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Speaker 1: Get in text with technology with tex Stuff from stuff

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Speaker 1: dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tex Stuff. I'm

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Speaker 1: your host, Jonathan Strickland and joining me today over several

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Speaker 1: nodes so I can't actually track her real whereabouts. Shannon Morse, Hi,

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Speaker 1: how are you doing? I'm great, but you're just you're

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Speaker 1: so crazy with the hacks. You're so so good at

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Speaker 1: typing random strings on your keyboard and and always one

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Speaker 1: step ahead of me. Well, you know, if you've ever

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Speaker 1: visited hacker typer dot net, I believe it is you

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Speaker 1: will know exactly how to hack excellent. I'm glad that.

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Speaker 1: I'm glad now because I've been wondering for years. Guys.

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Speaker 1: We've had Shannon on the show a few times, and

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Speaker 1: today it's a real treat, really because we're gonna talk

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Speaker 1: about some examples of hacking in pop culture and some

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Speaker 1: of the ones that are incredibly awful, just terrible inaccurate

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Speaker 1: ways of showing how hacking works, as well as talk

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Speaker 1: about something to get it more right than not right,

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Speaker 1: which is kind of awesome. And I mean the start off,

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Speaker 1: we have to admit the real world of hacking, while

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Speaker 1: the results can be quite dramatic and have a huge effect.

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Speaker 1: The process itself is not always cinematic. Nope, it is not.

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Speaker 1: It's actually pretty boring. There's just a bunch of text

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Speaker 1: on the screen and that's about it, right, Yeah, I

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Speaker 1: mean it's it's it's coding, right, yeah, exactly. There's a

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Speaker 1: lot of coding involved, a lot of Python and BASS

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Speaker 1: scripts and things of that nature, and a lot of

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Speaker 1: terminal work. So you don't see very much gooey or

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Speaker 1: graphical user interface usage whenever you're running some kind of

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Speaker 1: hack implementation. A lot of times it's just terminal, right,

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Speaker 1: And you know, I understand the need to stretch the

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Speaker 1: truth when you're trying to create a really thrilling movie

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Speaker 1: or TV show and you want to have something interesting

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Speaker 1: to look at, having your characters look at lines of

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Speaker 1: code and going through a process of trying to uh

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Speaker 1: to to create some sort of exploit for a vulnerability

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Speaker 1: that doesn't really hold a lot of people like on

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Speaker 1: the edge of their seat. So I get it, but

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Speaker 1: it is kind of a problem. And I should also

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Speaker 1: mention we're using the word hacker today a lot. But

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Speaker 1: of course, as I try to mention every time I

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Speaker 1: talk about hacking, hacking is a very broad term, and

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Speaker 1: it doesn't necessarily mean that you are doing anything illegal,

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Speaker 1: and it certainly doesn't even mean that you're necessarily working

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Speaker 1: on a computer. You could be doing some hardware hacks

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Speaker 1: that aren't related to software. Uh, that's important to remember.

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Speaker 1: But but as far as Hollywood has can certain there's

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Speaker 1: really only one kind of hacking, and that involves trying

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Speaker 1: to break into a place that you're not supposed to

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Speaker 1: be in. Of course, because those are the most interesting people,

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Speaker 1: they're the scary ones, and people are afraid of what

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Speaker 1: they don't understand, right, And I imagine that a lot

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Speaker 1: of screenwriters are particularly scared of hackers because it's one

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Speaker 1: it's clear that they have no understanding whatsoever about it.

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Speaker 1: And two, I mean we've seen, especially recently, we've seen

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Speaker 1: some very big stories about uh, the entertainment industry running

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Speaker 1: running away from hackers attacking. And whether it's a hacker

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Speaker 1: who's actually gaining access to a system, or it was

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Speaker 1: someone who was on the inside who just managed to

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Speaker 1: exploit their access in the first place, which I would

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Speaker 1: argue really isn't a hack, it's just kind of industrial

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Speaker 1: sabotage at that point. But the Sony story would be

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Speaker 1: the big example, right. Yeah, the Sony story, I think

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Speaker 1: put a lot of fear in the entertainment industry. And

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Speaker 1: I feel like the entertainment industry as a whole, with

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Speaker 1: very few exceptions, are one of the genres that is

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Speaker 1: the farthest behind when it comes to their own security

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Speaker 1: and privacy. Uh, They're they're the farthest behind when it

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Speaker 1: comes to a lot of things, including how they treat

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Speaker 1: their women. But I think that it's something that they

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Speaker 1: really need to start focusing on and start understanding, not

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Speaker 1: only for their own security, like with for their employees,

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Speaker 1: for the actors and actresses that work there for these

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Speaker 1: different companies, but also because they need to understand how

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Speaker 1: to actually portray it so that more people understand it

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Speaker 1: as a whole and aren't so afraid. Right, And so

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Speaker 1: we're going to dive into a discussion of some of

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Speaker 1: the more entertaining and often wildly inaccurate versions of hacking

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Speaker 1: in film and TV. I should also give a shout out.

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Speaker 1: A lot of people on my Twitter feed suggested that

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Speaker 1: I check out a subreddit. The subreddit is it's a

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Speaker 1: Unix system, which is a reference to Jurassic Park. Uh,

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Speaker 1: if you remember the young lady runs up to a computer,

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Speaker 1: she takes one look at it. She says, it's a

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Speaker 1: unique system. I know this, And then she's immediately looking

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Speaker 1: at a graphic user interface and identifying one block out

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Speaker 1: of like fifty blocks that are on the screen and

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Speaker 1: immediately makes the conclusion that all the files for the

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Speaker 1: entire island are accessible from that one terminal. I don't

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Speaker 1: know how she knows that. Um, that's amazing. It's amazing

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Speaker 1: that you can you you automatically know that everything available

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Speaker 1: on the island is on that one drive. Somehow, I

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Speaker 1: feel like the only way you would know that it

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Speaker 1: is if you were the information security professional that is

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Speaker 1: working for that company. Was not, you know, she she didn't,

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Speaker 1: just something like she was a little too young to

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Speaker 1: be in a full time employee at that point. So

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Speaker 1: Jurassic Park, while it lends the the the quote it's

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Speaker 1: a unique system to the sub credit, I didn't really

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Speaker 1: included on this list. There is one other incredibly famous

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Speaker 1: example that I've talked about on a previous episode Tech Stuff,

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Speaker 1: that we will hit. But first I'm gonna talk about

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Speaker 1: a movie. I haven't actually seen this movie, but I

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Speaker 1: have seen the sequences that involve hacking. That movie is

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Speaker 1: the Core And in the first sequence I wanted to

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Speaker 1: talk about, there's a character whose handle is RAT, which

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Speaker 1: could be you know, like remote access trojan or remote

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Speaker 1: access terminal, depending upon what acronym you want to look at.

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Speaker 1: Often one that is associated with hacking, and RAT is

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Speaker 1: caught by the FBI. The sequence in which he's caught,

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Speaker 1: he's trying desperately to erase all traces of his activities.

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Speaker 1: He's got tons and tons of computers, and he's using

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Speaker 1: massive magnets to try and wipe drives, and he's throwing

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Speaker 1: CD ROM disks into a microwave and turn to get

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Speaker 1: on high you know, the typical stuff we do when

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Speaker 1: the Feds come knocking. Uh. But but my favorite bit

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Speaker 1: about this little sequence is he then has taken to

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Speaker 1: an interrogation and as he's being interrogated, he just casually

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Speaker 1: reaches over and grabs a guy's cell phone out of

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Speaker 1: his little holster or his pocket or whatever. But the

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Speaker 1: guy's it's just a cell phone. What can he do

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Speaker 1: with that? Well, Shannon, you know what people can do

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Speaker 1: with so I mean, if you have physical access to

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Speaker 1: a cell phone, it's game over. But but but what

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Speaker 1: what this guy does. He doesn't do something to get

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Speaker 1: hold of the guy's contacts. He doesn't. And this is

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Speaker 1: also pre smartphone. It's really a cell phone. He doesn't

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Speaker 1: do anything like that. What he does is he takes

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Speaker 1: a little um, a little chewing gum rapper, He dials

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Speaker 1: a couple of numbers on the phone, and then he

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Speaker 1: uses the chewing gum rapper to make a weird little whistling,

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Speaker 1: humming noise, and then casually this is the phone, tosses

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Speaker 1: it back to the guy and says that phone's got

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Speaker 1: free long distance on it forever. I love to real life,

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Speaker 1: that's exactly how it works. Yeah, totally. So I'm pretty

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Speaker 1: sure that this is kind of a comparison to what

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Speaker 1: people would actually do, which was called phone freaking. And

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Speaker 1: this was like before hacking became a really big popular

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Speaker 1: norm that you would see in like online media that

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Speaker 1: you see in this day. So back in the day,

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Speaker 1: this guy named Captain Crunch he got his online screen

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Speaker 1: name from opening up a Captain Crunch cereal box and

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Speaker 1: getting out a little I believe it was a kazoo

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Speaker 1: or something similar to that, and he was able to

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Speaker 1: recreate or reproduce the kind of tone that you could

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Speaker 1: put into a pay phone to allow you to make

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Speaker 1: free long distance calls. So they're using that real life

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Speaker 1: scenario to their advantage in this this movie the Core

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Speaker 1: and making it seem like you can do the same

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Speaker 1: thing with a gum wrapper. Now, personally, I don't believe

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Speaker 1: that you can do the same thing with a gum wrapper.

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Speaker 1: That seems a little bit odd. I know that you

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Speaker 1: can make noises with things like that. You can also

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Speaker 1: do the same thing with a piece of grass if

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Speaker 1: you want to. Yeah, you can. You can entertain yourself

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Speaker 1: in like a third grade kind of way for hours

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Speaker 1: at a time. But yeah, phone freaking really worked on landlines.

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Speaker 1: They worked when the phone system wasn't fully digital yet.

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Speaker 1: It was a much different system. I mean there and

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Speaker 1: there's some very famous people who got their start as

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Speaker 1: phone freaks. I mean, Steve Wozniak was in that world.

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Speaker 1: The great was was one of the freakers of back

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Speaker 1: in the seventies and uh, but it was it was

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Speaker 1: sort of the same thing that you would talk about

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Speaker 1: hackers today. They weren't necessarily trying to gain the system.

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Speaker 1: They were trying to figure out, how does this work, right,

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Speaker 1: They were just messing with things. They were trying to

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Speaker 1: reverse engineer them and figure out how they work and

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Speaker 1: put them back together and let them let these different

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Speaker 1: pieces of technology do things that they weren't necessarily supposed

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Speaker 1: to do. And that's what I love so much about hacking.

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Speaker 1: But then you bring it to Hollywood and they're like, oh,

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Speaker 1: these are scary people. They're all going to end up

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Speaker 1: in the FBI's hands. And that's not necessarily true, right,

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Speaker 1: And and to to take something that worked on landlines

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Speaker 1: on a pay phone basis using a whistle that had

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Speaker 1: I think he even modified it slightly so it would

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Speaker 1: make exactly the tone he needed to replicate the tones

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Speaker 1: that the phone company was using in order to allow

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Speaker 1: for this kind of thing to happen. Yeah, it would

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Speaker 1: never work on the cell phone range at all. So

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Speaker 1: and and also just just what a weird line like

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Speaker 1: this phone's got free long distance on it forever, and

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Speaker 1: you think there's gotta be multiple ways a phone company

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Speaker 1: would say, Hey, something weird is going on with this

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Speaker 1: one line. But but the Core, the Core also has

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Speaker 1: another great scene in it with that same hacker, same

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Speaker 1: guy rat Uh And when I see him I always think, uh,

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Speaker 1: he's he's the he's a character who also or he's

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Speaker 1: an actor who also shows up as a character on

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Speaker 1: the show UM Supernatural as a weird, reedy looking uh

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Speaker 1: demon killer guy that you would just expect to get

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Speaker 1: completely obliterated the first time he shows up, but he

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Speaker 1: turns out to be more capable than you would consider

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Speaker 1: based upon his appearance. Anyway, he walks into a cyber cafe.

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Speaker 1: He's got a CD rom Uh, I think it even

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Speaker 1: says Kung Fu on it, if I'm not mistaken, and

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Speaker 1: he puts it, puts it into a cyber cafe computer,

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Speaker 1: and after like leaning back and putting his hand up

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Speaker 1: to his face for about five seconds, it ends up

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Speaker 1: completely taking over not just his computer, but the entire

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Speaker 1: local network, and all of the screens in the cyber

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Speaker 1: cafe pop up with this image of his rat network

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Speaker 1: where he has taken over all the computers. I don't

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Speaker 1: even know exactly why he's trying to take over all

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Speaker 1: the computers, apart from just seeing lots and lots of uh,

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Speaker 1: what appears to be news footage which spoiler alert, there's

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Speaker 1: a thing we can use to get that news footage.

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Speaker 1: It's called a TV. You can use that without having

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Speaker 1: to hack any systems. But uh, it's it's just a

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Speaker 1: weird little moment where he's taken over all the computers

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Speaker 1: in the cyber cafe. Now, let's let's go ahead and

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Speaker 1: make some things clear, Shannon. I know that you've addressed

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Speaker 1: this on on multiple episodes and and other ways of

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Speaker 1: reaching out to your audience. There are certain things you

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Speaker 1: should be concerned about when you go and log into

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Speaker 1: any kind of local area network, UM, any kind of

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Speaker 1: open WiFi. If you're going to a coffee shop and

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Speaker 1: you're using that kind of WiFi, you need to be

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Speaker 1: more um aware of potential security problems. Yes, absolutely, it's

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Speaker 1: it's very easy if you're on your local coffee shops

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Speaker 1: network or your locals hotels network for anybody to snoop

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Speaker 1: on what you're doing. Uh, you may be using HTTPS,

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Speaker 1: but that's not going to keep somebody for understanding what

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Speaker 1: sites you are visiting. But even though that data may

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Speaker 1: be encrypted, however, they're still collecting that encrypted information. And

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Speaker 1: it really just depends on how a website that you're

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Speaker 1: visiting is encrypting that information, whether or not they would

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Speaker 1: be able to decrypt it. After a specific amount of time.

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Speaker 1: So I always tell people if they're going to use

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Speaker 1: a you know, hotel WiFi or a coffee shop WiFi,

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Speaker 1: to use a VPN, use some way to tunnel your

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Speaker 1: traffic from point A to point B so that nobody

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Speaker 1: else on that network will be able to see what

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Speaker 1: you're doing. They may see that your dogged on, they

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Speaker 1: may see your IP address, but they won't know exactly

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Speaker 1: what's going on with your traffic while you're connected. So,

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Speaker 1: and I'm pretty sure that everybody who generally uses these

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Speaker 1: WiFi networks that are available for free aren't necessarily using VPNs,

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Speaker 1: But it's it's a huge security risk for pretty much

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Speaker 1: every consumer out there that's using these WiFi networks, right

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Speaker 1: and whereas in the core, you know we were talking,

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Speaker 1: it's it's really hardwired computers that are part of the

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Speaker 1: cyber cafe. You just sit down at a terminal and

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Speaker 1: log in so that you have access to everything on

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Speaker 1: that machine. That's scary too. I mean it's it's kind

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Speaker 1: of like using a computer at the library. You want

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Speaker 1: to be very careful about the kinds of activities you

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Speaker 1: do on that machine, um, because it's not really yours

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Speaker 1: and you don't really you know, and you don't want

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Speaker 1: to go so far to cover your tracks that you're

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Speaker 1: actually causing problems for the real purpose of that machine. Uh.

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Speaker 1: It's still not quite sure what he was trying to do.

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Speaker 1: It was like he was setting up his own a

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Speaker 1: botan net. Also, if you are sitting of a buttonet,

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Speaker 1: probably a bad idea to have a graphic pop up

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Speaker 1: on everyone's screen saying, hey, your computer's mind now. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So it's in today's age, it is very popular for

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Speaker 1: people to use ransomware, which will basically announce it's it's

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Speaker 1: availability on your computer. Yeah, it'll announce its presence on

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Speaker 1: your machine to let the user know, Hey, I've just

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Speaker 1: encrypted all the information, all the photos, all the documents

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Speaker 1: that is on your computer. Now you have to pay

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Speaker 1: me like one bitcoin to get your data back. And

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Speaker 1: then you pay that bitcoin and you may or may

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Speaker 1: not get your data back. So, you know, ransomware it's

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Speaker 1: a big thing. But in the case of this one,

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Speaker 1: in the case of rat yes, you can install like

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Speaker 1: malware or something like that on a c D. That's

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Speaker 1: entirely possible. You can put pretty much anything on a CD. Uh,

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Speaker 1: And then it looks like he's he's running this CD

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Speaker 1: through the entire network, which you can install malware through

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Speaker 1: pivot and a networks open ports or open eyedps so

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Speaker 1: that you can put the same hour on several different computers.

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Speaker 1: But it's it's never a good idea to let everybody

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Speaker 1: know what the heck you're doing, if you're doing something

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Speaker 1: that you shouldn't necessarily be doing in the first place. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean again, it's it's there for dramatic effect. But

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Speaker 1: if you're the one person in the cyber cafe who

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Speaker 1: isn't visibly freaking out when all the computers switch over,

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Speaker 1: here's a here's a little hint, they're going to figure

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Speaker 1: out it was you, right, I mean that, that's kind

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Speaker 1: of like, if you're the one guy not surprised that

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Speaker 1: everything's on fire, you probably set the fire. I'm just saying.

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Speaker 1: Our next example comes from one of my favorite movies

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Speaker 1: of all time. Oh my gosh, me too. I love

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Speaker 1: this movie. Yes, Oh, it's so great. It's so cheesy

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Speaker 1: and wonderful. The Net Also is a is a movie

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Speaker 1: in which a character actually has her identity stolen, and

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Speaker 1: very prescient for its time. It's not like it got

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Speaker 1: everything wrong. Some of the stuff and actually predicted quite well.

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Speaker 1: For example, best prediction of any movie ever it predicted

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Speaker 1: being able to order pizza online. This was before the

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Speaker 1: dot com bubble even began. This The movie came out

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Speaker 1: in the mid nineties, so this was actually pretty advanced.

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Speaker 1: They they the people behind the film, said, we wanted

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Speaker 1: to be able to let our character make an activity

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Speaker 1: online that would stress how she was uh distancing herself

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Speaker 1: from other people. She was trying her best to limit

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Speaker 1: the amount of interaction she had with other human beings.

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Speaker 1: It stresses her loneliness, also her paranoia, uh to some extent,

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Speaker 1: and and it was a neat way of doing it,

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Speaker 1: and it also ended up being accurate. However, that being said,

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Speaker 1: there's a bit in the very beginning. It's right when

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Speaker 1: she's going to order pizza. When she's on the phone

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Speaker 1: with a client she does essentially text support and really

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Speaker 1: helps people who have been attacked by a virus recover

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Speaker 1: their systems. Uh. And it takes her like no time

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Speaker 1: at all to identify what the virus is on this

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Speaker 1: customer's computer, which which she does not have access to.

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Speaker 1: She's she's she's accessing it remotely. She identifies the virus,

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Speaker 1: She sequesters the virus, she removes the virus, plus apparently

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Speaker 1: does repairs to the system, so it goes so it

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Speaker 1: starts working again, and that takes her less time than

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Speaker 1: it would take for her to order the pizza. That's incredible.

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Speaker 1: I mean, she should Every security firm should hire her.

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Speaker 1: She's a genius apparently. So so I like making the

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Speaker 1: comparison between Sandra Bullock's character in the Net to an

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Speaker 1: actual penetration tester that we have in the two thousands

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Speaker 1: or in the tens, in the twenty tens. Penetration testers

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Speaker 1: go through contracts. They go through a company. They're usually

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Speaker 1: hired on by a large firm to go through their

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Speaker 1: security and make sure everything's okay. They have to write reports,

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Speaker 1: everything has to go through a financial financialist before they're

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Speaker 1: actually paid for any of their work. They don't actually

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Speaker 1: discuss how much they're getting paid with the client. They

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Speaker 1: discuss how much they're getting paid with the company that

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Speaker 1: they are salaried through. So in the case of Sandra

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Speaker 1: Bullocks character here she's talking about you know, oh yeah,

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Speaker 1: he's like, yeah, I'm gonna you know, pay X amount

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Speaker 1: of money, and he's like, I don't care how much

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Speaker 1: it costs. It's worth it. And that's not necessarily something

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Speaker 1: that you would talk to the penetration tester about, because

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Speaker 1: when you do, they're going to make their they're going

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Speaker 1: to make their time with you as a client much

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Speaker 1: longer to make it seem like a much more important case. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so if you if you do, uh, you know, it's

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Speaker 1: kind of like what Scotty would say is that he'd

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Speaker 1: say he'd figure out how long it was going to

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Speaker 1: take him to do a task, and then he would

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Speaker 1: then he would give the captain a time that was

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Speaker 1: longer than what it would take him to do. In

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Speaker 1: that case, it wasn't so that he could get over time.

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Speaker 1: It was so that he could impress the captain by

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Speaker 1: finishing early. Right. It was like, I told you it

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Speaker 1: was gonna take me three days, but I really put

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Speaker 1: my nose to the grindstone and got it done in

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Speaker 1: a day and a half and the captain's impressed, like, Wow,

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Speaker 1: you're amazing. In this case, it would be yeah, that's

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Speaker 1: probably gonna take me. You know, I don't know a

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Speaker 1: week's worth of work and you're done in you know,

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Speaker 1: five hours, then you're just billing the time, right, So,

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Speaker 1: so during this conversation that these too have, it sounds

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Speaker 1: like she's a like she's a red teamer, Like she's

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Speaker 1: a penetration tester that works for a big security firm,

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Speaker 1: and she's she's talking to her client though. Uh, but

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Speaker 1: but her actions make me think that she's a freelancer.

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Speaker 1: So I'm not sure what's going on here. I think

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Speaker 1: that the that it was produced a little bit confusingly. Um,

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Speaker 1: but now that I understand how penetration testing works, even

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Speaker 1: though I am not one myself, I was quite confused

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Speaker 1: by this scene. Yeah, I I I think it was.

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Speaker 1: Out of all the errors that we're talking about today,

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Speaker 1: it's one of the less egregious because, again, unless you

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Speaker 1: were to show like that time had obviously passed a

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Speaker 1: significant amount so that she had had time to really

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Speaker 1: identify what was happening and then respond to it. Uh,

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Speaker 1: it's not that big a deal compared to some of

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Speaker 1: the other versions that we've got in this episode. So

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Speaker 1: I'm I'm gonna I'm gonna give this one a pass.

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Speaker 1: It's not as bad as it could have been. It's

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Speaker 1: certainly not as bad as the next one. Oh my gosh,

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Speaker 1: can you just talk about n C I S. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: let's talk about n C I S for a bit, because, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know n C I S. First of all, it

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Speaker 1: has one of the most infamous awful hacking scenes in Hollywood,

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Speaker 1: and so much so that that there are multiple versions

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Speaker 1: of the clip we're gonna talk about on YouTube, my

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Speaker 1: favorite titled to Idiots One Keyboard. But yeah, let's talk

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Speaker 1: about n C I S for a second here. So

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Speaker 1: we've got we've got a character in n C I

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Speaker 1: S who is sort of she's the the young hip

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Speaker 1: hacker character who uh is the one responding in this

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Speaker 1: particular scene to an attack that's coming in that attack

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Speaker 1: is being represented by lots and lots of pop ups

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Speaker 1: of just strings of characters meaninglessly appearing all over her

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Speaker 1: her computer monitor, and her response is that each one

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Speaker 1: of these is absolutely meaningful, and she knows exactly what's happening,

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Speaker 1: that the hacker is attacking their systems and trying to

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Speaker 1: get at very uh very secure data and is quickly

390
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Speaker 1: winnowing through all the different security and so she's just

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Speaker 1: furiously typing on her keyboard in response, and her co

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Speaker 1: worker who's standing next to her and asking her questions

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Speaker 1: and giving her suggestions that don't necessarily mean very much,

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Speaker 1: ends up deciding to help her out by simultaneously typing

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Speaker 1: on the same keyboard. Chese typing on So you have

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Speaker 1: four hands typing on the same keyboard at the same time.

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Speaker 1: Dear Hollywood, that is not how keyboards work. A computer

398
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Speaker 1: can't tell which person is typing which thing. It would

399
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Speaker 1: just come out as a super garbled mess. Not to

400
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Speaker 1: mention the frustration, like have you ever had somebody come

401
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Speaker 1: up and just like start pressing keys on your keyboard,

402
00:23:33,080 --> 00:23:36,400
Speaker 1: because it's very irritating. It is. There's no way that

403
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Speaker 1: these two characters would be able to type on the

404
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Speaker 1: same keyboard at the same time. That's ridiculous. It feels

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Speaker 1: like a violation when someone does that to me, Like

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Speaker 1: like if they if they're like move, even if it

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Speaker 1: if it, if it's preceded by move, I'll show you.

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Speaker 1: I'm like, no, no, you'll tell me and then I'll

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Speaker 1: do it. This is my computer and I don't let

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Speaker 1: you touch it. Yeah. This was one of those sequences

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Speaker 1: where really the whole purpose of the scene was to

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Speaker 1: show how a non tech savvy, pragmatic guy has a

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Speaker 1: solution to a problem that the two tech wizards completely overlook.

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Speaker 1: So in a way, it's it's about taking down the

415
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Speaker 1: tech wizard folks a peg or two because they're not

416
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Speaker 1: thinking practically, they're too filled with panic. So you've got

417
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Speaker 1: these two characters who are responding in real time to

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Speaker 1: a security threat as if they're doing battle with the hacker.

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Speaker 1: And this is a common thread in a lot of

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Speaker 1: television and movies. It's not terribly accurate in the real

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Speaker 1: world scenarios, but they are. They're acting like the keystrokes

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Speaker 1: they're doing are going to end up either booting the

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Speaker 1: hacker out or securing some of the data away from

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00:24:48,280 --> 00:24:52,080
Speaker 1: the hacker, and they're just furiously typing when the pragmatic

425
00:24:52,119 --> 00:24:56,520
Speaker 1: guy walks behind the computer system and unplugs it, thus

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Speaker 1: saving them from the hack because now there's no connection

427
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Speaker 1: and for the hacker to exploit. Except what he did

428
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Speaker 1: was actually make it worse because now they don't have

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Speaker 1: a computer that they can work through to hopefully, uh

430
00:25:11,000 --> 00:25:14,160
Speaker 1: find the hack, find the open port that this guy

431
00:25:14,280 --> 00:25:17,400
Speaker 1: is coming through, this attacker and close it off. So

432
00:25:18,720 --> 00:25:22,360
Speaker 1: he's unplugging a computer as opposed to going to the

433
00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:25,520
Speaker 1: server and cutting that off and turning off the server.

434
00:25:25,680 --> 00:25:29,040
Speaker 1: He's just unplugging one of the open PCs, right, and

435
00:25:29,080 --> 00:25:32,720
Speaker 1: that just drives me nuts. This and Okay, I wanted

436
00:25:32,760 --> 00:25:34,639
Speaker 1: to throw things at my TV when I was watching

437
00:25:34,640 --> 00:25:36,520
Speaker 1: this scene because I was like, this is so bad.

438
00:25:36,760 --> 00:25:40,560
Speaker 1: It's so bad. Yeah, this one, this one's probably out

439
00:25:40,600 --> 00:25:42,480
Speaker 1: of all the ones that we have, this was probably

440
00:25:43,440 --> 00:25:47,119
Speaker 1: maybe not the worst, but it's way up there, and

441
00:25:47,160 --> 00:25:50,359
Speaker 1: it's it's it's clearly played for laughs, at least a

442
00:25:50,400 --> 00:25:54,040
Speaker 1: little bit for laughs. Maybe not like outright belly laughs,

443
00:25:54,080 --> 00:25:56,560
Speaker 1: like you know, anyone who knows what a computer is

444
00:25:56,960 --> 00:26:01,280
Speaker 1: is probably chuckling, but it's obviously played for this little

445
00:26:01,359 --> 00:26:05,200
Speaker 1: moment where the pragmatic character can kind of be a

446
00:26:05,240 --> 00:26:09,119
Speaker 1: smug jerk face like huh see I thought of it first,

447
00:26:09,160 --> 00:26:11,640
Speaker 1: and the other two characters like why didn't we think

448
00:26:11,680 --> 00:26:15,159
Speaker 1: of that? And as as Shannon points out, because it

449
00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:21,480
Speaker 1: doesn't solve the problem, No, it does not. Yeah. I

450
00:26:21,480 --> 00:26:24,280
Speaker 1: I highly recommend if anyone is unfamiliar with this, go

451
00:26:24,440 --> 00:26:26,520
Speaker 1: look for in C. I s who it hits one

452
00:26:26,600 --> 00:26:29,440
Speaker 1: keyboard and watched this scene and really appreciate it. I

453
00:26:29,480 --> 00:26:31,920
Speaker 1: also liked when I was reading comments about this one

454
00:26:31,960 --> 00:26:35,199
Speaker 1: of the comments I read in that subreddit was. The

455
00:26:35,280 --> 00:26:38,159
Speaker 1: part of the scene that completely pulls me out of

456
00:26:38,160 --> 00:26:39,800
Speaker 1: it is the fact that when the guy takes a

457
00:26:39,840 --> 00:26:42,719
Speaker 1: bite of a sandwich, it's such a tiny little bite.

458
00:26:43,400 --> 00:26:45,960
Speaker 1: It lost it lost all credibility with me. There No

459
00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:48,840
Speaker 1: one needs a sandwich like that. Oh that's so funny.

460
00:26:49,520 --> 00:26:53,919
Speaker 1: Creditors are great. Um. Now. Next on our list is Swordfish,

461
00:26:53,920 --> 00:26:57,639
Speaker 1: which actually has quite a few awful, awful hacking scenes,

462
00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:02,680
Speaker 1: some of which involved material not appropriate for this podcast,

463
00:27:02,920 --> 00:27:07,080
Speaker 1: and so I did not include those scenes when I wrote.

464
00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:09,960
Speaker 1: There's one in particular where a guy is being tested

465
00:27:10,480 --> 00:27:13,960
Speaker 1: to see if his hacking skills are leite enough to join.

466
00:27:16,240 --> 00:27:20,160
Speaker 1: It is awful. It is terrible in so many ways.

467
00:27:20,200 --> 00:27:22,160
Speaker 1: But that one was so bad that I was like, no,

468
00:27:22,280 --> 00:27:25,200
Speaker 1: I can't, that's not going on the list. So instead

469
00:27:25,240 --> 00:27:27,920
Speaker 1: I looked at a different one. And Hugh Jackman's playing

470
00:27:27,920 --> 00:27:32,080
Speaker 1: the hacker and he's trying to get access to a system,

471
00:27:32,119 --> 00:27:34,240
Speaker 1: and the way that they decided to depict this was

472
00:27:34,320 --> 00:27:38,280
Speaker 1: they show a little cube on the screen and he's

473
00:27:38,320 --> 00:27:41,240
Speaker 1: building onto this cube with other cubes to make what

474
00:27:41,359 --> 00:27:46,120
Speaker 1: looks like essentially a Rubik's Cube sized digital construct. It's

475
00:27:46,119 --> 00:27:50,199
Speaker 1: all virtual. There's no actual physical cubes, and this is

476
00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:55,280
Speaker 1: what represents getting access to a system somehow building a

477
00:27:55,400 --> 00:28:00,000
Speaker 1: three dimensional virtual object out of smaller three dimensional virtual objects. Now, Shannon,

478
00:28:01,440 --> 00:28:05,080
Speaker 1: is that in fact, how that that looks like when

479
00:28:05,160 --> 00:28:09,720
Speaker 1: you're trying to access a system you are confronted with

480
00:28:09,720 --> 00:28:12,960
Speaker 1: a Rubik's cube that you have to construct virtually. Yeah,

481
00:28:13,000 --> 00:28:17,399
Speaker 1: so I'm gonna say, uh no, So for me, this

482
00:28:17,480 --> 00:28:21,679
Speaker 1: looks like they are trying to show their viewers a

483
00:28:21,760 --> 00:28:26,280
Speaker 1: graphical compilation of what coding would look like once you

484
00:28:26,359 --> 00:28:29,199
Speaker 1: finally finally compile your code and you get the a

485
00:28:29,320 --> 00:28:31,879
Speaker 1: okay that everything is okay and there are no errors.

486
00:28:32,200 --> 00:28:34,800
Speaker 1: So that's what it looks like to me. Um, if

487
00:28:34,840 --> 00:28:36,960
Speaker 1: you see actual code, if you see somebody building a

488
00:28:37,040 --> 00:28:39,920
Speaker 1: virus or building a worm, or like in this case,

489
00:28:40,200 --> 00:28:44,360
Speaker 1: Hugh Jackman's character is building worm, you'll see lines and

490
00:28:44,480 --> 00:28:46,960
Speaker 1: line hundreds of lines of code, and then at the

491
00:28:47,080 --> 00:28:50,160
Speaker 1: end they'll probably choose like go into the gooey and

492
00:28:50,200 --> 00:28:53,800
Speaker 1: choose to compile code, and then the interface that they're

493
00:28:53,840 --> 00:28:55,680
Speaker 1: using will give them the okay and tell them that

494
00:28:55,720 --> 00:28:58,280
Speaker 1: there are no errors. But in this case, he's building

495
00:28:58,320 --> 00:29:01,840
Speaker 1: a Rubik's cube on is computer and it looks nothing

496
00:29:01,880 --> 00:29:06,400
Speaker 1: like what actual compilation looks like. Yeah, yeah, compiling code

497
00:29:06,480 --> 00:29:09,720
Speaker 1: is uh. So to give to give you guys a

498
00:29:09,760 --> 00:29:12,960
Speaker 1: little bit of an insight into how computers quote unquote think.

499
00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:18,240
Speaker 1: We use computer languages in order to construct programs, and

500
00:29:18,280 --> 00:29:20,160
Speaker 1: the computer languages are written in such a way that

501
00:29:20,160 --> 00:29:23,840
Speaker 1: a computer understands what operation it needs to perform in

502
00:29:23,960 --> 00:29:27,640
Speaker 1: order to progress through the program. Ultimately, that stuff gets

503
00:29:27,880 --> 00:29:31,600
Speaker 1: compiled and you have like high level computer languages and

504
00:29:31,640 --> 00:29:34,960
Speaker 1: low level computer languages, uh and then you eventually get

505
00:29:35,000 --> 00:29:37,120
Speaker 1: down to the point where you get to machine code,

506
00:29:37,120 --> 00:29:40,520
Speaker 1: and that's where you're getting into the binary codes zeros

507
00:29:40,520 --> 00:29:45,520
Speaker 1: and ones, where most humans, the vast majority of humans,

508
00:29:45,560 --> 00:29:49,480
Speaker 1: nearly all humans, are not capable of reading that, at

509
00:29:49,560 --> 00:29:52,560
Speaker 1: least at least not with a whole lot of time

510
00:29:52,600 --> 00:29:56,240
Speaker 1: on their hands. So that's why we have these programming

511
00:29:56,280 --> 00:29:59,080
Speaker 1: languages to kind of bridge the gap between the language

512
00:29:59,080 --> 00:30:02,240
Speaker 1: that computers eek and the languages that we speak. So,

513
00:30:02,920 --> 00:30:06,520
Speaker 1: if you're completely unfamiliar with coding languages or programming languages

514
00:30:06,760 --> 00:30:09,680
Speaker 1: and you take a look at it, it looks like nonsense, right,

515
00:30:09,840 --> 00:30:14,600
Speaker 1: and it for someone who is completely unschooled, it looks

516
00:30:14,640 --> 00:30:16,920
Speaker 1: like you would have to be a genius in order

517
00:30:16,960 --> 00:30:19,760
Speaker 1: to use it. But in fact, it follows very specific rules.

518
00:30:19,760 --> 00:30:22,240
Speaker 1: So once you learn those rules, you know, it does

519
00:30:22,280 --> 00:30:24,400
Speaker 1: take there is a learning curve, but you do get

520
00:30:24,440 --> 00:30:26,520
Speaker 1: to a point where you start feeling a little confident

521
00:30:26,560 --> 00:30:29,920
Speaker 1: with that stuff exactly. And there's plenty of programmers that

522
00:30:30,000 --> 00:30:34,280
Speaker 1: I know who never learn every single rule in a

523
00:30:34,320 --> 00:30:38,160
Speaker 1: specific language that they know, but they they have books

524
00:30:38,160 --> 00:30:41,280
Speaker 1: and books, they have you know, definitions and posters and

525
00:30:41,280 --> 00:30:43,760
Speaker 1: things of this nature so that they always have a reminder,

526
00:30:43,840 --> 00:30:46,600
Speaker 1: so they're able to write different kinds of programs. But

527
00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:49,960
Speaker 1: as long as you know a few general rules for

528
00:30:50,040 --> 00:30:52,640
Speaker 1: any language that you're working with, you can write a program.

529
00:30:52,680 --> 00:30:57,640
Speaker 1: It's it's very hard, it is very complicated, but it's possible. Yeah. Yeah.

530
00:30:57,960 --> 00:31:03,040
Speaker 1: So it's not like you're building a cube, unless, of course,

531
00:31:03,360 --> 00:31:08,640
Speaker 1: your program, once executed, is a cube building program, in

532
00:31:08,680 --> 00:31:10,800
Speaker 1: which case, if it looks like you're building a cube,

533
00:31:10,840 --> 00:31:15,400
Speaker 1: congratulations you coded it correctly, um. But other otherwise that's

534
00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:17,760
Speaker 1: not gonna happen. Our next one is one of my

535
00:31:17,920 --> 00:31:20,640
Speaker 1: favorite examples of bad hacking because it takes me back

536
00:31:20,640 --> 00:31:22,840
Speaker 1: to my childhood. I had a discussion with some of

537
00:31:22,840 --> 00:31:27,080
Speaker 1: my my co workers here about this particular movie, and

538
00:31:27,200 --> 00:31:30,040
Speaker 1: some of them couldn't remember ever seeing it. Some of

539
00:31:30,080 --> 00:31:32,440
Speaker 1: them remembered seeing it as a kid on video. I

540
00:31:32,480 --> 00:31:37,080
Speaker 1: remember seeing this in the theater because I'm old. Superman three.

541
00:31:37,760 --> 00:31:41,000
Speaker 1: So in Superman three, you've got uh character played by

542
00:31:41,040 --> 00:31:44,400
Speaker 1: Richard Pryor who is a computer programmer, and he goes

543
00:31:44,520 --> 00:31:47,600
Speaker 1: to work for a company and he's a he's a

544
00:31:47,680 --> 00:31:50,440
Speaker 1: data entry guy. For some reason, the data entry folks

545
00:31:50,480 --> 00:31:52,960
Speaker 1: at this company all have to wear like slippers and stuff.

546
00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:55,640
Speaker 1: It's almost like it's a clean room, like kind of

547
00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:58,920
Speaker 1: a clean room, but not really a clean room. And

548
00:31:59,360 --> 00:32:03,120
Speaker 1: he finds out that everyone in the company is paid

549
00:32:03,880 --> 00:32:07,280
Speaker 1: their Their payment involves fractions of assent that end up

550
00:32:07,280 --> 00:32:09,880
Speaker 1: getting rounded down. So if this sounds like office space,

551
00:32:10,280 --> 00:32:13,720
Speaker 1: it's very much the same sort of blood. He figures out, Hey,

552
00:32:13,720 --> 00:32:16,120
Speaker 1: what if I took all the fractions of assent that

553
00:32:16,240 --> 00:32:20,200
Speaker 1: otherwise go unaccounted. They're just floating around out there, and

554
00:32:20,240 --> 00:32:23,600
Speaker 1: I pay myself all those fractions of assent so that

555
00:32:23,720 --> 00:32:27,320
Speaker 1: I make a real huge amount of money, because once

556
00:32:27,360 --> 00:32:31,480
Speaker 1: you accumulate all of them, it actually amounts to something's significant.

557
00:32:31,880 --> 00:32:36,360
Speaker 1: But because each individual little appearance of it. It's tiny,

558
00:32:36,640 --> 00:32:38,720
Speaker 1: no one takes notice of it. Right Like if I

559
00:32:38,720 --> 00:32:42,360
Speaker 1: if I took a halfpenny, no one is going to care.

560
00:32:42,920 --> 00:32:47,280
Speaker 1: If I take a billion halfpennies, suddenly it matters. But

561
00:32:48,320 --> 00:32:52,000
Speaker 1: he does this by staying late one day and turning

562
00:32:52,000 --> 00:32:55,880
Speaker 1: on his computer and he does type some stuff with

563
00:32:56,000 --> 00:33:00,760
Speaker 1: one hand on a little bitty keyboard that uh, then

564
00:33:00,800 --> 00:33:04,840
Speaker 1: I'll makes texts start to disappear and appear like one

565
00:33:04,920 --> 00:33:06,960
Speaker 1: letter at a time, to a point where it's a

566
00:33:07,080 --> 00:33:11,000
Speaker 1: very common thing in Hollywood, right that the display has

567
00:33:11,080 --> 00:33:16,000
Speaker 1: some sort of weird effect to it that indicates that, yes,

568
00:33:16,120 --> 00:33:19,280
Speaker 1: something is happening, like a hacker is attacking or the

569
00:33:19,320 --> 00:33:24,160
Speaker 1: system is being compromised. Um. Once he does that, he

570
00:33:24,240 --> 00:33:28,120
Speaker 1: types in a command that essentially just says, hey, pay

571
00:33:28,120 --> 00:33:31,360
Speaker 1: all the fractions of a cent to me, and it's

572
00:33:31,400 --> 00:33:35,200
Speaker 1: written out in more or less natural language, and then

573
00:33:35,200 --> 00:33:38,760
Speaker 1: he hits enter and it works. A lot of problems

574
00:33:38,840 --> 00:33:42,360
Speaker 1: with this, the big one being natural language. Like we

575
00:33:42,480 --> 00:33:45,240
Speaker 1: just said just a second ago, computers do not understand

576
00:33:45,240 --> 00:33:49,280
Speaker 1: the languages that we communicate with to each other, not

577
00:33:49,280 --> 00:33:51,680
Speaker 1: not on their own. They have to be taught how

578
00:33:51,720 --> 00:33:56,080
Speaker 1: to do that. They're not. They don't automatically speak English. Yeah,

579
00:33:56,160 --> 00:33:59,440
Speaker 1: if you ever open up a command line on any

580
00:33:59,560 --> 00:34:03,120
Speaker 1: kind of computer, doesn't matter what operating system pick one,

581
00:34:03,360 --> 00:34:06,040
Speaker 1: whether it's Linux or DOS or whatever. You get to

582
00:34:06,040 --> 00:34:08,640
Speaker 1: that command line and you try and type in full

583
00:34:08,719 --> 00:34:11,320
Speaker 1: English sentences to see if you can make your computer

584
00:34:11,400 --> 00:34:15,760
Speaker 1: to do stuff, You're gonna be sorely disappointed. It doesn't

585
00:34:15,800 --> 00:34:20,640
Speaker 1: work that way. It's not like a search bar with Google.

586
00:34:21,400 --> 00:34:24,759
Speaker 1: I mean, the Web has really spoiled us, and that

587
00:34:24,880 --> 00:34:28,040
Speaker 1: anyone who has not had experience with computers before the

588
00:34:28,040 --> 00:34:32,080
Speaker 1: Web was a thing doesn't really understand that when you

589
00:34:32,120 --> 00:34:34,720
Speaker 1: get to the command line, it's not like a search

590
00:34:34,800 --> 00:34:39,920
Speaker 1: field like you're not You're not Gooey has spoiled us. Yes, yeah,

591
00:34:39,960 --> 00:34:44,400
Speaker 1: I um side note again, I'm old enough where Doss

592
00:34:44,719 --> 00:34:49,000
Speaker 1: was the way to interface with a computer when I

593
00:34:49,080 --> 00:34:52,240
Speaker 1: was a kid, or Apple Basic, but I was mostly

594
00:34:52,320 --> 00:34:55,680
Speaker 1: using Doss at that point. And then uh, you had

595
00:34:55,719 --> 00:34:59,320
Speaker 1: the Mac come out in four they took the gooey.

596
00:34:59,360 --> 00:35:02,120
Speaker 1: They didn't gate the gooey, the graphic user interface. They

597
00:35:02,160 --> 00:35:05,359
Speaker 1: actually kind of took that from Xerox Park. Xerox Park

598
00:35:05,400 --> 00:35:09,560
Speaker 1: really kind of pioneered that. Then Microsoft came out with

599
00:35:09,600 --> 00:35:16,040
Speaker 1: Windows and I resisted switching to Windows for a very

600
00:35:16,040 --> 00:35:19,279
Speaker 1: long time, and eventually broke down to get Windows when

601
00:35:19,440 --> 00:35:22,840
Speaker 1: it became clear that all the software coming out only

602
00:35:22,880 --> 00:35:25,920
Speaker 1: would be supported through Windows and not through DOSS. And

603
00:35:26,920 --> 00:35:31,160
Speaker 1: to this day, I'm bitter about that because I taught

604
00:35:31,280 --> 00:35:35,920
Speaker 1: myself all the Tree commands. Darn it. I grew up

605
00:35:35,920 --> 00:35:37,640
Speaker 1: with Windows since I was a kid, so it was

606
00:35:37,719 --> 00:35:40,839
Speaker 1: always I started in the gooey graphical user in a phase.

607
00:35:40,880 --> 00:35:44,360
Speaker 1: I didn't start with commands. But this is where Shannon

608
00:35:44,400 --> 00:35:46,920
Speaker 1: makes me feel old. Yeah, I was born in the eighties,

609
00:35:46,920 --> 00:35:49,640
Speaker 1: so I think that's the difference. That's that's that's fair.

610
00:35:49,840 --> 00:35:54,360
Speaker 1: That's fair. Go ahead. I I love you too, Shannon.

611
00:35:54,480 --> 00:35:57,839
Speaker 1: It's fine. Every every every co host I have makes

612
00:35:57,840 --> 00:36:01,000
Speaker 1: me feel old because I'm older than everyone but one

613
00:36:01,120 --> 00:36:08,280
Speaker 1: podcaster at this company. So continue. So I actually liked

614
00:36:08,520 --> 00:36:13,080
Speaker 1: this Superman three scene because back in the day before

615
00:36:13,120 --> 00:36:18,240
Speaker 1: I was born, Uh, it was very popular among um

616
00:36:18,440 --> 00:36:21,520
Speaker 1: people all over the place, no matter what company you

617
00:36:21,560 --> 00:36:24,120
Speaker 1: were working with, to deal with fractions of a penny,

618
00:36:24,160 --> 00:36:28,879
Speaker 1: because even a penny as a change in pricing would

619
00:36:28,920 --> 00:36:32,160
Speaker 1: be a lot of money. So people would be like, Okay,

620
00:36:32,239 --> 00:36:34,640
Speaker 1: well it's a penny and a half, and I believe

621
00:36:34,680 --> 00:36:38,920
Speaker 1: at one point there was even a half cent coin

622
00:36:39,120 --> 00:36:42,560
Speaker 1: that was distributed in the United States. So this was

623
00:36:42,600 --> 00:36:44,600
Speaker 1: a thing. You can still see it in this day

624
00:36:44,600 --> 00:36:47,120
Speaker 1: and age at gas stations. Whenever you go to a

625
00:36:47,160 --> 00:36:49,000
Speaker 1: gas station, you see on the sign it says like

626
00:36:49,080 --> 00:36:52,440
Speaker 1: gases to and nine tenths of a of a penny.

627
00:36:52,480 --> 00:36:56,359
Speaker 1: That's that's a that's from back in the day. One

628
00:36:56,440 --> 00:37:01,440
Speaker 1: day would use these exact precise measurements for gasoline distribution

629
00:37:01,600 --> 00:37:06,160
Speaker 1: at gas stations. So so that really is a thing. Um.

630
00:37:06,200 --> 00:37:11,600
Speaker 1: But the whole hacking scenario of this scene is very false.

631
00:37:12,360 --> 00:37:17,319
Speaker 1: You you can't do a specific distribution of money in

632
00:37:17,360 --> 00:37:20,279
Speaker 1: that nature, and anybody who has access to that kind

633
00:37:20,280 --> 00:37:23,640
Speaker 1: of information who is working for a company should not

634
00:37:24,200 --> 00:37:27,000
Speaker 1: have that access in the first pace, especially if they're

635
00:37:27,040 --> 00:37:30,120
Speaker 1: they're getting paid and they're not like a a chief

636
00:37:30,719 --> 00:37:35,640
Speaker 1: operating manager of that company. Right. Yeah, it's the the

637
00:37:35,800 --> 00:37:40,040
Speaker 1: idea that you would have these dumb terminals, like I

638
00:37:40,040 --> 00:37:42,399
Speaker 1: am assuming they were dumb terminals. I'm assuming they were

639
00:37:42,400 --> 00:37:47,000
Speaker 1: all connected to a main system as opposed to each

640
00:37:47,000 --> 00:37:50,360
Speaker 1: being individual computers. But either in either case you would

641
00:37:50,400 --> 00:37:53,560
Speaker 1: have limitations on what any of those terminals could access,

642
00:37:54,320 --> 00:37:58,640
Speaker 1: but because of his leap programming skills, he's able to

643
00:37:59,360 --> 00:38:02,759
Speaker 1: bypass that and get access to the main frame. I'm

644
00:38:02,800 --> 00:38:05,760
Speaker 1: pretty sure they use it as a main frame. Mainframe,

645
00:38:05,800 --> 00:38:08,840
Speaker 1: by the way, is also a great general term that

646
00:38:08,880 --> 00:38:14,960
Speaker 1: Hollywood has misused throughout all the computer films. But uh,

647
00:38:15,360 --> 00:38:17,279
Speaker 1: it's one of those things that's never explained how he

648
00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:19,080
Speaker 1: does it. It's just a it's just a thing that

649
00:38:19,160 --> 00:38:21,880
Speaker 1: happens in the movie. Uh, doesn't you know. They're not

650
00:38:21,960 --> 00:38:24,239
Speaker 1: drawing attention to it. It's not an important thing other

651
00:38:24,280 --> 00:38:28,520
Speaker 1: than the fact to illustrate that one. He is smart too.

652
00:38:29,280 --> 00:38:32,480
Speaker 1: He doesn't see anything ethically wrong with bending the rules

653
00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:36,560
Speaker 1: because in his mind, these fractions of assent, they're not

654
00:38:36,600 --> 00:38:40,040
Speaker 1: doing anything right. They're not they're not in an account,

655
00:38:40,360 --> 00:38:43,520
Speaker 1: they're not being used by the company. They're just they're

656
00:38:43,520 --> 00:38:47,319
Speaker 1: just kind of loose somehow. They're they're they're in the

657
00:38:47,320 --> 00:38:50,560
Speaker 1: company's ownership, but no one's doing anything with it. So therefore,

658
00:38:50,880 --> 00:38:52,640
Speaker 1: if no one's doing anything with it, no one's gonna

659
00:38:52,680 --> 00:38:54,759
Speaker 1: miss them when they're gone. So that's kind of how

660
00:38:54,760 --> 00:38:58,560
Speaker 1: he justifies it, and eventually he becomes one of the

661
00:38:59,360 --> 00:39:01,719
Speaker 1: he's more of a reluctant villain in the movie. But

662
00:39:01,760 --> 00:39:05,120
Speaker 1: he's one of the villains in Superman three. That's a

663
00:39:05,440 --> 00:39:08,960
Speaker 1: if you have not seen Superman three, good job. Continue

664
00:39:09,000 --> 00:39:12,480
Speaker 1: on that track. Don't feel tempted to change that. It

665
00:39:12,600 --> 00:39:16,279
Speaker 1: is not a good movie. It's better than Superman four,

666
00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:20,960
Speaker 1: although my coworker Joe would probably trounce me for saying so, uh,

667
00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:24,960
Speaker 1: super Superman four is awful. Um the next movie. The

668
00:39:25,080 --> 00:39:27,400
Speaker 1: next example we have is Numbers, which I love just

669
00:39:27,440 --> 00:39:32,640
Speaker 1: because of the way it mischaracterizes I r C. Which is,

670
00:39:32,920 --> 00:39:34,719
Speaker 1: there's a scene in which people are trying to figure

671
00:39:34,760 --> 00:39:37,160
Speaker 1: out what these what these hackers, these two different hackers

672
00:39:37,160 --> 00:39:39,799
Speaker 1: are trying to do, and they don't know, and they

673
00:39:39,800 --> 00:39:42,040
Speaker 1: aren't sure how they're going to track down the hackers

674
00:39:42,320 --> 00:39:45,000
Speaker 1: and learn what they're trying to do. But then one

675
00:39:45,000 --> 00:39:47,400
Speaker 1: of the characters says, oh, we gotta go on I

676
00:39:47,600 --> 00:39:51,000
Speaker 1: r C because that's where all the hackers go to chat.

677
00:39:51,440 --> 00:39:54,000
Speaker 1: And they use handles. You know, they don't use the

678
00:39:54,080 --> 00:39:56,960
Speaker 1: real name they use. They use handles on I r C.

679
00:39:57,400 --> 00:39:59,439
Speaker 1: And that way they can secretly chat to each other.

680
00:40:00,040 --> 00:40:04,360
Speaker 1: And then they use this weird meaningless analogy talking about

681
00:40:04,880 --> 00:40:08,160
Speaker 1: two ships that are sailing across the ocean, and they

682
00:40:08,239 --> 00:40:10,560
Speaker 1: meet in the middle of the ocean and they exchange

683
00:40:10,560 --> 00:40:14,280
Speaker 1: illegal goods and then they sail away, and because the

684
00:40:14,320 --> 00:40:17,160
Speaker 1: wake of a ship fades so quickly, they leave no

685
00:40:17,320 --> 00:40:19,920
Speaker 1: trace behind. That's the same thing as I r C.

686
00:40:21,040 --> 00:40:24,320
Speaker 1: They actually do this whole sequence where that that ship

687
00:40:24,360 --> 00:40:30,040
Speaker 1: analogy I just talked about is visualized on screen, because folks,

688
00:40:30,080 --> 00:40:32,640
Speaker 1: I r C is boring, Like showing I r C

689
00:40:33,120 --> 00:40:36,800
Speaker 1: on screen is incredibly dull, So it's way more exciting

690
00:40:36,880 --> 00:40:41,520
Speaker 1: to have a visualization of a meaningless ship analogy. Yeah,

691
00:40:41,560 --> 00:40:45,839
Speaker 1: IRC is super boring to look at, but it's very fun.

692
00:40:45,880 --> 00:40:47,480
Speaker 1: You can make lots of friends in I r C,

693
00:40:47,960 --> 00:40:51,160
Speaker 1: so it's it is called Internet relay chat, so that

694
00:40:51,280 --> 00:40:54,160
Speaker 1: is a sure thing. People do use LEAs fat Lee

695
00:40:54,239 --> 00:40:57,120
Speaker 1: speak in I r C, even though leap speak is

696
00:40:57,200 --> 00:41:01,479
Speaker 1: not that hard to read and her Phinian going into

697
00:41:01,520 --> 00:41:04,680
Speaker 1: the ships made absolutely no sense to me as an

698
00:41:04,719 --> 00:41:08,640
Speaker 1: IRC user, because when I pop into I r C

699
00:41:09,480 --> 00:41:12,280
Speaker 1: and then when I leave, my chats are still there,

700
00:41:12,680 --> 00:41:14,879
Speaker 1: and they are still there for anybody to see who

701
00:41:14,920 --> 00:41:18,320
Speaker 1: was also logged in at the same time. So saying

702
00:41:18,360 --> 00:41:21,040
Speaker 1: that they disappear after x amount of time is not

703
00:41:21,120 --> 00:41:24,840
Speaker 1: necessarily true, because anybody with a very very simple script

704
00:41:25,280 --> 00:41:27,960
Speaker 1: can capture everything that was said in an I R

705
00:41:28,040 --> 00:41:30,120
Speaker 1: C for X amount of time, for whatever time that

706
00:41:30,520 --> 00:41:33,160
Speaker 1: they want to save a file four, and then they

707
00:41:33,160 --> 00:41:36,000
Speaker 1: can upload that file anywhere that they want to. So

708
00:41:36,320 --> 00:41:39,920
Speaker 1: that this information disappears is completely false. I love that

709
00:41:39,960 --> 00:41:42,200
Speaker 1: there's a I'm pretty sure it's the same one. I'm

710
00:41:42,239 --> 00:41:44,400
Speaker 1: not watching the clips as I'm going through them, so

711
00:41:44,440 --> 00:41:46,640
Speaker 1: I'm not entirely certain, but I think there's a moment

712
00:41:46,680 --> 00:41:50,279
Speaker 1: in this where they have a desperate like take a screenshot,

713
00:41:50,400 --> 00:41:53,319
Speaker 1: take a screen shot, and she does it like at

714
00:41:53,320 --> 00:41:55,799
Speaker 1: the last second before the connection is broken. And I

715
00:41:55,880 --> 00:42:00,640
Speaker 1: was laughing so hard that the idea of oh, yeah,

716
00:42:00,640 --> 00:42:03,759
Speaker 1: you gotta take a screen shutter it's gone forever. Um, Yeah,

717
00:42:04,320 --> 00:42:07,160
Speaker 1: it's it's pretty ridiculous. And and there is a funny

718
00:42:07,200 --> 00:42:10,319
Speaker 1: little exchange where where the lady says like they'll be

719
00:42:10,360 --> 00:42:13,879
Speaker 1: speaking in lete, but don't worry, I also speak let

720
00:42:14,920 --> 00:42:21,160
Speaker 1: like like, oh, screenwriter, you're so adorable son. Yeah. Le

721
00:42:21,160 --> 00:42:23,399
Speaker 1: it's easy to speak, so anybody can do it. Yeah,

722
00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:26,680
Speaker 1: I mean it's it's really it's really just replacing certain

723
00:42:26,800 --> 00:42:29,879
Speaker 1: characters with other characters. That look similar to the ones

724
00:42:29,920 --> 00:42:34,160
Speaker 1: you were replacing, and then sometimes purposefully misspelling words because

725
00:42:34,239 --> 00:42:37,120
Speaker 1: someone some at some point misspelled things people thought was

726
00:42:37,160 --> 00:42:40,040
Speaker 1: funny and they went with it, like pone pone is

727
00:42:40,080 --> 00:42:43,280
Speaker 1: a great example. P w N. It's supposed to be owned,

728
00:42:43,320 --> 00:42:46,200
Speaker 1: but someone just in a typo and then that typo

729
00:42:46,239 --> 00:42:55,040
Speaker 1: became the word yep. That's the lovely thing about it, guys.

730
00:42:55,160 --> 00:42:57,879
Speaker 1: Shannon and I had so much to say about how

731
00:42:57,960 --> 00:43:01,399
Speaker 1: Hollywood portrays hackers that we went on for quite some time.

732
00:43:01,840 --> 00:43:04,360
Speaker 1: So we're gonna divide up the episodes and we're gonna

733
00:43:04,440 --> 00:43:07,759
Speaker 1: end part one here. The whole thing has already been recorded,

734
00:43:07,920 --> 00:43:10,680
Speaker 1: but next week you'll get part two where we talk

735
00:43:10,880 --> 00:43:14,080
Speaker 1: more about some of the bad examples of hacking in

736
00:43:14,120 --> 00:43:16,360
Speaker 1: Hollywood as well as some of the good ones. So

737
00:43:16,440 --> 00:43:18,560
Speaker 1: make sure you tune in and check that out. Also,

738
00:43:18,840 --> 00:43:21,480
Speaker 1: if you want to follow Shannon on Twitter, her handle

739
00:43:21,560 --> 00:43:25,560
Speaker 1: is at snubs that's s n U b s. And

740
00:43:25,600 --> 00:43:28,880
Speaker 1: if you want to find her other work, it's amazing stuff,

741
00:43:29,160 --> 00:43:32,200
Speaker 1: you can just go to hack five dot org. That's

742
00:43:32,680 --> 00:43:37,839
Speaker 1: h a K the number five dot org. And I'll

743
00:43:37,880 --> 00:43:45,920
Speaker 1: talk to you guys again really soon for more on

744
00:43:45,960 --> 00:43:48,719
Speaker 1: this and thousands of other topics. Is how stuff works.

745
00:43:48,719 --> 00:44:05,320
Speaker 1: Dot com