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Speaker 1: We've all had that mildly creepy experience. You're shopping online for,

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Speaker 1: I don't know, a coffeemaker, and suddenly an ad for

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Speaker 1: that very same coffeemaker pops up on every website you

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Speaker 1: visit for the next week.

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Speaker 2: You didn't know you were in an audience, but you are.

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Speaker 2: You're the audience for this industry.

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Speaker 1: So yeah, by now we know we're being tracked. But

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Speaker 1: the truth is most of us don't know the half

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Speaker 1: of it. I'm West Kesova today on the big Take.

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Speaker 1: What online ad brokers and now governments can really find

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Speaker 1: out about you? Bloomberg cybersecurity reporter Ryan Gallagher writes in

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Speaker 1: Business Week about an Israeli company that markets information about

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Speaker 1: people's online travels to law enforcement and intelligence agencies around

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Speaker 1: the world.

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Speaker 3: What Raison has done is found a way too basically

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Speaker 3: purchase this information on mass on an absolutely gigantic scale,

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Speaker 3: and repurpose it and to a system that uses the

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Speaker 3: same advertising information but for other purposes.

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Speaker 1: He'll tell us what they're using that info for in

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Speaker 1: just a bit. First, though, let's hear from doctor Johnny

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Speaker 1: Ryan on exactly what's being vacuumed up about you as

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Speaker 1: you click around the web each day. He's a Senior

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Speaker 1: Fellow at the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and he's

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Speaker 1: an expert in online tracking. Johnny, you've said the system

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Speaker 1: that targets adds to us online is the biggest data

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Speaker 1: breach ever recorded, and it's repeated every day.

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Speaker 2: What do you mean by that it's the world's biggest

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Speaker 2: data breach with because when you visit a website or app,

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Speaker 2: almost any website or app that has advertising information about

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Speaker 2: what you're watching, reading, and listening to and where you

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Speaker 2: physically are is very likely to be broadcast out to

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Speaker 2: tens or maybe more of companies who then do god

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Speaker 2: knows what with it. That is happening all the time. Now,

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Speaker 2: it's a simple, simple idea. The websites want to show ads,

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Speaker 2: and often when you turn up on a website, whereas

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Speaker 2: you'll notice there are empty rectangles just for a split

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Speaker 2: second around the editorial that you want to read, And

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Speaker 2: sometimes even as you're looking at the page loading, the

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Speaker 2: ad appears and it bumps the.

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Speaker 4: Editorial content down.

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Speaker 2: Now, what has happened in that tiny moment of time

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Speaker 2: is that information about you is sent out to at

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Speaker 2: least one auction this is an auction for the opportunity

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Speaker 2: to show you an AD And how does it work.

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Speaker 2: The way it works is you go to a website.

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Speaker 2: The publisher of the website sends information about you to

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Speaker 2: a company that it has contracted with called a supply

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Speaker 2: side platform an SSP. The SSP if he gets any

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Speaker 2: data it can about you that the website has exposed

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Speaker 2: to it, and it puts it together in what is

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Speaker 2: called a bid request. I will tell you what can

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Speaker 2: be in a bit request. In a moment, that bid

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Speaker 2: request is sent to at least one auction called an

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Speaker 2: ad exchange. Often there is an auction of auctions, multiple

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Speaker 2: ad exchanges, and that request for bids or bid requests

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Speaker 2: then is sent by each ad exchange out to tens

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Speaker 2: or hundreds of companies. So publisher of website or app

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Speaker 2: goes to SSP, goes to AD exchange, one or more

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Speaker 2: goes to multiple they're called demand side platforms DSPs. They

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Speaker 2: work on behalf of advertisers and they are keeping their

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Speaker 2: eyes open monitoring for the right kind of person, in

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Speaker 2: the right kind of context and place, who their advertiser

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Speaker 2: is trying.

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Speaker 1: To reach, what kind of information is being collected, How

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Speaker 1: specific is it.

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Speaker 2: It includes tags like I'll quote you, the technical number

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Speaker 2: IAB seven hyphen two eight, and that denotes a person

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Speaker 2: who is categorized as incest slash abuse support. The word

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Speaker 2: support is important there. That is a person who has

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Speaker 2: been a victim. Similarly, code IAB seven hyphen three is

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Speaker 2: AIDS slash HIV. This clearly should not be being broadcast

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Speaker 2: about people based on what they're reading. Why would you

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Speaker 2: broadcast it? And what happens when it's broadcast. Well, there's

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Speaker 2: another industry standard, which is called the audience taxonomy.

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Speaker 4: This is the Rosetta.

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Speaker 2: Stone for the data broker industry. The data broker industry

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Speaker 2: exists to sell information about people. Now, you've got plenty

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Speaker 2: of players in that industry, and they need to reconcile

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Speaker 2: what they know about you, and they need some way

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Speaker 2: to do that.

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Speaker 1: And how are these determining these various classification code?

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Speaker 2: Now those codes I've just given you come from anywhere

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Speaker 2: they can get the data. The data broker industry is

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Speaker 2: certainly a big consumer in online advertising, but it does

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Speaker 2: not confine itself to that. If you take the example

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Speaker 2: of one that should be particularly concerning a so called

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Speaker 2: purchase intent, what is this person intending to buy there's

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Speaker 2: a code for aerospace and defense that's IAB code eight

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Speaker 2: eighty five. Now, presumably this is someone who works in

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Speaker 2: the defense industry and is visiting procurement websites, but the

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Speaker 2: information about them being present on the site is then

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Speaker 2: being broadcast out to innumerable parties, and often the advertiser

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Speaker 2: can tell the auction I'm looking for this particular code, person,

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Speaker 2: this number, this string of numbers and letters. What can

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Speaker 2: be in a bit request is totally benign, things like

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Speaker 2: is this a video ad what size is the rectangle?

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Speaker 2: What technology should it use? Should have any issue I

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Speaker 2: think with that side of it. But the rest of

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Speaker 2: the information is about the person or their device, And

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Speaker 2: of course, when you know enough about a device, you

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Speaker 2: can find out that it's the same person you saw

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Speaker 2: last time on that same device, and then you can

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Speaker 2: stitch together multiple devices by finding out about the person

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Speaker 2: and their behavior. The information about the person includes where

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Speaker 2: they are that can be literally their GPS coordinates. The

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Speaker 2: bit request will also say what you're looking at. Now,

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Speaker 2: sometimes that's just the name of the website, but often

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Speaker 2: it's website slash, category slash name of article and Beyond that,

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Speaker 2: then it'll have the long ID code that is assigned

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Speaker 2: by the SSP, that is the publisher's tech firm. It's

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Speaker 2: assigned to you as you go out into this auction,

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Speaker 2: but it may also include identifiers that prospective buyers have

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Speaker 2: for you too. That is called pre matching, so the

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Speaker 2: buyers who've expressed an interest in this person get a

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Speaker 2: good shot at showing him an AD And of course

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Speaker 2: all of this entices a higher bid for your attention.

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Speaker 1: So as you're looking at different things online, these codes

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Speaker 1: are automatically assigned to you depending on the content you see.

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Speaker 1: Every facet of what you're looking at has another code

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Speaker 1: that follows around with you.

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Speaker 4: That's a good way to put it.

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Speaker 1: Yes, and it's legal for them to collect this information

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Speaker 1: because whether we quite realize it or not, we consent

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Speaker 1: to it when we click on those little windows that

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Speaker 1: pop up.

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Speaker 2: Well, it depends on the jurisdiction. We unfortunate Europeans have

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Speaker 2: been inundated with consent spam. It's meaningless spam because it

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Speaker 2: doesn't really matter whether you say yes or no to

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Speaker 2: any particular thing. There is behind that system, no means

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Speaker 2: of controlling what happens to the data once they're broadcast out.

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Speaker 2: Why is that Well, because the end of decided not

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Speaker 2: to go the route of protecting the data. We know

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Speaker 2: what we know, often very often because the industry's standards,

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Speaker 2: which are very very dry. Documents are public documents. It's

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Speaker 2: not covered up. You can find this online instantly.

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Speaker 1: Now, are all of these various codes aggregated so that

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Speaker 1: the various aspects of your life are put together into

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Speaker 1: a comprehensive profile, or do they exist as separate strands

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Speaker 1: that go different places.

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Speaker 2: In the online advertising industry, there is a user ID code.

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Speaker 2: It can have different names for everybody. Now, different companies

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Speaker 2: will have different codes and they will then have to

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Speaker 2: match them. This practice of matching often involves cookies, but

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Speaker 2: there are other ways of doing it. And when you

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Speaker 2: visit a web page, often there will be a large

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Speaker 2: number of companies who are just loading a single pixel

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Speaker 2: which is often transparent. You can see it from each

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Speaker 2: other's servers, so that they are getting asked for that

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Speaker 2: pixel by your machine. It allows them to cross reference

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Speaker 2: you in a very very clear way and know that

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Speaker 2: they're both talking about the same person. So I know

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Speaker 2: you as as ABC two five seven and someone else

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Speaker 2: knows you as two, three, four, five, six wys, but

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Speaker 2: you're actually the same guy, and we have a commercial

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Speaker 2: deal to match up what we know about you.

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Speaker 4: That's how we might do it.

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Speaker 1: So all of us, in our daily lives, we have

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Speaker 1: so many devices. Do all of these come together or

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Speaker 1: does each of these create its own profile?

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Speaker 2: Cross device targeting is the holy grail for online advertising.

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Speaker 2: If you are a marketer, there is no end of

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Speaker 2: tech people who will walk into your office and show

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Speaker 2: you diagrams of how you can reach someone at every

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Speaker 2: stage of their journey to buy your product. All of

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Speaker 2: those devices they probably end up somewhere in your house,

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Speaker 2: So even if you're just looking at location alone, the

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Speaker 2: fact that they keep ending up at the same place

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Speaker 2: is the first hint. But there are going to be

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Speaker 2: many others. Another question is how many people get to

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Speaker 2: try to do this about you and then can sell

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Speaker 2: what they've learned back into the scrum. And then the

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Speaker 2: next question is how many times does this happen to you.

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Speaker 2: We got industry data from one of the big systems

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Speaker 2: that coordinates auctions of auctions, and we have it by

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Speaker 2: state before I give you the numbers. This doesn't include Amazon,

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Speaker 2: which has its own system. It doesn't include Meta, which

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Speaker 2: has its own system, So these numbers are low. If

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Speaker 2: you're in Arizona, on average per day, based on thirty

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Speaker 2: days of numbers, this will happen to you seven hundred

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Speaker 2: and eighty two times. If you're in Colorado, it's nine

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Speaker 2: hundred and eighty seven.

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Speaker 1: Where information about you is sent out to someone who

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Speaker 1: then uses that information in one way or another.

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Speaker 2: Yes, we don't know what the information is for each

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Speaker 2: particular broadcast, but it will almost certainly include at least

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Speaker 2: ideas and stuff about your device, so it's building up

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Speaker 2: a picture of you over time. All of this adds

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Speaker 2: up to a really big number. You asked at the beginning,

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Speaker 2: why would we describe this as the biggest data breach? Ever,

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Speaker 2: the answer is because Americans are exposed in this manner

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Speaker 2: one hundred and seven trillion times per year, So there

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Speaker 2: is no other data breach that even comes close to

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Speaker 2: that scale. And when you think about the sensitivity of

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Speaker 2: the data that it is about what you are looking at.

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Speaker 2: You're on embarrassingwebsite dot com for whatever category of thing

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Speaker 2: you like looking at on your own, that's what we're

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Speaker 2: talking about.

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Speaker 1: You talked about these codes that are assigned to people.

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Speaker 1: Does it include your name? Does it include who you are?

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Speaker 2: No, it doesn't need to. The identification codes specified in

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Speaker 2: the industry documents are far longer than your Social Security number.

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Speaker 2: If we're talking about where someone lives, everything that they're reading, watching,

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Speaker 2: and listening to, there is no question that this is anonymous.

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Speaker 2: And by the way, the industry stopped using that defense

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Speaker 2: a long time ago. It's just not open to question.

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Speaker 2: These are definitely data that you can use to find

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Speaker 2: out about an individual after the break, What if anything,

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Speaker 2: can we do to protect our privacy online? Are there

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Speaker 2: dangers to this information being collected for individuals that you

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Speaker 2: can be found out that this information can be used

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Speaker 2: against you.

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Speaker 4: Absolutely.

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Speaker 2: We've had cases where DHS, the Department of Homeland Security,

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Speaker 2: was found to be buying this data for example. There

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Speaker 2: are other cases where different security services were buying it

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Speaker 2: as well. But let me give you a more prosaic

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Speaker 2: but I suspect more terrifying example. When you next apply

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Speaker 2: for your dream job, imagine you're at an earlier stage

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Speaker 2: in your career. Was you can't remember what you did

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Speaker 2: online last week, last month, or last year. You put

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Speaker 2: in an application for your dream job. There are a

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Speaker 2: whole lot of clever, bright, young prospects just like you

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Speaker 2: as who are applying for that job. You're competing against them,

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Speaker 2: and because there are so many of them, the company

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Speaker 2: will almost certainly have some automated filtering of those cvs,

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Speaker 2: probably some so called AI system that sifts them and

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Speaker 2: tries to figure out what else it can find out

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Speaker 2: about them and score them in some way. If, however,

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Speaker 2: your CV ends up associated with the tag for drug

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Speaker 2: use bankruptcy, you know, whatever it is, or the politics

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Speaker 2: don't align, it's pretty clear your CV is not actually

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Speaker 2: going to be seen by a human. You pull that out,

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Speaker 2: that idea of sifting through people's private lives and then

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Speaker 2: using it to filter their futures, you pull that out

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Speaker 2: across society and you get a very bleak picture.

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Speaker 1: All of this, of course, raises the question what can

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Speaker 1: we do to protect ourselves so that our information isn't

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Speaker 1: being used in this way, that profiles about us aren't

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Speaker 1: being compiled wherever we go.

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Speaker 2: Well, I've got some bad news. The bad news is

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Speaker 2: the individual I don't think can or should be expected

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Speaker 2: to wear a tinfoil hat and protect themselves. I just

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Speaker 2: don't believe that that is a sensible solution. It is

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Speaker 2: clearly the job of lawmakers and law enforcers. Credit to

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Speaker 2: the completely transformed and invigorated FTC Federal Trade Commission, because

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Speaker 2: they are currently considering how to introduce new rules that

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Speaker 2: would act on this kind of problem. In fact, on

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Speaker 2: the problem I believe in particular as well, think about

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Speaker 2: where the responsibility lies here was Is it your job

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Speaker 2: to protect yourself back in the middle of the last

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Speaker 2: century against a chemicals industry that just dumps stuff in

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Speaker 2: the rivers and lakes.

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Speaker 4: No, it's not.

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Speaker 2: There's very little that you can do. That is a

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Speaker 2: systemic problem. It is up to the legislator and the

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Speaker 2: enforcer to take action to protect you. And although you

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Speaker 2: might decide to boil every cup of water and change

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Speaker 2: how you live, the general population.

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Speaker 4: Won't do that.

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Speaker 1: So you said that the Federal Trade Commission is looking

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Speaker 1: into this. If you were to say to them, here's

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Speaker 1: what you need to do to make people's data more secure,

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Speaker 1: what would you tell them?

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Speaker 2: The FDC can enforce where they can find on fairness

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Speaker 2: and deception. I think they have a pretty good case

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Speaker 2: to make there. The other thing that they can do

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Speaker 2: is introduce new rules, so the FDC has rule making ability. Unfortunately,

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Speaker 2: Congress and Senate in the US have had various attempts

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Speaker 2: to introduce a sensible federal privacy law and have failed

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Speaker 2: to do so. But in the interim, the FTC can

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Speaker 2: use its rule making power. Now it'll be challenged, of

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Speaker 2: course by the industry. This is a multi billion dollar industry,

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Speaker 2: but I think they're in a pretty good place where

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Speaker 2: they can do this.

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Speaker 4: What we need is for everyone to be protected.

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Speaker 1: So what are we to take away from this? When

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Speaker 1: you think about the future, what do you see?

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Speaker 2: I see two possible futures. I see one future where

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Speaker 2: we keep treating personal data as a kind of a

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Speaker 2: lubricant for part of the economy. I think that's one

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Speaker 2: very likely future, and it's a blique one because individual

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Speaker 2: human liberty and agency, our democracy, our media, our individual

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Speaker 2: prospects are at hazard. And that sounds like a very

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Speaker 2: grim statement to make, but it's the statement I'm making

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Speaker 2: having been in that industry. The other future sees something

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Speaker 2: called law being applied in some jurisdictions. The law will

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Speaker 2: have to be written. But we've been here before this

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Speaker 2: happens something harmful happens, it goes unnoticed for quite a while,

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Speaker 2: but then the problems it causes ultimately galvanize action. What

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Speaker 2: we need to have a brighter future for everyone, I

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Speaker 2: think is a serious effort at a federal privacy law,

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Speaker 2: and part of that law needs to give individuals a

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Speaker 2: private right of action because enforcers do not always get

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Speaker 2: the jobs done.

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Speaker 1: Doctor Johnny Ryan, thanks so much for coming on the show.

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Speaker 4: Thanks.

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Speaker 2: Wez enjoy using the internet now.

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Speaker 1: So now we know that kind of information that's being

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Speaker 1: collected about us and what's being done with it. And

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Speaker 1: as I mentioned at the top of the show, it's

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Speaker 1: not just advertisers who want to get to know us. Bloombers.

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Speaker 1: Rank Allegher is here with that part of the story.

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Speaker 3: Ran.

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Speaker 1: We've been talking about how your travels across the Internet

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Speaker 1: are being watched by people who want to sell you stuff.

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Speaker 1: But it's not only that you've reported an Israeli company

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Speaker 1: called Raizone. Can you tell us about them?

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Speaker 3: Raizone is a company based out of Tel Aviv in Israel,

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Speaker 3: and one of their key or their flagship products, is

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Speaker 3: the tool they call Echo and this technology essentially repackages

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Speaker 3: information gathered from the advertising industry and then sells it

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Speaker 3: to governments to help governments track people. The data that

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Speaker 3: they buy from the advertising industry is really basic information

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Speaker 3: about websites that you have visited, geal location associated with

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Speaker 3: your device, and this information is supposed to be used

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Speaker 3: by marketers and advertisers to sell you products that are

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Speaker 3: more relevant to you based on where you live, based

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Speaker 3: on the types of websites that you visit, your interest.

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Speaker 3: But what Raizon has done is found a way to

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Speaker 3: basically purchase this information on mass on an absolutely gigantic

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Speaker 3: scale and repurpose it into a system that uses the

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Speaker 3: same advertising information but for other purposes to track people.

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Speaker 3: So governments can essentially monitor people they're interested in, where

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Speaker 3: they're going, who they're associating with, going back months in

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Speaker 3: time up to even like six months back in time.

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Speaker 3: And they refer to this echo tool as like it

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Speaker 3: being like a time machine because it allows governments to

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Speaker 3: look back in time.

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Speaker 1: Exactly what kind of information are they collecting.

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Speaker 3: It's just quite generic basic information such as like an

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Speaker 3: IP address, which is a series of numbers that everyone

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Speaker 3: has whenever you connect to the internet. Also a unique

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Speaker 3: advertising ID that's also would be connected to your individual phone,

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Speaker 3: and this is a code the advertising industry uses to

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Speaker 3: basically identify particular devices and so they can know, Okay,

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Speaker 3: this person has a visit to these websites, they are

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Speaker 3: possibly interested in buying this product, and so they can

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Speaker 3: then target you with those adverts and also geolocation like

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Speaker 3: sometimes GPS data that your phone will routinely share with

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Speaker 3: websites or apps that you're using in isolation. This kind

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Speaker 3: of data is pretty meaningless. It doesn't really reveal your name,

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Speaker 3: it doesn't reveal much information about you, maybe accept a

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Speaker 3: particular website that you visited. The power of what raizone

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Speaker 3: is doing here with its technology is is taking these

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Speaker 3: individual records and building them up into this huge repository

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Speaker 3: of literally billions or trillions of these records that will

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Speaker 3: be connected to entire countries, and then governments can then

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Speaker 3: use this data in bulk to basically de anonymize it

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Speaker 3: to find out who.

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Speaker 4: These people are.

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Speaker 3: They can essentially reverse engineer the advertising ID and link

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Speaker 3: it to a particular person and see where they've been going,

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Speaker 3: where they live, the people that they are associating with

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Speaker 3: based on the gal location. So that's essentially the power

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Speaker 3: of it is when they take these individual records and

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Speaker 3: build them up, and build them up over months and weeks,

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Speaker 3: you know, and they can see patterns of people's behavior

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Speaker 3: and their activities, and their friends and their relationships, and

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Speaker 3: where they work, where they live, these sorts of details.

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Speaker 1: When we come back, who's paying up for this information?

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Speaker 1: Let's talk a little bit more about this idea of

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Speaker 1: D and nanimizing the data. Is this difficult to do?

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Speaker 1: How much effort does it take to identify individual people

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Speaker 1: from this giant pile of data.

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Speaker 4: Through this reporting.

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Speaker 3: We actually got internal documentation showing how this system works,

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Speaker 3: and Raizon is very clear in the documents that it

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Speaker 3: has produced on this echo technology that they use this

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Speaker 3: advertising data to produce what they call profiles on individual people,

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Speaker 3: showing not just their name, their age, where they live,

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Speaker 3: but also their hobbies, their interests, granular details about a

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Speaker 3: person's character, almost in their personality. The way they're able

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Speaker 3: to do this is because they're collecting so much data

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Speaker 3: that eventually, if you have just one record of you know,

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Speaker 3: I visited this website in this place on this particular day,

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Speaker 3: in this minute, it doesn't mean much. But once you've

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Speaker 3: got that over months weeks. You know, every hour on

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Speaker 3: a particular person, you're able to see, Okay, every night,

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Speaker 3: this person goes back to that building, so that's probably

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Speaker 3: their home. Every day they go to this location, they

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Speaker 3: probably work there, and over time you can see learn

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Speaker 3: a lot about a person and also fusing that advertising

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Speaker 3: information with other sources of data that a government will

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Speaker 3: have access to. It seems, at least from the documents

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Speaker 3: I've seen, fairly trivial for them to then make the

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Speaker 3: leap from this supposedly anonymous data to actually a person's

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Speaker 3: name and who they are and identity.

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Speaker 1: So how does the product work if government uses Echo?

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Speaker 3: What happens usually will be the government or like the

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Speaker 3: law enforcement agency or intelligence agency, We'll go to Raizon

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Speaker 3: and say, look, we want to use your system and

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Speaker 3: we are interested in let's just say again hypothetically France.

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Speaker 3: So what raizone will then do is that they can

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Speaker 3: make a custom installation. They will start harvesting data from

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Speaker 3: the advertising industry through supply side platforms and industry jargon.

396
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Speaker 3: It's basically like an ad exchange that people can purchase

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Speaker 3: data from, and then they will start buying the data

398
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Speaker 3: on France and they will harvest. You know, the government

399
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Speaker 3: says we want data between January and March on the

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Speaker 3: entire nation of France. Raizon can then purchase and harvest

401
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Speaker 3: that data and put it together in the system and

402
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Speaker 3: what the government ultimately gets.

403
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Speaker 4: It's essentially just like.

404
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Speaker 3: A Google like system, you know, where they just go

405
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Speaker 3: in into what's just an interface and they can then

406
00:24:03,040 --> 00:24:07,000
Speaker 3: begin to search for particular locations that they're interested in

407
00:24:07,400 --> 00:24:10,000
Speaker 3: on X date and find out who was at that

408
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Speaker 3: cafe on Tuesday at three pm and narrow it down

409
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Speaker 3: like that and see all of the people who were there,

410
00:24:16,240 --> 00:24:18,520
Speaker 3: and then they can drill it down, Okay, where did

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Speaker 3: this person go after the cafe. That's kind of how

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00:24:21,200 --> 00:24:23,479
Speaker 3: it works, and it will be very depending on what

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Speaker 3: the government's interested in.

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Speaker 1: When you went to Raison and asked them about their

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Speaker 1: business and the Echo product, what did they say?

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Speaker 3: They're on the record response was very brief and to

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Speaker 3: the point, and basically they just said that they sell

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Speaker 3: their technologies to help governments fight crime and terrorism and

419
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Speaker 3: they didn't really want to go beyond that, so they

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Speaker 3: like to stay under the radar this company, that's for sure.

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Speaker 1: You said the price of their product varies depending on

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Speaker 1: what the government wants. How expensive is this.

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Speaker 3: What we were told is that if it was like

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Speaker 3: a major installa like a big you know, they're looking

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00:25:01,920 --> 00:25:04,359
Speaker 3: at maybe a few different countries and a lot of data,

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Speaker 3: it will be up to about ten million dollars. Looking

427
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Speaker 3: at a smaller country, smaller number of people, it will

428
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Speaker 3: be down near like two million, So that the sort

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00:25:12,320 --> 00:25:15,080
Speaker 3: of price band was like two to ten million. Was

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Speaker 3: we were told about regular sales that they're making, and

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Speaker 3: we were told also that it's been quite successful in

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Speaker 3: so far as they have dozens of law enforcement and

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Speaker 3: intelligence agencies. You're buying this across the world, you know,

434
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Speaker 3: and most continents across Europe, North America, Asia, Middle East, Africa,

435
00:25:32,520 --> 00:25:35,920
Speaker 3: I believe also, and they have a few different products

436
00:25:35,960 --> 00:25:37,960
Speaker 3: that they sell, but this is their main product that's

437
00:25:37,960 --> 00:25:41,560
Speaker 3: bringing the most money in for them. Is quite a

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Speaker 3: powerful tool for the budget of a major intelligence agency,

439
00:25:45,440 --> 00:25:46,639
Speaker 3: not a lot of money.

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Speaker 4: And also I think one of.

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00:25:48,960 --> 00:25:52,320
Speaker 3: The appeals of it is that it doesn't involve hacking

442
00:25:52,359 --> 00:25:56,960
Speaker 3: into a person's phone or installing any equipment within a

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00:25:57,000 --> 00:26:00,720
Speaker 3: telecommunication network, so in a way it kind of has

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00:26:00,720 --> 00:26:01,800
Speaker 3: a lower profile.

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00:26:02,119 --> 00:26:04,480
Speaker 4: It's less likely to be detected.

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00:26:04,560 --> 00:26:08,320
Speaker 1: Ryan, is there any regulation against the company like Raizone

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00:26:08,840 --> 00:26:11,760
Speaker 1: selling this kind of data?

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00:26:11,880 --> 00:26:18,360
Speaker 3: The Israeli Export Control system regulates the sale of particular

449
00:26:18,640 --> 00:26:23,840
Speaker 3: surveillance technologies that involve hacking into phones or placing equipment

450
00:26:24,119 --> 00:26:28,280
Speaker 3: within a network. This technology Echo doesn't involve either of

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00:26:28,320 --> 00:26:31,280
Speaker 3: those two things, so therefore it isn't regulated through the

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00:26:31,320 --> 00:26:34,679
Speaker 3: Export control which gives Raizone a lot of latitude to

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00:26:34,800 --> 00:26:38,080
Speaker 3: just sell essentially to however it wants without much oversight.

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00:26:38,520 --> 00:26:41,840
Speaker 3: And also you know within individual countries that we'll be

455
00:26:41,880 --> 00:26:46,240
Speaker 3: purchasing this, there isn't much regulation because this isn't data

456
00:26:46,320 --> 00:26:50,680
Speaker 3: that is being obtained directly from like a telco. It's

457
00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:53,840
Speaker 3: not been like wire tapped or anything like that. So

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00:26:53,880 --> 00:26:56,159
Speaker 3: the agencies that are using it aren't having to go

459
00:26:56,200 --> 00:26:58,440
Speaker 3: and get like a search warrant to obtain it. It's

460
00:26:58,480 --> 00:27:03,120
Speaker 3: commercially purchased data. Certainly, I know, like there are regulators

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00:27:03,119 --> 00:27:05,240
Speaker 3: in Europe and also in the United States. There have

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00:27:05,320 --> 00:27:09,280
Speaker 3: been several US senators who've expressed concerns about this kind

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00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:12,800
Speaker 3: of marketplace for this data. Because of the reasons I've outlined,

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00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:14,960
Speaker 3: it's a very unregulated space.

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00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:22,440
Speaker 1: Raizone is marketing this Echo product to governments and intelligence agencies.

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00:27:22,520 --> 00:27:24,640
Speaker 1: But are any companies using it.

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00:27:25,119 --> 00:27:27,280
Speaker 3: Not as far as I know, And they do say

468
00:27:27,320 --> 00:27:29,920
Speaker 3: that they won't sell it to private companies. They say

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00:27:29,920 --> 00:27:32,719
Speaker 3: that it's only a tool that they will sell to governments.

470
00:27:33,160 --> 00:27:35,720
Speaker 3: You know, we don't really know ultimately how it's being used,

471
00:27:35,720 --> 00:27:38,560
Speaker 3: but it's supposed to be used to fight crime and terrorism.

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Speaker 1: Ryan, thanks so much for coming on the show.

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Speaker 3: My pleasure, Thanks for having me on.

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Speaker 1: Thanks for listening to us here at The Big Take.

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00:27:49,480 --> 00:27:53,560
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00:27:53,600 --> 00:27:56,200
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00:27:56,600 --> 00:28:00,000
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