1 00:00:03,120 --> 00:00:07,760 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news. 2 00:00:08,640 --> 00:00:11,799 Speaker 2: Mohammed Mohammed became a driver for Uber and Lyft about 3 00:00:11,920 --> 00:00:14,320 Speaker 2: nine years ago. He'd been a yellow cab driver in 4 00:00:14,320 --> 00:00:17,160 Speaker 2: New York City for a decade before that, but switched 5 00:00:17,200 --> 00:00:19,360 Speaker 2: to the apps in part because they offered him more 6 00:00:19,360 --> 00:00:20,840 Speaker 2: control over his schedule. 7 00:00:21,120 --> 00:00:25,200 Speaker 3: You are very free, very flexible to have the job, 8 00:00:25,239 --> 00:00:26,239 Speaker 3: to do whatever you want. 9 00:00:26,640 --> 00:00:28,560 Speaker 2: Mohammad likes working mornings. 10 00:00:28,800 --> 00:00:33,640 Speaker 3: I wake up five o'clock, six o'clock after the early prayer. 11 00:00:34,159 --> 00:00:37,400 Speaker 3: Then I keep working until one two o'clock, three o'clock. 12 00:00:37,760 --> 00:00:40,600 Speaker 2: Nearly every day for the past nine years, that was 13 00:00:40,640 --> 00:00:46,040 Speaker 2: Mohammed's schedule, wake up, pray, drive. He'd open the Uber 14 00:00:46,080 --> 00:00:48,519 Speaker 2: app on his phone, press the big go button that 15 00:00:48,600 --> 00:00:51,959 Speaker 2: signals he's ready for passengers, and start picking people up 16 00:00:52,120 --> 00:00:56,400 Speaker 2: around the city until this summer in August. 17 00:00:56,840 --> 00:01:00,920 Speaker 1: He clicks go and nothing happens, and in staid he 18 00:01:01,000 --> 00:01:03,520 Speaker 1: sees a message that you aren't able to go online, 19 00:01:03,920 --> 00:01:06,720 Speaker 1: and another message that says go to a busy area 20 00:01:06,800 --> 00:01:07,600 Speaker 1: to go online. 21 00:01:07,720 --> 00:01:10,800 Speaker 2: Natalie Lung is a tech reporter for Bloomberg, and she 22 00:01:10,880 --> 00:01:14,040 Speaker 2: says that when Muhammad tried to log into Lift that day, 23 00:01:14,440 --> 00:01:18,400 Speaker 2: he was locked out too. Over the next few weeks, 24 00:01:18,520 --> 00:01:22,600 Speaker 2: Mohammed kept getting locked out of both apps again and again, 25 00:01:23,200 --> 00:01:26,080 Speaker 2: and he sent Natalie voice notes from the road chronicling 26 00:01:26,080 --> 00:01:26,840 Speaker 2: his experience. 27 00:01:27,400 --> 00:01:31,280 Speaker 3: Sometimes many days when I start work, it's lucked out 28 00:01:31,400 --> 00:01:34,280 Speaker 3: both of them. That means tell you go back home, 29 00:01:34,400 --> 00:01:37,839 Speaker 3: go back to sleep, or wait in the car until 30 00:01:37,920 --> 00:01:39,319 Speaker 3: we open the air for you. 31 00:01:39,880 --> 00:01:44,280 Speaker 2: The lockouts were disruptive and frustrating. Mohammed couldn't predict when 32 00:01:44,360 --> 00:01:45,360 Speaker 2: he'd be able to work. 33 00:01:45,680 --> 00:01:48,600 Speaker 3: When you are coming out of your bid and you 34 00:01:48,680 --> 00:01:52,120 Speaker 3: take a shower and you are ready to work, and 35 00:01:52,240 --> 00:01:54,720 Speaker 3: the till you know you're not going to work. Now, 36 00:01:55,280 --> 00:01:59,320 Speaker 3: before the luckouts, you are very free, very flexible to 37 00:01:59,600 --> 00:02:03,640 Speaker 3: have the job. But now after luck out, you are 38 00:02:04,480 --> 00:02:05,760 Speaker 3: very controlled. 39 00:02:06,160 --> 00:02:08,840 Speaker 2: Natalie and her colleagues discovered that over the course of 40 00:02:08,880 --> 00:02:12,760 Speaker 2: the summer, lockouts were affecting thousands of drivers like Mohammad 41 00:02:12,960 --> 00:02:15,480 Speaker 2: all over the city. It was part of an intentional 42 00:02:15,520 --> 00:02:18,520 Speaker 2: strategy by Uber and Lyft to cut down on the 43 00:02:18,520 --> 00:02:22,400 Speaker 2: time drivers spend without passengers in the car and the 44 00:02:22,480 --> 00:02:25,440 Speaker 2: amount of money these companies would have to spend next 45 00:02:25,520 --> 00:02:26,960 Speaker 2: year to compensate them. 46 00:02:27,120 --> 00:02:30,960 Speaker 1: The issue here is a classic demanded supply problem. Uber 47 00:02:31,000 --> 00:02:34,400 Speaker 1: and Lyft have onboarded too many drivers, so in an 48 00:02:34,440 --> 00:02:39,520 Speaker 1: attempt to fix that supply issue. To balance it, they 49 00:02:39,520 --> 00:02:40,799 Speaker 1: are locking drivers out. 50 00:02:43,360 --> 00:02:46,560 Speaker 2: Today on the show, an investigation into Uber and Lyft's 51 00:02:46,760 --> 00:02:51,480 Speaker 2: summer of lockouts, what the company's strategy costs drivers and customers, 52 00:02:51,919 --> 00:02:54,880 Speaker 2: and what it says about the future of regulating the 53 00:02:54,880 --> 00:02:58,280 Speaker 2: gig economy. This is the big Take from Bloomberg News. 54 00:02:58,760 --> 00:03:05,960 Speaker 2: I'm Sarah Holder. The story of Uber and Lyft's twenty 55 00:03:06,040 --> 00:03:09,320 Speaker 2: twenty four summer of lockouts actually starts way back in 56 00:03:09,360 --> 00:03:12,760 Speaker 2: twenty eighteen, when New York City passed a law establishing 57 00:03:12,760 --> 00:03:15,880 Speaker 2: a minimum wage for ride share app drivers, the first 58 00:03:15,960 --> 00:03:19,840 Speaker 2: of its kind in the US. Bloomberg Tech reporter Natalie 59 00:03:19,880 --> 00:03:22,720 Speaker 2: Lung told me it was an extra complicated rule for 60 00:03:22,800 --> 00:03:26,240 Speaker 2: the city's Taxi and Limousine Commission to design because of 61 00:03:26,280 --> 00:03:30,040 Speaker 2: the way ride hill drivers work. The commission, called the 62 00:03:30,080 --> 00:03:33,079 Speaker 2: TLC for short, wanted to find a way to make 63 00:03:33,120 --> 00:03:36,680 Speaker 2: sure drivers were compensated fairly for all their working hours, 64 00:03:37,120 --> 00:03:40,240 Speaker 2: including the time they spent on the job waiting for riders. 65 00:03:40,560 --> 00:03:45,400 Speaker 1: The TLC commissioned to economists to study how to implement 66 00:03:45,440 --> 00:03:47,040 Speaker 1: that rule effectively. 67 00:03:47,440 --> 00:03:50,640 Speaker 2: The economists found that drivers weren't making enough each hour 68 00:03:50,760 --> 00:03:53,720 Speaker 2: through fares alone. Uber and Lyft would have to step 69 00:03:53,760 --> 00:03:56,480 Speaker 2: in to compensate drivers for the time they spent working 70 00:03:56,520 --> 00:03:59,680 Speaker 2: without passengers in the car. But how much of the 71 00:03:59,760 --> 00:04:02,800 Speaker 2: driver vers time should be paid for by passengers and 72 00:04:02,880 --> 00:04:05,840 Speaker 2: how much should be covered by the companies. To find 73 00:04:05,840 --> 00:04:08,880 Speaker 2: the sweet spot, economists developed a formula. 74 00:04:09,200 --> 00:04:12,240 Speaker 1: The economists came up with the model where drivers would 75 00:04:12,240 --> 00:04:16,039 Speaker 1: not only be compensated for per mile and per minute, 76 00:04:16,160 --> 00:04:19,360 Speaker 1: but there will also be a component or a multiplier 77 00:04:19,839 --> 00:04:23,880 Speaker 1: called the utilization rate, which measures how busy drivers are 78 00:04:23,920 --> 00:04:28,159 Speaker 1: and would compensate drivers or when they don't have a 79 00:04:28,200 --> 00:04:29,479 Speaker 1: passenger in their car. 80 00:04:29,600 --> 00:04:33,120 Speaker 2: A utilization rate. It basically measures how much of an 81 00:04:33,200 --> 00:04:35,760 Speaker 2: Uber or lyft drivers on time is spent with an 82 00:04:35,800 --> 00:04:38,520 Speaker 2: actual passenger in the car versus how much is spent 83 00:04:38,640 --> 00:04:41,680 Speaker 2: driving around waiting for a passenger. Because it would be 84 00:04:41,760 --> 00:04:45,080 Speaker 2: too complicated to calculate a different utilization rate for every 85 00:04:45,160 --> 00:04:49,400 Speaker 2: driver every day, the city sets an industry wide standard 86 00:04:49,480 --> 00:04:52,160 Speaker 2: rate each year based on data from all the drivers 87 00:04:52,200 --> 00:04:54,880 Speaker 2: in the city. When the minimum wage lock came into 88 00:04:54,920 --> 00:04:58,320 Speaker 2: effect in twenty nineteen, that utilization rate was set at 89 00:04:58,360 --> 00:05:02,479 Speaker 2: fifty eight out of every one hundred minutes on the job, 90 00:05:02,680 --> 00:05:05,159 Speaker 2: the average Uber or Lyft driver in New York City 91 00:05:05,440 --> 00:05:08,559 Speaker 2: spent about fifty eight minutes with passengers. 92 00:05:08,320 --> 00:05:10,800 Speaker 1: And the other forty two minutes are on the road 93 00:05:11,080 --> 00:05:14,200 Speaker 1: going to a passenger or waiting for right requests. 94 00:05:14,600 --> 00:05:18,240 Speaker 2: Those forty two minutes idle time not covered by passenger 95 00:05:18,360 --> 00:05:21,200 Speaker 2: fares are what Uber and Lyft are on the hook for, 96 00:05:21,960 --> 00:05:24,680 Speaker 2: and Natalie says, companies want that idle number to be 97 00:05:24,839 --> 00:05:29,560 Speaker 2: as low as possible and that utilization rate, the efficiency rate, 98 00:05:29,720 --> 00:05:33,120 Speaker 2: to stay as high as possible because. 99 00:05:33,040 --> 00:05:37,840 Speaker 1: The higher the utilization rate, the companies out of pocket 100 00:05:37,839 --> 00:05:41,320 Speaker 1: pay would be lower. And conversely, if the utilization rate 101 00:05:41,400 --> 00:05:45,640 Speaker 1: is lower, meaning drivers out waiting around more, the companies 102 00:05:45,640 --> 00:05:48,719 Speaker 1: will have to pay more out of pocket to compensate 103 00:05:48,800 --> 00:05:49,880 Speaker 1: for the idle time. 104 00:05:50,320 --> 00:05:53,359 Speaker 2: The idea was that this utilization rate would be refreshed 105 00:05:53,440 --> 00:05:57,480 Speaker 2: every year by the TLC based on updated statistics submitted 106 00:05:57,480 --> 00:05:58,719 Speaker 2: by the ride share companies. 107 00:05:58,839 --> 00:06:02,280 Speaker 1: But then the pandemic has in twenty twenty and that 108 00:06:02,360 --> 00:06:06,960 Speaker 1: really plummeted right share demand, and that caused the TLC 109 00:06:07,080 --> 00:06:09,600 Speaker 1: to just keep the rate as fifty eight percent, and 110 00:06:09,640 --> 00:06:11,200 Speaker 1: it went on until. 111 00:06:10,960 --> 00:06:14,200 Speaker 2: Now until now because in the first two months of 112 00:06:14,240 --> 00:06:19,120 Speaker 2: twenty twenty four, that utilization rate dropped below fifty three percent. 113 00:06:19,880 --> 00:06:22,280 Speaker 2: The problem was there were too many drivers on the 114 00:06:22,360 --> 00:06:27,240 Speaker 2: road and not enough riders. Idle time was increasing, and 115 00:06:27,279 --> 00:06:30,320 Speaker 2: that was very bad news for Uber and Lyft. 116 00:06:30,600 --> 00:06:33,880 Speaker 1: Fifty three percent is like a floor that is set 117 00:06:33,920 --> 00:06:36,200 Speaker 1: by the city. If they go below that, they would 118 00:06:36,240 --> 00:06:38,560 Speaker 1: have to pay more out of pocket next year or 119 00:06:38,839 --> 00:06:41,080 Speaker 1: whenever the TLC evaluates it again. 120 00:06:41,279 --> 00:06:44,960 Speaker 2: So the reason that they're trying to meet this utilization rate, 121 00:06:45,080 --> 00:06:49,280 Speaker 2: this rate of fifty three percent activity for drivers, is 122 00:06:49,320 --> 00:06:52,520 Speaker 2: to save themselves money. 123 00:06:52,279 --> 00:06:55,400 Speaker 1: Right, And their argument is that they wouldn't want to 124 00:06:55,520 --> 00:06:58,760 Speaker 1: pass all that cost to riders, and riders would be, 125 00:06:58,920 --> 00:07:00,960 Speaker 1: you know, scared off by the higher prices, and that 126 00:07:01,000 --> 00:07:03,760 Speaker 1: would lead to lower demand for the service and less 127 00:07:03,839 --> 00:07:06,159 Speaker 1: jobs for drivers. So they feel like this is a 128 00:07:06,160 --> 00:07:07,839 Speaker 1: cycle that they don't want to see. 129 00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:11,520 Speaker 2: So to make sure drivers were spending more time driving 130 00:07:11,560 --> 00:07:14,800 Speaker 2: each hour, to keep that utilization rate from dropping more, 131 00:07:15,320 --> 00:07:18,240 Speaker 2: and to save themselves tens of millions of dollars in 132 00:07:18,280 --> 00:07:23,000 Speaker 2: future driver wages, Uber and Lyft did something drastic this summer. 133 00:07:23,240 --> 00:07:27,320 Speaker 2: They started locking drivers out of the app. Drivers were 134 00:07:27,360 --> 00:07:30,720 Speaker 2: outraged they were being locked out of their livelihoods. Many 135 00:07:30,720 --> 00:07:43,920 Speaker 2: took to the streets in protest. Bloomberg broke the news 136 00:07:43,960 --> 00:07:47,400 Speaker 2: about the first Uber lockouts in June, lifts started locking 137 00:07:47,440 --> 00:07:51,320 Speaker 2: out drivers shortly thereafter. The companies didn't deny what they 138 00:07:51,320 --> 00:07:54,200 Speaker 2: were doing. They said they needed to lock some drivers 139 00:07:54,200 --> 00:07:57,239 Speaker 2: out some of the time because of a mismatch between 140 00:07:57,320 --> 00:08:00,920 Speaker 2: rider demand and driver supply. But Natalie and her team 141 00:08:01,000 --> 00:08:04,000 Speaker 2: had a hunch this wasn't the full story. They wanted 142 00:08:04,040 --> 00:08:07,200 Speaker 2: to know more about just how many drivers were impacted 143 00:08:07,200 --> 00:08:10,280 Speaker 2: by Uber and Lyft's decision and how much money was 144 00:08:10,320 --> 00:08:13,800 Speaker 2: on the line for companies. So the reporters started a 145 00:08:13,880 --> 00:08:17,680 Speaker 2: massive crowdsourcing campaign who they heard from and what they 146 00:08:17,720 --> 00:08:29,040 Speaker 2: found after the break to understand the impact of the 147 00:08:29,120 --> 00:08:32,080 Speaker 2: Uber and Lyft lockouts on New York City's ride hill system. 148 00:08:32,240 --> 00:08:35,400 Speaker 2: Bloomberg reporter Natalie Lung and her colleagues needed a way 149 00:08:35,400 --> 00:08:38,200 Speaker 2: to hear from as many drivers as possible. 150 00:08:38,320 --> 00:08:41,640 Speaker 1: And so we created this automated WhatsApp tip line to 151 00:08:41,760 --> 00:08:45,200 Speaker 1: let them send screenshots off lockouts when they encountered them. 152 00:08:45,480 --> 00:08:47,800 Speaker 2: They opened the tip line in mid August, and the 153 00:08:47,840 --> 00:08:49,839 Speaker 2: response was overwhelming. 154 00:08:50,520 --> 00:08:53,960 Speaker 1: By the end of this three week collection period, we 155 00:08:54,120 --> 00:08:57,960 Speaker 1: had close to nine hundred drivers sending us a screenshots 156 00:08:58,000 --> 00:08:58,840 Speaker 1: off their lockouts. 157 00:08:58,880 --> 00:09:01,480 Speaker 2: Wow, and were by the level of response. 158 00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:04,920 Speaker 1: Yeah, we were surprised that so many people responded to 159 00:09:05,000 --> 00:09:07,400 Speaker 1: us within a short period of time, but at the 160 00:09:07,440 --> 00:09:12,040 Speaker 1: same time, we understood drivers were really desperate and eager 161 00:09:12,080 --> 00:09:15,400 Speaker 1: to seek out someone who would listen to their plight. 162 00:09:16,520 --> 00:09:19,640 Speaker 2: Armed with more than five thousand screenshots and after more 163 00:09:19,679 --> 00:09:23,160 Speaker 2: than one hundred interviews, Natalie and her team found that 164 00:09:23,200 --> 00:09:27,040 Speaker 2: the lockouts were more frequent and more damaging than was 165 00:09:27,080 --> 00:09:30,680 Speaker 2: previously reported. Uber and Lyft had told them earlier that 166 00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:33,640 Speaker 2: summer that they were only locking out drivers during low 167 00:09:33,679 --> 00:09:37,880 Speaker 2: demand times. The Bloomberg found lockouts were actually happening at 168 00:09:37,880 --> 00:09:41,560 Speaker 2: almost every hour of the day, even during periods of 169 00:09:41,640 --> 00:09:42,240 Speaker 2: high demand. 170 00:09:43,120 --> 00:09:46,360 Speaker 1: The fact that these lockouts are unpredictable makes them hard 171 00:09:46,400 --> 00:09:48,520 Speaker 1: to plan out there how much they need to earn 172 00:09:48,520 --> 00:09:51,920 Speaker 1: and how much they need to work. For Mohammed's example, 173 00:09:52,240 --> 00:09:55,079 Speaker 1: he told me that he has incurred around two thousand 174 00:09:55,160 --> 00:09:57,719 Speaker 1: dollars in credit card debt. A lot of them are 175 00:09:57,800 --> 00:10:01,440 Speaker 1: behind on Texas. Some of them they're behind on their 176 00:10:01,480 --> 00:10:04,120 Speaker 1: auto loan payments, insurance payments. 177 00:10:04,480 --> 00:10:07,320 Speaker 2: To make up for the lost time drivers started working 178 00:10:07,360 --> 00:10:09,960 Speaker 2: more and taking fewer breaks. 179 00:10:10,240 --> 00:10:12,720 Speaker 1: They feel like if they took a break and went 180 00:10:13,000 --> 00:10:16,559 Speaker 1: off line on the app voluntarily, it makes it impossible 181 00:10:16,600 --> 00:10:19,520 Speaker 1: for them to get online again. And so one driver 182 00:10:19,600 --> 00:10:22,559 Speaker 1: I spoke to he would just forego bathroom breaks or 183 00:10:22,640 --> 00:10:25,280 Speaker 1: lunch breaks and just keep driving so that he could 184 00:10:25,320 --> 00:10:26,960 Speaker 1: make the most out of his online time. 185 00:10:27,400 --> 00:10:30,040 Speaker 2: It was a little ironic. Uber and Lyft have long 186 00:10:30,200 --> 00:10:34,439 Speaker 2: argued to regulators the drivers are independent contractors, not employees. 187 00:10:34,880 --> 00:10:37,400 Speaker 1: A lot of drivers told us that this is completely 188 00:10:37,520 --> 00:10:42,600 Speaker 1: the opposite of the foundational flexibility that they were promised 189 00:10:42,640 --> 00:10:46,080 Speaker 1: when they switched over to the platforms, and it makes 190 00:10:46,120 --> 00:10:49,680 Speaker 1: it complicated because they have unpredictable hours they cannot work 191 00:10:49,720 --> 00:10:50,640 Speaker 1: when they want to work. 192 00:10:51,160 --> 00:10:54,400 Speaker 2: It was frustrating for riders too, as Uber and Lyft 193 00:10:54,520 --> 00:10:58,040 Speaker 2: limited the supply of drivers on the road prices in 194 00:10:58,080 --> 00:10:58,800 Speaker 2: some areas. 195 00:10:58,880 --> 00:11:03,280 Speaker 1: Rose found more than four hundred instances of drivers being 196 00:11:03,320 --> 00:11:05,800 Speaker 1: locked out in search zones, and in about half of 197 00:11:05,840 --> 00:11:11,560 Speaker 1: those instances, the price for consumers did increase after a lockout. 198 00:11:11,679 --> 00:11:14,920 Speaker 2: But for the companies, all this pain for drivers and 199 00:11:14,960 --> 00:11:18,440 Speaker 2: customers may have been worth it, because Natalie and her 200 00:11:18,440 --> 00:11:21,679 Speaker 2: team found that for Uber and Lyft, the lockouts served 201 00:11:21,720 --> 00:11:27,040 Speaker 2: an important purpose protecting the company's bottom line. Based on 202 00:11:27,080 --> 00:11:31,199 Speaker 2: Bloomberg's analysis, by stopping the utilization rate from dipping too 203 00:11:31,360 --> 00:11:34,800 Speaker 2: low through lockouts, Uber and Lyft would save themselves from 204 00:11:34,840 --> 00:11:38,040 Speaker 2: having to make millions of dollars in extra minimum wage 205 00:11:38,080 --> 00:11:39,040 Speaker 2: payments next year. 206 00:11:39,800 --> 00:11:44,080 Speaker 1: So our analysis found, using historical data from the first 207 00:11:44,120 --> 00:11:47,640 Speaker 1: six months of the year, even one percentage drop in 208 00:11:47,800 --> 00:11:51,040 Speaker 1: the utilization rate would cause Uber and Lift tests of 209 00:11:51,080 --> 00:11:52,080 Speaker 1: millions of dollars. 210 00:11:52,440 --> 00:11:55,719 Speaker 2: So, just to make sure I'm understanding the impact of 211 00:11:55,760 --> 00:12:00,920 Speaker 2: these lockouts from what your reporting shows, companies say tens 212 00:12:00,920 --> 00:12:06,600 Speaker 2: of millions of dollars, drivers worked longer hours, went into 213 00:12:06,640 --> 00:12:10,959 Speaker 2: thousands of dollars of debt, and customers paid more for rides. 214 00:12:11,480 --> 00:12:18,800 Speaker 2: M that's a pretty staggering impact, right. Spokespeople for both 215 00:12:18,880 --> 00:12:21,800 Speaker 2: Uber and Lyft have pushed back on this calculation, saying 216 00:12:21,800 --> 00:12:24,920 Speaker 2: that the financial model Bloomberg used doesn't take into account 217 00:12:24,960 --> 00:12:27,840 Speaker 2: how a lower utilization rate would make the companies pass 218 00:12:27,920 --> 00:12:31,720 Speaker 2: more costs onto riders, in turn scaring more business away. 219 00:12:32,559 --> 00:12:35,520 Speaker 2: How did Uber explain why they were doing these lockouts 220 00:12:35,559 --> 00:12:36,840 Speaker 2: when you asked about them? 221 00:12:36,880 --> 00:12:41,480 Speaker 1: So they said, it's actually by the ruse design, saying 222 00:12:41,679 --> 00:12:46,200 Speaker 1: the ROUE incentivizes companies to increase their utilization rate so 223 00:12:46,240 --> 00:12:49,240 Speaker 1: that drivers would be kept busier and so that the 224 00:12:49,320 --> 00:12:52,720 Speaker 1: supply would manage better. So they say lockouts is actually 225 00:12:53,040 --> 00:12:55,640 Speaker 1: a feature of the rute, not a bug. What did 226 00:12:55,760 --> 00:12:59,199 Speaker 1: Lifts say, Lift In a letter that they sent to 227 00:12:59,240 --> 00:13:03,160 Speaker 1: a TLC, they said, it's also unnecessary too, even though 228 00:13:03,200 --> 00:13:05,880 Speaker 1: it's a lots of resort for them, because they noticed 229 00:13:05,960 --> 00:13:09,400 Speaker 1: that Ryesha demand has been weaker than anticipated, even though 230 00:13:09,400 --> 00:13:12,000 Speaker 1: they already stopped onboarding new drivers last year. 231 00:13:12,320 --> 00:13:15,200 Speaker 2: What did you think about those explanations that Ubernlift gave. 232 00:13:15,640 --> 00:13:19,120 Speaker 1: Obviously, lockouts are a feature that the companies decided to 233 00:13:19,160 --> 00:13:21,680 Speaker 1: do themselves, like the regulator did not force them to 234 00:13:21,720 --> 00:13:25,400 Speaker 1: do it. There's definitely more that they could have done earlier, 235 00:13:25,480 --> 00:13:28,040 Speaker 1: or there were other ways that this could have been 236 00:13:28,600 --> 00:13:31,040 Speaker 1: resolved before resulting to lockouts. 237 00:13:31,320 --> 00:13:34,480 Speaker 2: Natalie says the situation in New York City shows how 238 00:13:34,520 --> 00:13:37,240 Speaker 2: complicated it is to calculate the right way to set 239 00:13:37,240 --> 00:13:41,280 Speaker 2: a minimum wage for independent contractors and to get companies 240 00:13:41,280 --> 00:13:44,120 Speaker 2: like Uber and Lyft to follow both the spirit and 241 00:13:44,320 --> 00:13:45,880 Speaker 2: the letter of the rules. 242 00:13:46,240 --> 00:13:48,560 Speaker 1: This is sort of a loopho and gray area that 243 00:13:48,640 --> 00:13:52,880 Speaker 1: the regulator has not included in their route and allowing 244 00:13:52,920 --> 00:13:54,160 Speaker 1: this sort of thing to happen. 245 00:13:54,600 --> 00:13:58,199 Speaker 2: These rules could be changing soon. New York City regulators 246 00:13:58,200 --> 00:14:00,760 Speaker 2: have agreed to revisit the drivermen and wage by the 247 00:14:00,880 --> 00:14:03,160 Speaker 2: end of the year to make sure the system works 248 00:14:03,200 --> 00:14:08,160 Speaker 2: for all parties, drivers, customers and companies alike. And what 249 00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:09,439 Speaker 2: would those new rules be. 250 00:14:09,720 --> 00:14:13,560 Speaker 1: The TLC says they're still in deliberation on those rules, 251 00:14:13,600 --> 00:14:15,440 Speaker 1: but one thing that was clear was that they would 252 00:14:15,520 --> 00:14:18,800 Speaker 1: limit how many new drivers the companies could on board. 253 00:14:19,120 --> 00:14:22,280 Speaker 1: Another thing that they're considering is sort of looking at 254 00:14:22,280 --> 00:14:26,200 Speaker 1: that utilization rate to see how it actually reflects the 255 00:14:26,280 --> 00:14:30,320 Speaker 1: driver's experience so that they can be compensated fairly. But 256 00:14:30,600 --> 00:14:34,520 Speaker 1: drivers who are most impacted in this instance, they may 257 00:14:34,560 --> 00:14:37,200 Speaker 1: not be able to afford to wait for new rules. 258 00:14:37,440 --> 00:14:40,080 Speaker 1: A lot of them told us they're already are considering 259 00:14:40,360 --> 00:14:42,000 Speaker 1: other jobs to complement income. 260 00:14:42,840 --> 00:14:46,920 Speaker 2: In the meantime, after months of lockouts and several driver protests, 261 00:14:47,520 --> 00:14:51,560 Speaker 2: Uber Lift, the Mayor's office and the TLC made a deal. 262 00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:55,680 Speaker 2: Uber agreed to stop its lockouts as long as Lifted 263 00:14:55,720 --> 00:14:59,720 Speaker 2: more to keep its own utilization rate up. And what's 264 00:14:59,760 --> 00:15:03,720 Speaker 2: this status of these lockouts? Now are drivers like Muhammad 265 00:15:03,840 --> 00:15:06,600 Speaker 2: still signing onto the app, looking for the go button 266 00:15:06,800 --> 00:15:08,560 Speaker 2: and instead being turned away. 267 00:15:09,360 --> 00:15:12,960 Speaker 1: So Uber has stopped blockouts as of early September per 268 00:15:13,000 --> 00:15:16,200 Speaker 1: the agreement, because Lyft is now trying to keep their 269 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:20,680 Speaker 1: promise with the utilization rate, So Lyft is still contoing lockouts. 270 00:15:20,680 --> 00:15:22,960 Speaker 1: So for Mohammed, he's been able to drive for Uber, 271 00:15:23,040 --> 00:15:24,520 Speaker 1: but he's still locked out by Lyft. 272 00:15:24,920 --> 00:15:28,640 Speaker 2: Mohammad says the whole experience has left him exhausted. He 273 00:15:28,720 --> 00:15:30,800 Speaker 2: used to wake up each morning knowing he'd be able 274 00:15:30,800 --> 00:15:33,760 Speaker 2: to jump into work as soon as he wanted. Now 275 00:15:34,200 --> 00:15:38,720 Speaker 2: it's unpredictable how and when he drives, doesn't feel under 276 00:15:38,760 --> 00:15:39,680 Speaker 2: his control anymore. 277 00:15:39,920 --> 00:15:42,480 Speaker 3: So it's like this is like a monkey business. This 278 00:15:42,560 --> 00:15:47,000 Speaker 3: is this is make you depressed many days. Many days 279 00:15:47,000 --> 00:15:48,120 Speaker 3: I feel depressed. I go back. 280 00:15:54,760 --> 00:15:57,920 Speaker 2: This is the big take from Bloomberg News. I'm Sarah Holder. 281 00:15:58,360 --> 00:16:01,480 Speaker 2: This episode was produced by Thomas. It was edited by 282 00:16:01,480 --> 00:16:05,480 Speaker 2: Stacy Vanicksmith and Dana Wallman. It was mixed by Alex Sugia. 283 00:16:05,840 --> 00:16:08,720 Speaker 2: It was fact checked by Adrian A. Tapia. Our senior 284 00:16:08,760 --> 00:16:12,360 Speaker 2: producer is Naomi Shaven. Our senior editor is Elizabeth Ponso. 285 00:16:12,920 --> 00:16:16,480 Speaker 2: Our executive producer is Nicole Beamster born Sage Bauman, is 286 00:16:16,480 --> 00:16:20,040 Speaker 2: Bloomberg's head of podcasts. If you liked this episode, make 287 00:16:20,080 --> 00:16:22,520 Speaker 2: sure to subscribe and review The Big Take wherever you 288 00:16:22,560 --> 00:16:26,280 Speaker 2: listen to podcasts. It helps people find the show. Thanks 289 00:16:26,280 --> 00:16:28,720 Speaker 2: for listening. We'll be back next week.