Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news.
Speaker 2: Okay, here's what we're gonna do worldwide an incrassination. It's
Speaker 2: not going to be Oh Trump, what do we do that?
Speaker 2: The Washington Post with a nice treatment this morning, thinking
Speaker 2: of Ian Bremer is maybe it was the first G
Speaker 2: two summit where there was some form of equalization in
Speaker 2: the United States and China. What we're going to do here,
Speaker 2: which a lot of people don't know, is how did
Speaker 2: we get here? And I doam mean Kissinger is sitting
Speaker 2: in the piece hotel in Shanghai, are on the way
Speaker 2: to Beijing. And for all of US fossils the shock
Speaker 2: of seventy two and Nixon with US Robert Hormats. Some
Speaker 2: people talk, other people do ew and Winston Lord got
Speaker 2: this going back then there had to be literally like
Speaker 2: Columbus looking over the horizon. Tell us about what Winston Lord,
Speaker 2: with your assistance on economics, Ambassador, what was the shaning
Speaker 2: I communicate like to jump start this new Asia US
Speaker 2: and nexus.
Speaker 1: It's a great question, and I wrote a piece about
Speaker 1: it in Foreign Affairs to document this. The goal at
Speaker 1: that point was to try to make the relationship more normal,
Speaker 1: to deal with a whole series of problems that had
Speaker 1: been built up over twenty five years of no communication,
Speaker 1: no trade, no investment. And of course the key issue
Speaker 1: on the minds of both the Chinese and the Americans
Speaker 1: was Taiwan and Joe and Lai, who was the Premier
Speaker 1: of China, who was their negotiator, and Henry Kissinger, who
Speaker 1: was Nixon's negotiator, and both formidable people on their own,
Speaker 1: decided they would need some compromise language and the Shinghai
Speaker 1: Declaration that still is the centerpiece of China US relations
Speaker 1: on that issue was worked out between the two of them,
Speaker 1: and that opened the way to a building up of confidence.
Speaker 1: And then after that we came up with a few
Speaker 1: economic issues that we can use to normalize relations, to
Speaker 1: increase trade incrementally, and it built from there. But it
Speaker 1: was trust and confidence and precise planning. And we're critical
Speaker 1: to this and trust.
Speaker 2: Which of course the Trump administration is wonderful just because
Speaker 2: of time, and Paul wants to get in here with
Speaker 2: some real questions. I've got to ask you, this President
Speaker 2: g seems to venerate the pre chow in like China.
Speaker 2: He wants to go back to Mao, he wants to
Speaker 2: go back to a more rigid, tougher China. When you
Speaker 2: see the turmoil with their defense leaders, their generals, they're admirals.
Speaker 2: When you see just the clock ticking, is there any
Speaker 2: chance President g can pull back and become more like
Speaker 2: the China Robert Hormance.
Speaker 1: New Well, I think he's I know him quite well
Speaker 1: because I've worked with him since he was the party
Speaker 1: secretary and Jujuan Proms in the nineties. He's a very
Speaker 1: methodical person and he does sort of venerate Mao, but
Speaker 1: he also realizes Mao had a number of issues that
Speaker 1: made him controversial. But there are two parts of the
Speaker 1: Mau background that are extremely important to understand. Mao made
Speaker 1: one point that we've been bullied by the foreigners over
Speaker 1: the last one hundred years, and we're not going to
Speaker 1: be bullied again, and she is very much of the
Speaker 1: view that that must be a critical part of China's
Speaker 1: strategy to be invulnerable to bullying or pressure or leveraged
Speaker 1: by the foreigners. The second is that Mao understood and
Speaker 1: she understands that the fall of the Soviet Union was
Speaker 1: in part because they did not have a lot of
Speaker 1: trading partners. They were confined to very few products that
Speaker 1: they produced and of very few countries to sell them too.
Speaker 1: And she Jinpain was going to make sure that China
Speaker 1: had a broad range of trading partners and had a
Speaker 1: very diversified economy and therefore could not be leveraged by
Speaker 1: the United States or anyone else. Those were really two
Speaker 1: key points that he draws from the mal period and
Speaker 1: the fall of the Soviet Union. And let me matter
Speaker 1: make one other point follows up your point, Tom, and
Speaker 1: that is, if we learned anything from this summit, it
Speaker 1: is that for the first time and nearly one hundred years,
Speaker 1: the US has a peer competitor, a peer competitor on
Speaker 1: military issues, political issues, technology issues, and economic issues and
Speaker 1: appear both in scale and in skill. We have If
Speaker 1: we didn't know that before, we know it now.
Speaker 2: Involve David Weston had a brilliant insight I think it
Speaker 2: was yesterday or the day before on how we were
Speaker 2: back in the time of Robert Hormance and there's a
Speaker 2: whole new China out there is.
Speaker 3: So, Bob, what is some of your takeaways or what
Speaker 3: are some of your takeaways from this President Trump, President
Speaker 3: g I guess we call it a summit here I'm
Speaker 3: not sure what was really accomplished, but what are your takeaways?
Speaker 1: Well, my takeaway is that Trump came to understand that
Speaker 1: China is a pure competitor, unlike any we have seen
Speaker 1: for as I say, in early one hundred years. The
Speaker 1: second is that China does business negotiates in a very
Speaker 1: different way Trump Trump came in with a great deal
Speaker 1: of flattery of she Chinese do not necessarily take the flattery.
Speaker 1: And she came in with a very crisp agenda and
Speaker 1: was particularly crisp on Taiwan. And I think it was
Speaker 1: because he had picked up and the Chinese authorities had
Speaker 1: picked up that there was a lot of pressure in
Speaker 1: Washington on Trump to in effect give away a little
Speaker 1: bit on Taiwan, to move closer to the Chinese position
Speaker 1: on Taiwan. But also so the people in Washington wanted
Speaker 1: a statement or something that was clear that said we
Speaker 1: would we would toughen up our support for Taiwan. And
Speaker 1: she wanted to make sure that that issue did not
Speaker 1: arise and that the United States did not use this
Speaker 1: summit to make any statements that were pro Taiwan or
Speaker 1: gave Taiwan additional power in terms of at least verbal
Speaker 1: support from the United States. Trump she wanted to avoid that.
Speaker 1: That's why he made the statement very early on, don't
Speaker 1: mess around with Taiwan.
Speaker 3: Yeah, the first two readouts of the first day were
Speaker 3: very different. President Trump brought a planeload of American CEOs
Speaker 3: over to Beijing. Here. Do you think Beijing as wants
Speaker 3: to do business with the US with the West? Here?
Speaker 1: Yes, I think that they realized that they have a need.
Speaker 1: They see a lot of companies looking for new supply
Speaker 1: chains diversifying away from China.
Speaker 4: Yep.
Speaker 1: They want to make sure that they don't that that
Speaker 1: does not continue. And therefore, I think it was smart
Speaker 1: to bring those CEOs. And every one of them has
Speaker 1: the potential to make a deal that can actually enhance
Speaker 1: our capability and maybe their's the problem. Has a lot
Speaker 1: of them encounter a lot of complex difficulties on regulatory issues,
Speaker 1: intellectual property issues.
Speaker 2: So they're killing me about hormone, says I'm going to
Speaker 2: interrupt here. So we brought over a bowtload of billionaires.
Speaker 2: See you there were what's the shoes of the white soles.
Speaker 2: They're all decked out in the Laura Piano shoes. Hormance
Speaker 2: would be called dead notes. We didn't take Nicholas.
Speaker 4: Burns, we didn't take William Burns, we didn't take Robert Ormantz,
Speaker 4: we didn't take the detritus of James Baker out of
Speaker 4: Rice University. Can we rebuild your world at state?
Speaker 1: Not in the way we're doing it now. If you
Speaker 1: look at the number of diplomats who Trump took over
Speaker 1: relative to the number of CEOs he took over, the
Speaker 1: latter vastly outnumbered the former. And I think that China
Speaker 1: is a matter of building trust, and China trusts a
Speaker 1: few people who've worked on China, not that they always
Speaker 1: agree with them, but there are a lot of There
Speaker 1: are several diplomats and Nick Burns is certainly one. I
Speaker 1: think I'm another, and there's several others who have a
Speaker 1: long history with China. I think he would have done
Speaker 1: well to consult with those people and bring them over
Speaker 1: to show continuity with the China, the knowledgeable people about
Speaker 1: China from the past, not necessarily to agree with them,
Speaker 1: but that would be a way.
Speaker 4: I got to run.
Speaker 2: Can we do a once a month thing with you?
Speaker 2: Can your people talk to my people so we can
Speaker 2: figure out it once a month?
Speaker 1: Yeah,