Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to the Votes and Verdicts podcast, hosted
Speaker 1: by the litigation and Policy team of Bloomberg Intelligence, the
Speaker 1: investment research platform of Bloomberg LP. This podcast series examines
Speaker 1: the intersection of business policy and law.
Speaker 2: I'm Elliott Stein.
Speaker 1: I'm an analyst with Bloomberg Intelligence covering financials litigation.
Speaker 3: And my name is Nathan Dean, and I'm an analyst
Speaker 3: with BI covering financials policy.
Speaker 1: We're delighted today to be joined by Herman Chan, who
Speaker 1: is not just one of the foremost experts on regional banks,
Speaker 1: but also our colleague and friend here at BI. Herman
Speaker 1: has been covering the banking sector, including the regionals, for
Speaker 1: more than fifteen years. He's been on the cell side
Speaker 1: as a research analyst. He's been in investor relations at
Speaker 1: a leading regional bank for the.
Speaker 2: Past four years.
Speaker 1: He's led bi's regional bank coverage as a senior analyst.
Speaker 1: We're really excited to have Herman here today since there
Speaker 1: is really no one better to explain what we've seen
Speaker 1: these last few weeks with Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank,
Speaker 1: and more broadly, the most recent banking crisis. So Herman,
Speaker 1: Welcome to Votes and verdicts.
Speaker 4: Great, Thanks Ellie, I really appreciate it and looking forward
Speaker 4: to the discussion.
Speaker 1: So, you know, we'll jump into some substantive conversation in
Speaker 1: a minute about the banking crisis, but what we like
Speaker 1: to do with guests usually is to get a little
Speaker 1: more background about them first.
Speaker 2: You know, you've been involved with.
Speaker 1: Regional banks for about a decade and a half now,
Speaker 1: both as an analyst and also in investor relations, so
Speaker 1: you know, I thought it'd be good to get your
Speaker 1: take on how you got into research generally, how you
Speaker 1: got into regional banks specifically, and maybe as part of that,
Speaker 1: tell us you know what you like about covering the center.
Speaker 2: Sure that'd be great, Elliott. Yeah, that's right.
Speaker 4: I've been doing banks and regil bank specifically for a
Speaker 4: while now. What really got me interested was I knew
Speaker 4: I wanted to be in equity research. It sort of
Speaker 4: fits my personality and I'm a numbers person by trade,
Speaker 4: so it researching gives an individual really the opportunity to
Speaker 4: better understand the company, become an expert in it, and
Speaker 4: really focus on the performance and the potential performance of
Speaker 4: the bank and the industry as a whole. I started
Speaker 4: out my career in equity research too many years ago
Speaker 4: to remember at this point, but it's been a great journey.
Speaker 4: Covered financial services my entire career, including life insurance, asset managers,
Speaker 4: large cat banks, small cat banks, and really cut my
Speaker 4: teeth during the Great Financial Crisis, which.
Speaker 2: Was really a eye opening and learning.
Speaker 4: Experience and have really shaped the way I think about
Speaker 4: banks and policy in general. And so I've been with
Speaker 4: BI for about four years. As you mentioned before, covering regionals,
Speaker 4: it was really an opportunity because I was covering the
Speaker 4: large cat banks as an associate at a prior institution
Speaker 4: and got the opportunity to cover regionals as a senior
Speaker 4: analyst on the cell side, and my career has really
Speaker 4: taken off ever since then.
Speaker 2: So it's been great.
Speaker 1: I got to imagine these last two maybe three weeks
Speaker 1: have been probably the craziest since the Great Financial Crisis
Speaker 1: for you, yeah, maybe.
Speaker 4: COVID this many crisis of competence I would call it.
Speaker 2: Has been.
Speaker 4: Really interesting these last four years at BI and covering
Speaker 4: the current crisis at Bloomberg has really been interesting.
Speaker 2: Because of the platform.
Speaker 4: That we're on where we are able to connect with
Speaker 4: clients via research but also via media in radio and
Speaker 4: TV as well.
Speaker 2: So I've been really.
Speaker 4: Busy these last few weeks, but it's been really really
Speaker 4: been fun as well.
Speaker 1: So yeah, so let's let's talk about this this most
Speaker 1: recent crisis. You know, I think most people have a
Speaker 1: general understanding of what happened, you know, in terms of
Speaker 1: you know, Silicon Valley Bank in particularly having a very
Speaker 1: non diversified customer base, and then also you know what
Speaker 1: it appears to be mismanagement of their interest rate risks.
Speaker 1: But you know, I'd love to get your explanation and
Speaker 1: you know, like the simplest explanation for what happened, like
Speaker 1: talk to talk to us.
Speaker 2: Like we're five year olds.
Speaker 4: Yeah, there's a lot of different issues that that really
Speaker 4: contributed to the failure of the bank.
Speaker 2: I guess if you really break it down there.
Speaker 4: There's one issue on the on the bank's asset side
Speaker 4: of the balance sheet and one issue on the bank's
Speaker 4: liability side of the balance sheet.
Speaker 2: So on the asset side, uh SVB and said very.
Speaker 4: Heavily in to investment securities, specifically held to maturity securities
Speaker 4: when interest rates were zero, So they built up their
Speaker 4: investment securities portfolio at a very large clip.
Speaker 2: Subsequently, when interest rates rose.
Speaker 4: Those the value of the securities fell and they were
Speaker 4: sitting on a fifteen billion dollar paper loss position in
Speaker 4: their health to maturity portfolio. Secondarily on the deposit side
Speaker 4: the liability side, SBB really was the premier bank that
Speaker 4: catered to the venture capital and startup communities.
Speaker 2: So during the pandemic.
Speaker 4: When reads for zero, startups were raising money left and
Speaker 4: right from venture capital firms, they were doing IPOs and
Speaker 4: garnering really astronomical evaluations. So all that money flowed into
Speaker 4: spb's balance sheet in the form of deposits, and SBB
Speaker 4: wasn't really growing their portfolio as fast as they were
Speaker 4: on the deposit side, so in effect they needed to
Speaker 4: park those funds somewhere else, hence the growth in the
Speaker 4: securities portfolio. Now fast forward to early March, the bank
Speaker 4: was looking to raise capital and sell the AFS portfolio
Speaker 4: at a loss position because these were securities that they
Speaker 4: also bought during the height of the pandemic on rates
Speaker 4: for zero. That maneuvering from a capital standpoint really spooked
Speaker 4: the markets and contributed to the initial share price decline
Speaker 4: because management didn't.
Speaker 2: Do a good job of.
Speaker 4: Articulating to the street and investors their expectations for how
Speaker 4: to manage the securities portfolio, and it really caught investors
Speaker 4: by rise, contributing to the fact that the share price
Speaker 4: decline drove the spotlight to the AFS book with a
Speaker 4: fifteen billion dollar loss position, which in effect, if they
Speaker 4: would have had to realize that would have wiped out
Speaker 4: the book value. So the market was spooked. That in
Speaker 4: turn spooked the depositors. And given the fact that depositors
Speaker 4: now have a very free hand in terms of extricating
Speaker 4: their deposits from from a bank, their phones and other
Speaker 4: electronic avenues, and given the fact that social media is
Speaker 4: a big influence as well, there was a herd mentality
Speaker 4: from its startups and vcs and really contributed to the
Speaker 4: deposit flight. And eventually regulators need to step in and
Speaker 4: close the bank.
Speaker 2: So you know, Herman, I actually you bring up a
Speaker 2: great point here.
Speaker 3: You listen to all the the you know, the the
Speaker 3: reasons why SVB failed and forth like that. You know,
Speaker 3: you and I have had some conversations this week about
Speaker 3: the congressional hearings and one of the big questions we
Speaker 3: hear in Washington is is this a regulatory problem or
Speaker 3: a regulator.
Speaker 2: Problem, you know.
Speaker 3: And so the question I have for you is as
Speaker 3: you dive, as you delved into SVB and the situation
Speaker 3: and so forth like that, you know, are what's your
Speaker 3: initial thoughts on the regulatory response we're regulators able to
Speaker 3: identify these items or where they slow to the game.
Speaker 3: I mean, I just I'm really curious on where do
Speaker 3: you think the response of the FED, in the San
Speaker 3: Francisco FED and the FDIC fall into this.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I think it's a combination of management doing the
Speaker 4: wrong thing in terms of not managing the risk properly,
Speaker 4: especially interest rate risk, which is as as Michael Barr,
Speaker 4: the head of FED Supervision, has discussed earlier this week,
Speaker 4: it's a bread and butter core risks that banks in
Speaker 4: general manage, and it's one of its It's the same
Speaker 4: thing as banks managing credit risk and making sure their
Speaker 4: borrowers pay them back.
Speaker 2: This is a.
Speaker 4: Fundamental way and a fundamental thing that all banks manage
Speaker 4: and look at. And the fact that they blew it
Speaker 4: really speaks to the fact that they were they these
Speaker 4: risks were unappreciated or underappreciated at the bank. I would
Speaker 4: also say that I think their regulators do need to
Speaker 4: take some blame because it's come out that the San
Speaker 4: Francisco FED did raise red flags on the bank as
Speaker 4: early as twenty twenty one, and if they were a
Speaker 4: bit more forceful with their enforcement and their duty as
Speaker 4: and role as regulators, maybe this whole situation wouldn't have unfolded.
Speaker 2: The way it has.
Speaker 3: And correct me if I'm wrong. But you know, SVB
Speaker 3: didn't have a chief risk officer for what nine months?
Speaker 2: Right?
Speaker 4: That's true that that's something that they probably should have
Speaker 4: done and filled that very important role a bit earlier.
Speaker 4: But you have a CFO that been in the business
Speaker 4: for a very long time, you have a treasury function
Speaker 4: that should be managing these risks on a day to
Speaker 4: day basis much more closely, and ultimately you have a
Speaker 4: CEO that should have taken more responsibility on looking into
Speaker 4: these matters.
Speaker 2: So I think there there's really a lot of blame
Speaker 2: to go around. Yeah.
Speaker 3: You know, when a FED Vice chair Bard testified earlier
Speaker 3: this week, he said, and I'm paraphrasing here, that the
Speaker 3: interest rate and risk models at SVB were not grounded
Speaker 3: in reality. You knew the regulators were going to have
Speaker 3: some issues with that, So just turning a little bit
Speaker 3: more towards, you know, the response of the regulators. You know,
Speaker 3: so you know, Silicon Valley Bank was a small bank
Speaker 3: what two years ago, and it's balloomed up, and before
Speaker 3: it's collapsed, it was around two hundred and eleven billion
Speaker 3: in assets, so that would have put it in a
Speaker 3: different category of regulations. But we've seen statements from Congress
Speaker 3: that they want to go back and revisit the CIFY threshold,
Speaker 3: whether it's fifty or two hundred fifty billion, And my
Speaker 3: analysis says that's not even gonna it's not even worth
Speaker 3: really talking about. But the FED and the FDIC in
Speaker 3: the Office of the Comptrore or the Currency have said
Speaker 3: that they have the ability to go back and reapply
Speaker 3: enhance crudential standards to banks above one hundred billion in assets,
Speaker 3: so things like higher capital requirements, tough for liquidity cover
Speaker 3: ratio stress tests. If the FED were to do this,
Speaker 3: what's your outlook on US regional banks. Is this a
Speaker 3: much more stringent environment for them or is this something
Speaker 3: that you think that they can manage in the long run.
Speaker 4: It is something that they will have to manage in
Speaker 4: the wrong run. I'm not sure it really changes the
Speaker 4: trajectory of the bank, and I think these banks probably
Speaker 4: would welcome some of these enhance their regulatory standards given
Speaker 4: the fact that everything that we've been through.
Speaker 2: One thing I would want to would want.
Speaker 4: To ask, is everybody is talking about higher debt increases
Speaker 4: in the capital structure for these banks or making the
Speaker 4: capital ratio is a bit more conservative by taking out
Speaker 4: the unrealized losses and the available for sales securities book.
Speaker 4: But really the issue with SBB was the liquidity and
Speaker 4: the liquidity of the balance sheet and the pace of
Speaker 4: deposits that really left the bank in such a ferocious
Speaker 4: fashion that I don't think anybody would have expected that,
Speaker 4: and I'm not sure if that scenario would have played
Speaker 4: out in any other regional or even larger bank that
Speaker 4: that bank would still survive to this day. So I
Speaker 4: think the crux of the issue is the regulators need
Speaker 4: to focus on the liquidity and maybe change the way
Speaker 4: they look at liquidity based on the amount of uninsured
Speaker 4: deposits meeting chunkier commercial deposits that sit on banks balance
Speaker 4: sheets and really better understand the behavior of those deposits
Speaker 4: when we get the positive flight scenario that felled SVB.
Speaker 3: So I'm going to put you on the spot a
Speaker 3: little bit. So again, we're recording this on March thirtieth,
Speaker 3: and anytime now in the next day or so, we're
Speaker 3: anticipating President Biden is going to put out a executive
Speaker 3: order directing regulators to do tougher regulations. Now, I'm going
Speaker 3: to make you president of the United States, and I'm
Speaker 3: going to limit that, right, Yeah, I'm going to you know, So,
Speaker 3: I'm going to say that you have the ability to
Speaker 3: write this executive order and tell the FED and the
Speaker 3: OCC and the FDIIC what to do.
Speaker 2: What would you want them to do? I would focus
Speaker 2: more on the liquidity side.
Speaker 4: We need to buff up the liquid coverage ratio, I think,
Speaker 4: and maybe have it in place for these banks that
Speaker 4: are fifty or one hundred billion dollars and above, and
Speaker 4: really tweak some of the assumptions within the LCR.
Speaker 2: Right now, one of the.
Speaker 4: Main components of the if we get on the beads weeds,
Speaker 4: one of the main components of the LCR is operational
Speaker 4: deposits versus non operational deposits. We probably need to factor
Speaker 4: in ensured deposits versus uninsured deposits as well, to really
Speaker 4: delineate the fact that these uninsured deposits cannot really be
Speaker 4: counted in times of stress and in times of need.
Speaker 3: So you bring up deposits, and that's a perfect segue
Speaker 3: for my next question. You know, there's currently the cap
Speaker 3: in especially if we have any non US listeners listening
Speaker 3: at the moment, you know, the cap for deposit insurance
Speaker 3: is two hundred and fifty thousand dollars per individual, and
Speaker 3: there's been a lot of talk about floating that up
Speaker 3: to one million or five million, but you know, just
Speaker 3: again in looking at SVB, it wasn't really the I mean,
Speaker 3: there were several firms there that had I think the
Speaker 3: FDIC chairman at one point even said that like something
Speaker 3: like nineteen billion dollars worth of deposits were in the
Speaker 3: top ten accounts.
Speaker 2: You know, is there a.
Speaker 3: Is there a solution that Congress can do, because you know,
Speaker 3: changing FDIC insurance is a is a congressional matter, changing
Speaker 3: the assessment is an FDIC matter, But the actual is
Speaker 3: there a solution that Congress can come up with that
Speaker 3: would actually help a situation like SVB that doesn't just
Speaker 3: also inherently cover all the unsecured deposits across the across
Speaker 3: the country.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's really a good question.
Speaker 4: I think that increasing the insurance limit the threshold maybe
Speaker 4: a way to calm fears.
Speaker 2: But as you mentioned before, these are.
Speaker 4: Very large deposits of multi million dollars deposits in certain accounts,
Speaker 4: and I don't think that increasing it to a million
Speaker 4: dollars really makes a big difference. I think the upshot
Speaker 4: is that banks really need to be more conservative with
Speaker 4: the way they manage the balance sheet, way they manage
Speaker 4: interest rate risks, everything. You don't want to give the
Speaker 4: positors a reason to leave the bank. So all of
Speaker 4: this suggests to us that banks will be much more
Speaker 4: conservative with the way they manage their investment securities portfolio.
Speaker 4: They'll probably hedge their assets both on the loans and
Speaker 4: security sides a bit more to really protect themselves against
Speaker 4: interest rate movements, and increase capital, increase liquidity standards. All
Speaker 4: of those things should create a more conservative bank and
Speaker 4: a more conservative banking system, so the powers would have
Speaker 4: less reason to leave to join a competitor.
Speaker 3: And my last question before I turn it back to Elliott,
Speaker 3: you know the failure of Silicon Valley Bank is going
Speaker 3: to cost the FDIC insurance fund the diff if you will,
Speaker 3: twenty billion, and I saw that signature was around two
Speaker 3: point five billion, and that's got to be made up
Speaker 3: by the banks. So obviously the FDIC said that they're
Speaker 3: going to put out a new assessment for this. You know,
Speaker 3: if the United States were to move forward and change
Speaker 3: deposit insurance, is it the big banks that are going
Speaker 3: to be paying the most for this just because they
Speaker 3: have the higher deposits or can we see this in
Speaker 3: your view across the bloard.
Speaker 4: Yeah, it seems to me based on the commentary from
Speaker 4: the hearings that were in.
Speaker 2: The past a couple of days, is that the.
Speaker 4: Head of the fd I see seemed to suggest that
Speaker 4: that would be a bit more nuanced in terms of
Speaker 4: how they pushed the assessment to the industry. The fact
Speaker 4: that some of these community banks that have no connection
Speaker 4: to SBB or signature and don't operate in the same
Speaker 4: geography as don't operate in the same customer set, could
Speaker 4: be relieved of a higher assessments. So the typical community
Speaker 4: bank is below ten billion in assets, so anything above that,
Speaker 4: probably the rest of the industry collectively would need to
Speaker 4: pay into recall that the diff is already below what
Speaker 4: they want in terms of the coverage. So there was
Speaker 4: already a two basis points increase in the assessment for
Speaker 4: twenty twenty three, and that's only going to go higher
Speaker 4: with a special assessment to really replenish the insurance fund.
Speaker 1: So I have a question maybe for the two of
Speaker 1: you and Hermon, maybe you go first and and you
Speaker 1: chime in, but you know, you were just talking about
Speaker 1: the congressional hearings. I just wanted to get both your
Speaker 1: views on, you know, what you thought of them? Was it?
Speaker 1: You know, it felt like it was more policy actually
Speaker 1: than politics, although there was some politics, as they always is.
Speaker 2: Yeah, a little bit of both.
Speaker 4: We did see some humility from the regulators, specifically a
Speaker 4: Michael Barr, the head of the the FED in terms
Speaker 4: of regulating the banks. He says they're having.
Speaker 2: An assessment in terms of what went wrong, and.
Speaker 4: It seems like there is some blame to the regulators
Speaker 4: and the FED regulators themselves.
Speaker 2: And then policy wise, there was talk about what.
Speaker 4: Comes next in next steps, and the regulators had talked
Speaker 4: about May first with a report that will lay out
Speaker 4: their findings and recommendations. So things seem to be moving
Speaker 4: fairly quickly on that front. So we're really looking forward
Speaker 4: to what the policy makers think about what needs to
Speaker 4: happen next. And maybe Nathan, you can chime in in
Speaker 4: terms of what you expect.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you know, you've seen a million of these, so
Speaker 1: they're very curious to hear your thoughts.
Speaker 3: Yeah, and I watched all five hour or five hours
Speaker 3: and three minutes of the House Financial Services Committee. I
Speaker 3: mean these were working hearings. These were not political hearings.
Speaker 3: I mean, obviously there were you know, like Herman mentioned
Speaker 3: parts of political theater in there, but I think this
Speaker 3: also talks about the strength of the relationship between the
Speaker 3: chairman and ranking member of both the Senate Banking and
Speaker 3: the House Financial Services Committee, because this is a situation
Speaker 3: where it's easy.
Speaker 2: To blame things and there is no one thing.
Speaker 3: You know, you can either blame regulations, you can blame regulators,
Speaker 3: you can BLAMESVB. And with that touch of humility that
Speaker 3: came from the FED and the fdi C and so
Speaker 3: forth like that, there was more of a seriousness to
Speaker 3: this issue. So, you know, I still don't think there's
Speaker 3: going to be a congressional solution to this, because I
Speaker 3: think the FED is going to use its own authority
Speaker 3: to move forward, and I think that may first report
Speaker 3: is going to just show about how the FED is
Speaker 3: going to do it, but certainly a lot less controversy
Speaker 3: in these hearings that I had originally thought there would be.
Speaker 1: What do you think we're going to call this crisis
Speaker 1: like in five years right? I mean the AWAIT crisis
Speaker 1: with all the GFC now the Great Financial Crisis or
Speaker 1: global financial crisis. We had the SNL crisis in the
Speaker 1: early nineties. I guess, what is this the regional bank crisis?
Speaker 2: Herman? Any thoughts?
Speaker 4: Yeah, I think I think regional bank crisis. It's not
Speaker 4: super catchy, but it really gets to the crux of
Speaker 4: the matter than any thoughts.
Speaker 3: You know. I was just thinking, I was trying to
Speaker 3: think of something fun. I saw somebody on Twitter say,
Speaker 3: you know, this was going to be the big hangover weekend,
Speaker 3: you know, just just because it all took place over
Speaker 3: over one weekend. But you know, I think the regional
Speaker 3: bank or you know, maybe the cify something, but it's
Speaker 3: going to be a blurb, you know, I think, is you.
Speaker 2: Know in Herman correct me if you're wrong.
Speaker 3: But it does feel like from the investor community that
Speaker 3: the contagion has been stopped for now, and I certainly
Speaker 3: have seen the White House starting to make statements about
Speaker 3: how they feel like contagent is stopped. So maybe this
Speaker 3: was just a blurb and not something much bigger. I mean,
Speaker 3: especially when it comes to like First Republic.
Speaker 1: I was just gonna ask, you know, you're saying the
Speaker 1: contagion has stopped, but there's new there. You know, there
Speaker 1: have been concerns that there may be like a sort
Speaker 1: of a second wave of bank where I'm sort of
Speaker 1: more slow moving as people moved their money out of
Speaker 1: you know, the Positi accounts that are earning like nothing
Speaker 1: into money market funds or something else.
Speaker 2: Does that wear you at all?
Speaker 4: It worries me more as an earnings issue than a
Speaker 4: solvency issue or an ex extension issue. Banks will manage
Speaker 4: through it. With deposits continuing to decline. We've already seen
Speaker 4: deposits sort of drop last year in twenty twenty two,
Speaker 4: and this is a.
Speaker 2: Continuation of that.
Speaker 4: Given the fact that rates are much higher than they were,
Speaker 4: banks really are counting on some of the inertia from
Speaker 4: there from their depositors, and if the positive flight continues
Speaker 4: into money market funds, really what the banks will need
Speaker 4: to do is increase their deposit costs to entice these
Speaker 4: folks to remain at their banks. So it's and that
Speaker 4: also means that banks will need to increase their their
Speaker 4: lending rates to across their products set mortgages, credit cards,
Speaker 4: commercial loans, commercial real estate loans. So that's going to
Speaker 4: affect the consumer, and that's going to affect businesses. So
Speaker 4: it's it will potentially lead to a slower economic growth scenario,
Speaker 4: which is something that we're really interested in monitoring and
Speaker 4: hearing more about. With earnings for the regionals a couple
Speaker 4: of weeks away, Yeah, that would.
Speaker 1: Definitely be Earning season coming up is going to be
Speaker 1: really interesting. That's just for the regionals, but for so
Speaker 1: many different sectors, I think. All right, So, as we
Speaker 1: always do in our Votes and Verdicts podcast, we'd like
Speaker 1: to end with a couple you know, more fun type questions.
Speaker 1: That's about the substance of what we've been talking about.
Speaker 1: So Herman, you're no different. You get to answer these
Speaker 1: as well. Great, So, okay, if you were expanded on
Speaker 1: a desert island, what three albums or you know, pieces
Speaker 1: of music or bands would you want to have with you.
Speaker 2: Wow, that's interesting.
Speaker 4: I guess if I would pick three, I would try
Speaker 4: to pick from different genres to spice it up, because
Speaker 4: if you're stuck in the desert potentially for a long time,
Speaker 4: you don't want to be listening to the same thing
Speaker 4: all the time. So I guess one would be something
Speaker 4: near and dear to my adolescence, never mind from Nirvana,
Speaker 4: so good.
Speaker 2: Second maybe an R and B type album.
Speaker 4: So mis Education of Lauren Hill is another one that's
Speaker 4: a classic in my view, and I still listen to
Speaker 4: this day and it's still relevant, So that's something. And
Speaker 4: I guess I'm not afraid to admit that I'm a
Speaker 4: bit of a swift feet, so I will say Taylor
Speaker 4: Swift's Red album Taylor's Version would be my third.
Speaker 2: Were you able to get concert tickets under five of that.
Speaker 4: I was hoping to surprise my wife with them, but
Speaker 4: alast no luck.
Speaker 3: Well, Herman, I can offer that Lauren Hill is playing
Speaker 3: at Wolf Trapped in the Washington, DC area this summer,
Speaker 3: so if we can invite you down to Washington to
Speaker 3: work out of the DC Bureau.
Speaker 2: Maybe we can go check that out. Make it happen.
Speaker 3: So just one other fun question from my side is
Speaker 3: if you can invite any three individuals to dinner, you know,
Speaker 3: who would you do it and why would you pick me?
Speaker 1: Wow?
Speaker 2: Well, I've got.
Speaker 4: Nathan, I've got Elliott and my wife.
Speaker 2: So we make it happen.
Speaker 4: We'll make it a bit of a dinner date in
Speaker 4: DC and then we'll go check out Lauren Hill.
Speaker 1: That sounds like a good dinner where we're going to
Speaker 1: go to Botlet All right, I think we'll leave it there.
Speaker 1: Thank you for listening to this most recent episode of
Speaker 1: Boats and Verdicts. We're extremely grateful to Herman for taking
Speaker 1: time out of his day to appear on this episode
Speaker 1: and to really enlighten us with everything that's been going on.
Speaker 1: Thank you to the listener for taking time to listen
Speaker 1: to this as well as a reminder you can read
Speaker 1: all of our Bloomberg intelligence research on the Bloomberg terminal
Speaker 1: at Big And with that, thank you again and have
Speaker 1: a great day.