces a totally different dynamic of threat and a

0:23:45.920 --> 0:23:49.960
<v Speaker 1>certainly different dynamic of proliferation, and that that's something that

0:23:50.040 --> 0:23:52.360
<v Speaker 1>makes it a whole different ball game when we're considering

0:23:52.840 --> 0:23:54.640
<v Speaker 1>how much of a threat it is and what kind

0:23:54.640 --> 0:23:57.480
<v Speaker 1>of limits we should put on it in international agreements,

0:23:57.920 --> 0:24:00.480
<v Speaker 1>so much the same way that we debate how to

0:24:00.520 --> 0:24:03.280
<v Speaker 1>make air travel safer while people are are dying by

0:24:03.320 --> 0:24:06.920
<v Speaker 1>the thousands on the road in traffic accidents, we're debating

0:24:06.960 --> 0:24:11.800
<v Speaker 1>autonomous conventional weapons, which does matter, while autonomous cyber weapons

0:24:11.800 --> 0:24:15.879
<v Speaker 1>are already here and already fighting and potentially capable of

0:24:15.920 --> 0:24:18.520
<v Speaker 1>doing far more harm and killing more people than a

0:24:18.600 --> 0:24:21.560
<v Speaker 1>robot with a gun could. But I think the availability

0:24:21.640 --> 0:24:24.560
<v Speaker 1>heuristic is at play again here because it's it's just

0:24:24.640 --> 0:24:29.000
<v Speaker 1>that the damage done by autonomous digital weapons like these

0:24:29.040 --> 0:24:33.320
<v Speaker 1>computer viruses and worms and malicious bits of code, the

0:24:33.680 --> 0:24:36.600
<v Speaker 1>the type of damage done by these is less visceral,

0:24:36.640 --> 0:24:39.880
<v Speaker 1>it's harder to picture, and it definitely has fewer movies

0:24:39.960 --> 0:24:43.320
<v Speaker 1>about it, and thus it doesn't get the advantage offered

0:24:43.320 --> 0:24:45.960
<v Speaker 1>by the availability heuristic. You get when you get pictures

0:24:45.960 --> 0:24:48.480
<v Speaker 1>of terminators, that's right, When when you think of an

0:24:48.520 --> 0:24:53.840
<v Speaker 1>infrastructure wrecking, malicious program, uh, It's really hard to think

0:24:53.880 --> 0:24:56.959
<v Speaker 1>of in any horror films that that really line up

0:24:56.960 --> 0:24:58.720
<v Speaker 1>with that concept. The best I can come up with

0:24:59.160 --> 0:25:04.760
<v Speaker 1>is Stephen is maximum Overdrive, which is of course Vigures film.

0:25:04.800 --> 0:25:09.080
<v Speaker 1>So that is the most realistic picture of future technology threat. Yeah,

0:25:09.080 --> 0:25:11.320
<v Speaker 1>it's strange how this works. Right, we were talking about

0:25:11.320 --> 0:25:14.479
<v Speaker 1>this a little before we we started rolling. You know,

0:25:14.520 --> 0:25:18.480
<v Speaker 1>it's it's It's been said that any sufficiently advanced technology

0:25:18.520 --> 0:25:21.199
<v Speaker 1>is indistinguishable from magic, right, and you can point to

0:25:21.240 --> 0:25:23.920
<v Speaker 1>it to various bits of mythology, the myths of say,

0:25:24.160 --> 0:25:28.880
<v Speaker 1>humans creating other rational beings. And in the past these

0:25:28.880 --> 0:25:33.240
<v Speaker 1>were this was pure fantasy. Now in the twenty first century,

0:25:33.280 --> 0:25:35.399
<v Speaker 1>it is. Uh, it is far more realistic when we

0:25:35.440 --> 0:25:40.080
<v Speaker 1>look at models of AI and genetic engineering, etcetera. Uh. Likewise,

0:25:40.119 --> 0:25:43.520
<v Speaker 1>maximum overdrive was ridiculous in the nineteen eighties, but as

0:25:43.520 --> 0:25:47.080
<v Speaker 1>we enter into this age that is increasingly defined by

0:25:47.080 --> 0:25:51.200
<v Speaker 1>research into autonomous vehicles or the Internet of things, Uh,

0:25:51.920 --> 0:25:55.720
<v Speaker 1>maximum overdrive is suddenly not so bonkers. It is crazy.

0:25:55.760 --> 0:25:59.119
<v Speaker 1>In the nineteen eighties, people might have said, Okay, maximum

0:25:59.119 --> 0:26:03.480
<v Speaker 1>overdrive is a silly fantasy about the future technology threat,

0:26:03.560 --> 0:26:07.719
<v Speaker 1>and Terminator is a more realistic movie about future technology

0:26:07.720 --> 0:26:10.159
<v Speaker 1>threat and looking at the wilay of the land today,

0:26:10.320 --> 0:26:13.480
<v Speaker 1>I said, I mean, obviously Maximum Overdrive his cartoony, but

0:26:13.640 --> 0:26:17.200
<v Speaker 1>the general picture outlined by the two of them, maximum

0:26:17.200 --> 0:26:21.560
<v Speaker 1>Overdrive might be the more realistic threat. Any sufficiently advanced

0:26:21.560 --> 0:26:26.760
<v Speaker 1>technology is indistinguishable from Maximum Overdrive. But if you're lost

0:26:26.840 --> 0:26:29.679
<v Speaker 1>right now, okay, why do we say Maximum Overdrive, by

0:26:29.720 --> 0:26:33.080
<v Speaker 1>the way, is basically just a ridiculous eighties Stephen King

0:26:33.119 --> 0:26:36.720
<v Speaker 1>movie where like trucks and appliances and everything every electronic

0:26:36.920 --> 0:26:40.920
<v Speaker 1>thing or sometimes just cars and stuff start trying to

0:26:41.000 --> 0:26:45.280
<v Speaker 1>kill mostly cars, and like really badass trucks come to

0:26:45.359 --> 0:26:47.960
<v Speaker 1>life and start killing things. But but also I think

0:26:47.960 --> 0:26:51.280
<v Speaker 1>like toast drivans and lawn mowers and whatnot. So so

0:26:51.480 --> 0:26:54.960
<v Speaker 1>what autonomous cyber weapons have already been deployed? We said,

0:26:55.000 --> 0:26:57.800
<v Speaker 1>this is already a thing that exists. So in his article,

0:26:58.240 --> 0:27:01.760
<v Speaker 1>Sue quote Scott Borg, director in chief economist of the

0:27:01.800 --> 0:27:05.600
<v Speaker 1>US Cyber Consequences Unit, and Borg says quote malicious computer

0:27:05.680 --> 0:27:10.080
<v Speaker 1>programs that could be described as intelligent autonomous agents are

0:27:10.200 --> 0:27:14.040
<v Speaker 1>what steal people's data, build bot nets, lock people out

0:27:14.040 --> 0:27:16.960
<v Speaker 1>of their systems until they pay a ransom. And do

0:27:17.040 --> 0:27:19.920
<v Speaker 1>most of the other work of cyber criminals. So he's

0:27:19.920 --> 0:27:22.200
<v Speaker 1>talking about the fact that generally when they're cyber crime

0:27:22.280 --> 0:27:26.480
<v Speaker 1>going on, it's not a cyber criminal sitting at a

0:27:26.520 --> 0:27:30.960
<v Speaker 1>computer like manually doing stuff to you. They've they've created

0:27:30.960 --> 0:27:34.919
<v Speaker 1>a program that does it autonomously, so they just put it,

0:27:35.000 --> 0:27:37.240
<v Speaker 1>they let it go, and it does its work and

0:27:37.280 --> 0:27:40.160
<v Speaker 1>then they reap the benefits. But there have been plenty

0:27:40.200 --> 0:27:43.040
<v Speaker 1>of examples of this type of warfare in in actual

0:27:43.080 --> 0:27:46.840
<v Speaker 1>international relations. So there's the ducks networm. This is a

0:27:46.920 --> 0:27:51.560
<v Speaker 1>malicious computer worm that attacked computers controlling nuclear center refuges

0:27:51.600 --> 0:27:54.159
<v Speaker 1>in Iran, and it's believed to have slowed down the

0:27:54.200 --> 0:27:57.840
<v Speaker 1>development of the Iranian nuclear program. I think this happened

0:27:57.880 --> 0:28:01.080
<v Speaker 1>around two thousand ten, and no one's in it responsibility,

0:28:01.119 --> 0:28:04.040
<v Speaker 1>but it appears that this was a cyber weapon created

0:28:04.040 --> 0:28:06.760
<v Speaker 1>by the United States and Israel to try to prevent

0:28:06.840 --> 0:28:11.240
<v Speaker 1>Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Another example would be the

0:28:11.440 --> 0:28:15.199
<v Speaker 1>want to Cry ransomware worm, which shuts down computers and

0:28:15.240 --> 0:28:18.720
<v Speaker 1>demands payment of money before allowing the computers to be

0:28:18.800 --> 0:28:21.919
<v Speaker 1>made functional again. And want to Cry has caused real damage.

0:28:21.960 --> 0:28:25.160
<v Speaker 1>It attacked computer systems in hospitals at the UK National

0:28:25.200 --> 0:28:29.160
<v Speaker 1>Health Service, among a bunch of other important infrastructure machines.

0:28:29.560 --> 0:28:31.680
<v Speaker 1>Plus I think you could you could, you could reasonably

0:28:31.760 --> 0:28:36.199
<v Speaker 1>argue that there was UH psychological damage inflicted by that

0:28:36.240 --> 0:28:38.880
<v Speaker 1>attack as well. I mean, maybe not as much as

0:28:38.880 --> 0:28:44.280
<v Speaker 1>like a full blown UH cyber terrorism event, but it's

0:28:44.280 --> 0:28:47.240
<v Speaker 1>certainly captured headlines and it was It was the kind

0:28:47.280 --> 0:28:50.600
<v Speaker 1>of threat that's kind of central to the the appeal

0:28:50.600 --> 0:28:54.480
<v Speaker 1>of a terroristic act. It makes everyone feel like they

0:28:54.520 --> 0:28:57.880
<v Speaker 1>could be a potential victim. Yeah, yeah, totally, and in

0:28:58.000 --> 0:29:00.800
<v Speaker 1>fact a lot of people you could be a potential victim.

0:29:00.880 --> 0:29:03.320
<v Speaker 1>I mean, this is a thing that's that's worth being

0:29:03.360 --> 0:29:06.440
<v Speaker 1>concerned about and thinking about what defensive measures could we

0:29:06.480 --> 0:29:11.000
<v Speaker 1>put in place. Again, no one has plausibly admitted responsibility

0:29:11.080 --> 0:29:13.200
<v Speaker 1>for the want to Cry attack, but a lot of

0:29:13.240 --> 0:29:15.520
<v Speaker 1>analysts thinks science point to it being a project of

0:29:15.560 --> 0:29:19.200
<v Speaker 1>the North Korean government. Now, these examples demonstrate that, like

0:29:19.320 --> 0:29:24.760
<v Speaker 1>any weapon and autonomous UH, an autonomous cyberweapon can be

0:29:24.880 --> 0:29:28.720
<v Speaker 1>used for various types of conflicts, right like in the

0:29:28.720 --> 0:29:31.120
<v Speaker 1>case of the stuck S networm. Whatever you think about

0:29:31.160 --> 0:29:33.360
<v Speaker 1>the U S and Israel, I think most people would

0:29:33.360 --> 0:29:35.920
<v Speaker 1>probably agree that they're glad somebody figured out a non

0:29:36.040 --> 0:29:39.800
<v Speaker 1>violent way to stop an authoritarian regime from making nuclear weapons.

0:29:40.240 --> 0:29:42.920
<v Speaker 1>But then again, the same technology could be used by

0:29:42.920 --> 0:29:46.479
<v Speaker 1>the same actors or by others to attack things that

0:29:46.520 --> 0:29:48.840
<v Speaker 1>are you know, that would get less sympathy from people

0:29:48.880 --> 0:29:57.160
<v Speaker 1>around the world. Attack critical infrastructure anywhere, power, water, security, hospitals, telecommunications, media, banks,

0:29:57.200 --> 0:30:00.440
<v Speaker 1>and financial systems, transportation. I mean, all the these things

0:30:00.480 --> 0:30:04.240
<v Speaker 1>are increasingly connected now. Yeah, and we've only seen partial

0:30:04.480 --> 0:30:07.440
<v Speaker 1>use of these cyber weapons, certainly nothing of the magnitude

0:30:07.440 --> 0:30:10.840
<v Speaker 1>of of a full scale cyber war. Uh, something that

0:30:10.840 --> 0:30:14.800
<v Speaker 1>that you know that some futurists and cybersecurity analysts have

0:30:14.800 --> 0:30:17.040
<v Speaker 1>have written about and discussed like what would this look like?

0:30:17.480 --> 0:30:20.040
<v Speaker 1>Uh though though that though many of them stressed that

0:30:20.080 --> 0:30:23.800
<v Speaker 1>even these limited uses, they can build legitimacy for the

0:30:23.840 --> 0:30:26.560
<v Speaker 1>development of such weapons, as well as for the development

0:30:26.560 --> 0:30:30.880
<v Speaker 1>of national cyber response teams. And it's inevitable too that

0:30:30.880 --> 0:30:35.040
<v Speaker 1>that such attacks will lean increasingly into machine learning and

0:30:35.080 --> 0:30:38.440
<v Speaker 1>the use of AI. So what we've seen so far

0:30:38.600 --> 0:30:42.440
<v Speaker 1>is is sadly just like the tip of the iceberg unfortunately. Yeah,

0:30:42.480 --> 0:30:44.440
<v Speaker 1>and I want to talk more about that, especially the

0:30:44.560 --> 0:30:47.920
<v Speaker 1>role of machine learning and AI later on. But um,

0:30:48.040 --> 0:30:50.560
<v Speaker 1>one of the things I really want to stress is

0:30:50.600 --> 0:30:55.920
<v Speaker 1>that these days in the modern world, attacks on infrastructure

0:30:55.960 --> 0:31:00.720
<v Speaker 1>are not necessarily just inconveniences. It's not like thinking, oh, well,

0:31:00.760 --> 0:31:02.640
<v Speaker 1>I just lost internet for a day. It was actually

0:31:02.680 --> 0:31:04.960
<v Speaker 1>kind of nice because I went outside and took a walk. Yeah.

0:31:05.000 --> 0:31:07.920
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you might have lost power in your neighborhood before,

0:31:07.960 --> 0:31:09.960
<v Speaker 1>and you know it was an inconvenience or something, but

0:31:10.040 --> 0:31:14.080
<v Speaker 1>you were fine. But at a large enough scale, attacks

0:31:14.120 --> 0:31:18.480
<v Speaker 1>like these on infrastructure that are totally plausible under under

0:31:18.480 --> 0:31:21.720
<v Speaker 1>the world we live in today, they're pretty much guaranteed

0:31:21.800 --> 0:31:26.320
<v Speaker 1>to result in people facing serious material loss, injury, and death.

0:31:26.880 --> 0:31:29.560
<v Speaker 1>As an example for comparison, you could look at the

0:31:29.600 --> 0:31:33.280
<v Speaker 1>tragedy that's happened in Puerto Rico following the following the

0:31:33.360 --> 0:31:38.160
<v Speaker 1>landfall of Hurricane Maria in September. Now, when that happened,

0:31:38.160 --> 0:31:41.160
<v Speaker 1>when Puerto Rico was hit by the hurricane, it effectively

0:31:41.240 --> 0:31:44.800
<v Speaker 1>knocked out Puerto Rico's electrical power grid and temporarily put

0:31:44.800 --> 0:31:48.640
<v Speaker 1>a stop to lots of services in its aftermath, including electricity,

0:31:49.080 --> 0:31:52.720
<v Speaker 1>sewage treatment, some types of health and medical care, clean

0:31:52.800 --> 0:31:56.800
<v Speaker 1>tap water, and so forth. And in a civilization that's

0:31:56.920 --> 0:32:00.200
<v Speaker 1>built on the assumption of continued access to service is

0:32:00.240 --> 0:32:04.760
<v Speaker 1>like power and clean water. Sudden interruption of those services

0:32:04.840 --> 0:32:08.920
<v Speaker 1>is devastating and genuinely lethal. And while we we can't

0:32:08.920 --> 0:32:10.960
<v Speaker 1>be sure of the exact number of people who died

0:32:11.000 --> 0:32:13.440
<v Speaker 1>as a result of the devastation caused by the hurricane,

0:32:13.760 --> 0:32:15.640
<v Speaker 1>there have been some estimates and it seems like a

0:32:15.720 --> 0:32:19.480
<v Speaker 1>lot of people survived the initial storm but died in

0:32:19.520 --> 0:32:22.800
<v Speaker 1>the weeks and months afterwards from complications in the aftermath.

0:32:22.840 --> 0:32:27.120
<v Speaker 1>A lot of these possibly due to interruptions and services, healthcare, disease,

0:32:27.200 --> 0:32:30.760
<v Speaker 1>and so forth. Harvard study published in the New England

0:32:30.840 --> 0:32:34.200
<v Speaker 1>Journal of Medicine used survey data from households in Puerto

0:32:34.240 --> 0:32:37.360
<v Speaker 1>Rico to try to estimate the amount of the human impact,

0:32:37.440 --> 0:32:40.040
<v Speaker 1>and they found that among respondents there was a mortality

0:32:40.160 --> 0:32:44.000
<v Speaker 1>rate of about fourteen point three deaths for thousand persons

0:32:44.200 --> 0:32:48.240
<v Speaker 1>in September twenty through the end of seventeen, and this

0:32:48.320 --> 0:32:52.800
<v Speaker 1>yielded somewhere between seven hundred and ninety three and eight thousand,

0:32:53.040 --> 0:32:57.120
<v Speaker 1>four hundred nine excess deaths above the normal rate for

0:32:57.160 --> 0:32:59.560
<v Speaker 1>this period. That the mean of those numbers would be

0:32:59.600 --> 0:33:03.040
<v Speaker 1>like four six hundred people and that was within that

0:33:03.120 --> 0:33:07.120
<v Speaker 1>range with confidence interval. So the authors think the death

0:33:07.160 --> 0:33:09.920
<v Speaker 1>holl could actually be higher because the survey data is

0:33:09.920 --> 0:33:13.720
<v Speaker 1>contaminated by survivor bias. Right, people who died were not

0:33:13.840 --> 0:33:16.640
<v Speaker 1>able to respond to the survey. Now, we don't know

0:33:16.760 --> 0:33:18.840
<v Speaker 1>for sure if that estimate is accurate. There could be

0:33:18.880 --> 0:33:21.320
<v Speaker 1>flaws in the method. But if it's accurate, that's equivalent

0:33:21.600 --> 0:33:24.600
<v Speaker 1>to a sixty two percent increase in the mortality rate

0:33:24.640 --> 0:33:27.880
<v Speaker 1>as compared to the same period in st And we

0:33:27.920 --> 0:33:30.040
<v Speaker 1>should acknowledge there's been a lot of anger about the

0:33:30.040 --> 0:33:34.280
<v Speaker 1>way the US government handled the Hurricane Maria aftermath, with

0:33:34.400 --> 0:33:37.160
<v Speaker 1>charges that it basically didn't do enough to get essential

0:33:37.200 --> 0:33:41.240
<v Speaker 1>infrastructure and services back online fast enough, and that people

0:33:41.280 --> 0:33:44.240
<v Speaker 1>actually suffered and died as a result of not having

0:33:44.240 --> 0:33:47.240
<v Speaker 1>this infrastructure online, arguably in a manner that would have

0:33:47.240 --> 0:33:49.840
<v Speaker 1>been far different had this been, uh, you know, the

0:33:50.240 --> 0:33:54.480
<v Speaker 1>aftermath of a terrorist attack or or something that was

0:33:54.880 --> 0:33:58.680
<v Speaker 1>a little more centralized, personified, or too or tied in

0:33:58.720 --> 0:34:01.880
<v Speaker 1>with these more pervasive fear. Yeah, there there does appear

0:34:01.920 --> 0:34:05.280
<v Speaker 1>to be a weird psychology in the way societies respond

0:34:05.360 --> 0:34:08.200
<v Speaker 1>to threats, and that all different kinds of biases can

0:34:08.239 --> 0:34:12.680
<v Speaker 1>provide differential motivation in how much effort we put into

0:34:12.719 --> 0:34:16.080
<v Speaker 1>fixing the problem afterwards and helping people. So, yeah, it's

0:34:16.080 --> 0:34:19.120
<v Speaker 1>been it's been a horrible tragedy there, But we should

0:34:19.120 --> 0:34:22.360
<v Speaker 1>think about that. This kind of tragedy is what happens

0:34:22.400 --> 0:34:25.839
<v Speaker 1>due to a random attack by the weather. One can

0:34:25.880 --> 0:34:29.160
<v Speaker 1>only wonder what it would look like if, say, infrastructure

0:34:29.200 --> 0:34:31.640
<v Speaker 1>was attacked not randomly by the weather, but by a

0:34:31.719 --> 0:34:35.719
<v Speaker 1>malicious party intentionally trying to do as much damage as

0:34:35.800 --> 0:34:39.040
<v Speaker 1>possible with digital weapons. Yeah, I mean obviously a number

0:34:39.080 --> 0:34:44.160
<v Speaker 1>of possibilities instantly come to mind. Targeting infrastructure during the

0:34:44.239 --> 0:34:48.600
<v Speaker 1>very depths of winter, for example, right, or during a key,

0:34:48.760 --> 0:34:52.839
<v Speaker 1>say politically sensitive times like during an election. Yeah. Um, yeah,

0:34:52.880 --> 0:34:55.919
<v Speaker 1>I know I've read that there there's belief that there

0:34:56.120 --> 0:35:00.919
<v Speaker 1>was Russian digital autonomous agent attacks again to say some

0:35:01.120 --> 0:35:06.040
<v Speaker 1>Ukrainian power infrastructure during times of political upheaval and civil unrest,

0:35:06.080 --> 0:35:08.800
<v Speaker 1>which you know, it only makes things worse the timing

0:35:08.840 --> 0:35:11.560
<v Speaker 1>of those attacks. And a scary part is that we're

0:35:11.600 --> 0:35:15.200
<v Speaker 1>constantly connecting more and more devices to the Internet. Yeah,

0:35:15.239 --> 0:35:20.040
<v Speaker 1>like our refrigerators to the internet, cars, home appliances, medical devices,

0:35:20.080 --> 0:35:24.120
<v Speaker 1>and even medical implants. Every year the connectedness does not shrink,

0:35:24.160 --> 0:35:27.680
<v Speaker 1>it grows, and thus every year the world's connectedness and

0:35:27.760 --> 0:35:32.240
<v Speaker 1>vulnerability to cyber attacks, you could argue, becomes even greater,

0:35:32.719 --> 0:35:36.040
<v Speaker 1>almost as if we really want maximum overdrive to happen,

0:35:36.120 --> 0:35:38.439
<v Speaker 1>as if we were saying, you know, you know that movie,

0:35:38.480 --> 0:35:40.120
<v Speaker 1>that movie that came out in the eighties that was

0:35:40.160 --> 0:35:42.840
<v Speaker 1>so ridiculous, Uh, let's do that. Let's just go ahead

0:35:42.840 --> 0:35:45.680
<v Speaker 1>and put our refrigerator and our toaster on the Internet

0:35:45.680 --> 0:35:47.440
<v Speaker 1>and have them talk to each other. I mean, it's

0:35:47.440 --> 0:35:50.160
<v Speaker 1>hard to predict exactly what attacks would look like, though

0:35:50.160 --> 0:35:51.520
<v Speaker 1>there has been a lot of work on this, and

0:35:51.560 --> 0:35:53.600
<v Speaker 1>maybe if we revisit this topic in the future, we

0:35:53.600 --> 0:35:58.480
<v Speaker 1>could just more explicitly explore scenarios that have been talked

0:35:58.480 --> 0:36:01.759
<v Speaker 1>about by cybersecurity x birds. Yeah, in particular that the

0:36:02.280 --> 0:36:05.080
<v Speaker 1>concept of full blown cyber warfare. What that would look

0:36:05.120 --> 0:36:08.120
<v Speaker 1>like if you had nation states actively and at least

0:36:08.160 --> 0:36:12.600
<v Speaker 1>semi openly engaging in attacks and counterattacks against each other,

0:36:12.800 --> 0:36:16.680
<v Speaker 1>with the possibility then of actual military attacks on top

0:36:16.719 --> 0:36:19.560
<v Speaker 1>of that. Yeah, totally. But I mean, one thing I

0:36:19.640 --> 0:36:21.680
<v Speaker 1>really want to drive home, if you take anything away

0:36:21.719 --> 0:36:24.719
<v Speaker 1>from this episode, I wanted to be that attacks by

0:36:24.760 --> 0:36:29.320
<v Speaker 1>autonomous digital agents just computer viruses. Basically in the common understanding,

0:36:29.360 --> 0:36:31.520
<v Speaker 1>worms and stuff like that, things that don't have a

0:36:31.560 --> 0:36:34.120
<v Speaker 1>gun or a missile or an explosive attacks to them

0:36:34.480 --> 0:36:37.840
<v Speaker 1>can be just as dangerous, just as deadly and probably

0:36:37.960 --> 0:36:42.280
<v Speaker 1>more so than conventional weapons can be. Absolutely and remember

0:36:42.320 --> 0:36:44.319
<v Speaker 1>another thing is that most of these attacks can, at

0:36:44.360 --> 0:36:49.040
<v Speaker 1>least in theory, function without ongoing human input or direction. Right,

0:36:49.239 --> 0:36:51.680
<v Speaker 1>It's the set it and forget it model of warfare.

0:36:52.120 --> 0:36:55.840
<v Speaker 1>Like you, you make an autonomous digital agent, a computer virus,

0:36:55.880 --> 0:36:59.080
<v Speaker 1>a worm, whatever to attack infrastructure out there, and you

0:36:59.120 --> 0:37:01.040
<v Speaker 1>might be able to sign it so that you don't

0:37:01.080 --> 0:37:03.399
<v Speaker 1>need to go back and do anything to it later.

0:37:03.560 --> 0:37:07.279
<v Speaker 1>You don't need to maintain it. Uh directed it functions

0:37:07.360 --> 0:37:10.319
<v Speaker 1>on its own. That's what autonomous means. Yeah, it's it's

0:37:10.360 --> 0:37:13.719
<v Speaker 1>basically the more perfect version of the nuclear torpedo that

0:37:13.760 --> 0:37:15.959
<v Speaker 1>I talked about earlier. Like the the idea there, of course,

0:37:16.000 --> 0:37:18.799
<v Speaker 1>is that it's out there, it's not communicating back, and

0:37:18.840 --> 0:37:22.759
<v Speaker 1>then it could and then it strikes its target, detonates

0:37:22.800 --> 0:37:26.480
<v Speaker 1>and causes you know, lasting radioactive damage to a particular

0:37:26.520 --> 0:37:30.160
<v Speaker 1>area uh and and uh and loss of life um

0:37:30.280 --> 0:37:33.879
<v Speaker 1>and damage to the infrastructure. Etcetera. But we're talking about

0:37:33.880 --> 0:37:37.200
<v Speaker 1>digital agents. It would be able to achieve many of

0:37:37.239 --> 0:37:40.719
<v Speaker 1>those same goals. Uh, but without the same risk of

0:37:40.760 --> 0:37:44.240
<v Speaker 1>components aging and uh and uh and and the torpedo

0:37:44.280 --> 0:37:47.880
<v Speaker 1>itself eventually dying. Right, And the one thing about what

0:37:47.960 --> 0:37:50.040
<v Speaker 1>you just said does make me want to emphasize, I'm

0:37:50.040 --> 0:37:54.600
<v Speaker 1>not suggesting that cyber warfares, say, worse than a nuclear

0:37:54.640 --> 0:37:57.360
<v Speaker 1>attack would be. I don't think that's true. I mean, obviously,

0:37:57.680 --> 0:38:00.760
<v Speaker 1>a full scale attack by conventional or new clear weapons

0:38:01.080 --> 0:38:04.000
<v Speaker 1>would be a worse outcome than a cyber attack. But

0:38:04.040 --> 0:38:07.000
<v Speaker 1>I think a cyber attack is a more a threat

0:38:07.040 --> 0:38:09.400
<v Speaker 1>that we need to be even more concerned about because

0:38:10.040 --> 0:38:13.799
<v Speaker 1>it can be very, very realistically destructive, and it's very

0:38:13.920 --> 0:38:17.359
<v Speaker 1>likely to happen because it's already happening. I mean, it's

0:38:17.360 --> 0:38:21.319
<v Speaker 1>something that you can very easily see being deployed, much

0:38:21.320 --> 0:38:24.960
<v Speaker 1>more so than you can imagine, say, nuclear war between

0:38:25.000 --> 0:38:29.120
<v Speaker 1>currently nuclear armed countries. Right. Yeah, When we try to

0:38:29.160 --> 0:38:33.360
<v Speaker 1>imagine an the anonymous use of a nuclear even a

0:38:33.480 --> 0:38:38.040
<v Speaker 1>powerful enough conventional weapon, um, it's it's far less less

0:38:38.120 --> 0:38:42.040
<v Speaker 1>likely compared to the anonymous use of a particularly volatile

0:38:42.280 --> 0:38:44.960
<v Speaker 1>cyber weapon, because we haven't really seen the former, and

0:38:45.000 --> 0:38:48.719
<v Speaker 1>we've definitely definitely seen the ladder exactly. So a lot

0:38:48.760 --> 0:38:50.640
<v Speaker 1>of this article that I mentioned earlier that got me

0:38:50.680 --> 0:38:54.600
<v Speaker 1>thinking about this by Jeremy Sue it it's simply highlighting

0:38:54.600 --> 0:38:58.440
<v Speaker 1>the fact that governments and international organizations are not having

0:38:58.560 --> 0:39:02.120
<v Speaker 1>enough conversation about sidelines for how to control the threat

0:39:02.480 --> 0:39:06.560
<v Speaker 1>of autonomous cyber weapons. We are having some international conversations

0:39:06.600 --> 0:39:09.440
<v Speaker 1>about what to do about autonomous conventional weapons, the robot

0:39:09.440 --> 0:39:12.680
<v Speaker 1>with a gun, We are not having enough conversations about

0:39:12.680 --> 0:39:16.399
<v Speaker 1>what to do about controlling autonomous cyber weapons. And these

0:39:16.440 --> 0:39:19.759
<v Speaker 1>autonomous cyber weapons are already here and being used. They're

0:39:19.800 --> 0:39:23.520
<v Speaker 1>easier to create and deploy and potentially in many cases

0:39:23.560 --> 0:39:27.600
<v Speaker 1>more destructive than autonomous conventional weapons. One of the experts

0:39:27.680 --> 0:39:30.279
<v Speaker 1>that Sue quotes in his article is Kenneth Anderson, a

0:39:30.320 --> 0:39:35.360
<v Speaker 1>professor of law at American University who specializes in national security.

0:39:35.400 --> 0:39:37.440
<v Speaker 1>One of the experts Sue quotes in his article is

0:39:37.520 --> 0:39:41.520
<v Speaker 1>Kenneth Anderson, a professor uh law professor at American University

0:39:41.560 --> 0:39:45.440
<v Speaker 1>who does national security issues. And Anderson says where is

0:39:45.480 --> 0:39:49.360
<v Speaker 1>the band killer apps? In GEO advocacy campaign demanding a

0:39:49.400 --> 0:39:53.600
<v Speaker 1>sweeping total ban on the use, possession, transferred to transfer,

0:39:53.680 --> 0:39:56.640
<v Speaker 1>or development of cyber weapons all the features found in

0:39:56.680 --> 0:40:00.879
<v Speaker 1>today's Stop Killer Robots campaign. I think that's a good question. Yeah,

0:40:01.040 --> 0:40:03.600
<v Speaker 1>I absolutely agree, and I mean I hope that that

0:40:03.719 --> 0:40:05.840
<v Speaker 1>someone is putting it together. I would very much, especially

0:40:05.840 --> 0:40:09.040
<v Speaker 1>after this episode, like to support such a campaign. Yeah.

0:40:09.200 --> 0:40:12.480
<v Speaker 1>I mean, we've got nuclear non proliferation agreements and stuff

0:40:12.520 --> 0:40:15.520
<v Speaker 1>like that. It seems more than reasonable to be trying

0:40:15.520 --> 0:40:18.600
<v Speaker 1>to work on a similar framework for cyber weapons, and

0:40:18.960 --> 0:40:23.160
<v Speaker 1>and nuclear proliferation treaties have to a large extent worked.

0:40:23.440 --> 0:40:26.680
<v Speaker 1>I mean, for starters, we have not had a nuclear war,

0:40:27.000 --> 0:40:30.399
<v Speaker 1>which some commentators have said is nothing short of a miracle. Um,

0:40:30.960 --> 0:40:35.400
<v Speaker 1>we've seen the nuclear stockpiles of of of the United

0:40:35.400 --> 0:40:39.720
<v Speaker 1>States and Russia uh deplete over the decades, and hopefully

0:40:39.800 --> 0:40:43.120
<v Speaker 1>that will remain the trend. Again, We've seen similar scenarios

0:40:43.120 --> 0:40:46.520
<v Speaker 1>with biological and chemical agents as well. So something could

0:40:46.560 --> 0:40:50.960
<v Speaker 1>be done here if we act and we actually uh,

0:40:51.000 --> 0:40:54.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, push for regulations to be made. You know, Robert,

0:40:54.080 --> 0:40:56.520
<v Speaker 1>one of the things you mentioned earlier is about the

0:40:56.600 --> 0:41:01.160
<v Speaker 1>difficulty in controlling the proliferation of digital agents as compared

0:41:01.200 --> 0:41:05.960
<v Speaker 1>to conventional weapons, right, like digital agents, a computer worm

0:41:06.239 --> 0:41:09.520
<v Speaker 1>or a virus something like that can replicate in the

0:41:09.560 --> 0:41:13.200
<v Speaker 1>wild in some scenarios. So I would say that this

0:41:13.320 --> 0:41:17.080
<v Speaker 1>is also a case where just like with nuclear weapons,

0:41:17.120 --> 0:41:19.759
<v Speaker 1>it's like if if two countries with nuclear weapons go

0:41:19.800 --> 0:41:22.120
<v Speaker 1>to war, it's not just a problem for the people

0:41:22.200 --> 0:41:25.000
<v Speaker 1>in those two countries, it's a problem for the entire world.

0:41:25.600 --> 0:41:29.240
<v Speaker 1>And I would say that software based digital warfare agents

0:41:29.280 --> 0:41:31.960
<v Speaker 1>that operate on the Internet are similarly a problem for

0:41:32.000 --> 0:41:35.000
<v Speaker 1>the entire world because you don't know potentially who they

0:41:35.000 --> 0:41:37.719
<v Speaker 1>could harm on the sidelines. Yeah, I mean we with

0:41:37.719 --> 0:41:40.799
<v Speaker 1>with nuclear, biological and chemical agents. Obviously, we all share

0:41:40.800 --> 0:41:44.719
<v Speaker 1>an atmosphere, we all share a global environment, and when

0:41:44.760 --> 0:41:49.400
<v Speaker 1>we wage devastating war within that environment, we run the

0:41:49.480 --> 0:41:54.240
<v Speaker 1>risk of destabilizing UH everything and harming ourselves in the process.

0:41:54.560 --> 0:41:58.560
<v Speaker 1>And with the digital technology, we have created another environment

0:41:58.760 --> 0:42:02.760
<v Speaker 1>that we have we have made ourselves dependent upon uh

0:42:02.840 --> 0:42:05.480
<v Speaker 1>and and we run the risk of doing the same thing,

0:42:05.600 --> 0:42:09.319
<v Speaker 1>poisoning this new ocean that we've created, especially when we

0:42:09.400 --> 0:42:13.560
<v Speaker 1>consider the possibility of these autonomous agents becoming more adaptive,

0:42:14.160 --> 0:42:16.520
<v Speaker 1>and I think we should explore that after we take

0:42:16.560 --> 0:42:20.080
<v Speaker 1>a break. Thank thank you, thank you, Alright, we're back.

0:42:20.160 --> 0:42:24.319
<v Speaker 1>We're talking about the future, the dangers, the risk, and

0:42:24.360 --> 0:42:27.399
<v Speaker 1>how we should how we should really handle the risk

0:42:27.520 --> 0:42:32.320
<v Speaker 1>and handle anxiety over the prospect of of cyber warfare

0:42:32.320 --> 0:42:34.839
<v Speaker 1>in the future. So here's something I think is really

0:42:34.840 --> 0:42:38.160
<v Speaker 1>worth considering, and it's the convergence of cyber warfare and

0:42:38.200 --> 0:42:42.640
<v Speaker 1>cyber weapons with machine learning and artificial intelligence. Because we've

0:42:42.680 --> 0:42:46.560
<v Speaker 1>already got autonomous cyber weapons, these these malicious bits of

0:42:46.560 --> 0:42:50.120
<v Speaker 1>software out there that you know, enact warfare on on

0:42:50.239 --> 0:42:53.640
<v Speaker 1>infrastructure of opposing forces in the world, and we've got

0:42:53.719 --> 0:42:57.080
<v Speaker 1>machine learning and AI, and there's really no reason these

0:42:57.080 --> 0:43:00.320
<v Speaker 1>capabilities could not be combined. So this is a future

0:43:00.360 --> 0:43:04.520
<v Speaker 1>that combines the devastating capabilities of cyber warfare with the

0:43:04.600 --> 0:43:09.399
<v Speaker 1>attack dynamics of something like biological or germ warfare. This

0:43:09.480 --> 0:43:13.239
<v Speaker 1>is a future that should worry us. Autonomous cyber weapons

0:43:13.280 --> 0:43:17.040
<v Speaker 1>that can learn, adapt and change on their own. And

0:43:17.080 --> 0:43:19.080
<v Speaker 1>I think it's not hard to see how we could

0:43:19.239 --> 0:43:23.160
<v Speaker 1>potentially go down this road of developing dangerous AI cyber

0:43:23.200 --> 0:43:26.960
<v Speaker 1>weapons that alter themselves through machine learning and get out

0:43:26.960 --> 0:43:29.400
<v Speaker 1>of control. I thought of just a couple of scenarios

0:43:29.440 --> 0:43:32.239
<v Speaker 1>that seem plausible to me, at least one would be

0:43:32.280 --> 0:43:35.960
<v Speaker 1>cyber terrorism. You know, some forces are not rational actors

0:43:36.000 --> 0:43:39.760
<v Speaker 1>seeking to limit the harm they cause and preserve their interests.

0:43:39.760 --> 0:43:42.319
<v Speaker 1>But some people are just simply interested in causing harm

0:43:42.320 --> 0:43:45.239
<v Speaker 1>and chaos. I imagine how bad things could be if

0:43:45.280 --> 0:43:48.840
<v Speaker 1>somebody like the Uni bomber had computer skills to wage

0:43:49.000 --> 0:43:52.040
<v Speaker 1>lone wolf cyber warfare of this kind. But then I

0:43:52.080 --> 0:43:56.040
<v Speaker 1>also think about dangerous autonomous AI that begins as a

0:43:56.160 --> 0:44:01.560
<v Speaker 1>defensive measure to protect against cyber attacks. So most harmful

0:44:01.600 --> 0:44:04.600
<v Speaker 1>military technologies, Robert, I bet you would agree, most of

0:44:04.600 --> 0:44:08.120
<v Speaker 1>these harmful technologies and strategies in world history have not

0:44:08.239 --> 0:44:12.239
<v Speaker 1>come from people claiming to be developing offensive weapons to

0:44:12.360 --> 0:44:17.160
<v Speaker 1>maliciously attack on suspecting victims. They've been developed under a mindset,

0:44:17.239 --> 0:44:20.520
<v Speaker 1>whether this is really objectively fair or not, of defense.

0:44:20.840 --> 0:44:23.279
<v Speaker 1>People think like, I'm under threat, I need to do

0:44:23.400 --> 0:44:26.239
<v Speaker 1>something to protect myself exactly. I mean this is that

0:44:26.280 --> 0:44:29.359
<v Speaker 1>this is then the arms race throughout history, right. Uh,

0:44:29.640 --> 0:44:31.920
<v Speaker 1>if the other side has a large slingshot, I need

0:44:31.960 --> 0:44:34.279
<v Speaker 1>an equally size size sling shot. I need something that

0:44:34.360 --> 0:44:37.640
<v Speaker 1>is a deterrent, otherwise they're just going to take advantage

0:44:37.640 --> 0:44:40.760
<v Speaker 1>of me. Yeah, So what what looks like offensive threatening

0:44:40.800 --> 0:44:45.399
<v Speaker 1>behavior from your perspective. From the other person's perspective is like, look,

0:44:45.440 --> 0:44:48.920
<v Speaker 1>I just got to defend myself. Uh So, usually by

0:44:48.920 --> 0:44:50.920
<v Speaker 1>the time you recognize you've been the victim of a

0:44:50.960 --> 0:44:54.200
<v Speaker 1>cyber attack, a lot of damage is already done. So

0:44:54.280 --> 0:44:57.360
<v Speaker 1>what if in the future we decide we need autonomous,

0:44:57.520 --> 0:45:02.760
<v Speaker 1>adaptive defensive cyber weapons to protect us against offensive cyber weapons,

0:45:02.760 --> 0:45:07.200
<v Speaker 1>something like an immune system for our infrastructure, the equivalent

0:45:07.280 --> 0:45:10.239
<v Speaker 1>of deployed white blood cells, you know, T cells and

0:45:10.280 --> 0:45:13.839
<v Speaker 1>B cells and so forth, to autonomously detect, hunt, and

0:45:13.960 --> 0:45:17.720
<v Speaker 1>kill malicious autonomous cyberweapons the same way that white blood

0:45:17.719 --> 0:45:20.719
<v Speaker 1>cells in your body behave kind of like an adaptive,

0:45:20.840 --> 0:45:24.960
<v Speaker 1>independent organism within the body, hunting and killing autonomously in

0:45:25.000 --> 0:45:27.440
<v Speaker 1>the bloodstream. Well that sounds great, Joe, But now you're

0:45:27.560 --> 0:45:30.080
<v Speaker 1>right back to sky net, Like this sounds exactly like

0:45:30.200 --> 0:45:33.359
<v Speaker 1>sky net, except it is like sky net is just

0:45:33.560 --> 0:45:36.680
<v Speaker 1>is the the clunkier metaphor for what the future may become. Well,

0:45:36.719 --> 0:45:39.480
<v Speaker 1>it's not terminators holding guns, but it is a distributed

0:45:39.600 --> 0:45:42.520
<v Speaker 1>defense network. At this point, you're you're talking about like

0:45:42.560 --> 0:45:46.279
<v Speaker 1>an anti virus virus, right, or the possibility of an

0:45:46.320 --> 0:45:49.799
<v Speaker 1>of an immune system turning against itself, turning against its host,

0:45:49.800 --> 0:45:52.879
<v Speaker 1>which which of course we see in the biological Well absolutely, yeah,

0:45:53.040 --> 0:45:54.960
<v Speaker 1>that's exactly where I was going with that. So you've

0:45:55.000 --> 0:45:57.920
<v Speaker 1>got autoimmune diseases, if you've got an immune system, you

0:45:58.000 --> 0:46:01.040
<v Speaker 1>run the risk of the immune system, in say cases

0:46:01.080 --> 0:46:05.760
<v Speaker 1>like arthritis or type one diabetes or MS, misidentifying friendly

0:46:06.480 --> 0:46:09.360
<v Speaker 1>tissue as something that needs to be defended against and

0:46:09.440 --> 0:46:13.560
<v Speaker 1>attacking its own body, you know, turning, turning parts of

0:46:13.600 --> 0:46:16.799
<v Speaker 1>the body into innocent victims. Except the nature of the

0:46:16.800 --> 0:46:19.719
<v Speaker 1>internet and the connected world means that if one system

0:46:19.840 --> 0:46:24.600
<v Speaker 1>develops the digital equivalent of an autoimmune disease, potentially anybody

0:46:24.640 --> 0:46:27.520
<v Speaker 1>could catch it. I'd also pair this this kind of

0:46:27.560 --> 0:46:31.120
<v Speaker 1>scary scenario with our episode last year about neurosecurity. The

0:46:31.160 --> 0:46:35.680
<v Speaker 1>increasing vulnerabilities were accumulating as you make the connections between

0:46:35.800 --> 0:46:40.160
<v Speaker 1>your digital services and your nervous system more robust. Indeed,

0:46:40.160 --> 0:46:42.520
<v Speaker 1>the idea that you could have your your brain implant

0:46:42.600 --> 0:46:47.359
<v Speaker 1>hacked or your pacemaker device hacked, etcetera. So anyway, just

0:46:47.560 --> 0:46:50.719
<v Speaker 1>entertaining these scenarios and thinking about the risks posed makes

0:46:50.719 --> 0:46:55.440
<v Speaker 1>me think, should we have international cyber warfare non proliferation

0:46:55.520 --> 0:46:58.920
<v Speaker 1>treatise the same way we've got nuclear non proliferation treaties.

0:46:59.120 --> 0:47:01.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean, absolutely, as we've been driving home these these

0:47:01.880 --> 0:47:04.960
<v Speaker 1>are legitimate threats and therefore they you know, we should

0:47:04.960 --> 0:47:08.719
<v Speaker 1>be taking steps to prevent um it from happening. As

0:47:08.760 --> 0:47:11.600
<v Speaker 1>far as what countries could do, countries around the world

0:47:11.640 --> 0:47:15.799
<v Speaker 1>could do to protect themselves, I mean, I wonder is

0:47:15.800 --> 0:47:19.000
<v Speaker 1>there an option other than just trying to revert to

0:47:19.120 --> 0:47:23.440
<v Speaker 1>a world of decreased connectedness, And would societies ever do

0:47:23.520 --> 0:47:26.040
<v Speaker 1>that without being forced to by some kind of tragedy

0:47:26.160 --> 0:47:29.680
<v Speaker 1>where Like decreased connectedness of course would mean fewer rather

0:47:29.760 --> 0:47:32.759
<v Speaker 1>than more systems can be accessed by the Internet. Where

0:47:32.760 --> 0:47:36.400
<v Speaker 1>you might have crucial systems for controlling infrastructure kept offline

0:47:36.520 --> 0:47:39.680
<v Speaker 1>or in isolated networks, they're not plugged into the Internet,

0:47:39.960 --> 0:47:41.880
<v Speaker 1>and so it would be a lot harder to infect

0:47:41.920 --> 0:47:46.000
<v Speaker 1>them with some kind of autonomous digital weapon. Uh though,

0:47:46.000 --> 0:47:48.960
<v Speaker 1>I wonder if that's possible even would it takes some

0:47:49.040 --> 0:47:53.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of visceral disaster that calls to mind images through

0:47:53.560 --> 0:47:56.800
<v Speaker 1>the availability heuristic to make people think this is worth doing.

0:47:57.800 --> 0:47:59.800
<v Speaker 1>And it's a good point because I mean, I've certainly

0:47:59.800 --> 0:48:02.840
<v Speaker 1>read predictions for the sort of digital future, both in

0:48:02.920 --> 0:48:05.520
<v Speaker 1>sci fi and just in general futurism, the idea that

0:48:05.840 --> 0:48:09.880
<v Speaker 1>the Internet will become say more national, more regional, more

0:48:09.920 --> 0:48:15.840
<v Speaker 1>more layered, and indeed and they need less worldwide. Um uh.

0:48:15.880 --> 0:48:18.319
<v Speaker 1>The alternative, of course, is as a continuation of what

0:48:18.360 --> 0:48:21.960
<v Speaker 1>we've already been doing, essentially building what cybersecurity expert Bruce

0:48:22.239 --> 0:48:26.520
<v Speaker 1>Schneier referred to as a as a worldwide computer. We're

0:48:26.520 --> 0:48:30.960
<v Speaker 1>building a worldwide computer, and it's uh, it's susceptible to

0:48:31.000 --> 0:48:34.600
<v Speaker 1>attack at every level, from baby monitors to uh to

0:48:34.800 --> 0:48:37.319
<v Speaker 1>nuclear power plants. I get, you know. I would hope

0:48:37.320 --> 0:48:40.319
<v Speaker 1>that we're that that we that we will grow into

0:48:40.360 --> 0:48:42.920
<v Speaker 1>this globally connected world. It will be like there will

0:48:42.960 --> 0:48:46.799
<v Speaker 1>be the people deserving of such a worldwide computer. But

0:48:46.880 --> 0:48:49.719
<v Speaker 1>if not, then yeah, we deserve the regional model. I

0:48:49.719 --> 0:48:52.799
<v Speaker 1>guess well, I don't like the regional model. I mean,

0:48:52.840 --> 0:48:57.000
<v Speaker 1>I understand that some decrease in connectedness might be necessary

0:48:57.040 --> 0:49:00.880
<v Speaker 1>to prevent attacks, but then again, I like the world

0:49:00.880 --> 0:49:03.640
<v Speaker 1>connected model in terms of communication, I mean, all the

0:49:03.719 --> 0:49:06.759
<v Speaker 1>good stuff about connection between cultures. I don't think I

0:49:06.840 --> 0:49:09.440
<v Speaker 1>buy into the nationalist mindset that says we should only

0:49:09.480 --> 0:49:12.800
<v Speaker 1>be talking and interacting with people within our own national

0:49:13.080 --> 0:49:16.560
<v Speaker 1>national boundaries or our own culture that seems very limiting.

0:49:16.600 --> 0:49:18.239
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's a wonderful thing to be able to

0:49:18.280 --> 0:49:21.680
<v Speaker 1>communicate across borders and with people all around the world.

0:49:21.719 --> 0:49:25.279
<v Speaker 1>That that's something I love about what we get to do, right, Uh,

0:49:25.320 --> 0:49:27.160
<v Speaker 1>And so I don't know that that sounds like a

0:49:27.200 --> 0:49:30.120
<v Speaker 1>horrible thing to do. But then again, I mean I

0:49:30.160 --> 0:49:33.400
<v Speaker 1>wonder if there are ways to to leave open the

0:49:33.440 --> 0:49:38.280
<v Speaker 1>good channels while preventing people from from using digital exchange

0:49:38.320 --> 0:49:40.359
<v Speaker 1>to hurt one another. Well, I mean, part of this

0:49:40.400 --> 0:49:43.080
<v Speaker 1>goes back to our past discussions on just the the

0:49:43.080 --> 0:49:46.000
<v Speaker 1>the the origins of the Internet. Some would argue that

0:49:46.160 --> 0:49:48.799
<v Speaker 1>that that one of the big problems is just uh

0:49:49.000 --> 0:49:51.600
<v Speaker 1>security issues with the Internet itself and the idea that

0:49:51.640 --> 0:49:53.799
<v Speaker 1>you have this thing that was built as a as

0:49:54.000 --> 0:49:58.359
<v Speaker 1>essentially a private network for for developers that has been

0:49:58.560 --> 0:50:01.360
<v Speaker 1>bloated out into this glow system that it was really

0:50:01.400 --> 0:50:04.160
<v Speaker 1>never meant to be. So we we need a new Internet,

0:50:04.200 --> 0:50:10.080
<v Speaker 1>we need a new human race. Uh, just for starters,

0:50:10.120 --> 0:50:13.000
<v Speaker 1>those are two things that would help. Yeah. Well, so

0:50:13.080 --> 0:50:15.440
<v Speaker 1>if there there are any takeaways from this episode, I

0:50:15.480 --> 0:50:19.040
<v Speaker 1>would say I think it's that people should should understand

0:50:19.120 --> 0:50:22.840
<v Speaker 1>the relative severity of different types of autonomous technological weapon

0:50:22.920 --> 0:50:27.280
<v Speaker 1>threats like that that cyber warfare is not just an inconvenience.

0:50:27.320 --> 0:50:29.839
<v Speaker 1>It's not just like, oh darn, the power went out

0:50:29.880 --> 0:50:31.160
<v Speaker 1>for a day, or oh, you know, there was a

0:50:31.239 --> 0:50:33.279
<v Speaker 1>d d O S attack on the website I wanted

0:50:33.320 --> 0:50:35.759
<v Speaker 1>to go to and it went down. These could be

0:50:35.880 --> 0:50:38.960
<v Speaker 1>real serious. This could be the warfare of the future

0:50:38.960 --> 0:50:43.440
<v Speaker 1>and every bit as serious as conventional warfare. And uh

0:50:43.480 --> 0:50:45.920
<v Speaker 1>and so that's worth considering, and it's so it's worth

0:50:46.000 --> 0:50:48.680
<v Speaker 1>promoting people who have good ways of thinking about this.

0:50:48.719 --> 0:50:52.120
<v Speaker 1>If if you know of cybersecurity experts, the kind of

0:50:52.120 --> 0:50:54.399
<v Speaker 1>people who are doing the best thought about this, coming

0:50:54.440 --> 0:50:57.879
<v Speaker 1>up with ways of thinking about defenses, especially as we've

0:50:57.880 --> 0:51:00.440
<v Speaker 1>talked about the kinds of defenses that don't lead to

0:51:00.560 --> 0:51:04.560
<v Speaker 1>a you know, a shutdown of international communication and and

0:51:04.640 --> 0:51:07.719
<v Speaker 1>this worse soft world. Shine a light on those people.

0:51:07.800 --> 0:51:10.560
<v Speaker 1>I want to know what our best options are. Who's

0:51:10.600 --> 0:51:12.759
<v Speaker 1>doing the best thinking about this right now? Yeah, let

0:51:12.840 --> 0:51:14.719
<v Speaker 1>us know. We'll do our part to shine our light

0:51:15.040 --> 0:51:17.000
<v Speaker 1>on those people as well. All right, So there you

0:51:17.040 --> 0:51:19.839
<v Speaker 1>have it. Um as always stuff to blow your mind.

0:51:19.880 --> 0:51:21.959
<v Speaker 1>Dot com that is the mothership, that's where you'll find

0:51:22.120 --> 0:51:25.879
<v Speaker 1>this and other episodes of note, we've had a number

0:51:25.920 --> 0:51:28.960
<v Speaker 1>of them that have dealt with technology and warfare uh

0:51:28.960 --> 0:51:31.759
<v Speaker 1>and likewise, UH. There are a number of issues in

0:51:31.800 --> 0:51:34.680
<v Speaker 1>this episode that we could easily return to, such as

0:51:34.719 --> 0:51:39.520
<v Speaker 1>cyber warfare even the more traditional autonomous weapon designs that

0:51:40.080 --> 0:51:42.319
<v Speaker 1>we could do multiple episodes on that as well. So

0:51:42.640 --> 0:51:44.880
<v Speaker 1>as we said, I think one thing definitely worth exploring

0:51:44.880 --> 0:51:47.799
<v Speaker 1>would be the more specific nitty gritty of the scenarios

0:51:47.840 --> 0:51:50.960
<v Speaker 1>imagined by cyber cyber warfare experts, like what's the most

0:51:50.960 --> 0:51:55.480
<v Speaker 1>plausible thing that could happen and how could it be prevented? Um?

0:51:55.600 --> 0:51:57.560
<v Speaker 1>So hey, yeah, check it out Stuff to blow your

0:51:57.560 --> 0:51:59.719
<v Speaker 1>mind dot com UH, and you'll find links to our

0:51:59.760 --> 0:52:02.000
<v Speaker 1>various social media accounts there as well. And if you

0:52:02.040 --> 0:52:05.440
<v Speaker 1>want to support the show, rate and review us wherever

0:52:05.560 --> 0:52:08.200
<v Speaker 1>you have the ability to do so. Big thanks as

0:52:08.239 --> 0:52:11.800
<v Speaker 1>always to our wonderful audio producers Alex Williams and Torry Harrison.

0:52:12.080 --> 0:52:13.680
<v Speaker 1>If you would like to get in touch with us

0:52:13.680 --> 0:52:16.319
<v Speaker 1>with feedback about this episode or any other to let

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<v Speaker 1>to just send us your your thoughts to say hi,

0:52:22.160 --> 0:52:23.799
<v Speaker 1>let us know where you listen, from, how you found

0:52:23.800 --> 0:52:25.920
<v Speaker 1>out about the show. Any of that, You can always

0:52:25.960 --> 0:52:28.720
<v Speaker 1>email us at Blow the Mind and how stuff Works

0:52:28.880 --> 0:52:40.480
<v Speaker 1>dot com for more on this and thousands of other topics.

0:52:40.760 --> 0:53:00.759
<v Speaker 1>Is it how stuff works dot com. B b P

0:53:01.120 --> 0:53:02.880
<v Speaker 1>has a found back about a protect