WEBVTT - Tech News: Hackers, National Security and You 0:00:04.440 --> 0:00:12.360 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 0:00:12.400 --> 0:00:16.079 and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 0:00:16.120 --> 0:00:19.200 I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio. And how the tech 0:00:19.239 --> 0:00:22.160 are you. It's time for the tech news for Thursday 0:00:22.160 --> 0:00:25.919 October nineteenth, twenty twenty three, and we're going to start 0:00:25.960 --> 0:00:30.080 off with some tech in national security concerns here in 0:00:30.080 --> 0:00:34.600 the United States. So this week the Five Eyes Alliance 0:00:34.720 --> 0:00:38.960 met at Stanford University to discuss matters of tech and security. 0:00:39.840 --> 0:00:41.920 And you know, the Five Eyes Alliance sounds like something 0:00:41.960 --> 0:00:44.800 out of you know, a Sherlock Holmes novel or maybe 0:00:44.960 --> 0:00:48.040 Game of Thrones or something, but in fact, it's a 0:00:48.120 --> 0:00:51.800 group that consists of representatives from the United States, the 0:00:51.880 --> 0:00:57.320 United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. And they discussed 0:00:57.320 --> 0:01:00.600 current and future threats to safety and innovation, and the 0:01:00.680 --> 0:01:04.840 general consensus was that China is the largest threat in 0:01:04.880 --> 0:01:09.399 that regard. The group cited instances of Chinese hackers infiltrating 0:01:09.400 --> 0:01:15.200 computer systems, as well as of actual spies conducting industrial espionage, 0:01:15.280 --> 0:01:19.039 and of various attempts to compromise business insiders, all in 0:01:19.080 --> 0:01:22.920 an effort to steal intellectual property and tech secrets. Much 0:01:23.000 --> 0:01:25.319 was made of the fact that China has an enormous 0:01:25.360 --> 0:01:29.720 program centered on state backed hacking projects, a program that's 0:01:29.880 --> 0:01:34.720 larger than all other nations combined in fact, and that 0:01:34.920 --> 0:01:38.600 China has directed operatives to focus on emerging technologies, including 0:01:38.600 --> 0:01:44.120 stuff like quantum computing and artificial intelligence. The representatives also 0:01:44.200 --> 0:01:47.240 warned that the emergence of generative AI could help hackers 0:01:47.280 --> 0:01:51.840 create more efficient attacks, making their efforts even more effective. 0:01:52.360 --> 0:01:55.440 The meeting concluded with representatives warning the audience that this 0:01:55.600 --> 0:01:58.040 is something all governments and businesses will need to be 0:01:58.080 --> 0:02:00.400 aware of or else they will run the risk of 0:02:00.440 --> 0:02:04.600 being caught unawares. Sounds like a real fun group. On 0:02:04.640 --> 0:02:08.280 a related note, the US government has updated its export 0:02:08.400 --> 0:02:11.920 rules and added restrictions on the types of processors that 0:02:12.040 --> 0:02:15.680 companies are allowed to ship to China. As it stands, 0:02:16.080 --> 0:02:20.040 big companies like AMD, Nvidia, and Intel are not allowed 0:02:20.080 --> 0:02:24.120 to ship their high end processors to China unless they 0:02:24.160 --> 0:02:28.079 first secure an export license from the US Department of Commerce. 0:02:28.600 --> 0:02:33.560 That actually includes Nvidia's g Force RTX forty ninety graphics cards, 0:02:34.000 --> 0:02:36.600 and I think most people would associate that with high 0:02:36.720 --> 0:02:40.840 end computer gaming. But as we've seen, powerful GPUs could 0:02:40.840 --> 0:02:43.880 be put to work doing all sorts of processing besides, 0:02:44.120 --> 0:02:47.480 you know, making puddles of water all reflective in sessions 0:02:47.480 --> 0:02:51.000 of call of duty or whatever. Further, the rules mean 0:02:51.080 --> 0:02:53.880 that companies will not be able to rely on Chinese 0:02:53.880 --> 0:02:57.760 manufacturing to make these products. And since a lot of 0:02:57.840 --> 0:03:02.119 chip manufacturing, or the very least chip assembly, will take 0:03:02.160 --> 0:03:04.880 place in China, that's going to push these companies to 0:03:04.960 --> 0:03:08.920 pivot to find alternatives that in turn is likely to 0:03:08.960 --> 0:03:11.440 impact the cost of production. And I think we all 0:03:11.480 --> 0:03:15.519 know that that's probably going to mean for us down 0:03:15.520 --> 0:03:17.720 the road that we're going to be paying higher prices 0:03:17.720 --> 0:03:20.840 for these chips for ourselves in the products that we 0:03:20.840 --> 0:03:25.639 were purchasing. China is not the only country that's on 0:03:25.720 --> 0:03:28.960 the US's list of no nos when it comes to exports. 0:03:29.520 --> 0:03:33.680 There's also the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Saudi Arabia. 0:03:33.840 --> 0:03:37.040 All will require that companies first secure and export license 0:03:37.080 --> 0:03:40.160 with the US Department of Commerce before they can legally 0:03:40.240 --> 0:03:45.839 send those high performing chips to those destinations. A couple 0:03:45.920 --> 0:03:48.960 of weeks ago, a hacker leaked stolen information from the 0:03:49.040 --> 0:03:52.480 genetic testing company twenty three and meters, So according to 0:03:52.520 --> 0:03:55.400 the company, the suspicion is the hacker used a technique 0:03:55.480 --> 0:03:59.920 called credential stuffing, So that's when a hacker is able 0:03:59.960 --> 0:04:03.600 to pull data from other breaches and then uses that 0:04:03.680 --> 0:04:06.920 data to try and match user names and emails and 0:04:06.960 --> 0:04:12.000 stolen passwords for other services and try combinations of them 0:04:12.120 --> 0:04:14.920 so they can see if someone's used the same password 0:04:14.960 --> 0:04:19.280 at multiple locations, which is why you should not do that. 0:04:19.720 --> 0:04:22.080 Do not use the same password or even just a 0:04:22.120 --> 0:04:25.839 small group of passwords for all of your services. You 0:04:25.880 --> 0:04:29.840 should have a unique password for every single service, because 0:04:29.920 --> 0:04:32.760 it's bad enough. If one of your accounts gets hacked, 0:04:32.920 --> 0:04:36.000 that's terrible. It is a horrible hassle and it can 0:04:36.040 --> 0:04:38.920 really have a negative impact on you and your livelihood. 0:04:39.800 --> 0:04:42.320 But it can turn into a total disaster if it 0:04:42.360 --> 0:04:44.920 turns out the now the people who did that attack 0:04:45.000 --> 0:04:47.520 have the keys to all your stuff because you use 0:04:47.560 --> 0:04:52.039 the same log in and password for everything. Well, now 0:04:52.080 --> 0:04:55.000 that some hacker has done this again and the new 0:04:55.120 --> 0:04:58.200 leak includes millions of data points about twenty three and 0:04:58.279 --> 0:05:02.599 Me's customers, it's big news. The information covers around four 0:05:02.760 --> 0:05:06.080 million people, and the hacker posted the information on a 0:05:06.120 --> 0:05:09.800 forum known as a Hive of Scum and Villainy a 0:05:09.920 --> 0:05:14.200 hacker forum, and it has the imposing name Beach Forums. 0:05:14.760 --> 0:05:18.279 Trust me, it's scarier than it sounds anyway. The hacker 0:05:18.279 --> 0:05:21.120 claims that the records include information on people from very 0:05:21.120 --> 0:05:24.480 wealthy backgrounds. Twenty three and Me has informed users that 0:05:24.520 --> 0:05:27.560 they should both update their passwords and also enable multi 0:05:27.560 --> 0:05:31.320 factor authentication. According to tech Crunch, twenty three and meter 0:05:31.560 --> 0:05:36.080 quote blamed the incident on its customers for reusing passwords 0:05:36.680 --> 0:05:40.520 and an opt in feature called DNA relatives, which allows 0:05:40.600 --> 0:05:43.640 users to see the data of other opted end users 0:05:43.960 --> 0:05:47.400 whose genetic data matches theirs. End quote. So, in other words, 0:05:47.920 --> 0:05:50.600 twenty three and Me is saying you should stop reusing 0:05:50.600 --> 0:05:53.960 your passwords so much, you're the reason why this attack worked. 0:05:54.000 --> 0:05:56.080 But they're also like, oh, and also, we have this 0:05:56.200 --> 0:05:59.520 option in our service that if you turn it on, 0:06:00.160 --> 0:06:03.640 means that hackers could potentially use your account to scrape 0:06:03.760 --> 0:06:07.320 other accounts. So other accounts that might be very well 0:06:07.360 --> 0:06:10.120 protected as far as passwords go, they could still be 0:06:10.200 --> 0:06:14.080 vulnerable because of this opt in feature. So really everyone's 0:06:14.120 --> 0:06:16.560 at fault. I guess a lot of victim blaming going 0:06:16.600 --> 0:06:20.200 around over at twenty three and me. But anyway, that's 0:06:20.520 --> 0:06:24.359 the update on that story. The Washington Post published an 0:06:24.440 --> 0:06:27.279 article with advice on what people can do if they 0:06:27.400 --> 0:06:30.760 are worried about the twenty three and me breach. The 0:06:30.839 --> 0:06:33.320 article also expanded a little bit on the attack itself. 0:06:33.360 --> 0:06:35.760 They said that the hacker was specifically calling out the 0:06:35.760 --> 0:06:39.280 fact that the breach included many Jewish people in it, 0:06:39.720 --> 0:06:43.560 and considering world events right now, that is particularly sinister, 0:06:44.120 --> 0:06:46.200 like that has an edge to it in my mind. 0:06:46.880 --> 0:06:49.880 The suggestions in the article include pretty much the same 0:06:49.880 --> 0:06:52.159 steps that twenty three and Me suggested. You know, select 0:06:52.200 --> 0:06:55.880 a unique, impossible to guess password for the service and 0:06:55.960 --> 0:06:59.360 for every other service. It should not be a password 0:06:59.440 --> 0:07:02.200 that you've used anywhere else, and the article goes on 0:07:02.279 --> 0:07:04.800 to suggest that users who are really concerned can ask 0:07:04.920 --> 0:07:08.000 twenty three and me to delete all information about you 0:07:08.120 --> 0:07:10.920 from their servers. It also points out that only a 0:07:10.920 --> 0:07:13.880 few states in the United States have laws that compel 0:07:14.040 --> 0:07:17.080 a company to follow through on those requests, and those 0:07:17.120 --> 0:07:21.280 states are California, Colorado, and Virginia, which leaves forty seven 0:07:21.320 --> 0:07:24.840 states that you know don't have a law that does that. 0:07:25.080 --> 0:07:31.120 But requesting the deletion within the service will then prompt 0:07:31.360 --> 0:07:34.400 them to send you a confirmation email, and then you 0:07:34.480 --> 0:07:37.280 have to, you know, click in the confirmation email to 0:07:37.320 --> 0:07:39.880 confirm that yes, you want all of your data delete it. 0:07:40.680 --> 0:07:43.920 And even then, twenty three and me will keep some 0:07:44.200 --> 0:07:48.520 information due to quote unquote legal and lab requirements. However, 0:07:48.680 --> 0:07:51.800 when asked to elaborate on that, twenty three and Me 0:07:51.960 --> 0:07:54.600 did not expound upon the nature of that data. So 0:07:54.640 --> 0:07:58.240 I don't know exactly what they do retain, but they 0:07:58.240 --> 0:08:02.320 do retain something, not truly that they delete all of 0:08:02.360 --> 0:08:05.840 the user data. The article also suggests that perhaps you 0:08:05.840 --> 0:08:10.040 should resist sharing genetic information in general, which you know, 0:08:10.240 --> 0:08:12.320 not very helpful because the cat is already out of 0:08:12.320 --> 0:08:15.400 the bag. Like I get it, like saying you shouldn't 0:08:15.400 --> 0:08:17.880 have done that, But you know what, saying you shouldn't 0:08:18.280 --> 0:08:21.400 have done that doesn't help anybody because the person who 0:08:21.400 --> 0:08:24.920 did it already knows they shouldn't have done it. It's 0:08:25.080 --> 0:08:27.559 just a whole superiority thing. It's one of my pet peeves. 0:08:27.600 --> 0:08:29.840 That's why I'm getting head up about it. Like the 0:08:29.960 --> 0:08:32.840 I told you so, nature doesn't It doesn't help anything. 0:08:33.240 --> 0:08:35.240 It just makes you look like a jerk. I know 0:08:35.320 --> 0:08:37.520 because I used to say it all the time and 0:08:37.640 --> 0:08:40.440 I was a jerk and some days I still am. Anyway, 0:08:41.480 --> 0:08:45.480 I also think sharing genetic information isn't a very good idea. 0:08:45.960 --> 0:08:49.160 But we also live in a world where companies are 0:08:49.320 --> 0:08:54.480 constantly conditioning us to share more information about ourselves, right, Like, 0:08:54.520 --> 0:08:57.720 that's what all of social media is predicated upon, is 0:08:57.840 --> 0:09:01.640 us sharing information about ourselves, and we kind of get 0:09:01.679 --> 0:09:03.760 a little reward for that by the way, people who 0:09:03.960 --> 0:09:07.439 you know, engage with the stuff we post, and in 0:09:07.520 --> 0:09:10.120 the meantime, all we're really doing is feeding the machine, 0:09:11.440 --> 0:09:14.880 which is a big ol' yuck. So yeah, I also 0:09:14.920 --> 0:09:17.720 don't think that you should share your genetic data on, 0:09:18.280 --> 0:09:21.280 especially on a platform that is, you know, publicly viewable. 0:09:22.160 --> 0:09:23.679 But I also think we all need to kind of 0:09:23.679 --> 0:09:26.240 take a step back on how much we're sharing online anyway, 0:09:27.000 --> 0:09:31.679 because what we're really doing is just you know, lining 0:09:31.720 --> 0:09:34.720 the pockets of these companies with lots of more, lots 0:09:34.800 --> 0:09:37.439 more money because they can advertise to us more effectively. 0:09:38.000 --> 0:09:40.360 But all right, that's enough soap boxing. Let's let's keep 0:09:40.400 --> 0:09:43.440 on going. Our next story might have you questioning what 0:09:43.600 --> 0:09:47.880 the I in CIA actually stands for. Now, for the record. 0:09:48.280 --> 0:09:51.760 The CIA is the central intelligence agency here in the 0:09:51.840 --> 0:09:54.760 United States. The main job of the CIA is to 0:09:54.800 --> 0:10:00.320 protect US national security, primarily through gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence. 0:10:01.000 --> 0:10:05.000 But anyway, earlier this month, the CIA included a link 0:10:05.520 --> 0:10:09.079 in its bio on x, you know, the service formerly 0:10:09.160 --> 0:10:11.960 known as Twitter, and the link was meant to take 0:10:12.040 --> 0:10:17.240 people to a CIA run channel on telegram uh And 0:10:17.320 --> 0:10:19.679 it was meant so that for people who have intelligence 0:10:19.720 --> 0:10:22.080 that is important to national security, they could have a 0:10:22.200 --> 0:10:26.120 secure and private way to contact someone at the CIA 0:10:26.800 --> 0:10:31.800 and share the information. So what you're supposed to do 0:10:31.960 --> 0:10:35.920 is use tour the tor browser and you clandestinely contact 0:10:35.920 --> 0:10:38.840 the CIA over the dark web. But there was a 0:10:38.880 --> 0:10:43.840 problem because the restrictions on biolink on x meant that 0:10:43.960 --> 0:10:47.080 when this was posted, the address for that telegram channel 0:10:47.320 --> 0:10:50.560 got cut off a bit, so, in other words, it 0:10:50.600 --> 0:10:54.040 was no longer the actual telegram channel for the CIA. 0:10:54.120 --> 0:10:57.240 If you were to try and go to that telegram channel, 0:10:57.600 --> 0:11:00.240 you would find that it went to an unclaimed channel, 0:11:00.360 --> 0:11:04.640 which meant someone could claim it and then pose as 0:11:04.679 --> 0:11:09.080 the CIA. A man named Kevin mcshehon noticed this problem 0:11:09.160 --> 0:11:12.440 and took the steps to register the channel before a 0:11:12.480 --> 0:11:15.320 malicious actor could do it. And he even posted a 0:11:15.360 --> 0:11:17.920 message that revealed that if you did go to that 0:11:18.000 --> 0:11:21.600 telegram channel, that it was not an official CIA channel 0:11:21.840 --> 0:11:25.560 and said do not share sensitive information with anyone, and 0:11:25.640 --> 0:11:29.640 he listed it both in English and in Cyrillic. The 0:11:29.720 --> 0:11:32.800 CIA has since addressed the problem by ensuring that the 0:11:32.840 --> 0:11:36.440 full address for the real telegram channel is appearing in 0:11:36.480 --> 0:11:39.800 the ex bio. And as I read about this in Motherboard, 0:11:40.160 --> 0:11:43.559 the title of the article suggests that the problem was 0:11:43.640 --> 0:11:46.439 due to a flaw in X, but I think I 0:11:46.480 --> 0:11:49.000 would be more inclined to wag by thinker at the 0:11:49.000 --> 0:11:52.880 CIA for not double checking that the address that appeared 0:11:52.920 --> 0:11:57.680 in the bio was in fact the correct one. So yeah, 0:11:57.720 --> 0:12:01.400 it may be because the limitation on bio length and 0:12:01.720 --> 0:12:05.440 X caused it to happen, But that seems like that's 0:12:05.440 --> 0:12:08.120 something you should triple check is correct before you just 0:12:08.200 --> 0:12:12.600 walk away. Okay, we've got other news stories to cover today. 0:12:12.640 --> 0:12:24.559 Before we get to that, let's take a quick break. Okay, 0:12:24.679 --> 0:12:28.320 So the media outlet New Scientist posted an article last 0:12:28.320 --> 0:12:31.800 week that I did not see until today, but I 0:12:31.800 --> 0:12:34.079 figure it's an important one to bring up because we're 0:12:34.120 --> 0:12:37.360 talking about security and hackers a lot. In today's episode, 0:12:38.080 --> 0:12:42.400 a cryptography expert named Daniel Bernstein, who works at the 0:12:42.600 --> 0:12:45.360 University of Illinois, Chicago, came forward to say that the 0:12:45.480 --> 0:12:50.320 US National Security Agency, the NSA, has been pushing to 0:12:50.440 --> 0:12:55.160 influence the adoption of standards related to post quantum cryptography, 0:12:56.000 --> 0:13:00.199 and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or nis T, 0:13:01.000 --> 0:13:06.480 refutes this accusation. So essentially, what Bernstein is saying is 0:13:06.480 --> 0:13:10.840 that the NSA wants to shape these standards, which would 0:13:10.920 --> 0:13:16.120 then weaken cryptography, because otherwise quantum cryptography could potentially be 0:13:16.240 --> 0:13:19.320 so strong that the NSA would not be able to 0:13:19.360 --> 0:13:23.240 crack it. And the NSA is all about reading stuff 0:13:23.360 --> 0:13:26.559 that you didn't intend the NSA to read. You might remember, 0:13:26.840 --> 0:13:29.480 the NSA has a pretty nasty track record of finding 0:13:29.480 --> 0:13:33.840 ways to intercept communications. This was a huge scandal like 0:13:33.880 --> 0:13:38.280 a decade ago, and that capability also led to abuse. 0:13:38.320 --> 0:13:42.719 I'm reminded of stories about how some people on NSA's 0:13:42.800 --> 0:13:46.240 staff would use these tools that were meant to do 0:13:46.320 --> 0:13:51.840 things like detect potential terrorists, cell communications, things like that, 0:13:52.160 --> 0:13:54.000 but they were using the tools to do stuff like 0:13:54.320 --> 0:13:58.160 snoop on people they knew, like an ex romantic partner 0:13:59.280 --> 0:14:03.560 and they're using these these government level surveillance tools for 0:14:03.600 --> 0:14:07.680 that kind of stuff, And you know that obviously wasn't 0:14:07.679 --> 0:14:10.240 the intended purpose for the tools. But it turns out 0:14:10.240 --> 0:14:13.560 a tool is only trustworthy if the person who's using 0:14:13.600 --> 0:14:17.320 it is also trustworthy, and people can be total jerkfaces. 0:14:18.120 --> 0:14:21.920 Bernstein maintains that the NIST is not being transparent when 0:14:21.920 --> 0:14:25.160 it comes to establishing these standards and that the consequences 0:14:25.160 --> 0:14:29.520 of this could be unreliable security measures moving forward. That 0:14:30.240 --> 0:14:33.360 you know, if the NSA essentially has the equivalent of 0:14:33.400 --> 0:14:39.360 a back door to get into these otherwise encrypted communication channels, 0:14:40.040 --> 0:14:42.800 that means other people could potentially find their way through 0:14:42.800 --> 0:14:45.320 those back doors too. It. Like I've always said, this, 0:14:45.960 --> 0:14:48.840 putting a back door into a security system means you 0:14:48.880 --> 0:14:52.360 no longer have a secure system, just full stop. Like, 0:14:53.160 --> 0:14:56.120 the whole point of creating a secure system is to 0:14:56.360 --> 0:14:59.560 not have ways for people to get in that aren't 0:15:00.080 --> 0:15:05.280 through specific checkpoints. So I still feel that way about this. 0:15:06.160 --> 0:15:09.760 Earlier this week, US Senator Michael Bennett sent a letter 0:15:09.800 --> 0:15:13.960 to Google, TikTok X, and Meta regarding how these platforms 0:15:14.000 --> 0:15:18.240 are handling the influx of misinformation in the wake of 0:15:18.280 --> 0:15:21.520 the war between Israel and hamas As. I'm sure you 0:15:21.600 --> 0:15:23.960 know there's been a surge in that kind of content 0:15:24.040 --> 0:15:27.720 across all of social media, and Bennett has accused the 0:15:27.800 --> 0:15:32.880 respective algorithms of these platforms of amplifying that signal and 0:15:33.120 --> 0:15:37.720 quote contributing to a dangerous cycle of outrage, engagement, and 0:15:37.840 --> 0:15:42.320 redistribution end quote. Bennett is seeking information on the policies 0:15:42.320 --> 0:15:47.240 and processes each platform follows to combat misinformation, though whatever 0:15:47.280 --> 0:15:50.400 those might be, they are clearly not sufficient, at least 0:15:50.400 --> 0:15:53.240 according to Bennett. In his letter, he writes, quote, the 0:15:53.360 --> 0:15:57.280 mountain of false content clearly demonstrates that your current policies 0:15:57.280 --> 0:16:02.600 and protocols are inadequate end quote. Bennett also criticized how Google, Meta, 0:16:02.640 --> 0:16:06.800 and X have all made cuts, sometimes drastic ones, to 0:16:06.840 --> 0:16:10.600 the various teams dedicated to detecting and removing disinformation and 0:16:10.680 --> 0:16:13.480 hate speech. While I feel the Senator is making some 0:16:13.600 --> 0:16:17.560 legitimate criticisms, I'm not sure what follow up there's going 0:16:17.600 --> 0:16:20.760 to be from all of this. If you are in 0:16:20.880 --> 0:16:24.480 New Zealand or the Philippines and you're not already on 0:16:25.080 --> 0:16:29.160 X formerly known as Twitter, pretty soon you're gonna have 0:16:29.200 --> 0:16:31.720 to pay admission if you do want to join, and 0:16:31.760 --> 0:16:34.680 that's because X is going to require a one dollar 0:16:34.880 --> 0:16:40.000 annual subscription fee for new users starting in those countries. Now, 0:16:40.080 --> 0:16:44.320 according to X, this is to discourage bot farms. Only 0:16:44.360 --> 0:16:47.120 by paying the fee will the account be able to 0:16:47.240 --> 0:16:50.720 post and interact with other posts. If you don't pay 0:16:50.720 --> 0:16:53.560 the fee, you can follow folks on Twitter and you 0:16:53.600 --> 0:16:56.480 can read posts on Twitter, but you can't interact with them, 0:16:56.600 --> 0:17:00.920 and you can't post anything yourself. So you might be asking, 0:17:00.960 --> 0:17:03.680 all right, well, they're starting in New Zealand and the Philippines, 0:17:03.680 --> 0:17:06.040 does that mean that's where all the bot farms are. No, 0:17:06.320 --> 0:17:09.399 It's just these are serving as a testing ground for 0:17:09.520 --> 0:17:13.160 this new policy, and then the thought is, assuming it works, 0:17:13.560 --> 0:17:18.000 that policy will roll out to other countries. Now, X 0:17:18.040 --> 0:17:21.200 says this is not intended to be a revenue generator, 0:17:21.680 --> 0:17:24.480 and I'm inclined to believe them. I mean, at one 0:17:24.760 --> 0:17:28.480 dollar per user per year, I think it's pretty fair 0:17:28.520 --> 0:17:31.600 to say that's not a revenue generator. Instead, what this 0:17:31.640 --> 0:17:33.960 is meant to be as a deterrent for people who 0:17:34.000 --> 0:17:38.120 want to run armies of spambots, because if they want 0:17:38.160 --> 0:17:40.560 all those spambots to be able to post and that's 0:17:40.600 --> 0:17:43.439 the only way that spambots are useful. Then they have 0:17:43.480 --> 0:17:46.360 to pay a dollar for every single one of those spambots. 0:17:46.400 --> 0:17:50.080 And if you're trying to coordinate a campaign that has 0:17:50.119 --> 0:17:53.440 thousands of spam bots, that's thousands of dollars out of 0:17:53.520 --> 0:17:56.200 your pocket to do it. So while I'm not crazy 0:17:56.240 --> 0:17:59.000 about this idea, I do think the strategy could potentially 0:17:59.080 --> 0:18:02.480 work for X and it doesn't put a hefty burden 0:18:02.680 --> 0:18:06.679 on most new users. Most folks can cough up a 0:18:06.920 --> 0:18:10.959 dollar for a year's subscription to being able to use Twitter, 0:18:11.359 --> 0:18:13.399 and if it means that it cuts back on the 0:18:13.440 --> 0:18:17.480 spam armies, then that's a good thing. So I often 0:18:17.560 --> 0:18:21.000 am very critical of X, but in this case, I 0:18:21.040 --> 0:18:26.040 think it might actually make sense switching gears, as it were, 0:18:26.400 --> 0:18:30.680 to a different elon Musk company Tesla held an earnings 0:18:30.680 --> 0:18:33.320 call this week, and Musk gave an update on the 0:18:33.480 --> 0:18:36.960 long delayed cyber truck. Now, we first heard about this 0:18:37.160 --> 0:18:40.879 concept way back in twenty nineteen, and since then a 0:18:40.920 --> 0:18:43.280 lot of people have put in a pre order for one, 0:18:43.320 --> 0:18:47.600 like a million customers have reserved a cyber truck, and 0:18:47.720 --> 0:18:49.800 it sounds like folks are going to have to keep 0:18:49.800 --> 0:18:52.160 on waiting. At least a lot of them are because 0:18:52.240 --> 0:18:55.960 Musk says that Tesla will start to deliver cyber trucks 0:18:55.960 --> 0:19:00.119 to customers beginning on November thirtieth, So that's good, but 0:19:00.200 --> 0:19:02.959 it will take quite a bit longer before Tesla can 0:19:03.080 --> 0:19:06.480 ramp up manufacturing to meet demand. In fact, Musk said, 0:19:06.520 --> 0:19:09.200 the goal is that they're hoping the company can get 0:19:09.280 --> 0:19:12.840 up to manufacturing two hundred and fifty thousand cyber trucks 0:19:12.880 --> 0:19:17.320 per year. That's not even likely to be reached until 0:19:17.359 --> 0:19:20.719 after twenty twenty four. And because you've got a million 0:19:20.720 --> 0:19:22.800 people who have put a reservation on the cyber truck, 0:19:23.080 --> 0:19:25.320 that means it's going to take several years before Tesla 0:19:25.359 --> 0:19:28.879 can even meet the demand of pre orders. And that, 0:19:29.200 --> 0:19:31.520 of course, that's assuming everybody wants to keep their pre 0:19:31.640 --> 0:19:34.359 order on their truck. But yeah, just because you have 0:19:34.359 --> 0:19:36.880 a pre order, it may mean you're still like three 0:19:36.960 --> 0:19:39.600 years out from being able to get your vehicle or more. 0:19:40.359 --> 0:19:43.480 Musk said that quote we dug our own grave with 0:19:43.560 --> 0:19:45.920 the cyber truck end quote. I think that was apparent 0:19:46.400 --> 0:19:49.159 when during a demonstration of how strong the cyber truck's 0:19:49.160 --> 0:19:54.320 windows are, they shattered the Windows anyway. During the call, 0:19:54.520 --> 0:19:57.119 Musk also gave a somewhat pessimistic view on where the 0:19:57.160 --> 0:20:00.560 global economy is going in general. Will also ways to 0:20:00.600 --> 0:20:03.320 bring down the price on Tesla vehicles. They said, we've 0:20:03.320 --> 0:20:05.560 got to get the costs to come down. And that 0:20:05.640 --> 0:20:08.400 makes sense because there are also a lot more auto 0:20:08.400 --> 0:20:12.800 companies that are making vehicles that now compete directly with 0:20:12.920 --> 0:20:17.120 the ones that Tesla manufactures. And it's not just Tesla. 0:20:17.560 --> 0:20:20.520 It's having to face a tough economy. Both Apple and 0:20:20.680 --> 0:20:26.240 Microsoft are seeing declines. There's a decline in MacBook shipments 0:20:26.359 --> 0:20:30.600 that one analyst has pointed to. Windows eleven adoption is 0:20:30.760 --> 0:20:34.240 trailing well behind what Windows ten did, So we're seeing 0:20:34.240 --> 0:20:37.960 these issues throughout the tech space. Okay, well, this brings 0:20:38.040 --> 0:20:39.720 us to the end of the episode. I do have 0:20:39.720 --> 0:20:42.280 a couple of article recommendations for you. First up as 0:20:42.320 --> 0:20:45.679 a piece from ap news dot Com titled Fuji's Rapper 0:20:45.800 --> 0:20:49.440 says lawyer's use of AI helped tank his case, pushes 0:20:49.440 --> 0:20:52.320 for new trial. I just think that's interesting. One, it's 0:20:52.359 --> 0:20:54.480 the Fuji is Two, it's not the first time we've 0:20:54.520 --> 0:20:57.760 heard how AI being used in a trial setting has 0:20:57.800 --> 0:21:00.840 not gone According to Plan. The other piece I recommend 0:21:00.960 --> 0:21:05.560 is by Emon Javers and Page Tortorelli of CNBC. That 0:21:05.600 --> 0:21:08.920 one's titled The Secret Life of Jimmy Jeong, who Stole 0:21:09.160 --> 0:21:14.800 and lost more than three billion dollars. That story involves cryptocurrency, 0:21:15.080 --> 0:21:19.359 stealing money from the Silk Road, living like a rock star, 0:21:20.320 --> 0:21:23.879 being the victim of a break in like it's got everything. 0:21:24.200 --> 0:21:27.960 There's also a documentary that CNBC has released called How 0:21:28.000 --> 0:21:30.720 To Steal and Lose more Than three Billion in Bitcoin. 0:21:31.400 --> 0:21:34.640 Both of those are well worth checking out. And that's 0:21:34.680 --> 0:21:37.439 it for this week. I will talk to you again 0:21:38.080 --> 0:21:47.880 really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more 0:21:47.920 --> 0:21:52.680 podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or 0:21:52.680 --> 0:21:58.480 wherever you listen to your favorite shows.