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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there,

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Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland.

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Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio. And how the tech

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Speaker 1: are you. It's time for the tech news for Thursday

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Speaker 1: October nineteenth, twenty twenty three, and we're going to start

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Speaker 1: off with some tech in national security concerns here in

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Speaker 1: the United States. So this week the Five Eyes Alliance

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Speaker 1: met at Stanford University to discuss matters of tech and security.

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Speaker 1: And you know, the Five Eyes Alliance sounds like something

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Speaker 1: out of you know, a Sherlock Holmes novel or maybe

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Speaker 1: Game of Thrones or something, but in fact, it's a

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Speaker 1: group that consists of representatives from the United States, the

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Speaker 1: United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. And they discussed

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Speaker 1: current and future threats to safety and innovation, and the

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Speaker 1: general consensus was that China is the largest threat in

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Speaker 1: that regard. The group cited instances of Chinese hackers infiltrating

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Speaker 1: computer systems, as well as of actual spies conducting industrial espionage,

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Speaker 1: and of various attempts to compromise business insiders, all in

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Speaker 1: an effort to steal intellectual property and tech secrets. Much

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Speaker 1: was made of the fact that China has an enormous

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Speaker 1: program centered on state backed hacking projects, a program that's

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Speaker 1: larger than all other nations combined in fact, and that

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Speaker 1: China has directed operatives to focus on emerging technologies, including

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Speaker 1: stuff like quantum computing and artificial intelligence. The representatives also

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Speaker 1: warned that the emergence of generative AI could help hackers

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Speaker 1: create more efficient attacks, making their efforts even more effective.

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Speaker 1: The meeting concluded with representatives warning the audience that this

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Speaker 1: is something all governments and businesses will need to be

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Speaker 1: aware of or else they will run the risk of

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Speaker 1: being caught unawares. Sounds like a real fun group. On

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Speaker 1: a related note, the US government has updated its export

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Speaker 1: rules and added restrictions on the types of processors that

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Speaker 1: companies are allowed to ship to China. As it stands,

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Speaker 1: big companies like AMD, Nvidia, and Intel are not allowed

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Speaker 1: to ship their high end processors to China unless they

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Speaker 1: first secure an export license from the US Department of Commerce.

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Speaker 1: That actually includes Nvidia's g Force RTX forty ninety graphics cards,

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Speaker 1: and I think most people would associate that with high

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Speaker 1: end computer gaming. But as we've seen, powerful GPUs could

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Speaker 1: be put to work doing all sorts of processing besides,

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Speaker 1: you know, making puddles of water all reflective in sessions

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Speaker 1: of call of duty or whatever. Further, the rules mean

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Speaker 1: that companies will not be able to rely on Chinese

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Speaker 1: manufacturing to make these products. And since a lot of

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Speaker 1: chip manufacturing, or the very least chip assembly, will take

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Speaker 1: place in China, that's going to push these companies to

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Speaker 1: pivot to find alternatives that in turn is likely to

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Speaker 1: impact the cost of production. And I think we all

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Speaker 1: know that that's probably going to mean for us down

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Speaker 1: the road that we're going to be paying higher prices

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Speaker 1: for these chips for ourselves in the products that we

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Speaker 1: were purchasing. China is not the only country that's on

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Speaker 1: the US's list of no nos when it comes to exports.

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Speaker 1: There's also the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Saudi Arabia.

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Speaker 1: All will require that companies first secure and export license

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Speaker 1: with the US Department of Commerce before they can legally

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Speaker 1: send those high performing chips to those destinations. A couple

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Speaker 1: of weeks ago, a hacker leaked stolen information from the

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Speaker 1: genetic testing company twenty three and meters, So according to

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Speaker 1: the company, the suspicion is the hacker used a technique

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Speaker 1: called credential stuffing, So that's when a hacker is able

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Speaker 1: to pull data from other breaches and then uses that

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Speaker 1: data to try and match user names and emails and

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Speaker 1: stolen passwords for other services and try combinations of them

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Speaker 1: so they can see if someone's used the same password

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Speaker 1: at multiple locations, which is why you should not do that.

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Speaker 1: Do not use the same password or even just a

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Speaker 1: small group of passwords for all of your services. You

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Speaker 1: should have a unique password for every single service, because

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Speaker 1: it's bad enough. If one of your accounts gets hacked,

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Speaker 1: that's terrible. It is a horrible hassle and it can

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Speaker 1: really have a negative impact on you and your livelihood.

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Speaker 1: But it can turn into a total disaster if it

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Speaker 1: turns out the now the people who did that attack

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Speaker 1: have the keys to all your stuff because you use

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Speaker 1: the same log in and password for everything. Well, now

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Speaker 1: that some hacker has done this again and the new

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Speaker 1: leak includes millions of data points about twenty three and

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Speaker 1: Me's customers, it's big news. The information covers around four

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Speaker 1: million people, and the hacker posted the information on a

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Speaker 1: forum known as a Hive of Scum and Villainy a

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Speaker 1: hacker forum, and it has the imposing name Beach Forums.

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Speaker 1: Trust me, it's scarier than it sounds anyway. The hacker

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Speaker 1: claims that the records include information on people from very

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Speaker 1: wealthy backgrounds. Twenty three and Me has informed users that

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Speaker 1: they should both update their passwords and also enable multi

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Speaker 1: factor authentication. According to tech Crunch, twenty three and meter

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Speaker 1: quote blamed the incident on its customers for reusing passwords

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Speaker 1: and an opt in feature called DNA relatives, which allows

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Speaker 1: users to see the data of other opted end users

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Speaker 1: whose genetic data matches theirs. End quote. So, in other words,

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Speaker 1: twenty three and Me is saying you should stop reusing

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Speaker 1: your passwords so much, you're the reason why this attack worked.

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Speaker 1: But they're also like, oh, and also, we have this

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Speaker 1: option in our service that if you turn it on,

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Speaker 1: means that hackers could potentially use your account to scrape

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Speaker 1: other accounts. So other accounts that might be very well

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Speaker 1: protected as far as passwords go, they could still be

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Speaker 1: vulnerable because of this opt in feature. So really everyone's

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Speaker 1: at fault. I guess a lot of victim blaming going

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Speaker 1: around over at twenty three and me. But anyway, that's

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Speaker 1: the update on that story. The Washington Post published an

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Speaker 1: article with advice on what people can do if they

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Speaker 1: are worried about the twenty three and me breach. The

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Speaker 1: article also expanded a little bit on the attack itself.

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Speaker 1: They said that the hacker was specifically calling out the

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Speaker 1: fact that the breach included many Jewish people in it,

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Speaker 1: and considering world events right now, that is particularly sinister,

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Speaker 1: like that has an edge to it in my mind.

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Speaker 1: The suggestions in the article include pretty much the same

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Speaker 1: steps that twenty three and Me suggested. You know, select

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Speaker 1: a unique, impossible to guess password for the service and

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Speaker 1: for every other service. It should not be a password

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Speaker 1: that you've used anywhere else, and the article goes on

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Speaker 1: to suggest that users who are really concerned can ask

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Speaker 1: twenty three and me to delete all information about you

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Speaker 1: from their servers. It also points out that only a

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Speaker 1: few states in the United States have laws that compel

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Speaker 1: a company to follow through on those requests, and those

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Speaker 1: states are California, Colorado, and Virginia, which leaves forty seven

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Speaker 1: states that you know don't have a law that does that.

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Speaker 1: But requesting the deletion within the service will then prompt

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Speaker 1: them to send you a confirmation email, and then you

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Speaker 1: have to, you know, click in the confirmation email to

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Speaker 1: confirm that yes, you want all of your data delete it.

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Speaker 1: And even then, twenty three and me will keep some

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Speaker 1: information due to quote unquote legal and lab requirements. However,

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Speaker 1: when asked to elaborate on that, twenty three and Me

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Speaker 1: did not expound upon the nature of that data. So

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Speaker 1: I don't know exactly what they do retain, but they

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Speaker 1: do retain something, not truly that they delete all of

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Speaker 1: the user data. The article also suggests that perhaps you

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Speaker 1: should resist sharing genetic information in general, which you know,

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Speaker 1: not very helpful because the cat is already out of

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Speaker 1: the bag. Like I get it, like saying you shouldn't

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Speaker 1: have done that, But you know what, saying you shouldn't

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Speaker 1: have done that doesn't help anybody because the person who

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Speaker 1: did it already knows they shouldn't have done it. It's

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Speaker 1: just a whole superiority thing. It's one of my pet peeves.

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Speaker 1: That's why I'm getting head up about it. Like the

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Speaker 1: I told you so, nature doesn't It doesn't help anything.

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Speaker 1: It just makes you look like a jerk. I know

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Speaker 1: because I used to say it all the time and

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Speaker 1: I was a jerk and some days I still am. Anyway,

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Speaker 1: I also think sharing genetic information isn't a very good idea.

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Speaker 1: But we also live in a world where companies are

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Speaker 1: constantly conditioning us to share more information about ourselves, right, Like,

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Speaker 1: that's what all of social media is predicated upon, is

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Speaker 1: us sharing information about ourselves, and we kind of get

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Speaker 1: a little reward for that by the way, people who

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Speaker 1: you know, engage with the stuff we post, and in

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Speaker 1: the meantime, all we're really doing is feeding the machine,

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Speaker 1: which is a big ol' yuck. So yeah, I also

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Speaker 1: don't think that you should share your genetic data on,

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Speaker 1: especially on a platform that is, you know, publicly viewable.

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Speaker 1: But I also think we all need to kind of

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Speaker 1: take a step back on how much we're sharing online anyway,

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Speaker 1: because what we're really doing is just you know, lining

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Speaker 1: the pockets of these companies with lots of more, lots

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Speaker 1: more money because they can advertise to us more effectively.

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Speaker 1: But all right, that's enough soap boxing. Let's let's keep

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Speaker 1: on going. Our next story might have you questioning what

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Speaker 1: the I in CIA actually stands for. Now, for the record.

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Speaker 1: The CIA is the central intelligence agency here in the

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Speaker 1: United States. The main job of the CIA is to

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Speaker 1: protect US national security, primarily through gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence.

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Speaker 1: But anyway, earlier this month, the CIA included a link

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Speaker 1: in its bio on x, you know, the service formerly

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Speaker 1: known as Twitter, and the link was meant to take

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Speaker 1: people to a CIA run channel on telegram uh And

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Speaker 1: it was meant so that for people who have intelligence

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Speaker 1: that is important to national security, they could have a

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Speaker 1: secure and private way to contact someone at the CIA

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Speaker 1: and share the information. So what you're supposed to do

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Speaker 1: is use tour the tor browser and you clandestinely contact

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Speaker 1: the CIA over the dark web. But there was a

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Speaker 1: problem because the restrictions on biolink on x meant that

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Speaker 1: when this was posted, the address for that telegram channel

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Speaker 1: got cut off a bit, so, in other words, it

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Speaker 1: was no longer the actual telegram channel for the CIA.

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Speaker 1: If you were to try and go to that telegram channel,

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Speaker 1: you would find that it went to an unclaimed channel,

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Speaker 1: which meant someone could claim it and then pose as

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Speaker 1: the CIA. A man named Kevin mcshehon noticed this problem

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Speaker 1: and took the steps to register the channel before a

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Speaker 1: malicious actor could do it. And he even posted a

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Speaker 1: message that revealed that if you did go to that

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Speaker 1: telegram channel, that it was not an official CIA channel

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Speaker 1: and said do not share sensitive information with anyone, and

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Speaker 1: he listed it both in English and in Cyrillic. The

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Speaker 1: CIA has since addressed the problem by ensuring that the

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Speaker 1: full address for the real telegram channel is appearing in

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Speaker 1: the ex bio. And as I read about this in Motherboard,

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Speaker 1: the title of the article suggests that the problem was

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Speaker 1: due to a flaw in X, but I think I

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Speaker 1: would be more inclined to wag by thinker at the

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Speaker 1: CIA for not double checking that the address that appeared

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Speaker 1: in the bio was in fact the correct one. So yeah,

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Speaker 1: it may be because the limitation on bio length and

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Speaker 1: X caused it to happen, But that seems like that's

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Speaker 1: something you should triple check is correct before you just

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Speaker 1: walk away. Okay, we've got other news stories to cover today.

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Speaker 1: Before we get to that, let's take a quick break. Okay,

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Speaker 1: So the media outlet New Scientist posted an article last

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Speaker 1: week that I did not see until today, but I

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Speaker 1: figure it's an important one to bring up because we're

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Speaker 1: talking about security and hackers a lot. In today's episode,

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Speaker 1: a cryptography expert named Daniel Bernstein, who works at the

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Speaker 1: University of Illinois, Chicago, came forward to say that the

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Speaker 1: US National Security Agency, the NSA, has been pushing to

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Speaker 1: influence the adoption of standards related to post quantum cryptography,

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Speaker 1: and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or nis T,

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Speaker 1: refutes this accusation. So essentially, what Bernstein is saying is

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Speaker 1: that the NSA wants to shape these standards, which would

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Speaker 1: then weaken cryptography, because otherwise quantum cryptography could potentially be

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Speaker 1: so strong that the NSA would not be able to

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Speaker 1: crack it. And the NSA is all about reading stuff

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Speaker 1: that you didn't intend the NSA to read. You might remember,

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Speaker 1: the NSA has a pretty nasty track record of finding

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Speaker 1: ways to intercept communications. This was a huge scandal like

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Speaker 1: a decade ago, and that capability also led to abuse.

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Speaker 1: I'm reminded of stories about how some people on NSA's

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Speaker 1: staff would use these tools that were meant to do

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Speaker 1: things like detect potential terrorists, cell communications, things like that,

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Speaker 1: but they were using the tools to do stuff like

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Speaker 1: snoop on people they knew, like an ex romantic partner

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Speaker 1: and they're using these these government level surveillance tools for

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Speaker 1: that kind of stuff, And you know that obviously wasn't

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Speaker 1: the intended purpose for the tools. But it turns out

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Speaker 1: a tool is only trustworthy if the person who's using

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Speaker 1: it is also trustworthy, and people can be total jerkfaces.

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Speaker 1: Bernstein maintains that the NIST is not being transparent when

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Speaker 1: it comes to establishing these standards and that the consequences

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Speaker 1: of this could be unreliable security measures moving forward. That

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Speaker 1: you know, if the NSA essentially has the equivalent of

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Speaker 1: a back door to get into these otherwise encrypted communication channels,

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Speaker 1: that means other people could potentially find their way through

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Speaker 1: those back doors too. It. Like I've always said, this,

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Speaker 1: putting a back door into a security system means you

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Speaker 1: no longer have a secure system, just full stop. Like,

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Speaker 1: the whole point of creating a secure system is to

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Speaker 1: not have ways for people to get in that aren't

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Speaker 1: through specific checkpoints. So I still feel that way about this.

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Speaker 1: Earlier this week, US Senator Michael Bennett sent a letter

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Speaker 1: to Google, TikTok X, and Meta regarding how these platforms

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Speaker 1: are handling the influx of misinformation in the wake of

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Speaker 1: the war between Israel and hamas As. I'm sure you

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Speaker 1: know there's been a surge in that kind of content

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Speaker 1: across all of social media, and Bennett has accused the

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Speaker 1: respective algorithms of these platforms of amplifying that signal and

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Speaker 1: quote contributing to a dangerous cycle of outrage, engagement, and

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Speaker 1: redistribution end quote. Bennett is seeking information on the policies

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Speaker 1: and processes each platform follows to combat misinformation, though whatever

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Speaker 1: those might be, they are clearly not sufficient, at least

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Speaker 1: according to Bennett. In his letter, he writes, quote, the

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Speaker 1: mountain of false content clearly demonstrates that your current policies

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Speaker 1: and protocols are inadequate end quote. Bennett also criticized how Google, Meta,

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Speaker 1: and X have all made cuts, sometimes drastic ones, to

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Speaker 1: the various teams dedicated to detecting and removing disinformation and

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Speaker 1: hate speech. While I feel the Senator is making some

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Speaker 1: legitimate criticisms, I'm not sure what follow up there's going

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Speaker 1: to be from all of this. If you are in

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Speaker 1: New Zealand or the Philippines and you're not already on

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Speaker 1: X formerly known as Twitter, pretty soon you're gonna have

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Speaker 1: to pay admission if you do want to join, and

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Speaker 1: that's because X is going to require a one dollar

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Speaker 1: annual subscription fee for new users starting in those countries. Now,

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Speaker 1: according to X, this is to discourage bot farms. Only

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Speaker 1: by paying the fee will the account be able to

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Speaker 1: post and interact with other posts. If you don't pay

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Speaker 1: the fee, you can follow folks on Twitter and you

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Speaker 1: can read posts on Twitter, but you can't interact with them,

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Speaker 1: and you can't post anything yourself. So you might be asking,

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Speaker 1: all right, well, they're starting in New Zealand and the Philippines,

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Speaker 1: does that mean that's where all the bot farms are. No,

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Speaker 1: It's just these are serving as a testing ground for

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Speaker 1: this new policy, and then the thought is, assuming it works,

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Speaker 1: that policy will roll out to other countries. Now, X

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Speaker 1: says this is not intended to be a revenue generator,

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Speaker 1: and I'm inclined to believe them. I mean, at one

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Speaker 1: dollar per user per year, I think it's pretty fair

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Speaker 1: to say that's not a revenue generator. Instead, what this

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Speaker 1: is meant to be as a deterrent for people who

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Speaker 1: want to run armies of spambots, because if they want

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Speaker 1: all those spambots to be able to post and that's

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Speaker 1: the only way that spambots are useful. Then they have

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Speaker 1: to pay a dollar for every single one of those spambots.

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Speaker 1: And if you're trying to coordinate a campaign that has

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Speaker 1: thousands of spam bots, that's thousands of dollars out of

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Speaker 1: your pocket to do it. So while I'm not crazy

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Speaker 1: about this idea, I do think the strategy could potentially

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Speaker 1: work for X and it doesn't put a hefty burden

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Speaker 1: on most new users. Most folks can cough up a

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Speaker 1: dollar for a year's subscription to being able to use Twitter,

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Speaker 1: and if it means that it cuts back on the

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Speaker 1: spam armies, then that's a good thing. So I often

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Speaker 1: am very critical of X, but in this case, I

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Speaker 1: think it might actually make sense switching gears, as it were,

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Speaker 1: to a different elon Musk company Tesla held an earnings

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Speaker 1: call this week, and Musk gave an update on the

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Speaker 1: long delayed cyber truck. Now, we first heard about this

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Speaker 1: concept way back in twenty nineteen, and since then a

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Speaker 1: lot of people have put in a pre order for one,

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Speaker 1: like a million customers have reserved a cyber truck, and

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Speaker 1: it sounds like folks are going to have to keep

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Speaker 1: on waiting. At least a lot of them are because

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Speaker 1: Musk says that Tesla will start to deliver cyber trucks

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Speaker 1: to customers beginning on November thirtieth, So that's good, but

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Speaker 1: it will take quite a bit longer before Tesla can

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Speaker 1: ramp up manufacturing to meet demand. In fact, Musk said,

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Speaker 1: the goal is that they're hoping the company can get

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Speaker 1: up to manufacturing two hundred and fifty thousand cyber trucks

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Speaker 1: per year. That's not even likely to be reached until

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Speaker 1: after twenty twenty four. And because you've got a million

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Speaker 1: people who have put a reservation on the cyber truck,

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Speaker 1: that means it's going to take several years before Tesla

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Speaker 1: can even meet the demand of pre orders. And that,

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Speaker 1: of course, that's assuming everybody wants to keep their pre

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Speaker 1: order on their truck. But yeah, just because you have

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Speaker 1: a pre order, it may mean you're still like three

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Speaker 1: years out from being able to get your vehicle or more.

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Speaker 1: Musk said that quote we dug our own grave with

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Speaker 1: the cyber truck end quote. I think that was apparent

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Speaker 1: when during a demonstration of how strong the cyber truck's

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Speaker 1: windows are, they shattered the Windows anyway. During the call,

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Speaker 1: Musk also gave a somewhat pessimistic view on where the

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Speaker 1: global economy is going in general. Will also ways to

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Speaker 1: bring down the price on Tesla vehicles. They said, we've

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Speaker 1: got to get the costs to come down. And that

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Speaker 1: makes sense because there are also a lot more auto

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Speaker 1: companies that are making vehicles that now compete directly with

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Speaker 1: the ones that Tesla manufactures. And it's not just Tesla.

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Speaker 1: It's having to face a tough economy. Both Apple and

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Speaker 1: Microsoft are seeing declines. There's a decline in MacBook shipments

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Speaker 1: that one analyst has pointed to. Windows eleven adoption is

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Speaker 1: trailing well behind what Windows ten did, So we're seeing

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Speaker 1: these issues throughout the tech space. Okay, well, this brings

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Speaker 1: us to the end of the episode. I do have

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Speaker 1: a couple of article recommendations for you. First up as

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Speaker 1: a piece from ap news dot Com titled Fuji's Rapper

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Speaker 1: says lawyer's use of AI helped tank his case, pushes

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Speaker 1: for new trial. I just think that's interesting. One, it's

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Speaker 1: the Fuji is Two, it's not the first time we've

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Speaker 1: heard how AI being used in a trial setting has

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Speaker 1: not gone According to Plan. The other piece I recommend

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Speaker 1: is by Emon Javers and Page Tortorelli of CNBC. That

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Speaker 1: one's titled The Secret Life of Jimmy Jeong, who Stole

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Speaker 1: and lost more than three billion dollars. That story involves cryptocurrency,

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Speaker 1: stealing money from the Silk Road, living like a rock star,

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Speaker 1: being the victim of a break in like it's got everything.

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Speaker 1: There's also a documentary that CNBC has released called How

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Speaker 1: To Steal and Lose more Than three Billion in Bitcoin.

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Speaker 1: Both of those are well worth checking out. And that's

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Speaker 1: it for this week. I will talk to you again

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Speaker 1: really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more

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Speaker 1: podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or

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Speaker 1: wherever you listen to your favorite shows.