1
00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680
Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

2
00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080
Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

3
00:00:09,160 --> 00:00:12,119
Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

4
00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:13,880
Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

5
00:00:25,360 --> 00:00:27,960
Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

6
00:00:28,240 --> 00:00:29,720
Speaker 2: my name is Noah.

7
00:00:29,840 --> 00:00:32,400
Speaker 3: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our

8
00:00:32,479 --> 00:00:36,440
Speaker 3: super producer Andrew the try Force Howard. Most importantly, you

9
00:00:36,560 --> 00:00:40,080
Speaker 3: are you. You are here. That makes this the stuff

10
00:00:40,120 --> 00:00:43,920
Speaker 3: they don't want you to know. It's that time again,

11
00:00:44,360 --> 00:00:48,240
Speaker 3: friends and neighbors, fellow conspiracy realists. We are exploring one

12
00:00:48,240 --> 00:00:52,600
Speaker 3: of the largest subjects in all of US conspiracy lore,

13
00:00:52,800 --> 00:00:58,040
Speaker 3: the Central Intelligence Agency or the CIA. And let's be honest, guys,

14
00:00:58,760 --> 00:01:00,160
Speaker 3: they get a lot of guff.

15
00:01:01,000 --> 00:01:04,200
Speaker 4: Yeah, well, I can't imagine what kind of issues people

16
00:01:04,280 --> 00:01:07,440
Speaker 4: might have with the Central Intelligence Agency or a CIA.

17
00:01:08,280 --> 00:01:10,760
Speaker 2: Well, I yeah, I think a lot of it has

18
00:01:10,840 --> 00:01:15,600
Speaker 2: to do with how how much they employ trickery, right,

19
00:01:15,720 --> 00:01:20,600
Speaker 2: that idea of the CIA being so deceptive, which is

20
00:01:20,840 --> 00:01:22,880
Speaker 2: at the heart of this episode.

21
00:01:23,720 --> 00:01:26,960
Speaker 3: That's right, yeah, which may end up being a two

22
00:01:27,000 --> 00:01:33,080
Speaker 3: part episode a series, because we're diving into some deep water. Historically,

23
00:01:33,120 --> 00:01:36,760
Speaker 3: it is true the agency as it's sometimes called this

24
00:01:36,959 --> 00:01:40,639
Speaker 3: organization has met with a great deal of controversy over

25
00:01:40,680 --> 00:01:44,959
Speaker 3: the decades, But tonight we're exploring a story many people

26
00:01:45,000 --> 00:01:48,560
Speaker 3: may have missed. It's a bizarre and very true conspiracy.

27
00:01:50,400 --> 00:01:53,600
Speaker 3: I don't know. Catch up on our episodes on mk Ultra.

28
00:01:54,360 --> 00:01:57,440
Speaker 3: Catch up on the numerous times we roast the CIA

29
00:01:57,560 --> 00:02:02,000
Speaker 3: a little bit for their weird, cartoonish acme level plans

30
00:02:02,040 --> 00:02:07,120
Speaker 3: to kill Castro. And then after you do that, come

31
00:02:07,160 --> 00:02:12,119
Speaker 3: back here exploding cigar piping in LSD to a studio.

32
00:02:12,280 --> 00:02:15,799
Speaker 3: It's wild. Let's pause for a word from our sponsors,

33
00:02:16,080 --> 00:02:19,360
Speaker 3: and then maybe we begin by learning more about the history,

34
00:02:19,800 --> 00:02:24,280
Speaker 3: the fact and fiction surrounding Uncle Sam's most powerful known

35
00:02:24,520 --> 00:02:29,440
Speaker 3: intelligence agency. And there's a lot of fact and fiction there.

36
00:02:35,280 --> 00:02:39,920
Speaker 3: Here are the facts. All right, let's set this sage.

37
00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:42,320
Speaker 5: Just give me some fiction thrown in for good measure, right.

38
00:02:42,320 --> 00:02:45,200
Speaker 3: Oh, there has to be, Yeah, because a lot of

39
00:02:45,240 --> 00:02:51,880
Speaker 3: the sources we're pulling are from the CIA itself. So yeah,

40
00:02:51,960 --> 00:02:55,919
Speaker 3: maybe not an unbiased reporter, maybe a little bit of

41
00:02:55,960 --> 00:02:59,680
Speaker 3: an Well, critics would call it an unreliable narrative, but

42
00:02:59,720 --> 00:03:03,720
Speaker 3: that's that's what makes literature interesting. So where do we

43
00:03:03,760 --> 00:03:08,240
Speaker 3: start when we talk about the CIA, what's our ultimate genesis,

44
00:03:08,280 --> 00:03:10,480
Speaker 3: like our Garden of Eden moment.

45
00:03:11,480 --> 00:03:14,360
Speaker 4: I guess I didn't realize comparatively, you know, as far

46
00:03:14,400 --> 00:03:18,160
Speaker 4: as other agencies are concerned, how relatively recently the CIA

47
00:03:18,560 --> 00:03:22,880
Speaker 4: was created. The United States has always been super invested

48
00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:27,120
Speaker 4: in gathering of intelligence, so much that the CIA's Layson

49
00:03:27,600 --> 00:03:32,040
Speaker 4: Conference Center named three of its meeting rooms after revolutionary

50
00:03:32,040 --> 00:03:38,480
Speaker 4: war heroes. The idea of those early spymasters, right, yeah, oh.

51
00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:41,040
Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely, because you need to know what your enemy

52
00:03:41,160 --> 00:03:44,440
Speaker 2: might be doing, and you also sometimes need to let

53
00:03:44,440 --> 00:03:47,400
Speaker 2: your enemy think that you're gonna do something even when

54
00:03:47,440 --> 00:03:47,720
Speaker 2: you're not.

55
00:03:48,760 --> 00:03:49,040
Speaker 4: M h.

56
00:03:49,400 --> 00:03:52,440
Speaker 2: And that goes it. Yeah, that's revolutionary times. That's I

57
00:03:52,480 --> 00:03:55,560
Speaker 2: mean times are the Pharaohs. That's just go all the

58
00:03:55,600 --> 00:03:57,080
Speaker 2: way back, Master.

59
00:03:56,840 --> 00:04:00,400
Speaker 4: Of Whispers and the like and the George or an

60
00:04:00,440 --> 00:04:01,840
Speaker 4: extended universe.

61
00:04:02,200 --> 00:04:05,680
Speaker 3: Love of reference. Yeah, that's varus right. And then also

62
00:04:06,280 --> 00:04:11,720
Speaker 3: we could extend that reasoning further later. There's inevitable mission

63
00:04:11,760 --> 00:04:15,400
Speaker 3: creep in any intelligence operation, and you start to apply

64
00:04:15,480 --> 00:04:19,120
Speaker 3: the same things to people you call allies and friends. Right,

65
00:04:19,240 --> 00:04:24,680
Speaker 3: let me also just trust but verify what my friend, allies,

66
00:04:24,720 --> 00:04:26,400
Speaker 3: my all of friends are saying.

67
00:04:27,240 --> 00:04:31,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, friend and or foes. But I think the difference

68
00:04:31,560 --> 00:04:35,320
Speaker 2: here and why the CIA really stands out for history

69
00:04:35,560 --> 00:04:39,840
Speaker 2: and for you know, these types of organizations, is because

70
00:04:39,920 --> 00:04:43,800
Speaker 2: often that intelligence is dealing in war times, right, and

71
00:04:43,839 --> 00:04:48,000
Speaker 2: so you're you're gathering intelligence to make war, and the

72
00:04:48,040 --> 00:04:51,720
Speaker 2: CIA is really getting into almost prevention of war.

73
00:04:51,839 --> 00:04:55,120
Speaker 4: Well, think about the preprentish is coming you guys. I mean,

74
00:04:55,160 --> 00:04:57,680
Speaker 4: the first of all, they had to know that was happening.

75
00:04:57,960 --> 00:05:00,559
Speaker 4: Then they had to have a clandestine way for Paul

76
00:05:00,640 --> 00:05:03,679
Speaker 4: Revere to let people know, you know, to be prepared

77
00:05:03,720 --> 00:05:06,080
Speaker 4: with the candles in the window and all of that,

78
00:05:06,120 --> 00:05:08,799
Speaker 4: which is a banger Elton JOHNSNG that was not apparently

79
00:05:08,839 --> 00:05:10,159
Speaker 4: originally about Princess Diana.

80
00:05:11,200 --> 00:05:15,039
Speaker 3: And check out also our episodes on Agent three point

81
00:05:15,040 --> 00:05:17,800
Speaker 3: fifty five, who has yet to be identified in the

82
00:05:17,839 --> 00:05:21,680
Speaker 3: modern day, and the culper Ring. If you go like

83
00:05:21,760 --> 00:05:24,200
Speaker 3: you were saying no to the Liaisahl in the center,

84
00:05:24,760 --> 00:05:29,679
Speaker 3: you'll see the CIA has I don't want to maybe

85
00:05:29,720 --> 00:05:34,960
Speaker 3: not deify, but lionized a triumvirate of founding fathers that

86
00:05:35,000 --> 00:05:42,040
Speaker 3: they consider emblematic and pioneers of three key aspects of intelligence.

87
00:05:42,320 --> 00:05:43,880
Speaker 3: We've got, you know, now, it's like.

88
00:05:43,839 --> 00:05:44,480
Speaker 5: A heist film.

89
00:05:44,560 --> 00:05:47,839
Speaker 3: Right where everybody gets their little hero moment at the camera.

90
00:05:48,120 --> 00:05:52,080
Speaker 3: George Washington did a lot of stuff. He's also he's

91
00:05:52,600 --> 00:05:58,040
Speaker 3: also known as a pioneer in the acquisition of foreign intelligence.

92
00:05:58,160 --> 00:06:01,039
Speaker 3: Key one turns out this guy was a cracker jack

93
00:06:01,080 --> 00:06:05,440
Speaker 3: spymaster in addition to all this other stuff, including almost

94
00:06:05,440 --> 00:06:08,080
Speaker 3: being king. But he did not do the cherry tree thing.

95
00:06:08,560 --> 00:06:11,480
Speaker 5: That was more Yeah, well, met or lore.

96
00:06:11,760 --> 00:06:13,720
Speaker 4: Why is it that I'm picturing all of these guys

97
00:06:13,760 --> 00:06:16,960
Speaker 4: like in like street fighter to style versus you know,

98
00:06:17,120 --> 00:06:20,359
Speaker 4: splash screen like it. We've got We've got John Jay

99
00:06:20,760 --> 00:06:23,440
Speaker 4: as well. In addition to George, he would later become

100
00:06:23,520 --> 00:06:26,440
Speaker 4: Chief Justice. He was also considered the founding father of

101
00:06:26,720 --> 00:06:28,480
Speaker 4: US counter intelligence.

102
00:06:28,920 --> 00:06:32,320
Speaker 2: And then we've got Ringo, my favorite.

103
00:06:31,920 --> 00:06:36,080
Speaker 5: My favorite founder, Beetle just trucking.

104
00:06:37,120 --> 00:06:43,520
Speaker 2: It is weird. George John.

105
00:06:42,440 --> 00:06:45,080
Speaker 4: Let's call him by his prophib Christian name, Benjamin Franklin.

106
00:06:45,200 --> 00:06:48,320
Speaker 4: What do we know, was you know, quite the renaissance man.

107
00:06:48,560 --> 00:06:52,200
Speaker 4: And I'm sure with his you know, big brains, figured

108
00:06:52,200 --> 00:06:54,960
Speaker 4: out some very clever ways of gathering intelligence and was

109
00:06:55,000 --> 00:06:58,320
Speaker 4: a great collaborator in a lot of these schemes and.

110
00:06:58,400 --> 00:07:03,320
Speaker 3: A very naughty boy on multiple levels.

111
00:07:04,040 --> 00:07:07,920
Speaker 2: Yeah, but as we're gonna learn throughout these episodes, and

112
00:07:08,160 --> 00:07:12,240
Speaker 2: as I guess as the CIA learned, those types of

113
00:07:12,280 --> 00:07:16,440
Speaker 2: activities where there's a lot of commingling going on, maybe

114
00:07:16,480 --> 00:07:20,960
Speaker 2: a little activity physical mental.

115
00:07:21,160 --> 00:07:21,640
Speaker 3: Where.

116
00:07:23,040 --> 00:07:26,280
Speaker 2: Well, that's where a lot of intelligence can be both

117
00:07:26,320 --> 00:07:30,800
Speaker 2: gathered and you know, given to somebody else quietly. It's

118
00:07:30,840 --> 00:07:33,480
Speaker 2: it's almost it's kind of creepy now that I really

119
00:07:33,560 --> 00:07:35,760
Speaker 2: think about it, because I know that's why he was

120
00:07:35,800 --> 00:07:37,760
Speaker 2: so good, That's why he was so good.

121
00:07:37,800 --> 00:07:40,480
Speaker 4: Well, not to mention flipping that the other way in

122
00:07:40,600 --> 00:07:44,720
Speaker 4: sort of a honeypot operation like a sting operation for entrapping,

123
00:07:45,160 --> 00:07:49,960
Speaker 4: you know, foreign agents, you know, or gathering information clandestinely

124
00:07:50,040 --> 00:07:52,400
Speaker 4: through a little little naughty time.

125
00:07:53,600 --> 00:07:58,840
Speaker 3: Yeah, this guy, old old BINGI f he probably didn't

126
00:07:58,840 --> 00:08:03,000
Speaker 3: go by Benji Benny Franks to his friend. Yeah, yeah,

127
00:08:03,680 --> 00:08:05,960
Speaker 3: I don't know why. I don't care for Benny. I

128
00:08:05,960 --> 00:08:08,720
Speaker 3: don't know anyway, it's up to him. It's his name,

129
00:08:09,040 --> 00:08:09,920
Speaker 3: uh Frank.

130
00:08:09,960 --> 00:08:11,040
Speaker 2: Because of the Jets.

131
00:08:11,840 --> 00:08:16,680
Speaker 5: Sorry, then, in fact, are you the Jets?

132
00:08:17,040 --> 00:08:20,480
Speaker 3: Are you serious? Benny and the Jets a banker.

133
00:08:22,840 --> 00:08:24,640
Speaker 2: This conversation, you have issues.

134
00:08:24,640 --> 00:08:27,240
Speaker 4: I think you might be taking it a little personally,

135
00:08:27,240 --> 00:08:27,640
Speaker 4: Ben you.

136
00:08:27,600 --> 00:08:31,080
Speaker 3: Need to realize I'm too close. I got too close.

137
00:08:31,160 --> 00:08:34,960
Speaker 3: Somebody exfiltrate me from the ulti job mission.

138
00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:38,880
Speaker 5: My dear friend day stayed Glass Artist.

139
00:08:39,160 --> 00:08:41,559
Speaker 4: She hates the song It's a Beautiful Day by You

140
00:08:41,679 --> 00:08:44,000
Speaker 4: too because she got teased with that all the time,

141
00:08:44,040 --> 00:08:46,360
Speaker 4: and therefore she thinks she hates the band you two,

142
00:08:46,400 --> 00:08:48,520
Speaker 4: and I've tried to show her like the Joshua Tree

143
00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:50,320
Speaker 4: and turn her off from that way of thinking.

144
00:08:50,640 --> 00:08:51,920
Speaker 5: I understand, Ben.

145
00:08:52,520 --> 00:08:55,480
Speaker 3: Where are you at with the first Noelle? I think

146
00:08:55,520 --> 00:08:57,000
Speaker 3: you at this in the past.

147
00:08:57,040 --> 00:08:59,120
Speaker 4: Okay, okay, this is not I would not be just

148
00:08:59,320 --> 00:09:02,800
Speaker 4: I don't I would be discounting an entire genre or era.

149
00:09:03,600 --> 00:09:05,760
Speaker 4: I'm not a huge fan of Christmas songs in general,

150
00:09:05,760 --> 00:09:08,240
Speaker 4: but the first no Wel, I just don't like you

151
00:09:08,240 --> 00:09:10,360
Speaker 4: when people think that they're the first one that's ever

152
00:09:10,400 --> 00:09:11,880
Speaker 4: thought of that, You know what I mean?

153
00:09:12,200 --> 00:09:18,000
Speaker 3: Hey, I have have you been bowling lately? Holy step

154
00:09:18,080 --> 00:09:25,800
Speaker 3: Aside Shakespeare a new wordsmith in town? Anyway? Regular over here?

155
00:09:26,720 --> 00:09:28,920
Speaker 2: Are you? Fred or Rick?

156
00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:30,199
Speaker 5: Oh?

157
00:09:34,559 --> 00:09:39,640
Speaker 3: Oh shit, that's terrible. Sorry, Andrew, thanks for bv B. God.

158
00:09:39,880 --> 00:09:43,080
Speaker 4: Matt, Wow, I'm sorry that happened to you. But Matt,

159
00:09:43,200 --> 00:09:44,319
Speaker 4: now I know who hurt.

160
00:09:44,120 --> 00:09:47,120
Speaker 5: You terrible, that's terrible for he won.

161
00:09:48,040 --> 00:09:52,840
Speaker 3: So so, uh, we all have our burdens to bear.

162
00:09:53,679 --> 00:09:58,040
Speaker 3: Ben Franklin's was he was. He was wearing a lot

163
00:09:58,080 --> 00:10:00,800
Speaker 3: of hats. He's a the old Liberty is known for,

164
00:10:01,200 --> 00:10:04,600
Speaker 3: you know, being saucy and then allegedly being a serial

165
00:10:04,679 --> 00:10:07,280
Speaker 3: killer at some parts of history.

166
00:10:07,840 --> 00:10:10,360
Speaker 5: More likely a resurrection man, you know what I mean.

167
00:10:10,400 --> 00:10:15,680
Speaker 4: He's doing some experiments in his creepy basement like you do.

168
00:10:15,960 --> 00:10:17,480
Speaker 4: But he like, like we were saying, though, I mean,

169
00:10:17,520 --> 00:10:20,640
Speaker 4: the dude had smarts and he was very forward thinking,

170
00:10:20,840 --> 00:10:23,200
Speaker 4: very clever, and Ben, like I was saying, I imagine

171
00:10:23,200 --> 00:10:26,400
Speaker 4: that he must have been super useful in the war room, right.

172
00:10:27,080 --> 00:10:28,000
Speaker 5: Yeah, he was.

173
00:10:28,080 --> 00:10:35,640
Speaker 3: Actually he was actually more involved in the direct kind

174
00:10:35,640 --> 00:10:40,040
Speaker 3: of wetwork you might call it or covert action, because

175
00:10:40,360 --> 00:10:47,959
Speaker 3: he was masterminding strategizing propaganda operations, influence campaigns, and good

176
00:10:48,040 --> 00:10:53,760
Speaker 3: old fashioned paramilitary ops against the British. These guys, these

177
00:10:53,800 --> 00:10:58,040
Speaker 3: three guys we just named George Washington, Acquisition of Foreign Intel,

178
00:10:58,440 --> 00:11:03,280
Speaker 3: John Jay Founding, father of Intelligence, Benjamin Franklin covert action.

179
00:11:04,640 --> 00:11:08,200
Speaker 3: They had that startup mentality, you know, they were doing

180
00:11:08,320 --> 00:11:10,440
Speaker 3: other stuff. They were wearing a lot of hats, and

181
00:11:10,480 --> 00:11:13,400
Speaker 3: they had to wear a lot of hats at this

182
00:11:13,520 --> 00:11:19,640
Speaker 3: time because the course of the revolution was determined successfully

183
00:11:19,920 --> 00:11:24,719
Speaker 3: by this tendency to exercise and this appetite for unorthodox

184
00:11:24,840 --> 00:11:30,640
Speaker 3: asymmetric strategies. You know, forget Napoleonic warfare lining people up

185
00:11:30,679 --> 00:11:34,560
Speaker 3: in rows. First they didn't have enough resources in terms

186
00:11:34,559 --> 00:11:38,840
Speaker 3: of firepower and ammunition to do that, and then secondly

187
00:11:39,160 --> 00:11:42,400
Speaker 3: they had these This gave them a tremendous advantage. They

188
00:11:42,440 --> 00:11:47,280
Speaker 3: had these new, agile ways of thinking, and the somewhat

189
00:11:47,720 --> 00:11:52,959
Speaker 3: I want to be unfair, but the somewhat tradition bound

190
00:11:53,320 --> 00:11:56,800
Speaker 3: rigor of European enemies couldn't deal with it. They were

191
00:11:56,840 --> 00:11:58,239
Speaker 3: speaking different languages.

192
00:11:58,280 --> 00:11:58,680
Speaker 5: In war.

193
00:11:59,280 --> 00:12:03,000
Speaker 4: Asymmetric just kind of meaning unorthodox or maybe not not

194
00:12:03,200 --> 00:12:07,520
Speaker 4: traditional like battlefield like you said, Ben, like the infantry

195
00:12:07,600 --> 00:12:10,280
Speaker 4: the front lines. This is like wars fought on multiple

196
00:12:10,320 --> 00:12:15,040
Speaker 4: fronts using kind of more secretive means of gathering information

197
00:12:15,160 --> 00:12:16,920
Speaker 4: about your enemy so that you can kind of head

198
00:12:16,960 --> 00:12:18,200
Speaker 4: them off at the past.

199
00:12:18,920 --> 00:12:21,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, the way I think about it is exactly what

200
00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:24,120
Speaker 2: you described it, Ben. Those two If you imagine two

201
00:12:24,679 --> 00:12:28,280
Speaker 2: armies in revolutionary times looking at each other with their muskets,

202
00:12:28,320 --> 00:12:31,720
Speaker 2: and everything just aiming. That is symmetric warfare. Yes, you've

203
00:12:31,720 --> 00:12:35,240
Speaker 2: got two identical, you know, forces that are like, I

204
00:12:35,320 --> 00:12:38,160
Speaker 2: will win, I will win in this way. You got

205
00:12:38,240 --> 00:12:41,000
Speaker 2: some flanking folks right from one of the sides, you

206
00:12:41,080 --> 00:12:43,120
Speaker 2: got somebody that sneaks up from behind, and then it

207
00:12:43,440 --> 00:12:45,079
Speaker 2: just becomes Now it's asymmetrical.

208
00:12:45,440 --> 00:12:48,000
Speaker 5: But it also refers to the information gathering of it

209
00:12:48,040 --> 00:12:48,600
Speaker 5: all too, right.

210
00:12:48,600 --> 00:12:51,800
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, yes, yeah, yeah, And there were you know,

211
00:12:51,920 --> 00:12:56,000
Speaker 3: of course there were turncoats on, you know, working for

212
00:12:56,080 --> 00:13:00,319
Speaker 3: the British. The game goes both ways. A modern examsample

213
00:13:00,559 --> 00:13:03,520
Speaker 3: of asymmetric warfare, which we've talked about in the past,

214
00:13:05,000 --> 00:13:11,200
Speaker 3: is pretty scary. At some point, multiple countries, especially China,

215
00:13:11,520 --> 00:13:16,560
Speaker 3: looked at the massive US Navy, especially the carriers and

216
00:13:16,600 --> 00:13:18,840
Speaker 3: the battle groups, and they said, all right, we could

217
00:13:18,840 --> 00:13:22,720
Speaker 3: spend billions of dollars trying to make a carrier, or

218
00:13:22,760 --> 00:13:26,160
Speaker 3: we could spend far less money building a missile that

219
00:13:26,160 --> 00:13:29,920
Speaker 3: can definitely just blow up a carrier, and that's what

220
00:13:30,000 --> 00:13:35,600
Speaker 3: they went for. That's asymmetry. It's still a huge deal

221
00:13:35,760 --> 00:13:39,600
Speaker 3: because it works, and you know, we could make an

222
00:13:39,760 --> 00:13:44,160
Speaker 3: entire podcast series about the Revolutionary War and all the

223
00:13:44,200 --> 00:13:48,600
Speaker 3: crazy espionage occurring. Then a lot of people have there's

224
00:13:48,640 --> 00:13:52,120
Speaker 3: no shortage of scholarship on the matter. But in general,

225
00:13:53,200 --> 00:13:56,440
Speaker 3: if in general, in major general and brigadier general, if

226
00:13:56,440 --> 00:14:00,360
Speaker 3: we're talking about the road to modern intelligence are story

227
00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:06,240
Speaker 3: begins with something called the Office of Strategic Services in

228
00:14:06,360 --> 00:14:09,800
Speaker 3: nineteen forty two. Oh man, these guys have popped up

229
00:14:10,080 --> 00:14:13,520
Speaker 3: in previous episodes as well, right, that's right.

230
00:14:13,720 --> 00:14:18,960
Speaker 4: During the Spanish American War, World War One, and other conflicts,

231
00:14:19,000 --> 00:14:23,000
Speaker 4: intelligence gathering was considered a bit more ad hoc. I guess,

232
00:14:23,080 --> 00:14:25,280
Speaker 4: sort of on a case by case basis, right, like,

233
00:14:25,320 --> 00:14:27,840
Speaker 4: sort of as a needed per project.

234
00:14:28,960 --> 00:14:34,480
Speaker 3: Yeah. Like Matt was saying earlier, a lot of this

235
00:14:34,720 --> 00:14:40,400
Speaker 3: would depend upon person to person interactions, right, finding the

236
00:14:40,480 --> 00:14:43,560
Speaker 3: right time to pass the letter, Oh I know you

237
00:14:43,680 --> 00:14:49,400
Speaker 3: from the salon earlier, the viscounts since his regards.

238
00:14:50,120 --> 00:14:54,200
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, well, and also intelligence gathering on a specific location, right,

239
00:14:54,240 --> 00:14:56,560
Speaker 2: and then folks who were working in that location because

240
00:14:56,560 --> 00:14:58,800
Speaker 2: it's a strategic target or something like that.

241
00:14:59,200 --> 00:14:59,600
Speaker 3: I don't know.

242
00:14:59,800 --> 00:15:01,640
Speaker 2: Yeah, ad hoc is a really good way to put it.

243
00:15:02,120 --> 00:15:05,240
Speaker 2: I sometimes don't even understand fully what it means. What

244
00:15:05,320 --> 00:15:09,160
Speaker 2: that means, but it's used in a couple of different ways.

245
00:15:09,160 --> 00:15:11,360
Speaker 2: In American English, it.

246
00:15:11,360 --> 00:15:13,720
Speaker 4: Doesn't just kind of mean as needed, like, yes, I

247
00:15:13,720 --> 00:15:15,200
Speaker 4: think that's what presents itself.

248
00:15:15,800 --> 00:15:18,040
Speaker 2: That's how I think about it, but I honestly don't

249
00:15:18,040 --> 00:15:18,720
Speaker 2: know if that's right.

250
00:15:19,240 --> 00:15:22,040
Speaker 3: It's also kind of kind of jazz, like jazz can

251
00:15:22,080 --> 00:15:24,960
Speaker 3: be because it's on the spur of the moment. There's

252
00:15:25,000 --> 00:15:26,480
Speaker 3: a bit of improvisation.

253
00:15:26,760 --> 00:15:27,160
Speaker 5: There's not.

254
00:15:27,880 --> 00:15:32,840
Speaker 3: Ad hoc means that there is not this clearly established,

255
00:15:32,960 --> 00:15:36,120
Speaker 3: ironclad rubric for a procedure.

256
00:15:36,760 --> 00:15:41,000
Speaker 4: So like or an agency that like a centralized you know,

257
00:15:42,160 --> 00:15:43,560
Speaker 4: command structure, right.

258
00:15:43,800 --> 00:15:48,600
Speaker 2: You know, yeah, call those guys. We need some intelligence, right, right, right, Yes,

259
00:15:48,720 --> 00:15:49,800
Speaker 2: it's only.

260
00:15:50,960 --> 00:15:54,680
Speaker 3: Right. So if you, for instance, if you are uh,

261
00:15:55,240 --> 00:15:58,840
Speaker 3: running down a flight of stairs and you stumble and

262
00:15:58,880 --> 00:16:03,240
Speaker 3: you catch yourself, you have done some ad hoc Parker, right,

263
00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:10,600
Speaker 3: So depending on how you stumble. I don't know anyway,

264
00:16:10,720 --> 00:16:16,080
Speaker 3: this like we're saying, this was all again case by case, right,

265
00:16:16,280 --> 00:16:22,280
Speaker 3: No big central, nervous system of espionage and intelligence gathering,

266
00:16:22,880 --> 00:16:27,720
Speaker 3: and a lot of times it depended upon individuals who

267
00:16:27,760 --> 00:16:32,640
Speaker 3: could travel to places. Right, you want to know what's

268
00:16:32,680 --> 00:16:36,120
Speaker 3: going on in Europe, then you have to talk to

269
00:16:36,240 --> 00:16:38,680
Speaker 3: Americans who can travel over there.

270
00:16:39,200 --> 00:16:41,320
Speaker 4: The people who would be able to hide in plain

271
00:16:41,480 --> 00:16:44,520
Speaker 4: sight as well, Yeah, would be seen as being out

272
00:16:44,520 --> 00:16:44,960
Speaker 4: of place.

273
00:16:45,720 --> 00:16:48,440
Speaker 2: Think about how tough that is. Somebody who can gain

274
00:16:48,600 --> 00:16:51,560
Speaker 2: access to an adversary that's high enough to have the

275
00:16:51,600 --> 00:16:59,120
Speaker 2: intelligence you need and also not be on anyone's radar somehow. Right,

276
00:16:59,120 --> 00:17:00,120
Speaker 2: that's a tough.

277
00:17:01,200 --> 00:17:02,600
Speaker 5: We love spy movies so much.

278
00:17:02,640 --> 00:17:05,240
Speaker 4: The snakes are always so damn high, the idea of

279
00:17:05,240 --> 00:17:07,040
Speaker 4: getting your cover blown, right.

280
00:17:07,480 --> 00:17:10,439
Speaker 3: Yeah, And that's why. Also, I can't remember it, did

281
00:17:10,520 --> 00:17:15,400
Speaker 3: one of you guys at some point recommend the show

282
00:17:15,520 --> 00:17:16,280
Speaker 3: The Agency.

283
00:17:17,080 --> 00:17:20,320
Speaker 4: Well, there's an original French version that is apparently quite good,

284
00:17:20,320 --> 00:17:22,560
Speaker 4: and there's a new remake with Richard Gear that is

285
00:17:22,600 --> 00:17:24,879
Speaker 4: also apparently quite good. And I have seen neither, but

286
00:17:24,920 --> 00:17:26,320
Speaker 4: I've heard great things about both.

287
00:17:27,000 --> 00:17:30,879
Speaker 3: Okay, Yeah, this bringing this up because a great deal

288
00:17:31,040 --> 00:17:34,040
Speaker 3: of the books in the French series at least, is

289
00:17:34,160 --> 00:17:40,480
Speaker 3: all about the maintenance of a cover or a persona,

290
00:17:41,000 --> 00:17:44,240
Speaker 3: and it's possible psychological effects over the long term.

291
00:17:44,400 --> 00:17:48,200
Speaker 2: Right, nice dude. That's why I like The Recruit so much,

292
00:17:49,480 --> 00:17:52,439
Speaker 2: that show on Netflix. I think it's about a newbie

293
00:17:53,080 --> 00:17:55,800
Speaker 2: getting getting thrown into that world, you know, with the

294
00:17:56,040 --> 00:17:58,080
Speaker 2: like even his job as a cover and then you're

295
00:17:58,119 --> 00:18:00,399
Speaker 2: just like, oh my god, everything just becomes what is

296
00:18:00,440 --> 00:18:01,680
Speaker 2: my life? What is this thing?

297
00:18:02,240 --> 00:18:03,520
Speaker 5: I'll tell you what else is go.

298
00:18:03,640 --> 00:18:06,240
Speaker 4: We're recommending spy type shows, you know, there's been an

299
00:18:06,480 --> 00:18:10,080
Speaker 4: embarrassment of riches of those lately Black Doves, which is

300
00:18:10,119 --> 00:18:13,159
Speaker 4: also I want to say, a Netflix show with that

301
00:18:13,200 --> 00:18:16,919
Speaker 4: guy Ben Wishaw who's also known as the voice of

302
00:18:17,000 --> 00:18:19,640
Speaker 4: Paddington and one of my favorite films of all time.

303
00:18:20,080 --> 00:18:22,760
Speaker 4: It's it's not CI it's British intelligence, but it really

304
00:18:22,800 --> 00:18:24,600
Speaker 4: does tickle out of the boxes as we're talking about.

305
00:18:24,600 --> 00:18:26,960
Speaker 4: And of course Slow Horses, which we've talked about at

306
00:18:27,720 --> 00:18:28,880
Speaker 4: So Good love that.

307
00:18:29,040 --> 00:18:33,960
Speaker 3: Yeah, I read, I read, I think the first two books.

308
00:18:34,200 --> 00:18:37,120
Speaker 3: I want to say as well, too good, too good.

309
00:18:37,280 --> 00:18:39,160
Speaker 3: I stopped reading the books because I want to watch

310
00:18:39,200 --> 00:18:41,120
Speaker 3: the show. That's how I learned about it. And now

311
00:18:41,160 --> 00:18:43,920
Speaker 3: I'll watch The Recruit and then I'll watch Black Doves.

312
00:18:44,600 --> 00:18:50,359
Speaker 2: Yeah, and spies everywhere.

313
00:18:50,760 --> 00:18:52,760
Speaker 5: Yeah, yeah, lurking you know.

314
00:18:52,920 --> 00:18:59,280
Speaker 3: Yeah, we're not paranoid folks. So so this idea here,

315
00:18:59,480 --> 00:19:04,680
Speaker 3: this case by case basis, this lack of a centralized authority,

316
00:19:04,840 --> 00:19:09,560
Speaker 3: nervous system, the analogy we used earlier, This all changed

317
00:19:09,760 --> 00:19:14,080
Speaker 3: in World War Two because at the beginning, the United

318
00:19:14,080 --> 00:19:17,080
Speaker 3: States got their ass handed to them in Pearl Harbor.

319
00:19:17,720 --> 00:19:25,240
Speaker 3: You said, ass hand, it's an enormous tragedy. We're not

320
00:19:25,359 --> 00:19:27,960
Speaker 3: trying to be you know, We're being honest. And it

321
00:19:27,960 --> 00:19:31,000
Speaker 3: may sound glib, it may sound flip, but the reality

322
00:19:31,119 --> 00:19:35,800
Speaker 3: is there was a successful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

323
00:19:35,920 --> 00:19:41,560
Speaker 3: It cost thousands of lives and war Nerds, war Nerds

324
00:19:41,640 --> 00:19:43,840
Speaker 3: knew there was precedent for this, didn't they.

325
00:19:44,280 --> 00:19:46,560
Speaker 4: Yeah, And just really quickly, speaking of war Nerds, do

326
00:19:46,720 --> 00:19:49,360
Speaker 4: check out a two part series Ben and I did

327
00:19:49,359 --> 00:19:53,480
Speaker 4: on Ridiculous History. It was almost like about a precursor

328
00:19:53,640 --> 00:19:57,280
Speaker 4: or sort of like an early attempt at the kind

329
00:19:57,320 --> 00:20:00,000
Speaker 4: of warfare that the Japanese would employ during Pearl Harbor.

330
00:20:02,600 --> 00:20:06,600
Speaker 3: Yeah, at that time it was against the Russian Empire

331
00:20:07,240 --> 00:20:11,479
Speaker 3: in the turn of the nineteenth century. This time, it

332
00:20:11,600 --> 00:20:14,879
Speaker 3: was the attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base that

333
00:20:15,000 --> 00:20:19,000
Speaker 3: galvanized the US public to support intervention in World War Two.

334
00:20:19,280 --> 00:20:24,400
Speaker 3: It also launched some pretty serious conspiracy theories that continue

335
00:20:24,440 --> 00:20:28,000
Speaker 3: in the modern day. How much did the US power

336
00:20:28,080 --> 00:20:31,879
Speaker 3: apparatus know about Pearl Harbor or the likelihood of it

337
00:20:31,960 --> 00:20:39,520
Speaker 3: occurring in advance, or did US trade policies push the

338
00:20:39,640 --> 00:20:44,280
Speaker 3: Japanese Empire towards something where from their perspective, Pearl Harbor

339
00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:45,120
Speaker 3: was inevitable.

340
00:20:45,800 --> 00:20:48,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a tough question, and it's something we've explored

341
00:20:48,800 --> 00:20:51,399
Speaker 2: in a bunch of different episodes, like our one on

342
00:20:51,480 --> 00:20:54,479
Speaker 2: the Project for the New American Century and stuff like that,

343
00:20:54,560 --> 00:20:58,240
Speaker 2: where if you have an event and Pearl Harbor is

344
00:20:58,320 --> 00:21:01,120
Speaker 2: used as an example in that specific episode, and that's

345
00:21:01,640 --> 00:21:04,440
Speaker 2: set of circumstances, But if you have an event like that,

346
00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:09,720
Speaker 2: it will spur both the public mind right to want

347
00:21:09,920 --> 00:21:13,040
Speaker 2: a certain thing, but also it will open up dollars

348
00:21:13,520 --> 00:21:16,080
Speaker 2: in budgets to create a thing potentially that you want

349
00:21:16,119 --> 00:21:18,720
Speaker 2: to create even you know, and it doesn't mean that's

350
00:21:18,720 --> 00:21:22,359
Speaker 2: what happens when there's something like that. It just calls

351
00:21:22,359 --> 00:21:25,160
Speaker 2: in to question the motivations perhaps, right.

352
00:21:25,480 --> 00:21:29,399
Speaker 3: One hundred percent. Yeah, well said there too, because that

353
00:21:30,200 --> 00:21:35,520
Speaker 3: shows us the system at play, right, the structural reckonings

354
00:21:35,520 --> 00:21:40,200
Speaker 3: that occur and to the US establishment at large. In

355
00:21:40,240 --> 00:21:43,320
Speaker 3: the wake of Pearl Harbor, while the events of World

356
00:21:43,359 --> 00:21:47,040
Speaker 3: War two are unfolding, everyone in the halls of Power

357
00:21:47,200 --> 00:21:51,280
Speaker 3: DC is looking at each other and say holy smokes,

358
00:21:51,840 --> 00:21:55,240
Speaker 3: if this happens again, it could end the nation.

359
00:21:56,240 --> 00:21:56,760
Speaker 5: Like we.

360
00:21:58,600 --> 00:22:02,360
Speaker 3: Stop so bad. That's essentially what they're saying. I don't

361
00:22:02,400 --> 00:22:05,560
Speaker 3: mean to sound like we're characters on drunk History, which

362
00:22:05,600 --> 00:22:08,400
Speaker 3: is a great show, check it out, but that is

363
00:22:08,520 --> 00:22:12,600
Speaker 3: the like, that's the to your point all about high stakes.

364
00:22:12,800 --> 00:22:15,840
Speaker 3: That's the level of the stakes here. And that's why

365
00:22:15,920 --> 00:22:21,119
Speaker 3: President Roosevelt calls up a very highly decorated veteran of

366
00:22:21,200 --> 00:22:25,760
Speaker 3: World War One, a man named William J. Donovan.

367
00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:30,600
Speaker 2: Oh Billy Donovan, Oh Billy J.

368
00:22:31,240 --> 00:22:31,639
Speaker 5: Billy J.

369
00:22:32,280 --> 00:22:36,960
Speaker 3: Is kind of a cowboy. He's not the soldier you

370
00:22:37,040 --> 00:22:39,240
Speaker 3: take home to your parents, Let's put it that way.

371
00:22:39,560 --> 00:22:42,320
Speaker 3: And he says, all right, Donovan, you're gonna head a

372
00:22:42,359 --> 00:22:45,560
Speaker 3: new organization. It's the first of its kind in the

373
00:22:45,680 --> 00:22:48,479
Speaker 3: United States. We've been kind of ad hoc for a while.

374
00:22:49,240 --> 00:22:53,639
Speaker 3: I'm gonna call it the Coordinator of Information. And then

375
00:22:53,680 --> 00:22:59,520
Speaker 3: apparently all the other generals went, eh, eh.

376
00:22:58,800 --> 00:23:02,600
Speaker 2: Doesn't really have a ring to it. Yeah, I know,

377
00:23:02,840 --> 00:23:04,760
Speaker 2: I know we have to go vague with these things,

378
00:23:04,760 --> 00:23:06,400
Speaker 2: but that's a little too much.

379
00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:10,000
Speaker 3: Right right, And it was like Secretary of Secrets and

380
00:23:10,040 --> 00:23:12,480
Speaker 3: they said no. The abbreviation is S o s that's

381
00:23:12,480 --> 00:23:13,600
Speaker 3: gonna screw up everything.

382
00:23:15,080 --> 00:23:16,240
Speaker 5: No, one don't can use.

383
00:23:21,040 --> 00:23:23,639
Speaker 4: Secretary of secrets. Though it does sound fun. Yeah, I

384
00:23:24,520 --> 00:23:26,080
Speaker 4: like it when you say it out loud like that.

385
00:23:26,119 --> 00:23:28,280
Speaker 4: It's I love the alliteration as well.

386
00:23:28,920 --> 00:23:31,400
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, agree, it's got a how would you say?

387
00:23:31,560 --> 00:23:32,760
Speaker 5: A good feel?

388
00:23:33,280 --> 00:23:39,399
Speaker 3: Yeah, but it's also maybe a little too fun. You know,

389
00:23:39,640 --> 00:23:53,520
Speaker 3: how do you introduce yourself and a serious I'm.

390
00:23:48,760 --> 00:23:50,560
Speaker 5: Shouting into a cat right now?

391
00:23:51,600 --> 00:23:53,240
Speaker 2: He really did, he did.

392
00:23:53,280 --> 00:23:54,480
Speaker 3: It's not a figure of speech.

393
00:23:55,320 --> 00:23:58,760
Speaker 4: I've been podcasting from upstairs lately just to kind of know,

394
00:23:58,840 --> 00:24:00,440
Speaker 4: have a little change of scenery in This cat is

395
00:24:00,480 --> 00:24:04,040
Speaker 4: obsessed with me like I never Oh my god, it's like,

396
00:24:04,080 --> 00:24:04,800
Speaker 4: I love this cat.

397
00:24:04,920 --> 00:24:07,080
Speaker 5: I love Vanessa. I love you, but you're making me

398
00:24:07,160 --> 00:24:09,639
Speaker 5: go crazy right now. Sorry, guys, carry on, please.

399
00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:12,440
Speaker 2: Oh send her my way.

400
00:24:13,200 --> 00:24:14,280
Speaker 5: I did she heard you?

401
00:24:14,359 --> 00:24:20,200
Speaker 3: She knows I nominate you Vanessa for our Secretary of Secrets.

402
00:24:20,640 --> 00:24:23,800
Speaker 3: So there we go. It has to be a cat,

403
00:24:24,040 --> 00:24:26,600
Speaker 3: you know what I mean? That's a profile perfect.

404
00:24:28,040 --> 00:24:30,480
Speaker 5: Very cats would be very well suited for spying.

405
00:24:30,560 --> 00:24:32,920
Speaker 4: We have an episode either on this show or Ridiculous

406
00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:36,719
Speaker 4: History about stuff that animals. That's right, Yeah, it was

407
00:24:36,800 --> 00:24:40,880
Speaker 4: exactly it's about animals being employed for these very kinds

408
00:24:40,920 --> 00:24:41,800
Speaker 4: of tasks.

409
00:24:41,840 --> 00:24:45,040
Speaker 2: Much like Ben Franklin cats are always rubbing cheeks with

410
00:24:45,119 --> 00:24:46,400
Speaker 2: everyone there.

411
00:24:46,480 --> 00:24:51,479
Speaker 3: We go, well done, and so Coordinator of Information. It

412
00:24:51,680 --> 00:24:55,160
Speaker 3: just doesn't work as the original as as the ongoing name,

413
00:24:55,440 --> 00:24:59,040
Speaker 3: and so they go with something equally vague. Office of

414
00:24:59,200 --> 00:25:04,480
Speaker 3: Strategic Services or OSS. This is made official. It's June thirteenth,

415
00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:10,280
Speaker 3: nineteen forty two. And here we're going to pause for

416
00:25:10,440 --> 00:25:14,760
Speaker 3: a word from our sponsors. When we return, we'll tell

417
00:25:14,800 --> 00:25:26,560
Speaker 3: you why the OSS is a thing that happened. We're back,

418
00:25:26,680 --> 00:25:30,360
Speaker 3: all right. There's no denying the Office of Strategic Services.

419
00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:35,520
Speaker 3: Just like intelligence in the Revolutionary War, they are absolutely

420
00:25:35,720 --> 00:25:39,920
Speaker 3: instrumental in the Allied victory in World War Two. It's

421
00:25:39,960 --> 00:25:42,880
Speaker 3: actually difficult to list all the ways in which the

422
00:25:42,920 --> 00:25:48,560
Speaker 3: OSS contributed to the war effort because some of it

423
00:25:48,600 --> 00:25:51,520
Speaker 3: is still secret, like some of it died with people.

424
00:25:51,680 --> 00:25:53,760
Speaker 3: We will never know the full extent.

425
00:25:54,440 --> 00:25:57,919
Speaker 2: We do know. Is this the organization that got into

426
00:25:58,119 --> 00:26:01,439
Speaker 2: code breaking and some of that stuff, or is that

427
00:26:01,480 --> 00:26:03,680
Speaker 2: specifically or is that something else.

428
00:26:04,800 --> 00:26:08,159
Speaker 3: That would be you're talking about like Enigma and stuff

429
00:26:08,200 --> 00:26:12,520
Speaker 3: like that, crypto cryptography that would be more. Oh, gosh,

430
00:26:12,560 --> 00:26:18,920
Speaker 3: what was the what was the guy's name, Turing? Yes, yes,

431
00:26:19,080 --> 00:26:23,560
Speaker 3: thank you, Yeah, that would be Yes, the brilliant polymath

432
00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:29,919
Speaker 3: Alan Turing. Oss not as not as involved on the

433
00:26:30,040 --> 00:26:35,119
Speaker 3: cryptography side to the extent that other initiatives were. But

434
00:26:35,280 --> 00:26:39,080
Speaker 3: they had a lot of weird missions and they had

435
00:26:39,200 --> 00:26:46,920
Speaker 3: a lot of fun toys. They they did behind enemy

436
00:26:47,000 --> 00:26:51,960
Speaker 3: line stuff, right. They did a lot of training, surveillance, analysis,

437
00:26:52,000 --> 00:26:58,120
Speaker 3: and what we're called operational groups. Uh, these operational Yeah,

438
00:26:58,200 --> 00:27:06,160
Speaker 3: these operational groups did things like assassination and elimination programs. Uh.

439
00:27:06,240 --> 00:27:08,480
Speaker 3: They they did the wetwork.

440
00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:13,000
Speaker 2: It's a yeah. The CIA says often they were used

441
00:27:13,040 --> 00:27:17,040
Speaker 2: to demoralize the enemy, right, a lot of ops.

442
00:27:17,480 --> 00:27:24,359
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, compromising newspapers, spreading fake news, that kind of stuff.

443
00:27:25,920 --> 00:27:30,480
Speaker 4: And the CIA also would probably argue that the OSS,

444
00:27:30,520 --> 00:27:34,240
Speaker 4: in its short lived a very important, you know life,

445
00:27:34,880 --> 00:27:37,920
Speaker 4: was sort of an incubator for the types of operations

446
00:27:37,920 --> 00:27:40,280
Speaker 4: and agents that would go on to make up the

447
00:27:40,359 --> 00:27:42,600
Speaker 4: CIA one hundred.

448
00:27:43,359 --> 00:27:43,679
Speaker 3: Yeah.

449
00:27:44,240 --> 00:27:46,320
Speaker 5: The oh, oh dude, they did.

450
00:27:46,560 --> 00:27:51,280
Speaker 2: They did things like creating the Free Time movement, yeah,

451
00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:54,760
Speaker 2: as as an operation, and they got a bunch of

452
00:27:54,800 --> 00:27:57,439
Speaker 2: students involved who had no idea they were working for

453
00:27:57,520 --> 00:27:59,440
Speaker 2: the oss basically high.

454
00:28:01,240 --> 00:28:03,399
Speaker 5: Yeah, yeah, okay, I don't know about this movement.

455
00:28:04,720 --> 00:28:11,359
Speaker 3: They dispatched, Okay, so they they tapped college students who

456
00:28:11,440 --> 00:28:17,080
Speaker 3: were either Thai American or studying in the US from Thailand,

457
00:28:18,040 --> 00:28:20,720
Speaker 3: and they found them wherever they could. It was not

458
00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:23,800
Speaker 3: a big population to choose from from what we understand.

459
00:28:24,119 --> 00:28:28,840
Speaker 3: And then they trained them up and they shipped them

460
00:28:28,960 --> 00:28:34,960
Speaker 3: secretly back to Thailand the submarine. Sometimes they walked over

461
00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:38,040
Speaker 3: the border, and I think they had a few on parachute, right,

462
00:28:38,640 --> 00:28:43,120
Speaker 3: which is a pretty pretty crazy gap year for a

463
00:28:43,160 --> 00:28:43,800
Speaker 3: grad student.

464
00:28:44,760 --> 00:28:48,040
Speaker 2: It's crazy because they're they're using the university students, the

465
00:28:48,080 --> 00:28:51,280
Speaker 2: young minds. They're using the potentially capable fighters with young

466
00:28:51,360 --> 00:28:55,680
Speaker 2: minds that are very malleable to become a resistance force

467
00:28:55,880 --> 00:28:59,440
Speaker 2: against the force of Japanese military might there in Thailand.

468
00:28:59,840 --> 00:29:05,719
Speaker 2: Just it's creepy, smart, and I don't know it just

469
00:29:06,200 --> 00:29:09,240
Speaker 2: it's that yucky feeling of oh, none of this is

470
00:29:09,480 --> 00:29:10,680
Speaker 2: actually what I think it.

471
00:29:10,600 --> 00:29:16,600
Speaker 3: Is, right, Yeah, And we see this later reflected in

472
00:29:16,800 --> 00:29:23,920
Speaker 3: other student movements throughout especially Latin America. But you don't

473
00:29:23,920 --> 00:29:26,520
Speaker 3: have to throw a stone far across the globe to

474
00:29:27,040 --> 00:29:30,600
Speaker 3: find a country or regime that's been touched by something

475
00:29:30,720 --> 00:29:34,200
Speaker 3: like this, and not always from the Yankees. Sometimes it

476
00:29:34,440 --> 00:29:39,040
Speaker 3: occurs from the European side. And of course Soviet forces

477
00:29:39,120 --> 00:29:41,120
Speaker 3: got very good at this in their own way.

478
00:29:41,640 --> 00:29:44,400
Speaker 2: Yeah they did. It makes you really understand why the

479
00:29:44,560 --> 00:29:48,400
Speaker 2: US really cracked down on a bunch of student movements,

480
00:29:48,520 --> 00:29:52,120
Speaker 2: you know, in the nineteen sixties specifically. It really makes

481
00:29:52,160 --> 00:29:55,920
Speaker 2: you understand their paranoia about that because it was their playbook.

482
00:29:57,400 --> 00:29:59,840
Speaker 3: That's the thing. Yeah, it's you know what it's like.

483
00:30:00,600 --> 00:30:02,880
Speaker 3: This may be a deep reference now, but I bet,

484
00:30:03,080 --> 00:30:05,440
Speaker 3: I bet we're all on the same page. It reminds

485
00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:09,480
Speaker 3: me of the Key and Peel sketch about the Albanian

486
00:30:09,600 --> 00:30:13,320
Speaker 3: restaurant and the Macedonian restaurant that are directly across the

487
00:30:13,360 --> 00:30:17,080
Speaker 3: street from each other. One makes kapapi and one makes

488
00:30:17,160 --> 00:30:21,800
Speaker 3: chavapi and they're both. It's super Have you guys seen

489
00:30:21,840 --> 00:30:22,240
Speaker 3: this one.

490
00:30:22,360 --> 00:30:23,360
Speaker 5: I don't think I've seen this one.

491
00:30:23,360 --> 00:30:24,360
Speaker 2: I don't remember it, dude.

492
00:30:24,560 --> 00:30:27,800
Speaker 3: Oh it's legend. It is s here. I'll send it

493
00:30:27,840 --> 00:30:32,720
Speaker 3: to you, but it's without spoiling it too much. The

494
00:30:32,760 --> 00:30:37,880
Speaker 3: owners of these restaurants are essentially creating the same dish,

495
00:30:38,440 --> 00:30:41,680
Speaker 3: and they're super pissed. That the restaurant across the street

496
00:30:41,760 --> 00:30:45,520
Speaker 3: is doing it because it's their thing. And that's exactly

497
00:30:45,560 --> 00:30:49,440
Speaker 3: what happens with student movements in the USS or made

498
00:30:49,440 --> 00:30:53,040
Speaker 3: by the ussr KGB and made by the us CIA.

499
00:30:54,160 --> 00:30:58,360
Speaker 3: It's true or OSS, Yes, oh good note OSS at

500
00:30:58,400 --> 00:31:01,160
Speaker 3: that time. Yes, because we're not adding to the CIA

501
00:31:01,720 --> 00:31:04,680
Speaker 3: just yet. The OSS has, as you were saying, no,

502
00:31:04,880 --> 00:31:10,920
Speaker 3: a very short lifespan. Operationally. They employ they full time

503
00:31:11,040 --> 00:31:15,920
Speaker 3: employ about thirteen thousand people. As in, we're not counting

504
00:31:15,960 --> 00:31:18,760
Speaker 3: the students, we're not counting the assets. We're not counting

505
00:31:19,120 --> 00:31:22,360
Speaker 3: you know, the newspaper printers who didn't know who they

506
00:31:22,360 --> 00:31:27,320
Speaker 3: were taking orders from. The actual facts employees thirteen thousand,

507
00:31:27,680 --> 00:31:30,959
Speaker 3: and they were only The OSS was only really popping

508
00:31:31,120 --> 00:31:33,240
Speaker 3: for about can I say that, all right? Fine, only

509
00:31:33,280 --> 00:31:37,480
Speaker 3: really popping from about nineteen forty two to nineteen forty five,

510
00:31:37,640 --> 00:31:41,960
Speaker 3: three years, very very short. The whole time this is happening,

511
00:31:42,480 --> 00:31:46,560
Speaker 3: our buddy Billy J. Donovan is still cooking with gas Man.

512
00:31:46,640 --> 00:31:51,040
Speaker 3: He's stirring that cauldron of intrigue and he's saying, oh, yeah,

513
00:31:51,160 --> 00:31:54,640
Speaker 3: we're doing you know, we're doing cool stuff in wartime.

514
00:31:55,760 --> 00:31:58,720
Speaker 3: And he may have overestimated the effectiveness of some of

515
00:31:58,760 --> 00:32:02,240
Speaker 3: these projects, and he starts talking to the people in

516
00:32:02,360 --> 00:32:05,680
Speaker 3: power above him, to the presidents and the presidential staff,

517
00:32:05,720 --> 00:32:09,240
Speaker 3: and he starts saying, what if we just kind of

518
00:32:09,320 --> 00:32:12,480
Speaker 3: kept the band going, you know, after the tour that

519
00:32:12,640 --> 00:32:15,200
Speaker 3: is World War Two? What if we had a peacetime

520
00:32:15,840 --> 00:32:20,200
Speaker 3: version of this to stop wars from ever happening again

521
00:32:21,240 --> 00:32:24,920
Speaker 3: through trickery. I feel like he paused a second, you know,

522
00:32:25,200 --> 00:32:33,560
Speaker 3: he was like, ever happening again through trickery? And President Truman,

523
00:32:34,240 --> 00:32:37,040
Speaker 3: you know, Roosevelt's not president at this point. Now it's

524
00:32:37,080 --> 00:32:42,400
Speaker 3: President Truman. And he says, you know what, Billy, you

525
00:32:42,480 --> 00:32:43,840
Speaker 3: make some good points.

526
00:32:45,360 --> 00:32:49,280
Speaker 4: So that's when later on Truman decided to create the

527
00:32:49,320 --> 00:32:54,000
Speaker 4: CIA in nineteen forty seven. The organization pretty much took

528
00:32:54,040 --> 00:32:58,040
Speaker 4: all of its cues from Donovan, who had earlier pitched

529
00:32:58,040 --> 00:33:02,120
Speaker 4: the idea of a post war peace time spy operation

530
00:33:02,360 --> 00:33:05,600
Speaker 4: that would continue after World War One. Is more of

531
00:33:05,720 --> 00:33:08,200
Speaker 4: like a preparedness kind of thing rather than like being

532
00:33:08,240 --> 00:33:09,320
Speaker 4: in an active conflict.

533
00:33:10,200 --> 00:33:13,400
Speaker 2: Well, yeah, and I think you can probably understand why

534
00:33:13,440 --> 00:33:17,120
Speaker 2: this is such an what felt like a necessary move

535
00:33:17,160 --> 00:33:22,040
Speaker 2: at the time. You've got major military powers that all

536
00:33:22,160 --> 00:33:25,840
Speaker 2: rise up during World War two right to fight back

537
00:33:25,880 --> 00:33:29,000
Speaker 2: against a single enemy, but each one of those individual

538
00:33:29,120 --> 00:33:33,440
Speaker 2: nations that has a massive military now could potentially be

539
00:33:33,640 --> 00:33:38,240
Speaker 2: that in that frenemy zone. Right, that kind of developed

540
00:33:38,800 --> 00:33:41,200
Speaker 2: while everybody said, Hey, there's a real threat over there,

541
00:33:41,280 --> 00:33:44,960
Speaker 2: we need to eliminate that threat. Now that it's over,

542
00:33:45,080 --> 00:33:47,880
Speaker 2: we should probably keep our ears and our eyes to

543
00:33:47,960 --> 00:33:49,520
Speaker 2: our friends that we've just made.

544
00:33:50,720 --> 00:33:53,959
Speaker 3: Yeah, pick and choose the parts of the relationships we

545
00:33:54,040 --> 00:33:58,400
Speaker 3: want to maintain and the avenues of communication. You're absolutely right,

546
00:33:59,000 --> 00:34:03,120
Speaker 3: You're absolutely right back, because proponents will argue this was

547
00:34:03,160 --> 00:34:07,080
Speaker 3: a necessary move, and there's validity to that claim because

548
00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:11,840
Speaker 3: away from the public eye, right away from all the shiny,

549
00:34:12,040 --> 00:34:17,120
Speaker 3: problematic support the troops propaganda, you know, with Donald Duck

550
00:34:17,200 --> 00:34:23,720
Speaker 3: and your favorite cartoon characters fighting racist caricatures of access powers,

551
00:34:24,000 --> 00:34:27,480
Speaker 3: away from all that jazz and the Hubblou, Uncle Sam's

552
00:34:27,760 --> 00:34:32,200
Speaker 3: finest minds have already predicted just what you were describing,

553
00:34:32,280 --> 00:34:35,759
Speaker 3: mat a new conflict on the horizon. The alliance with

554
00:34:35,800 --> 00:34:40,840
Speaker 3: the Soviets was always fragile. These were real strange bedfellows,

555
00:34:41,040 --> 00:34:43,960
Speaker 3: the US and the USSR. And it was only it

556
00:34:44,000 --> 00:34:46,840
Speaker 3: was only a friendship. It was not a friendship, it

557
00:34:46,920 --> 00:34:50,120
Speaker 3: was only a working relationship based on the enemy of

558
00:34:50,200 --> 00:34:54,640
Speaker 3: acxis power and without that mutual shared enemy, democracy and

559
00:34:54,719 --> 00:34:58,560
Speaker 3: communism were inevitably going to set on a collision course

560
00:34:59,000 --> 00:35:01,719
Speaker 3: for nothing less than control of the world. And on

561
00:35:01,840 --> 00:35:06,000
Speaker 3: the Soviet side, there Bo often saw this too, because

562
00:35:06,000 --> 00:35:08,680
Speaker 3: the nerds are often going to end up being friends

563
00:35:08,719 --> 00:35:12,160
Speaker 3: with each other outside of political ideologies because they're the

564
00:35:12,160 --> 00:35:15,200
Speaker 3: only ones who like are on the level of what

565
00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:20,400
Speaker 3: the other person is talking about. That's why nuclear technology

566
00:35:21,280 --> 00:35:24,440
Speaker 3: it has to be clamped down so hard, because you know,

567
00:35:24,520 --> 00:35:27,319
Speaker 3: in certain aspects, it's like there are fifty people who

568
00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:30,000
Speaker 3: know about it, and they want to hang out with

569
00:35:30,040 --> 00:35:32,919
Speaker 3: the other forty nine people because they're the only ones

570
00:35:32,920 --> 00:35:35,680
Speaker 3: who like get their dumb puns and stuff like that.

571
00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:38,200
Speaker 5: It's important.

572
00:35:38,680 --> 00:35:44,280
Speaker 2: Isn't it a little weird that both of these superpowers.

573
00:35:44,920 --> 00:35:48,200
Speaker 2: Well here's the thing, I don't know the Soviet view

574
00:35:48,719 --> 00:35:51,560
Speaker 2: of this from this time. I haven't read enough books

575
00:35:51,719 --> 00:35:54,440
Speaker 2: or about the history of it. Were the Soviets I'm

576
00:35:54,440 --> 00:35:58,160
Speaker 2: trying to understand if we're the Soviets also thinking, oh,

577
00:35:58,440 --> 00:36:01,600
Speaker 2: we have to become the world. Old's ideology of how

578
00:36:02,040 --> 00:36:06,120
Speaker 2: you know, governments are organized and how human beings get

579
00:36:06,160 --> 00:36:09,839
Speaker 2: their money and how the economics of the world work.

580
00:36:09,920 --> 00:36:11,880
Speaker 2: We have to be the ones or was it just

581
00:36:11,960 --> 00:36:14,239
Speaker 2: the US thinking they're going to try and take this

582
00:36:14,280 --> 00:36:15,760
Speaker 2: thing from us?

583
00:36:15,040 --> 00:36:18,719
Speaker 4: Well, and I always wonder you guys, like what it

584
00:36:18,840 --> 00:36:24,360
Speaker 4: is that makes communism and capitalism just so like oil

585
00:36:24,400 --> 00:36:26,680
Speaker 4: and water, you know, like I mean, just on paper,

586
00:36:26,920 --> 00:36:29,440
Speaker 4: just the antithesis to one another. Like you know, when

587
00:36:29,480 --> 00:36:33,000
Speaker 4: you think about just what communism is, it doesn't seem

588
00:36:33,239 --> 00:36:37,920
Speaker 4: that alarmist or doesn't seem that, you know, like counterintuitive,

589
00:36:37,920 --> 00:36:40,680
Speaker 4: But I guess it is because it's like literally, you know,

590
00:36:40,800 --> 00:36:45,279
Speaker 4: making money versus like governing for the people or like

591
00:36:45,360 --> 00:36:47,560
Speaker 4: having everyone be on an equal playing field, and that

592
00:36:47,719 --> 00:36:49,839
Speaker 4: does not jive with capitalism.

593
00:36:50,000 --> 00:36:53,120
Speaker 5: So therefore it's like a bigger ideological kind of conflict.

594
00:36:53,160 --> 00:36:55,759
Speaker 4: I'm sorry if I'm oversimplifying, but I think that piggybacks

595
00:36:55,760 --> 00:36:56,520
Speaker 4: on Matt's question.

596
00:36:57,719 --> 00:37:02,600
Speaker 2: It's weird because the oligarch thing can exist in both places,

597
00:37:03,640 --> 00:37:08,080
Speaker 2: which is what you imagine is that's who's being served ultimately.

598
00:37:08,239 --> 00:37:11,040
Speaker 3: Right, Yeah, so let's unpack that. I think it's worth

599
00:37:11,080 --> 00:37:14,960
Speaker 3: the time here because these are excellent points. So to

600
00:37:15,200 --> 00:37:20,960
Speaker 3: the original question, Yes, both sides had aspirations to control

601
00:37:21,239 --> 00:37:24,680
Speaker 3: the world order in a way that you could argue

602
00:37:24,760 --> 00:37:29,799
Speaker 3: they were both seeking to make a macrocosmic iteration of

603
00:37:29,840 --> 00:37:35,520
Speaker 3: their earlier revolutions, the American Revolution, democracy, right, the Communist revolution,

604
00:37:35,840 --> 00:37:42,959
Speaker 3: the Soviet Empire, and they did see ideologically, they did

605
00:37:43,000 --> 00:37:49,640
Speaker 3: see these as mutually exclusive, clashing ideas. And the important

606
00:37:49,640 --> 00:37:54,279
Speaker 3: point here, the takeaway for all the common John and

607
00:37:54,320 --> 00:37:57,480
Speaker 3: Ivan doze out in the crowd tonight, is that a

608
00:37:57,520 --> 00:38:00,200
Speaker 3: lot of these decisions were being made by what we

609
00:38:00,239 --> 00:38:05,400
Speaker 3: will call oligarchs to your point, in practice, like communism

610
00:38:05,520 --> 00:38:11,560
Speaker 3: in theory was often not communism in practice in the

611
00:38:11,600 --> 00:38:14,799
Speaker 3: Soviet Empire, right, there was a lot of corruption, just

612
00:38:14,880 --> 00:38:17,799
Speaker 3: the same way that democracy in theory is often not

613
00:38:17,960 --> 00:38:21,640
Speaker 3: democracy in practice. In the history of the United States.

614
00:38:23,080 --> 00:38:26,120
Speaker 2: Yeah, it is really strange to me.

615
00:38:26,280 --> 00:38:28,520
Speaker 3: Sorry, I know that's cynical, but that's the truth.

616
00:38:29,000 --> 00:38:32,000
Speaker 2: No, no, no, you're right, because ultimately it's well, how

617
00:38:32,400 --> 00:38:36,480
Speaker 2: will I become wealthy? Right, and the minds of the

618
00:38:36,480 --> 00:38:40,480
Speaker 2: people who are really sitting at the top end deciding that, oh, well,

619
00:38:40,480 --> 00:38:43,359
Speaker 2: this ideology is the most important thing. So we need

620
00:38:43,400 --> 00:38:46,759
Speaker 2: to build ships that have the biggest weapons on them

621
00:38:46,920 --> 00:38:50,080
Speaker 2: and go kill the other guys that also have big

622
00:38:50,080 --> 00:38:54,279
Speaker 2: ships with weapons because they think different. It's just sorry,

623
00:38:54,280 --> 00:38:59,960
Speaker 2: I'm breaking it down to like stupidly general and simple

624
00:39:00,080 --> 00:39:02,480
Speaker 2: five parts.

625
00:39:01,680 --> 00:39:02,680
Speaker 5: Which I think is key.

626
00:39:02,840 --> 00:39:05,000
Speaker 4: But I mean speaking of you know, the the baked

627
00:39:05,120 --> 00:39:08,360
Speaker 4: in corruption, the you know, the difference between you know,

628
00:39:08,400 --> 00:39:11,880
Speaker 4: a concept on paper versus how it actually works and

629
00:39:11,960 --> 00:39:14,759
Speaker 4: operates in the real world. The same could be said

630
00:39:14,760 --> 00:39:18,080
Speaker 4: of the CIA and some of the sins of the

631
00:39:18,120 --> 00:39:22,000
Speaker 4: OSS that it kind of inherited, whether you could call

632
00:39:22,040 --> 00:39:25,320
Speaker 4: it corruption or just sort of circumventing the rule of law.

633
00:39:25,840 --> 00:39:28,080
Speaker 4: A lot of these things sort of carried over into

634
00:39:28,120 --> 00:39:30,239
Speaker 4: this new agency right on.

635
00:39:32,160 --> 00:39:36,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, and there is that also, that underlying thing of

636
00:39:37,800 --> 00:39:41,440
Speaker 2: everyone is a potential enemy, you know, at least an

637
00:39:41,520 --> 00:39:45,719
Speaker 2: organization that has to buy its very nature view everybody

638
00:39:45,800 --> 00:39:47,120
Speaker 2: as a potential enemy.

639
00:39:48,160 --> 00:39:51,560
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's true. It's true. It's brutal. I mean, riddle

640
00:39:51,600 --> 00:39:55,560
Speaker 3: be this. Do you guys know who the most surveilled

641
00:39:55,800 --> 00:40:00,520
Speaker 3: individuals associated with a lot of these agencies are, Because

642
00:40:00,520 --> 00:40:07,120
Speaker 3: it's the employees of those agencies. They're also not super trusted,

643
00:40:07,239 --> 00:40:10,800
Speaker 3: and they can't be because of the nature of their enterprise.

644
00:40:10,960 --> 00:40:15,640
Speaker 3: I do think it's important here to note that we're

645
00:40:15,719 --> 00:40:20,040
Speaker 3: not saying people in power during the Cold War were

646
00:40:20,320 --> 00:40:25,480
Speaker 3: bad faith actors. A lot of them clearly sincerely believed

647
00:40:25,520 --> 00:40:28,640
Speaker 3: and the ideology and the the ideology they were practicing,

648
00:40:28,719 --> 00:40:32,080
Speaker 3: the aims they were pursuing. Yet you have to ask

649
00:40:33,239 --> 00:40:36,279
Speaker 3: why they believe these things. And when you ask that,

650
00:40:36,320 --> 00:40:38,839
Speaker 3: what you will find is they believed in the thing

651
00:40:38,960 --> 00:40:43,399
Speaker 3: that was good for them in their social structure. They

652
00:40:43,760 --> 00:40:48,000
Speaker 3: liked it because they were successful within that milieu. Whatever

653
00:40:48,040 --> 00:40:49,239
Speaker 3: that miliu may be.

654
00:40:50,280 --> 00:40:53,720
Speaker 2: Well, yeah, and we can't discount the fact that politicians

655
00:40:53,840 --> 00:40:57,680
Speaker 2: are often in a lot of ways servicing the money,

656
00:40:58,080 --> 00:41:01,720
Speaker 2: which is the folks who you know, who can build

657
00:41:01,920 --> 00:41:05,000
Speaker 2: the bombs and the weapons and the things that are

658
00:41:05,040 --> 00:41:08,320
Speaker 2: necessary to hold on to power and to maintain those structures.

659
00:41:08,760 --> 00:41:11,399
Speaker 2: And that hasn't changed and I don't think that will

660
00:41:11,400 --> 00:41:13,440
Speaker 2: ever change. And those are the oligarchs.

661
00:41:14,440 --> 00:41:17,080
Speaker 4: And it's sort of like a self fulfilling prophecy as well,

662
00:41:17,120 --> 00:41:21,560
Speaker 4: where it's like, in order to satiate those interests, those

663
00:41:21,600 --> 00:41:25,800
Speaker 4: economic interests, you almost kind of have to constantly exist

664
00:41:25,920 --> 00:41:27,879
Speaker 4: in various states of conflicts.

665
00:41:28,200 --> 00:41:31,919
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, and what if those guys need natural resources,

666
00:41:32,280 --> 00:41:35,719
Speaker 2: if you if some other empire controls where the resources are.

667
00:41:35,880 --> 00:41:38,279
Speaker 2: You can't get those resources, you know, you got to

668
00:41:38,320 --> 00:41:42,080
Speaker 2: pay them for the service of getting those resources. So

669
00:41:42,120 --> 00:41:43,719
Speaker 2: why not just control everything?

670
00:41:44,480 --> 00:41:47,640
Speaker 3: I want a word of the day, salaqu word of

671
00:41:47,640 --> 00:41:51,719
Speaker 3: the evening slecu right now, perfect, perfect? I trust you,

672
00:41:52,080 --> 00:41:55,160
Speaker 3: Tilling and Andrew, because Noel, you settled out of the

673
00:41:55,200 --> 00:42:01,479
Speaker 3: word of the evening. Interest right. Oh gosh, we've done

674
00:42:01,520 --> 00:42:05,520
Speaker 3: so much for American interest. It's not the same thing

675
00:42:05,640 --> 00:42:10,400
Speaker 3: as security, it's not the same thing as humanitarian efforts.

676
00:42:11,080 --> 00:42:14,000
Speaker 3: But it is interesting, you know what I mean. Like,

677
00:42:15,480 --> 00:42:22,400
Speaker 3: intervening in Libya is interesting. A couple of explorations in

678
00:42:22,960 --> 00:42:25,640
Speaker 3: South and Central America super interesting.

679
00:42:26,280 --> 00:42:27,000
Speaker 5: I'm intrigued.

680
00:42:27,239 --> 00:42:32,040
Speaker 2: Yeah, Invading Iraq again interesting interesting?

681
00:42:33,040 --> 00:42:36,319
Speaker 3: And what do we mean by that? We'll tell you

682
00:42:36,440 --> 00:42:46,520
Speaker 3: after a word from our sponsors. We've returned. All right,

683
00:42:46,680 --> 00:42:49,160
Speaker 3: this is this is the point we're getting at. And

684
00:42:50,160 --> 00:42:52,880
Speaker 3: I you know, I think we're all being very fair

685
00:42:53,480 --> 00:42:58,680
Speaker 3: with the way we're exploring this. But we nailed something earlier.

686
00:42:58,960 --> 00:43:03,000
Speaker 3: The proponents have that validity to their claims that something

687
00:43:03,080 --> 00:43:06,280
Speaker 3: like the CIA needs to exist. The critics have validity

688
00:43:06,440 --> 00:43:10,439
Speaker 3: to their claims that the CIA carried along a lot

689
00:43:10,520 --> 00:43:15,359
Speaker 3: of the corruption and problematic behavior of the OSS. And

690
00:43:15,400 --> 00:43:19,480
Speaker 3: that's because this is still Donovan's baby. This is a

691
00:43:19,600 --> 00:43:24,040
Speaker 3: charismatic leader. He has built, he has built a kind

692
00:43:24,040 --> 00:43:27,600
Speaker 3: of church, really, and he has acolytes, he has followers,

693
00:43:27,640 --> 00:43:31,359
Speaker 3: he has disciples. Four of those guys end up being

694
00:43:31,440 --> 00:43:36,160
Speaker 3: directors of the New CIA. They cut their teeth or

695
00:43:36,280 --> 00:43:39,840
Speaker 3: made their bones, if you want to use some crime terms.

696
00:43:40,239 --> 00:43:43,319
Speaker 3: Under Donovan directly, they did the wet work, They did

697
00:43:43,360 --> 00:43:47,120
Speaker 3: the psyops, they did all of that, all the hits,

698
00:43:47,360 --> 00:43:51,200
Speaker 3: all the slow jazz, Alan Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby,

699
00:43:51,239 --> 00:43:56,160
Speaker 3: William Casey, and later when they took control of the CIA,

700
00:43:56,239 --> 00:43:59,840
Speaker 3: when they were directors, they themselves made decisions that in

701
00:44:00,120 --> 00:44:06,319
Speaker 3: hindsight clearly circumvented the rule of American law and international

702
00:44:06,480 --> 00:44:10,719
Speaker 3: law in pursuit of kind of a greater good that

703
00:44:10,800 --> 00:44:14,840
Speaker 3: they thought was very concrete, and that history proofs was

704
00:44:14,880 --> 00:44:19,799
Speaker 3: somewhat of a moving goalpost at times. You know, Beya

705
00:44:19,880 --> 00:44:24,080
Speaker 3: pigs Cuba, what else? Right?

706
00:44:27,200 --> 00:44:29,359
Speaker 2: Iran Contra was just a thing that happened. You don't

707
00:44:29,360 --> 00:44:30,360
Speaker 2: need to think about.

708
00:44:30,080 --> 00:44:31,840
Speaker 5: That, Pay no attention.

709
00:44:33,760 --> 00:44:38,240
Speaker 3: And this is an organization that has been to protect

710
00:44:38,360 --> 00:44:43,040
Speaker 3: and champion American democracy and of course interest and so

711
00:44:43,120 --> 00:44:47,920
Speaker 3: it's interesting that they also attempted to overthrow the Allende

712
00:44:48,080 --> 00:44:54,200
Speaker 3: government in Chile, which was democratically elected, which was very much,

713
00:44:54,239 --> 00:44:57,920
Speaker 3: on paper the thing the US should support to the

714
00:44:57,920 --> 00:44:59,960
Speaker 3: fullest and not burned out.

715
00:45:00,360 --> 00:45:01,640
Speaker 2: What a weird thing to do.

716
00:45:03,320 --> 00:45:09,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, this doesn't count the ways the CIA repeatedly meddled

717
00:45:09,120 --> 00:45:14,080
Speaker 3: in the African theater up to and including being associated

718
00:45:14,200 --> 00:45:19,719
Speaker 3: with assassinations of government leaders. We're not talking about the

719
00:45:19,760 --> 00:45:23,920
Speaker 3: CIA now, we're talking about the history of this organization. Yeah,

720
00:45:24,080 --> 00:45:26,800
Speaker 3: so everybody be cool.

721
00:45:28,320 --> 00:45:34,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, should should we talk about the official mission of

722
00:45:34,080 --> 00:45:37,719
Speaker 2: the CIA, like what it stated at least yes when

723
00:45:37,800 --> 00:45:43,680
Speaker 2: it was created. So nineteen forty seven July CIA is born,

724
00:45:44,280 --> 00:45:46,759
Speaker 2: and its missions are there are two of them, and

725
00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:49,080
Speaker 2: then there's a bunch of submissions after that. But the

726
00:45:49,120 --> 00:45:53,160
Speaker 2: two primary ones are prevent surprise foreign attacks against the

727
00:45:53,239 --> 00:45:57,200
Speaker 2: United States, Right, that makes sense. Don't let another pearl

728
00:45:57,200 --> 00:46:01,000
Speaker 2: harbor happen, and you do that by gathering intelligence watching

729
00:46:01,080 --> 00:46:04,720
Speaker 2: your fre enemies. The second is to counter the advance

730
00:46:04,800 --> 00:46:08,760
Speaker 2: of Soviet Communism into Europe and other third world nations,

731
00:46:08,840 --> 00:46:12,600
Speaker 2: is how they called it. Yeah, but yeah, be an

732
00:46:12,680 --> 00:46:17,600
Speaker 2: ideological stop gap and then don't let another surprise happen.

733
00:46:18,320 --> 00:46:22,560
Speaker 3: Oh and this this, yeah, this gives us insight. Again,

734
00:46:22,680 --> 00:46:26,799
Speaker 3: we weren't just spinning tails or flipping pancakes when when

735
00:46:26,840 --> 00:46:29,919
Speaker 3: we were saying this was an ideological war. This very

736
00:46:30,200 --> 00:46:32,920
Speaker 3: heart and mind and soul. But it's also important to

737
00:46:33,000 --> 00:46:36,640
Speaker 3: note a common misconception that shows up in the United

738
00:46:36,640 --> 00:46:40,080
Speaker 3: States all the time. The idea of first, second, and

739
00:46:40,160 --> 00:46:46,240
Speaker 3: third world countries is inherently bs. It is a phrase

740
00:46:46,480 --> 00:46:50,279
Speaker 3: from the Cold War. It does not refer to economic

741
00:46:50,360 --> 00:46:54,040
Speaker 3: development originally, not the way to the way it was

742
00:46:54,040 --> 00:46:59,880
Speaker 3: supposed to be used. Originally, it referred to where people

743
00:47:00,040 --> 00:47:04,120
Speaker 3: we're on this ideological spectrum of democracy v. Communism?

744
00:47:05,080 --> 00:47:08,040
Speaker 2: Yeah, are you one, two or other?

745
00:47:08,920 --> 00:47:09,719
Speaker 3: Right? Right?

746
00:47:09,880 --> 00:47:13,240
Speaker 2: Not yet stomped on? Basically not aligned?

747
00:47:13,440 --> 00:47:16,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, and if you are, if you are a kid

748
00:47:16,239 --> 00:47:19,920
Speaker 3: growing up in the United States, then as now a

749
00:47:20,239 --> 00:47:23,799
Speaker 3: country purporting to be a democracy in a meritocracy so far,

750
00:47:24,280 --> 00:47:28,480
Speaker 3: then of course you're going to be taught that first

751
00:47:28,520 --> 00:47:33,200
Speaker 3: world is the best world. Of course, it's typocratic.

752
00:47:32,840 --> 00:47:36,319
Speaker 2: You know, it's the right one. M's the same, with

753
00:47:36,360 --> 00:47:37,840
Speaker 2: a weird smile on his face.

754
00:47:40,320 --> 00:47:44,919
Speaker 3: Oh gosh, the beatings will continue until morale improves. Also

755
00:47:45,120 --> 00:47:49,719
Speaker 3: look into this very interesting folks. Look into when the

756
00:47:49,880 --> 00:47:53,960
Speaker 3: US public school system decided to make the morning Pledge

757
00:47:54,000 --> 00:47:58,080
Speaker 3: of Allegiance mandatory. Hint, it's way more recent than you

758
00:47:58,160 --> 00:47:58,680
Speaker 3: might assume.

759
00:47:59,760 --> 00:48:02,040
Speaker 2: Oh oh yeah, Oh my god, I'm gonna leave that there.

760
00:48:02,880 --> 00:48:06,000
Speaker 3: Just leave that breadcrumb there. That's a tasty one. Pick

761
00:48:06,040 --> 00:48:06,319
Speaker 3: it up.

762
00:48:06,560 --> 00:48:08,040
Speaker 5: Uh oh hey.

763
00:48:08,360 --> 00:48:10,279
Speaker 2: There's one other thing that we have to mention here.

764
00:48:10,680 --> 00:48:12,759
Speaker 2: One of the primary reasons why the CIA was so

765
00:48:12,840 --> 00:48:16,239
Speaker 2: important as a thing was because there's this term you

766
00:48:16,280 --> 00:48:19,279
Speaker 2: may have heard, the iron Dome like a long time ago,

767
00:48:19,360 --> 00:48:22,359
Speaker 2: or the iron curtain. The iron curtain is probably the

768
00:48:22,400 --> 00:48:26,960
Speaker 2: most widely used. That's the concept that information doesn't come

769
00:48:27,000 --> 00:48:30,960
Speaker 2: out of the Soviet Union. There's so many secrets, secret actions,

770
00:48:31,000 --> 00:48:36,319
Speaker 2: secret motivations, and all these other things that are somewhere

771
00:48:36,480 --> 00:48:39,200
Speaker 2: behind this curtain that you can't see through. It's iron.

772
00:48:39,360 --> 00:48:42,319
Speaker 2: Your signals can't even get through it, right, signals aren't

773
00:48:42,360 --> 00:48:44,239
Speaker 2: coming out. So you got to find a way to

774
00:48:44,280 --> 00:48:47,640
Speaker 2: get behind that thing and then get stuff out of it.

775
00:48:47,719 --> 00:48:50,560
Speaker 2: And that's that was one of the CIA's main things.

776
00:48:51,680 --> 00:48:56,720
Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, And if you are a longtime listener, you've

777
00:48:56,800 --> 00:49:01,520
Speaker 3: heard and explored these stories with US episodes. If you

778
00:49:01,560 --> 00:49:04,560
Speaker 3: haven't heard these yet, we encourage you to check them out.

779
00:49:04,920 --> 00:49:08,640
Speaker 3: And if you are a fan of deep dive books

780
00:49:08,680 --> 00:49:12,960
Speaker 3: on these sorts of subjects, please also peruse Killing Hope,

781
00:49:13,320 --> 00:49:17,040
Speaker 3: US Military and CIA Intervention since World War Two by

782
00:49:17,080 --> 00:49:22,400
Speaker 3: William Blum and Legacy of Ashes by Tim Wiener. Anyway,

783
00:49:22,480 --> 00:49:25,800
Speaker 3: the key takeaway, and maybe this is episode one, the

784
00:49:25,920 --> 00:49:30,520
Speaker 3: key takeaway is this descended from an organization founded on

785
00:49:30,600 --> 00:49:35,080
Speaker 3: an existential need for subterfuge. The CIA has always had

786
00:49:35,160 --> 00:49:38,160
Speaker 3: an outside the box approach to problems, and we are

787
00:49:38,200 --> 00:49:44,160
Speaker 3: being very diplomatic with that description. Like any good intelligence apparatus,

788
00:49:44,280 --> 00:49:49,200
Speaker 3: this organization, for better or worse, leaves nose stone unturned

789
00:49:49,400 --> 00:49:57,399
Speaker 3: in its constant effort to protect American interest interest. And

790
00:49:58,239 --> 00:50:01,800
Speaker 3: you know, we could say that at times the objectivity

791
00:50:02,080 --> 00:50:06,440
Speaker 3: of these pursuits fell sway to ideology, right or not,

792
00:50:07,360 --> 00:50:11,319
Speaker 3: or paranoia. You know, there's a lot of Unfortunately, there

793
00:50:11,360 --> 00:50:15,880
Speaker 3: are examples of this kind of catch twenty two Heller

794
00:50:16,040 --> 00:50:18,719
Speaker 3: esque reasoning. We had to burn the village to save

795
00:50:18,800 --> 00:50:22,000
Speaker 3: the village, right, because otherwise the village would turn communists.

796
00:50:23,040 --> 00:50:26,400
Speaker 3: And then you know, you know it's yeah, it's like

797
00:50:26,440 --> 00:50:29,080
Speaker 3: a witch hunt. You know, Oh, we killed the person

798
00:50:30,920 --> 00:50:33,919
Speaker 3: to make sure she wasn't a witch. What happened, Well,

799
00:50:34,160 --> 00:50:36,920
Speaker 3: she drowned, so you know she's not a witch?

800
00:50:39,560 --> 00:50:42,200
Speaker 5: Oh yeah? Is she a duck? Though? Is the question?

801
00:50:43,000 --> 00:50:47,239
Speaker 3: That's the question. That's the question imposed by such great

802
00:50:47,280 --> 00:50:52,399
Speaker 3: philosophers as Monty Python. I believe for sure, Okay, good

803
00:50:52,440 --> 00:50:57,399
Speaker 3: best I know. It was either them or Plato, that's

804
00:50:58,080 --> 00:51:03,360
Speaker 3: the issue. Though, there's no denying the CIA's historical asymmetric,

805
00:51:03,880 --> 00:51:09,480
Speaker 3: unorthodox approach has led the organization to some very strange places,

806
00:51:09,719 --> 00:51:13,880
Speaker 3: you know, one of the strangest, of course, being MK Ultra.

807
00:51:15,200 --> 00:51:17,280
Speaker 3: Do we want to talk about MK Ultra for a second.

808
00:51:17,880 --> 00:51:19,920
Speaker 5: Absolutely. I mean we teased it.

809
00:51:20,160 --> 00:51:22,440
Speaker 4: I've been talking about some of the crazy ways that

810
00:51:22,840 --> 00:51:27,760
Speaker 4: the CIA went after Castro, like exposing him to psychedelics,

811
00:51:27,800 --> 00:51:29,040
Speaker 4: you know, in the hopes that it would make.

812
00:51:29,000 --> 00:51:30,240
Speaker 5: Him lose his mind.

813
00:51:30,400 --> 00:51:33,680
Speaker 4: Well, we also did that to just regular people, like

814
00:51:33,960 --> 00:51:39,120
Speaker 4: on subway trains in New York City, missing them with LSD.

815
00:51:39,440 --> 00:51:40,920
Speaker 5: That was only one of the many.

816
00:51:40,840 --> 00:51:44,719
Speaker 4: Bizarro operations that went by MK Ultra, also known as

817
00:51:44,760 --> 00:51:46,640
Speaker 4: Operation Midnight Climax.

818
00:51:47,600 --> 00:51:53,040
Speaker 2: Yeah, it started in nineteen fifty three, way back when.

819
00:51:53,960 --> 00:51:56,680
Speaker 2: And then it never stopped. No, I'm just joking, I.

820
00:51:56,600 --> 00:52:04,200
Speaker 3: Will wet Okay. So the American public only knows about, well,

821
00:52:04,239 --> 00:52:08,400
Speaker 3: the global public only knows about mk Ultra because of

822
00:52:08,440 --> 00:52:13,120
Speaker 3: a filing mistake that is a true story. An activist

823
00:52:14,560 --> 00:52:20,120
Speaker 3: newspaper group broke into the wrong storage facility and they

824
00:52:20,239 --> 00:52:23,680
Speaker 3: found papers that had been misfiled that we're supposed to

825
00:52:23,719 --> 00:52:27,600
Speaker 3: be destroyed in entirety. So to this evening in twenty

826
00:52:27,640 --> 00:52:33,400
Speaker 3: twenty five, no one knows all of what mk ultra

827
00:52:34,040 --> 00:52:39,719
Speaker 3: was over or what it encapsulated encompassed, because it is

828
00:52:39,760 --> 00:52:43,840
Speaker 3: a group umbrella term for a lot of other projects

829
00:52:44,320 --> 00:52:48,640
Speaker 3: like Operation Midnight Climax, which you can hear a fantastic

830
00:52:48,760 --> 00:52:53,000
Speaker 3: podcast on hosted by none other than mister Noel Brown

831
00:52:53,040 --> 00:52:54,279
Speaker 3: and Nolan oh Man.

832
00:52:54,320 --> 00:52:55,600
Speaker 4: Thanks, you know, that was super fun to be a

833
00:52:55,640 --> 00:52:58,520
Speaker 4: part of and it really does tell the whole story

834
00:52:58,560 --> 00:53:01,319
Speaker 4: in a really interesting and well sound design kind of

835
00:53:01,400 --> 00:53:05,200
Speaker 4: narrative way. And speaking of narrative, then another project that

836
00:53:05,400 --> 00:53:07,840
Speaker 4: you know talks about this type of thing is The

837
00:53:07,920 --> 00:53:10,840
Speaker 4: Control Group, written by Brett Wood and eped by you

838
00:53:11,160 --> 00:53:14,360
Speaker 4: Ben Bollen, which is a great piece about kind of

839
00:53:14,480 --> 00:53:18,400
Speaker 4: psychedelic experimentation, you know, in a government capacity.

840
00:53:18,880 --> 00:53:21,000
Speaker 2: Dude, that's an intense one of them. It was one

841
00:53:21,040 --> 00:53:24,480
Speaker 2: of my favorite podcasts for a long time because it

842
00:53:24,600 --> 00:53:29,400
Speaker 2: was fictional, but it was based so much on actual stuff,

843
00:53:29,520 --> 00:53:29,960
Speaker 2: big time.

844
00:53:30,719 --> 00:53:34,560
Speaker 3: Brett Wood's a beast, yeah, and and an extraordinarily humble

845
00:53:34,760 --> 00:53:40,319
Speaker 3: guy that also was That also was sound design and

846
00:53:40,400 --> 00:53:45,800
Speaker 3: eped by our brother in arms, Paul Mission Control decad

847
00:53:46,000 --> 00:53:47,160
Speaker 3: So credit where it's due.

848
00:53:48,160 --> 00:53:50,000
Speaker 2: Oh yeah.

849
00:53:50,120 --> 00:53:52,520
Speaker 3: Anyway, Yeah, as far as we know, the MKAY Ultra

850
00:53:52,640 --> 00:53:57,160
Speaker 3: program did not create a Manchurian candidate as far as

851
00:53:57,239 --> 00:54:02,080
Speaker 3: we know, because again, most of the conclusions and paperwork

852
00:54:02,120 --> 00:54:08,040
Speaker 3: and documentation was destroyed and a lot of the researchers,

853
00:54:08,920 --> 00:54:13,200
Speaker 3: for one way, through one means or another, were prevented

854
00:54:13,360 --> 00:54:16,960
Speaker 3: from ever going public. And at this point, as you said,

855
00:54:17,040 --> 00:54:19,640
Speaker 3: back beginning in the fifties, at this point, a lot

856
00:54:19,680 --> 00:54:24,080
Speaker 3: of the original Avengers or Justice League crew of Mad

857
00:54:24,120 --> 00:54:26,040
Speaker 3: Science here, they're long dead.

858
00:54:27,560 --> 00:54:32,840
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, but you know what didn't die.

859
00:54:31,960 --> 00:54:33,480
Speaker 3: Uh, the funk.

860
00:54:35,360 --> 00:54:37,600
Speaker 5: Never never let the fuck die.

861
00:54:38,480 --> 00:54:40,960
Speaker 2: Well, another thing this is so we talked about how

862
00:54:41,480 --> 00:54:44,000
Speaker 2: MK Ultra we only know about because of those unshredded

863
00:54:44,000 --> 00:54:46,240
Speaker 2: documents that were supposed to die and go away forever.

864
00:54:46,680 --> 00:54:49,520
Speaker 2: We only know about the stuff we're going to be

865
00:54:49,560 --> 00:54:53,319
Speaker 2: talking about in part two of this series because of

866
00:54:53,520 --> 00:54:58,279
Speaker 2: another series of documents that didn't get shredded properly and

867
00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:01,279
Speaker 2: we're just sitting around place where they weren't supposed to

868
00:55:01,280 --> 00:55:03,040
Speaker 2: be And now we know.

869
00:55:04,200 --> 00:55:06,600
Speaker 3: And I'm going to tell you honestly, guys, this is

870
00:55:06,640 --> 00:55:11,040
Speaker 3: something that the the espionage movies and the fiction and

871
00:55:11,120 --> 00:55:13,920
Speaker 3: the film, the novels and so on. That's what they

872
00:55:13,960 --> 00:55:16,799
Speaker 3: always miss, you know, what spies are really afraid of,

873
00:55:17,080 --> 00:55:23,319
Speaker 3: and spy masters more so than even a bullet. It's paperwork.

874
00:55:23,560 --> 00:55:28,959
Speaker 3: It's a paper trail, it's documentation, it's it's indisputable proof. Right,

875
00:55:29,560 --> 00:55:33,200
Speaker 3: So this stuff it may sound, you know, like a

876
00:55:33,400 --> 00:55:36,319
Speaker 3: like a funny bitty hill sketch. Oh, we've found the

877
00:55:36,400 --> 00:55:41,160
Speaker 3: papers that show the secret operations, but that's terrifying to

878
00:55:41,840 --> 00:55:44,000
Speaker 3: the ms of the world.

879
00:55:45,160 --> 00:55:46,640
Speaker 5: Like I mean, yeah, they.

880
00:55:46,920 --> 00:55:51,680
Speaker 4: Thrive on plausible deniability or just straight up deniability. It's

881
00:55:51,680 --> 00:55:53,640
Speaker 4: sort of the whole point is not to be able

882
00:55:53,680 --> 00:55:56,080
Speaker 4: to be connected with any of these things.

883
00:55:57,200 --> 00:56:01,240
Speaker 2: Yeah, especially names, like actual names of that are involved.

884
00:56:01,480 --> 00:56:05,200
Speaker 3: Mike go yeah. Oh, And speaking of names, at the

885
00:56:05,239 --> 00:56:09,759
Speaker 3: center of this web of mk ultra, there is a

886
00:56:10,280 --> 00:56:14,960
Speaker 3: waving spider, a whispering voice, a varus of sorts, a singular,

887
00:56:15,280 --> 00:56:20,320
Speaker 3: fascinating and troubling man, doctor Sidney Gottlieb, who will play

888
00:56:20,440 --> 00:56:26,080
Speaker 3: a major role in our later explorations. Amid all these

889
00:56:26,160 --> 00:56:32,400
Speaker 3: chaotic scramblings for an edge, any advantage over enemies, seditionist movements,

890
00:56:32,560 --> 00:56:39,360
Speaker 3: even allies, the CIA explored surprising conspiratorial partnerships with the

891
00:56:39,400 --> 00:56:45,919
Speaker 3: most unlikely groups and individuals. This series question how far

892
00:56:46,000 --> 00:56:52,759
Speaker 3: did this go? Did the CIA actually hire magicians? That's right,

893
00:56:53,239 --> 00:56:57,239
Speaker 3: this is going to be a two part episode. Thank

894
00:56:57,239 --> 00:57:00,280
Speaker 3: you so much for tuning in. Please join us, fellow

895
00:57:00,400 --> 00:57:05,960
Speaker 3: conspiracy realist, for chapter two of the CIA Higher Magicians.

896
00:57:06,040 --> 00:57:09,719
Speaker 3: We left you with a cliffhanger because there was a

897
00:57:09,760 --> 00:57:11,799
Speaker 3: lot of context. We had to get to a lot

898
00:57:11,840 --> 00:57:17,360
Speaker 3: of explorations together in the dark. So while you're waiting

899
00:57:17,560 --> 00:57:20,720
Speaker 3: in the interim, if you're wondering, Hey, I'm already on

900
00:57:20,760 --> 00:57:23,480
Speaker 3: the internet. What am I going to do now? Just

901
00:57:23,560 --> 00:57:27,720
Speaker 3: keep waiting for chapter two. Never fear. You can join

902
00:57:27,840 --> 00:57:30,160
Speaker 3: the show yourself. Reach out to us. You can find

903
00:57:30,280 --> 00:57:33,560
Speaker 3: us on email, via telephone, and the internets.

904
00:57:34,360 --> 00:57:36,960
Speaker 4: Indeed, you can find us at the handle Conspiracy Stuff

905
00:57:36,960 --> 00:57:39,920
Speaker 4: where we exist on Facebook with our Facebook group Here's.

906
00:57:39,720 --> 00:57:40,680
Speaker 5: Where it gets crazy.

907
00:57:40,680 --> 00:57:43,000
Speaker 4: On you Do, where we have video content for you

908
00:57:43,080 --> 00:57:46,760
Speaker 4: to enjoy, as well as on xfka, Twitter, on Instagram

909
00:57:46,800 --> 00:57:47,560
Speaker 4: and TikTok.

910
00:57:47,640 --> 00:57:50,600
Speaker 5: We are Conspiracy Stuff Show.

911
00:57:51,360 --> 00:57:53,040
Speaker 2: If you want to give us a call, our number

912
00:57:53,120 --> 00:57:57,480
Speaker 2: is one eight three three std WYTK. Tell us your

913
00:57:57,640 --> 00:58:03,080
Speaker 2: espionage stories, especially if you've been involved with them. When

914
00:58:03,120 --> 00:58:04,800
Speaker 2: you call in, you've got three minutes. Give yourself a

915
00:58:04,800 --> 00:58:07,600
Speaker 2: cool nickname in let us know in the message whether

916
00:58:07,680 --> 00:58:09,360
Speaker 2: or not we can use your name and message on

917
00:58:09,400 --> 00:58:11,240
Speaker 2: the air. If you've got more to say, then can

918
00:58:11,240 --> 00:58:13,320
Speaker 2: fit in a voicemail. Why not instead send us a

919
00:58:13,360 --> 00:58:14,360
Speaker 2: good old fashioned email.

920
00:58:14,560 --> 00:58:18,360
Speaker 3: We are the entities that read every single piece of

921
00:58:18,440 --> 00:58:21,480
Speaker 3: correspondence we receive and don't feel like the email has

922
00:58:21,520 --> 00:58:23,800
Speaker 3: to be your last resort, even if you want to

923
00:58:23,880 --> 00:58:27,280
Speaker 3: just send us a fun one liner, a high coup

924
00:58:28,040 --> 00:58:31,600
Speaker 3: secret code word right, something to update us on Operation

925
00:58:31,800 --> 00:58:35,000
Speaker 3: Rude Bega. We're all about it. Give us the links,

926
00:58:35,080 --> 00:58:38,480
Speaker 3: give us the photographs, write your story, no word limit.

927
00:58:38,560 --> 00:58:40,840
Speaker 3: We can all see if we can all respond, and

928
00:58:40,920 --> 00:58:43,320
Speaker 3: we would love for you to join us out here

929
00:58:43,360 --> 00:59:05,360
Speaker 3: in the dark Conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

930
00:59:05,800 --> 00:59:07,880
Speaker 2: Stuff They Don't Want You to Know is a production

931
00:59:08,000 --> 00:59:12,520
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

932
00:59:12,600 --> 00:59:15,720
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.