1 00:00:02,240 --> 00:00:06,800 Speaker 1: This is Master's in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:09,560 --> 00:00:12,160 Speaker 1: This week on the podcast, I have a special guest. 3 00:00:12,520 --> 00:00:16,160 Speaker 1: His name is Jeremy Schwartz. He essentially runs the research 4 00:00:16,239 --> 00:00:20,200 Speaker 1: division at Wisdom Tree Investments. I was kind of surprised 5 00:00:20,239 --> 00:00:24,040 Speaker 1: to learn his nickname is Junior Jeremy. He has been 6 00:00:24,040 --> 00:00:29,320 Speaker 1: working with Professor Jeremy Siegel at Wharton for almost twenty years. 7 00:00:29,920 --> 00:00:34,920 Speaker 1: Uh and he is a really knowledgeable and up to 8 00:00:35,120 --> 00:00:40,360 Speaker 1: his elbows in all of the specifics of creating ETFs 9 00:00:41,680 --> 00:00:47,120 Speaker 1: focusing on valuation, dividends, earnings. They have carved out a 10 00:00:47,360 --> 00:00:51,280 Speaker 1: niche in the world of investing in ETFs um that 11 00:00:51,440 --> 00:00:53,840 Speaker 1: kind of bypassed the question I was gonna ask, Hey, 12 00:00:53,840 --> 00:00:57,680 Speaker 1: what makes you guys different from filling the blank, Black Rock, Vanguard, 13 00:00:57,680 --> 00:01:02,120 Speaker 1: Dimensional funds, whatever. But Jeremy does a great job explaining 14 00:01:02,440 --> 00:01:05,320 Speaker 1: what they do, what it's like to work in a 15 00:01:05,440 --> 00:01:09,679 Speaker 1: fund where you have legends of finance like Michael Steinhardt 16 00:01:09,800 --> 00:01:12,480 Speaker 1: as chairman and Jeremy Siegel as as one of the 17 00:01:12,520 --> 00:01:17,720 Speaker 1: chief advisers, and Jonathan uh Stein putting this together. Really 18 00:01:17,760 --> 00:01:21,360 Speaker 1: a fascinating conversation for anybody who is at all interested 19 00:01:21,520 --> 00:01:27,200 Speaker 1: in indexing factor based investing valuation e t f S. 20 00:01:27,560 --> 00:01:29,840 Speaker 1: I think you're gonna find this to be an absolutely 21 00:01:30,680 --> 00:01:35,360 Speaker 1: fascinating conversation. It's something I've been trying to do for 22 00:01:35,400 --> 00:01:38,000 Speaker 1: a long time. We we Jeremy and I just keep 23 00:01:38,520 --> 00:01:40,720 Speaker 1: ships in the night. Our schedules just didn't work out, 24 00:01:40,760 --> 00:01:43,200 Speaker 1: and I'm glad I finally got him into the studio 25 00:01:43,600 --> 00:01:52,640 Speaker 1: with no further ado. My conversation with Jeremy Schwartz. My 26 00:01:52,720 --> 00:01:56,960 Speaker 1: special guest today is Jeremy Schwartz. He is the Director 27 00:01:57,120 --> 00:02:00,320 Speaker 1: of Research at Wisdom Tree Investments, where he has been 28 00:02:00,400 --> 00:02:04,280 Speaker 1: asconce since two thousand and five, having risen through the 29 00:02:04,360 --> 00:02:09,040 Speaker 1: ranks from senior analyst to deputy director to essentially head 30 00:02:09,080 --> 00:02:12,280 Speaker 1: of research at the firm. He is responsible for the 31 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:17,320 Speaker 1: construction process and oversees all of research across the wisdom 32 00:02:17,360 --> 00:02:22,399 Speaker 1: Tree equity family. Jeremy Schwartz, Welcome to Bloomberg Berry. Thanks 33 00:02:22,440 --> 00:02:25,800 Speaker 1: for having me. Let's begin with the fun stuff. You 34 00:02:25,919 --> 00:02:29,680 Speaker 1: were um an early higher at wisdom Tree. You started 35 00:02:29,680 --> 00:02:32,160 Speaker 1: in oh five, is that right? That's right, and you 36 00:02:32,320 --> 00:02:37,480 Speaker 1: had around two thousand and eight, recently received a promotion 37 00:02:38,240 --> 00:02:42,680 Speaker 1: right into the midst of the financial collapse. What was 38 00:02:42,840 --> 00:02:45,959 Speaker 1: that collapse like while you were working at wisdom Tree 39 00:02:46,000 --> 00:02:49,040 Speaker 1: and since also a startup asset management firm going into 40 00:02:49,080 --> 00:02:53,519 Speaker 1: the biggest financial crisis. It's the Great Depression, pastic time 41 00:02:53,639 --> 00:02:56,320 Speaker 1: and you have value oing to investment philosophies, dividend based 42 00:02:56,320 --> 00:03:00,480 Speaker 1: investment strategies. Financials were big parts that dividend paying universe, right, 43 00:03:00,480 --> 00:03:03,280 Speaker 1: So it was a tough environment. Also, you know, wisdom 44 00:03:03,280 --> 00:03:06,000 Speaker 1: Tree was really trying to establish yourself as a pioneer 45 00:03:06,000 --> 00:03:08,040 Speaker 1: in e t s. It was early days in ets 46 00:03:08,120 --> 00:03:10,919 Speaker 1: when we started, oh six, there was three t s 47 00:03:11,040 --> 00:03:13,440 Speaker 1: maybe three billion under management, so we were trying to 48 00:03:13,560 --> 00:03:16,639 Speaker 1: novel indexing approach and so we were built not for 49 00:03:16,840 --> 00:03:20,080 Speaker 1: small success. We really had bigger ambitions in mind. So 50 00:03:20,120 --> 00:03:23,040 Speaker 1: we had high break events um and really trying to 51 00:03:23,040 --> 00:03:25,200 Speaker 1: have a big team to to put us on the map. 52 00:03:25,240 --> 00:03:28,120 Speaker 1: So it was certainly a challenging moment going through the 53 00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:31,639 Speaker 1: financial crisis UM. But we bottomed around three billions of 54 00:03:31,680 --> 00:03:33,840 Speaker 1: assets in two thousand nine, a little bit below three billion. 55 00:03:34,080 --> 00:03:37,560 Speaker 1: Today were forty five billions. We've seen mammoth growth over 56 00:03:37,680 --> 00:03:39,760 Speaker 1: last ten years. But yeah, it was very trying times 57 00:03:39,760 --> 00:03:41,880 Speaker 1: and you didn't know could you survive, could you get 58 00:03:41,880 --> 00:03:46,160 Speaker 1: past that crisis point. Everybody has a story about what 59 00:03:46,200 --> 00:03:48,600 Speaker 1: was going on in their shop in the midst of 60 00:03:48,640 --> 00:03:52,800 Speaker 1: the crisis, from from Vanguard to Morgan Stanley to Dave 61 00:03:52,920 --> 00:03:55,560 Speaker 1: Rosenberg tells the story of his first day at work 62 00:03:55,840 --> 00:03:57,680 Speaker 1: in the private sector was the day of the eighty 63 00:03:57,720 --> 00:04:00,880 Speaker 1: seven crash. Tell us what was going on behind the 64 00:04:00,880 --> 00:04:04,240 Speaker 1: scenes at Wisdom Tree when it felt like the world 65 00:04:04,280 --> 00:04:06,400 Speaker 1: was coming to an end. I mean, what's amazing is 66 00:04:06,440 --> 00:04:09,600 Speaker 1: I was on vacation in the first week of October. 67 00:04:09,680 --> 00:04:11,600 Speaker 1: We had a family vacation plan. We were on a 68 00:04:11,680 --> 00:04:14,280 Speaker 1: cruise in two thousand and eight, October two thousand and eight, 69 00:04:14,720 --> 00:04:18,320 Speaker 1: leaving from Asia and Asia cruise. You know, we're in 70 00:04:18,440 --> 00:04:21,279 Speaker 1: starting in Japan, going to Hong Kong, China, and I 71 00:04:21,600 --> 00:04:24,240 Speaker 1: looking at the screens on TVA, Am I gonna have 72 00:04:24,279 --> 00:04:25,560 Speaker 1: a job when I get back? I mean, it was 73 00:04:25,600 --> 00:04:28,600 Speaker 1: really unbelievable. You see the market falling ten percent um 74 00:04:28,640 --> 00:04:30,640 Speaker 1: and I didn't know, you know, where we were just 75 00:04:30,680 --> 00:04:32,880 Speaker 1: as a firm wise, like how close we were to 76 00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:35,440 Speaker 1: just not surviving during the depths of the crisis, Like 77 00:04:35,480 --> 00:04:37,360 Speaker 1: we were weeks away from not being able to make payroll? 78 00:04:37,560 --> 00:04:39,760 Speaker 1: Is that true? You were actually that close in March 79 00:04:39,800 --> 00:04:42,679 Speaker 1: of O nine. Yeah, I mean we were definitely bleeding losses. 80 00:04:43,040 --> 00:04:45,320 Speaker 1: We definitely had you know, a capital raising in March 81 00:04:45,360 --> 00:04:48,240 Speaker 1: of O nine. Um, and that put us on. The 82 00:04:48,240 --> 00:04:50,039 Speaker 1: markets turned around and we were sort of off to 83 00:04:50,040 --> 00:04:52,040 Speaker 1: the races after that. But yeah, we were we were 84 00:04:52,080 --> 00:04:54,159 Speaker 1: close in March of O nine. Did you guys have 85 00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:57,120 Speaker 1: a white night? Or was it the existing funders and 86 00:04:57,200 --> 00:05:00,200 Speaker 1: founders basically reached a little deeper into their pocket. It's 87 00:05:00,200 --> 00:05:02,920 Speaker 1: a combination. Um. So A I G came in during 88 00:05:02,960 --> 00:05:05,760 Speaker 1: two thousand nine. Uh, and there was a you know, 89 00:05:05,800 --> 00:05:08,560 Speaker 1: that's hilarious, isn't it. A I G said it's a 90 00:05:08,600 --> 00:05:10,839 Speaker 1: Wisdom Tree. Hey, let us help you out. You guys 91 00:05:10,880 --> 00:05:12,839 Speaker 1: look like you can need a little assistance. They were 92 00:05:12,880 --> 00:05:15,800 Speaker 1: investing in the investment management side. They saw the growth 93 00:05:15,800 --> 00:05:18,320 Speaker 1: potential of ETS as part of ASID management and they 94 00:05:18,320 --> 00:05:22,000 Speaker 1: did make an investment that that's that's fascinating and the 95 00:05:22,040 --> 00:05:25,400 Speaker 1: structure currently of Wisdom Trade, it's been a publicly traded company. 96 00:05:25,440 --> 00:05:29,640 Speaker 1: And one of the background is we had Jonathan Steinberger CEO, 97 00:05:29,720 --> 00:05:32,800 Speaker 1: had a media company in nineties and two thousand's and 98 00:05:32,920 --> 00:05:35,920 Speaker 1: he saw INDEXI and ETS when he was doing publishing. 99 00:05:36,000 --> 00:05:40,640 Speaker 1: Was called Individual Investor Group, and so he was. He 100 00:05:40,640 --> 00:05:42,919 Speaker 1: saw McGraw hill, he saw indexes, he saw ETS and 101 00:05:42,920 --> 00:05:45,280 Speaker 1: he's trying to create his own indexes, license him to 102 00:05:45,320 --> 00:05:49,120 Speaker 1: become ETS. Well. During the tech bubble, he sold the magazine, 103 00:05:49,400 --> 00:05:52,280 Speaker 1: kept the indexes and was trying to relaunch the firm 104 00:05:52,720 --> 00:05:54,559 Speaker 1: UM and it was really he had this shell company 105 00:05:54,600 --> 00:05:57,960 Speaker 1: is really literally a penny stock trading and then he 106 00:05:58,160 --> 00:06:00,280 Speaker 1: re raised capital and No. Four to real waunch the 107 00:06:00,320 --> 00:06:04,640 Speaker 1: business UM with Michael Steinhardt, Professor Siegell, Jim Robinson from 108 00:06:04,680 --> 00:06:08,800 Speaker 1: American Express funding the business and OH four and relaunching UM. 109 00:06:08,839 --> 00:06:11,360 Speaker 1: But that was that was the history back back then. 110 00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:15,440 Speaker 1: So it's always been publicly traded because of Johano's previous 111 00:06:15,800 --> 00:06:19,480 Speaker 1: magazine days. So that's some trinity behind behind the company. 112 00:06:19,520 --> 00:06:21,640 Speaker 1: That's quite a list of heavy hitters. Yeah, I mean, 113 00:06:21,640 --> 00:06:24,320 Speaker 1: you think going from trading at a few pennies right 114 00:06:24,360 --> 00:06:28,480 Speaker 1: before the funding, Michael funded it in oh for at 115 00:06:28,560 --> 00:06:32,680 Speaker 1: sixteen cents and the day they announced, just these these 116 00:06:32,720 --> 00:06:35,560 Speaker 1: people coming together, I think it closed at a dollar 117 00:06:35,680 --> 00:06:38,480 Speaker 1: dollar dollar fifty something like that. That Steinhardt guy is 118 00:06:38,520 --> 00:06:40,280 Speaker 1: an up and comic. Keep an eye on, Keep an 119 00:06:40,279 --> 00:06:42,560 Speaker 1: eye on him. The other thing that I find kind 120 00:06:42,560 --> 00:06:44,880 Speaker 1: of fascinating, And I think I kind of knew this 121 00:06:44,920 --> 00:06:48,240 Speaker 1: about you, but forgot about it. You were Jeremy Siegell's 122 00:06:48,279 --> 00:06:53,000 Speaker 1: assistant at Wharton. You helped him edit subsequent editions of 123 00:06:53,040 --> 00:06:56,040 Speaker 1: Stops for the Long Run. You practically co authored a 124 00:06:56,080 --> 00:06:59,239 Speaker 1: book with him. What on earth was it like being 125 00:07:00,320 --> 00:07:03,160 Speaker 1: next to Jeremy Seagal during all the unbelievable um? And 126 00:07:03,200 --> 00:07:04,719 Speaker 1: he was he was a fountain hose of knowledge. I 127 00:07:04,720 --> 00:07:06,400 Speaker 1: was just trying to soak it all in. Um. I mean, 128 00:07:06,400 --> 00:07:08,800 Speaker 1: I got so lucky of when I got to Warrant. 129 00:07:08,880 --> 00:07:12,880 Speaker 1: It was so the bubble um. That's when I first 130 00:07:12,880 --> 00:07:15,920 Speaker 1: got to warr And I've done internships at Prudential, you know, 131 00:07:16,120 --> 00:07:18,280 Speaker 1: sort of caught up in the tech craze. You know, 132 00:07:18,320 --> 00:07:20,160 Speaker 1: he wrote our Internet socks that were valued in April, 133 00:07:21,120 --> 00:07:23,400 Speaker 1: then big cap tech socks or suckers bet in March 134 00:07:23,440 --> 00:07:25,400 Speaker 1: of two thousand. I meet him right after that article 135 00:07:25,480 --> 00:07:29,560 Speaker 1: comes out. He's, you know, reevaluating his own portfolio from 136 00:07:29,600 --> 00:07:32,840 Speaker 1: being just vanguardists and fire from the nineteen seventies and 137 00:07:32,880 --> 00:07:35,840 Speaker 1: all of his researches around. Okay, I'm telling people to 138 00:07:35,880 --> 00:07:38,920 Speaker 1: sell tech stocks, yet my own portfolios vanguardist be five hundred. 139 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:41,760 Speaker 1: What should I be doing? And so I helped him 140 00:07:41,800 --> 00:07:43,440 Speaker 1: do a lot of that research. I met him in 141 00:07:43,480 --> 00:07:45,080 Speaker 1: two thousand one. I took well, I met him through 142 00:07:45,080 --> 00:07:47,680 Speaker 1: a bunch of programs. I took his class in oh one. 143 00:07:48,240 --> 00:07:50,920 Speaker 1: I needed something to do for a few months before 144 00:07:50,920 --> 00:07:53,240 Speaker 1: I supposed to go to Australia from a semester abroad, 145 00:07:53,680 --> 00:07:56,800 Speaker 1: ended up working for him. Never went to Australia. Took 146 00:07:56,840 --> 00:07:58,760 Speaker 1: off like two years of school to work for him 147 00:07:58,800 --> 00:08:01,520 Speaker 1: full time on his books. You know, obviously set my 148 00:08:01,640 --> 00:08:04,040 Speaker 1: future path. I just dedicated really my life after that 149 00:08:04,080 --> 00:08:06,440 Speaker 1: towards working with him, and I sort of knew it 150 00:08:06,480 --> 00:08:08,120 Speaker 1: could be more than books. One day, because I sat 151 00:08:08,160 --> 00:08:10,560 Speaker 1: in his office, I heard every conversation he had, and 152 00:08:10,600 --> 00:08:12,600 Speaker 1: I knew what people wanted to do with him, and 153 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:15,040 Speaker 1: he just you know, he was very much in low 154 00:08:15,120 --> 00:08:17,800 Speaker 1: fee I Vanguard, I buy the market, but he really 155 00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:19,800 Speaker 1: was struggling with what is the best way to index? 156 00:08:20,320 --> 00:08:22,480 Speaker 1: And so I saw there could be a potential to 157 00:08:22,480 --> 00:08:24,840 Speaker 1: do more with him. Um and wisdom Tree came along 158 00:08:24,880 --> 00:08:28,240 Speaker 1: with the perfect fit. But it was you know, he 159 00:08:28,320 --> 00:08:31,040 Speaker 1: wasn't just unbelievable mentor and teacher and still is something 160 00:08:31,080 --> 00:08:33,840 Speaker 1: I still interact with him all the time today. How 161 00:08:33,880 --> 00:08:37,560 Speaker 1: has the company changed over the past decade since the 162 00:08:37,559 --> 00:08:40,600 Speaker 1: financial crisis? You know, when we started out that the 163 00:08:40,800 --> 00:08:43,400 Speaker 1: idea was very simple, is everything's market cap weighted. You 164 00:08:43,480 --> 00:08:47,120 Speaker 1: need some relative discipline to rebounce back to value, help 165 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:49,440 Speaker 1: try to protect investors from bubbles and things get it 166 00:08:49,480 --> 00:08:53,360 Speaker 1: really expensive. So the original conception was these value based 167 00:08:53,520 --> 00:08:58,880 Speaker 1: rebalancing dividend earnings waited type portfolios and in other words, 168 00:08:59,040 --> 00:09:02,640 Speaker 1: moving away from the heavy market cap waiting towards something 169 00:09:03,280 --> 00:09:06,600 Speaker 1: with a different flavor. Yes, the idea was to be simple, 170 00:09:06,840 --> 00:09:10,760 Speaker 1: rules based, transparent but managed valuation risk for the market. 171 00:09:11,000 --> 00:09:13,800 Speaker 1: And that was the original conception, and that just applied 172 00:09:13,800 --> 00:09:16,240 Speaker 1: in every region around the world, and we blanketed the 173 00:09:16,240 --> 00:09:21,040 Speaker 1: world with equities for that. UM. We've certainly branched out 174 00:09:21,240 --> 00:09:24,280 Speaker 1: and continue to develop products UM currency hedging became a 175 00:09:24,400 --> 00:09:27,160 Speaker 1: very major focus of the firm. UM that's one things 176 00:09:27,200 --> 00:09:29,400 Speaker 1: that's really taken off. It's one thing that I'm very 177 00:09:29,400 --> 00:09:31,720 Speaker 1: passionate about, where I think we have some really unique 178 00:09:31,720 --> 00:09:34,960 Speaker 1: ideas that are different than the way people traditionally allocated 179 00:09:35,000 --> 00:09:39,160 Speaker 1: or nationally and let's talk about that because d x 180 00:09:39,240 --> 00:09:43,440 Speaker 1: J was essentially your baby. That's the wisdom Tree Japan 181 00:09:44,160 --> 00:09:48,520 Speaker 1: Yen currency, hedged e t F and full disclosure. I 182 00:09:48,640 --> 00:09:51,160 Speaker 1: own it, clients of my firm own it when we 183 00:09:51,200 --> 00:09:56,520 Speaker 1: want a Japan exposure, and recognized that uh Abonomics and 184 00:09:56,600 --> 00:09:59,640 Speaker 1: their version of QWI was gonna really put a little 185 00:09:59,679 --> 00:10:02,520 Speaker 1: pain on the end as the dollar was getting stronger. 186 00:10:02,760 --> 00:10:05,840 Speaker 1: It was the perfect product. Thank you well, we appreciate 187 00:10:05,880 --> 00:10:09,160 Speaker 1: your support, UH And I think, listen, I think currency 188 00:10:09,280 --> 00:10:12,080 Speaker 1: is one of these very misunderstood phenomenas, and I you know, 189 00:10:12,160 --> 00:10:15,440 Speaker 1: I think so it's great to see Japan take off. 190 00:10:15,440 --> 00:10:17,559 Speaker 1: It was the first currency GT have to really illustrate 191 00:10:17,720 --> 00:10:20,720 Speaker 1: how currencies and stocks can work together. That often a 192 00:10:20,760 --> 00:10:23,120 Speaker 1: declining currency can be very good for the stocks in 193 00:10:23,120 --> 00:10:26,600 Speaker 1: that market and they move in such big directions. I mean. So, 194 00:10:26,600 --> 00:10:28,600 Speaker 1: so let me interrupt you there because there's a really 195 00:10:28,640 --> 00:10:32,240 Speaker 1: interesting story about d x J. It's been trading for 196 00:10:32,320 --> 00:10:34,840 Speaker 1: how long now. It was one of our original et 197 00:10:35,040 --> 00:10:37,320 Speaker 1: s and O six now it was unhedged when we 198 00:10:37,400 --> 00:10:40,320 Speaker 1: launched it. It was given way to Japan and it 199 00:10:40,400 --> 00:10:42,640 Speaker 1: was going it was doing better than the MSCI capway 200 00:10:42,640 --> 00:10:45,800 Speaker 1: of Japan by points a year, but it was you know, 201 00:10:46,080 --> 00:10:48,640 Speaker 1: nobody cared enough. And as we were looking at it, 202 00:10:48,679 --> 00:10:51,360 Speaker 1: and we're saying, and at the time, the end was 203 00:10:51,400 --> 00:10:54,000 Speaker 1: super strong and the stocks were super weak. Dollar was weak, 204 00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:56,320 Speaker 1: The end was strong, and things were about to reverse, 205 00:10:56,480 --> 00:10:58,400 Speaker 1: and we kept saying, this may not go on forever, 206 00:10:58,440 --> 00:11:00,920 Speaker 1: this might turn around. And you could say, everybody else 207 00:11:01,040 --> 00:11:03,360 Speaker 1: has these two bets. They have the stock bet and 208 00:11:03,440 --> 00:11:06,120 Speaker 1: the currency additional risk, and the currency moving ten to 209 00:11:06,160 --> 00:11:08,960 Speaker 1: fifteen percent a year. So while our our our value 210 00:11:09,000 --> 00:11:10,400 Speaker 1: added on the stocks that might have been a hundred 211 00:11:10,400 --> 00:11:13,000 Speaker 1: basis points, if the currency goes against you ten percentage 212 00:11:13,000 --> 00:11:15,480 Speaker 1: points a year, good luck, right, So we said, just 213 00:11:15,640 --> 00:11:18,000 Speaker 1: he'ld be so different by just focusing on the stock 214 00:11:18,160 --> 00:11:20,360 Speaker 1: alone and not take this second So when did the 215 00:11:20,400 --> 00:11:25,439 Speaker 1: currency hedge enter that particular holding? Ap All? Right, now, 216 00:11:25,480 --> 00:11:30,680 Speaker 1: I remember I haven't seen that holding, and your a 217 00:11:30,800 --> 00:11:33,640 Speaker 1: u M was fairly low, the inflows were fairly low. 218 00:11:34,200 --> 00:11:38,800 Speaker 1: It was doing okay, and then suddenly, you know, suddenly 219 00:11:38,880 --> 00:11:41,680 Speaker 1: it was like a fuse was lit and off to 220 00:11:41,720 --> 00:11:44,480 Speaker 1: the races. How did that come about? And what was 221 00:11:44,520 --> 00:11:47,719 Speaker 1: it like watching these giant inflows on a product you 222 00:11:47,880 --> 00:11:50,040 Speaker 1: essentially created? So we were the first firm to do 223 00:11:50,080 --> 00:11:52,280 Speaker 1: currency hedging in e t F FORMA. It's not a 224 00:11:52,320 --> 00:11:54,440 Speaker 1: new concept. People have been doing charging and they've been 225 00:11:54,440 --> 00:11:56,200 Speaker 1: teaching on the c f A text books for years, 226 00:11:56,400 --> 00:11:57,920 Speaker 1: but we're the first one to do it in ETS. 227 00:11:58,000 --> 00:12:00,400 Speaker 1: We've done our first one on a broader national basis 228 00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:02,360 Speaker 1: a few months before d x J, which was what 229 00:12:02,520 --> 00:12:04,720 Speaker 1: was the which is now h E d J, which 230 00:12:04,800 --> 00:12:07,800 Speaker 1: was we start off with just broad EFA hedging. And 231 00:12:07,880 --> 00:12:11,800 Speaker 1: what's interesting is we then made the second for listeners 232 00:12:11,800 --> 00:12:15,160 Speaker 1: who are IFA is your is your core international index 233 00:12:15,200 --> 00:12:18,199 Speaker 1: that people follow? It's all the twenty one developed markets 234 00:12:18,280 --> 00:12:23,600 Speaker 1: of the x US without the emerging markets Europe, Australasia, Asia, 235 00:12:23,679 --> 00:12:27,679 Speaker 1: so Hong Kong, Australia, it's it's Europe, Australia, Far East. 236 00:12:27,760 --> 00:12:31,160 Speaker 1: Is that essentially the shorthand? Yes? And so now how 237 00:12:31,160 --> 00:12:33,920 Speaker 1: do you do a currency hedge on a broad region 238 00:12:34,000 --> 00:12:37,240 Speaker 1: that has a dozen different currencies. It's really the same 239 00:12:37,240 --> 00:12:39,720 Speaker 1: way as d x J, just with multiple currencies, as 240 00:12:39,760 --> 00:12:42,560 Speaker 1: you have the underlying stock exposures, and then you add 241 00:12:42,600 --> 00:12:45,560 Speaker 1: a currency forward on top that's designed to neutralize and 242 00:12:45,600 --> 00:12:48,240 Speaker 1: get you back to just the underlying stock exposure. So 243 00:12:48,280 --> 00:12:51,240 Speaker 1: you're rolling these currency forwards on a monthly basis. But 244 00:12:51,240 --> 00:12:54,200 Speaker 1: it's pretty plain vanilla, simple um. Which is the ironic 245 00:12:54,200 --> 00:12:58,160 Speaker 1: thing is people think of hedging as the more exotic play, 246 00:12:58,200 --> 00:13:02,319 Speaker 1: and I say, it's actually more plane vanilla. So it's expensive. 247 00:13:02,800 --> 00:13:06,360 Speaker 1: You're dealing with a lot of different it's complicated, and 248 00:13:06,360 --> 00:13:08,600 Speaker 1: make the counter argument, so it's really not expensive. So 249 00:13:08,640 --> 00:13:11,160 Speaker 1: it's expensive in Brazil. Brazil costs you ten percent a 250 00:13:11,240 --> 00:13:14,720 Speaker 1: year in Ifa, you're being paid to hedge is actually 251 00:13:14,760 --> 00:13:17,120 Speaker 1: a better than free proposition, and it's been better than 252 00:13:17,120 --> 00:13:19,720 Speaker 1: free probably for the last thirty years. So the idea 253 00:13:19,760 --> 00:13:21,320 Speaker 1: that it's expensive is one of these myths that I 254 00:13:21,400 --> 00:13:23,960 Speaker 1: keep trying to come back on. And I actually feel 255 00:13:24,000 --> 00:13:26,840 Speaker 1: like we have this branding problem in hedging, which is 256 00:13:26,920 --> 00:13:29,080 Speaker 1: you can't go back and change history. But if I 257 00:13:29,080 --> 00:13:31,920 Speaker 1: if you call your international stock fund, your international double 258 00:13:32,000 --> 00:13:35,760 Speaker 1: decker fund, which is your international stock plus currency fund, 259 00:13:37,080 --> 00:13:40,000 Speaker 1: who would buy that? I don't know. They wouldn't. They 260 00:13:40,000 --> 00:13:41,480 Speaker 1: would say, I just want the stocks. I don't want 261 00:13:41,480 --> 00:13:45,000 Speaker 1: a double decker fund. And the problem is people think 262 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:47,000 Speaker 1: of the hedge is a double decker. No, the hedges 263 00:13:47,040 --> 00:13:50,640 Speaker 1: plane vanilla stock exposure, not stock plust current. So let 264 00:13:50,640 --> 00:13:54,040 Speaker 1: me push back a little bit on the European hedge fund. 265 00:13:54,080 --> 00:13:58,480 Speaker 1: You have a eurohedged e t f UM, but not 266 00:13:58,679 --> 00:14:02,960 Speaker 1: every country in Europe is on the euro so you're 267 00:14:02,960 --> 00:14:05,720 Speaker 1: ex Switzerland, your excellent, a lot of the Nordic countries, 268 00:14:05,720 --> 00:14:10,640 Speaker 1: your Xenland. How European is the European fund. So HD 269 00:14:10,760 --> 00:14:13,599 Speaker 1: d J, which we start off as our broad EF proxy. 270 00:14:13,720 --> 00:14:16,160 Speaker 1: We saw the success in d x J. The japan 271 00:14:16,480 --> 00:14:19,640 Speaker 1: in you know, went from a hundred million. The earthquake 272 00:14:19,680 --> 00:14:22,560 Speaker 1: happened and people really started training it after literally the 273 00:14:22,560 --> 00:14:25,760 Speaker 1: earthquake to tsunami, everything that took place there that whacked 274 00:14:25,760 --> 00:14:28,400 Speaker 1: the end and suddenly you had some well the end 275 00:14:28,440 --> 00:14:31,160 Speaker 1: went up a lot, but people were starting to say 276 00:14:31,360 --> 00:14:33,920 Speaker 1: it might not continue. And that's when it really started. 277 00:14:34,040 --> 00:14:38,280 Speaker 1: That was trading five years six years ago, and so 278 00:14:38,360 --> 00:14:41,280 Speaker 1: that's when I started training and started seeing some interest UM. 279 00:14:41,320 --> 00:14:42,840 Speaker 1: And that's when we had the idea to make the 280 00:14:42,880 --> 00:14:45,080 Speaker 1: broad h E d J, which was at the start 281 00:14:45,080 --> 00:14:47,280 Speaker 1: just the whole international basket. We focused it on the 282 00:14:47,320 --> 00:14:50,480 Speaker 1: single currency, the Euro because we saw, hey, people can 283 00:14:50,520 --> 00:14:52,920 Speaker 1: grasp the idea that a single currency the end. They 284 00:14:52,920 --> 00:14:56,000 Speaker 1: started training d x J. We made the hedge h 285 00:14:56,040 --> 00:14:58,560 Speaker 1: e d J just the euro Zone only, so it 286 00:14:58,720 --> 00:15:02,080 Speaker 1: is just zero specific um. Euro is the biggest currency 287 00:15:02,120 --> 00:15:04,840 Speaker 1: in the IFA international complex. It's a third called a 288 00:15:04,920 --> 00:15:07,880 Speaker 1: third of IFA's Euro traded stocks. So we did focus 289 00:15:07,920 --> 00:15:09,680 Speaker 1: on the single currency so we can make it easier 290 00:15:09,720 --> 00:15:14,960 Speaker 1: for people to make that decision. One currency Germany, France, Spain, 291 00:15:15,480 --> 00:15:17,960 Speaker 1: all those Euro only countries. So yes, each e J 292 00:15:18,160 --> 00:15:20,280 Speaker 1: is Euro only, but you could you could have a 293 00:15:20,320 --> 00:15:22,600 Speaker 1: broader Europe fund that you hedge the euro the pound. 294 00:15:22,640 --> 00:15:24,840 Speaker 1: This was frank the Norway. You could do that too. 295 00:15:25,240 --> 00:15:29,000 Speaker 1: We've focused on Euro only. That that's what I I 296 00:15:29,040 --> 00:15:31,960 Speaker 1: think d x J is unique because you have one 297 00:15:32,040 --> 00:15:37,240 Speaker 1: country with one currency, with a fairly uniform population and 298 00:15:37,280 --> 00:15:40,400 Speaker 1: a behavior set that is very very similar. I'm not 299 00:15:40,400 --> 00:15:44,760 Speaker 1: saying everybody acts and things alike in Japan, but it 300 00:15:44,920 --> 00:15:48,320 Speaker 1: is unique in that there is no other sizeable country 301 00:15:48,320 --> 00:15:51,240 Speaker 1: other than the United States that that has that same 302 00:15:51,280 --> 00:15:54,040 Speaker 1: sort of Japan is also unique in the currency market 303 00:15:54,080 --> 00:15:56,200 Speaker 1: where you actually need a week end for the stocks 304 00:15:56,200 --> 00:16:00,480 Speaker 1: to do well. So it is correlated, right, There is 305 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:05,200 Speaker 1: a real economic linkage between the currency and the stocks, 306 00:16:05,200 --> 00:16:07,280 Speaker 1: and you do see profits the last five years as 307 00:16:07,280 --> 00:16:10,000 Speaker 1: the currency is weaken profits have soared, so there is 308 00:16:10,040 --> 00:16:13,440 Speaker 1: a real direct economic benefit. But even for small cab 309 00:16:13,480 --> 00:16:16,280 Speaker 1: companies which are more local to Japan, even they trade 310 00:16:16,560 --> 00:16:19,960 Speaker 1: inversely correlated to the end. So Japan just the way 311 00:16:20,000 --> 00:16:22,640 Speaker 1: people trade it, you need a week end to really 312 00:16:22,640 --> 00:16:26,360 Speaker 1: be bullish Japan today. Um So it's one where when 313 00:16:26,400 --> 00:16:29,480 Speaker 1: you hedge, you actually increase the volatility for the broader 314 00:16:29,520 --> 00:16:33,000 Speaker 1: international basket where I'm talking about. That's where the opportunity 315 00:16:33,080 --> 00:16:35,840 Speaker 1: really is. You know, for the going forward basis Europe 316 00:16:35,880 --> 00:16:38,200 Speaker 1: and Japan. Maybe there's a hundred billions of assets between 317 00:16:38,240 --> 00:16:41,040 Speaker 1: Europe and Japan. Mutual funds, there's one point a trillion 318 00:16:41,080 --> 00:16:45,680 Speaker 1: dollars in IFA that are basically unhedged, but thirty percent 319 00:16:45,760 --> 00:16:49,760 Speaker 1: of Japan's now hedged, of Europe's hedged. The big opportunity 320 00:16:49,800 --> 00:16:51,480 Speaker 1: and that I'm focused on, or we had with some 321 00:16:51,600 --> 00:16:55,240 Speaker 1: tree really focused on our the EFA complex. We're adding 322 00:16:55,520 --> 00:16:59,400 Speaker 1: currency adds your expected risk profile, not your expected return profile, 323 00:16:59,560 --> 00:17:03,440 Speaker 1: you're did risk profile. That's pretty fascinating. Let's talk a 324 00:17:03,440 --> 00:17:07,840 Speaker 1: little bit about what's happening in the world of asset management. 325 00:17:08,800 --> 00:17:12,760 Speaker 1: We've heard that indexing is worse than Marxism, that this 326 00:17:12,880 --> 00:17:15,399 Speaker 1: is an American. It's the end of the world. I 327 00:17:15,800 --> 00:17:18,960 Speaker 1: think that everybody who is making those arguments are sort 328 00:17:18,960 --> 00:17:22,760 Speaker 1: of self interested in talking their own books. But let's 329 00:17:22,760 --> 00:17:27,320 Speaker 1: at least discuss how indexing might be affecting, uh, the 330 00:17:27,400 --> 00:17:30,680 Speaker 1: price discovery mechanism. What what are your views on this? Yeah, 331 00:17:30,760 --> 00:17:33,399 Speaker 1: I don't think it's worse than Marxism. It's actually the 332 00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:36,000 Speaker 1: definition of what people need. They want lower fees. Right, 333 00:17:36,040 --> 00:17:40,360 Speaker 1: Amazon is bringing down fees for retail customers, and essentially 334 00:17:40,400 --> 00:17:46,080 Speaker 1: indexing is bringing down fees for active or asset management generally. Um. Now, 335 00:17:46,119 --> 00:17:48,119 Speaker 1: there's this idea that our et s to story of 336 00:17:48,119 --> 00:17:50,400 Speaker 1: the market is that flows to passive causing this quote 337 00:17:50,440 --> 00:17:54,000 Speaker 1: unquote bubble in the markets or pushing up prices. For 338 00:17:54,080 --> 00:17:56,879 Speaker 1: every buyer there's a seller. So I just see fees 339 00:17:56,880 --> 00:17:59,120 Speaker 1: coming out of the system. Investors are being better off 340 00:17:59,119 --> 00:18:01,480 Speaker 1: with fees not going to the active managers are keeping 341 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:04,480 Speaker 1: it in investors pockets. For you to say that the 342 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:07,080 Speaker 1: flows too passive over the last decade, and passive is 343 00:18:07,119 --> 00:18:09,199 Speaker 1: taking a large amount of money or last decade for 344 00:18:09,240 --> 00:18:12,760 Speaker 1: them to be driving up the market prices. There people 345 00:18:12,760 --> 00:18:15,280 Speaker 1: are buying the passive, who are they selling? Are they 346 00:18:15,359 --> 00:18:19,440 Speaker 1: selling value managers? Are they selling the people who's who 347 00:18:19,480 --> 00:18:22,239 Speaker 1: buy cheaply and just buying the more expensive stuff? And 348 00:18:22,240 --> 00:18:23,920 Speaker 1: it has been a growth led market over the last 349 00:18:23,920 --> 00:18:26,040 Speaker 1: ten years. But when I look at the flows to 350 00:18:26,160 --> 00:18:29,560 Speaker 1: the styles, let's say us large cap, I don't see 351 00:18:29,600 --> 00:18:32,880 Speaker 1: the flows dramatically leaving value if anything. Or the last 352 00:18:32,880 --> 00:18:36,680 Speaker 1: ten years you've seen flows leaving growth. You're seeing active growth, 353 00:18:36,800 --> 00:18:40,040 Speaker 1: seeing out flows, and you're seeing just general trends towards indexing, 354 00:18:40,280 --> 00:18:42,760 Speaker 1: which makes you question, are the flows to passive really 355 00:18:42,840 --> 00:18:45,399 Speaker 1: driving up the prices of these sort of quote unquote 356 00:18:45,400 --> 00:18:47,320 Speaker 1: expensive parts of the market. So I see it as 357 00:18:47,359 --> 00:18:49,280 Speaker 1: a big win for investors are keeping the fees. I 358 00:18:49,280 --> 00:18:52,800 Speaker 1: don't see them as dramatically changing. And I think Vanguard 359 00:18:52,880 --> 00:18:57,560 Speaker 1: did a study saying that feed compression saved investors over 360 00:18:57,680 --> 00:19:00,879 Speaker 1: forty billion dollars over the past twenty year. That's a 361 00:19:00,920 --> 00:19:02,760 Speaker 1: lot of money, and that's going to continue. I mean 362 00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:06,080 Speaker 1: that's people people worry. You know, what percentage of the 363 00:19:06,119 --> 00:19:08,520 Speaker 1: market can be indexed. It could be a lot higher 364 00:19:08,520 --> 00:19:10,040 Speaker 1: than where we are today, and it should be a 365 00:19:10,080 --> 00:19:12,560 Speaker 1: lot higher. There's a lot of active managers who aren't 366 00:19:12,560 --> 00:19:15,320 Speaker 1: adding value, and so in the future are not adding 367 00:19:15,400 --> 00:19:18,920 Speaker 1: value active managers that Bill Miller calls them the closet index. Yeah. 368 00:19:18,960 --> 00:19:21,960 Speaker 1: I love that conversation, and it's it's I see more 369 00:19:22,000 --> 00:19:23,719 Speaker 1: and more of what we're trying to do at Wisdom 370 00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:26,840 Speaker 1: Trees is you know, we started off ten years ago 371 00:19:26,880 --> 00:19:31,960 Speaker 1: trying to provide low tracking indexes so get you very 372 00:19:31,960 --> 00:19:35,800 Speaker 1: broad exposure. Are broad diven weighted portfolios have fifteen hundred stocks, 373 00:19:35,800 --> 00:19:38,639 Speaker 1: are broad earnings waited portfolios have two thousand stocks, And 374 00:19:38,680 --> 00:19:41,399 Speaker 1: there we're tilting towards value and quality factors that we 375 00:19:41,440 --> 00:19:43,439 Speaker 1: think can add value over the market. So maybe we 376 00:19:43,480 --> 00:19:46,640 Speaker 1: add a hundred bases points over long periods of time 377 00:19:46,640 --> 00:19:49,760 Speaker 1: with two percent tracking error in the earnings indexes. That's 378 00:19:49,840 --> 00:19:52,680 Speaker 1: low tracking air portfolios. Those are the closet index trackers 379 00:19:52,720 --> 00:19:54,920 Speaker 1: Miller is talking about, and we're doing it in sort 380 00:19:54,960 --> 00:19:58,520 Speaker 1: of low fee index type format. Increasingly, where I think 381 00:19:58,560 --> 00:20:00,119 Speaker 1: the future is that we're going to be going for 382 00:20:00,200 --> 00:20:03,720 Speaker 1: the higher active share, higher alpha strategies and trying to 383 00:20:03,760 --> 00:20:07,639 Speaker 1: get more activeness into the portfolios as well. So so 384 00:20:07,760 --> 00:20:11,639 Speaker 1: let's touch on that because that's a fascinating subject. First, 385 00:20:11,720 --> 00:20:13,920 Speaker 1: I noticed you have I don't want to say a 386 00:20:13,960 --> 00:20:18,159 Speaker 1: dividend way across everything. But but dear lord, dividends are 387 00:20:18,200 --> 00:20:22,679 Speaker 1: really the mother's milk of wisdom tree? Is it? Is 388 00:20:22,720 --> 00:20:26,760 Speaker 1: it profitability and valuation? Or what is it about dividends 389 00:20:26,840 --> 00:20:30,000 Speaker 1: that are special? And the past decade is seen a 390 00:20:30,080 --> 00:20:33,280 Speaker 1: cheat money allowed a ton of buy backs? What does 391 00:20:33,640 --> 00:20:37,439 Speaker 1: what do all those buy backs due to dividends? I 392 00:20:37,560 --> 00:20:40,679 Speaker 1: personally would rather see dividends as an investor than buy backs. 393 00:20:40,720 --> 00:20:43,720 Speaker 1: But tell me your perspective. Yeah, finance one oh one, 394 00:20:43,760 --> 00:20:46,359 Speaker 1: assets are president value of cash flows for stocks? Cash 395 00:20:46,359 --> 00:20:48,360 Speaker 1: flows are dividends. Where do we do is come from? 396 00:20:48,400 --> 00:20:50,840 Speaker 1: They come from earnings. So when we started ten years 397 00:20:50,840 --> 00:20:53,440 Speaker 1: ago dividends and earnings, where the two families we created 398 00:20:53,920 --> 00:20:56,960 Speaker 1: dividends and earnings? Okay, two separate families. We launch the 399 00:20:57,080 --> 00:21:00,679 Speaker 1: US Earnings Family Global dividen. How many different funds were 400 00:21:00,680 --> 00:21:05,960 Speaker 1: in that group in in earnings? We have today approximately 401 00:21:06,040 --> 00:21:10,159 Speaker 1: six across different regions and different that's in the US. 402 00:21:10,200 --> 00:21:14,040 Speaker 1: So what are the six in the US? Total market? Large, mid, small, 403 00:21:14,440 --> 00:21:17,560 Speaker 1: And then we have some specific um sort of domestic 404 00:21:17,600 --> 00:21:21,640 Speaker 1: economy and exporter strategies. And then and what about dividends? 405 00:21:21,840 --> 00:21:24,480 Speaker 1: There's a the exact number I'm gonna lose because it's 406 00:21:24,520 --> 00:21:28,360 Speaker 1: like it's a large number. UM. So we do cover 407 00:21:28,440 --> 00:21:31,600 Speaker 1: the world with dividend focused strategies. UM. We do India. 408 00:21:31,640 --> 00:21:34,480 Speaker 1: We have an earning fund because diven end earnings fund. 409 00:21:34,560 --> 00:21:36,840 Speaker 1: India is earnings because they don't pay a lot of dividends, 410 00:21:36,840 --> 00:21:38,760 Speaker 1: and so we're the first firm to do India local 411 00:21:38,760 --> 00:21:41,639 Speaker 1: shares in two thousand eight. So we have the broadest 412 00:21:41,680 --> 00:21:44,399 Speaker 1: India Index or India Earnings Wait Index, and that's the 413 00:21:44,440 --> 00:21:47,680 Speaker 1: country we're super bullshot over. The I couldn't agree more. 414 00:21:47,880 --> 00:21:50,119 Speaker 1: But it's valuation sensitive and we wanted to own the 415 00:21:50,160 --> 00:21:53,440 Speaker 1: broadest cross sections. So the tradial Eta sixty seventy stocks, 416 00:21:53,480 --> 00:21:56,440 Speaker 1: we have two D plus stocks, so that's one where 417 00:21:56,560 --> 00:21:59,320 Speaker 1: earnings waited. We did do UM, but the idea was 418 00:21:59,400 --> 00:22:02,480 Speaker 1: dividends are the subjective measure around the world, and every 419 00:22:02,520 --> 00:22:05,200 Speaker 1: region outside the US N plus to the market pays 420 00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:06,720 Speaker 1: a divon. It's really the U S where we do 421 00:22:06,760 --> 00:22:08,679 Speaker 1: a lot of buy backs because of stock options. If 422 00:22:08,680 --> 00:22:10,439 Speaker 1: you have a stock option, you don't like to pay 423 00:22:10,480 --> 00:22:12,040 Speaker 1: a DIVD because your stock goes down by the amount 424 00:22:12,040 --> 00:22:15,639 Speaker 1: of the dividend. Because we have literally penny for penny 425 00:22:15,920 --> 00:22:18,760 Speaker 1: and so that's what when we started doing stock options. 426 00:22:19,480 --> 00:22:21,760 Speaker 1: Two is when we started paying divids less. I mean 427 00:22:21,760 --> 00:22:24,520 Speaker 1: the power issue used to be seventy in the old days. 428 00:22:24,920 --> 00:22:27,240 Speaker 1: It's been you know, thirty to pent in the last 429 00:22:27,240 --> 00:22:30,800 Speaker 1: twenty thirty years. UM. But so clearly buy backs are 430 00:22:30,840 --> 00:22:33,760 Speaker 1: impacting the available cast for dividends. People are doing as 431 00:22:33,840 --> 00:22:36,359 Speaker 1: much buybacks as dividends today. So when people look at 432 00:22:36,359 --> 00:22:38,399 Speaker 1: the two percent diven yield and say we used have 433 00:22:38,400 --> 00:22:40,720 Speaker 1: a four percent diven yield, will net buy backs have 434 00:22:40,800 --> 00:22:42,679 Speaker 1: been one and a half to two percent? And so 435 00:22:42,760 --> 00:22:44,639 Speaker 1: that what that means is and they're actually net buy 436 00:22:44,680 --> 00:22:46,760 Speaker 1: back So there who docing shares out standing, which means 437 00:22:46,800 --> 00:22:49,800 Speaker 1: future dealing growth will be higher. Um. And so i've 438 00:22:49,920 --> 00:22:52,199 Speaker 1: you know, we've focused when people say, do you have 439 00:22:52,200 --> 00:22:55,240 Speaker 1: a dividend plus net buy back index, we've often set 440 00:22:55,240 --> 00:22:58,600 Speaker 1: our earnings indexes represent that because you would basically add 441 00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:01,159 Speaker 1: at historically would more technic alogy companies, which is what 442 00:23:01,560 --> 00:23:04,240 Speaker 1: had earnings and buybacks but no dividends. Now in our 443 00:23:04,320 --> 00:23:09,240 Speaker 1: large cat doing next you have more tech companies financial So, UM, 444 00:23:09,280 --> 00:23:12,119 Speaker 1: I gotta ask you the question that always has been 445 00:23:12,160 --> 00:23:16,919 Speaker 1: scratching my head on an earnings based set of holdings. 446 00:23:18,000 --> 00:23:22,560 Speaker 1: The US, we have completely wacky accounting rules and regulations. 447 00:23:23,400 --> 00:23:27,280 Speaker 1: How do you manage to square the circle of every 448 00:23:27,320 --> 00:23:30,120 Speaker 1: region of the world. Every country in the world has 449 00:23:30,160 --> 00:23:34,000 Speaker 1: our own set of accounting standards and and rules, and 450 00:23:34,040 --> 00:23:37,439 Speaker 1: you end up with, Hey, a pe of ten in 451 00:23:37,480 --> 00:23:40,359 Speaker 1: this country maybe nothing like a pe in ten of 452 00:23:40,440 --> 00:23:43,200 Speaker 1: ten in a different country. You just made my case 453 00:23:43,240 --> 00:23:45,840 Speaker 1: for divin waiting around the world. That's exactly why we 454 00:23:45,880 --> 00:23:48,640 Speaker 1: did dividends around the world was it's an objective measure. 455 00:23:48,800 --> 00:23:50,320 Speaker 1: When we started ten years ago, you didn't have to 456 00:23:50,320 --> 00:23:53,160 Speaker 1: worry about different accounting centers. Now we really don't have 457 00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:56,119 Speaker 1: any cross country earnings waited funds. I mean, we have 458 00:23:56,240 --> 00:23:59,960 Speaker 1: the India Fund. Um we do have any that's not exact. 459 00:24:00,160 --> 00:24:03,879 Speaker 1: You are emerging market consumer fund has an earnings model, 460 00:24:04,920 --> 00:24:06,440 Speaker 1: but that's you know, it's like a one off fund 461 00:24:06,440 --> 00:24:08,280 Speaker 1: for US. So so in other words, when you go 462 00:24:08,320 --> 00:24:11,320 Speaker 1: in country by country, you're really doing the valuation screen 463 00:24:11,760 --> 00:24:14,959 Speaker 1: specific to that country, and the top ten percent across 464 00:24:15,000 --> 00:24:17,600 Speaker 1: every country. What does it make a difference how their 465 00:24:17,640 --> 00:24:20,239 Speaker 1: math is. It's still the cream of the crop in 466 00:24:20,280 --> 00:24:22,760 Speaker 1: each country. And that is why dividen just cut across 467 00:24:22,760 --> 00:24:24,840 Speaker 1: all the countries, and so I think that's the that's 468 00:24:24,880 --> 00:24:27,800 Speaker 1: the key there. Um, you can fake earnings, you can't 469 00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:30,760 Speaker 1: fake dividends. For only so long can you fake the dividends. 470 00:24:31,119 --> 00:24:35,920 Speaker 1: Let's talk a little bit about the future of asset management. Um, 471 00:24:35,960 --> 00:24:39,679 Speaker 1: there's a sense that the Vanguard effect, the compression of 472 00:24:39,720 --> 00:24:44,399 Speaker 1: fees everywhere, is not just a brief phenomena or a 473 00:24:44,520 --> 00:24:48,359 Speaker 1: shallow phenomena. But hey, it's all going to zero eventually, 474 00:24:49,000 --> 00:24:52,360 Speaker 1: discuss Listen to the drive for fees lower puts more 475 00:24:52,440 --> 00:24:56,080 Speaker 1: money back in investors pockets. I think it's generally the 476 00:24:56,119 --> 00:24:58,600 Speaker 1: trend it's going in. It's across all segments, from asset 477 00:24:58,640 --> 00:25:02,920 Speaker 1: management to advisors to everywhere. Is that's where it's going. 478 00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:06,879 Speaker 1: How low can it go? It's getting close to zero. 479 00:25:06,960 --> 00:25:09,160 Speaker 1: I mean it's at a few basis points for pure beta. 480 00:25:09,200 --> 00:25:11,400 Speaker 1: I mean wisdom Tree was set up living in a 481 00:25:11,480 --> 00:25:14,639 Speaker 1: Vanguard world, and we were saying, we have our mission 482 00:25:14,640 --> 00:25:17,000 Speaker 1: in life only mission life was can we do better 483 00:25:17,080 --> 00:25:19,879 Speaker 1: than Vanguard after fees, after taxes? You got improved on 484 00:25:19,920 --> 00:25:21,919 Speaker 1: the Vanguard experience because you know they're gonna always have 485 00:25:21,960 --> 00:25:25,879 Speaker 1: the lowest fees. Nobody can compete, So they're built for 486 00:25:25,920 --> 00:25:28,680 Speaker 1: that for forty years, there's nobody even close to them, 487 00:25:29,000 --> 00:25:31,560 Speaker 1: So dimensional funds maybe, so it's no, I mean, they're 488 00:25:31,600 --> 00:25:34,560 Speaker 1: they're they're well, they're a little more expensive, they have 489 00:25:34,560 --> 00:25:38,439 Speaker 1: a little deeper research bench, but you know, they're considered 490 00:25:38,720 --> 00:25:41,960 Speaker 1: factor slash active. So it's there's a there's a little 491 00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:44,960 Speaker 1: more on it, pure beta, zero cost beta. You're going 492 00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:47,320 Speaker 1: to have that out there. But so the question is 493 00:25:47,359 --> 00:25:49,080 Speaker 1: how can you add value on top of that? So 494 00:25:49,119 --> 00:25:51,280 Speaker 1: we think of that as an investment firm. Can our 495 00:25:51,280 --> 00:25:55,960 Speaker 1: individual products add value after fees, after taxes? But then 496 00:25:56,000 --> 00:25:59,119 Speaker 1: also then how when you deliver advice, can you try 497 00:25:59,119 --> 00:26:01,880 Speaker 1: to package it in a way that adds value as well? 498 00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:04,159 Speaker 1: And that's really so our first ten years that was 499 00:26:04,160 --> 00:26:06,840 Speaker 1: in was about building great products, and I think the 500 00:26:06,880 --> 00:26:09,560 Speaker 1: next ten years is really how do we help our 501 00:26:09,600 --> 00:26:12,719 Speaker 1: clients and how do we deliver advice in a cheaper 502 00:26:12,760 --> 00:26:15,439 Speaker 1: format enabled by technology. So we're making a lot of 503 00:26:15,480 --> 00:26:19,400 Speaker 1: investments in that technology side to really help advisors grow 504 00:26:19,480 --> 00:26:22,760 Speaker 1: and and and leverage their businesses and then um, you know, 505 00:26:22,800 --> 00:26:25,399 Speaker 1: just bring costs down there as well. So let's let's 506 00:26:25,720 --> 00:26:30,840 Speaker 1: look at that um advisory firms and advisors are looking 507 00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:35,840 Speaker 1: for more than just asset management. What do you you 508 00:26:36,160 --> 00:26:38,359 Speaker 1: sit in a fairly unique position in the in the 509 00:26:38,359 --> 00:26:41,880 Speaker 1: food chain. What do you think the financial advisors are 510 00:26:41,880 --> 00:26:45,240 Speaker 1: looking for and how do you guys create something unique 511 00:26:45,359 --> 00:26:49,959 Speaker 1: for that audience. Yeah, everybody is talking about the robo world, right, 512 00:26:50,040 --> 00:26:53,080 Speaker 1: the betterments of the wellffronts and and this online direct 513 00:26:53,080 --> 00:26:57,240 Speaker 1: to consumer model. We are very advisor driven, so you 514 00:26:57,280 --> 00:27:00,000 Speaker 1: know we're we have an advisor solutions program. We made 515 00:27:00,040 --> 00:27:03,080 Speaker 1: a big investment in a firm called advisor Engine that 516 00:27:03,240 --> 00:27:06,080 Speaker 1: is really a full technology stack try to help people 517 00:27:06,119 --> 00:27:10,200 Speaker 1: manage from client on boarding, account opening digital. It's a 518 00:27:10,320 --> 00:27:13,720 Speaker 1: very digitizing your investment practice and that's gonna be an 519 00:27:13,760 --> 00:27:15,800 Speaker 1: increasing part of what we do over time. I see 520 00:27:15,840 --> 00:27:17,800 Speaker 1: it from just the conversation we've had in the last 521 00:27:17,800 --> 00:27:20,640 Speaker 1: few months going out with Advisor Engine together. Um, they're 522 00:27:20,680 --> 00:27:23,639 Speaker 1: becoming an increasing partner. But as well as you know 523 00:27:23,760 --> 00:27:27,159 Speaker 1: are we're also we've been investing in technology ourselves for 524 00:27:27,160 --> 00:27:29,919 Speaker 1: the last few years, and so we created some great tools. 525 00:27:30,000 --> 00:27:33,080 Speaker 1: We call it portfolio construction services on our website, just 526 00:27:33,240 --> 00:27:36,840 Speaker 1: digital portfolios, a way to do analytics, institutional caliber stuff 527 00:27:36,880 --> 00:27:39,200 Speaker 1: that people pay very high fees for. We're trying to 528 00:27:39,200 --> 00:27:42,200 Speaker 1: provide for free that will help you look at your portfolio, 529 00:27:42,280 --> 00:27:46,199 Speaker 1: look at different factor exposures, stress test, it creates some mappings, 530 00:27:46,440 --> 00:27:48,600 Speaker 1: edit your own what we spit back out it there 531 00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:52,240 Speaker 1: for you. So it's a really trying to help people 532 00:27:52,280 --> 00:27:55,160 Speaker 1: with their portfolio management side. That's available to any advisor 533 00:27:55,359 --> 00:27:59,520 Speaker 1: or anybody who goes to the wood and financial professionals 534 00:27:59,640 --> 00:28:02,119 Speaker 1: uh through you know, there's you gotta have to log 535 00:28:02,160 --> 00:28:04,000 Speaker 1: in on our website and that's all you need as 536 00:28:04,040 --> 00:28:06,280 Speaker 1: a financial professional and you can get access to the 537 00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:11,200 Speaker 1: portfolio tool. So you mentioned robo advisors. I'm a little 538 00:28:11,200 --> 00:28:14,679 Speaker 1: bit of a contrarian because, hey, you know what, if 539 00:28:14,720 --> 00:28:17,800 Speaker 1: you give me two hundred million dollars in venture capital 540 00:28:17,800 --> 00:28:21,119 Speaker 1: money from marketing, I could raise three or four billion dollars. 541 00:28:21,119 --> 00:28:23,520 Speaker 1: But the better way to think about it is, Wait, 542 00:28:23,880 --> 00:28:26,600 Speaker 1: you've spent a hundred million dollars to generate four or 543 00:28:26,640 --> 00:28:28,959 Speaker 1: five million dollars a year in revenue. How is that 544 00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:30,920 Speaker 1: going to take over the world. Yeah, I don't want 545 00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:34,320 Speaker 1: to comment on valuations there, but it's it's everybody's going 546 00:28:34,359 --> 00:28:36,240 Speaker 1: to have some element of that. I mean, it's that 547 00:28:36,240 --> 00:28:40,920 Speaker 1: that technology all clients are going to access their accounts online. 548 00:28:41,360 --> 00:28:45,560 Speaker 1: I think everything place already now is increasingly I mean, 549 00:28:45,600 --> 00:28:47,920 Speaker 1: if you think about it, everybody who's got a custodian 550 00:28:47,960 --> 00:28:50,640 Speaker 1: be a Schwab or TV, your fidelity, you get a 551 00:28:50,640 --> 00:28:53,280 Speaker 1: full dashboard online. You could see your holdings. You can 552 00:28:53,400 --> 00:28:57,360 Speaker 1: more or less see your performance. What what the robos 553 00:28:57,360 --> 00:28:59,680 Speaker 1: seem to do is come up with an asset allocation 554 00:28:59,760 --> 00:29:03,760 Speaker 1: mob all relative to your risk tolerance. How unique is 555 00:29:03,800 --> 00:29:06,560 Speaker 1: that and and is that gonna spread to the rest 556 00:29:06,560 --> 00:29:10,440 Speaker 1: of the industry. I think, you know, our our firm 557 00:29:10,440 --> 00:29:12,320 Speaker 1: has been investing on the advisors side. We think there 558 00:29:12,440 --> 00:29:14,160 Speaker 1: there will be some people who like to go direct 559 00:29:14,200 --> 00:29:16,800 Speaker 1: to consumer and people manage our own money and do 560 00:29:16,840 --> 00:29:19,480 Speaker 1: that through through what they're offering, and they have very 561 00:29:19,480 --> 00:29:21,960 Speaker 1: good jet you know, generic offerings. Is that Is that 562 00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:24,280 Speaker 1: going to be true for the average high net worth family. 563 00:29:24,360 --> 00:29:27,200 Speaker 1: Someone has three million dollars five million dollars in the market. 564 00:29:27,680 --> 00:29:29,320 Speaker 1: Do they want to pick up the phone and speak 565 00:29:29,360 --> 00:29:31,640 Speaker 1: to somebody or they want to log in? I think 566 00:29:31,680 --> 00:29:34,920 Speaker 1: most people there's a spa is how much of the 567 00:29:34,960 --> 00:29:39,120 Speaker 1: wealth around is is advisor overseeing versus direct? I think 568 00:29:39,160 --> 00:29:42,400 Speaker 1: we're still we've always from the beginning in position for 569 00:29:42,560 --> 00:29:45,360 Speaker 1: working with advisors and financial intermedis. I think that's how 570 00:29:45,400 --> 00:29:47,040 Speaker 1: we continue to see. You know, so all of our 571 00:29:47,080 --> 00:29:50,520 Speaker 1: investments in technology advisor solutions is really trying to help 572 00:29:50,600 --> 00:29:53,880 Speaker 1: advisors build their businesses and it's very tough to find 573 00:29:53,880 --> 00:29:56,920 Speaker 1: that individual client, and that's what we're going to continue 574 00:29:56,960 --> 00:30:00,080 Speaker 1: position for. I'm curious as to how much of a 575 00:30:00,480 --> 00:30:05,520 Speaker 1: fear of robo advisors is a generational thing that the 576 00:30:05,560 --> 00:30:09,440 Speaker 1: older advisors see the new technology and fear it, and 577 00:30:09,480 --> 00:30:11,840 Speaker 1: the younger advisors say, yeah, this is just another tool 578 00:30:11,920 --> 00:30:15,440 Speaker 1: in our another arrow in my quiver. And the research 579 00:30:15,480 --> 00:30:17,959 Speaker 1: we've seen is that even the older generations they've been 580 00:30:17,960 --> 00:30:21,160 Speaker 1: working with technology, you know, the successful people, they've been 581 00:30:21,160 --> 00:30:24,160 Speaker 1: operating with technology. So they even the seventy year olds, 582 00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:27,360 Speaker 1: they need they want your a digital experience. UM So 583 00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:30,840 Speaker 1: if you if you're not on board with upgrading your technology, 584 00:30:30,840 --> 00:30:33,520 Speaker 1: if you're still in the paper world, clients are going 585 00:30:33,560 --> 00:30:36,120 Speaker 1: to go to firms that have the digital offerings. And 586 00:30:36,160 --> 00:30:38,560 Speaker 1: so that's that's the trend that we see just continuing 587 00:30:38,560 --> 00:30:40,840 Speaker 1: and we want to help on the clients that we 588 00:30:40,920 --> 00:30:43,480 Speaker 1: work with do that and do it do it well. 589 00:30:43,840 --> 00:30:46,760 Speaker 1: So you mentioned fees earlier, we've been talking about that 590 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:52,840 Speaker 1: for for forever. UM Very recently Fidelity introduced the concept 591 00:30:52,920 --> 00:30:56,440 Speaker 1: of the Falcrum fee, which is a reduced fee if 592 00:30:56,480 --> 00:31:00,040 Speaker 1: they're not out not out performing a particular benchmark. Is 593 00:31:00,080 --> 00:31:02,520 Speaker 1: that's something that potentially can catch on. What are your 594 00:31:02,520 --> 00:31:05,640 Speaker 1: thoughts on these fulk room fees. Conceptually, it's a very 595 00:31:05,680 --> 00:31:08,000 Speaker 1: interesting I mean, it's a it's what you would think 596 00:31:08,040 --> 00:31:10,640 Speaker 1: you want as a consumer products. If you're manager, you're 597 00:31:10,640 --> 00:31:13,560 Speaker 1: trying to outperform. Your manager doesn't outperform, you should pay less. 598 00:31:13,680 --> 00:31:16,960 Speaker 1: And so conceptually I'm I'm aligned with it. The incentives 599 00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:19,800 Speaker 1: are very hard to align it in sort of a 600 00:31:19,840 --> 00:31:23,160 Speaker 1: public vehicle like in ETFU. There are some people who 601 00:31:23,160 --> 00:31:25,600 Speaker 1: are starting to experiment with that, so we're definitely watching 602 00:31:25,640 --> 00:31:28,720 Speaker 1: that closely, UM, and and you just you want to 603 00:31:28,720 --> 00:31:30,920 Speaker 1: make sure if you're doing it, you've got align when 604 00:31:31,200 --> 00:31:34,280 Speaker 1: people are invested in the fund, you know, time periods, 605 00:31:34,360 --> 00:31:37,760 Speaker 1: the incentives for both the investors in the fund. Properly 606 00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:41,960 Speaker 1: timing up who's paying what when is not a straightforward 607 00:31:42,000 --> 00:31:45,239 Speaker 1: proposition in the public vehicle like ETFs, I mean, as 608 00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:47,680 Speaker 1: a doing a one on one, separate account where you 609 00:31:47,680 --> 00:31:50,160 Speaker 1: can manage your time horizon with your performance in the 610 00:31:50,160 --> 00:31:54,240 Speaker 1: fund super easy to think about. But as a ute 611 00:31:54,240 --> 00:31:57,160 Speaker 1: et f rapper, that's a challenge that seems challenging me. 612 00:31:57,200 --> 00:31:58,880 Speaker 1: But you know, I'm sure there's gonna be ways of 613 00:31:58,880 --> 00:32:00,800 Speaker 1: looking at that and we'll we'll study that and see 614 00:32:01,240 --> 00:32:04,400 Speaker 1: think about it. So you guys are are pretty heavy 615 00:32:04,480 --> 00:32:09,440 Speaker 1: value oriented, you're pretty heavy divinend oriented. These are part 616 00:32:09,800 --> 00:32:13,959 Speaker 1: not that dividends are. But it's the same traditional FAMA 617 00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:17,360 Speaker 1: fringe factor models. What do you think of the rise 618 00:32:17,400 --> 00:32:21,080 Speaker 1: of so called smart beta, which really is factor investing 619 00:32:21,600 --> 00:32:24,719 Speaker 1: with a little bit of a different marketing twist, and 620 00:32:24,840 --> 00:32:29,000 Speaker 1: you guys get painted with that same brush. What you 621 00:32:29,080 --> 00:32:31,160 Speaker 1: call things is always an interesting term, and we used 622 00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:35,200 Speaker 1: to call things passive alpha when we first started passive alpha, 623 00:32:35,360 --> 00:32:38,800 Speaker 1: trying to get rules based ways of generating alpha in 624 00:32:38,840 --> 00:32:41,000 Speaker 1: a lot of ways. I think what we're trying to 625 00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:43,640 Speaker 1: provide is lo fi alpha, or you could say modern alpha. 626 00:32:43,720 --> 00:32:46,560 Speaker 1: You know the idea I like that modern alpha in 627 00:32:46,560 --> 00:32:53,280 Speaker 1: other words, low fie passive technology twist. And so you're 628 00:32:53,320 --> 00:32:56,320 Speaker 1: using technology algorithms to add value. It's going to be 629 00:32:56,400 --> 00:33:01,080 Speaker 1: increasingly you're you're using smart technology, which is its century 630 00:33:01,160 --> 00:33:04,880 Speaker 1: technologies to try to add value UM and so increasingly, 631 00:33:04,960 --> 00:33:08,440 Speaker 1: where we might have been low tracking error alpha, we're 632 00:33:08,480 --> 00:33:10,760 Speaker 1: increasingly going to be going after the higher tracking air 633 00:33:10,840 --> 00:33:14,400 Speaker 1: real value added defined tracking a sort of how much 634 00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:17,000 Speaker 1: risk versus the benchmark you're taking. So we're not talking 635 00:33:17,040 --> 00:33:20,920 Speaker 1: about active share, we're talking about risk adjusted returns. Yeah, 636 00:33:21,040 --> 00:33:22,960 Speaker 1: we active share is a component of that. So the 637 00:33:23,000 --> 00:33:25,320 Speaker 1: more active share you are, the higher tracking AIR is 638 00:33:25,400 --> 00:33:27,920 Speaker 1: likely to be because the more mismatch you are from 639 00:33:27,920 --> 00:33:32,640 Speaker 1: the front. So UM, I think about it as the 640 00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:34,719 Speaker 1: closer you are to the benchmark, the lowrier tracking AIR 641 00:33:34,760 --> 00:33:37,520 Speaker 1: will be. And that's what just a total market, if 642 00:33:37,520 --> 00:33:39,120 Speaker 1: you have two thousand stocks, you're gonna have a pretty 643 00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:41,840 Speaker 1: low tracking air. Let's talk about a little bit about bonds. 644 00:33:41,880 --> 00:33:44,880 Speaker 1: We haven't gotten to fixed income at all. How are 645 00:33:44,920 --> 00:33:47,960 Speaker 1: you perceiving what's going on in that space? Can you 646 00:33:48,040 --> 00:33:51,120 Speaker 1: create alpha in the fixed income side? What? What do 647 00:33:51,160 --> 00:33:56,400 Speaker 1: you guys? Absolutely so we do. We have enhanced yield 648 00:33:56,560 --> 00:33:58,640 Speaker 1: bond indexes. And actually you know we're here in the 649 00:33:58,640 --> 00:34:01,600 Speaker 1: Bloomberg offices. Were part here with bloom Bloomberg on a 650 00:34:01,760 --> 00:34:06,560 Speaker 1: number of fixing come indexes Yield Enhanced Bloomberg Barclay's Total 651 00:34:06,640 --> 00:34:10,600 Speaker 1: fixing income indexes where you're just you know, historical yields 652 00:34:10,600 --> 00:34:12,960 Speaker 1: are as low as they've been in the US market, 653 00:34:13,239 --> 00:34:15,920 Speaker 1: duration is the highest. But can you sort of rewaight 654 00:34:16,000 --> 00:34:18,960 Speaker 1: the agg away from just treasuries, which have been huge issuance, 655 00:34:19,160 --> 00:34:22,560 Speaker 1: low yield, high duration, reweight towards credit, which is what 656 00:34:22,600 --> 00:34:25,880 Speaker 1: your traditional active corporates tips, what reads. What are you 657 00:34:25,920 --> 00:34:29,319 Speaker 1: adding to. It's the traditional investment grade agg universe, but 658 00:34:29,440 --> 00:34:32,759 Speaker 1: just rebucketing it to have constraints so you don't an 659 00:34:32,760 --> 00:34:35,239 Speaker 1: increase ration too much, You don't tilt to credit too much, 660 00:34:35,840 --> 00:34:38,160 Speaker 1: but it really it tilts to credit in away from 661 00:34:38,200 --> 00:34:40,640 Speaker 1: treasuries and a constrained fashion. So we have a short 662 00:34:40,719 --> 00:34:43,520 Speaker 1: term version the e t F is SHAG s h 663 00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:46,799 Speaker 1: a G. The longer term is AGGIE so AG y 664 00:34:47,200 --> 00:34:49,359 Speaker 1: UM as a way to just yield enhancing the agg 665 00:34:49,400 --> 00:34:52,239 Speaker 1: we're definitely seeing traction there. It's early days um, but 666 00:34:52,360 --> 00:34:54,760 Speaker 1: I think that's our first factor investment in fixed income. 667 00:34:54,960 --> 00:34:58,920 Speaker 1: But we've also done fundamentally screened sort of credit screen 668 00:34:59,000 --> 00:35:01,560 Speaker 1: so looking at in the high old market as an example, 669 00:35:01,719 --> 00:35:04,759 Speaker 1: screening out bonds with negative free cash flow, not just 670 00:35:04,880 --> 00:35:07,600 Speaker 1: issuing market cap, which gives the biggest way to the 671 00:35:07,600 --> 00:35:10,600 Speaker 1: biggest indebted issuer, screen out those bonds with negative free 672 00:35:10,640 --> 00:35:13,719 Speaker 1: cash flow, and that's a quality portfolio on bonds that 673 00:35:13,800 --> 00:35:16,319 Speaker 1: we've we have four different funds screened around that as well. 674 00:35:16,360 --> 00:35:18,880 Speaker 1: Can you stick around a little bit about we'll keep talking. 675 00:35:19,000 --> 00:35:21,319 Speaker 1: We have been speaking with Jeremy Schwartz. He is the 676 00:35:21,360 --> 00:35:25,800 Speaker 1: director of research at Wisdom Tree Investments. If you enjoy 677 00:35:25,880 --> 00:35:29,040 Speaker 1: this conversation, be sure and stick around for the podcast 678 00:35:29,080 --> 00:35:32,200 Speaker 1: extras where we keep the tape rolling and continue chatting 679 00:35:32,200 --> 00:35:37,040 Speaker 1: about all things value, et F and divinend oriented. Be 680 00:35:37,120 --> 00:35:39,319 Speaker 1: sure to check out my daily column. You can see 681 00:35:39,360 --> 00:35:42,600 Speaker 1: that at Bloomberg view dot com. Follow me on Twitter 682 00:35:42,800 --> 00:35:46,719 Speaker 1: at Hults. I'm Barry Riholts. You're listening to Masters in 683 00:35:46,760 --> 00:36:02,680 Speaker 1: Business on Bloomberg Radio. Welcome to the podcast. Jeremy. Thank 684 00:36:02,760 --> 00:36:05,000 Speaker 1: you so much for doing this. We have been talking 685 00:36:05,160 --> 00:36:07,799 Speaker 1: about doing this for like a year and a half. 686 00:36:07,800 --> 00:36:09,200 Speaker 1: I'm like, oh, I have to get you on the 687 00:36:09,200 --> 00:36:12,560 Speaker 1: show for for forever. So I'm so glad we managed 688 00:36:13,120 --> 00:36:16,839 Speaker 1: um to get in to get you in. And by 689 00:36:16,880 --> 00:36:20,080 Speaker 1: the way, Medina and you could keep this in that 690 00:36:20,400 --> 00:36:25,120 Speaker 1: last conversation where he was describing Junior Jeremy in the intro. 691 00:36:25,800 --> 00:36:29,160 Speaker 1: I love that we should keep that on the broadcast portion. 692 00:36:30,760 --> 00:36:33,360 Speaker 1: So just just not or say yes or something, and 693 00:36:33,400 --> 00:36:39,919 Speaker 1: I'm fine. Um So, so anyway, let's talk a little 694 00:36:39,960 --> 00:36:44,239 Speaker 1: more about Siegel, because I'm endlessly amused by him. In 695 00:36:44,320 --> 00:36:47,439 Speaker 1: full disclosure, I used to bust his chops heading into 696 00:36:47,440 --> 00:36:51,680 Speaker 1: O eight o nine about um, just buy and hold 697 00:36:51,719 --> 00:36:54,040 Speaker 1: and kind of forget to me. The O eight o 698 00:36:54,160 --> 00:36:57,759 Speaker 1: nine crisis was You're never gonna call every crisis, but 699 00:36:57,880 --> 00:37:00,560 Speaker 1: dear Lord, you can if you looked. I used to 700 00:37:00,560 --> 00:37:04,759 Speaker 1: call it the leaping dolphin. Remember the three D pictures 701 00:37:04,760 --> 00:37:07,239 Speaker 1: people used to have on the wall, the posters where 702 00:37:07,239 --> 00:37:09,480 Speaker 1: it didn't look like anything, but if you caught it 703 00:37:09,520 --> 00:37:12,400 Speaker 1: at just the right angle, Oh, there's the leaping dolphin. 704 00:37:12,440 --> 00:37:15,400 Speaker 1: That That's kind of how I felt about the last crisis. 705 00:37:15,760 --> 00:37:22,359 Speaker 1: But full full disclosure, I'm endlessly impressed, entertained, amused by 706 00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:27,360 Speaker 1: Siegell for so many reasons. Him and Bob Shiller buddies. 707 00:37:27,400 --> 00:37:30,359 Speaker 1: Are there two more opposite personalities. I've got a great 708 00:37:30,360 --> 00:37:33,399 Speaker 1: story on sea so um in a way of when 709 00:37:33,440 --> 00:37:35,640 Speaker 1: I was courting my wife. So my wife likes to 710 00:37:35,719 --> 00:37:39,040 Speaker 1: joke that, you know, I met her in two thousand one, 711 00:37:39,200 --> 00:37:41,200 Speaker 1: and I met the love of my my true life, 712 00:37:41,200 --> 00:37:42,919 Speaker 1: of my life in two thousand one, which is when 713 00:37:42,960 --> 00:37:45,759 Speaker 1: I started working for Siegel also, but you know that 714 00:37:45,800 --> 00:37:48,480 Speaker 1: first summer I started working for him, she was taking 715 00:37:48,480 --> 00:37:51,600 Speaker 1: a class where she had to do a book report 716 00:37:51,800 --> 00:37:57,359 Speaker 1: reviewing and contrasting Irrational Exuberance with which Bob Schiller's book 717 00:37:57,400 --> 00:38:01,839 Speaker 1: where he had had briefed Um green Span in ninety six, 718 00:38:01,920 --> 00:38:04,120 Speaker 1: and then green Span went out and gave the Irrational 719 00:38:04,239 --> 00:38:08,439 Speaker 1: Zuberan speech based on Schiller's work, and then Schiller named 720 00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:11,000 Speaker 1: the book Irrational Zuberans. Yeah, And so you know, they 721 00:38:11,000 --> 00:38:13,440 Speaker 1: talked about how they vacation together. So on one of 722 00:38:13,440 --> 00:38:16,760 Speaker 1: those two thousand one summer vacations there in Ocean City, 723 00:38:17,000 --> 00:38:19,640 Speaker 1: Segul invited me to a barbecue and stay with them 724 00:38:19,640 --> 00:38:21,879 Speaker 1: for the weekend. In Ocean City. Schiller was coming down, 725 00:38:21,920 --> 00:38:24,080 Speaker 1: The New York Times was coming to profile and they 726 00:38:24,320 --> 00:38:26,040 Speaker 1: did the walks on the beach with the New York 727 00:38:26,080 --> 00:38:29,040 Speaker 1: Times Profile, And so I got to invite my wife 728 00:38:29,080 --> 00:38:31,799 Speaker 1: to the she was my girlfriend obviously at the time, 729 00:38:32,280 --> 00:38:34,880 Speaker 1: just to impress to the barbecue, and she had to 730 00:38:34,920 --> 00:38:37,480 Speaker 1: be she was doing this book report on Irrational zuber 731 00:38:38,320 --> 00:38:41,560 Speaker 1: and she tells the professor, I have to miss class. 732 00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:43,920 Speaker 1: I'm going to this barbecue with siegu and Schiller and 733 00:38:44,480 --> 00:38:47,520 Speaker 1: can I come? But she got to, you know, she 734 00:38:47,560 --> 00:38:50,960 Speaker 1: wrote her paper and she was giving examples of we 735 00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:53,520 Speaker 1: went to Atlantic City and they're playing black jack and 736 00:38:53,560 --> 00:38:56,480 Speaker 1: Siegel was into black jack, playing the cards, best odds 737 00:38:56,520 --> 00:38:59,239 Speaker 1: in the house, and Schiller didn't even you know, didn't 738 00:38:59,239 --> 00:39:01,200 Speaker 1: want to play the black chacked tables. And she put 739 00:39:01,280 --> 00:39:03,400 Speaker 1: that in her paper on the stories of how even 740 00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:07,080 Speaker 1: they're gambling. You know, Siegel embraced the risk of liking 741 00:39:07,120 --> 00:39:09,240 Speaker 1: to play black shack and Chiller was so risk averse 742 00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:11,759 Speaker 1: and didn't want to play blackjack. She gotten you know, 743 00:39:11,800 --> 00:39:14,680 Speaker 1: eight plus on the paper. But that was, you know, 744 00:39:14,760 --> 00:39:16,839 Speaker 1: in an interesting time. So that's those stories of them 745 00:39:16,920 --> 00:39:20,640 Speaker 1: vacation together are real. Um. And actually my first project 746 00:39:20,719 --> 00:39:23,160 Speaker 1: where I got to show Siegel my writing was also 747 00:39:23,160 --> 00:39:26,719 Speaker 1: really to Bob Schiller. So in what way go explain that? 748 00:39:26,840 --> 00:39:30,040 Speaker 1: So Stocks to the Long Run you know, came out, 749 00:39:30,440 --> 00:39:32,399 Speaker 1: he did the second dition. I was working with him 750 00:39:32,400 --> 00:39:34,560 Speaker 1: on the two thousand two edition, and right after I 751 00:39:34,640 --> 00:39:37,000 Speaker 1: spent the weekend or you know that vacation, I said, 752 00:39:37,560 --> 00:39:39,560 Speaker 1: you know, of all the stuff topics you have in 753 00:39:39,600 --> 00:39:42,680 Speaker 1: socks long when you have nothing on behavioral finance. Um, 754 00:39:42,719 --> 00:39:45,799 Speaker 1: and your best friend is Bob Schiller. Come on, and 755 00:39:45,840 --> 00:39:49,400 Speaker 1: you wrote a paper with Richard Taylor, and Faylor just 756 00:39:49,440 --> 00:39:51,439 Speaker 1: won the Nobel Prize for a lot of his work, 757 00:39:51,480 --> 00:39:54,080 Speaker 1: and Siegel and Taylor had collaborated on some work together. 758 00:39:54,320 --> 00:39:56,120 Speaker 1: So I said, let's you should add a chapter. And 759 00:39:56,160 --> 00:39:59,279 Speaker 1: he's always had quantz and math people, but he never 760 00:39:59,320 --> 00:40:01,520 Speaker 1: had a writer. Um, So I said, why don't you 761 00:40:01,600 --> 00:40:03,520 Speaker 1: let me take a stab at it? And so I 762 00:40:03,560 --> 00:40:06,600 Speaker 1: wrote the behavioral finance chapter for a Doctor long Run. 763 00:40:07,040 --> 00:40:08,520 Speaker 1: And you could see if you read it, it's very 764 00:40:08,560 --> 00:40:10,360 Speaker 1: different than any other chapter in the book. Is actually 765 00:40:10,360 --> 00:40:13,279 Speaker 1: written as a conversation between a psychologist. You know, a 766 00:40:13,280 --> 00:40:16,000 Speaker 1: couple goes to their psychologists and having all these behavioral 767 00:40:16,000 --> 00:40:19,400 Speaker 1: issues and the psychologist walks him through all their behavioral 768 00:40:19,440 --> 00:40:21,040 Speaker 1: finance problems. You can see it's very different than the 769 00:40:21,080 --> 00:40:23,480 Speaker 1: rest of the book. That that that's so funny. You know. 770 00:40:24,120 --> 00:40:26,759 Speaker 1: I have a number of Schiller stories, but the only 771 00:40:26,800 --> 00:40:29,800 Speaker 1: one I want to share is after he did the show, 772 00:40:30,400 --> 00:40:33,080 Speaker 1: I wasn't gonna put Bob Schiller on on a subway. 773 00:40:33,120 --> 00:40:34,880 Speaker 1: He had to go somewhere else. So I got a 774 00:40:34,920 --> 00:40:38,759 Speaker 1: car and I took him in a cab pouring rain, 775 00:40:39,719 --> 00:40:41,719 Speaker 1: tons of traffic. I was afraid we're gonna be late, 776 00:40:42,040 --> 00:40:44,040 Speaker 1: but he gets into the back of the cab and 777 00:40:44,120 --> 00:40:47,759 Speaker 1: immediately puts on a seatbelt, and I'm like, Ah, this 778 00:40:47,880 --> 00:40:51,000 Speaker 1: is a person who really understands risk. Yeah, you can 779 00:40:51,040 --> 00:40:53,880 Speaker 1: see carry throughout there all all their lives. So so 780 00:40:54,000 --> 00:40:56,120 Speaker 1: let's talk a little bit about segull. I have a 781 00:40:56,120 --> 00:40:59,640 Speaker 1: couple of seagulls stories. Also, I really enjoy him. When 782 00:40:59,680 --> 00:41:02,160 Speaker 1: he was on the podcast. I think it was the 783 00:41:02,160 --> 00:41:04,840 Speaker 1: first time I met him in person, as opposed to 784 00:41:05,320 --> 00:41:08,839 Speaker 1: a disembodied head on tv um or a voice in 785 00:41:08,840 --> 00:41:11,680 Speaker 1: in an in an earpiece while you're debating him about something. 786 00:41:12,280 --> 00:41:16,000 Speaker 1: And the only way I could really describe him is 787 00:41:16,880 --> 00:41:20,879 Speaker 1: filled with childlike wonders. Am I overstating that at all? 788 00:41:21,040 --> 00:41:24,000 Speaker 1: I mean his passion for teaching, his passion for the markets. 789 00:41:24,200 --> 00:41:26,960 Speaker 1: It's just that's what gets people excited. I mean why 790 00:41:27,000 --> 00:41:29,640 Speaker 1: he's the most popular professor at Wharton, And let me 791 00:41:30,040 --> 00:41:33,840 Speaker 1: stop you there. Year after year he is consistently voted 792 00:41:33,880 --> 00:41:37,520 Speaker 1: by Wharton students their favorite professor, and in the NBA 793 00:41:37,680 --> 00:41:40,000 Speaker 1: World you have to pay for your classes, so it's 794 00:41:40,040 --> 00:41:41,879 Speaker 1: a real market based system. If you have a certain 795 00:41:41,920 --> 00:41:44,360 Speaker 1: number of points, you can allocate it. And I remember 796 00:41:44,360 --> 00:41:47,280 Speaker 1: when this was. I haven't kept tracked with the points, 797 00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:49,200 Speaker 1: but when I was there, he was always the most 798 00:41:49,360 --> 00:41:53,160 Speaker 1: highly bid professor. And it's why it's while he starts 799 00:41:53,360 --> 00:41:55,880 Speaker 1: his class, his first half hour of every class is 800 00:41:55,960 --> 00:41:57,960 Speaker 1: essentially just to look at the markets, and he that 801 00:41:58,080 --> 00:42:01,360 Speaker 1: day he has his Bloomberg term know up, He's walking 802 00:42:01,400 --> 00:42:04,880 Speaker 1: through what's going on news wise, and so it's the 803 00:42:04,880 --> 00:42:06,360 Speaker 1: only you go to Wharton and you think this is 804 00:42:06,360 --> 00:42:08,400 Speaker 1: the most practical thing to learn about the markets, but 805 00:42:08,440 --> 00:42:11,560 Speaker 1: it's really the only class that actually does really go 806 00:42:11,640 --> 00:42:14,520 Speaker 1: through what's happy in the real time, actual market. And 807 00:42:14,680 --> 00:42:16,880 Speaker 1: looking at the other thing about him that I found 808 00:42:16,880 --> 00:42:20,239 Speaker 1: so amusing, he look, we go a little long the 809 00:42:20,280 --> 00:42:24,680 Speaker 1: whole ideas. These are deeper dive conversations. He's sitting where 810 00:42:24,719 --> 00:42:28,279 Speaker 1: you were sitting, and about an hour into the conversation 811 00:42:28,320 --> 00:42:31,160 Speaker 1: and I'm doing it now, he starts just you know, 812 00:42:31,200 --> 00:42:33,759 Speaker 1: it's it's swivel chair. He just starts rocking back and 813 00:42:33,800 --> 00:42:38,680 Speaker 1: forth while while gesticulating and and answering the question. And 814 00:42:38,719 --> 00:42:41,920 Speaker 1: then he started and I'm wearing just one earpiece. The 815 00:42:42,000 --> 00:42:44,960 Speaker 1: guest isn't wearing anything. He starts spinning in circles on 816 00:42:45,040 --> 00:42:49,759 Speaker 1: the It was the most amusing, charming and transing thing. 817 00:42:49,840 --> 00:42:54,440 Speaker 1: And if you listen towards the ends of the Seagull podcast, 818 00:42:54,840 --> 00:42:57,560 Speaker 1: you could kind of hear him whipping around the microphone 819 00:42:57,600 --> 00:43:01,800 Speaker 1: as he spins around, because like he really gets into 820 00:43:01,840 --> 00:43:04,360 Speaker 1: it and was he's presenting. He's pacing back and forth, 821 00:43:04,440 --> 00:43:07,799 Speaker 1: and he's like I can see him jumping on a 822 00:43:07,920 --> 00:43:11,200 Speaker 1: desk and waving his arms. He gets animated. That's for sure. 823 00:43:11,480 --> 00:43:14,800 Speaker 1: That that's that's really interesting. Um, So let's talk a 824 00:43:14,840 --> 00:43:17,720 Speaker 1: little b about some of the things we missed during 825 00:43:17,719 --> 00:43:20,759 Speaker 1: the broadcast. There were a couple of questions I had 826 00:43:20,800 --> 00:43:23,600 Speaker 1: to ask you because, uh, we talked about a lot 827 00:43:23,600 --> 00:43:28,320 Speaker 1: of things we hardly mentioned. Some guy named Michael Steinhardt, 828 00:43:29,280 --> 00:43:35,239 Speaker 1: legendary investor, uh, founder of Wisdom Tree. Tell us about 829 00:43:35,400 --> 00:43:38,800 Speaker 1: his role with the creation and development of the country 830 00:43:38,880 --> 00:43:43,200 Speaker 1: of the company and what sort of working relationship you 831 00:43:43,239 --> 00:43:45,080 Speaker 1: have with him. So I would say, he's the chairman 832 00:43:45,120 --> 00:43:47,560 Speaker 1: of the company. He was the original backer and the 833 00:43:47,680 --> 00:43:51,120 Speaker 1: sort of he funded the company. So Jonathan Steinberg was 834 00:43:51,200 --> 00:43:54,600 Speaker 1: in Luciana Sasano was their intellectual property stort, developing the 835 00:43:54,640 --> 00:43:58,840 Speaker 1: firm after the magazine initial investor group. But Michael, you know, 836 00:43:58,880 --> 00:44:01,360 Speaker 1: he hadn't done anything. He had retired, He closed his 837 00:44:01,480 --> 00:44:04,680 Speaker 1: fund after literally starting the hedge fund industry, hadn't the 838 00:44:04,680 --> 00:44:08,200 Speaker 1: best for twenty nine years, I think something like returned 839 00:44:08,520 --> 00:44:11,279 Speaker 1: an incredible track record, and then he closed the fund 840 00:44:11,280 --> 00:44:16,080 Speaker 1: in ninety four, dedicated his life to charity, Like you 841 00:44:16,160 --> 00:44:19,640 Speaker 1: still have seven years of a booming bullmarket. He's like, nope, 842 00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:23,040 Speaker 1: I'm done. Yeah, he just he That's another story for 843 00:44:23,040 --> 00:44:26,040 Speaker 1: another day. But he closed it. He didn't do anything 844 00:44:26,120 --> 00:44:29,200 Speaker 1: finance wise. He was giving back, giving his money to charity, 845 00:44:29,320 --> 00:44:32,040 Speaker 1: and he didn't do anything literally in finance until Wisdom 846 00:44:32,120 --> 00:44:35,279 Speaker 1: Tree uh in decade later, two thousand four year, so 847 00:44:35,280 --> 00:44:37,560 Speaker 1: he met John oh and John O was had the 848 00:44:37,600 --> 00:44:39,880 Speaker 1: idea about the et F structure and and really this 849 00:44:39,920 --> 00:44:43,880 Speaker 1: better way performance based indexing was his concept, and Michael was. 850 00:44:44,360 --> 00:44:45,919 Speaker 1: I mean, there's a story I remember from the early 851 00:44:46,000 --> 00:44:48,520 Speaker 1: days that Michael said, you know, if I was presented 852 00:44:48,520 --> 00:44:51,440 Speaker 1: with the opportunity to fund Vanguard, I would have that 853 00:44:51,560 --> 00:44:53,759 Speaker 1: I would not have. He would not have because he 854 00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:56,440 Speaker 1: was not about tracking the market. He was about beating 855 00:44:56,440 --> 00:44:58,840 Speaker 1: the market and he wanted he saw this idea of 856 00:44:58,880 --> 00:45:02,560 Speaker 1: trying to generate better performance, a very performance oriented culture, 857 00:45:03,040 --> 00:45:05,800 Speaker 1: and so that's what really inspired him to get involved 858 00:45:05,800 --> 00:45:08,239 Speaker 1: with JOHNO and John Oh you know, linked it up 859 00:45:08,280 --> 00:45:10,799 Speaker 1: with Siegel and we helped validate their initial research and 860 00:45:10,840 --> 00:45:13,520 Speaker 1: gave some academic back into why we think this could 861 00:45:13,520 --> 00:45:16,040 Speaker 1: work going forward and that there was something to this. 862 00:45:16,520 --> 00:45:19,040 Speaker 1: And that's how the that sort of trinity came together 863 00:45:19,080 --> 00:45:22,360 Speaker 1: of Steinhardt funding, Professor Siegel joining and also fund to 864 00:45:22,360 --> 00:45:24,600 Speaker 1: get back and back in a four and joining the 865 00:45:24,680 --> 00:45:27,279 Speaker 1: senior advisor, and then they brought me on together. But 866 00:45:27,360 --> 00:45:31,160 Speaker 1: it's it's um, it was that performance oriented mindset that 867 00:45:31,200 --> 00:45:36,279 Speaker 1: Steinhardt really wasn't inspired by. H That's quite fascinating. And 868 00:45:36,440 --> 00:45:40,280 Speaker 1: I don't know Jonathan stein but I know his father 869 00:45:40,960 --> 00:45:44,560 Speaker 1: was Soul Stein, who ran Reliance Insurance. This is back 870 00:45:44,560 --> 00:45:47,279 Speaker 1: in the eighties and nineties, way back when. Yeah, and 871 00:45:47,320 --> 00:45:49,360 Speaker 1: I didn't really get to know Saul, but in the 872 00:45:49,440 --> 00:45:51,239 Speaker 1: in this in this small world, um, you know, I 873 00:45:51,360 --> 00:45:53,240 Speaker 1: used to work in the Steinberg teacher call at Wharton 874 00:45:53,360 --> 00:45:56,840 Speaker 1: and Professor Siegel is the shared by Saul Steinberg. So 875 00:45:56,840 --> 00:46:00,399 Speaker 1: it's a small, interconnected world of how it all comes together. Um, 876 00:46:00,440 --> 00:46:03,160 Speaker 1: but yeah, it's been. It's been a great relationship. And 877 00:46:03,520 --> 00:46:06,720 Speaker 1: he's also one of these passionate about et s, passionate 878 00:46:06,719 --> 00:46:08,560 Speaker 1: about what we're doing, and really is assembled just a 879 00:46:08,600 --> 00:46:12,399 Speaker 1: remarkable team at with some tree. So you guys are 880 00:46:12,400 --> 00:46:16,520 Speaker 1: so valuation oriented, I would be remiss if I did 881 00:46:16,560 --> 00:46:21,960 Speaker 1: not ask you about valuations of stocks and bonds. First, 882 00:46:22,000 --> 00:46:24,680 Speaker 1: since we talked about Chiller, let's talk about the cape ratio. 883 00:46:25,160 --> 00:46:29,160 Speaker 1: Does the cape ratio tell the full story? Um, it's 884 00:46:29,200 --> 00:46:32,400 Speaker 1: a it's a it's a complicated question there. Um you 885 00:46:32,440 --> 00:46:34,120 Speaker 1: know it's Siegel has done a lot of work on this, 886 00:46:34,320 --> 00:46:36,480 Speaker 1: and which I find, by the way, I find hilarious 887 00:46:36,520 --> 00:46:39,360 Speaker 1: that the two of them are arguing in white papers, 888 00:46:39,760 --> 00:46:42,960 Speaker 1: good naturedly about what is the value of the cape? 889 00:46:43,000 --> 00:46:44,919 Speaker 1: Is it worth something? Is it not worth a lot? 890 00:46:45,440 --> 00:46:47,800 Speaker 1: Is it just here you're expected returns? Or does it 891 00:46:47,920 --> 00:46:51,960 Speaker 1: really give us buying cell signals? And Siegel loves the framework. 892 00:46:52,040 --> 00:46:54,399 Speaker 1: He thinks that it has been one of the better 893 00:46:54,440 --> 00:46:57,920 Speaker 1: predictors of long term returns. He thinks the earnings numbers 894 00:46:57,920 --> 00:47:01,680 Speaker 1: are biased and that is creating problems. So counting numbers 895 00:47:01,800 --> 00:47:04,920 Speaker 1: changed the O nine crisis, which is still in the CAPE. Basically, 896 00:47:05,000 --> 00:47:07,719 Speaker 1: three firms wiped out all of the earnings of the spire. 897 00:47:07,800 --> 00:47:10,279 Speaker 1: They were small firms. Wait to say that again? Three 898 00:47:10,360 --> 00:47:13,160 Speaker 1: How is that possible? Three firms wiped out all of 899 00:47:13,200 --> 00:47:16,319 Speaker 1: the earnings of the sp basically Bank of America's City 900 00:47:16,320 --> 00:47:19,160 Speaker 1: Group A I G. The way they do not exactly 901 00:47:19,160 --> 00:47:21,600 Speaker 1: small firms, no, but but at the time they were 902 00:47:21,800 --> 00:47:24,600 Speaker 1: by market value, they were small by market values, almost 903 00:47:24,719 --> 00:47:29,239 Speaker 1: giant companies with the so so go go. We'll go 904 00:47:29,280 --> 00:47:31,920 Speaker 1: through an example here, but by market value they were 905 00:47:31,920 --> 00:47:34,520 Speaker 1: small at the time, and they destroyed all of the earnings. 906 00:47:34,880 --> 00:47:38,680 Speaker 1: So you're investing, and take a simple to stock example 907 00:47:38,719 --> 00:47:42,560 Speaker 1: the city and but take a simple example you have 908 00:47:43,320 --> 00:47:46,880 Speaker 1: of your portfolio. Okay, let's say you have a hundred 909 00:47:47,360 --> 00:47:51,000 Speaker 1: forty billion ten billion dollars. One firm is is ten 910 00:47:51,040 --> 00:47:55,320 Speaker 1: billion of profits, another firm is is negative nine billion, okay, 911 00:47:55,520 --> 00:47:59,000 Speaker 1: and the first one So you have a hundred fifty 912 00:47:59,000 --> 00:48:01,840 Speaker 1: billion market cap set and firm nagative nine billion profits 913 00:48:01,880 --> 00:48:05,000 Speaker 1: called ten billion. So you have one billion of total 914 00:48:05,040 --> 00:48:08,959 Speaker 1: profits for the combined firm hundred sixty billion market cap. 915 00:48:09,200 --> 00:48:13,160 Speaker 1: So is your p D sixty, or is your pe 916 00:48:13,719 --> 00:48:17,600 Speaker 1: of your portfolio at what is the trooper? What is 917 00:48:17,600 --> 00:48:20,000 Speaker 1: the troop or folio P? And the way S and 918 00:48:20,040 --> 00:48:23,640 Speaker 1: P does their earnings is dollar for dollar, and so 919 00:48:23,760 --> 00:48:26,480 Speaker 1: that's makes sense. It's a it's a problem in the 920 00:48:26,520 --> 00:48:29,080 Speaker 1: way of the accounting on the on the P ratios. 921 00:48:29,120 --> 00:48:31,799 Speaker 1: So so here's the pushback on that. When you look 922 00:48:31,840 --> 00:48:37,239 Speaker 1: across the universe of earnings. Let's let's hold McDonald's and 923 00:48:37,320 --> 00:48:41,000 Speaker 1: g e Aside, who absolutely in the recession, so we're 924 00:48:41,000 --> 00:48:43,560 Speaker 1: an earnings crunched, but they still were on the green 925 00:48:43,600 --> 00:48:47,000 Speaker 1: side of the ledger more or less. But you have 926 00:48:47,600 --> 00:48:50,680 Speaker 1: Lehman Brothers going to zero when Bear Sterns earnings you know, 927 00:48:50,800 --> 00:48:54,720 Speaker 1: both of them deeply negative. And then there's a hundred 928 00:48:54,760 --> 00:48:59,560 Speaker 1: other financial related firms who saw their earnings compressed, be 929 00:48:59,640 --> 00:49:03,000 Speaker 1: it Black Rock or U B A U B S 930 00:49:03,120 --> 00:49:04,960 Speaker 1: is a A d oh, so not that, but you 931 00:49:05,000 --> 00:49:08,160 Speaker 1: could look at a ton of different Every bank, the 932 00:49:08,239 --> 00:49:11,560 Speaker 1: home builders totally one of the crapper, The broker dealers 933 00:49:11,920 --> 00:49:16,160 Speaker 1: got slacked, the community banks did really poorly. So while 934 00:49:16,239 --> 00:49:20,920 Speaker 1: those three firms had like a massively negative earnings number, 935 00:49:21,320 --> 00:49:25,840 Speaker 1: everybody else's numbers really came down or we're you know 936 00:49:25,880 --> 00:49:30,560 Speaker 1: what best flat, And that's before we start talking about industrials. 937 00:49:30,600 --> 00:49:33,120 Speaker 1: Auto sales fall off the cliff. I mean, you could 938 00:49:33,200 --> 00:49:37,080 Speaker 1: go down the list of of sectors. So while for 939 00:49:37,120 --> 00:49:40,720 Speaker 1: sure these three companies had an outsized impact, the rest 940 00:49:40,719 --> 00:49:45,560 Speaker 1: of earnings fell. Well that that's the question how much 941 00:49:45,560 --> 00:49:47,480 Speaker 1: did they really fall? And so I think if you 942 00:49:47,480 --> 00:49:51,040 Speaker 1: look at things like the niper profits um National incomproduct 943 00:49:51,080 --> 00:49:53,720 Speaker 1: account profits or their GDP numbers where they count profits, 944 00:49:53,760 --> 00:49:56,319 Speaker 1: they didn't fall anywhere near as much. And so when 945 00:49:56,360 --> 00:49:58,520 Speaker 1: you do these perations, but that's not what we use 946 00:49:58,640 --> 00:50:01,319 Speaker 1: for pe earning, the questions how do you get a 947 00:50:01,360 --> 00:50:04,080 Speaker 1: real earnings number? And what is the real earning series? 948 00:50:04,239 --> 00:50:08,040 Speaker 1: And so there's there's biases in the numbers, and you 949 00:50:08,080 --> 00:50:10,640 Speaker 1: could you could debate on how much the magnitude is. 950 00:50:10,800 --> 00:50:12,919 Speaker 1: But they changed the accounting rules, so now you're forced 951 00:50:12,960 --> 00:50:15,319 Speaker 1: to mark down losses. I mean, Buffett writes about this 952 00:50:15,320 --> 00:50:16,840 Speaker 1: all the time. He says, I can never write up 953 00:50:16,880 --> 00:50:19,040 Speaker 1: the value my assets. You can only mark down the 954 00:50:19,120 --> 00:50:21,200 Speaker 1: value of assets, and so the accounting rules are one 955 00:50:21,280 --> 00:50:24,239 Speaker 1: side of there. But they suspended that for banks right 956 00:50:24,280 --> 00:50:28,600 Speaker 1: after what was it the October o eight debacle, and 957 00:50:28,640 --> 00:50:33,040 Speaker 1: then again in um the first the whole, um, the whole. 958 00:50:33,080 --> 00:50:36,800 Speaker 1: I'm trying to remember with the which accounting rule changed, 959 00:50:37,160 --> 00:50:41,480 Speaker 1: but essentially essentially we allowed banks that you could segment them, 960 00:50:41,520 --> 00:50:43,719 Speaker 1: you don't have to write them down. So for all 961 00:50:43,760 --> 00:50:46,920 Speaker 1: we really know, these banks were insolvent and we're running 962 00:50:46,920 --> 00:50:50,880 Speaker 1: on fumes and government handouts. So I'm pushing back on 963 00:50:51,000 --> 00:50:54,919 Speaker 1: the well, things really weren't that bad, they were got awful. Then, 964 00:50:55,160 --> 00:50:57,560 Speaker 1: Oh no, I get that they're got awful, um, but 965 00:50:57,640 --> 00:51:01,200 Speaker 1: the question is that it's been a poor in the 966 00:51:01,280 --> 00:51:03,840 Speaker 1: last three years. It's certainly been a very poor predictor, 967 00:51:03,880 --> 00:51:05,840 Speaker 1: and so the question about that. So the question is, 968 00:51:05,880 --> 00:51:08,200 Speaker 1: in fact, you're you're better off buying when earnings are 969 00:51:08,200 --> 00:51:10,640 Speaker 1: worth their worst than buying when the earnings are worth 970 00:51:10,680 --> 00:51:13,000 Speaker 1: the better best. And it will kept you out of 971 00:51:13,000 --> 00:51:15,239 Speaker 1: the market for basically all but a few months, I 972 00:51:15,280 --> 00:51:17,319 Speaker 1: mean even O nine, right, a few months after the 973 00:51:17,400 --> 00:51:20,359 Speaker 1: market rebounded, oh nine, it was telling you to stay 974 00:51:20,360 --> 00:51:22,439 Speaker 1: out of the market. And the market's up to two 975 00:51:22,480 --> 00:51:24,520 Speaker 1: to three x since then. So and then the question 976 00:51:24,600 --> 00:51:26,399 Speaker 1: is at least three x in the US, to say 977 00:51:26,440 --> 00:51:29,760 Speaker 1: the least. And so you know, in terms of going forward, 978 00:51:29,800 --> 00:51:32,960 Speaker 1: how do you look at valuations today, I'd say, you know, 979 00:51:33,000 --> 00:51:36,000 Speaker 1: the S and p P s around twenty times earnings. 980 00:51:36,200 --> 00:51:37,600 Speaker 1: And this is going back and forth with Seagull, but 981 00:51:37,640 --> 00:51:39,439 Speaker 1: he would say the earning seal is close to five 982 00:51:39,440 --> 00:51:41,759 Speaker 1: percent today, and so you get a real earning seal 983 00:51:41,880 --> 00:51:46,319 Speaker 1: of five percent versus historical average of what sixteen is 984 00:51:46,360 --> 00:51:48,640 Speaker 1: the average pe. So when he says stocks are long, 985 00:51:48,640 --> 00:51:50,640 Speaker 1: when you had a six seven long term real return, 986 00:51:50,719 --> 00:51:53,279 Speaker 1: that's basically one divided by the six team. So that's 987 00:51:53,280 --> 00:51:56,120 Speaker 1: where you get the sixth six seven real return. Inverting 988 00:51:56,160 --> 00:51:58,680 Speaker 1: it will take out the zeros. It's just the earning sale. 989 00:51:58,680 --> 00:52:01,359 Speaker 1: It's just povere versus EO repeat, and so you get 990 00:52:01,400 --> 00:52:04,440 Speaker 1: six seven um today. If it's the piece twenty, you 991 00:52:04,480 --> 00:52:07,200 Speaker 1: get a five percent earning sield. You know, the historical 992 00:52:07,280 --> 00:52:11,239 Speaker 1: equity premium phrase two years of data was three. Today 993 00:52:11,520 --> 00:52:14,120 Speaker 1: the real equity you could say the real equity premium 994 00:52:14,120 --> 00:52:16,640 Speaker 1: is like four and a half because the tenure tips 995 00:52:16,719 --> 00:52:19,280 Speaker 1: is at fifty and you have a five earning sield. 996 00:52:19,840 --> 00:52:21,640 Speaker 1: And on top of that, and this is a whole 997 00:52:21,680 --> 00:52:24,839 Speaker 1: another conversation, but on top of that, when you look 998 00:52:24,880 --> 00:52:28,160 Speaker 1: at the money being thrown off by companies like Google 999 00:52:28,200 --> 00:52:31,319 Speaker 1: and Amazon and Facebook. It's not like the old days 1000 00:52:31,320 --> 00:52:33,840 Speaker 1: where you're building a railroad, you hire ten thousand people 1001 00:52:34,280 --> 00:52:38,799 Speaker 1: and buy you know, endless tonnage of steel. Look at 1002 00:52:38,880 --> 00:52:41,800 Speaker 1: look at what'sapp or look at Instagram or some of 1003 00:52:41,840 --> 00:52:44,960 Speaker 1: these other things where it's twenty people are worth five 1004 00:52:45,000 --> 00:52:47,759 Speaker 1: billion dollars and their core structure is a handful of 1005 00:52:47,840 --> 00:52:50,759 Speaker 1: laptops and some Internet connectivity. And that's the worry that 1006 00:52:50,840 --> 00:52:53,400 Speaker 1: people say, Well, margins are going to mean revert and 1007 00:52:53,600 --> 00:52:56,759 Speaker 1: they're gonna be the problem that we're at these high 1008 00:52:56,800 --> 00:52:59,480 Speaker 1: valuations and margins are are high and they're gonna head downward. 1009 00:52:59,680 --> 00:53:01,759 Speaker 1: So that the most barrish argument is that margins have 1010 00:53:01,840 --> 00:53:03,400 Speaker 1: to mean reversion, but they may not because of what 1011 00:53:03,440 --> 00:53:08,480 Speaker 1: you're saying, that different return on capital, that you just 1012 00:53:08,520 --> 00:53:10,320 Speaker 1: have a different profile. M You know, the problem with 1013 00:53:10,400 --> 00:53:12,920 Speaker 1: mean reversion is, hey, if you're waiting for mean reversion 1014 00:53:12,960 --> 00:53:16,279 Speaker 1: and the leather belt companies and steam engines, that that 1015 00:53:16,440 --> 00:53:19,960 Speaker 1: isn't happening. And you know, I always I never want 1016 00:53:19,960 --> 00:53:23,279 Speaker 1: to come across as an apologist for expensive stocks. But 1017 00:53:23,760 --> 00:53:26,359 Speaker 1: that's before you even start talking about the frictions of 1018 00:53:27,120 --> 00:53:30,319 Speaker 1: executing a trade. Buying a stock buying an ETF. It 1019 00:53:30,520 --> 00:53:33,239 Speaker 1: used to be immensely expensive to go out and just 1020 00:53:33,360 --> 00:53:35,920 Speaker 1: buy a stock. That isn't the case anymore, right, So 1021 00:53:35,960 --> 00:53:37,440 Speaker 1: if you may have had to pay more than one 1022 00:53:37,480 --> 00:53:39,920 Speaker 1: probably paid more than one to two percent to actually 1023 00:53:39,960 --> 00:53:43,200 Speaker 1: get market like portfolios and get these diversified portfolios where now, 1024 00:53:43,239 --> 00:53:45,360 Speaker 1: like we talked in the first segment, they're basically free 1025 00:53:45,440 --> 00:53:47,840 Speaker 1: to get diversification. And so how much higher should pe 1026 00:53:48,040 --> 00:53:50,560 Speaker 1: ratios be going forward compared to the past, and you 1027 00:53:50,560 --> 00:53:53,200 Speaker 1: don't have that friction, You can say you could justify 1028 00:53:53,280 --> 00:53:57,320 Speaker 1: a compared to a six ten p um And whenever 1029 00:53:57,360 --> 00:53:59,359 Speaker 1: you really did have single digit ps, you had double 1030 00:53:59,400 --> 00:54:02,160 Speaker 1: digit interest rates. So how far are we from double 1031 00:54:02,200 --> 00:54:05,440 Speaker 1: digit interest rates? So the pushback on stocks are expensive? 1032 00:54:05,480 --> 00:54:08,319 Speaker 1: Stocks are cheap? Hey, stocks are cheapest hell throughout the 1033 00:54:08,360 --> 00:54:11,200 Speaker 1: seventies because you can get ten percent in treasury. So 1034 00:54:11,280 --> 00:54:13,520 Speaker 1: why would you be invested in stole if you could 1035 00:54:13,520 --> 00:54:15,960 Speaker 1: get ten percent in treasuries today? And we gladly go 1036 00:54:16,280 --> 00:54:19,400 Speaker 1: all my portfolio bonds. But if you're getting tempercent treasuries, 1037 00:54:19,440 --> 00:54:22,200 Speaker 1: we have an inflation problem which is going to be different, 1038 00:54:22,239 --> 00:54:26,080 Speaker 1: which let's talk about bonds. So there's a huge swath 1039 00:54:26,200 --> 00:54:29,279 Speaker 1: of bond bears who have been declaring the end of 1040 00:54:29,320 --> 00:54:33,640 Speaker 1: the thirty year Paul Volcan induced bond bull market. For 1041 00:54:33,760 --> 00:54:35,839 Speaker 1: I don't know, about ten years we've been hearing this 1042 00:54:35,880 --> 00:54:39,040 Speaker 1: is the end of the bond market our bonds. By 1043 00:54:39,320 --> 00:54:43,440 Speaker 1: the way, you guys value the way Wisdom Tree values 1044 00:54:43,640 --> 00:54:46,919 Speaker 1: fixed income? Are we in a bond bubble? Well, segu 1045 00:54:47,000 --> 00:54:48,319 Speaker 1: and I had did some op eds in the Law 1046 00:54:48,320 --> 00:54:51,960 Speaker 1: Street Journal together. You don't get to choose your title 1047 00:54:52,000 --> 00:54:53,960 Speaker 1: in the Wall Street Journal. So that's true. By the way, 1048 00:54:53,960 --> 00:54:56,560 Speaker 1: for everybody who writes a column. People don't know this. 1049 00:54:57,040 --> 00:55:01,480 Speaker 1: The editors choose the headline and very often it's clicking 1050 00:55:01,520 --> 00:55:04,960 Speaker 1: and catchy, but may not reflect the nuances of what 1051 00:55:05,000 --> 00:55:07,040 Speaker 1: you wrote. And the nuance of the article was by 1052 00:55:07,120 --> 00:55:09,680 Speaker 1: different paint stocks over tips because you had a you know, 1053 00:55:09,840 --> 00:55:12,440 Speaker 1: a one percent ten year tips. The first article in 1054 00:55:13,239 --> 00:55:15,239 Speaker 1: had one percent ten year tips, and we said you 1055 00:55:15,239 --> 00:55:20,080 Speaker 1: could get stocks yielding three and six years ago. That 1056 00:55:20,120 --> 00:55:23,080 Speaker 1: worked out. That was a good, good call. The article 1057 00:55:23,120 --> 00:55:25,919 Speaker 1: is the Great American bond Bubble. So the title was, yes, 1058 00:55:25,960 --> 00:55:28,000 Speaker 1: there's this huge bubble and bonds. Because you had this 1059 00:55:28,000 --> 00:55:30,520 Speaker 1: one percent tips, then you had this negative tips shield 1060 00:55:30,520 --> 00:55:32,640 Speaker 1: you had negative one percent, which was really and which 1061 00:55:33,600 --> 00:55:36,239 Speaker 1: a few years later you had bond yields. In the 1062 00:55:36,280 --> 00:55:37,520 Speaker 1: U S. You would say, I'm going to give the 1063 00:55:37,560 --> 00:55:40,320 Speaker 1: US government a hundred dollars and get back ninety dollars 1064 00:55:40,360 --> 00:55:43,279 Speaker 1: after inflation ten years later on the expectation that it 1065 00:55:43,320 --> 00:55:47,320 Speaker 1: wasn't even disinflation, that there was full blown deflation coming away. 1066 00:55:47,400 --> 00:55:49,839 Speaker 1: It was just massive risk aversion. It's like, why would 1067 00:55:49,840 --> 00:55:52,359 Speaker 1: you give the government and take back You would never 1068 00:55:52,440 --> 00:55:54,640 Speaker 1: think you would have a ten year negative tips shield, 1069 00:55:54,800 --> 00:55:56,800 Speaker 1: but guess where you do have that today? You still 1070 00:55:56,840 --> 00:56:00,880 Speaker 1: have huge negative tips or inflation adjust body was in Europe. 1071 00:56:00,920 --> 00:56:05,920 Speaker 1: I mean Germany's tenure tips are negative, which which is 1072 00:56:05,960 --> 00:56:08,960 Speaker 1: not a surprise when you look at you had a 1073 00:56:09,000 --> 00:56:12,960 Speaker 1: financial crisis hit the whole world. But the order of 1074 00:56:13,040 --> 00:56:15,439 Speaker 1: recovery was the U S was the first and most 1075 00:56:15,480 --> 00:56:19,680 Speaker 1: aggressive responder. As much as people screamed about KWI and Zurup, 1076 00:56:20,280 --> 00:56:23,920 Speaker 1: we were the first there. Then it's arguable that Japan 1077 00:56:24,120 --> 00:56:27,120 Speaker 1: was next and Europe is still the lagger. Is that 1078 00:56:27,280 --> 00:56:29,680 Speaker 1: a fair description? Yeah? And I think even from where 1079 00:56:29,880 --> 00:56:32,080 Speaker 1: quee and monterary policy is going, you have the FED 1080 00:56:32,200 --> 00:56:35,520 Speaker 1: is quote unquote normalizing we're raising rates, we're reducing our 1081 00:56:35,520 --> 00:56:40,080 Speaker 1: balance sheet. You have Japan targeting zero yields on the tenure, 1082 00:56:40,600 --> 00:56:44,120 Speaker 1: so they sort of outsourced their monetary policy to the US. 1083 00:56:44,560 --> 00:56:47,200 Speaker 1: You have the ECB negative rates at the short end, 1084 00:56:47,320 --> 00:56:50,120 Speaker 1: you have them still aggressively expanding the balance sheet. Um, 1085 00:56:50,120 --> 00:56:52,160 Speaker 1: but you could still say, why should somebody have a 1086 00:56:52,320 --> 00:56:57,359 Speaker 1: negative inflation adjusted body for tenure? And that's a pretty 1087 00:56:57,400 --> 00:57:02,200 Speaker 1: aggressive statement that that's rational unless you're you really have 1088 00:57:02,440 --> 00:57:06,560 Speaker 1: an expectation that we're entering a period of deflation and 1089 00:57:06,600 --> 00:57:09,399 Speaker 1: your money is worth more today than tomorrow. I mean, 1090 00:57:09,440 --> 00:57:11,600 Speaker 1: that's the only way I can rationalize it. And these 1091 00:57:11,640 --> 00:57:14,240 Speaker 1: inflation adjusted yields, I mean, it's it's it's hard. It's 1092 00:57:14,280 --> 00:57:16,200 Speaker 1: just a sign of risk aversion that you don't trust 1093 00:57:16,280 --> 00:57:18,520 Speaker 1: money in the banks, that makes sense, and you don't 1094 00:57:18,520 --> 00:57:20,400 Speaker 1: want to get the negative you know, the CBS at 1095 00:57:20,400 --> 00:57:23,280 Speaker 1: negative forty and so they're they're they're sort of taxing 1096 00:57:23,280 --> 00:57:26,000 Speaker 1: your money by keeping them in and cash at the bank. 1097 00:57:27,000 --> 00:57:29,280 Speaker 1: You and I can talk about this stuff forever, but 1098 00:57:29,360 --> 00:57:32,200 Speaker 1: I only have you for a finite amount of time. 1099 00:57:32,320 --> 00:57:35,800 Speaker 1: So what say we jump to my favorite questions that 1100 00:57:35,880 --> 00:57:40,320 Speaker 1: I ask all of my guests. The first one is 1101 00:57:40,440 --> 00:57:43,880 Speaker 1: tell me something about your background that most people don't know. 1102 00:57:44,720 --> 00:57:46,400 Speaker 1: You know. So, and I think about this. I have 1103 00:57:46,480 --> 00:57:49,360 Speaker 1: two young daughters there, two and five, and you think 1104 00:57:49,360 --> 00:57:52,040 Speaker 1: about how much of where what you do at a 1105 00:57:52,040 --> 00:57:54,200 Speaker 1: young age influences You're like, you sort of think back 1106 00:57:54,240 --> 00:57:56,080 Speaker 1: to like where how do I get to where I am? 1107 00:57:56,120 --> 00:57:59,040 Speaker 1: And there's obviously the proximate causes getting linked up with 1108 00:57:59,080 --> 00:58:01,520 Speaker 1: Siegel at at Pen and how did I get hooked 1109 00:58:01,600 --> 00:58:03,040 Speaker 1: up with that and the people you met at Pen? 1110 00:58:03,400 --> 00:58:05,800 Speaker 1: But I actually go back to my dad says it 1111 00:58:05,840 --> 00:58:08,120 Speaker 1: goes back to when I was two and he would 1112 00:58:08,160 --> 00:58:10,080 Speaker 1: read me the you know, the Wall Streetjournal page in 1113 00:58:10,080 --> 00:58:12,080 Speaker 1: stock pages, showing me numbers and getting me interested in 1114 00:58:12,160 --> 00:58:15,560 Speaker 1: stocks from two years old on his knee, you know. 1115 00:58:15,680 --> 00:58:18,480 Speaker 1: So he thinks it was that that early. Um, I 1116 00:58:18,520 --> 00:58:20,840 Speaker 1: think about when did I really get good at math? 1117 00:58:21,040 --> 00:58:24,000 Speaker 1: And so when I was in first grade, Um, my 1118 00:58:24,040 --> 00:58:26,000 Speaker 1: parents moved to Baltimore for six months and I went 1119 00:58:26,040 --> 00:58:28,280 Speaker 1: to this Hebrew day school where they taught half the 1120 00:58:28,360 --> 00:58:31,160 Speaker 1: day in Hebrew and half the day in English Hebrew. 1121 00:58:31,320 --> 00:58:33,320 Speaker 1: So I spoke more Hebrew in first grade than I 1122 00:58:33,400 --> 00:58:35,480 Speaker 1: ever did ever. Again, so we moved down to Florida 1123 00:58:35,640 --> 00:58:38,160 Speaker 1: and that was end of that. But I was you 1124 00:58:38,200 --> 00:58:40,880 Speaker 1: could could have started speaking Yiddish in parts of so 1125 00:58:40,920 --> 00:58:42,840 Speaker 1: Supposedly when I moved back to South Florida, I was 1126 00:58:42,880 --> 00:58:46,720 Speaker 1: teaching people Hebrew in my class. But in first grade 1127 00:58:46,880 --> 00:58:49,560 Speaker 1: I was already in second grade math, so they accelerated me. 1128 00:58:49,560 --> 00:58:51,880 Speaker 1: And then I just always thought of myself as really 1129 00:58:51,880 --> 00:58:54,440 Speaker 1: good in math, sort of advanced from that one. You know, 1130 00:58:54,520 --> 00:58:57,920 Speaker 1: that first grade where you just get this edge from 1131 00:58:57,960 --> 00:58:59,760 Speaker 1: a different school and you transfer back to a different 1132 00:58:59,760 --> 00:59:03,960 Speaker 1: schoo And how much that then to establish my foundation 1133 00:59:04,000 --> 00:59:07,160 Speaker 1: throughout the rest of middle school, high school, college, coming 1134 00:59:07,200 --> 00:59:09,880 Speaker 1: in with a year's worth of credit so I could 1135 00:59:09,880 --> 00:59:11,840 Speaker 1: take off a year to work with Siegel. All these 1136 00:59:11,880 --> 00:59:14,480 Speaker 1: things started from basically when I was in first grade. 1137 00:59:14,800 --> 00:59:16,640 Speaker 1: You had you had an edge in first grade, and 1138 00:59:16,680 --> 00:59:19,040 Speaker 1: you just carried that forward, never let anybody catch up. 1139 00:59:19,360 --> 00:59:21,600 Speaker 1: I mean, it's it's hard to but I think it 1140 00:59:21,640 --> 00:59:24,960 Speaker 1: does carry all the way back there. So here's a 1141 00:59:25,040 --> 00:59:29,480 Speaker 1: silly question for you, but I'm assuming we can expand 1142 00:59:29,520 --> 00:59:32,800 Speaker 1: on it. Who are your early mentors and feel free 1143 00:59:32,800 --> 00:59:36,400 Speaker 1: to talk about Siegel although we've really discussed him a lot. 1144 00:59:36,480 --> 00:59:39,720 Speaker 1: At what you want or or describe other mentors. Yeah, 1145 00:59:39,760 --> 00:59:41,840 Speaker 1: I mean, so he's obviously been the number one that 1146 00:59:41,920 --> 00:59:44,520 Speaker 1: shaped the last twenty years. Um. I think one of 1147 00:59:44,560 --> 00:59:47,600 Speaker 1: the things that I hope to embody UM is he 1148 00:59:47,600 --> 00:59:49,880 Speaker 1: he said to me, you know, despite all he had 1149 00:59:49,920 --> 00:59:52,480 Speaker 1: obviously was successful from the books and the speaking and 1150 00:59:52,480 --> 00:59:55,200 Speaker 1: then wisdom he took it to another level. But he 1151 00:59:55,280 --> 01:00:01,800 Speaker 1: told me once that despite all that success, se um like, 1152 01:00:01,840 --> 01:00:04,400 Speaker 1: the impact he had on me over time was like 1153 01:00:04,480 --> 01:00:07,640 Speaker 1: just more even more rewarding. So I hope to have 1154 01:00:07,760 --> 01:00:10,320 Speaker 1: that influence on people who work with me. And so 1155 01:00:10,880 --> 01:00:13,600 Speaker 1: for I'm sure that my team is listening in when 1156 01:00:13,600 --> 01:00:15,600 Speaker 1: the podcast comes out, I hope to have that influence 1157 01:00:15,640 --> 01:00:18,560 Speaker 1: on them. And uh, you know, you have to embrace 1158 01:00:18,600 --> 01:00:20,000 Speaker 1: it like I embrace it with him, and you gotta 1159 01:00:20,080 --> 01:00:22,360 Speaker 1: push me to hopefully know my team tries to take 1160 01:00:22,360 --> 01:00:24,480 Speaker 1: me up on that. Beyond that, I mean the co 1161 01:00:24,560 --> 01:00:28,760 Speaker 1: founder's Wisdom Tree Jonathan Steinberg, which Channa Circustano gave a 1162 01:00:28,840 --> 01:00:31,240 Speaker 1: trust in me at a young age. I mean I 1163 01:00:31,280 --> 01:00:33,360 Speaker 1: was when I joined them twenty two years old, twenty 1164 01:00:33,400 --> 01:00:35,440 Speaker 1: three years old, and they made me head of research 1165 01:00:35,480 --> 01:00:38,920 Speaker 1: for his twenty seven managing a few billion dollars. So 1166 01:00:39,040 --> 01:00:43,800 Speaker 1: the trust and confidence in just seeing talent and trying 1167 01:00:43,800 --> 01:00:45,760 Speaker 1: to help you put them in a position to do well. 1168 01:00:46,000 --> 01:00:49,120 Speaker 1: Was was unbelievable. So they've mentored me in in unbelievable ways, 1169 01:00:49,800 --> 01:00:52,360 Speaker 1: um and and Seorat of I try to aspire to be. 1170 01:00:52,600 --> 01:00:55,800 Speaker 1: I mean, John O, our CEO, is really unbelievable character 1171 01:00:55,920 --> 01:00:58,800 Speaker 1: and it really leads us in a way that just 1172 01:00:58,840 --> 01:01:01,240 Speaker 1: what he's been able to overcome in terms of building 1173 01:01:01,280 --> 01:01:03,520 Speaker 1: Wisdom Tree, I mean, it's the odds were definitely stacked 1174 01:01:03,520 --> 01:01:07,240 Speaker 1: against him, and he's just built this incredible team and 1175 01:01:07,280 --> 01:01:10,520 Speaker 1: motivated us all to rally around it and keeps us 1176 01:01:10,560 --> 01:01:14,440 Speaker 1: motivated every day. So let's talk about investors. What investors 1177 01:01:14,640 --> 01:01:22,280 Speaker 1: influenced your approach to markets? Valuation, ETFs, etcetera. UM, some 1178 01:01:22,320 --> 01:01:24,600 Speaker 1: of the standards, I mean, it's very value based investing. 1179 01:01:24,640 --> 01:01:27,520 Speaker 1: So it's it's you know, you've read everything Buffets written 1180 01:01:27,600 --> 01:01:30,880 Speaker 1: and so the Behavioral Finance Crew from Failure and all 1181 01:01:30,960 --> 01:01:34,160 Speaker 1: all that he's written on on behavioral finance Schiller and 1182 01:01:34,280 --> 01:01:36,800 Speaker 1: that it's it's it's a it's a standard thing in 1183 01:01:37,120 --> 01:01:41,640 Speaker 1: the value quality type investing is a lot of it. UM. 1184 01:01:41,720 --> 01:01:44,040 Speaker 1: The one of the books I remember and he's they're 1185 01:01:44,040 --> 01:01:46,160 Speaker 1: also getting a great following now. You know, in terms 1186 01:01:46,160 --> 01:01:48,640 Speaker 1: of the quant finance group, you know, you've read things 1187 01:01:48,640 --> 01:01:52,360 Speaker 1: like What Works on Wall Street from the O'shaughnessys. That 1188 01:01:52,400 --> 01:01:54,320 Speaker 1: was one of the first books I read with working 1189 01:01:54,320 --> 01:01:56,520 Speaker 1: with Siegel, So all those, So it's a lot of 1190 01:01:56,560 --> 01:02:00,320 Speaker 1: the standard quant value quality type folks. So let's let's 1191 01:02:00,320 --> 01:02:05,080 Speaker 1: talk about books. This is everybody's favorite, UM question. I'm 1192 01:02:05,080 --> 01:02:08,800 Speaker 1: going to put down O Sam's What Works on Wall Street? 1193 01:02:08,840 --> 01:02:12,240 Speaker 1: What are some of your favorite books? By the way, fiction, nonfiction, 1194 01:02:12,320 --> 01:02:15,520 Speaker 1: investment related, whatever? What? What do you what have you 1195 01:02:15,600 --> 01:02:18,880 Speaker 1: enjoyed reading? What are you reading now? Yeah? And and 1196 01:02:18,520 --> 01:02:21,320 Speaker 1: and there's actually an overlap there from from O. Sam. 1197 01:02:21,400 --> 01:02:23,520 Speaker 1: So Patrick's reading list is probably one of my go 1198 01:02:23,640 --> 01:02:26,680 Speaker 1: to sources. UM. I think on a personal level, one 1199 01:02:26,680 --> 01:02:30,240 Speaker 1: of the books that I read that has influenced me 1200 01:02:30,280 --> 01:02:33,120 Speaker 1: in my thinking is there's a book Mountains Beyond Mountains 1201 01:02:33,200 --> 01:02:38,120 Speaker 1: from from Tracy Kidder who profiled Paul Farmer, and you 1202 01:02:38,120 --> 01:02:40,280 Speaker 1: know he it was a really moving book for me 1203 01:02:40,480 --> 01:02:43,840 Speaker 1: and as I thought about how do I become, you know, 1204 01:02:43,960 --> 01:02:47,080 Speaker 1: is there some charities to embrace? But Farmers started this group, 1205 01:02:47,120 --> 01:02:50,680 Speaker 1: Partners in Health, and it's one that I've embraced personally 1206 01:02:50,880 --> 01:02:54,080 Speaker 1: partners in health. Yeah, so he's just as a one man. 1207 01:02:54,360 --> 01:02:58,040 Speaker 1: He's a Harvard doctor goes to Haiti. That the book 1208 01:02:58,080 --> 01:03:00,120 Speaker 1: was all about his expeditions to Haiti and how is 1209 01:03:00,160 --> 01:03:02,880 Speaker 1: devoting his life to improving the health conditions in Haiti. 1210 01:03:03,320 --> 01:03:06,080 Speaker 1: But it's now expanded to their like in twelve different countries. 1211 01:03:06,120 --> 01:03:09,240 Speaker 1: But it was one that I found an O'Shaughnessy's list, 1212 01:03:09,280 --> 01:03:11,560 Speaker 1: and it's it's one that it definitely touched me and 1213 01:03:11,760 --> 01:03:13,880 Speaker 1: I sort of spread that to my friends who are 1214 01:03:13,920 --> 01:03:16,240 Speaker 1: involved in health and in health policy. It's it's a 1215 01:03:16,240 --> 01:03:19,360 Speaker 1: really fascinating book. What are you reading right now? What's 1216 01:03:19,400 --> 01:03:22,080 Speaker 1: on your nights? Then one that I think is actually 1217 01:03:22,080 --> 01:03:24,520 Speaker 1: for the next decade that I just i'm sort of 1218 01:03:24,520 --> 01:03:28,960 Speaker 1: in finishing is um Destined for War, which I Destined 1219 01:03:29,080 --> 01:03:32,080 Speaker 1: for War Wow, which is some title which I picked 1220 01:03:32,160 --> 01:03:35,120 Speaker 1: up from Kyle Bass on one of the other podcasts 1221 01:03:35,160 --> 01:03:37,800 Speaker 1: I just listened to, and so he it talks about 1222 01:03:38,400 --> 01:03:43,480 Speaker 1: it's a Graham Allison, I think is the author, and 1223 01:03:43,720 --> 01:03:48,000 Speaker 1: it talks about it really the US versus China, and 1224 01:03:48,080 --> 01:03:50,720 Speaker 1: so it's it's as you think about the two rivalries 1225 01:03:51,000 --> 01:03:54,640 Speaker 1: over the next ten years. China is ascending, It's challenging 1226 01:03:54,680 --> 01:03:58,120 Speaker 1: the US, and the book goes through the times in 1227 01:03:58,240 --> 01:04:00,919 Speaker 1: history you had these ascending rival and it's it goes 1228 01:04:00,960 --> 01:04:04,240 Speaker 1: back to Athens and Sparta, and it goes through all 1229 01:04:04,240 --> 01:04:06,480 Speaker 1: these different examples of when you had these up and 1230 01:04:06,520 --> 01:04:09,840 Speaker 1: comers rivaling. You know, the statu the embedded powers and 1231 01:04:10,160 --> 01:04:13,400 Speaker 1: attentions that creates. And I do think China's ascendance is 1232 01:04:13,400 --> 01:04:15,960 Speaker 1: one of the big stories for the next ten years, no, 1233 01:04:16,080 --> 01:04:18,840 Speaker 1: no doubt. And thank you for not using the word frenemies. 1234 01:04:18,880 --> 01:04:23,160 Speaker 1: I I we all really appreciate that. Um. So you've 1235 01:04:23,160 --> 01:04:26,440 Speaker 1: been in the industry for almost twenty years. Is that 1236 01:04:26,520 --> 01:04:29,520 Speaker 1: a fair statements? Since when did you graduate? Warden? So 1237 01:04:29,560 --> 01:04:32,400 Speaker 1: I've been working, I'd say, really I would. I would 1238 01:04:32,400 --> 01:04:34,200 Speaker 1: mark my start date of two thousand one once I 1239 01:04:34,200 --> 01:04:37,160 Speaker 1: started working for Segull, but we graduated three al right, 1240 01:04:37,200 --> 01:04:39,920 Speaker 1: So you're you're fifteen years coming up on on on 1241 01:04:40,040 --> 01:04:43,320 Speaker 1: twenty years. What do you think is the most significant 1242 01:04:43,520 --> 01:04:46,840 Speaker 1: changes that have taken place taken place over the course 1243 01:04:46,880 --> 01:04:51,600 Speaker 1: of that arc of time within the financial industry. Certainly 1244 01:04:51,760 --> 01:04:55,400 Speaker 1: ETFs have exploded, and that's right where trillion now something 1245 01:04:55,640 --> 01:04:58,480 Speaker 1: that we were three billion to ten times that, right, 1246 01:04:58,520 --> 01:05:01,040 Speaker 1: So that's certainly the one of the major trends and 1247 01:05:01,040 --> 01:05:03,760 Speaker 1: we're I'm lucky to be part of it and trying 1248 01:05:03,800 --> 01:05:05,920 Speaker 1: to shape it and try to continue to shape it. 1249 01:05:06,080 --> 01:05:09,360 Speaker 1: And certainly technology has just advanced just such remarkable space 1250 01:05:10,000 --> 01:05:12,240 Speaker 1: that that's the next ten years is gonna be all 1251 01:05:12,240 --> 01:05:18,120 Speaker 1: about how you marry technology increasingly with investments, and that's 1252 01:05:18,400 --> 01:05:20,840 Speaker 1: I hope to be part of that as well. And um, 1253 01:05:20,920 --> 01:05:22,800 Speaker 1: your ears must have been burning last week. I was 1254 01:05:22,840 --> 01:05:25,640 Speaker 1: in an e t F event, um, and your name 1255 01:05:25,680 --> 01:05:28,240 Speaker 1: had come up several times. I believe one of your 1256 01:05:28,280 --> 01:05:32,160 Speaker 1: staff members was was actually there. Um, So let's talk 1257 01:05:32,240 --> 01:05:35,360 Speaker 1: about the next major shifts. It's the rise of etf 1258 01:05:35,440 --> 01:05:38,880 Speaker 1: is is the biggest single factor over the past ten 1259 01:05:39,000 --> 01:05:42,320 Speaker 1: fifteen years. What do you think the next major change 1260 01:05:42,360 --> 01:05:48,720 Speaker 1: is gonna be. Well, everything has been broad based exposure 1261 01:05:48,800 --> 01:05:52,280 Speaker 1: so far, so you really where there's still the highest 1262 01:05:52,280 --> 01:05:54,560 Speaker 1: feet So if you think about this active passive shift, 1263 01:05:56,080 --> 01:05:59,240 Speaker 1: there hasn't been. I mean, the hedge funds is in 1264 01:05:59,320 --> 01:06:02,280 Speaker 1: some ways so the most expensive part of the market. 1265 01:06:02,280 --> 01:06:04,680 Speaker 1: Where you know, our CEO likes to say, John likes 1266 01:06:04,680 --> 01:06:06,640 Speaker 1: to say that the rich get the worst advice, and 1267 01:06:06,680 --> 01:06:09,240 Speaker 1: so they get put in this most expensive advice for sure. Yeah, 1268 01:06:09,280 --> 01:06:13,120 Speaker 1: the most expensive and worst together. Come. Come for the 1269 01:06:13,200 --> 01:06:15,520 Speaker 1: high fees, stay for the under performance and the not 1270 01:06:15,600 --> 01:06:18,760 Speaker 1: ability to get your money back, no transparency, and so 1271 01:06:19,680 --> 01:06:22,600 Speaker 1: it's it's going we're going to increasingly go after that. 1272 01:06:23,200 --> 01:06:25,600 Speaker 1: And and so we start off as very broad based beta. 1273 01:06:25,920 --> 01:06:29,040 Speaker 1: We're doing more along short, more alternatives. We're gonna go 1274 01:06:29,080 --> 01:06:32,640 Speaker 1: after that too. So alternatives being hedge funds, private equity, 1275 01:06:32,720 --> 01:06:37,640 Speaker 1: venture capital. You think that entire UM, well, private equity 1276 01:06:37,680 --> 01:06:39,880 Speaker 1: can't be in ETF al right, that's no doubt about that. 1277 01:06:39,960 --> 01:06:42,960 Speaker 1: But is that sector of the of the investment world 1278 01:06:43,280 --> 01:06:47,120 Speaker 1: ripe for disruption UM We definitely, we definitely think about that. 1279 01:06:47,200 --> 01:06:49,760 Speaker 1: We figured out how do we rope that into things 1280 01:06:49,800 --> 01:06:53,560 Speaker 1: like our advisor engine UM Investment partnership in terms of 1281 01:06:53,600 --> 01:06:57,280 Speaker 1: bringing that technology oriented to the masses. But there's gonna 1282 01:06:57,280 --> 01:06:59,200 Speaker 1: be elements of trying to I think there's more we 1283 01:06:59,200 --> 01:07:02,240 Speaker 1: can do there on the private side. But but in 1284 01:07:02,560 --> 01:07:04,520 Speaker 1: the where the public side where you can where we 1285 01:07:04,640 --> 01:07:06,440 Speaker 1: focus on the et F market, we're definitely gonna think 1286 01:07:06,440 --> 01:07:09,600 Speaker 1: about doing alternatives and long short strategies. Tell us about 1287 01:07:09,600 --> 01:07:13,400 Speaker 1: a time you've failed and what you learned from the experience. UM, 1288 01:07:13,440 --> 01:07:15,080 Speaker 1: I mean I think about our E T s. I 1289 01:07:15,080 --> 01:07:17,080 Speaker 1: mean every E t F is a little startup, and 1290 01:07:17,760 --> 01:07:19,880 Speaker 1: so we have a number of ETFs that fail. You 1291 01:07:19,920 --> 01:07:23,840 Speaker 1: close ets down, UM, you try to examine why your 1292 01:07:23,920 --> 01:07:26,960 Speaker 1: thesis when you start, UM, when you launched it, and 1293 01:07:27,040 --> 01:07:31,400 Speaker 1: it didn't gain assets attraction? What caused that? So we're 1294 01:07:31,440 --> 01:07:34,880 Speaker 1: constantly evaluating our failures and trying to learn from them 1295 01:07:34,880 --> 01:07:38,360 Speaker 1: and figure out can we do things differently over time? 1296 01:07:38,400 --> 01:07:40,520 Speaker 1: And a means of our greatest success stories have come 1297 01:07:40,560 --> 01:07:42,439 Speaker 1: from changing. As we talked about earlier on, you change 1298 01:07:42,480 --> 01:07:45,040 Speaker 1: funds that didn't take off, and you change them UM, 1299 01:07:45,400 --> 01:07:47,120 Speaker 1: and then you say, you know, why did I miss 1300 01:07:47,200 --> 01:07:49,680 Speaker 1: that segment? Things that took off that you could have 1301 01:07:49,720 --> 01:07:52,240 Speaker 1: been their positioned well for and you try to learn 1302 01:07:52,280 --> 01:07:54,800 Speaker 1: from all those things. So let me let me ask 1303 01:07:54,920 --> 01:07:58,400 Speaker 1: the part B to that question. You guys have over 1304 01:07:58,480 --> 01:08:02,480 Speaker 1: fifty different funds, how and some of them have clearly 1305 01:08:03,040 --> 01:08:05,520 Speaker 1: caught a little lightning in a bottle. They've done really well. 1306 01:08:05,880 --> 01:08:10,280 Speaker 1: How do you try and sprinkle that into a fund 1307 01:08:10,360 --> 01:08:12,560 Speaker 1: that might not be doing as well as as you 1308 01:08:12,640 --> 01:08:15,320 Speaker 1: had originally hoped for when it was launched, and I 1309 01:08:15,440 --> 01:08:18,000 Speaker 1: mean doing as well in terms of performance, I mean 1310 01:08:18,479 --> 01:08:21,680 Speaker 1: resonating with investors in attracting assets. Yeah, we close. We 1311 01:08:21,720 --> 01:08:23,559 Speaker 1: have close to a hundred funds in the US today, 1312 01:08:23,920 --> 01:08:27,240 Speaker 1: so we have a very broad menu um and they 1313 01:08:27,280 --> 01:08:29,640 Speaker 1: are all I actually view all of our ets as 1314 01:08:29,680 --> 01:08:31,960 Speaker 1: little options where your paints. You know, you're paying a 1315 01:08:32,000 --> 01:08:34,960 Speaker 1: fixed cost and you've got to figure out until they 1316 01:08:34,960 --> 01:08:37,040 Speaker 1: get to break even, and so you're paying this sort 1317 01:08:37,040 --> 01:08:40,400 Speaker 1: of option premium until they potentially can have big upside. 1318 01:08:40,760 --> 01:08:43,000 Speaker 1: And so at some point you have to say, that's 1319 01:08:43,000 --> 01:08:45,720 Speaker 1: a good way to contextualize that. It's it's right they 1320 01:08:45,720 --> 01:08:48,360 Speaker 1: either you're either willing to pay that option premium because 1321 01:08:48,360 --> 01:08:51,000 Speaker 1: you still think that option might really take off and 1322 01:08:51,000 --> 01:08:54,479 Speaker 1: then it has really big payoffs. It makes sense to me, 1323 01:08:54,840 --> 01:08:56,600 Speaker 1: and so that's really how I think about it. And 1324 01:08:56,600 --> 01:08:59,120 Speaker 1: so as long as we're still convinced there's a market opportunity, 1325 01:08:59,120 --> 01:09:01,639 Speaker 1: we you know, when we started in O six oh seven, 1326 01:09:01,680 --> 01:09:03,680 Speaker 1: we didn't have that kind of runway. We had to 1327 01:09:03,680 --> 01:09:07,320 Speaker 1: be much more careful. We have more runway today. You 1328 01:09:07,320 --> 01:09:10,479 Speaker 1: can afford to nurture things that might be a little 1329 01:09:10,640 --> 01:09:14,080 Speaker 1: pricey while internally to run it while waiting for it 1330 01:09:14,120 --> 01:09:16,880 Speaker 1: to hit break even for better because you believe in 1331 01:09:16,920 --> 01:09:19,080 Speaker 1: the you have a high degree of conviction and in 1332 01:09:19,120 --> 01:09:21,519 Speaker 1: the idea, and we do close things down. You know, 1333 01:09:21,560 --> 01:09:23,160 Speaker 1: of course from time to time when you've just given 1334 01:09:23,240 --> 01:09:24,720 Speaker 1: up and you think you've given it its time and 1335 01:09:24,760 --> 01:09:26,960 Speaker 1: you've let a play out, but you know, we want 1336 01:09:27,000 --> 01:09:29,599 Speaker 1: to try to give things to take three to five 1337 01:09:29,640 --> 01:09:31,840 Speaker 1: years before you evaluate whether or not it's really been 1338 01:09:32,479 --> 01:09:34,599 Speaker 1: why you haven't been successful, and you could still close 1339 01:09:34,640 --> 01:09:36,160 Speaker 1: things down, then you wish you didn't close it down. 1340 01:09:36,800 --> 01:09:40,639 Speaker 1: That's interesting. Alright, we're down to our last few questions. UM, 1341 01:09:40,680 --> 01:09:43,040 Speaker 1: you're a relatively young guy, so I'm going to ask 1342 01:09:43,120 --> 01:09:47,080 Speaker 1: this differently. What do you do to relax outside of 1343 01:09:47,080 --> 01:09:50,920 Speaker 1: the office. Um? And my wife got into yoga, so 1344 01:09:50,960 --> 01:09:53,800 Speaker 1: she she got teacher trained as a yoga teacher. So 1345 01:09:53,880 --> 01:09:56,800 Speaker 1: this summer's she we go down the Jersey Shore by 1346 01:09:56,800 --> 01:09:59,080 Speaker 1: the beach there and that's where we do with the 1347 01:09:59,080 --> 01:10:02,120 Speaker 1: most yoga. Um is our We have a Jersey Shore 1348 01:10:02,240 --> 01:10:06,400 Speaker 1: yoga teacher. That's it's like our guru. UM In in 1349 01:10:06,400 --> 01:10:08,559 Speaker 1: in Philly where we live, we have a pool. And 1350 01:10:08,640 --> 01:10:10,400 Speaker 1: she says, if I ever finance doesn't work out, I 1351 01:10:10,400 --> 01:10:13,360 Speaker 1: should be a swim teacher. So lovelet's spending time in 1352 01:10:13,400 --> 01:10:16,080 Speaker 1: the water with the kids, and but a combination of 1353 01:10:16,160 --> 01:10:19,760 Speaker 1: yoga walking and we did the alf architect mark for 1354 01:10:19,800 --> 01:10:21,400 Speaker 1: the fall and which was that looks fascinating. It was 1355 01:10:21,400 --> 01:10:24,719 Speaker 1: a big New York Times article about that. West is great. 1356 01:10:24,760 --> 01:10:27,200 Speaker 1: I really like everything those guys do. Yeah, so it's 1357 01:10:27,240 --> 01:10:31,760 Speaker 1: a lot of walking as well. Um, you're a relatively 1358 01:10:31,840 --> 01:10:35,400 Speaker 1: young person who graduated school not too long ago. But 1359 01:10:35,520 --> 01:10:38,360 Speaker 1: if a millennial or a recent graduate came up to 1360 01:10:38,400 --> 01:10:41,080 Speaker 1: you and said, hey, I'm interested in the career of finance, 1361 01:10:41,640 --> 01:10:44,600 Speaker 1: what sort of advice would you give them? You know, 1362 01:10:44,600 --> 01:10:46,160 Speaker 1: when I think back to how I got hooked up 1363 01:10:46,160 --> 01:10:48,839 Speaker 1: with Segell, obviously can you find that mentor who can 1364 01:10:48,920 --> 01:10:52,000 Speaker 1: be useful for you? And the keywords I used there 1365 01:10:52,040 --> 01:10:55,639 Speaker 1: when I made my pitch was free work for free. 1366 01:10:55,840 --> 01:10:58,120 Speaker 1: And in reality you should pay people because it's really 1367 01:10:58,200 --> 01:11:00,840 Speaker 1: investment in their time. But I think out interns and 1368 01:11:00,880 --> 01:11:03,760 Speaker 1: even my cost to bring an intern on. If you're 1369 01:11:03,760 --> 01:11:05,360 Speaker 1: gonna have to spend time with things, they're not gonna 1370 01:11:05,360 --> 01:11:07,679 Speaker 1: add a lot of value upfront, and so they're actually 1371 01:11:07,680 --> 01:11:10,720 Speaker 1: a drag on you versus the time. And so you 1372 01:11:10,760 --> 01:11:14,120 Speaker 1: know that's true. Um, so you want to get find 1373 01:11:14,120 --> 01:11:15,600 Speaker 1: the right people who can mentor you and get the 1374 01:11:15,680 --> 01:11:17,920 Speaker 1: right opportunity, and and you got to put in a 1375 01:11:17,920 --> 01:11:20,559 Speaker 1: lot of time and effort early on don't come. You know, 1376 01:11:20,600 --> 01:11:23,880 Speaker 1: the millennials mentalities. They're entitled, So you've got to not 1377 01:11:23,920 --> 01:11:26,640 Speaker 1: feel entitled and work hard and and and a lot 1378 01:11:26,680 --> 01:11:30,120 Speaker 1: of good things will come. And our final question, what 1379 01:11:30,320 --> 01:11:33,800 Speaker 1: is it that you know about investing, indexing E t FS, 1380 01:11:34,200 --> 01:11:38,840 Speaker 1: dividends valuation today that you wish you knew seventeen years 1381 01:11:38,840 --> 01:11:42,880 Speaker 1: ago when you first started UH divid investing. When we 1382 01:11:42,920 --> 01:11:45,439 Speaker 1: looked at history going back fifty sixty years, I mean, 1383 01:11:45,520 --> 01:11:48,720 Speaker 1: dividends did very well during most down markets. Um, the 1384 01:11:48,760 --> 01:11:51,840 Speaker 1: O eight oh nine down market financials paid a lot 1385 01:11:51,840 --> 01:11:54,320 Speaker 1: of dividends, so it was not your typical down market 1386 01:11:54,320 --> 01:11:56,599 Speaker 1: in terms of how much down market protection you've got. 1387 01:11:56,960 --> 01:11:59,519 Speaker 1: So I think I learned more about sector concentration risk 1388 01:12:00,040 --> 01:12:03,320 Speaker 1: and just the risk of overly becoming concentrate in sectors 1389 01:12:03,320 --> 01:12:06,800 Speaker 1: despite what their value signals might say. So it's something 1390 01:12:06,800 --> 01:12:11,080 Speaker 1: on sector concentrations that you know, I've tried to think 1391 01:12:11,080 --> 01:12:13,479 Speaker 1: about more over time as we developed future products, is 1392 01:12:13,520 --> 01:12:16,280 Speaker 1: what what sort of the sector biases or how can 1393 01:12:16,280 --> 01:12:18,920 Speaker 1: you control for sectors in a way that you don't 1394 01:12:18,920 --> 01:12:22,680 Speaker 1: get overloaded in those times of crisis. We have been 1395 01:12:22,720 --> 01:12:25,839 Speaker 1: speaking with Jeremy Schwartz. He is the director of research 1396 01:12:26,280 --> 01:12:30,200 Speaker 1: at Wisdom Tree Investments. Uh, thank you, Jeremy for doing this. 1397 01:12:30,240 --> 01:12:32,840 Speaker 1: I really appreciate you being so generous with your time. 1398 01:12:33,000 --> 01:12:36,160 Speaker 1: Thanks for having me. If you enjoy this conversation, be 1399 01:12:36,240 --> 01:12:38,080 Speaker 1: sure to look up and intro down an Inch on 1400 01:12:38,120 --> 01:12:40,880 Speaker 1: Apple iTunes and you could see any of the other 1401 01:12:41,000 --> 01:12:46,720 Speaker 1: hundred and fifties something previous conversations we've had. We love 1402 01:12:46,800 --> 01:12:51,960 Speaker 1: your comments, feedback, end suggestions right to us at m 1403 01:12:51,960 --> 01:12:56,000 Speaker 1: IB podcast at Bloomberg dot net. I would be remiss 1404 01:12:56,000 --> 01:12:58,920 Speaker 1: if I did not thank my crack staff who helps 1405 01:12:59,000 --> 01:13:03,200 Speaker 1: me put together these podcasts each week. Medina Parwana is 1406 01:13:03,240 --> 01:13:07,559 Speaker 1: our audio producer and engineer par Excellence. Taylor Riggs is 1407 01:13:07,560 --> 01:13:11,560 Speaker 1: in charge of booking. Michael Batnick is our head of research. 1408 01:13:12,400 --> 01:13:15,839 Speaker 1: I'm Barry Retults. You've been listening to Masters in Business 1409 01:13:16,280 --> 01:13:17,519 Speaker 1: on Bloomberg Radio