1 00:00:10,322 --> 00:00:12,522 Speaker 1: This is an iHeart original. 2 00:00:15,282 --> 00:00:17,082 Speaker 2: What's interesting though about the dream case though, of course, 3 00:00:17,162 --> 00:00:21,242 Speaker 2: is that I think it's a very sympathetic impulse to. 4 00:00:21,242 --> 00:00:22,242 Speaker 3: Want to use some. 5 00:00:22,122 --> 00:00:28,722 Speaker 2: Sort of law here to convey that what Laurie Drew 6 00:00:29,202 --> 00:00:32,802 Speaker 2: and her daughter did in this case, not only did 7 00:00:32,842 --> 00:00:36,122 Speaker 2: it have a tragic ending, but the act itself was 8 00:00:36,962 --> 00:00:37,642 Speaker 2: quite cruel. 9 00:00:39,442 --> 00:00:43,602 Speaker 1: I'm Joanna Ocneil, and this is main accounts the story 10 00:00:43,642 --> 00:00:58,882 Speaker 1: of MySpace episode seven. My safety users regularly experienced online 11 00:00:58,922 --> 00:01:06,282 Speaker 1: harassment on MySpace, hateful and hurtful comments, even bullying, especially 12 00:01:06,362 --> 00:01:10,082 Speaker 1: users who were very young yet at the time, with 13 00:01:10,322 --> 00:01:14,762 Speaker 1: social networking still new and regarded as an experiment, these 14 00:01:14,802 --> 00:01:19,762 Speaker 1: experiences weren't often taken seriously, and to those who did 15 00:01:19,842 --> 00:01:24,202 Speaker 1: experience online harassment in the context of MySpace and at 16 00:01:24,202 --> 00:01:27,762 Speaker 1: the time and the oughts, it was so unexpected or 17 00:01:27,802 --> 00:01:32,322 Speaker 1: bizarre that they often didn't know how to process it. 18 00:01:32,402 --> 00:01:37,322 Speaker 1: Take for example, Roommates, the web series MySpace produced from 19 00:01:37,322 --> 00:01:40,482 Speaker 1: two thousand and seven to two thousand and eight. The 20 00:01:40,522 --> 00:01:44,762 Speaker 1: show was available to watch on MySpace. It was also 21 00:01:44,882 --> 00:01:49,602 Speaker 1: promoted through the social network. It was critical for driving engagement. 22 00:01:50,282 --> 00:01:53,842 Speaker 1: The team set up accounts for individual characters on the show, 23 00:01:54,442 --> 00:01:58,442 Speaker 1: audiences could interact with the characters like there were real people. 24 00:01:59,002 --> 00:02:03,402 Speaker 1: It was exciting, but as Roommates creator Scott Zacherin soon 25 00:02:03,442 --> 00:02:07,602 Speaker 1: found out, there were drawbacks to being this public available. 26 00:02:08,402 --> 00:02:11,602 Speaker 1: Some of the comments made about the characters played by 27 00:02:11,682 --> 00:02:15,642 Speaker 1: real people actors we're really cutting. 28 00:02:16,802 --> 00:02:18,842 Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean it's happened a few times. I mean 29 00:02:18,882 --> 00:02:21,922 Speaker 4: in our early shows when people would see the photos 30 00:02:22,042 --> 00:02:28,282 Speaker 4: and people would comment on their books. Any actor, male, female, 31 00:02:29,362 --> 00:02:31,882 Speaker 4: it was really painful for them. At first, we removed 32 00:02:31,922 --> 00:02:38,082 Speaker 4: the the garden variety hater or we warned them we 33 00:02:38,162 --> 00:02:40,642 Speaker 4: only would go to MySpace if there was something that, 34 00:02:41,122 --> 00:02:44,282 Speaker 4: you know, was beyond what we should be doing, so 35 00:02:44,522 --> 00:02:46,722 Speaker 4: you can get a sense of you know, okay, this 36 00:02:46,802 --> 00:02:53,642 Speaker 4: guy can be salvaged or ignored, but somebody else if 37 00:02:53,682 --> 00:02:56,922 Speaker 4: they start to get you know, too sexual, or you know, 38 00:02:57,202 --> 00:03:00,122 Speaker 4: something that goes beyond our standards and practices, that's when 39 00:03:00,122 --> 00:03:01,362 Speaker 4: we would kick it up to MySpace. 40 00:03:01,682 --> 00:03:04,842 Speaker 1: The line between Stan and Stalker is kind of a 41 00:03:05,042 --> 00:03:07,842 Speaker 1: thin one. Like the people who are like really get 42 00:03:07,922 --> 00:03:11,002 Speaker 1: enthusiastic about a celebrity, it can be little really can 43 00:03:11,082 --> 00:03:12,922 Speaker 1: I get very easily tip the other way. 44 00:03:13,162 --> 00:03:15,282 Speaker 4: Because I think people are more nervous about doing that 45 00:03:15,882 --> 00:03:18,162 Speaker 4: back then because they didn't know what have caused. Now 46 00:03:18,202 --> 00:03:23,802 Speaker 4: it's tearing people apart is common interactivity. 47 00:03:26,362 --> 00:03:30,242 Speaker 1: Most users on my Space did not have access to 48 00:03:30,282 --> 00:03:34,362 Speaker 1: MySpace the company, like the roommates, cast and crew. They 49 00:03:34,402 --> 00:03:38,682 Speaker 1: cannot make special requests for the company to intervene. Typically, 50 00:03:38,762 --> 00:03:42,202 Speaker 1: it was expected back then that if you were harassed online, 51 00:03:42,882 --> 00:03:46,962 Speaker 1: the only thing to do was ignore it, don't feed 52 00:03:47,002 --> 00:03:51,802 Speaker 1: the trolls. This is something bridget Todd, host of Beef 53 00:03:52,202 --> 00:03:55,402 Speaker 1: and there Are No Girls on the Internet, commented on 54 00:03:55,562 --> 00:03:56,442 Speaker 1: in our interview. 55 00:03:56,842 --> 00:04:00,602 Speaker 5: I think for far too long, people in positions of power, 56 00:04:00,762 --> 00:04:03,562 Speaker 5: or like parents and educators and administrators, people who are 57 00:04:03,562 --> 00:04:06,562 Speaker 5: in positions where they're meant to help young people understand 58 00:04:06,562 --> 00:04:09,202 Speaker 5: the world around them, we have been telling them this 59 00:04:09,362 --> 00:04:12,442 Speaker 5: complete fiction that what happens on the Internet is just 60 00:04:12,482 --> 00:04:15,002 Speaker 5: the Internet, and like your real life is your real life, 61 00:04:15,042 --> 00:04:17,082 Speaker 5: and like who cares what they're saying, It's just words 62 00:04:17,122 --> 00:04:20,962 Speaker 5: on a screen. And so when young people are facing 63 00:04:20,962 --> 00:04:24,042 Speaker 5: this kind of thing, there's oftentimes not a lot of 64 00:04:24,042 --> 00:04:26,842 Speaker 5: adults in the room who can really understand what's happening 65 00:04:26,882 --> 00:04:28,522 Speaker 5: and like talk to them about it in a real way. 66 00:04:28,522 --> 00:04:31,162 Speaker 5: That's going to be meaningfully helpful when we're talking about 67 00:04:31,202 --> 00:04:33,522 Speaker 5: things like online harassment. It is really important to keep 68 00:04:33,522 --> 00:04:36,042 Speaker 5: that in mind. And I think that we're seeing that 69 00:04:36,042 --> 00:04:40,082 Speaker 5: that attitude sort of slowly change, but I think it's 70 00:04:40,602 --> 00:04:44,642 Speaker 5: changing far too slowly to actually, you know, deal with 71 00:04:44,682 --> 00:04:46,162 Speaker 5: the problem at any kind of scale. 72 00:04:48,202 --> 00:04:52,442 Speaker 1: The tragic death of Megan Meyer, which resulted in major 73 00:04:52,522 --> 00:04:57,202 Speaker 1: news coverage ongoing for years following the Glory True trial, 74 00:04:59,042 --> 00:05:03,122 Speaker 1: was a rackoning the thinking until then, a mix of 75 00:05:03,842 --> 00:05:06,522 Speaker 1: on the Internet no one Knows You're a dog as 76 00:05:06,562 --> 00:05:09,642 Speaker 1: a famou A New Yorker cartoon caption from nineteen ninety 77 00:05:09,642 --> 00:05:13,962 Speaker 1: three put it, combined with a moral panic over youth 78 00:05:14,002 --> 00:05:20,322 Speaker 1: online that we addressed in earlier episodes, belide how sometimes 79 00:05:20,362 --> 00:05:24,682 Speaker 1: the real threat of online harassment is more prosaic. Your 80 00:05:24,722 --> 00:05:30,762 Speaker 1: own neighbor could create indescribable pain for your family. Lourie Drew, 81 00:05:31,242 --> 00:05:34,882 Speaker 1: the mother of Megan Meyer's classmate, a neighbor of the Myers, 82 00:05:35,642 --> 00:05:40,162 Speaker 1: became virtually universally scorned when her role in the bullying 83 00:05:40,242 --> 00:05:44,442 Speaker 1: of Meghan became public. But while most people familiar with 84 00:05:44,482 --> 00:05:48,322 Speaker 1: the case believe that her behavior toward Meghan was cruel, 85 00:05:49,042 --> 00:05:53,202 Speaker 1: there was no clearly drawn path to accountability. There were 86 00:05:53,242 --> 00:05:57,482 Speaker 1: no laws that perfectly prevented someone else from behaving the 87 00:05:57,482 --> 00:06:01,042 Speaker 1: way that Laurie Drew had on MySpace. She was taken 88 00:06:01,082 --> 00:06:04,962 Speaker 1: to court in the case United States Versus Drew and 89 00:06:05,042 --> 00:06:10,442 Speaker 1: faced felony computer hacking charges. Drew was charged in two 90 00:06:10,482 --> 00:06:16,642 Speaker 1: thousand and eight with misdemeanor offenses of unauthorized access to MySpace. 91 00:06:17,442 --> 00:06:20,362 Speaker 1: This was overturned in two thousand and nine and Drew 92 00:06:20,522 --> 00:06:21,602 Speaker 1: was fully acquitted. 93 00:06:22,002 --> 00:06:23,762 Speaker 6: Now to a new development, in the case of the 94 00:06:23,762 --> 00:06:26,762 Speaker 6: Missouri teenager who took her own life after she was 95 00:06:26,802 --> 00:06:29,562 Speaker 6: harassed on the internet. Her family wanted the mother allegedly 96 00:06:29,602 --> 00:06:32,722 Speaker 6: behind the hopes to be prosecuted. That authorities hit a roadblock, 97 00:06:33,002 --> 00:06:35,242 Speaker 6: But now there has been a surprising development. 98 00:06:37,162 --> 00:06:39,402 Speaker 1: What kind of reactions to the Drew case do you 99 00:06:39,442 --> 00:06:41,642 Speaker 1: get from your students in one case? 100 00:06:41,842 --> 00:06:47,042 Speaker 2: Specifically, I would say that by the time in the 101 00:06:47,082 --> 00:06:51,162 Speaker 2: semester where I'm introducing the students to this case, they've 102 00:06:51,202 --> 00:06:55,642 Speaker 2: already been quite outraged by the scope of the CFA 103 00:06:55,842 --> 00:06:58,722 Speaker 2: in certain other cases that I think many of them 104 00:06:58,722 --> 00:07:03,762 Speaker 2: are primed to think that the prosecutor hear was really overreaching. 105 00:07:04,402 --> 00:07:09,402 Speaker 2: They already have Aaron Schwartz's story in their minds as 106 00:07:09,402 --> 00:07:15,242 Speaker 2: somebody who was massed downloading academic articles from jstore and 107 00:07:15,482 --> 00:07:19,602 Speaker 2: was prosecuted and then ultimately tragically took his own life 108 00:07:22,042 --> 00:07:25,642 Speaker 2: after being charged under the CFA. They have him in 109 00:07:25,682 --> 00:07:29,362 Speaker 2: their minds. They have other types of cases in their minds, 110 00:07:29,402 --> 00:07:35,962 Speaker 2: where you know, LinkedIn is trying to stop another company 111 00:07:35,962 --> 00:07:40,602 Speaker 2: from scraping its website the public profiles that people have 112 00:07:40,682 --> 00:07:43,682 Speaker 2: posted on LinkedIn, and they're trying to use the CFAA 113 00:07:44,322 --> 00:07:48,242 Speaker 2: for that, and so by the time they get to 114 00:07:48,762 --> 00:07:51,362 Speaker 2: the Drew case, I think many of them are already 115 00:07:51,402 --> 00:07:58,002 Speaker 2: a little skeptical of the ways in which especially sort 116 00:07:58,002 --> 00:08:01,802 Speaker 2: of corporate actors can use a law like the CFAA 117 00:08:04,322 --> 00:08:12,682 Speaker 2: to exert forms of power and control over websites that 118 00:08:12,722 --> 00:08:13,242 Speaker 2: they create. 119 00:08:16,042 --> 00:08:19,682 Speaker 1: That's Thomas Cadre. He teaches at the University of Georgia 120 00:08:19,722 --> 00:08:23,122 Speaker 1: School of Law, and he's an affiliated researcher with a 121 00:08:23,202 --> 00:08:27,762 Speaker 1: Cornell Clinic to end tack abuse, and as he just mentioned, 122 00:08:28,322 --> 00:08:31,442 Speaker 1: United States versus Lori Drew is a case that he 123 00:08:31,522 --> 00:08:32,842 Speaker 1: brings up in his classes. 124 00:08:33,202 --> 00:08:34,962 Speaker 2: What's interesting though about the Drew case, though, of course, 125 00:08:35,042 --> 00:08:39,042 Speaker 2: is that I think it's a very sympathetic impulse to 126 00:08:39,162 --> 00:08:44,802 Speaker 2: want to use some sort of law here to convey 127 00:08:44,922 --> 00:08:51,762 Speaker 2: that what the what Laurie Drew and her daughter did 128 00:08:51,802 --> 00:08:55,762 Speaker 2: in this case, not only did it have a tragic ending, 129 00:08:56,362 --> 00:09:00,922 Speaker 2: but the act itself was quite cruel. And so I 130 00:09:00,922 --> 00:09:03,362 Speaker 2: think there's at least, you know, there's this perception that 131 00:09:04,042 --> 00:09:08,442 Speaker 2: what happened was it was at the very at the 132 00:09:08,602 --> 00:09:15,002 Speaker 2: very least uncivil and mean spirited. And so I think 133 00:09:15,042 --> 00:09:21,682 Speaker 2: the students do have a tough time squearing their opposition 134 00:09:22,242 --> 00:09:27,042 Speaker 2: to this very far reaching federal law that probably makes 135 00:09:27,122 --> 00:09:32,162 Speaker 2: all of them a cyber criminal. In my classroom, in 136 00:09:32,202 --> 00:09:35,482 Speaker 2: every class when they drift off for a second and 137 00:09:35,522 --> 00:09:39,682 Speaker 2: they go on a website and they, you know, they 138 00:09:39,762 --> 00:09:42,522 Speaker 2: violate a term of service without even realizing. 139 00:09:43,642 --> 00:09:47,882 Speaker 1: After the break, we'll learn more about the CFAA and 140 00:09:47,922 --> 00:09:52,082 Speaker 1: to find out why this and other laws were slippery 141 00:09:52,122 --> 00:09:53,762 Speaker 1: to hold Lauratry to account. 142 00:10:01,122 --> 00:10:04,722 Speaker 2: Essentially, the CFA, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, is 143 00:10:04,762 --> 00:10:11,562 Speaker 2: a federal criminal law that makes it a crime to 144 00:10:11,602 --> 00:10:16,922 Speaker 2: access a computer without authorization or to exceed your authorized 145 00:10:16,962 --> 00:10:22,322 Speaker 2: access on a computer. Now, what all of those magic 146 00:10:22,362 --> 00:10:26,482 Speaker 2: words mean has been the subject of now decades of 147 00:10:27,762 --> 00:10:34,762 Speaker 2: scholarly debate, different court decisions, many different interpretations have been 148 00:10:34,802 --> 00:10:37,162 Speaker 2: kind of put forward, and different cases have kind of 149 00:10:37,162 --> 00:10:40,362 Speaker 2: tested the boundaries of what sort of those key terms 150 00:10:40,442 --> 00:10:43,202 Speaker 2: might mean, especially the idea of what it means to 151 00:10:43,282 --> 00:10:48,282 Speaker 2: access a computer without authorization or to exceed your authorized access. 152 00:10:48,802 --> 00:10:52,962 Speaker 2: That concept of unauthorized access is really at the heart 153 00:10:52,962 --> 00:10:56,322 Speaker 2: of a lot of these disputes. Colloquially, the c IF 154 00:10:56,482 --> 00:11:01,962 Speaker 2: is talked about as the federal hacking law, but of 155 00:11:02,002 --> 00:11:06,202 Speaker 2: course even what constitutes hacking is a kind of disputed 156 00:11:06,602 --> 00:11:11,082 Speaker 2: conce and some of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of 157 00:11:11,122 --> 00:11:14,562 Speaker 2: the set she reflects some of those kind of colloquial 158 00:11:15,202 --> 00:11:16,962 Speaker 2: tensions as well. 159 00:11:17,082 --> 00:11:20,202 Speaker 1: One thing that I just was curious about because it 160 00:11:20,282 --> 00:11:22,842 Speaker 1: is a law that last, I'm mistaken. It's been on 161 00:11:22,922 --> 00:11:29,202 Speaker 1: the books for decades now. So has a perception changed 162 00:11:29,362 --> 00:11:33,722 Speaker 1: over the decades because of changes in the technology or 163 00:11:34,762 --> 00:11:35,722 Speaker 1: what does it mean to have a. 164 00:11:35,642 --> 00:11:38,322 Speaker 2: Lot of that old Absolutely? 165 00:11:38,602 --> 00:11:38,842 Speaker 7: Yeah. 166 00:11:38,922 --> 00:11:41,682 Speaker 2: So one of the interesting things about the CFA is 167 00:11:41,682 --> 00:11:45,682 Speaker 2: that I think best sceptions surrounding the law have changed, 168 00:11:45,962 --> 00:11:48,842 Speaker 2: and the law itself has also changed. It's been amended 169 00:11:48,882 --> 00:11:52,042 Speaker 2: by Congress several times since it was initially passed. In 170 00:11:52,082 --> 00:11:56,042 Speaker 2: the nineteen eighties, and so we've got these kind of 171 00:11:56,082 --> 00:11:58,442 Speaker 2: two parallel changes that are going on, and they're not 172 00:11:58,482 --> 00:12:01,882 Speaker 2: always synced up. So sometimes I would say public perceptions 173 00:12:01,882 --> 00:12:05,922 Speaker 2: surrounding the law has changed in response to a case 174 00:12:06,122 --> 00:12:10,362 Speaker 2: like the law Drew case, or a situation like Aaron Schwartz, 175 00:12:12,002 --> 00:12:15,122 Speaker 2: one of the founders of Reddit, who was famously charged 176 00:12:15,282 --> 00:12:19,442 Speaker 2: under the CFAA. We've had other high profile cases more 177 00:12:19,482 --> 00:12:22,122 Speaker 2: recently than those two, but there are these kind of 178 00:12:22,122 --> 00:12:27,162 Speaker 2: moments where there's increased public consciousness surrounding the CFAA, usually 179 00:12:27,202 --> 00:12:32,082 Speaker 2: paired with opposition to how it's being enforced or interpreted. 180 00:12:34,122 --> 00:12:39,002 Speaker 1: The origin of the CFAA, possibly apocryphal, is that President 181 00:12:39,122 --> 00:12:44,042 Speaker 1: Reagan watched wargames at Camp David. It's that Matthew Broderick 182 00:12:44,122 --> 00:12:48,002 Speaker 1: movie from nineteen eighty three. You know it. The only 183 00:12:48,002 --> 00:12:52,042 Speaker 1: winning move is not to play yeah that one. Reagan 184 00:12:52,162 --> 00:12:55,362 Speaker 1: was allegedly so disturbed by the hacking depicted in this 185 00:12:55,482 --> 00:13:00,202 Speaker 1: movie that he whipped up legislation that extremely broadly outlawed 186 00:13:00,602 --> 00:13:06,002 Speaker 1: computer access without authorization. In the summer of twenty twenty one, 187 00:13:06,522 --> 00:13:09,402 Speaker 1: there was a Supreme Core case which narrowed the scope 188 00:13:09,442 --> 00:13:13,482 Speaker 1: of the CFAA. The way that the CFAA was applied 189 00:13:13,522 --> 00:13:18,522 Speaker 1: in the laureatory trial would probably be considered obsolete. But also, 190 00:13:19,122 --> 00:13:22,882 Speaker 1: I am very, very obviously not a lawyer, so I'll 191 00:13:22,882 --> 00:13:24,842 Speaker 1: that Thomas Cadrew take it from here. 192 00:13:26,602 --> 00:13:30,002 Speaker 2: I still teach the case to my students because I 193 00:13:30,002 --> 00:13:32,362 Speaker 2: think it really helps to kind of ground the stakes 194 00:13:32,522 --> 00:13:36,362 Speaker 2: of what the Supreme Court was really doing in this 195 00:13:36,442 --> 00:13:40,602 Speaker 2: case last summer in saying, well, there's this one way 196 00:13:40,602 --> 00:13:42,802 Speaker 2: that we could read the statute that might cover all 197 00:13:42,882 --> 00:13:48,482 Speaker 2: of these forms of conduct, some of which may be harmful, 198 00:13:48,602 --> 00:13:51,002 Speaker 2: but maybe not harmful in the way that this statute 199 00:13:51,042 --> 00:13:54,122 Speaker 2: was designed to cover, an other of which may not 200 00:13:54,162 --> 00:13:57,242 Speaker 2: be harmful at all, maybe really inocuous. And of course, 201 00:13:57,242 --> 00:13:58,682 Speaker 2: one of the main things that said issue in the 202 00:13:58,762 --> 00:14:00,842 Speaker 2: Drew case and in many other cases involved in the 203 00:14:00,842 --> 00:14:05,322 Speaker 2: CFA is whether the violation of terms of service or 204 00:14:05,402 --> 00:14:10,882 Speaker 2: some other form of contractual agreement or written policy, whether 205 00:14:11,042 --> 00:14:16,442 Speaker 2: violating that kind of a restriction that isn't bypassing some 206 00:14:16,482 --> 00:14:19,842 Speaker 2: sort of technical restraint on access to a computer, that 207 00:14:19,962 --> 00:14:22,642 Speaker 2: is really doing something that you're not supposed to be 208 00:14:22,682 --> 00:14:26,122 Speaker 2: doing under some sort of rule that's written down or 209 00:14:26,162 --> 00:14:28,482 Speaker 2: that's conveyed to you in some way or maybe that's implied. 210 00:14:30,602 --> 00:14:33,962 Speaker 2: Those were the cases that always, I think, gave judges 211 00:14:34,002 --> 00:14:36,882 Speaker 2: some of the greatest discomfort in saying that the CFA 212 00:14:36,922 --> 00:14:41,522 Speaker 2: should apply there. But some courts and some judges, including 213 00:14:41,562 --> 00:14:44,242 Speaker 2: the judge and the Lorry Droot case, felt compelled to 214 00:14:44,282 --> 00:14:49,322 Speaker 2: reach that conclusion in part because the terms in the 215 00:14:49,322 --> 00:14:52,282 Speaker 2: statute to say that you're doing something, you're accessing a 216 00:14:52,322 --> 00:14:58,282 Speaker 2: computer without authorization, the statue gave no specialized definition about 217 00:14:58,282 --> 00:15:02,442 Speaker 2: what without authorization should mean, and so often when judges 218 00:15:02,442 --> 00:15:05,522 Speaker 2: are faced with interpreting a law like that, they just 219 00:15:05,562 --> 00:15:07,922 Speaker 2: look to the ordinary meanings, and we know what without 220 00:15:07,962 --> 00:15:13,082 Speaker 2: authorization means. It's synonymous with things like without permission, not allowed. 221 00:15:14,482 --> 00:15:17,042 Speaker 2: And so if something is forbidden in a written policy 222 00:15:17,802 --> 00:15:20,562 Speaker 2: and you go ahead and do it anyway, it sort 223 00:15:20,562 --> 00:15:23,442 Speaker 2: of makes sense to talk about that as lacking authorization 224 00:15:23,602 --> 00:15:26,922 Speaker 2: of some kind, lacking permission, And so judges, like the 225 00:15:27,002 --> 00:15:31,402 Speaker 2: judge in the Laurie Drew case felt compelled to say, well, 226 00:15:32,002 --> 00:15:37,762 Speaker 2: these actions because Laurie Drew and her co conspirators, as 227 00:15:37,802 --> 00:15:40,682 Speaker 2: the court puts it, co conspirators here being her daughter 228 00:15:40,922 --> 00:15:44,322 Speaker 2: and her eighteen year old employee. The mother's eighteen year 229 00:15:44,362 --> 00:15:50,042 Speaker 2: old employee. They violated various terms of service that my 230 00:15:50,122 --> 00:15:52,402 Speaker 2: Space had laid out, and so they were acting without 231 00:15:52,402 --> 00:15:56,522 Speaker 2: authorization and therefore they violated. Therefore they violated the law. 232 00:15:56,802 --> 00:15:58,482 Speaker 2: And so I still teach it to my students because 233 00:15:58,482 --> 00:16:01,202 Speaker 2: it's a fascinating case to kind of show. I think 234 00:16:01,202 --> 00:16:04,362 Speaker 2: a lot of people, my students included, they have some 235 00:16:05,562 --> 00:16:08,722 Speaker 2: sympathy with the idea that operators of websites should be 236 00:16:08,722 --> 00:16:13,042 Speaker 2: able to set certain rules and if those get violated, 237 00:16:13,522 --> 00:16:15,962 Speaker 2: it's not just a question of oh, you broached the contract, 238 00:16:16,042 --> 00:16:20,562 Speaker 2: but you did something that violated a criminal law, and 239 00:16:20,642 --> 00:16:23,162 Speaker 2: so we should be able to use the criminal law 240 00:16:23,762 --> 00:16:29,002 Speaker 2: to get at those kinds of permissionless uses of computers. 241 00:16:30,322 --> 00:16:32,882 Speaker 2: But I think the Drew case kind of pushes some 242 00:16:32,922 --> 00:16:35,722 Speaker 2: of those impulses to say, well, if this is allowed, 243 00:16:35,762 --> 00:16:37,642 Speaker 2: then this is the this is the extent. 244 00:16:37,322 --> 00:16:40,042 Speaker 1: That you could go to. One question I have about 245 00:16:40,042 --> 00:16:42,762 Speaker 1: this case and then going back to this moment in 246 00:16:42,802 --> 00:16:44,642 Speaker 1: time in two thousand and seven, two thousand and eight, 247 00:16:46,362 --> 00:16:48,882 Speaker 1: I think a lot of reactions to the story of 248 00:16:48,922 --> 00:16:56,322 Speaker 1: Megan Meier is that something terrible happens and this you know, 249 00:16:56,962 --> 00:17:00,362 Speaker 1: what does justice look like in this in this situation? 250 00:17:02,122 --> 00:17:04,842 Speaker 1: What is on the books at all, and if the 251 00:17:04,842 --> 00:17:11,002 Speaker 1: CFA is a perfect legislation, and was there anything at 252 00:17:11,042 --> 00:17:15,082 Speaker 1: the time that could have been more suitable, or in 253 00:17:15,322 --> 00:17:19,482 Speaker 1: the years since then have there been developments to enforced 254 00:17:19,562 --> 00:17:23,442 Speaker 1: cases of what I would say extreme online harassment of 255 00:17:24,162 --> 00:17:25,602 Speaker 1: this nature or any nature. 256 00:17:26,842 --> 00:17:30,562 Speaker 2: At the time, there certainly weren't as many laws that 257 00:17:30,602 --> 00:17:34,282 Speaker 2: would apply as there are now, And that's one of 258 00:17:34,282 --> 00:17:37,442 Speaker 2: the reasons why I would imagine federal prosecutors reached for 259 00:17:37,482 --> 00:17:42,402 Speaker 2: a law like the CFAA that, given its interpretation at 260 00:17:42,402 --> 00:17:46,402 Speaker 2: the time, was something of a capsule, or at least 261 00:17:46,442 --> 00:17:49,602 Speaker 2: it could help fill in the gaps where some other 262 00:17:49,682 --> 00:17:54,282 Speaker 2: laws wouldn't apply. And so you might have had certain 263 00:17:54,362 --> 00:18:02,402 Speaker 2: laws that prohibited forms of harassment but that didn't yet 264 00:18:02,442 --> 00:18:08,082 Speaker 2: apply to internet based harassment. Or you might have had 265 00:18:11,282 --> 00:18:14,962 Speaker 2: claims that could be brought for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 266 00:18:15,162 --> 00:18:17,162 Speaker 2: That's a thought that had existed for a long time, 267 00:18:17,802 --> 00:18:20,482 Speaker 2: but the government can't bring that as a criminal charge. 268 00:18:20,522 --> 00:18:23,522 Speaker 2: That's a private lawsuit that needs to exist between people. 269 00:18:23,602 --> 00:18:26,562 Speaker 2: So you know, Megan Meia's parents, for example, might have 270 00:18:26,642 --> 00:18:29,802 Speaker 2: been able to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 271 00:18:31,202 --> 00:18:33,162 Speaker 2: but actually There are all sorts of very complicated reasons. 272 00:18:33,162 --> 00:18:35,322 Speaker 2: We won't get into that why it's difficult for Paris 273 00:18:35,362 --> 00:18:39,122 Speaker 2: to sue when something like that happens to a child. 274 00:18:39,202 --> 00:18:44,162 Speaker 2: But anyway, that the bigger point is that, yes, that's 275 00:18:44,162 --> 00:18:47,362 Speaker 2: one of the reasons why prosecutors reached for a law 276 00:18:47,442 --> 00:18:52,362 Speaker 2: like the CFAA, where you can you can bring in. 277 00:18:54,042 --> 00:18:58,242 Speaker 2: It gives a legal basis for our sense of moral 278 00:18:58,282 --> 00:19:01,482 Speaker 2: outrage that something bad happened and somebody needs to be 279 00:19:01,562 --> 00:19:09,242 Speaker 2: held responsible. Since the Drew decision, which ultimately, remember right, 280 00:19:09,282 --> 00:19:12,642 Speaker 2: even though she was convicted, it was her conviction was 281 00:19:12,722 --> 00:19:18,402 Speaker 2: ultimately overturned because of a constitutional challenge that she raised 282 00:19:18,522 --> 00:19:24,482 Speaker 2: to her conviction. Since then, there have been a whole 283 00:19:24,562 --> 00:19:29,322 Speaker 2: slew of cyber bullying and harassment and stalking statutes that 284 00:19:29,322 --> 00:19:31,762 Speaker 2: have been passed in many states across the country, including 285 00:19:31,802 --> 00:19:35,882 Speaker 2: one in Missouri, the home state where these events kind 286 00:19:35,882 --> 00:19:41,082 Speaker 2: of mainly took place. Missouri passed Meghan's Law, which was 287 00:19:41,642 --> 00:19:45,482 Speaker 2: a statute designed to get at various forms of cyber 288 00:19:45,522 --> 00:19:51,682 Speaker 2: bullying and cyber harassment that the terms of the statute 289 00:19:51,722 --> 00:19:59,282 Speaker 2: certainly seemed much they seem much closer to what happened here, right, 290 00:19:59,362 --> 00:20:02,802 Speaker 2: it's actions that are taken, you know, with the purpose 291 00:20:02,922 --> 00:20:07,242 Speaker 2: to frighten and intimidate and cause emotional distress. There are 292 00:20:07,242 --> 00:20:10,842 Speaker 2: different provisions that apply depending on whether the perpetrator is 293 00:20:10,882 --> 00:20:14,642 Speaker 2: a minor or an adult. So laws like this have 294 00:20:15,042 --> 00:20:17,402 Speaker 2: since been passed, but they've also been subject to a 295 00:20:17,402 --> 00:20:21,362 Speaker 2: lot of constitutional challenges as well, usually First Amendment challenges 296 00:20:21,402 --> 00:20:25,642 Speaker 2: based on the freedom of speech. So courts tend to get, 297 00:20:26,042 --> 00:20:30,642 Speaker 2: let's just say a little more skittish when laws make 298 00:20:30,722 --> 00:20:38,082 Speaker 2: it illegal to communicate with people with the intent to annoy, 299 00:20:39,482 --> 00:20:46,922 Speaker 2: with the intent yeah, pester, you know, if it's with 300 00:20:46,962 --> 00:20:52,282 Speaker 2: an intent to threaten, if it's with an intent to harass. 301 00:20:53,802 --> 00:20:58,722 Speaker 2: Generally that's you know, courts are a little less likely 302 00:20:58,762 --> 00:21:03,802 Speaker 2: to strike down those laws as unconstitutional. But the story 303 00:21:03,802 --> 00:21:06,162 Speaker 2: of kind of cyber bullying laws across the country has 304 00:21:06,202 --> 00:21:09,482 Speaker 2: been one of a few successes and many failures in 305 00:21:09,562 --> 00:21:15,242 Speaker 2: terms of those laws standing. This sort of the wealth 306 00:21:15,922 --> 00:21:19,082 Speaker 2: being being upheld by courts when. 307 00:21:19,162 --> 00:21:24,682 Speaker 1: When they're challenge Yeah, that was a really helpful explanation there. 308 00:21:25,242 --> 00:21:27,482 Speaker 1: It raised a question that I have now, which is 309 00:21:28,122 --> 00:21:34,082 Speaker 1: it seems like with online harassment legislation you have different stakeholders, 310 00:21:34,562 --> 00:21:43,562 Speaker 1: the users, the people, the business, the executives of a platform, 311 00:21:44,282 --> 00:21:50,522 Speaker 1: the victims of cyber bullying or online harassment. How do 312 00:21:50,562 --> 00:21:54,762 Speaker 1: you negotiate I mean, again, I imagine it's a very imperfect process. 313 00:21:54,802 --> 00:21:59,322 Speaker 1: But how do you negotiate with these that balance between 314 00:21:59,402 --> 00:22:04,562 Speaker 1: the First Amendment rights and the accountability? Who is responsible 315 00:22:04,602 --> 00:22:10,442 Speaker 1: for what? And how has this process evolved over the 316 00:22:10,482 --> 00:22:11,802 Speaker 1: past couple decades. 317 00:22:13,522 --> 00:22:18,122 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's constantly evolving. It is by no means settled. 318 00:22:19,242 --> 00:22:23,202 Speaker 2: And I'll add one additional complication, not that we need anymore. 319 00:22:23,242 --> 00:22:26,282 Speaker 2: We've got enough to be getting along with. But law 320 00:22:26,402 --> 00:22:30,282 Speaker 2: is only one possible regulatory tool that can be used 321 00:22:30,322 --> 00:22:36,562 Speaker 2: here to address some of these harmful forms of conduct communication, 322 00:22:36,722 --> 00:22:43,522 Speaker 2: interaction right that are conducted through technology. Technology itself is 323 00:22:43,562 --> 00:22:49,322 Speaker 2: another regulatory force here. Technology can enable and constrain different 324 00:22:49,362 --> 00:22:52,962 Speaker 2: forms of behavior in ways that is certainly not a 325 00:22:53,202 --> 00:22:56,842 Speaker 2: direct analog to law, that can be complementary to law 326 00:22:56,882 --> 00:23:00,202 Speaker 2: and sometimes not so complementary to law. And there are 327 00:23:00,242 --> 00:23:03,402 Speaker 2: other regulatory forces as well, right. There can be certain 328 00:23:03,682 --> 00:23:08,242 Speaker 2: market constraints on some of these forms behavior, and social 329 00:23:08,322 --> 00:23:13,122 Speaker 2: norms are working in the background as well to again 330 00:23:13,282 --> 00:23:16,202 Speaker 2: push certain types of behavior, enable it, or constrain it, 331 00:23:17,002 --> 00:23:20,082 Speaker 2: But technology in particular is really important to think and 332 00:23:20,162 --> 00:23:24,282 Speaker 2: talk about in this context because your question asked about, 333 00:23:24,322 --> 00:23:27,602 Speaker 2: you know, how do we navigate, for example, First Amendment 334 00:23:28,162 --> 00:23:33,242 Speaker 2: rights to free speech or just the political value of 335 00:23:33,282 --> 00:23:40,722 Speaker 2: freedom of expression right with laws and other forms of regulation, 336 00:23:40,802 --> 00:23:45,762 Speaker 2: including technology that might seek to regulate this kind of behavior. 337 00:23:46,442 --> 00:23:49,442 Speaker 2: And this is a constant process of evolution. I would 338 00:23:49,482 --> 00:23:55,122 Speaker 2: say that we see play out write everything from when 339 00:23:55,922 --> 00:24:00,362 Speaker 2: a former president of the United States gets kicked off Twitter, 340 00:24:00,842 --> 00:24:04,682 Speaker 2: whether that is a First Amendment issue, a free speech issue, 341 00:24:04,722 --> 00:24:07,362 Speaker 2: whether those things are one and the same. Right they aren't, 342 00:24:07,402 --> 00:24:15,402 Speaker 2: but they often get lumped together. The question of online 343 00:24:15,482 --> 00:24:25,642 Speaker 2: harassment by cyber mobs, dosing, non consensual distribution of intimate images, 344 00:24:26,922 --> 00:24:32,922 Speaker 2: other forms of kind of networked harassment, the values that 345 00:24:32,962 --> 00:24:36,442 Speaker 2: are at stake in each of those different situations, the 346 00:24:36,562 --> 00:24:40,002 Speaker 2: types of regulations that might be appropriate to deal with them, 347 00:24:40,522 --> 00:24:45,002 Speaker 2: the constitutional issues at stake. In some ways, I like 348 00:24:45,042 --> 00:24:47,762 Speaker 2: to think that that you know, they are all deserving 349 00:24:47,802 --> 00:24:51,242 Speaker 2: a very distinct treatment because they do often raise very 350 00:24:51,242 --> 00:24:55,202 Speaker 2: different questions of how to try and mitigate or address 351 00:24:55,242 --> 00:24:57,762 Speaker 2: some of those harms, and yet at the same time 352 00:24:57,802 --> 00:25:01,722 Speaker 2: they're all intimately connected. The types of lines that you 353 00:25:01,882 --> 00:25:05,362 Speaker 2: draw in one context will inevitably at least have to 354 00:25:05,402 --> 00:25:07,522 Speaker 2: be reckoned with in the other context, even if they 355 00:25:07,522 --> 00:25:11,562 Speaker 2: don't directly apply. And so if we want Twitter to 356 00:25:11,642 --> 00:25:15,082 Speaker 2: be able to or you know, let's use my Space, 357 00:25:15,122 --> 00:25:16,682 Speaker 2: right since it is still around, if we want my 358 00:25:16,762 --> 00:25:20,802 Speaker 2: Space nowadays to be able to address certain forms of 359 00:25:21,002 --> 00:25:28,282 Speaker 2: networked harassment or targeted threats that are you know, communicated 360 00:25:28,322 --> 00:25:34,522 Speaker 2: through its platform, that has a certain vision of the 361 00:25:34,562 --> 00:25:37,682 Speaker 2: ability of those platforms to kind of govern and police 362 00:25:38,122 --> 00:25:44,842 Speaker 2: their spaces that they've created online. That might also apply 363 00:25:45,082 --> 00:25:51,562 Speaker 2: in the context of trying to de platform somebody or 364 00:25:51,602 --> 00:25:54,722 Speaker 2: remove somebody's ability to engage in these kinds of expression, 365 00:25:55,402 --> 00:25:57,882 Speaker 2: and how they go about doing that right, Sometimes it's 366 00:25:57,882 --> 00:25:59,442 Speaker 2: going to be a question of law. Sometimes it's going 367 00:25:59,482 --> 00:26:02,522 Speaker 2: to be a question of other forms of regulation that 368 00:26:02,562 --> 00:26:05,362 Speaker 2: they might put in place, But it's all pretty connected. 369 00:26:05,362 --> 00:26:09,162 Speaker 2: In this ecosystem. 370 00:26:07,722 --> 00:26:12,242 Speaker 1: Social media ad scale is difficult to govern. Any proposed 371 00:26:12,322 --> 00:26:15,442 Speaker 1: law that might aim to rid social networks of online 372 00:26:15,522 --> 00:26:21,602 Speaker 1: harassment and prevent future lory jrews could backfire in countless ways. 373 00:26:22,122 --> 00:26:26,722 Speaker 1: But while online harassment is real, what you believe constitutes 374 00:26:26,762 --> 00:26:31,442 Speaker 1: online harassment depends a lot on who you are when I. 375 00:26:31,362 --> 00:26:33,842 Speaker 2: Write in this area, and when I teach these issues, 376 00:26:34,962 --> 00:26:39,642 Speaker 2: I can't just teach law. I have to teach technology 377 00:26:39,682 --> 00:26:43,122 Speaker 2: as well. I have to teach to some extent social 378 00:26:43,162 --> 00:26:48,682 Speaker 2: norms because they're all interacting in this space. There are 379 00:26:48,722 --> 00:26:52,442 Speaker 2: occasionally laws that are going to be a major motivating factor, 380 00:26:53,562 --> 00:26:55,202 Speaker 2: but often there are going to be other forces that 381 00:26:55,242 --> 00:26:58,202 Speaker 2: are actually pushing some of the key protagonists in this 382 00:26:58,362 --> 00:27:01,922 Speaker 2: space to act in certain ways, to remove certain types 383 00:27:02,042 --> 00:27:05,802 Speaker 2: of content, to protect people from certain types of harm. 384 00:27:05,842 --> 00:27:08,282 Speaker 1: Well, it seem like no on the corporate side of 385 00:27:08,322 --> 00:27:12,882 Speaker 1: MySpace cared what the users were doing. In fact, there 386 00:27:12,962 --> 00:27:16,762 Speaker 1: were workers in MySpace who were on task to remove 387 00:27:17,002 --> 00:27:22,162 Speaker 1: objectionable content from the social network. More in the MySpace 388 00:27:22,202 --> 00:27:35,762 Speaker 1: content moderators. After the break, MySpace seemed like a free 389 00:27:35,802 --> 00:27:39,962 Speaker 1: for all, a place where you could post or upload anything, 390 00:27:41,082 --> 00:27:44,722 Speaker 1: and some took advantage of the lax rules. There were 391 00:27:44,842 --> 00:27:48,402 Speaker 1: users who uploaded incredibly vile content. 392 00:27:48,962 --> 00:27:52,722 Speaker 7: I once interviewed, very early on in my research time, 393 00:27:53,082 --> 00:27:57,522 Speaker 7: a person who had been an executive at a digital 394 00:27:57,562 --> 00:28:02,682 Speaker 7: media company, and that person said to me, very very 395 00:28:02,762 --> 00:28:06,642 Speaker 7: wrily and sagely, if you open a hole on the 396 00:28:06,682 --> 00:28:11,722 Speaker 7: inner it gets filled with shit, and that was like, 397 00:28:12,922 --> 00:28:16,922 Speaker 7: you know, like mic drop. So MySpace opened this hole 398 00:28:16,962 --> 00:28:20,562 Speaker 7: in the Internet for people to fill in with photos 399 00:28:20,642 --> 00:28:21,362 Speaker 7: and imagery. 400 00:28:23,322 --> 00:28:23,562 Speaker 3: You know. 401 00:28:23,642 --> 00:28:27,082 Speaker 7: There were like also like you know, kind of crude 402 00:28:27,442 --> 00:28:30,642 Speaker 7: computer graphics that were part of it too, So you 403 00:28:30,682 --> 00:28:34,562 Speaker 7: can imagine how quickly swastikas would have shown up or 404 00:28:34,722 --> 00:28:37,362 Speaker 7: you know what I mean, just whatever crappy thing people 405 00:28:37,402 --> 00:28:40,402 Speaker 7: could do, they took the opportunity to do it. 406 00:28:40,482 --> 00:28:40,682 Speaker 2: You know. 407 00:28:40,722 --> 00:28:41,962 Speaker 3: It reminds me of like. 408 00:28:43,482 --> 00:28:50,562 Speaker 7: When there's a fresh piece of sidewalk cement that they've 409 00:28:50,602 --> 00:28:52,962 Speaker 7: put in, you know, and they put some barriers around 410 00:28:53,002 --> 00:28:55,042 Speaker 7: it when they put it down, and then in no 411 00:28:55,202 --> 00:28:57,562 Speaker 7: time people are in there writing on it and putting 412 00:28:57,562 --> 00:28:59,682 Speaker 7: their face in it, like Michael Scott in the office, 413 00:28:59,722 --> 00:29:01,522 Speaker 7: and just doing stuff to it, you know. 414 00:29:02,282 --> 00:29:04,082 Speaker 3: And that's what this is. Like, it was like this 415 00:29:04,202 --> 00:29:06,722 Speaker 3: blank slate and then. 416 00:29:06,562 --> 00:29:10,602 Speaker 1: What that's Sarah T Roberts, author of Behind the Screen 417 00:29:11,082 --> 00:29:15,282 Speaker 1: and professor at UCLA. MySpace was the first social media 418 00:29:15,282 --> 00:29:18,802 Speaker 1: company at massive scale, which meant that things like kicking 419 00:29:18,882 --> 00:29:24,522 Speaker 1: people off the platform for say, posting swastikas was not 420 00:29:24,682 --> 00:29:25,922 Speaker 1: an easy process. 421 00:29:27,202 --> 00:29:31,602 Speaker 7: There's no size of labor force that you could employ 422 00:29:31,722 --> 00:29:35,082 Speaker 7: that could have even gotten all the material on MySpace, 423 00:29:35,202 --> 00:29:38,322 Speaker 7: you know, much less on some of the platforms that 424 00:29:38,362 --> 00:29:42,362 Speaker 7: are out there now that are just exponential in comparison. 425 00:29:42,842 --> 00:29:47,322 Speaker 1: A lot of Sarah's research and writing focuses on content moderation. 426 00:29:48,042 --> 00:29:52,282 Speaker 1: Big social media platforms like Facebook and YouTube employ massive 427 00:29:52,322 --> 00:29:56,762 Speaker 1: teams of workers, usually content workers, to remove photos of 428 00:29:56,882 --> 00:30:01,162 Speaker 1: violent or sexual content that users have uploaded. The worst 429 00:30:01,162 --> 00:30:04,842 Speaker 1: thing you can imagine, well, someone has probably tried to 430 00:30:04,882 --> 00:30:08,642 Speaker 1: get that up on a social media platform. At some point. 431 00:30:09,362 --> 00:30:17,282 Speaker 7: Almost every major platform thinks of content moderation a little late, 432 00:30:18,042 --> 00:30:22,762 Speaker 7: like they think of it because some crisis has predicated 433 00:30:22,802 --> 00:30:26,922 Speaker 7: a new conversation within the firm like uh, oh, we 434 00:30:27,042 --> 00:30:30,202 Speaker 7: actually have to have some policies, or oh my god, 435 00:30:30,682 --> 00:30:34,642 Speaker 7: I didn't think someone would nefariously do this, But here 436 00:30:34,762 --> 00:30:37,042 Speaker 7: are a bunch of people doing this thing with our 437 00:30:37,122 --> 00:30:42,282 Speaker 7: tooling or our systems, and not only is that distasteful 438 00:30:42,282 --> 00:30:44,202 Speaker 7: to us, but maybe it's illegal, you know, in the 439 00:30:44,242 --> 00:30:48,242 Speaker 7: case of circulating child sexual abuse material, which people do 440 00:30:48,442 --> 00:30:51,082 Speaker 7: all the time, all the time on social. 441 00:30:50,802 --> 00:30:53,722 Speaker 3: Media to this day, and it is illegal. 442 00:30:53,882 --> 00:30:54,082 Speaker 7: Right. 443 00:30:54,202 --> 00:30:58,442 Speaker 3: The thing about content moderation of social media is that 444 00:31:00,442 --> 00:31:02,962 Speaker 3: it's treated as a trade secret. 445 00:31:03,322 --> 00:31:09,882 Speaker 7: It's treated the practices, the specifics, who does what and 446 00:31:10,002 --> 00:31:15,722 Speaker 7: where and exactly how. There's no consortium of social media 447 00:31:15,762 --> 00:31:18,122 Speaker 7: companies getting together and being like, hey, we all have 448 00:31:18,242 --> 00:31:19,242 Speaker 7: the same problem. 449 00:31:19,762 --> 00:31:23,602 Speaker 1: MySpace, as the first social media company at a massive 450 00:31:23,642 --> 00:31:27,402 Speaker 1: scale and one that was largely image based, was the 451 00:31:27,442 --> 00:31:32,042 Speaker 1: first social network to grapple with the consequences of scale. 452 00:31:35,042 --> 00:31:39,962 Speaker 3: There were like a series of maybe moral and ethical. 453 00:31:42,522 --> 00:31:46,362 Speaker 7: Responsibilities that my Space felt, and then there were also 454 00:31:46,442 --> 00:31:51,122 Speaker 7: maybe some potential legal ones that kind of came into play, 455 00:31:51,482 --> 00:31:59,642 Speaker 7: and so all of that necessitated some some gatekeeping of 456 00:31:59,722 --> 00:32:04,962 Speaker 7: some sort. But there the firms have a hard time 457 00:32:05,202 --> 00:32:10,162 Speaker 7: thinking about that kind of activity, gatekeeping, taking material down, 458 00:32:10,402 --> 00:32:14,722 Speaker 7: enforcing rules, thinking about what can't be done. 459 00:32:15,242 --> 00:32:18,802 Speaker 3: They have a hard time thinking about that as revenue generating. 460 00:32:19,082 --> 00:32:21,362 Speaker 1: If you were a user who encountered some of this 461 00:32:21,522 --> 00:32:25,922 Speaker 1: file stuff, maybe someone left a testimonial with a picture 462 00:32:25,922 --> 00:32:30,042 Speaker 1: of dead animals, it wasn't clear how to flag this material, 463 00:32:30,482 --> 00:32:32,762 Speaker 1: and it wasn't clear what would happen if you did. 464 00:32:33,282 --> 00:32:35,802 Speaker 7: They often would have had no idea where it was going, 465 00:32:35,842 --> 00:32:39,522 Speaker 7: and I think in many cases probably just presumed, oh, 466 00:32:39,522 --> 00:32:42,362 Speaker 7: I'm sending it off to the computer whatever that meant 467 00:32:42,602 --> 00:32:44,282 Speaker 7: when in fact, you know they were sending it off 468 00:32:44,322 --> 00:32:47,882 Speaker 7: to people, but they were doing some labor on the 469 00:32:47,922 --> 00:32:52,042 Speaker 7: front end of triaging that material already. So like maybe 470 00:32:52,882 --> 00:32:55,722 Speaker 7: at one point you had to go through a series 471 00:32:55,722 --> 00:32:58,242 Speaker 7: of menus to find where you would report. Now, it's 472 00:32:58,362 --> 00:33:04,162 Speaker 7: usually the the convention is like to have that much 473 00:33:04,162 --> 00:33:07,282 Speaker 7: more available to users, like that those buttons us the 474 00:33:07,282 --> 00:33:09,162 Speaker 7: red button or something, I've got to report this. 475 00:33:09,602 --> 00:33:13,042 Speaker 3: But you know, it was a it was a process of. 476 00:33:13,042 --> 00:33:17,162 Speaker 7: Like flow chart logic where you would find this place 477 00:33:17,202 --> 00:33:20,162 Speaker 7: to report, and then this is the macro category of 478 00:33:21,242 --> 00:33:21,842 Speaker 7: why it's. 479 00:33:21,722 --> 00:33:24,922 Speaker 3: A problem because it's violent, or because it's. 480 00:33:25,322 --> 00:33:29,202 Speaker 7: Inappropriate sexual material, or because it's some other kind of thing. 481 00:33:29,522 --> 00:33:32,882 Speaker 3: I mean, I would argue that making. 482 00:33:32,562 --> 00:33:35,962 Speaker 7: A better, safer, more comfortable place for people ultimately will 483 00:33:36,042 --> 00:33:39,482 Speaker 7: generate revenue, but that's a long that's kind of a 484 00:33:39,482 --> 00:33:43,802 Speaker 7: longtudinal argument for companies that want quarterly returns, so it's 485 00:33:43,842 --> 00:33:48,682 Speaker 7: hard to make that case. So what happened was, in 486 00:33:48,762 --> 00:33:51,602 Speaker 7: the case of MySpace, you know, they had to build 487 00:33:51,682 --> 00:33:57,362 Speaker 7: up a content moderation department, which meant they also had 488 00:33:57,362 --> 00:34:01,562 Speaker 7: to create a bunch of policies simultaneously. Because the policies 489 00:34:01,682 --> 00:34:03,802 Speaker 7: governed the operations of content moderation. 490 00:34:04,322 --> 00:34:11,642 Speaker 1: Executives often rationalize these haphazard content moderation workforces with haphazard workflows. 491 00:34:12,122 --> 00:34:16,282 Speaker 1: They assume it will all get automated eventually, and for 492 00:34:16,402 --> 00:34:21,322 Speaker 1: those who work as content moderators, the experience can be traumatizing. 493 00:34:23,762 --> 00:34:27,522 Speaker 1: Sarah talked to moderators from multiple platforms for her book, 494 00:34:27,802 --> 00:34:30,442 Speaker 1: including someone who moderated MySpace content. 495 00:34:31,322 --> 00:34:35,282 Speaker 7: She said, well, for the three years after I worked 496 00:34:35,282 --> 00:34:39,522 Speaker 7: at MySpace, if I met someone, I wouldn't shake their hand. 497 00:34:39,682 --> 00:34:41,562 Speaker 7: So I said, can you tell me more about what 498 00:34:41,882 --> 00:34:44,882 Speaker 7: you're saying with that? She said, well, I know how 499 00:34:44,922 --> 00:34:49,122 Speaker 7: people are, and people are nasty and their growth, and 500 00:34:49,162 --> 00:34:52,322 Speaker 7: I don't want to touch a stranger's hand because I 501 00:34:52,362 --> 00:34:56,122 Speaker 7: know the stuff they do. So this is kind of 502 00:34:56,162 --> 00:34:59,842 Speaker 7: how she went forward in the world after that experience. 503 00:35:00,882 --> 00:35:05,362 Speaker 7: She told me that she had coworkers or employees that 504 00:35:05,442 --> 00:35:08,722 Speaker 7: she was worried of out unleashing back into the world 505 00:35:08,802 --> 00:35:14,722 Speaker 7: because of the harm that they underwent in what they 506 00:35:14,762 --> 00:35:15,802 Speaker 7: were doing and seeing. 507 00:35:16,522 --> 00:35:16,762 Speaker 1: You know. 508 00:35:16,842 --> 00:35:18,882 Speaker 7: She told me, maybe some of these people started out 509 00:35:18,882 --> 00:35:22,562 Speaker 7: a little bit weird and this job just you know, 510 00:35:22,642 --> 00:35:27,202 Speaker 7: took them to the matt psychologically and she said, you know, 511 00:35:27,282 --> 00:35:30,362 Speaker 7: she often worried about what became of those people, where 512 00:35:30,362 --> 00:35:31,082 Speaker 7: did they end up? 513 00:35:31,202 --> 00:35:37,642 Speaker 1: And in case you're wondering, automating content moderation would be 514 00:35:37,922 --> 00:35:42,922 Speaker 1: extremely difficult to do. In fact, many of the much 515 00:35:42,962 --> 00:35:47,682 Speaker 1: heralded AI applications depend on this kind of labor too. 516 00:35:48,402 --> 00:35:52,442 Speaker 1: A recent Time magazine feature revealed that workers in Kenya 517 00:35:52,962 --> 00:35:57,122 Speaker 1: moderate and filter chat GPT content for less than two 518 00:35:57,242 --> 00:35:58,002 Speaker 1: dollars an hour. 519 00:35:59,442 --> 00:36:03,882 Speaker 3: Does it have to be that way? I guess. 520 00:36:05,082 --> 00:36:11,562 Speaker 7: Companies think so for now, and they throw a lot 521 00:36:11,602 --> 00:36:14,962 Speaker 7: of resources on the you know again, computationally, but there's 522 00:36:15,082 --> 00:36:17,202 Speaker 7: no getting away from the human. 523 00:36:18,842 --> 00:36:26,962 Speaker 3: The human ability to discern that is so uniquely human. 524 00:36:27,442 --> 00:36:33,682 Speaker 7: To take all of these inputs symbols, language, cultural meaning 525 00:36:34,442 --> 00:36:37,762 Speaker 7: you know, the specificities of a particular region in Mexico, 526 00:36:38,362 --> 00:36:45,562 Speaker 7: you know, for example, and the political situation in that place, 527 00:36:47,042 --> 00:36:52,642 Speaker 7: and having someone who knows intimately that area, uh and 528 00:36:52,762 --> 00:36:54,202 Speaker 7: can respond to it like. 529 00:36:54,762 --> 00:37:00,922 Speaker 3: That is nuanced and it's so it's so uniquely human 530 00:37:01,042 --> 00:37:01,802 Speaker 3: in some ways. 531 00:37:02,602 --> 00:37:08,002 Speaker 7: It's like that discernment and judgment, like yes, if it's 532 00:37:08,402 --> 00:37:10,762 Speaker 7: you know, there's too much boob in the photo, okay, 533 00:37:10,802 --> 00:37:13,802 Speaker 7: A computer can like make a decision about that, Yes, 534 00:37:14,362 --> 00:37:22,522 Speaker 7: But when we bring in all of these elements language, culture, symbols, politics, 535 00:37:25,082 --> 00:37:29,602 Speaker 7: you know, like regional politics in some cases very specific religion, 536 00:37:30,362 --> 00:37:34,602 Speaker 7: all of these elements that are so complex that people 537 00:37:34,642 --> 00:37:39,442 Speaker 7: spend entire careers studying them or you know whatever, and 538 00:37:39,482 --> 00:37:42,962 Speaker 7: then ask very lowly paid people in a completely different 539 00:37:43,002 --> 00:37:45,842 Speaker 7: part of the world to decide about it, or we 540 00:37:45,922 --> 00:37:51,842 Speaker 7: try to create algorithms that can imitate those decisions. You know, 541 00:37:52,002 --> 00:37:55,682 Speaker 7: things fall through the cracks and it's a really hard, 542 00:37:56,002 --> 00:38:01,642 Speaker 7: hard problem to solve under the current business model social media, 543 00:38:01,682 --> 00:38:05,002 Speaker 7: which says post it and we'll sort it out later. 544 00:38:05,562 --> 00:38:10,162 Speaker 1: My Space is still blame with content moderation because MySpace 545 00:38:10,642 --> 00:38:15,282 Speaker 1: still exists. It is still around, It exists as a company, 546 00:38:15,482 --> 00:38:19,562 Speaker 1: It exists as a platform. A collapse, certainly, no one 547 00:38:19,642 --> 00:38:22,522 Speaker 1: I know has used it in a decade by people 548 00:38:22,602 --> 00:38:26,362 Speaker 1: still work there, people post on it. What is MySpace 549 00:38:26,442 --> 00:38:30,762 Speaker 1: now in twenty twenty three. In the next episode, we're 550 00:38:30,802 --> 00:38:33,842 Speaker 1: going to explore what's left of it. Thanks for listening 551 00:38:33,842 --> 00:38:37,722 Speaker 1: to Main Accounts The Story of MySpace and iHeart original 552 00:38:37,802 --> 00:38:42,762 Speaker 1: podcast Main Accounts The Story of MySpace is written and 553 00:38:42,802 --> 00:38:47,002 Speaker 1: hosted by me Joanne McNeil, editing its sound design by 554 00:38:47,042 --> 00:38:52,002 Speaker 1: Mike Coscarelli and Mary Do. Original music by Elise McCoy, 555 00:38:52,322 --> 00:38:56,402 Speaker 1: Mixing and mastering by Josh Fisher, Research and fact checking 556 00:38:56,682 --> 00:39:01,402 Speaker 1: by Austin Thompson, Joson Sears, and Marissa Brown. Show logo 557 00:39:01,642 --> 00:39:06,482 Speaker 1: by Lucy Kintania. Special thanks to Ryan Murdoch Grace Views 558 00:39:06,962 --> 00:39:10,562 Speaker 1: at The Heat Frasier. Our associate producer is Lauren Phillip, 559 00:39:10,762 --> 00:39:14,722 Speaker 1: our senior producer is Mike Coscarelli, and our executive producer 560 00:39:14,922 --> 00:39:18,202 Speaker 1: is Jason English. If you're enjoying the show, leave us 561 00:39:18,202 --> 00:39:21,962 Speaker 1: a rating and review on your favorite podcast platform Sadly, 562 00:39:22,682 --> 00:39:25,562 Speaker 1: my MySpace page is no longer around, but you can 563 00:39:25,642 --> 00:39:28,362 Speaker 1: find me on Twitter at Joe Mick. Let us hear 564 00:39:28,442 --> 00:39:34,322 Speaker 1: your MySpace story and check out my book lurking main accounts. 565 00:39:34,402 --> 00:39:39,642 Speaker 1: The Story of MySpace is a production of iHeart Podcasts.