Speaker 1: Hi everyone, I'm Kitty Kuric, and this is next question.
Speaker 1: As the war between Israel and Hamas enters its second month,
Speaker 1: nothing is certain, but even as we look forward to
Speaker 1: the end of this conflict, its origins have a lot
Speaker 1: to tell the world. The latest revelation comes from New
Speaker 1: York Times reporters Ronan Bergmann and Adam Goldman, reporting from
Speaker 1: Tel Aviv on the developing story of an Israeli intelligence
Speaker 1: failure that, if acted upon, may have stopped this war
Speaker 1: before it even began. Bergmann and Goldman have discovered that
Speaker 1: Israeli intelligence had Hamas's battle plan for October seventh in
Speaker 1: hand nearly a year before the attack. In this episode,
Speaker 1: they outlined the intelligence Israel had and when they had it.
Speaker 1: They also provide insightful analysis of how a threat like
Speaker 1: this could be dismissed as imaginary and what this grave
Speaker 1: misstep means for not only this conflict, but Israel's idea
Speaker 1: of itself in the larger world. Ronan, I know when
Speaker 1: you first started asking your sources within Israel's intelligence community
Speaker 1: about the attack, everyone told you they had quote no
Speaker 1: idea and were completely blindsided. In retrospect, do you believe
Speaker 1: they were telling the truth.
Speaker 2: Some of the WS some of them, I'm not sure.
Speaker 2: And this is also this almost spontaneous, immediate sort of
Speaker 2: admittal to a major failure. We're talking about maybe three
Speaker 2: thousand people preparing for a moment, and Israel doesn't know anything.
Speaker 2: So I started to think maybe the middle is too
Speaker 2: fast to hide another much more problematic truth. I don't
Speaker 2: want to say that, I don't believe how I know
Speaker 2: that there was no deliberate hiding of information that could
Speaker 2: bring Israeli force us to be ready for this horrific attack.
Speaker 2: At the end, this will take the lives of many,
Speaker 2: and of course those who are in charge of the
Speaker 2: Israeli defense establishment and the intelligence community, they already took
Speaker 2: responsibility and said that when this is over, I mean
Speaker 2: the war is over, they will conclude, they will come
Speaker 2: to the conclusions, which in Israel in Hebrew means they
Speaker 2: will resign. But it's not going to be the first
Speaker 2: time that things that happened, that signs were not interpreted
Speaker 2: in the right way. So to say nothing came through
Speaker 2: our channels, it's embarrassing. It means that this intelligence officer
Speaker 2: or agency admit they had nothing The coverage was not right,
Speaker 2: not accessing the right places in Hamas, But to admit
Speaker 2: that there were signs that were not regarded as signs
Speaker 2: for preemptive attack, that's more embarrassing.
Speaker 1: Ronin not long after those initial conversations began, you started
Speaker 1: hearing stories about the existence of something called the email
Speaker 1: threat with the Southern Command and a woman who got
Speaker 1: it right. Can you explain what you started to hear
Speaker 1: circulating about those things?
Speaker 2: So this story is taking place mainly in something called
Speaker 2: Unit eight two hundred. That's the biggest, one single unit
Speaker 2: in the Israeli defense establishment. It's bigger than MOSAD. These
Speaker 2: really foreign intelligence agency, or she'd bet the is really
Speaker 2: domestic intelligence agency that are more famous. But this is
Speaker 2: just one unit of military into religious is the equivalent
Speaker 2: to the American and issae of the British GCHQ in
Speaker 2: charge of the collection of singand sigular intelligence and cyber intelligence.
Speaker 2: If there is an expectation that Israeli intelligence would bring
Speaker 2: an alert, would bring sufficient intelligence to notify Israeli leaders
Speaker 2: that the creative strike from the enemy's coming, it's mainly
Speaker 2: on the shoulders of this Unit eight two hundred, and
Speaker 2: something was happening there.
Speaker 1: So this very elite group of Israeli intelligence officials, military
Speaker 1: intelligence officials started to get word that something was going on, Adam,
Speaker 1: can you explain what the email thread with the Southern
Speaker 1: Command and the woman who got it right was.
Speaker 3: Well, I believe in July of this summer, this veteran
Speaker 3: AMAS analyst who had spent her career studying a mo
Speaker 3: she knew the voices on the walkie talkie, she knew
Speaker 3: the families, intimate details of the people who she would
Speaker 3: eavesdrop on. She had learned that there was a belive
Speaker 3: a training exercise two months prior, and so she came
Speaker 3: to the conclusion, based on her expertise and her knowledge
Speaker 3: of the people involved in the training and some of
Speaker 3: the things they did in the training, that this was
Speaker 3: no longer in fact a training exercise. It was the
Speaker 3: last moment of preparation for these particular Nuukba or Hamas commandos.
Speaker 1: And this was in July, Adam. And in this thread, Ronan,
Speaker 1: she also said the drill is quote in complete overlap
Speaker 1: with a forty page document called Jericho Wall. Tell me
Speaker 1: about that document.
Speaker 2: She just said, it's incomplete overlap with Jericho Wolves. Was
Speaker 2: just the word. This term Jericho Wall repeats itself throughout
Speaker 2: the thread, and it's clear that this is a code
Speaker 2: name for something else, for something that happened before this thread,
Speaker 2: for something that is the reference to everything she says
Speaker 2: in order to prove her point in the debate that
Speaker 2: follows her email with seeing most senior officers.
Speaker 4: So what is jericho wall ronin?
Speaker 2: So this is what I was trying to find out.
Speaker 2: Bottom line, Jericho Wall is the code name for a
Speaker 2: copy of around forty pages of Hamas Attack Order. It
Speaker 2: was obtained more than a year before October seventh, during
Speaker 2: twenty twenty two. It's a top secret Hamas document that
Speaker 2: details how to destroy how to break through the front,
Speaker 2: the southern israelly front, the Gaza is really border in,
Speaker 2: fix different places and smuggle through this dispatch through those
Speaker 2: holes in the fence some two thousand Hamas gunmen. Now,
Speaker 2: just to give a proportion, Israel believed this is why
Speaker 2: this document was regarded as they called it a compass
Speaker 2: to building of the force, meaning where Tamas wants to
Speaker 2: be in its competence and capabilities, where not the reflection
Speaker 2: of where Hamas was. This is the core of Israeli
Speaker 2: failure to anticipate what happened.
Speaker 1: We have to take a quick break, and then Ronan
Speaker 1: and Adam will share more context and details about Jericho
Speaker 1: Wall's origins and purpose. If you want to get smarter
Speaker 1: every morning with a breakdown of the news and fascinating
Speaker 1: takes on health and wellness and pop culture, sign up
Speaker 1: for our daily news wake up call by going to
Speaker 1: Katiecuric dot com. And we're back with Ronan Bergman and
Speaker 1: Adam Goldman of The New York Times. So Jericho Wall
Speaker 1: was a Hamas document outlining how it would wage an
Speaker 1: attack an invasion of Israel. When was that discovered?
Speaker 3: Well, it's by understanding that dating back years, Israel had
Speaker 3: versions of that document, and I think the last most
Speaker 3: updated document they got was in mid twenty twenty two.
Speaker 3: I think one way to think of the Jericho Wall
Speaker 3: document is to think of the D Day invasion of Normandy.
Speaker 3: That's what that was.
Speaker 4: It was a blueprint basically with.
Speaker 3: An invasion blueprint. Like I said, I imagine it is
Speaker 3: the invasion of Normandy. It's the break through the wall.
Speaker 3: The Jericho Wall is the Jerusalem Wall. It's literally a
Speaker 3: battle plan to break through the wall or the fortifications
Speaker 3: Israel had a massed around the.
Speaker 4: Gossars trip Ronan.
Speaker 1: The report was meticulously detailed in terms of its knowledge
Speaker 1: of Israeli security and defense information. How do you believe
Speaker 1: Hamas was able to have access to such critically important information?
Speaker 4: That?
Speaker 2: I think the first question I had when I read
Speaker 2: that a few weeks ago. It's such a detailed information
Speaker 2: that I believe at least part of that dealing with
Speaker 2: the exact nature location of all the different fortification israll
Speaker 2: put on the wall, the town, they cell phone towers,
Speaker 2: the fortress with the automatic controlled machine guns, the communication hubs,
Speaker 2: the cameras that drop everything.
Speaker 4: How did they know all this?
Speaker 2: Some of that clearly does not come from open media,
Speaker 2: open sources, or the social network, or even a gardener,
Speaker 2: a palaestinan garden that went to work in one of
Speaker 2: the keeble seamen maybe well possibly was recruited by Ramas.
Speaker 2: This is a question, maybe a task for our further reporting.
Speaker 2: I assume that this is also one of the questions
Speaker 2: that Israeli authorities are dealing with now. But it's not
Speaker 2: just the intelligence, but how the intelligence is translated into
Speaker 2: a detailed plan of attack with the aim of breaking
Speaker 2: the fence, letting hundreds of teams of Ramask gunmen storm through,
Speaker 2: each one with a different plan to a different location.
Speaker 2: Would the first location be the division headquarters in the Inn.
Speaker 2: This is the base from where they control the whole front.
Speaker 2: All of that done at the same time when power
Speaker 2: glides and drones are sent over to explode those towers
Speaker 2: and communication hubs, when a massive bombardment of motors at
Speaker 2: missiles and rockets is rained all over to create diversion.
Speaker 2: All of that create intelligence and operational folk to the
Speaker 2: extent that it took many hours until the idea if
Speaker 2: sad Koman in Central Kouman realized what was happening, Adam.
Speaker 1: How many people knew about this forty page document? For example,
Speaker 1: was Netanyahu aware of it? Were other top political leaders
Speaker 1: aware of it?
Speaker 3: I'll let run and speak to that. But I would
Speaker 3: also add one of the keys to success for Hamas
Speaker 3: was ensuring that few people within Hamas's senior ranks knew
Speaker 3: about that. And it's clear only a handful of people
Speaker 3: within hamas its most senior ranks signore the leader Mohammed
Speaker 3: diff These people, basically the shure of Hamas knew about that.
Speaker 3: In fact, today I was at a very sensitive briefing
Speaker 3: with the Israeli intelligence and they they themselves believed that
Speaker 3: very few of the people who the fighters who were
Speaker 3: actually sent to Israel knew what was going to happen
Speaker 3: that day, and they only learned about it within the
Speaker 3: first few hours of the attack.
Speaker 1: So you're saying it was a very small circle of
Speaker 1: Hamas leadership that had access to this highly sensitive information.
Speaker 3: Part of the plan was using deception and surprise. They
Speaker 3: knew they had to deceive the Israelis into thinking that
Speaker 3: they were not going to attack, and of course they
Speaker 3: needed the element of surprise to do that, and they
Speaker 3: succeeded on both fronts. And that's because they kept the
Speaker 3: circle small. Right is they used to say in World
Speaker 3: War Two, loose lips sink ships. Right, So they had
Speaker 3: the discipline to ensure that their plans didn't leak. Though
Speaker 3: to Israel's credit, they had the plans and ronan how
Speaker 3: many people knew of this blueprint?
Speaker 1: Bb net and Yahoo top political leader who was aware
Speaker 1: that this existed.
Speaker 2: So again this is another question we are looking at,
Speaker 2: but clearly this is from many documents that we review.
Speaker 2: The top leadership of the military and the intelligence community
Speaker 2: where part of the loop who saw the document back
Speaker 2: in twenty twenty two. This was not hidden from anyone,
Speaker 2: This was not disregard. It was wrongly analyzed. That's the mistake.
Speaker 2: This state was shown and it's you know, and that mistake,
Speaker 2: though very hard to measure, has also these same scenes,
Speaker 2: bad scenes of failure that led to the Yoki puh
Speaker 2: blunder fifty years and a day before October seventh, vanity hubris,
Speaker 2: feeling or certainty that the enemy is just uncapable and
Speaker 2: stupid to perform strategic deception. And it's unbelievable how much
Speaker 2: similarities we don't at the time, but how many, how
Speaker 2: many similarities there are between those two fists.
Speaker 1: Not only that, but I know, Adam, you've compared it
Speaker 1: to the intelligence failure that preceded nine to eleven. Do
Speaker 1: you think that really is an accurate parallel? It was
Speaker 1: hubris that really led to it or was it a
Speaker 1: lack of communication? I mean, how do you see these
Speaker 1: two things comparing?
Speaker 3: They have a few things in common. One is that
Speaker 3: nine to eleven wasn't a failure of intelligence collection, right,
Speaker 3: nine to eleven was a failure of imagination, like the Americans,
Speaker 3: like the Israelis, had developed information that al Qaida was
Speaker 3: going to attack the US. President Bush was made aware
Speaker 3: of that in August of two thousand and one. I
Speaker 3: think the title of the membo that went down and
Speaker 3: the President's dailian briefing was blinking red, right. So it
Speaker 3: wasn't a failure of collection. They knew they needed to know.
Speaker 3: But there was a lack of urgency and a.
Speaker 1: Lack of communication among agencies. I mean, I covered that,
Speaker 1: and I remember that was the big thing, that none
Speaker 1: of these people were talking to each other.
Speaker 3: The big blunder was the FBI was only told later
Speaker 3: that to al Qaeda operatives. Midhart Hamsey had actually entered
Speaker 3: the United States, putting the FBI on their heels, right
Speaker 3: and reacting whether they had to find them and then
Speaker 3: figure out what they were doing. You know what seems
Speaker 3: to be, and we don't know this for sure, is
Speaker 3: that I think Israeli authorities think that there were Palestinian
Speaker 3: workers on the ground in Israel collecting intelligence, so imagine
Speaker 3: midharn Hamsey, but you know many more midharn Hamsey's and
Speaker 3: Israel was gathering the work for Hamash right under the
Speaker 3: noses of the shin Bet, which is the equivalent of
Speaker 3: the FBI. You know, I also think that Israeli intelligence,
Speaker 3: at least it seems at this point that it was
Speaker 3: effected by confirmation bias, and confirmation bias can be deadly.
Speaker 3: We saw it happen on January sixth, right with the insurrection,
Speaker 3: right with the sacking of the capitol. There are many
Speaker 3: many red flags that were apparent to the FBI, which
Speaker 3: is in charge of thwarting domestic terrorists in this country.
Speaker 3: And at the end, it's sort of like Hamas the
Speaker 3: FBI didn't think that anything would happen, and these people
Speaker 3: were going to do exactly what they did, and they
Speaker 3: had forecasted even though it was only rhetoric. So I
Speaker 3: think they're parallels too with j six and what happened here,
Speaker 3: though obviously less fatalities.
Speaker 1: Ronan, can you elaborate on some of the wrong analysis
Speaker 1: that happened with all these warning signs, because I know
Speaker 1: you've written about others as well. So you have this
Speaker 1: senior female intelligence analyst raising concerns, you have this Jericho
Speaker 1: Walls forty page document that's a blueprint, what other factors
Speaker 1: Ronan were at play that made Israeli officials not take
Speaker 1: these threats seriously.
Speaker 2: There are three main reasons for the failures. The first
Speaker 2: one was a total misunderstanding of intent. Israel thought that
Speaker 2: Jeja Sinumar, that the leader of Hamas is they said
Speaker 2: contained or detered and in any case, is looking for
Speaker 2: sort of a ceasefire. He's not looking to esculate, he's
Speaker 2: not looking for all out war. Just five days before
Speaker 2: this happened, in a public radio interview, the National Security
Speaker 2: Advisor to Letaniao said Hamas has learned the lesson from
Speaker 2: the previous rounds of hostilities with Israel. The Cutteries were
Speaker 2: mediating between Israel and Hamas, and I would say not
Speaker 2: just Israel and Hamas. Caamas is an anxiety leadership based
Speaker 2: in Doha in Kato, but it was the Israelis knew
Speaker 2: that the cutterarist are calling Sinuar to get his approval
Speaker 2: to reduce the violence of oblos close to the border
Speaker 2: in exchange for Israel giving more working permits inside Israel.
Speaker 2: Working permits meaning money coming from Israel to Gaza. That
Speaker 2: means a lot of people dependent on money from Israel.
Speaker 2: Israel thought all of that as a very good sign.
Speaker 2: Even that analyst she said, what I'm saying is not imminent.
Speaker 2: She accepted the point of view that there's no clear
Speaker 2: indication of intent to launch that attack. The other one is,
Speaker 2: of course a total misjudgment of their capabilities, which we discussed,
Speaker 2: and the third one is not having any reliable intelligence
Speaker 2: any signs suggesting that Hamas is going to attack at
Speaker 2: that day. The first sign was received at half past
Speaker 2: Bidnet in the night between the six and the seven.
Speaker 2: It led the chief of Shibat deployed Takila is the
Speaker 2: secret unit, that is u Okuda, Jervis and unit. But
Speaker 2: because everybody thought that Haramaskn only deployed two teams of
Speaker 2: up to seventy, they sent te Quilla that can confront
Speaker 2: up to two teams. But we're talking about an all
Speaker 2: out invasion to Israel. It's not a rain, it's war.
Speaker 2: And so or that together just created this unbelievable fiasta.
Speaker 1: You say the senior intelligence officer, the woman didn't think
Speaker 1: it was eminent, but when she was told this plan
Speaker 1: was imaginary, she responded by saying, quote, I utterly refute
Speaker 1: that this scenario is imaginary. It is a plan designed
Speaker 1: to start a war. It's not just a raid on
Speaker 1: a village. So while she might not have believed it
Speaker 1: was imminent, she obviously believed it was extremely serious.
Speaker 2: And she expressed with a very clear and shock wards
Speaker 2: replying to that officer, which she might interpret it as
Speaker 2: a little bit chauvinistic or you know, paternalism, he said, basically,
Speaker 2: Hamas doesn't have the capability to execute Jericho Wohl. She said, no,
Speaker 2: I am the one who monitored Hamas and military exercise.
Speaker 2: It's serious. They do have the capabilities. She was she
Speaker 2: to call it, but the only ones that realized Hamas
Speaker 2: narrowed the gap between what it could do and Jericho Wohl.
Speaker 2: And now Hamas is capable, though they didn't know if
Speaker 2: it's happening, but it's capable of launching this massive, horrenderous
Speaker 2: invasion into Israel.
Speaker 1: When we come back more with Ronan and Adam about
Speaker 1: how these intelligence failures happened, and we're back with Ronan
Speaker 1: Bergman and Adam Goldman of the New York Times, Do
Speaker 1: either of you think sexism might have played a role
Speaker 1: in this, because a lot of people that I've spoken
Speaker 1: with said, you know, it was because it was a woman,
Speaker 1: her concerns were dismissed.
Speaker 3: Well, there had been stories in the Israeli media about
Speaker 3: women who were on the border and observation post running balloons,
Speaker 3: who were dismissed. And in fact, you know, I got
Speaker 3: an email from somebody after our story ran too, you know,
Speaker 3: basically accused as well of sexism. You know, there's another
Speaker 3: parallel with the CIA and al Qaeda was zero dark thirty. Yeah,
Speaker 3: it was zero dark thirty. And you know this intelligence
Speaker 3: analyst who worked for eighty two hundred at the end
Speaker 3: of the day, she had a strong hunch based on
Speaker 3: her expertise, right, she couldn't articulate to her bosses, who
Speaker 3: would then after artic to the leadership of the IDF
Speaker 3: and the country. You know, Nan Yahoo that an attack
Speaker 3: was imminent. Right, But if you look what happened in
Speaker 3: zero dort thirty, it was a woman, right, It was
Speaker 3: women who drove the reporting on al Qaeda in and
Speaker 3: it was a woman Maya, I know her real name.
Speaker 3: She drove this reporting on bin Laden where he might be.
Speaker 3: And let's remember that was essentially a hunch, right, there
Speaker 3: was you know, there was a guy they didn't see.
Speaker 3: They thought he was tall, and there was a courier
Speaker 3: right who was close to bin Laden who was working,
Speaker 3: but they never knew Ben Lauden was there, right. But
Speaker 3: I think the difference here with Israel is that she
Speaker 3: had an advocate, and her advocate was the director of
Speaker 3: the CIA, and the director of the CIA, Liam Panetta,
Speaker 3: pushed this. I think it was Panetta who who gave
Speaker 3: a fairly optimistic rating. What did he say? There was
Speaker 3: a ninety percent chance that bin Laden was in that
Speaker 3: compound and because she had she had an advocate like
Speaker 3: liamp Panetta, that raid got done. It doesn't happen without
Speaker 3: the big boss. And I'm not sure this woman who
Speaker 3: Israeli media described to me had those type of advocates.
Speaker 3: And when you look at the email chain, you don't
Speaker 3: see that, right. They describe what she says as imaginary.
Speaker 3: And you know, Ronan has made a great point. It's
Speaker 3: not that they dismissed this, It's not that they didn't
Speaker 3: take this seriously. Imagine the time and effort Israel invested
Speaker 3: in me getting these plans. This is a serious intelligence operation.
Speaker 3: Even get your hands on these plants. And one of
Speaker 3: the officials acknowledged in the email chain there was some
Speaker 3: gold in here, right, But at the end of the day,
Speaker 3: she didn't have a strong enough advocate who went to
Speaker 3: the leadership of AIDF and said, listen, at a minimum,
Speaker 3: we need to lose some forces to the border, right.
Speaker 4: Gronan, Have you met with her at all?
Speaker 2: No? No, No, she's an active duty non officer commander.
Speaker 2: She cannot meet with journalists. But I think the tragedy
Speaker 2: here is that she goted rights. I'm sure that parts
Speaker 2: of this email exchange will end up in the pages
Speaker 2: of the inquiry investigation panel that will be established to investigate.
Speaker 2: The tragedy is that it was left in the capsule
Speaker 2: of few analysts and few officers up to the rank
Speaker 2: of the connelly. None of those took that as other
Speaker 2: indicated and said, okay, let's write a memo, let's take
Speaker 2: it to someone more senior. And this was just left
Speaker 2: sort of in the air of this thread with no
Speaker 2: further investigation to substantiate it or dis orbit.
Speaker 1: Well, it sounds to me that Israel was lulled into
Speaker 1: a false sense of security by these other factors that
Speaker 1: were transpiring, sort of more soft intelligence, kind of a
Speaker 1: sense that Hamas was either incompetent or had been less adversay.
Speaker 2: They thought Hamas Sinua included, is more interested in being
Speaker 2: the governor of the states mostly but the state, the
Speaker 2: Gaza Strip, taking care of the water, the electricity, the
Speaker 2: health services, and not jeopardizing everything they already achieved with
Speaker 2: all out war with Israel because they those don't work together.
Speaker 1: You know, Hamas was obviously much more sophisticated militarily but
Speaker 1: also psychologically in terms of the signals they were sending
Speaker 1: Adam to Israeli intelligence about their intentions.
Speaker 3: It was a grand deception plan and as I said,
Speaker 3: they needed to pull off. The deception. Part of this
Speaker 3: is essentially a false flag. You know, they gave a
Speaker 3: false they were providing false signals to Israel and Israel
Speaker 3: bottom and you know, Sineoir as somebody said somewhre out
Speaker 3: Israeli the israelis right and studied his adversary and was
Speaker 3: incredibly patient. And you know, as I said earlier today,
Speaker 3: I was at a military base with a unit that
Speaker 3: exploits information or documenting computers found on the battlefield, and
Speaker 3: we were able to look at that information and it
Speaker 3: was extraordinary. The amount of preparation that they put into
Speaker 3: this attack was really really, really extraordinary, and it shows
Speaker 3: a level of patients that these people had to pull
Speaker 3: this off.
Speaker 1: Ronan, You've said that Israel got completely enchanted by the
Speaker 1: elaborate security measures in the wall that separated Gaza and Israel.
Speaker 1: Did that add to this false sense of security with
Speaker 1: no doubts.
Speaker 2: Together with two other colleagues, Markmzeediet the Patrick Kings League,
Speaker 2: The New York Times reported what happened after the fence
Speaker 2: was erected. No, this is the fence that goes a
Speaker 2: few meters above ground, one hundred meters that's very deep underground.
Speaker 2: It was directed mainly to stop Hamas from building, from
Speaker 2: digging tunnels underground into Israel. This was for years was
Speaker 2: the main fear, the main concern from Israel, and it stopped,
Speaker 2: but it forced Hamas to be more sophisticated, more robust,
Speaker 2: and instead of going underground which is hidden, going above ground,
Speaker 2: which is overt everybody can see, and being much more sophisticated.
Speaker 2: But the Israelis thought that the defense with all the
Speaker 2: different electronics and robots and drones and submachine guns, control
Speaker 2: from afar and camera, this is invincible. And it made
Speaker 2: the Israeli say military sleepy, lose their sharpness, not waking
Speaker 2: every morning as they did every morning for years at
Speaker 2: five o'clock, because this is the time. Between five and seven,
Speaker 2: they knew that there's a morning fall, don is coming,
Speaker 2: the sun is in the eyes of the Israelis. This
Speaker 2: is when Hamas attacks and guess what they attacked at
Speaker 2: six thirty five, and the Israelis many of the soldiers
Speaker 2: were killed in their sleep. And everybody who knows Ramasi
Speaker 2: this is like, this is inconceivable, it's inbearable. They did
Speaker 2: not follow protocol. Defence made them think that they.
Speaker 1: Don't need When all is said and done, how do
Speaker 1: you believe these revelations and your reporting will impact the
Speaker 1: Israeli intelligence infrastructure and the way it's run and the
Speaker 1: people in it.
Speaker 2: Look, everybody understand that in the second time, or fifty
Speaker 2: years after to the day, is really intelligence failed to
Speaker 2: supply exactly what it was established for. And it's not
Speaker 2: just about some kind of you know, exotic alert from
Speaker 2: the secret world. It led to the brutal violation of
Speaker 2: the contract of the agreement between Israel, the state and
Speaker 2: the Jewish people, which is to supply a security and
Speaker 2: safety that Holocaust style days will not repeat itself. This
Speaker 2: is a major watershed moment in the history of the
Speaker 2: country and the Jewish people, and the intelligence community is
Speaker 2: going to rebuild some parts of it, I'm sure, with
Speaker 2: some hopefully mechanism that would make sure that this doesn't happen.
Speaker 2: It's going to take the resignation of the leaders of
Speaker 2: the military and the intelligence. Unlike Prime Minister Natanielle, they
Speaker 2: said already that they take full responsibility and they in
Speaker 2: other words, we will resign. This will go for a
Speaker 2: very thorough investigation and re establishment of some of the
Speaker 2: main agencies and expertise to make sure this is the
Speaker 2: last of those of those as disastered.
Speaker 4: Adam, do you think net Yahoo is toast?
Speaker 3: You know, many of Israelies have asked me what I think,
Speaker 3: and my response is, but I don't know. They believe
Speaker 3: that Nannaho is toast. But you know, I just came
Speaker 3: from a country, United States, which saw the former president
Speaker 3: of the United States indicted for seditious conspiracy. Right He's
Speaker 3: accused of basically trying to overthrow the government, and now
Speaker 3: he is the leading GOP candidate and could potentially president
Speaker 3: of the United States again. So excuse me if I
Speaker 3: feel little contrary in these days.
Speaker 1: Well, gentlemen, Ronan Bergman and Adam Goldman, you all are
Speaker 1: really kind to spend this time with me. Thank you
Speaker 1: so much, and keep us posted. I'm sure we're going
Speaker 1: to be reading developments as this story evolves, and it
Speaker 1: would be great if one day you could talk to
Speaker 1: this woman v And actually, do you think that just
Speaker 1: would never happen?
Speaker 2: Ronan, No, I'm finding what positivits will.
Speaker 3: I've tried to speak with Maya, She's not interested.
Speaker 1: But you're right, there are some uncanny similarities between their stories,
Speaker 1: except for, as you said, no one advocating for her
Speaker 1: at a higher level.
Speaker 4: Well, gentlemen, thank you both so much. I really appreciate it.
Speaker 4: Thank goodness, Thank you Gay, Thanks for listening. Everyone.
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